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

AT GRAVELOTTE.

CASSELL'S

HISTORY OF THE WAR

BETWEEN

FRANCE AND GERMANY,

1870-1871.

VOLUME I.

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

CASSELL'S ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY
OF THE
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

CHAPTER I.

First Causes of the Franco-German War—Ancient Antagonism of the Celtic and Teutonic Races—The Wars between France and Prussia in the Time of Napoleon I.—Development of the idea of German Unity—The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and its Results—French Jealousy and Attempts at a Rectification of Frontiers—The French and Prussian Military Systems—The Emperor Napoleon III. and Count Bismarck—The Prince of Hohenzollern and his Candidature for the Spanish Crown—Opposition of the French Government—Rapid Growth of the War Feeling—Negotiations—Interview of M. Benedetti with the King of Prussia at Ems—Rupture between France and Prussia—Enthusiastic Demonstrations in both Countries—Statements of the Emperor and the King—Adhesion of the South German States to the Cause of Prussia—Despatch of French Troops to the Frontier—Departure of the Emperor for the Seat of War—Effect of the Outbreak of War on Opinion in England—Alleged Secret Treaty between France and Prussia—Explanations of the Two Powers—New Treaty for Securing the Independence of Belgium.

We must seek for the first causes of the Franco-German war in very remote times, and among influences far removed from those by which the present generation is surrounded. The history of the antagonism between Celt and Teuton is nearly, if not quite, as old as the history of Christianity. The two great races of north-western Europe have been in collision for ages over a large extent of territory; and, by some remarkable ethnological law, it generally happens that the Teuton is the victor. This animosity has been exhibited in a striking degree between the French and German peoples Both powerful, haughty, and warlike, they have always been prone to dissension, and quick to seek in open hostilities the assuagement of their mutual jealousy. Occupying neighbouring lands, they have unfortunately possessed no clearly-defined natural boundaries, such as might be in themselves actual barriers against mutual cupidity or aggressiveness. The two races are less separated than confused and mixed along the boundary line—a circumstance which has given constant occasion for disputes, fo onquests, for annexations, and for re-annexations. Towards Italy and towards Spain, France is boldly lefined and as effectually guarded; but towards Germany she has no such advantages. The frontier rovinces have accordingly changed masters several ies, as the fortunes of war or the stratagems of lomacy favoured one great Power or the other; l the result has been a mongrel race and a mixed lect, endless heartburnings and perpetual incen- es to war. The chief object of contention is possession of the Rhine. The Germans have ays maintained that this is solely a German river. e French, on their part, have long coveted the bank of that noble stream as their frontier vards the east. We, who are completely en- cled by the sea, are hardly capable of sym- hising with the anxieties and aspirations of wers whose limitations are weak, wavering, and certain; and for this reason we sometimes attribute simple greed what may spring from an instinct self-defence.

Not to penetrate too deeply into first principles, wever, we may say that the more immediate use of ill-feeling between France and Germany to be found in the conquest of Prussia by the at Napoleon in 1806, and in the part subse- ently taken by the Northern Power in effecting downfall of that potentate. Henceforth there e bitter memories between the two countries— mories of recent date, and incapable of being tened or moderated. France lost no opportunity taunting Germany with the humiliation which naparte had caused her to endure; and Germany orted with allusions to the victory of Leipzig and occupation of Paris. Körner, and Arndt, and herous other German poets, composed fervid gs, breathing the national hatred against the nch; and when, in 1841, France evinced a dis- ition to go to war with Prussia, Arndt wrote a song, in which occurs a passage foreshadowing e of the features of 1870:—

> "My own Fatherland, my brave Germany, on!
>   We'll sing them a terrible strain,
> Of what ages ago their vile policy won—
>   Of Strasburg, and Metz, and Lorraine.
> They shall hand it all back to the uttermost mite,
> Since for life or for death they compel us to fight.
> So shout, 'To the Rhine, cross the river, advance!
> All Germany, on, into France!'"*

t was in the period following the French invasion 806 that the idea of German unity first became ssion in the hearts of all Germans who desired e considered patriotic. This idea was an ad- nal stimulant to French jealousy, and all parties rance agreed in opposing it. The increasing strength of Prussia, and the successful issue of the war with Denmark which resulted in the seizure of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864—a war in which Prussia was certainly the prime agent, though acting in conjunction with Austria—intensified the French feeling of antagonism; and when the brief struggle between Austria and Prussia, in 1866, terminated in the utter discomfiture of the former, and the creation of a powerful North German Confederation under the absolute sway of the latter, who also retained undivided possession of the Danish Duchies, the rage and mortification of France nearly precipitated a collision. The Emperor Napoleon would probably have gone to war at once, but that he knew his armies were not in a condition to cope with the conquerors of Sadowa. He would not have had to wait long for a pretext. By the Treaty of Prague, concluded between Austria and Prussia on the termination of the war of 1866, it was agreed by Prussia, at the desire of France, that the new German Confederation, which was to replace the former Bund meeting at Frankfort, was only to include the German States north of the river Main, the other States being at liberty, if they pleased, to form a South German Confederation. In a few months, however, Prussia came to an agreement with the South German Governments for effecting certain unifications in matters of commerce, taxation, and other details; and, what was more important, concluded conventions with those Governments, obliging them to adopt any quarrel of Prussia's arising out of recent events, and to place military contingents of great strength at the absolute disposal of the Prussian monarch. This was certainly an evasion, if not a positive infraction, of the Treaty of Prague. It created general dissatisfaction in France, and all men saw that the Emperor had been outwitted by Count Bismarck, and that the military supremacy of the country was imperilled. The undertaking to restore to Denmark the northern part of Schleswig, the population of which is undoubtedly much more Scandinavian than German, had also been disregarded.

To these public excuses for a rupture, had the Emperor chosen to avail himself of them, others of a private nature might probably have been added. It is very generally believed that, in the interview which took place at Biarritz between the French Emperor and Count Bismarck, shortly before the war of 1866, an understanding was come to with reference to territorial compensation, in some direction, being granted to France in case the struggle with Austria should result in the material aggrandisement of Prussia. If any such promise was ever made by the Prussian Minister, it was

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certainly broken; for when the Emperor, in August, 1866, sought to obtain from Prussia a certain portion of the Rhenish lands which France actually possessed in the time of the first Napoleon, but of which she was deprived by the treaties of 1815, the reply was that any rectification of frontiers was totally inadmissible.

In the spring of 1867 a difference arose between France and Prussia on the subject of the Prussian occupation of Luxemburg, which was admitted by Count Bismarck himself to have no legal basis after the dissolution of the old German Bund; and the two countries were on the very brink of war, when terms of accommodation were agreed to at the Conference held in London. Both Count Bismarck and the Emperor Napoleon had cause to desire a postponement of hostilities. The former wished to consolidate the union of the North German States, to overcome the lingering jealousy of the South, and to introduce still further improvements into the military system of the country; the latter knew that it was imperative to augment and reorganise his army.

Early in 1868 a Bill was carried through the French Chambers (not, however, without considerable opposition and some modifications), which raised the forces, nominally, to 800,000 men. To these were added some 400,000 National Guards Mobile. The term of service was increased from seven years, according to the settlement of 1832, to nine years, or nine years and a half, counting from the period when the recruit is first marked for service. The rate of recruiting per annum was fixed at 100,000 men, selected by conscription; the proportion of which to the population is about one to every 370. The nine years of service were divided, as regards 70,000 of the 100,000, between five years passed under the regimental colours, and four years in a general reserve, called the second reserve. The remaining 30,000 were enrolled into the first reserve, and were not required to perform any military service during peace, except five months' drill in each of the first two years. At the commencement of a war, however, they were to be the first taken to bring up the regular regiments to their proper war strength The National Guards Mobile were to continue in arms for five years, and to undergo a moderate amount of drilling; and in war time they were to be employed in garrison duty, in guarding communications, or in furnishing reinforcements to the field army. The Mobile Guards, however, were not called out for training until the early days of the war; and hence, when they were most wanted, they were found of little use. for lack of knowledge.

The organisation of the Prussian or North German army is thus described by a military critic in the *Quarterly Review* of October, 1870:—"The population numbers about thirty millions. The number of recruits annually raised by conscription is 100,000; or one to every 300 of the population. The age of conscription is twenty. The period of military service is twelve years, divided into three portions of three, four, and five years respectively; three years being passed by the recruit with the colours of a regular regiment; the next four years in the regimental reserve; and the final period of five years in the Landwehr or militia of his district, after which he is enrolled in the Landsturm, or service for home defence in case of invasion. All men who attain the age of conscription in any one year, and are not drawn for the army, are exempt from military service except in case of war. The regiments of the regular army during peace are, on the breaking out of war, raised to double their number by recalling an equal number of men from the reserve; and each reserve man so recalled returns not merely to the same battalion, but even to the very same company in which he had passed the first three years of his military life." It will be seen that the effect of these provisions is to create a nation of disciplined soldiers.

Such were the military systems existing in France and Prussia at the commencement of the year 1870. The two men who, respectively, had the direction of these stupendous powers, and could precipitate them into war, or restrain them within the bounds of peace, were the Emperor Napoleon and Count Bismarck; for the King of Prussia must be regarded as practically subordinate to his able and ambitious Minister. The Emperor had for many years been regarded as the arbiter of Continental Europe. He had humbled Russia in 1856; he had conquered Austria in 1859; by a series of brilliant victories, comprised within a few weeks, he had contributed largely to the emancipation of Italy, and he was for some time described as the champion of oppressed nationalities. Belonging to a new dynasty, and being the child of popular suffrages, he always presented himself to the world as a democratic instead of a divine right sovereign. It cannot be denied that for many years he had the support of the immense majority of the French people, however much the literary classes, and the artisans of Paris and other large towns, were disinclined to forget the violence and illegality of the *coup d'état*. The people, in the widest sense of the term, had given him a bill of indemnity for the irregularity of that act, and it was not without warrant that Louis Napoleon spoke to Europe in the name of France. The period of his greatest prosperity and influence was from 1854 to 1863. France flourished at home, and was universally respected abroad. The wars in the Crimea, Italy, and China, restored to her that high rank as a military power which had been prejudiced since the days of Waterloo; and the development of wealth in the country itself, consequent on the apparent security of the social state, made the Empire popular with all but a minority. Some disappointment, however, was created in 1863 by the Emperor withholding from war with Russia, on behalf of the insurgent Poles—an abstention which is said to have been caused by his inability to get England to join him. Again, in 1864, he somewhat compromised his fame by declining to help the Danes against Austria and Prussia; but it was not until the German war of 1866, and the utter ruin of his Mexican project in 1867, that any serious inroad was made on the security of Louis Napoleon's position as the leader of the French people. In the one case it was evident that he had been baffled and defied. In the other, his armies stood before men's eyes as incapable of contending against the semi-savage hordes of Mexico, and as retiring from the New World at the somewhat peremptory requisition of the President of the United States. It was equally clear, moreover, that the unfortunate Archduke Maximilian had been abandoned in the terrible position into which he had been brought by the French Emperor himself; and when the consequent insanity of the Archduchess, and the ultimate military execution of her husband, became known, it is no wonder that Frenchmen felt ashamed, remorseful, and angry, and that the reputation of Louis Napoleon received a wound from which it never recovered. The progress of time was also showing more and more clearly every year the defects of the Imperial system. Opposition was becoming marked and wide-spread, and the old supporters of the Empire were dying one by one. The Emperor had wisely conciliated the reasonable members of the Liberal party by a series of voluntary reforms, which, beginning cautiously in 1860, terminated in the really radical changes of September, 1869, by which the Sovereign divested himself of most of his dictatorial attributes, and established, with some limitations, what is generally understood by Parliamentary Government. Doubtless, one of the motives for this transformation was the failing health of the Emperor, and his natural desire to lighten the responsibilities of his son and heir when the time should come for his assuming the reins of power. But there were other reasons too. The elections of the early summer had shown an immense increase in the demand for reform, while, at the same time, the easy suppression of the attempts at revolution in Paris had proved that the bases of the Empire were yet firm and unassailable. The installation of the Liberal Government of M. Emile Ollivier on the 2nd of January, 1870, looked like the commencement of a new era, of a very different nature to that which we have seen. One of the conditions of M. Ollivier was that there should be no German war.

For some years before the breaking out of the war of 1870, Count Bismarck had been regarded as the only formidable rival of the French Emperor. He passed the early period of his life in the army, and afterwards, in the Diet of the province of Saxony, distinguished himself by his opposition to Liberal ideas. In 1851 he was appointed to the Frankfort Legation, and subsequently represented Prussia at the courts of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Paris. It was not until September, 1862, that he reached the height of power by becoming President of the Prussian Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The King was at that time engaged in a struggle with Parliament with reference to the military administration; and Bismarck supported the arbitrary designs of his master with such energy, ability, and determination, that he made them completely successful against the strenuous opposition of the Chambers, which he browbeat and insulted to an extent that has had few parallels in history. The reorganisation of the army having been effected in accordance with the ideas of the King and his Minister, the wars with Denmark and Austria followed in due course. The name of Bismarck became famous as that of the most powerful, the most arbitrary, the most subtle, and the most successful, of European statesmen; and it appeared but too likely that he and the French Emperor would come into collision.

Of King William I. of Prussia it is sufficient to say that when he assumed the crown on the 18th of October, 1861, he spoke of himself as ruling "by the favour of God, and no one else;" that he is a man of strong religious feeling, of the somewhat Puritan North German order; that he has always inclined to arbitrary ideas of government; and that, as a young officer, he was present with the Prussian army of occupation in Paris in 1815. When the war of 1870 commenced, the King of Prussia was seventy-three years of age, the Emperor Napoleon sixty-two, and Count Bismarck fifty-seven.

The position of the two nations towards one another may be concisely defined. The one was an Empire long compacted into a unity of great strength and equal renown; the other was an aggregation of separate States, possessing a very homogeneous population, but otherwise loosely and precariously held together. It will be seen what effect the chances of war had upon both these Powers.

The standing irritation between France and Prussia was perpetually inflamed by the violent writing of the press of both countries; but the *plebiscitum* of May, 1870, by which Louis Napoleon sought a popular ratification of his constitutional changes, was recommended to the suffrages of the peasantry and trading classes by the argument that a more Liberal Government would strengthen the hands of the Emperor in the maintenance of peace. The immense majority which was obtained on the affirmative side showed the preponderating disinclination to war. It is indeed probable that Napoleon III. had at that time no hostile designs. We have seen that the Mobile National Guards were not called out by him; and the progress of the war soon showed that his army was far from a state of preparation. He had but recently effected some small reductions, and had proposed to Prussia, but without success, a mutual disarming. It should be added, however, that France continued to manufacture chassepôts and mitrailleuses at a great rate. The intentions or anticipations of King William are more uncertain. In the months of May and June, 1870, he had met the Emperor of Russia at Ems. Count Bismarck and Baron Brunow were present at these interviews, and it has been supposed by some that a scheme for provoking France into war was then determined on. Of this, however, there is no proof.

At the commencement of July, 1870, the prospects of war, which had long harassed the repose of Europe, seemed to have faded away. A profound peacefulness had apparently settled upon the nations; and on Lord Granville succeeding to the Foreign Office on the death of Lord Clarendon, he was told by Mr. Hammond, the permanent Under-Secretary—a gentleman of long and large experience—that he had never seen so great a lull in foreign affairs, and that he knew of no important question with which his Lordship would have to deal. This was about four o'clock in the afternoon of Tuesday, the 5th of July. Two hours later, Lord Granville received a telegram stating that the crown of Spain, rendered vacant by the revolution of September, 1868, had been offered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, who had signified his readiness to accept it. On the following day, M. de Lavalette, the French Ambassador in London, informed the new Minister of the same fact, adding that a great indignity had been offered to France, and that the Emperor was determined not to allow the project to be carried out.

The news of this contemplated arrangement was first rumoured in Paris on the 4th of July, and it immediately created considerable excitement. On the 5th, the Council of Spanish Ministers formally and unanimously resolved to offer the crown to the Prince. On the 6th, the Duke de Gramont, the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in the Corps Législatif, in answer to a question, that the Government did not believe that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliged them to suffer a foreign Power, "by placing a Prince upon the throne of Charles V., to disturb the European equilibrium to their disadvantage, and thus to imperil the interests and the honour of France." The Duke's speech was violent and injudicious in its tone, and certainly went far towards committing the nation to a hostile policy, and provoking the antagonism of Germany. It is not easy to see how the election of the Prince of Hohenzollern to a merely ceremonious throne, under a constitution which secured all real power to the Legislative Body, could have augmented the influence of Prussia, or imperilled that of France. The argument commonly advanced by Frenchmen, that France is weakly guarded towards Prussia, and that, in consideration of the growing strength of that Power, and its known aggressiveness, some greater protection is needed, has certainly more force and applicability.

It must be admitted that there are some facts which do not tell to the credit of Prussia. As far back as March, 1869 (as we learn from the official despatch of the Duke de Gramont, issued, on the 21st of July, 1870, to the diplomatic representatives of France in foreign countries), the idea of placing a prince of the House of Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain was mentioned to M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, who was immediately instructed to inform Count Bismarck that France would never allow a Prussian prince to reign beyond the Pyrenees. The Count is said to have replied that the French Government had no reason to feel uneasy about a combination which he himself regarded as impracticable; and it is added that when, subsequently, M. Benedetti showed some incredulity, and pressed for further assurances, the Under-Secretary for War at Berlin, in the temporary absence of Count Bismarck, pledged his word of honour that the Prince of Hohenzollern was not, and could not become, a serious candidate for the crown of Spain. To this statement, it is true, a denial was given by Count Bismarck and by Baron Thiele, the Under-Secretary for War; but the denial was of a somewhat evasive and guarded character, apparently not covering the whole period in question; and the Duke de Gramont reiterated his original statement, at the same time quoting from a despatch of M. Benedetti, written at the time, in which the assertion of Baron Thiele was specifically reported. It would therefore appear that Prussia knew that the elevation of a Prussian prince to the throne of Spain would lead to war with France; yet it is certain that the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern had the secret support of King William and his Prime Minister.*



WILLIAM I., KING OF PRUSSIA.

The Prince who gave rise to this terrible convulsion is the eldest son of the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who, some twenty years before, had abdicated his sovereign rights in favour of his relative, the King of Prussia. The son is married to the sister of the King of Portugal, and was thirty-five years of age at the commencement of the war.

It is to be feared that very little can be said for either France or Prussia in the conduct of the negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities. The manner of France was peremptory and arrogant; the explanations of Prussia were evasive and insincere. The Berlin Government at first denied that it had had any concern in the matter; but the King afterwards admitted to M. Benedetti that he had authorised the candidature—not as King, but in his private capacity as head of the House of Hohenzollern, though he acknowledged that he had kept Count Bismarck informed of the various phases of the negotiations. When Prince Leopold was advised by his father to decline the offer of the Spanish crown, the King approved of this course, but again only in his private capacity. The Prince withdrew; but there had been so much secresy in the candidature, and there was now so much appearance of subterfuge in the mode of renouncing it, that France, with some show of reason, though in a questionable manner, required of the King, on the 13th, to promise that, if the candidature were

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* See Appendix i., Vol. II., p. 537, "The Origin of the War."



PRUSSIAN UHLAN.

at any time revived, "he would interpose his authority, and prevent that course." M. Benedetti made this request to the King on the promenade of Ems, a pleasant watering-place where his Majesty was then staying. "The King," said M. Benedetti in his despatch on the subject, "absolutely refused me his authorisation to transmit any such affirmation. I strongly persisted, but without succeeding in modifying his Majesty's determination. The King terminated our conversation by telling me that he could not and would not enter into any such engagement, and that it was his duty, in this as in every other eventuality, to reserve to himself the power of being ruled by circumstances." The account given in the official Prussian journal, the *Staats Anzeiger*, was substantially to the same effect as this. M. Benedetti afterwards endeavoured to obtain another audience of the King personally (there had already been two); but his Majesty, by the mouth of an aide-de-camp, refused to grant it, saying that no further reply was necessary, and that all negotiations must pass through the hands of the Cabinet. M. Benedetti then demanded permission to leave the country, which of course was at once granted. Great indignation was excited in France by the statement that the refusal of King William to grant a further audience to M. Benedetti was immediately communicated by the Prussian Government to the various Cabinets of Europe, and that at the same time the Prussian Ambassador at Paris, Baron Werther, received orders to take leave of absence. These acts, however, were afterwards explained by the Prussian Government as being in the regular course of things, and as having no special significance or offensive character. The result of the conversations with M. Benedetti was simply communicated, in the form of a telegram, to the German Government, and to the North German Ministers at some non-German courts, for their information; and Baron Werther had only temporarily left Paris, entrusting the conduct of affairs to Count Solms-Sonnenwalde. It was also stated by Count Bismarck, on the authority of a despatch from the Prussian ambassador at Paris, that the French Government required a letter of apology from the King. The Count considered this demand so ridiculous that he did not lay the despatch before his Majesty.

The withdrawal of Prince Leopold was known in Paris on the 12th; and the funds, which had gone down very low at the prospect of war, rose with a bound. M. Ollivier stated to a knot of members in the lobby of the Corps Législatif that the question was at an end; but the assurance was afterwards rather tartly repudiated by the Foreign Minister, who told the House not to heed the gossip of the lobbies. The result of the interview on the 13th between the Prussian monarch and M. Benedetti effected a great change in public sentiment. When M. Ollivier made his statement to the Corps Législatif on the 15th of July, and concluded with words which were tantamount to a declaration of war (the formal declaration was not made at Berlin until the 19th), a scene of immense excitement ensued. The great majority of the members frantically applauded the Minister, and denounced the conduct of the King of Prussia and of Count Bismarck. In the Senate, the Ministerial statement was received with cries of "No more words, but action!" and an adjournment immediately took place. There was some discussion, however, in the Lower House. A Bill for a credit of fifty millions was voted on the demand of M. Ollivier; but M. Thiers made a long speech, in which, notwithstanding his strong anti-Prussian feelings, he condemned the proceedings of the Government, and expressed the opinion that King William had made every concession that could fairly be expected of him. He was followed by some Opposition members of great eminence, and a minority of 84 voted against the credit, which, however, found 159 supporters. On the ensuing day, M. Rouher, the President of the Senate, presented an address from that body, in which he said:—"Your Majesty draws the sword, and the country is with you, trembling with indignation at the excesses that an ambition, over-excited by one day's good-fortune, was sure, sooner or later, to produce. Your Majesty was able to wait, but has occupied the last four years in perfecting the armament and the organisation of the army." The latter words have been severely criticised, as showing that the Emperor had all that time been planning a war; but it cannot fairly be said that he had armed more than Prussia, while the event showed that he was far less prepared.

At the prospect of war, Paris grew mad with enthusiasm, rage, and desire of vengeance. Crowds assembled in the streets, shouting "Down with Prussia!" "Long live France!" "To the Rhine!" "To Berlin!" The traffic of carriages in the main thoroughfares was rendered impracticable. The "Marseillaise" hymn, long forbidden as seditious, was again permitted to be sung, and was heard incessantly all day, and far into the summer night. Processions, carrying banners with warlike inscriptions, paraded to and fro; and the hotel of the Prussian ambassador was only saved from destruction by the interposition of the police. For this outrage an apology was afterwards offered. The papers, with some exceptions, abounded with inflammatory appeals, and, after the impulsive French fashion, glorified beforehand the easy triumphs that were to be won over the Prussians. M. Ollivier had said that he entered upon the war "with a light heart;" and such seemed to be the feeling of the people at large. The capital throbbed with excitement, and was like a city divided between the influences of an intoxicating joy and of a feverish desire for action. Allusions to Jena became very popular, and men told one another that they would be across the Rhine in a week, and at Berlin in a fortnight. Some writers have endeavoured to make it appear that all this enthusiasm was manufactured by police agents, and that the populace were really indifferent to the war, if not actually opposed to it. But there is no evidence of any such agency on a scale commensurate with the results actually observed; nor, indeed, could so wide-spread an agitation have been artificially produced. It is true that the Republican party in the Corps Législatif opposed the credit demanded by M. Ollivier, but whether with the view of vexing the Imperial Government, rather than out of any strong feeling against war with the Prussians, or disinclination to augment the territories of France, it is probably now impossible to determine. A wish to wipe out the indignities of 1814 and 1815, and to repossess the Rhine frontier, has always been a passion as strong with the Republicans as with the Buonapartists. In the provinces there was doubtless far less enthusiasm for war. The French peasantry are habitually inclined to peace, because the conscription weighs upon them with peculiar heaviness, and because the interruption of their ordinary pursuits is most injurious to agriculture, and reduces the small farmer to the level of a pauper. The reports which, in the month of July, the prefects of the departments were ordered to send to the Ministry of the Interior, and which were published after the revolution of September, spoke, for the most part, in a pacific tone, and deprecated war, unless it were necessary for the honour of the country. But, after all, the opinions even here are very general and abstract, and it does not appear that the departments condemned the particular quarrel which was now supposed by the Government to render war unavoidable. In Paris and other large cities, the fervour was genuine and uncontrollable. The Emperor stated to a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, to whom he granted an interview shortly before starting for the seat of war, that he regretted the rupture, that he was taken by surprise, that he was not prepared for hostilities, but that the issue was inevitable. He added:—"I trusted that, when the Duc de Gramont had set me straight with France by speaking manfully in public as to the Hohenzollern candidature, I should be able so to manipulate and handle the controversy as to make peace certain. But France has slipped out of my hand. I cannot rule unless I lead. This is the most national war that in my time France has undertaken, and I have no choice but to advance at the head of a public opinion which I can neither stem nor check." It seems probable, upon a comparison of all the evidence, that this statement was little, if at all, in excess of the truth. The old hatred and jealousy of the two nations—long restrained—had at length burst forth, with a fury that overleapt all bounds.*

The excitement in Prussia was not less than that in France. When it became generally known that the King had refused to see M. Benedetti, the utmost enthusiasm was manifested. The people, with scarcely an exception, declared their readiness for war, and seemed to find a pleasure in the opportunity now presented for settling old quarrels. Hurrahs for the King were raised by a vast crowd which collected in the square in front of the royal palace at Berlin, where his Majesty arrived shortly after nine o'clock on the night of the 14th. Like the people of Paris, the Prussians shouted "To the Rhine!" The French cry of "To Berlin!" had its counterpart in the German ejaculation of "To Paris!" Leipzig was as much talked about by the Prussians as Jena by the French; and the national songs of the Fatherland were constantly sung in chorus. The Unter den Linden was illuminated, and displayed the North German and Prussian flags. The King repeatedly showed himself at the windows of the palace, to thank the people for their demonstrations. Articles full of defiance of the French, and of admiration of the conduct of the Government, appeared in the newspapers. Addresses of support were sent in from mercantile bodies, and the Town Council of Berlin presented one to the King on the 18th, to which his Majesty replied in a few telling sentences. "God knows," he said, "I am not answerable for this war. The demand sent me I could not do otherwise than reject. My reply gained the approval of all the towns and provinces, the expression of which I have received from all parts of Germany, and even from Germans residing beyond the seas. Heavy sacrifices will be demanded of my people. We have been rendered unaccustomed to them by the quickly-gained victories which we achieved in the last two wars. We shall not get off so cheaply this time; but I know what I may expect from my army, and from those now hastening to join the ranks. The instrument is sharp and cutting; the result is in the hands of God. I know also what I may expect from those who are called upon to alleviate the wounds, the pains, and the sufferings which war entails."

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* See Appendix ii., Vol. II., p. 543, "Incidents previous to the Declaration of War."

The North German Parliament was opened on the 19th, and the King was received with frantic cheers. In the speech which he delivered, he again affirmed that the Government had had nothing to do with the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern, but added that it had been seized upon as a pretext for a *casus belli*, "put forward in a manner long since unknown in the annals of diplomatic intercourse, and adhered to after the removal of the very pretext itself, with that disregard for the people's right to the blessings of peace, of which the history of a former ruler of France affords so many analogous examples." The unity and strength of Germany were dwelt on, and his Majesty added, "The German nation contains within itself the will and the power to repel the renewed aggression of France. With a clear gaze we have measured the responsibility which, before the judgment-seat of God and of mankind, must fall upon him who drags two great and peace-loving peoples at the head of Europe into a devastating war. Those who hold power in France have, by preconcerted misguidance, found means to work upon the legitimate but excitable national sentiment of a great neighbouring people, for the furtherance of personal interests and the gratification of passions." Finally, the King averred that they were pursuing no other object than the durable establishment of peace in Europe. The subsequent announcement of Count Bismarck, that the French *chargé d'affaires* had delivered a declaration of war against Prussia, was greeted with loud cries of "Hurrah!"

The other German Governments lost no time in declaring their adhesion to the cause of Prussia—a decision which was everywhere ratified by the populace. Bavaria was the first of the South German States to follow the lead of Prussia; the others rapidly followed. France had anticipated that the South (which, up to the outbreak of war, was certainly not very friendly to the North) would rejoice in an opportunity for opposing the ambition of King William and Count Bismarck. The *Journal Officiel* of the 19th of July spoke of "the audacious encroachments made by Prussia to annul the independence of the South German States." But, at the first threat of a foreign invasion, the jealousies of the previous four years were forgotten, and Germany was in effect made one by the very attempt to hinder her cohesion.

In France a spirited proclamation was issued by the Emperor in the following terms:—

"Paris, July 23, 1870.

"Frenchmen!—There are solemn moments in the life of peoples, when the national sense of honour, violently excited, imposes itself with irresistible force, dominates all interests, and alone takes in hand the direction of the destinies of the country. One of those decisive hours has sounded for France. Prussia, towards whom, both during and since the war of 1866, we have shown the most conciliatory disposition, has taken no account of our good wishes and our enduring forbearance. Launched on the path of invasion, she has provoked mistrust everywhere, necessitated exaggerated armaments, and turned Europe into a camp, where reigns nothing but uncertainty and fear of the morrow. A last incident has come to show the instability of international relations, and to prove the gravity of the situation. In presence of the new pretensions of Prussia, we made known our protests. They were evaded, and were followed on the part of Prussia by contemptuous acts. Our country resented this treatment with profound irritation, and immediately a cry for war resounded from one end of France to the other. It only remains to us to leave our destinies to the decision of arms.

"We do not make war on Germany, whose independence we respect. We wish that the peoples who compose the great German nationality may freely dispose of their destinies. For ourselves, we demand the establishment of a state of affairs which shall guarantee our security and assure our future. We wish to conquer a lasting peace, based on the true interests of peoples, and to put an end to that precarious state in which all nations employ their resources to arm themselves one against the other. The glorious flag which we once more unfurl before those who have provoked us is the same which bore throughout Europe the civilising ideas of our great Revolution. It represents the same principles and will inspire the same devotion.

"Frenchmen! I am about to place myself at the head of that valiant army which is animated by love of duty and of country. It knows its own worth, since it has seen how victory has accompanied its march in the four quarters of the world. I take with me my son, despite his youth. He knows what are the duties which his name imposes upon him, and he is proud to bear his share in the dangers of those who fight for their country. May God bless our efforts! A great people which defends a just cause is invincible.

"NAPOLEON."

In replying to a deputation of the legislative body, on the 22nd of July, the Emperor laid it down that "a war is right when it is waged with the assent of the country, and the approval of the country's representatives," and cited the words of Montesquieu, who remarked that "the real author of a war is not he by whom it is declared, but he who renders it necessary." Glancing towards the future, the Emperor said he had faith in the success of his arms, because he knew that behind him France had risen to her feet, and that God protected her. The proposition contained in the sentence first quoted is certainly very disputable, and, in the particular instance to which it was applied, it is obvious that it tended to defeat itself. For if the support of the French people rendered the war right for France, the support of the German people made it equally right for Germany, so that there was no wrong at all in the case. This, however, is more than the Emperor desired to affirm.

Even before the declaration of war, Prussia began to mobilise her troops, and to make other preparations for the conflict. In Paris the excitement was wrought up to its highest pitch by the departure of soldiers for the north-eastern frontier. For some days the streets echoed with the tramp of armed battalions streaming past in endless columns, and glittered with the terrible brilliance of military array. In the hearts of some of the on-lookers was a sad foreboding; but in most there was nothing but the elation of anticipated victories. The terminus of the Eastern Railway was crowded with soldiers, causing a suspension of the ordinary traffic; and train after train rolled off with regiment after regiment, until late at night. The men, many of whom were in a state of intoxication, shouted for France and the Emperor, or sang the "Marseillaise." The women clung to them, and wept. An eye-witness says that many of the younger soldiers would have wept too, had they dared. As the trains moved away, some of the broken-hearted women clung to the doors of the carriages, and fell with the augmenting speed of the engine. And still regiment after regiment departed on their fatal mission. "Food for Prussian powder!" said some among the cynically-disposed or despondent of the Parisian population. It was but too true.

A vivid picture of the appearance of Paris in the second half of July was painted by a correspondent of the *Daily News*, some of whose touches were almost prophetic:—

"A sailor with his arms round the necks of two male companions; a Zouave spread-eagle fashion in an open cab; two Voltigeurs of the Guard, carrying a thin trunk between them; a conscript, drunk, with his shako on the back of his head; soldiers of every uniform, bearing bundles, or giving their arms to sad-looking mothers or sisters; the wine-shops filled with military, and the little tables gay with a drinking company, although it is only eight o'clock in the morning—were the indications of war that appeared directly I had turned from the Great Northern Station into the Rue Lafayette. This longest street of Baron Haussmann's Paris evidently traversed the section in which the Zouaves of the Guard were quartered, for these alert, dashing, and unscrupulous gentlemen, who are mostly *enfants de Paris*, were sauntering, drinking, chattering in every direction, and preparing to make a day of it. Ammunition wagons and ambulance carts; vehicles stacked with mattresses; men of all arms in their heavy *tenue de campagne;* trim Lancers bearing despatches upon weedy but serviceable Algerian horses, that, as I heard it observed, could live 'on broken ginger-beer bottles;' at every corner, in every drinking-place, flushed lads shouting, tippling, singing, and executing fantastic *pas seuls;* with a rear and background of *gamins* and idlers everywhere—were among the salient features of Paris making ready, which burst upon me in the early morning. By the Opera we suddenly pulled up. We had nearly run over a belligerent group that was between more than two wines. A Grenadier of the Guard had exchanged his prodigious bearskin for the white 'melon' covering of his civil companion; while this one, who was in a black tail-coat, had girt the grenadier's sword about his holiday waistcoat, and had donned the shako. On the Place Vendôme there was a crowd before the *État-Major*, consisting of soldiers and their relatives, supported by the usual strength of idlers; and about the column were one or two old men with maps, retracing, I doubt not, the routes of the Jena time, but never wandering to Leipzig. . . . . . . Gaston Jollivet, in a 'Chant de Guerre' which the *Gaulois* has just published, circles his most fiery verse about the *immortelles* of the famous Place. To Berlin, brothers; to Berlin! Zouaves, legendary Turcos, chasseurs, grenadiers, voltigeurs—all of the antique race of sailors, hatchet in hand—arise! The Baltic waves are cresting to bear proudly the avenging fleet! For the road, poet Jollivet tells his countrymen they know it. Jena is after Jemappes; but this is the old route. Let the worn map be torn to atoms, and let a new one be made for 1870. It is time for garrulous parliamentarians to be hushed; for lo, powder is about to speak!

"That appeals like this have a mighty effect in Paris, who can doubt when warlike song is upon every lip? We wake to 'Mourir pour la Patrie' and the 'Marseillaise' at six in the morning; and it is dying away just for an hour or two when we go to bed at one on the following morning. The man who is polishing my floors is singing 'Marlbroock' under his breath. The air vibrates with songs and shouts of victory; and the idea of defeat is as far from the popular mind just now as the possibility of doubting that Paris is the centre of civilisation. But there are plenty of doubters, nevertheless, who are getting impatient with the brawlers in the streets, and the drunken sailors carrying flags at the head of a 'ragamuffin rout' along the Boulevards, and shouting that eternal 'À Berlin!' A calm elderly gentleman, looking on at one of these demonstrations, that sweep by the boulevard cafés at intervals, like the gusts of a dying storm, said to me, 'Poor fellows! they think it's as



CAVALRY SKIRMISH AT NIEDERBRONN

easy as eating a date for breakfast; and they don't remember that the Prussians have warmed their soup in the shady alleys of the Luxembourg.'"

Those parts of Paris which are inhabited by the rich and wealthy were less agitated than the other portions of the city; but the greatest excitement prevailed wherever the soldiers chiefly congregated. To see the troops depart was the most attractive of spectacles; and the shouting of patriotic songs, the delivery of sonorous speeches, and the frantic revelry of the wine-shops, drowned the graver feelings that must now and then have presented themselves. The women suffered in secret, as they always do on these occasions; but the men were loud in their jubilation, and Paris, reeling in the drunkenness of the moment, thought little of the morrow, and of all the dread possibilities of the approaching time.

Meanwhile the Government was silently pushing forward its preparations, and at length the opening of the campaign drew near. The Emperor, accompanied by the Prince Imperial and Prince Napoleon, left St. Cloud on the 28th of July, for Metz, the base of the French operations.

While these events were proceeding on the Continent, public opinion in England was much agitated by the imminence of a great European war. The press, as might be supposed, was divided on many of the points at issue; but it seemed to be generally agreed that France had been unduly precipitate; that there was no real occasion for war; but that the anger and jealousy of two powerful nations had rendered peace impossible. Mr. Disraeli, speaking in the House of Commons on the evening of the 15th of July, remarked that any ruler who lightly disturbed the peace of Europe "would find at the moment of action that he would have to encounter, wherever he might be placed, a greater and more powerful force than any military array, and that is the outraged opinion of an enlightened world." The Government endeavoured to mediate between the two antagonists; but matters had gone too far,



NAPOLEON III., EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.

and neither was inclined to retract. The Pope also, in a letter addressed to the Emperor and the King, offered his services, but with as little effect. The London Stock Exchange was violently agitated, and securities of all kinds were seriously depressed. A Proclamation of Neutrality was issued by the Queen on the 19th of July. Other Governments likewise made formal statements of their determination to remain neutral; and each belligerent signified his readiness to respect the neutrality of the small States, so long as it was not violated by the other.

The war had scarcely yet begun when a most painful impression was produced in England by the publication, in the *Times* of July 25th, confirmed by a telegram from Berlin in the *Echo* of the next day, of what professed to be a proposed secret treaty between France and Prussia, prepared some time subsequent to the battle of Sadowa, by which it was undertaken that the French Emperor should admit and recognise the acquisitions made by Prussia in the war with Austria; that Prussia should "facilitate for France the acquisition of Luxemburg;" that France should recognise the union of the whole of the German States, with the exception of Austrian Germany; that Prussia should help France, by military and naval assistance, to take possession of Belgium, and hold it against any other Power; and that France and Prussia should contract an offensive and defensive alliance. The effect of the publication of this projected treaty upon English opinion was very serious. It was held that the mere fact of such a scheme having been talked over was evidence of a criminal design on the part of both Powers; and, although it was obvious that the draft must have been communicated to the *Times* by Prussia herself, the cause of that country was certainly not strengthened by the disclosure, though of course France suffered in at least equal proportion. Several explanations were given by both Governments, and much recrimination was bandied about. Count Bismarck alleged that the proposal was made to him in 1867, and that about the same time several other projects for French aggrandisement at the expense of Germany and Belgium were submitted by the representative of France at Berlin. All these projects were rejected by the King. On the other hand, it was affirmed by the Imperial Government that the initiative in the proposed secret treaty came from Bismarck; that the draft was made by M. Benedetti at the dictation of the Prussian Minister, who was not sufficiently familiar with French to supply the exact words; and that when the plan was submitted to the Emperor, he at once declined to have anything to do with it. It was also suggested that the whole thing was a clever scheme on the part of Count Bismarck, who wished to entangle the French Government in a conspiracy against the liberties of Belgium. Neither in honour nor in policy could England permit the absorption of Belgium; and a treaty was accordingly submitted by our Government to Prussia and France, and signed by both. The object of this treaty was to bind each belligerent to respect the independence of Belgium, England undertaking to assist either against the other in defending that country from violation, but at the same time guarding herself against any obligation to take part in the general operations of the war. The treaty was to hold good for a year after the conclusion of peace. Prussia was the first to sign: France followed after a little hesitation. Both signatures were given in the first half of August.

As throwing some light on the antecedents of the war, it may be here mentioned that the Emperor, just before the commencement of hostilities in July, 1870, told a correspondent of a London daily paper that he had asked Count Bismarck to cede to him some small frontier towns that seriously menaced the French territory, basing his request on the "self-denying neutrality of France" during the struggle with Austria. The Count, however, refused point-blank, but said that with further acquisitions he might make some concessions. He then hinted at taking Holland, but was told by the Emperor that that would mean war with France. The conversation took place between Count Bismarck and the French Ambassador at Berlin, the latter speaking under the instructions of the Emperor.

In November, 1870, the *Français* published a narrative by the Parisian journalist, M. Sidney Renouf, which professes to give the secret history of the intrigues between the Emperor and Count Bismarck in 1865. According to this, France was to assist Prussia in conquering Austria; Prussia was to seize Austrian Germany, Hanover, and Saxony; and France was to pay herself with Belgium, Luxemburg, and portions of Prussian and Bavarian territory on the left bank of the Rhine. The hope of some ultimate advantage was the reason, in the view of this writer, why the Emperor so constantly held back from declaring war against Prussia, even after his Ministers had on certain questions taken up a very decided position. The degree of authority belonging to this statement may be doubtful; but the Emperor's hesitation for years is certain, and that some understanding existed for a time between the Emperor and Count Bismarck is highly probable.

CHAPTER II.

The Prussian Armies, and their Arrival on the Frontiers—Perfect Organisation of the German Forces—Count Moltke—First Operations of the War—Daring Reconnaissances of the Germans—Arrival of the French Emperor at Metz—His Address to the Army—Departure of the King of Prussia for the Seat of War—Prussian Amnesty—Delay of the French—Defective Organisation of the French Army—Alleged Pamphlet by the Emperor on the Causes of his Defeats—The French resolve to attack Saarbruck—Situation of that Town—Movement of French Troops on the Morning of the 2nd of August—Arrival of the Emperor at the Scene of Action—Disposition of the Attacking Force—Effect of the Mitrailleuses—The Prussians evacuate the Town, which is occupied by the French—The Emperor's Telegram to the Empress—Prussian Account of the Affair—The Prince Imperial and the Incidents of the Battle—State of Saarbruck after the Action—Character of the French and German Artillery—The Needle Gun and the Chassepôt—Correspondents at the Seat of War—The French Fleet in the North Sea—Its strange Inactivity—Abortive Attempt of the French Government to obtain the Alliance of Denmark.

THE forces which the Prussian Government was enabled to bring to the frontier not many days after the formal declaration of war were divided into three armies: the first consisting of 50,000 infantry, 6,600 cavalry, and 192 guns; the second comprising 190,000 infantry, 24,200 cavalry, and 672 guns; the third amounting to 172,000 infantry, 17,000 cavalry, and 576 guns. The three armies, taken together, formed a grand total of 412,000 infantry, 47,800 cavalry, and 1,440 guns. Of these armies the first was commanded by General Steinmetz, with Major-General von Sperling as chief of the staff; the second by Prince Frederick Charles, with Colonel von Stiehle as chief of the staff; and the third by the Crown Prince, with Lieut.-General von Blumenthal as chief of the staff. The entire forces were under the general command of the King of Prussia, assisted by General von Moltke, as chief of his staff. Strong reserves were formed at Coblentz, Maintz, Frankfort, and Hainau; and the North was defended by an army under General von Falckenstein. Taken altogether, and including the Landwehr and other resources, Prussia had at her disposal, for the purposes of war, a million and a quarter of well-armed and well-drilled soldiers. Of the forces actively employed, the first army reached the frontier some time before the 28th of July, and proceeded to occupy the line of the Saar, resting its right on Saarburg, with advanced posts at that place and at Merzig, Saarlouis, Saarbruck, and Bliescastel, and massing the main body behind at Ottweiler, Neunkirchen, Homburg, and Landstuhl. The second army, with the Royal head-quarters, crossed the Rhine at Maintz and Mannheim, and on the 1st of August took up its station to the left of General Steinmetz, occupying Zweibrücken and Pinnasens, with its main body echeloned along the line of railway from Landstuhl to Landau. A day or two later the third army arrived by Mannheim and Germersheim, and formed to the left of the second army, with its main body at Neustadt, Spires, Landau, and Germersheim.

All these armies were enabled to communicate with one another by rail, and were well secured in the rear in case they should be obliged to retreat. In about three weeks from the formal declaration of war, Prussia had brought to the front between four and five hundred thousand men in the highest state of efficiency and organisation, so that it is clear that Count Bismarck and his master had been long and actively preparing for war, and had not been entirely absorbed in peaceful and innocent designs, as we were constantly assured by certain writers in this country, who desired to present France to the world as a crafty and ravening wolf, and Prussia as a meek and inoffensive lamb. The German forces thus pushed forward at the commencement of hostilities were afterwards followed by others; but numbers alone were hardly the most formidable element in this prodigious demonstration of military power. The organisation of the army was complete in every department, and to the utmost nicety of detail. The men were perfect in drill, and so accustomed to combined action that they seemed to form parts of one vast machine, capable of being directed with the greatest facility and effect to any object that might be contemplated by the commanders, yet at the same time the intelligence and self-reliance of the individual soldier were not sacrificed to the completeness of the whole body. Arming, equipment, commissariat, transport, medical and surgical attendance, were all arranged in the best possible manner; and the rough test of war showed that what had previously held good in theory was equally excellent in practice. The forces were provided with a field-telegraph and a field-post, with the means of reconstructing railways that might be destroyed by the enemy, and with a corps of grave-diggers; and (by an arrangement characterised by a grim horror, yet unquestionably useful) every man was required to wear round his neck a label establishing his identity if killed, or, in case of his being wounded, supplying the surgeon with a form whereon to describe his case, for the instruction of the medical officers of the hospital to which he might be sent.

The directing intellect of all this vast mechanism was undoubtedly Count von Moltke, who is to the military system of Prussia what Bismarck has become to its political system. Moltke—who was born in 1800, and was therefore an old man of seventy at the time of the war—is a native of Mecklenburg, of Danish extraction. In early life he entered the service of Denmark, but soon transferred himself to Prussia, and studied with the utmost labour and assiduity the methods of scientific warfare. It was not, however, until 1864 that he had any positive experience of fighting. In that year he acted as chief of the staff to Prince Frederick Charles during the Schleswig-Holstein war, and earned a good deal of distinction; but his fame was chiefly acquired in the Austro-Prussian war of two years later. The entire plan of that war was prepared by him, and worked with an efficiency which we all know, yet with a quietness and secresy which were almost appalling. Moltke is like an embodied Fate, preparing in mystery and gloom the blows that are suddenly to fall on mighty armaments with crushing effect, and in a few weeks to reduce great military powers to ruin and humiliation. He is seen less often than commanders generally are, and, when seen, presents a hard, stern face, completely shaven, and showing in every line the presence of a cold, self-centred intellect. The front of the battle frequently knows him not. On the great field of Sadowa he was seated in a tent at the rear, where he was constantly informed by the field-telegraph of what was being done by each corps; where he consulted his map, telegraphed his orders to the various generals, and conducted the battle like a game of chess played at a distance. His mind takes note of every detail of military administration, from the largest to the most minute; and the vast operations of the war of 1870 were managed by him with the same unresting vigilance and calm pre-vision that had been manifested in the shorter war of 1866. He is certainly the most accomplished of modern strategists.

The French armies on the eastern frontier were supposed to present a grand total of 165,400 infantry, 18,400 cavalry, and 456 guns, with two corps of reserve, of 61,500 infantry, 12,350 cavalry, and 198 guns, commanded by Marshal Canrobert and General Felix Douay. A division was placed on the Spanish frontier, to watch the policy of the governing party across the Pyrenees; and another body of troops was detailed for the Baltic expedition. The general command of the invading army was retained by the Emperor in his own hands, assisted by Marshal Lebœuf (removed, for the purpose, from the Ministry of War) as chief of the staff; and the commanders of the several corps (five in number) into which the whole was divided, were Marshal MacMahon, General Frossard, Marshal Bazaine, General de l'Admirault, and General de Failly. In addition to these corps was the Imperial Guard, under General Bourbaki. Like the German army, the French forces had the advantage of a highly elaborated railway system, by which they could rapidly concentrate on particular points, or establish communications between city and city. In connection with their line of operations, or in their rear, were the fortified towns of Strasburg, Metz, Bitsche, Phalsburg, Thionville, Toul, and other places of strength.

The less important operations of the war began even before the formal declaration of hostilities. As early as the 16th of July there was a Prussian reconnaissance at Landau; on the 17th the French were concentrating on the frontier at Metz and Thionville, while the Prussians, who were pouring into the Rhenish provinces, occupied a French village near Longwy. War, as we have seen, was formally declared at Berlin on the 19th. On the 23rd the Prussians blew up the abutment of the bridge of Kehl, connecting that town with Strasburg. A French division of Frossard's corps was quartered on the 24th at Forbach, about six miles from Saarbruck; and a detachment which on that day entered Saarbruck reported that the Prussians were in some force at that place, and that they (the French) had been repulsed with a loss of ten men. This was followed, on the same day, by an incursion of Prussian Lancers into French territory to the east of Sarreguemines. These daring horsemen blew up the viaduct of the railroad between Sarreguemines and Haguenau, and so cut the French communication between Bitsche and St. Avold. A still more venturesome feat was performed a week later, when twenty Baden troopers entered France at Lauterburg in broad daylight, and rapidly pushed on as far as Niederbronn, cutting the telegraph wires along the railway. They were surprised the following morning while breakfasting at a farmhouse; and one of the party—an English gentleman, Mr. Winslow—was killed in the struggle that ensued. Mr. Winslow was the first officer slain in the war on either side. Reconnaissances of this nature were frequently executed by the Germans, resulting in the collection of a great deal of information as to the movements and plans of the enemy, and that at but a small cost of life. Several skirmishes took place from day to day, with varying fortune, but it would be tedious to enumerate them.

On the evening of the 28th of July the Emperor (who is described by an eye-witness as looking old and ill, with his head sunk on his breast) arrived at Metz to assume the command. He immediately issued the following address to the army:—

> "Soldiers!—I am about to place myself at your head to defend the honour and soil of the country. You go to fight against one of the best armies in Europe; but others who were quite as worthy were unable to resist your bravery. It will be the same again at the present time. The war which is now commencing will be a long and severe one, since it will have for the scene of its operations places full of fortresses and obstacles; but nothing is too difficult for the soldiers of Africa, the Crimea, China, Italy, and Mexico. You will again prove what the French army, animated by the sentiment of duty, maintained by discipline, and inspired with love of country, can perform. Whatever road we may take beyond our frontiers we shall find glorious traces of our fathers. We will prove ourselves worthy of them. The whole of France follows you with her ardent wishes, and the eyes of the whole world are upon you. The fate of liberty and civilisation depends upon our success. Soldiers! let each one do his duty, and the God of armies will be with us. "NAPOLEON.
>
> "The Imperial Head-quarters, Metz, July 28."

The King of Prussia set out for the seat of war on the 31st, after having issued a farewell proclamation, in which he spoke of fighting for Germany's honour and the preservation of her most precious possessions, again protested that the war did not emanate from him, expressed the resolve of the nation to accept the battle for the defence of the Fatherland, and granted an amnesty for all political crimes and offences.

There can be no question that the delay in opening the campaign operated very disadvantageously to the French. It is peculiarly the quality of French soldiers that they require to act with promptitude and dash—to be free to spring at once on the enemy, and carry all before them by suddenness of onslaught and fury of advance. Their ardour is apt to die out when they have to stand long on the defensive; inaction makes them nervous and depressed. At the outset of the Prussian war they waited for the Emperor until they began to think that all was not right; and their surmise was correct. Never was a great army worse prepared for a most formidable enterprise. The Emperor seems to have discovered this fact before the actual opening of the campaign, and it may account for a certain tone of gravity observable in his speeches and proclamations. His own delay in joining the army may have been unavoidable, but it was certainly unfortunate. Utter failure in organisation, however, was the most disastrous circumstance of the time. A pamphlet, supposed to be written or inspired by the Emperor, was published at Brussels about the end of October, which throws an extraordinary light on the state of the French army at the commencement of the war. According to this singular statement, the Emperor found himself constantly paralysed by want of information as to the position of the enemy. He discovered that his army was neither so large nor so well appointed as he had supposed. He was hampered by contradictory counsels, and embarrassed by want of discipline. His original plan—known only to himself, Marshal MacMahon, and Marshal Lebœuf—was to cross the Rhine into Baden, to separate Southern from Northern Germany, and to secure the alliance of Italy and Austria by a brilliant success. The scheme was in itself not at all a bad one, but the greater quickness and preparedness of the Prussians crushed it in the bud. The pamphlet avers that, at the time of the taking of Saarbruck, on the 2nd of August, the Army of the Rhine, exclusive of the corps then in course of formation at Châlons and Belfort, but far from complete, numbered only 140,000 men, instead of 250,000. MacMahon's First Corps the writer describes as principally composed of regiments from Africa—"veterans covered with renown;" yet, after their defeat at Wörth, at which they performed prodigies of valour, they were so vividly impressed by the tremendous effects of the Prussian artillery, that they left the field "with dissatisfied and mutinous feelings." It is further recorded of de Failly's corps, that it "lost without a fight a portion of its equipments, and almost all its baggage," and presented an appearance of indifference and disorganisation of the most alarming kind. Of Douay's corps of reserve we are told that "its solidity was not such as might have been desired;" and the Emperor says that he was deceived as to the capacity of the War Office for sending him reinforcements. "By the bold initiative of the Germans," he or his literary representative writes, "we were caught in the act of formation." Seeing the perilous nature of the situation, the Emperor determined, after his earlier discomfitures, to retreat on Châlons. M. Emile Ollivier, however, strongly opposed such a course; and when Canrobert arrived at Metz with the reserve, it was resolved to make another attempt. But again the Prussians were too quick, and disaster followed disaster to the end.*

We have thus briefly anticipated the course of events in order to show what, in the opinion of the Emperor himself (assuming the authenticity of the pamphlet), were the causes of the utter military collapse of France. The truth is that the army had been greater on paper than in fact. It had been jobbed in all its departments, and was wanting in organisation, in discipline, and in appointments. It had committed the great fault of undervaluing its enemy, and was deficient in unity of command and intelligent vigour of direction. The French had been living for a long while in the fool's paradise of a belief in their own invincibility; and in worshipping the glittering shadow of former renown they had lost the substance of present power. With some honourable exceptions, the generals seemed to have thought they were going to a succession of brilliant promenades. On the field itself they could not forget the luxuries and the dissipations of Paris. They rode about in carriages, accompanied by cooks and women of notorious character, and insisted on having every day at dinner eight courses served on plate. Who can wonder that the old energy and readiness of the French soldier vanished under such influences? The Emperor, according to a recent writer, "went from Paris to the Army of the Rhine, expecting to find it all perfection, and ready to undertake a glorious campaign. He found it really in cantonments, corps isolated from corps, and needing several days to consolidate and combine it." The battalions were far below their proper strength, owing to the advantage which had evidently been taken of the permission to purchase exoneration from service by fines to the State—fines which were not appropriated, as they should have been, to increasing the bounties to recruits. The men themselves were, in several regiments, below the mark



COUNT VON MOLTKE.

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* Campagne de 1870 : Des Causes qui ont amené la Capitulation de Sédan. Par un Officier attaché à l'Etat Major-Général. Bruxelles : 1870.

as to soldierly qualities; and the loose habits of discipline acquired in Africa operated with fatal potency against the whole army. The Emperor had been deceived; and France, as well as himself, suffered from the deception.

The die, however, was cast, and the war, having been rashly commenced, must be desperately pursued. On the 30th of July an attack was made by the French on the open town of Saarbruck, just within the Rhenish-Prussian frontier, but it was repulsed. The attempt was renewed on the 2nd of August, and with success. Saarbruck is situated on the river Saar, which waters a country abounding in fortresses. The country itself is both beautiful and interesting. The ancient and picturesque city of Trèves (or Trier, as the Germans call it) is situated some miles to the north of Saarbruck; and the landscape, in many parts of the valley through which the river flows, has a charmingly pastoral character. "From Saarburg, with its mediæval fortress of the prince-bishop of Tours," says the author of "On the Trail of the War" (Mr. Alexander Innes Shand), "up to Saarlouis, the modern fortress of the Kings of Prussia, the river runs out and in by the feet of hills wooded to their summits with beech and oak, scarred here and there with red precipices. A veritable red land, although not in the Suabian circle: red rocks, and red soil, and a red river in flood after a heavy rainfall; red brick manufactories, where the red clay is wrought to porcelain; and workmen smeared with red from the caps to the boots. Between these industrial centres the river is lovely and peaceful enough, with kingfishers and water-weeds flitting about red stones patched with orange lichens. Wherever it narrows to a pond, a fisher is pretty sure to be at work with his primitive tub and sink-net; and every now and then, where it spreads to a shallow, there is a solemn heron, with his eye riveted eagerly on the muddy waters. The valley widens to a plain where Saarlouis shelters among its earthworks and ditches. In the swampy fields great herds of cattle plash disconsolately about. In scenery, climate,



THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE IMPERIAL BEFORE SAARBRUCK.

accessories, and everything else, the place is a study for a Dutch landscape painter." The country is rich in coal-fields, which, together with its numerous and very powerful fortresses, rendered it a most desirable acquisition for the French.

The Emperor Napoleon, finding it necessary to do something to stimulate the spirit of his troops, as well as to appease the popular impatience, and seeing that the town of Saarbruck was a station of some importance to the Germans, who had here the command of three lines of railway, on which troops and stores were being rapidly moved, determined to take the place by a vigorous assault. Between nine and ten o'clock on the morning of the 2nd of August, the French moved up large bodies of troops, and occupied the heights overlooking the town. A good deal of wood surrounded the place, and from this ambuscade the Prussian cannon was heard at intervals as General Bataille, of the 2nd corps, advanced with his men. The ground soon began to be dotted with the killed and wounded, and stretchers and ambulances made their appearance along the route. Suddenly a loud cheer burst forth to the right, on the road running from Forbach (in the French territory) to Saarbruck. The Emperor had arrived, and was seen riding along the front of the columns. General Frossard, in his report of the action, says that "Lieutenant-Colonel Thebeaudin, with two battalions of his regiment (the 67th), in advancing to the attack of the village of St. Arnual, found it strongly occupied and defended by batteries of position planted on the right bank of the Saar. To demolish this artillery, General Micheler ordered into action a battery of the 15th Regiment, which effectually opened fire on the Prussian guns. Supported by a battalion of the 40th Regiment of the Line, and by the company of Sappers and Miners of the 3rd Division, materially assisted by the flank movement of Colonel Mangin (who, with the remainder of the 67th Regiment and the 66th Regiment, descended the heights on the left), Lieutenant-Colonel Thebeaudin carried the village of St. Arnual, and occupied it with a battalion of the 40th Regiment and the company of Sappers and Miners. The battalions of the 67th, with great *élan*, rushed up the slopes of the hillock of St. Arnual, and established themselves on the crest opposite Saarbruck. The 66th, with equal resolution, took possession of the heights up to the exercising ground, driving the enemy from all his positions. At the same time, General Bataille rapidly moved his 1st Brigade to the rising ground on the left of the Saarbruck road, connecting his movement with that of the 2nd Brigade by advancing a battalion of the 33rd regiment. Advancing in line, the battalions of the 23rd and 8th Regiments, their front covered by numerous skirmishers, resolutely carried the many ravines which run across the ground, which is very difficult and thickly wooded. One battalion of the 8th Regiment, working its way across the woods, followed the railway as far as the village of Frotrany, where it effected its junction with the other battalions of the regiment, and together they attacked the exercising-ground on the right. On gaining the heights, General Bataille planted one of his batteries in front of the lines of the 66th Regiment, and another on the exercising ground, to fire on the railway station, and silence the enemy's artillery, which had taken up a position on the left of Saarbruck." This had the desired effect; and after some more artillery practice, a battery of mitrailleuses of the 2nd Division threw the German columns of infantry into disorder. Thick columns of smoke from burning houses rose from out the trees, and the roar of projectiles was heard unceasingly along the whole line. A correspondent of a French paper describes the noise produced by the mitrailleuse as "a continuous, dry, shrieking, terrible sound." The effect in other respects was remarkable. Battalions were scattered with great loss, the remainder flying in all directions. When the French had gained the heights commanding the town, a battery of mitrailleuses was placed in position in presence of the Emperor and the Prince Imperial. Shortly afterwards a Prussian detachment marched over the railway bank at a distance of 1,600 mètres. The mitrailleuses fired, and in a moment the detachment was dispersed, leaving half its number on the ground. A second detachment subsequently suffered the same fate, and the spirits of the French army were raised by the apparent excellence of the weapon, now first tried in active warfare.

Finding the position no longer tenable, the Prussians began to evacuate the town. The French entered before the evacuation was complete, and established themselves in the parade-ground, where they planted their artillery, and directed their fire upon the railway station and the entrenched places. The town was by this time on fire in three or four directions, and a running fight between the two forces was for some while maintained in the streets. This part of the struggle, however, was not very long or very serious. The Prussians, according to the French accounts, made their way out of the town, and took their course along the paths which skirt the heights on the other side of the Saar, pursued by the fire of the mitrailleuses. All was over by about one o'clock, and in a little while men from either side came in under flags of truce to reclaim the dead and wounded.

It was with reference to this affair at Saarbruck that the Emperor Napoleon sent to the Empress a telegraphic message, which provoked a good deal of comment at the time. It ran:—

> "Louis has just received his baptism of fire. He was admirably cool, and in no way affected. A division of General Frossard's has taken the heights which command the left side of Saarbruck. The Prussians made a short resistance. We were in the front line, and the bullets and cannon-balls fell at our feet. Louis has kept a bullet which fell quite close to him. Some of the soldiers shed tears on seeing him so calm. We lost only one officer and ten men killed.
>
> "NAPOLEON."

The Emperor returned to Metz in the evening. A French writer says that the chassepôts were terrible, and that they carried 1,000 or 1,200 mètres, while the Prussian bullets were only effective at 800. Of the mitrailleuses he says that they "proved masterpieces in respect of death and carnage," adding:—"From our esplanade we saw the shower of balls strike down battalions as a waterspout ravages and uproots a field of corn. It was not a battle, properly so called, for the Prussians never waited for us. They beat a retreat before us at racing pace." The Prussians, on their side, say that they had only one battalion in the place, and that it was under orders to retreat fighting. It was a "weak advanced guard," and it evacuated the town in good order, and took up another post of observation. The whole affair is described as an "outpost skirmish." The loss sustained by the Prussians is described by themselves as consisting of only two officers and seventy men. There were some rather unworthy attempts to diminish the value (such as it was) of the French success. The action, it is true, was not of an important character; but to describe it as nothing more than an outpost skirmish was surely disingenuous. It is certain that the Prussians thought the town worth defending; that for some hours they did their utmost to defend it; and that finally they were driven back.

Among the incidents of the fight, one in particular should be mentioned. The Emperor and the Prince Imperial, followed by two generals and six officers of the staff, advanced to within three hundred yards of the Prussian needle-gun, and stood there for some time, in spite of the rain of bullets. The Prince, slightly overcome by the sight of the dead bodies of two soldiers, raised his képi, either in agitation or in reverence to the departed. In the evening, after his return from the combat, the Prince made a pen-and-ink sketch of the engagement, which he inscribed and presented to a son of Baron Lambert, a great friend of his Imperial Highness, then serving as a private in one of the regiments of Guards. A good deal of indignation has been wasted on the alleged cruelty of the Emperor in taking his son, a boy of fourteen, to the war. But it seems to be generally agreed among European Imperial and Royal families that the heir to the throne must be a military officer; and, if this is to be anything more than a matter of form, it is as well that the youth should have his nerves accustomed early to the fiery ordeal of actual conflict. In all armies, and in all navies, youths are employed as well as men; and the case is no worse for a prince than for a drummer-boy or a midshipman. The whole practice of war is saddening and horrible; but it is idle to concentrate upon special incidents the detestation which belongs to the entire system.

That the French obtained complete possession of Saarbruck is denied by some; though, in the face of the Prussian statement that the garrison evacuated the town, it seems difficult to maintain this view. The fact appears to be that the Prussians still lurked in the village of St. Johann, on the further side of the Saar, and in the thick woods beyond, from which their sharpshooters kept up a galling fire on the French. General Frossard, however, proceeded to throw up a few entrenchments in front and flank of the French position; he also established some *epaulements*, to protect the guns and gunners. Shortly after the action, a great many exaggerated statements were put forth, to the effect that this small open town had been mercilessly bombarded by the French, and reduced to a heap of smoking ruins. It was afterwards made manifest that very few shells had been thrown into the town itself, and that the damage to the houses was but slight. When it was seen that the Prussians were retreating, the Emperor ordered the mitrailleuses to cease firing, because of the injury they would have done to the townspeople.

The respective excellence of the French and German arms of precision was first put to the test in this affair of Saarbruck. The result for the time appeared to be in favour of the French; but subsequent operations of the war led to some degree of doubt. Up to the last moment, a great deal of mystery was maintained by the French Government as to the exact nature of the mitrailleuse; but it has been described as a four-pounder gun, divided into twenty-five departments by as many gun-barrels of the chassepôt type, all loading at the breech by cartridges. The acts of loading and firing consist of only five movements, which can be repeated five times in one minute. The barrels are discharged deliberately one by one, or almost in a volley, according as the handle by which the gun is worked is turned slowly or quickly; there is no rebound, and the immovability of the piece gives fixity to the aim. As many as 7,500 balls can be discharged in an hour, and, at 800 yards, or more, repeated volleys may be poured into a circle of from ten to twelve feet in diameter. It was found by experiments before the war that, at a distance of nearly 3,000 yards, 3,500 balls hit the mark. We have just seen what was the effect of this fearful weapon in the comparatively slight engagement of August 2nd. Yet in later actions, although it unquestionably inflicted great slaughter on the Germans, it does not seem to have equalled the Prussian gun in all the requirements of active warfare. The French guns appear to have been much superior in weight of metal; but the Prussian guns are said to possess the advantage of greater mobility. A sufficient number of men to work the pieces effectively, as soon as they are unlimbered for action, are carried on seats supported by the gun axle-trees; whereas the French gunners, having no such convenience, are obliged to follow their pieces on foot, which of course interferes with rapidity of action.

The needle-gun of the Prussians is a breech-loading rifle, in which the charge is exploded by the projection of a long piece of steel (called the needle) on to the detonating powder. The processes of loading and firing are greatly facilitated by all the arrangements of this weapon; it can discharge three times to every one discharge of the muzzle-loading rifle, and it carries a great deal farther. It contributed largely to the defeat of the Austrians in 1866; but it is surpassed in sheer deadliness by the French chassepôt. At a trial made in France in the early summer of 1870, a body of eighty foot-soldiers fired, in thirty-two seconds, 326 bullets from their chassepôts, of which 159 hit the mark. It is said, however, that one of the faults of all these breech-loading weapons is that in actual conflict they encourage a flurried habit of random firing, as if rapidity were of more consequence than accuracy. A great deal of ammunition is thus thrown away, and discipline is impaired by haste and want of coolness. The Prussians, in encountering the French, generally allowed them to exhaust their fire at long range, and then, coming to closer quarters, poured in their own. Military critics, however, affirm that the chassepôt is superior to the needle-gun in rapidity of fire, in range, and in flatness of trajectory, and that the comparative smallness of its bore enables the French soldier to take a larger supply of cartridges into battle than the Prussian can carry. Some particulars with respect to the working of the two weapons in the opening days of the war were given by a correspondent of the *Standard:*—

> "M. de Katow (a journalist) got into discussion with a French lieutenant of infantry as to the range of the fire-arms of the French. The lieutenant remarked that he would soon have an opportunity of judging, and put up his glass. He called M. de Katow's attention to a group of half a dozen men close to a white house, about 1,000 or 1,200 yards off, and directed a trained marksman to dislodge them. The party adjusted their telescopes. The soldier fired, and a little cloud of dust was observed to rise from the ground about twenty mètres to the right of the Prussian party, who are described thereupon to have got among some trees. A second shot was fired, but proved a miss. Five shots were thus fired, and none of the enemy were hit. But the last hit one of the trees under which some of the Prussian vedettes were standing. Thereupon they shifted their quarters somewhat to the left. The French marksman, with his party of amateurs, then moved on to a low mound; the soldier lay down behind it and began firing, but without any result, and at the same minute two bullets whizzed past the ears of the French lookers-on. 'Hang it!' ejaculated the lieutenant, 'these fellows are not such bad shots after all;' and the next minute two more bullets went past, when M. de Katow candidly confesses that he thought it prudent to lie down."

This account certainly does not place the chassepôt in a position of pre-eminence; and it was stated by an English traveller at the same period, that in all the shooting there had then been the Prussians had had much the best of it. "We see the Frenchmen," he said, "spitting on their cartridges, sticking their fingers into their guns, and giving every possible sign that after a few shots the chassepôt gets so foul they don't know how to treat it." One cause of this fouling is to be discovered in the fact of the cartridge-case, in firing, being driven through the barrel. Another reason is said to be that, owing to the over-heating of the gun, which is said to result from the method of rifling adopted, the india-rubber plug which drives the cartridge home, and keeps the barrel air-tight, is melted, and deranges the whole weapon.

At the commencement of the war, the French military authorities forbade the presence of newspaper correspondents in the neighbourhood of the armies. The representatives of several English journals, however, hung about head-quarters, and some were arrested under the supposition that they were Prussian spies. At length, the circumstances of one case in particular were brought before the Emperor, who ordered the correspondent in question to be released, expressed gratification at the efforts made by the English in Metz to prevent the publication of news injurious to the French, and said he relied on the honour of English journalists to act with discretion and judgment; adding that he wished to preserve the most cordial relations with England. This was on the day of the taking of Saarbruck. From that time forth, the presence of correspondents was allowed; though it is to be feared they were never popular.

The Empress, on the 24th of July, visited the fleet at Cherbourg, and read the Emperor's proclamation to the French people; and a squadron, under Admiral Bouet-Willaumez, was sent, about the same time, to the North Sea, where it established a blockade, from which German commerce suffered not a little. One or two coast towns were feebly bombarded, and a few encounters took place at sea between French and German gun-boats, but nothing of consequence occurred. The blockade after a while was raised, but later in the autumn was again imposed. The inaction of the French fleet is a strange feature in the history of the war. Considering the immense naval superiority of France over Prussia, something, one would think, ought to have been performed at sea to redress the disasters of the French on land. But the summer and autumn passed without anything of importance being effected beyond the damage done to the merchant ships of Germany.

One of the objects of the French fleet seems to have been to make an imposing demonstration at Copenhagen, so as to enable the Duke de Cadore to propose an alliance to the King of Denmark with the greater effect. The Danes had a strong feeling of animosity against the Prussians, on account of the war of 1864, and the shameful way in which the Government of King William, after promising the restoration of the northern part of Schleswig, had broken its word. They had therefore every disposition to enter the field against Prussia; but the King and his Ministers were prudent enough to see that if the fortune of war should be against France, Denmark would in all probability be totally annihilated as an independent Power, in revenge for siding with the enemy of Germany.

The projected alliance was accordingly declined on the 2nd of August; and, considering the weakness of the Copenhagen Government, it does not seem that France was any great loser by the refusal.

CHAPTER III.

Weissenburg and its Situation—Prussian Attack on the French Right—General Abel Douay's Division surprised at early Dawn on the 4th of August—Nature of the Movements of the Prussian Crown Prince—Exposed Position of Douay, and the Reason why he had been placed there—Want of Precaution on the Part of the French—Advance of the Crown Prince on the Geisberg—Sanguinary Encounter, and Defeat of the French—Death of General Abel Douay—The Losses on both Sides—French Valour compromised by Deficient Generalship—Marshal MacMahon concentrates his Forces at Reichshofen—His Line of Battle—Attack by the Crown Prince, August 6th—MacMahon Outflanked after a Desperate Battle (Wörth)—Flight of the French—MacMahon's Address to the Defeated Army—Saarbruck Retaken by the Prussians—Defeat of the French at Forbach—The Emperor's Telegrams—Excitement in the Army and at Paris—Measures of the Government—Threatening Aspect of the Capital—Violent Scene in the Corps Législatif—Fall of the Ollivier Ministry, and Appointment of the Duke of Palikao to the Premiership—The French Prisoners in Germany.

The slight success obtained by the French on the 2nd of August was quickly followed by serious disasters. Nothing of consequence occurred on the 3rd; but on the 4th the Crown Prince of Prussia (in command of the 3rd Army, forming the left of the German line) made a sudden attack on the French right. At daybreak the men of General Abel Douay's division were busy preparing their breakfast on a high hill, called the Geisberg, situated about three-quarters of a mile from the town of Weissenburg. The town itself is seated on the river Lauter, just within the French frontier, and a little to the south-east of Saarbruck. It communicates by railway with the Bavarian fortress of Landau in the one direction, and with the French fortress of Haguenau in the other. In itself a fortress of considerable strength, it derives additional importance from the fact of its being connected with what are called "the lines of Weissenburg," which are works constructed along the banks of the Lauter, to protect that part of France. The country all about is hilly and woody, with cultivated fields, little hamlets, and detached cottages, much as we see in England. In the grey light of dawn, on the morning of that 4th of August, the French soldiers encamped on the Geisberg looked across


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DEPARTURE OF FRENCH TROOPS FOR METZ

a valley of no slight beauty, abounding in objects of pastoral peace and rustic comfort. It was soon, however, to be the scene of a sanguinary contest. Suddenly a storm of shells broke over the camp and the neighbouring town, setting fire to the latter. The Crown Prince of Prussia had planted his guns on the heights of Schweigen, a village on the other side of the river, in Bavaria; and, although the French had prosecuted a reconnaissance in that direction on the previous day, and had not discovered the presence of the enemy, it was now evident that a very considerable force held the ground. In fact, the Crown Prince had under his orders, in that commanding position, the greater part of the 5th and 11th Prussian corps, and the 2nd Bavarian corps — the whole variously estimated at 50,000 and 100,000 men. The French division posted in the neighbourhood of Weissenburg seems to have numbered no more than 10,000. It had been stationed there in order to protect the march of MacMahon from Strasburg, on the right of the French line, to join the forces under de Failly at Sarreguemines and Bitsche, some miles to the north-west of Weissenburg. MacMahon, being too isolated at Strasburg, had been ordered by the Emperor to close up to the left; but in so doing he was obliged to make his way through that portion of the French frontier-territory where the Rhine no longer forms the boundary, and where, in fact, there is no great natural line of demarcation. At this point the Marshal's right flank was so much exposed to the possibility of an attack by the Germans that it was thought prudent to send General Abel Douay to cover the march of MacMahon's four divisions in the locality where they were most in danger of being surprised. The precaution was a very proper one; but it seems to have been forgotten that the protecting force was in itself also liable to a sudden incursion. Nothing effectual was done to ward off such a result, and the consequences were seen in the action that took place on August 4th.



GENERAL DE FAILLY.

The country on the Bavarian side of the Lauter is so thickly wooded that the approach of the Crown Prince's army was not perceived. Its advanced posts had been stationed a few miles off, at Bergzabern, and at Veuden Junction, on the railway from Trèves. The troops, having been massed at these points during the night of the 3rd, were ready to advance by dawn on the following morning. Suddenly confronted by an immense host of adversaries, who poured across the river at various points, the French did their best to defend the position they occupied; but the task was hopeless from the first. They soon found themselves attacked in front and on both flanks. The Geisberg was stormed and carried, and a hand-to-hand conflict ensued. Douay's troops rushed forward with great spirit, leaving their knapsacks and other impediments behind them. They had only three guns, while the artillery of the Prussians was very considerable, and did so much execution that the French, after a while, took shelter behind some farmhouses near the town, from which, however, they were speedily dislodged by the terrible fire that rained upon them. The Turcos are said to have fought with extraordinary courage and resolution, repeatedly charging the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and losing large numbers from the volleys of grape-shot. The two regiments of the Line also greatly distinguished themselves, and lost many officers and men. In the course of the action a detachment of the Line arrived by rail without knowing that a battle was going forward until they reached the scene of conflict. The soldiers at once jumped out, seized their muskets, and threw themselves into the thick of the fight. At about eleven A.M. General Voscan's division began to retire; shortly afterwards, however, a new attack was ordered, and the Turcos again charged with the bayonet on one of the Prussian batteries. But no valour, however splendid, no determination, however persistent, no self-sacrifice, however heroic, could possibly have prevailed against such a vast superiority in numbers and in arms. At noon General Douay was himself struck down by a shell, and killed on the spot. General de Montmarie was wounded, and many other officers fell at the head of their men. By two o'clock P.M. it was evident that any further attempt to resist the Prussians would be attended by the utter destruction of the division. The French therefore began to retreat; but, being followed some way by the Prussian artillery, the movement was soon converted into a rout. The troops began running, making their way through the woods and vineyards to the further side of Weissenburg, and leaving behind them tents, weapons, and wounded. According to a French correspondent, the Turcos at one time took eight guns, which, however, were subsequently re-captured, after a murderous struggle, in which they suffered greatly themselves, and half destroyed a regiment of Prussian Hussars. The same writer continues:—

> "I arrived at Haguenau at eight in the evening. The streets were thronged with people talking over the sad events of the day. Then came a mournful sight—long trains of carts drawn by oxen or horses, filled with furniture and bedding, and men, women, and children in tears. They were the inhabitants of Reidseltz, Schœnenburg, and neighbouring villages, flying before the enemy. They installed themselves in the streets under the trees. A crowd surrounded them. They wept, and imagined that their villages were burnt down. Then, pouring through the Weissenburg gate, came the soldiers who had been that day engaged in this unequal struggle. They arrived weary, dead beat, having tasted no food for twenty-four hours, mourning a commander, a comrade. I questioned forty or fifty of them. They all told the same tale—that it was impossible to keep up the fight; had they only been twenty thousand, they would have driven the enemy back. Their feeble columns had more than once held him in check. A few wounded came up, leaning on their muskets: one Turco shows his arm run through by a bayonet; another carries the sword of his captain, killed by his side, and kisses the weapon of his unfortunate commander. All this is very sad, and produces an extraordinary effect at dead of night. At eleven two carts arrived filled with wounded; they were taken to the ambulances. At midnight the Sisters of Charity were running about the town in search of assistance. At one A.M. the drums beat in the street of Haguenau. The firemen were mustered, and sent along the road to pick up the wounded, and help to bury the dead."

Both sides suffered severely in this action The French are said to have had 3,000 killed and wounded; while in officers alone the Prussians lost 158, either slain or disabled, and doubtless a proportionate number of privates. The German official accounts stated that upwards of 500 unwounded prisoners, including many Turcos, fell into the hands of the attacking force, which, it was admitted, suffered severely. One gun also was captured. This is attributed in the French official account to the fact of the carriage being smashed, and the horses killed. The French troops, according to the same report, fell back upon the ridge of the Pigeonnière, which commands the line to Bitsche. The pursuit was not prosecuted very far. Some Baden troops, which had crossed the Lauter at Lauterburg, made a slight attempt to cut off the retreating force; but the flight was so rapid as soon to outstrip the victors. The Crown Prince had arrived without his two Prussian cavalry divisions, and was therefore not in a favourable position for following up his success.

In this encounter—the first serious battle of the war—the French soldier proved that his old courage and gallantry were as brilliant as ever. But he was badly led, and suffered, both in person and reputation, from the faults of indolent, purblind, and incompetent commanders. Douay's situation was so exposed as to invite attack; a comparatively small number of men were placed at the mercy of a large army; and nothing was done to guard against surprise, or to ascertain the position of the enemy. Yet, under the most disadvantageous circumstances, the French held their ground with a tenacity that nothing could surpass. Overwhelmed with immensely disproportionate numbers, they maintained a desperate and hopeless fight for nearly half a day; and, though possessed of scarcely any guns with which to oppose the sweeping artillery of the Crown Prince, they nevertheless inflicted terrible reprisals. The Germans themselves acknowledged the splendid valour with which their opponents fought after the Geisberg had been stormed. Fourteen men of the 74th were all who were left of that regiment towards the close of the day; and even those refused to surrender, but kept on fighting at the point of the bayonet, until the Prussians, not liking to kill them, rushed upon them in a body and threw them down wrestling.* As in other operations of the war, the French soldiers were at once outnumbered and out-generalled; but in courage they were only equalled, not surpassed.

On the part of the Germans nothing could be more magnificent than the way in which they stormed the Geisberg—a feat requiring the utmost courage, resolution, and force. One of the battalions engaged in this exploit lost eleven officers and 247 men. The French were stationed at the top with their chassepôts. The Germans rushed up the slope amidst a tempest of fire, without giving a single shot in response to the showers of bullets with which they were greeted, though numbers of men fell mortally stricken on the route. As soon as they gained the crest, they charged the French at the point of the bayonet, and bore them down by sheer weight. It was found by an experiment at the hospitals at Mannheim that, as a rule, two Germans weigh nearly as much as three Frenchmen. The advantage of this in a bayonet charge is obvious; and it has gone far to neutralise the superior deadliness of the French arms of precision as compared with those of Prussia.

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* Frankfort correspondent of the *Daily News*.

The death of General Douay looks like an act of voluntary self-sacrifice. When the battle was hopelessly lost he stood apart upon a mound, watching the last desperate struggles of his men. He then gave some orders to the officers of his staff, and when they had left him he descended the slope alone. At the bottom he drew a pistol, killed his charger (like Roland at the battle of Roncesvalles), and, sword in hand, began to ascend the opposite hill. "Where are you going?" he was asked by some of his soldiers. "To the enemy," he replied. They endeavoured to dissuade him, but he continued calmly to advance. In a few minutes he was struck dead.

The Baden troops who crossed the river at Lauterburg (a little town situated at the junction of the Lauter with the Rhine) made a reconnaissance in the direction of Seltz, took possession of thirty boats which they found on the banks, and re-crossed, with but little molestation, to the German side of the Rhine. In accomplishing this exploit they lost only one lieutenant and two men killed, and one man wounded. These repeated reconnaissances testify to the vigour, enterprise, and daring with which the Germans opened the war, and by virtue of which, even more than by superiority of numbers, they were enabled to vanquish their enemy.

Unfortunate and mortifying for the French as the defeat at Weissenburg undoubtedly was, it was of small moment compared with the blows which followed on the 6th of August. As soon as he heard of the defeat of Douay, MacMahon moved to Reichshofen, at the foot of the Vosges Mountains, and was there joined by the remnant of the discomfited division, who endeavoured to persuade him that the force advancing from Landau was so large that it was impossible to encounter it even with the whole corps which the Marshal had under his command. An able and courageous general was not likely to listen to these arguments of fear; and MacMahon accordingly took up a strong defensive position fifteen miles to the south-west of Weissenburg. His forces certainly did not exceed 55,000 men,* whom he disposed in a semi-circular line, looking for the most part to the north-east. The right wing, which was thrown back, and followed the line of the great road and railway from Weissenburg along the Rhine to Strasburg, occupied the summit of some neighbouring hills, and extended from Morsbronn to Elsasshausen. From the latter place the centre reached to the heights in front of Fröschwiller, and, by reason of a jutting hill detached from the main line of eminences, was thrust out towards the enemy in the direction of Wörth and Gorsdorf. The left terminated in a mound covering the village of Reichshofen, and was protected by a wood. It was also in proximity to a branch of the railway already mentioned, turning off from the main line at Haguenau, and traversing the Vosges by the pass of Bitsche.

The scenery around these positions is of the same character as that in the immediate vicinity of Weissenburg. Indeed, the place of Douay's defeat, and that which was about to be signalised by the rout of MacMahon, are not far apart, and form portions of the same general country. Alsace is a picturesque province, woody and mountainous, here broken up into charming valleys, there spreading out into fair stretches of fields, watered by many runnels and quiet inland rivulets. Through this country the Crown Prince, coming in a southwesterly direction from Weissenburg, steadily made his way during the 5th, and on the evening of that day was close to the French position. He had 130,000 men under his command (140,000 according to MacMahon); so that the French were again greatly overmatched. The Prussian cavalry and some other detachments being still in the rear, the Prince, notwithstanding his known superiority of numbers, would gladly have postponed giving battle for some little while, owing, probably, to the strength of the enemy's position; but a skirmish between his outposts and those of the French precipitated a general collision at seven o'clock on the morning of the 6th. At that hour the Prussians, together with two Bavarian corps and the Wurtemberg division, showed themselves in advance of the heights of

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* The Marshal himself, in his report of the battle, says 35,000. Some accounts, however, place the number at 40 000; others at 55,000.

Gorsdorf, coming along the hills which run east of Wörth and of the rivulet called the Sauer. They at once commenced a cannonade, quickly followed by vigorous movements against the first and third divisions. MacMahon, fearing that the whole position of his army would be turned, ordered his first division to effect a change of front in advance upon its right wing, thus acting upon Fröschwiller as a pivot, and so altering his line of battle as to transform it from a figure describing two sides of a square, of which Fröschwiller was the angle, to a figure consisting of only one side, stretched out nearly in a straight line. Foiled in their attempts against the French left, the Germans now attacked the centre, but were repulsed with great loss. At one time, about the middle of the day, MacMahon seemed likely to win; but shortly after twelve o'clock a tremendous attack was directed against his right by the 11th Prussian corps. This assault was aided by sixty guns placed on the heights of Gunstett. It was met by the French in a series of desperate infantry charges, and equally frantic endeavours on the part of the Cuirassiers to ride down the force opposed to them. The work performed by the latter was, indeed, so terrible that, on a certain regiment being ordered to charge the Prussian infantry, which was stationed behind inclosures, the colonel solemnly took leave of MacMahon, being persuaded that he and the greater number of his men were going to certain death. The result proved, in all but one respect, the accuracy of his prevision. Three-fourths of the regiment were mown down; but the colonel himself escaped.

As the day wore on it became apparent that the French could not possibly maintain their ground. Their right was gradually out-flanked, and at four o'clock Marshal MacMahon gave the order to retreat. The movement was begun from the right, and was protected by the left, which still occupied the positions of Fröschwiller and Reichshofen. Owing to this local advantage, the main body, according to the report of Marshal MacMahon to the Emperor, was enabled to retire without being seriously annoyed. Other accounts, however, state that, after quitting the field, the French troops, without being pressed to any great degree (for the Bavarian and Wurtemberg horse who were in pursuit did not penetrate very far into the hills) gave way to one of those unreasoning panics to which armies in retreat are frequently liable. They fled southward through Haguenau to Strasburg, where, 3,000 arrived without arms, and were at once embodied in the rather small garrison of the latter fortress. Some of these men were on foot; others had taken the horses from the guns, and mounted them to secure their own safety, utterly regardless of the guns themselves falling into the hands of the Prussians. The left and the centre were scarcely more composed; they could not be rallied by the utmost exertions of their officers; and it is said that only three of the infantry regiments kept their ranks. Nearly all the personal staff of MacMahon were killed, and he himself was greatly exhausted, having been fifteen hours in the saddle. He arrived at Saverne the following evening by a cross march through the hills.

Two reasons for the defeat of this celebrated general are perhaps to be found in the alleged facts that his infantry and guns had spent all their ammunition by three o'clock in the afternoon, and that he was not supported by his reserves, which were unable to reach him from Strasburg by the railway from that place, owing to the defeat at Weissenburg having compelled the Marshal to abandon the line. One of de Failly's divisions, however, which, in consequence of a telegraphic error, had been prevented from joining MacMahon in time for the battle of Wörth, came up by rail from Bitsche to Niederbronn, and helped to cover the retreat. The losses on both sides are not precisely stated; but they were heavy, and, reckoning the 4,000 or 6,000 prisoners taken by the Germans, the French, at the end of the retreat, were minus 24,000 men. The Prussians also took two eagles, six mitrailleuses, and thirty guns. In a telegram from King William to Queen Augusta, the victorious army is described as having fired a salute of one hundred and one guns in honour of its own achievement.

Marshal MacMahon addressed the following proclamation to his army on a subsequent day:—

> "Soldiers!—On the 6th of August the fortune of war betrayed your courage. You lost your positions only after an heroic resistance which lasted not less than nine hours. You were 35,000 against 140,000, and were overwhelmed by numbers. Under such conditions a defeat is glorious, and history will record that at the battle of Fröschwiller the French displayed the greatest valour. You have experienced heavy loss; but that of the enemy is heavier still. If he did not pursue you, it was because you had hit him so hard. The Emperor is satisfied with you, and the whole country thanks you for having so worthily upheld the honour of your flag. We have had a great ordeal to go through. You must forget it. The First Corps is about to be reorganised, and, with God's help, we shall soon take a brilliant revenge.
>
> "MACMAHON."

In despatches from the Emperor's camp afterwards sent to Paris, it was pointed out that the corps of Bazaine, l'Admirault, Felix Douay (elder brother of the unfortunate commander at Weissenburg), and Canrobert, together with the Imperial Guard—comprising twenty-one divisions of infantry and eight of cavalry—had not then been injured by the enemy, so that there was no occasion for alarm or depression. Nor, indeed, was there, as a mere matter of reason; but the public, with that quick instinct of coming misfortune which is often so mysteriously shown, was excited and scared beyond measure; a state of mind which the concluding words of the Emperor's telegram to the Empress, of August 7th—"All may yet be re-established"—rather increased than allayed.*

It can be readily understood that the defeat of such a general as Marshal MacMahon must have had a very bad effect on the impressionable nature of the French. At the period in question the Marshal had just entered his sixty-third year—an age not too advanced for activity of mind and body, yet sufficiently so for a great range and variety of experience. He had served with distinction in Algeria, and had acquired a brilliant name in the Crimea, where, as a General of Division, he largely contributed to the successful assault of the Malakoff. Further African successes followed the conclusion of the Russian war; but it was in the Italian war of 1859 that MacMahon finally established his reputation as one of the ablest commanders of the age. He was placed at the head of the Second Army Corps, but was really the acting commander-in-chief, in association with the Emperor. At the battle of Magenta he rendered such important services at a critical moment, when the French were in great danger of defeat, that the Emperor nominated him, on the field itself, Duke of Magenta and Marshal of France. From that time forward he was generally regarded as a man of special mark in the theory and practice of war; and great reliance was placed on his skill, enterprise, and judgment, at the breaking out of hostilities with Prussia. That he should now be defeated was not his fault; but it shook the faith of the French public in his invincibility. Civilians are too apt to judge of the capacity of a general on principles they do not apply to the conduct of others. If a military chief has had a long career of success, it is assumed that he cannot possibly fail, unless by the culpable neglect of his former methods of procedure. Circumstances are not taken into account when an idol proves to be merely mortal; and it is not too much to say that an unfortunate general is doubly at a disadvantage when he has an array of brilliant antecedents to appeal to. MacMahon was so placed that defeat was inevitable; but the position was not of his own choosing. The Emperor would have done more wisely in retaining the Duke of Magenta at his side, as in Italy, instead of Lebœuf.

The Crown Prince of Prussia, now the conqueror of MacMahon, had distinguished himself in a high degree during the war with Austria in 1866, when he was largely instrumental in the great success of Könniggrätz. He was at that time only thirty-five years of age, and was therefore thirty-nine at the outbreak of the war with France. His fame is now assured as one of the first generals of Europe; and his repute was largely enhanced by so signal a triumph over the hero of Magenta.

While the battle of Wörth, as it is called, was being fought and lost, other events of an unfortunate character for the French were proceeding at no great distance. The drill-ground heights overlooking Saarbruck had been occupied since the action of the 2nd of August up to the evening of the 5th by General Frossard, with the second corps, numbering about 28,000 men and 72 guns. Fearing another surprise like that of Abel Douay on the 4th, the Emperor ordered Frossard to withdraw his whole force to the Spicheren heights, running parallel with those of Saarbruck, but of much greater altitude. Between the two ranges lies an open plain, by which an enemy designing to attack the front of the Spicheren would be obliged to approach, and would therefore be clearly in sight. The Spicheren is a broad square bluff, running boldly out from a range of wooded hills, following the line of the road to Forbach. This spur was the key of the French position in the battle now about to be described. "To the right of it," says Mr. Innes Shand, "the steep range of hills runs back to Forbach; to its left, the ground dips gradually, until, about half a mile off, the hills lose themselves in the meadows.* To right and left, from plain to sky-line, the hills in general are densely wooded; the Spicherenberg alone is bare of cover, except for a solitary orchard to its left; while over its brow you look across to a naked table-land, dotted only with a few fruit trees and a group of poplars. So steep is it in places that no soil will hold on the gravel banks; wherever industry had a chance, it has contrived to cultivate patches of green. It was against this tremendous natural wall, over this exposed plain, through a storm of shot, shell, and rifle-balls, that the Germans launched their columns."* Forbach (after which the battle is called) is situated some six miles from Saarbruck; and the village of Spicheren is about three miles and a half, in a direct line, from the Spicheren heights.

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* See Appendix iii., Vol. II., p. 544, "Imperial Correspondence."

* It would appear that there is an error in this description of Mr. Shand's, and that we should read left for right, and right for left.

Having been reinforced by one division of Bazaine's corps, Frossard seems to have had under his command about 40,000 men. The Germans brought four divisions into action, and, though apparently less numerous than the French in the early part of the day, were probably in excess of them before the conclusion of the battle, in the course of which they were three times reinforced. A correspondent of the *Times*, who witnessed the battle from a distance, gives it as his opinion that the German artillery, in comparison with the French, was as three to one; but, judged by the light of other accounts, it would appear that this is an exaggeration. On the morning of the 6th (the day of Wörth) the French were posted on the Spicheren, and the leading division of the First Prussian Army arrived at Saarbruck under General von Kameke, and was pushed somewhat forward, in order to ascertain whether the enemy were really in retreat. From the Saarbruck heights the Prussians discovered the French forces in their new position; and General Göben, who had command of the troops that had been sent in advance, determined on attacking the enemy, feeling tolerably secure in the consciousness that large reinforcements were at his back, and at no great distance. In the early part of the day the Prussians made repeated attacks on the steep sides of the Spicheren; but, notwithstanding the heroic courage they exhibited in hurling their masses against this formidable position, they were constantly driven back, until, by a skilful flank movement towards Forbach, they were enabled to carry the Spicheren, and to turn the French left, simultaneously with a vigorous assault on the right. The effect of this was to cut the French off from the direct road to Metz, which road was now in the hands of



THE CROWN PRINCE OF PRUSSIA.

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* "On the Trail of the War." Chapter V.



Map of the Country between

PARIS AND BERLIN.

Boundaries thus..............

Railways " ————

Emden
BREMEN
R. Weser
R. Elbe
BERLIN
Zuider Zee
AMSTERDAM
HOLLAND
HANOVER
Brunswick
Osnabruck
Magdeburg
ROTTERDAM
Arnhem
Ostende
Calais
Ghent
ANTWERP
PRUSSIA
Halle
Leipzig
Cassel
Sonderhausen
Gotha
RHINE
Dusseldorf
COLOGNE
BELGIUM
BRUSSELS
Lille
Liege
AIX LA CHAPELLE
Rhine
Mons
Abbeville
Amiens
R. Meuse
COBLENZ
PR
Meiningen
Coburg
FRANKFURT
R. Main
BAVARIA
Havre
Rouen
R. Seine
St Quentin
Breteuil
Mezieres
Sedan
R. Moselle
MAYENCE
Laon
R. Aisne
Beaumont
Treves
Luxemburg
Montmedy
Wurzburg
Mannheim
Soissons
R. Oise
Rheims
Thionville
Gravelotte
Verdun
Saarbruck
Forbach
Spires
Ansbach
NURNBERG
Versailles
PARIS
Epernay
CHALONS
METZ
St Avold
Worth
KARLSRUHE
REGENSBURG
Nogent le Rotrou
Pont a Mousson
Bitche
Wissembourg
R. Aube
NANCY
R. Meurthe
STUTTGART
FRANCE
Nogent
Troyes
STRASBOURG
Kehl
WURTEMBERG
Chevilly
Orleans
Bar sur Aube
Bar sur Seine
VOSGES
Ulm
AUGSBURG
MUNICH
R. Yonne
Seine
Colmar
R. Rhine
Frieburg
BADEN
R. Loire
Tours
Nevers
Dijon
BASLE
L. of Constance
SWITZERLAND

the Germans. Thus foiled once more, the French made a hasty retreat by night in a southerly direction, reaching Metz by a circuitous route, and in great confusion and alarm. The struggle did not terminate till dark, and the victors, hardly aware of the exact nature of the situation, made no attempt at pursuit. The Imperial Guard, which was sent from Metz during the action, at Frossard's requisition, arrived too late to be of any essential service. Here, again, the French loss in prisoners was serious, amounting, it is said, to 2,000.

At Spicheren, as at Weissenburg, the French were taken by surprise. The special correspondent of the *Times* says that at the moment the attack began the arms of the infantry regiments were piled, and the men were lying about, cooking, cleaning their accoutrements, or idling at their ease. The gunners were equally unprepared, and it was evident that not the least suspicion was entertained of the neighbourhood of the enemy. These observations had scarcely been made when the roar of a cannon was heard close at hand. It was then discovered that a Prussian battery, posted on the external slope of the heights which the French had abandoned the evening before, had opened fire on some troops in the farther extremity of the valley. In a moment all was activity in the French camp. The battery of artillery was got into position facing up the valleys; the infantry flew to their arms, the tents were struck, and a working party was soon throwing up entrenchments in front. The woods on the opposite side of the plain were after a time filled by the Prussian infantry, who kept up a murderous fire on their opponents in the open, and on some of their artillery. The French alternately retired and advanced, and the slaughter was terrible. "Obviously," says this correspondent, "the French fought at a tremendous disadvantage; and the effect produced by the fire of their tirailleurs upon the enemy, who kept themselves carefully concealed, must have been infinitely less than that which was directed against them from the dense cover of the woods. It would be impossible to overrate the dash and valour of the French infantry at this point, or to pay too high a tribute to their endurance under such trying circumstances. A hundred times they advanced close up to the wood with a desperate impetuosity, but, although they did all that could be expected of mortal men, they were always obliged to retire, and from our position we could see them dropping in scores at each successive advance or retreat—a truly lamentable sight. This sort of fighting appeared to me to go steadily on for a couple of hours, the artillery being engaged incessantly on the right, and the contest between the French in the open and the Prussians in the wood never flagging for an instant." When, at one period, the Prussian tirailleurs in the thickets ventured out of cover, they were so vigorously opposed by the Chasseurs de Vincennes that they "at once gave way, and made a hasty and undignified retreat to their friendly woods." Both armies were reinforced during the combat—the Prussians at each extremity of their line, the French only at their right and right-centre. Accordingly, when the French left found themselves opposed by large masses of fresh troops, they were compelled to retreat.

The most devoted heroism was displayed by French and Germans alike in this sanguinary conflict. Amongst the former, the 76th and 77th Infantry of the Line, and the 3rd Chasseurs-à-pied, were nearly annihilated. Of the 77th only a captain and six men were left alive and unwounded. The dismay among the people of a neighbouring village, when the retreating French poured through, was piteous to witness. The *Times* correspondent writes:—

"When we had reached the summit of the heights, and were actually out of immediate danger of the Prussian shot and shell—when, in fact, the poor people could think of something beyond the instant peril of life and limb—they seemed suddenly to realise the entire ruin which had fallen upon them; they also began to think of their families and friends, who were all scattered, flying in desperation through the deep woods, where the darkness was deepening with the falling night. Such scenes of anguish and misery I never saw before, and hope never again to see. Mothers who had lost their children seeking for them with frantic cries and gesticulations; old, tottering men and women stumbling feebly along, laden with some of their poor household gods, silent with the silent grief of age; little children, only half conscious of what all these things meant, tripping along, often leading some cherished household pet, and seeking for some friendly hand to guide them; husbands supporting their wives, carrying their little ones (sometimes two or three) on their shoulders, and encouraging the little family group with brave and tender words; the woods ringing with shrieks and lamentations, with prayers to the Saviour and the Virgin. It is impossible to describe in language the sadness and the pathos of that most mournful exodus."

A frightful scene was presented by the battlefield, which was visited the next day by a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*. He says:—"The woods to the left were, as I anticipated, filled with wounded, whose piteous cries were heart-rending to hear. On the crest of the hill the Prussian uniforms lay very thick. I counted more than one hundred and fifty to about thirty of the French. This was the hard-fought-for point, and where all the slaughter took place—I say, advisedly, slaughter, for it was nothing less. The unfortunate men were still being carried into Saarbruck at twelve o'clock to-day; I leave you to imagine their sufferings all night long without a drop of water. All branches of the service seemed to have suffered, for I picked up a lancet and some surgical instruments close to the body of a doctor, who had evidently been shot whilst employed in attending to a wounded man."

These two defeats, occurring on the same day, and completely scattering the French right and centre—to say nothing of the previous disaster of August 4th—placed the Imperial armies in a position of much gravity. The Emperor scarcely attempted to conceal this. On the following day (Sunday, August 7th) he sent five telegraphic messages to Paris, of which the first ran thus :—

"Metz, Sunday, 3.30 A.M.

"My communication with MacMahon being interrupted, I had no news from him up to yesterday. It is General l'Aigle who announces to me that MacMahon has lost a battle against considerable forces, and that he has retired in good order. On another side, on the Saar, an engagement commenced about one o'clock. It did not appear to be very serious, when little by little the masses of the enemy considerably increased, without, however, obliging the second corps to retreat. It was only between six and seven o'clock in the evening that, the masses of the enemy becoming continually more compact, the second corps and the regiments which supported it retired on the heights. The night has been quiet. I go to place myself at the centre of the position.

"NAPOLEON."

The second message says that in the engagement at Forbach only the Third Army Corps was concerned, supported by two divisions of other corps, and that the corps of Generals l'Admirault and de Failly, with the Imperial Guard, did not take part in the fight. The Emperor adds that "at five o'clock the Prussians appeared to be repulsed, and to have abandoned the attack;" but that, when a fresh corps arrived from Werden, General Frossard was obliged to retreat. The troops which had been temporarily divided were concentrated at Metz. Of the affair at Wörth, the Emperor alleges that "the Prussians had mitrailleuses, which caused much harm"—a statement of doubtful accuracy. The third message contains the sentence about all being yet recovered; and the others had reference to some of the details and rumours of the hour, concluding with an appeal to the patriotism of Paris and France. "In order to sustain us here," telegraphed the Emperor from Metz, "it is necessary that Paris and France should consent to make great efforts of patriotism. Here we lose neither our coolness nor our confidence; but the trial is a serious one." The phlegmatic Emperor saw the truth, and did not attempt to disguise it.

The feeling of rage in the army was of course very great. A war correspondent of the French journal, the *Soir*, wrote :—"There is but one cry in our army, and this cry I heard on the field of battle at Forbach, in the midst of the Prussian balls and bullets: 'Let them give us a leader in whom we can have confidence.' Officers, soldiers, every one, repeated this expression. The meanest corporal in the army would have known better how to lead his men into fire. One example among a thousand. The whole Prussian frontier is covered with woods in which the enemy shelter; therefore all the manœuvres of the Prussians escape us, and we wander like blind men. Marshal MacMahon asked the Emperor by telegraph for instructions to burn these woods. The Emperor refused from motives of humanity. Thus, through humanity we have allowed our troops at Weissenburg to be crushed, and for humanity's sake we have caused the death of tens of thousands of men. On the left of Spicheren are woods which enabled the Prussians to conceal their movements, and these woods also sheltered the hostile mitrailleuses on the left of Forbach, and enabled them to pour their mitraille on our decimated regiments, exhausted by a gigantic struggle for ten hours. All our troops are scattered along the frontier, division by division, regiment by regiment." A curious illustration of the want of management and organisation in the French army is to be found in a little incident which happened shortly after the battle of Wörth. A train containing a thousand French soldiers was proceeding from Haguenau to Bitsche, in ignorance of the advance of the Prussians beyond Weissenburg. The engine was stopped by a body of Prussian infantry, and the whole of the Frenchmen were taken prisoners, without making any resistance. On the other hand, the perfection of the German arrangements, in every respect, was acknowledged by a retired French officer, Captain Jeannerod, in a communication to the *Temps*. The captain was taken prisoner at the Saarbruck affair, and, speaking of what he observed in the forests beyond the town, he says :—"There were outposts under the trees, battalions massed along the roads; and let nobody try to deceive the public in a manner unworthy of our country and of our present circumstances. From the first step I had recognised the characteristics which announce an excellent army, as well as a nation powerfully organised for war. In what consisted these characteristics? In everything. The demeanour of the men, the subordination of their smallest movements to chiefs protected by a discipline far stronger than ours, the gaiety of some, the serious and determined look of others, the patriotism to which most of them gave vent, the thorough and constant zeal of the officers, and, above all, the moral worth—of which we may envy them—of the non-commissioned officers; that is what struck me at once, and what has never been from under my eyes, during the two days I passed in the midst of that army and in that country, where signboards placed from distance to distance, with the numbers of the local battalions of the Landwehr, recall the effort of which it is capable in a moment of danger and of ambition." The same writer speaks of the lax discipline, carelessness, indolence, profligacy, frivolity, ignorance, disposition to avoid trouble and suffering, and absence of the commonest precautions of safety, which he had remarked in the army of his own countrymen. He writes with evident bitterness, and it is difficult to avoid suspecting some exaggeration. The characteristics to which he alludes were certainly not those of French armies in former times, nor even in the recent days of the Crimean and Italian wars. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that in the Franco-German war itself many of the old virtues of the French soldier were again magnificently displayed. Yet that the army had in some respects deteriorated, and that its discipline was terribly relaxed, are truths which cannot be denied.

Paris was thrown into a state of the utmost excitement by the news of the defeats at Weissenburg, Wörth, and Forbach. Some were wildly exasperated; others gloomily depressed. The weather was sultry and thunderous, and a fatal cloud seemed to be settling down over the capital and the country. In old times men would have seen evil auguries in the heavens and on the earth; would have beheld armies in the clouds rushing forward "to join their dark encounter in mid-air;" would have fancied the passes of fiery swords in every flash of lightning, and heard the shock of earthquake in every roll of thunder. But we live in more prosaic times, and Paris simply read the newspapers, and raged against the Emperor, the generals, and the bad luck of the troops. M. Edmond About shrieked with rage and sorrow in the columns of the journal to which he was accredited; and others fully equalled him in the frenzies of grief and vituperation. There is something essentially feminine in the character of the Parisian population, which differs from that of the provincial French in a marked degree; and this tendency to a species of hysteria was very mischievously developed in the early days of August, and again later on. Business matters, however, were not wholly neglected in the indulgence of emotion. The Council of Ministers sat permanently. M. Rouher and M. Schneider, the Presidents of the Senate and Corps Législatif, were called to the Tuileries, where the Empress-Regent arrived at five o'clock on Sunday morning, August 7th, and issued the following proclamation:—

> "Frenchmen!—The opening of the war has not been in our favour. Our arms have suffered a check. Let us be firm under this reverse, and let us hasten to repair it. Let there be among us but a single party, that of France—but a single flag, the flag of our national honour. I come in your midst. Faithful to my mission and to my duty, you will see me first, where danger threatens, to defend the flag of France. I call upon all good citizens to preserve order. To disturb it would be to conspire with our enemies.
>
> "Eugénie."

On the same day Paris was declared in a state of siege, and the Senate and Corps Législatif were summoned. Monday evening saw the walls of Paris covered with a proclamation signed by all the Ministers, in which the people were exhorted to "rise quivering, and sworn to fight the great fight." Those of a colder race will think that there was something too much of "quivering." "To a momentarily successful audacity," the proclamation continued, "we will oppose a union which conquers destiny. Let us fall back upon ourselves, and our invaders will hurl themselves against a rampart of human breasts. As in 1792, and at Sebastopol, let our reverses be the school of our victories. It would be a crime to doubt for an instant the safety of our country; and a greater still not to do our part to secure it. Up, then, up! and you, inhabitants of the Centre, the North, and the South, upon whom the burthen of war does not fall, hasten with unanimous enthusiasm to the help of your brethren in the East. Let France, united in success, be still more united under trial; and may God bless our arms!" An article in the *Journal Officiel* of the 8th was expressed in similar terms, and the world was told that "the attitude of the [French] people is not one of discouragement; it is one of sublime and patriotic rage against the invaders of France, who in France must find a tomb." Considering that France had begun the war by an attempted invasion of Prussia, the "rage" was a little out of place; and when we recollect that the reverses at that time sustained by the Emperor's armies were not by any means of an overwhelming character, the degree of excitement seems unwarranted by the situation. Yet it was, perhaps, justified by subsequent events, of which the popular mind, in the midst of all its trembling eagerness of defiance, appears to have had some obscure premonition.

A report, dated August 7th, was presented to the Empress by General Dejean, the *ad interim* Minister of War, in which it was pointed out that circumstances made it requisite that measures should be taken for the defence of Paris, and for the raising of fresh troops. The external forts of the capital were described as fully armed, and other works were to be commenced the next day, so that the city would soon be in a condition to sustain a regular siege. The voids in the army by the losses of the last few days were to be filled by drafts from other regiments, by the incorporation of the Gardes Mobiles, and by the formation, from a portion of the gendarmerie, of regiments which would be constituted as a *corps d'élite.* In this way a force of 150,000 men could be placed in the field. The conscripts of 1869, who within a month would be "true soldiers," would add another 60,000. Then there would be the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and other arms; the volunteer companies of Francs-tireurs; and the sedentary Garde Nationale. Altogether, said the War Minister, France could call to arms two millions of defenders. Their muskets were ready, and there would still remain one million in reserve. This report was followed by a decree providing that all capable citizens between thirty and forty years of age, not already forming part of the sedentary Garde Nationale, should be incorporated in it; entrusting the Garde Nationale with the defence of the capital; and intimating that a Bill would be prepared for the consideration of the Legislature, with a view to the incorporation in the Garde Nationale Mobile of all citizens under thirty-three years of age who were not already included in that force.

Such were the measures taken by the Government to meet the crisis. They had but little effect in pacifying the discontent and feverish agitation of the Parisians. When the news of the defeat at Weissenburg reached the capital on the 5th, the people were furious. The Government had kept back the news, and it was first learnt, towards evening, from the English journals—a fact which greatly increased the popular exasperation. At about five o'clock P.M. a mob was collected round a money-changer's shop, at the corner of the Rue Richelieu, kept by Messrs. Leon and Dreher, agents of the Russian Embassy. The people were looking at the last quotations of the Bourse, when some one, on leaving the shop, remarked that the Prussians had had their turn. This was understood to be an allusion to Weissenburg, and a rush was made at the shop, which was quickly closed. A reassuring placard was then stuck up; but an immense crowd hung about the place all the evening, singing the "Marseillaise," and shouting "Death to the Prussians!" A gentleman who was supposed to look like a German was set upon and nearly murdered; windows were broken; and the rioting continued some hours, until the street was cleared by the Garde de Paris.

To make matters worse, a report got abroad on the following day that the Prussians had suffered a severe defeat, and that the Crown Prince, being captured and brought before the Emperor, had shot himself. The news spread all over Paris with extraordinary rapidity. The Bourse was greatly affected, and Rente ran up to 69f. 50c. The brokers kept waving their hats, and shouting patriotic exclamations; while the crowds on the Place de la Bourse, the Rue Vivienne, and the Boulevards, were so dense as to put a stop to the progress of carriages, omnibuses, &c. "As if by magic," says a writer from the spot, "flags were hoisted in every window. Capoul, the tenor of the Opéra Comique, was recognised on the Place de la Bourse, forced up on to the roof of a Passy omnibus, and made to sing the 'Marseillaise.' Madame Sass and Madame Gueymard went down the Boulevard in a cab, singing the 'Marseillaise,' and collecting subscriptions for the wounded. Here and there a solitary sceptic, who ventured to wonder whether the news could be true, was roughly handled. One of these indiscreet persons, a gentlemanly-looking man, evidently unaware of the danger of irritating a Parisian mob, would have been torn to pieces but for the presence of mind of the concierge of the house No. 40, Rue Vivienne, who pulled him in, and shut the door in the face of his pursuers." After about an hour and a half of this pleasurable excitement, it occurred to many that it was strange the news had not been posted up. A number of persons rushed to the Ministry of the Interior, and were informed that no such intelligence had been received. In their passionate disappointment, the mob declared that the false report had been got up for stock-jobbing purposes. Cries were raised of "Down with the Bourse!" "Down with the money-dealers!" "Hang them! Shoot them!" A strong body rushed up the steps of the building, and a fight ensued, ending in the mob gaining possession of the enclosure, from which, however, the business men had by that



CAPTURE OF MITRAILLEUSES BY THE BAVARIANS AT WÖRTH.

time escaped. The people were afterwards expelled by the Garde de Paris. They wandered about the town, shouting "To Berlin!" and ordering the flags to be taken in. Then they went to the Ministry of Justice, and called for M. Ollivier, who appeared on the balcony, and, addressing the crowd, said that a foul manœuvre had been practised, and that as soon as the Government received any news it would publish it. He begged the people to be calm and self-possessed, and it was subsequently announced that the author of the false report had been arrested. The mob at length dispersed of its own free will. The establishment of Messrs. Leon and Dreher remained closed all day; and on the shutters was written the sentence, "This is a French, not a Prussian firm."



PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES.

Sunday, the 7th, was far from being a day of rest. The streets were again crowded; seditious cries were uttered, and people began openly to talk of a radical change of government. Several arrests were made, and the night closed in gloomily and threateningly. A day or two afterwards, a declaration, signed by seventeen Deputies, members of the Left or Republican party, including M. Jules Favre, M. Grèvy, and M. Picard, was published, in which the immediate arming of all the citizens of Paris was demanded. The newspaper organs of the party made the same requisition. On Tuesday, the 9th, matters looked still more menacing. The important parts of the town were occupied by troops, who surrounded the Corps Législatif. The police made repeated charges on the mob, many of whom were apprehended. The Chambers having assembled, M. Parrieu in the Senate, and M. Ollivier in the Corps Législatif, required an authorisation for a levy *en masse*, and requested that the general organisation of the National Guard, the incorporation of a part of the Garde Mobile in the regular army, and other military measures, should be approved. A member of the Legislative Chamber proposed that the Presidency of the Ministry should be conferred on General Trochu; and M. Jules Favre moved that a Committee of Defence be constituted by the Chambers. The latter proposal was rejected by 190 to 53 votes; but the fall of the Ollivier Ministry was close at hand. M. Duvernois having carried against the Government a motion declaring that "the Chamber, being determined to support a Cabinet capable of organising the defence of the country, passes to the order of the day," the sitting was suspended, and, on its resumption, M. Ollivier announced that he had conferred with the Empress, and that, with the consent of the Emperor, General Montauban, Count of Palikao, had been charged with the formation of a new Cabinet. Thus, after little more than a seven months' tenure of office, the Ollivier Ministry, from which so much was hoped, passed away in storm and darkness in national humiliation and general distrust. The tendency of most men being to weigh heavily on those who have failed, whatever excuses may really exist in the pressure of circumstances, M. Ollivier has been bitterly criticised, both here and abroad. But it may fairly be said of him that he showed the possibility of reconciling Imperialism with progressive reforms; and, though he may have committed some errors, he compromised neither the country's honour nor his own. No Ministry in France could have stood against the damaging effect of such disasters. The war was not of M. Ollivier's making; but the Premier had the misfortune to be identified with its failures. He fell through the default of others.

After M. Ollivier's statement, the Corps Législatif declared urgent all the propositions submitted by the Minister of War. M. Jules Favre demanded the immediate armament and complete organisation of the National Guard in Paris and the departments, on the basis of the law of 1831. He also required that the Emperor should relinquish the command of the army, which his incapacity had compromised, and that the Legislative Body should take in hand the direction of the affairs of the country. Count Kératry demanded the abdication of the Emperor, and a disgraceful scene of tumult took place. Members shouted and shrieked at one another; shook their fists in each other's faces, and in some instances, it is said, resorted to actual personal violence. The discussion was at length declared to be closed, and the sitting was suspended; but the whole aspect of affairs was ominous for the Imperial system. Outside, the crowd increased, and angry murmurs went up and down. It was found necessary to clear the bridges and quays leading to the Chamber by charges of cavalry; but these were executed gently, and with so much care that no one was hurt. The excitement diminished after Tuesday, the 9th; yet every one felt that nothing but a brilliant military success could save the dynasty. That success never came.

At Berlin also there was excitement; but it was the excitement of victory. The French prisoners were kindly received in the several German towns they passed through: and so the days wore on in triumph and disaster—in the trembling of one great Empire to its fall, and the rise of another to yet prouder heights.

CHAPTER IV.

The Emperor Resigns the Command of the Army to Marshal Bazaine—Previous Career of that Officer—Character of the King of Prussia's Telegrams—Excessive Barbarity of Prussian Soldiers—Continued Retreat of the French—MacMahon and de Failly arrive at Châlons—Mutinous Conduct of the Gardes Mobiles—Bazaine's Force at Metz—Movements of the Emperor after Resigning the Command—Progress of the Prussian Crown Prince—Capitulation of Fortresses—Proclamation of the King of Prussia to the French People—Preparations for Attacking the French Army at Metz—The Prussians Cross the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson—Assault on the French Positions to the East of Metz (August 14th)—The French Continue their Retreat—Marshal Bazaine attacked by the Prussians at Vionville, to the West of Metz (August 16th)—Prussian Misrepresentation as to the Result of the Action—Bazaine Alters his Position on the 17th—Battle of Gravelotte (August 18th)—Prolonged and Sanguinary Struggle—Defeat of the French, who are driven back to Metz—Prussian Despatches with Reference to the Battle—German Complaints of English Violation of Neutrality—Correspondence between Count Bernstorff and Lord Granville.

Impressed, as it would seem, with the conviction that he was not competent to the control of a large army under circumstances of difficulty and disaster, and perhaps desiring to get back to Paris in order to repress any disorders which might ensue on the receipt of unfavourable news, the Emperor Napoleon, on the 9th of August (the same day which saw the fall of the Ollivier Ministry), resigned the command of the troops into the hands of Marshal Bazaine. This general can boast a varied and striking career. When a youth he failed to pass the examination required for admission into the École Polytechnique, and accordingly enlisted as a private soldier. He first served in Africa, and rapidly attained the rank of lieutenant. In 1837 he went to Spain as captain of a small body of troops whom Louis Philippe lent to Queen Christina, to help her to put down the Carlists. In subsequent years he returned to Algeria, and in 1854 was sent to the Crimea, where he soon became general of division. It was he who had command of the expedition to Kinburn, which he captured. In the Italian war of 1859 he distinguished himself very much, and in 1862 was appointed to a command in the unfortunate and reprehensible expedition to Mexico. The supreme command was originally in the hands of Marshal Forey; but Bazaine succeeded to the post in 1863. For a time he seemed to be effecting the subjugation of the country, and it is certain that he fought many brilliant actions, and propped up the insecure throne of the Emperor Maximilian with the force and energy of his operations. But the cause was rotten and hopeless, and Bazaine had the mortification of being obliged to return to France with a discomfited army, and the stain of failure in an attempt which even success could not have very brightly gilded. He had earned the exalted rank of Marshal of France, however, and he seems to have acted throughout with as much credit as was possible in such an expedition. It has, indeed, been charged against him that he was the instigator of the sanguinary order by which it was decreed that the republican insurgents of Mexico should be shot without mercy wherever taken. But he has denied the accusation, and it appears to be the fact that he even opposed the order, though in vain. Bazaine is a man of ability and courage; but the African experiences of modern French commanders are not the best for fitting them to encounter highly organised and thoroughly disciplined armies. Fighting in the bush, or in rocky deserts, against a barbarous foe, constantly on the move, and requiring in the pursuers rather the qualities of dash, daring, rapidity, and suppleness, than the more complex evolutions of scientific warfare, tends to develop a kind of guerilla tactics, not very well suited to foil the cool precision of the Germans. This was made apparent in the earlier events of the war. The Emperor, however, did wisely in resigning into more practical hands a command for which his paucity of previous experience, and the growing infirmity of his health, made him clearly unfit. MacMahon would perhaps have been a better choice than Bazaine; but MacMahon was flying with his shattered forces to the nearest rallying-point, and it was hardly known from day to day where he was. Napoleon took the only course that was open to him.

In proportion to the depressing effects of the late defeats on the minds of the French commanders was the feeling of elation on the part of the Prussians. With reference to the affair at Weissenburg, King William, in telegraphing to Queen Augusta, said:—"Under Fritz's eyes, we to-day (August 4th), gained a brilliant but bloody victory by storming Weissenburg, and the Geisberg behind it. . . . God be thanked for this first glorious achievement. May He help further!" And, referring to the battle of Wörth, on the 6th, he exclaimed, with pious exultation:—"Wonderful fortune—this great new victory won by Fritz! Thank God for His mercy!" The same tone was observable in most of the King's despatches. His Majesty arrogated to himself the special favour of Heaven, in a manner which seemed designed to suggest that he had obtained the Supreme Being as an ally, for the purpose of securing the supremacy of Germany and destroying the power of France. Many persons in England, even among those who approve of religious expressions, were shocked at this vulgar familiarity with the most sacred of names. The unthinking, however—and these are generally the majority—were imposed on by the official pietism of the Prussian monarch; and with all such his cause was advanced by the unctuous phrases of his despatches. How little his armies were controlled by regard for humanity—the most essential element of any religion—will appear in lurid colours in the course of this narrative. Abu Bekr, the successor of Mohammed, enjoined his soldiers not to kill old people, women, or children; to cut down no palm trees, nor burn any fields of corn; to spare all fruit trees, and slay no cattle but such as they should take for their own use. The Prussians made a desert of France, burnt villages and small towns, and treated old people and women with horrible barbarity. But they were prodigal of religious words; and words with many persons have too often a greater weight than facts.

After his defeat of August 6th, MacMahon continued to fall back—first on Saverne, then on Nancy, and afterwards on Châlons. An attempt should undoubtedly have been made to defend the passes of the Vosges mountains, those natural ramparts of eastern France. But MacMahon's army was thoroughly disorganised and disheartened, and all endeavours to rally and re-form it on its passage westward were in vain. Nancy is situated in the province of Lorraine, and is therefore on what may be called the French side of the Vosges, all the defiles of which were left open to the enemy. It was evident that MacMahon would not long be able to maintain himself so far east, for the Prussian Crown Prince was pressing him hard. Marshal Bazaine was in a critical position at Metz; and it became necessary to take some measures to save France, if possible, from entire subjugation. Accordingly, MacMahon and de Failly received orders to join Canrobert at Châlons, where the reserves were being organised. The former arrived at the camp on the 16th, and the latter on the 20th, of August. Of the 38,500 men he originally possessed, MacMahon had now only 16,000; and the Gardes Mobiles, whom he found in training at Châlons, did not seem likely to form good soldiers in an emergency. Some days before the arrival of MacMahon, these militiamen had exhibited a very rebellious temper. On inspecting them, Marshal Canrobert asked, in accordance with the usual custom, if they had any complaints. A great many complaints were made, and one body, saying that they were sick of the service already, shouted "Back to Paris!" Canrobert told them they were unworthy of the name of Frenchmen, and bid them bear in mind that they were under the utmost severity of martial law. It is even said that he had two of the ringleaders shot out of hand, by sentence of a drum-head court-martial. This state of feeling among the Mobiles was not reassuring to the remnants of the beaten army, who required the support of fresh legions to help them to resist the advancing tide of invasion. For the present it was resolved to make a stand at Metz, where Bazaine had under him a force of 100,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry, and 280 guns; or, according to some accounts, a total of 140,000 men.

On resigning the command, the Emperor went to the camp at Châlons, where he seems to have consulted with MacMahon, without fulfilling any office. He had been doubtful of the success of the war from the beginning, and appears now to have entertained the worst forebodings. Partly from popular compulsion, and partly from a blind feeling of personal pique, which urged him onward like Destiny, he had hazarded a great stake, and it was already pretty evident that he had lost. Previous to quitting Metz, together with the Prince Imperial, on the afternoon of the 14th of August, the Emperor issued a proclamation, in which he said:—"In leaving you to oppose the invading enemy, I rely upon your patriotism to defend this great city. You will not allow the foreigner to seize this bulwark of France, and you will emulate the army in courage and devotion. I shall preserve a grateful memory of the welcome I have found within your walls, and I hope to be able to return in happier days to thank you for your noble conduct." Metz had at that time never fallen before a hostile force, and the Emperor not unreasonably counted upon its inviolability. He reached the Châlons camp on the 17th, after temporarily stopping at one or two intermediate places.

Having completely shattered the French forces at Weissenburg, Wörth, and Forbach, the Prussians disposed their troops in such a way as to ensure their great object of driving the French more and more to the west, and striking at Paris itself. The Crown Prince followed up MacMahon with the army of the left; the right and centre, united, advanced on the 7th of August, and occupied St. Avold, Sarreguemines, and Haguenau. Two days later, the patrols from the first of these places extended to within two German (about nine English) miles of Metz. The pursuit of MacMahon by the Prussian left was exciting and rapid. When the Marshal paused for a short time at Toul, the Crown Prince was so close behind him that for some little while it was hoped on the one side, and feared on the other, that the retreating French would be cut off from Châlons. Nancy (the ancient capital of Lorraine) had already been abandoned. On the 12th of August, four Prussian soldiers took possession of the city. Then, in about half an hour, a detachment of twenty-six arrived, seized the railway station, reconnoitred the town, and forced some of the townspeople to tear up the railway towards Maxeville, and to pull down the telegraph posts. The municipal councillors, also, were compelled to vote, for the use of the invaders, a sum of 50,000 francs, with supplies of oats.

As the Prussian left advanced, the fortresses on their line were attacked or "observed." Strasburg was invested on the 10th; Lichtenberg, a little hill fort, capitulated on the 13th; Marsal, a fortified place on the main road from Saarburg and Metz, gave in after a short defence; and the small fortress of La Petite Pierre surrendered as soon as it was summoned. The surrender of Toul was also demanded, but energetically refused. Phalsburg and Bitsche were surrounded by detachments, and, together with Toul, long resisted with great heroism. The German army was now facing nearly due west, and the French continued to fly before its steady and terrible advance. The energy and daring of the Prussian scouts were remarkable, and the knowledge which the invading force was thus enabled to obtain of the features of the country, the disposition of the people, and the movements of the French army, was of the greatest value to the several commanders. The French were so ill served in this respect that, if we may believe uncontradicted statements, they were actually ignorant of the topography of their own country.

As soon as he had fairly established himself on

French soil, the King of Prussia issued the following proclamation to the people :—

"Saarbruck, August 11.

"We, William, King of Prussia, make known the following to the inhabitants of the French territories occupied by the German armies.

"The Emperor Napoleon having made, by land and by sea, an attack on the German nation, which desired, and still desires, to live in peace with the French people, I have assumed the command of the German armies to repel this aggression, and I have been led, by military circumstances, to cross the frontiers of France. I am waging war against soldiers, not against French citizens. The latter, consequently, will continue to enjoy security for their persons and property so long as they themselves shall not, by hostile attempts against the German troops, deprive me of the right of according them my protection. By special arrangements, which will be duly made known to the public, the generals commanding the different corps will determine the measures to be taken towards the communes or individuals that may place themselves in opposition to the usages of war. They will, in like manner, regulate all that concerns the requisitions which may be deemed necessary for the wants of the troops, and they will fix the rate of exchange between French and German currencies, in order to facilitate the individual transactions between the troops and the inhabitants."

On the 13th Prussian scouts were at Pont-à-Mousson, on the Moselle, thus cutting off MacMahon's communications with Metz; and the head-quarters of the Crown Prince were near Luneville. The same day found the King at Herny, a small town about fourteen miles south-east of Metz, where he prepared to attack the French under Bazaine. He appears to have had at his disposal about 250,000 men—a much larger number than the French, even if we accept the highest estimate of their strength. These forces consisted of the armies of the right and centre (in other words, the first and second armies), commanded, respectively, by Prince Frederick Charles and General Steinmetz, and drawn up to the east of the river Moselle in a large semicircle. Metz, which now lay before them, together with the bulk of the French army, had always been accounted the strongest city in France, after Strasburg. It is situated on both sides of the Moselle, at the juncture of that river with the Seille, and is a very convenient place for a defeated army to use as a rallying-point. Bazaine, however, did not feel safe there, nor did the Prussian commanders despair of dealing successfully with his regiments, notwithstanding the protection of the forts. It was therefore determined to send a portion of the army to take possession of the bridge and road through Pont-à-Mousson, situated some miles to the south-west, on the left (or western) bank of the Moselle, and on the railway running from Nancy to Metz. This was done on the morning of Sunday, the 14th. At the same time, in order to cover the movement, General Steinmetz made a demonstration against the French troops lying partly between him and the fortress, and partly under the immediate shelter of the walls on the eastern side. At the commencement of the action (which is called the battle of Longeville, or of Courcelles), half of the 7th corps attacked the French right, and, being afterwards reinforced, drove the enemy from a slightly entrenched position towards the fortifications. The Prussians, pursuing their advantage, came under the fire of the outworks, and lost a great number of men; but they assert that they succeeded in pushing the French back into the town. On the other hand, a telegram from the Emperor alleges that, after a combat of four hours, the Prussians were repulsed. According to this account, the French army was beginning to cross over to the left bank of the Moselle, and, when half had effected their passage, the enemy attacked in great force. This must mean that the other half, still remaining on the eastern side of the Moselle was attacked; for the corps which crossed at Pont-à-Mousson did not come into action on the present occasion. But so seriously did that movement menace the French, that Marshal Bazaine, as soon as he discovered indications of its having been accomplished, urged the Emperor to depart with his son along the northernmost of the two roads leading to Châlons by Verdun.*

An official German account of this affair says that at two o'clock in the afternoon General Steinmetz ordered the seventh corps, consisting of Westphalians, commanded by General von Zastrow, to proceed to the attack. The French were found lurking behind earthworks and in rifle-pits, which at once afforded protection, and enabled them to take the more deadly aim at their adversaries. These rifle-pits and other defences, situated near Ars, Laguenexy, Grigy, Borny, Colombey, and some other hamlets, and surrounded by hedges, so as to present very serious obstacles to an attacking force, were taken one by one by the Germans, after a long, vehement, and sanguinary fight. "In one rifle-pit alone," says this account, "we found 781, all laid low by our sharpshooters. Our losses, too, are considerable, as we did not break off the engagement till late in the evening, by which time we had driven the French into the very *glacis* of the fortress. When the enemy began to yield, immense confusion set in in his ranks. After a short time he had entirely disappeared, most of the slightly wounded managing to effect their escape with the rest. As we have made prisoners of nearly all regiments of the three principal corps united under Marshal Bazaine (respectively commanded by Generals Decaen, Frossard and l'Admirault), it seems that we had nearly the entire force opposed to us." Judging by the French reports, this conjecture would appear to be erroneous.

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* See Appendix iv., Vol. II., p. 544, "Proclamation of the Emperor."

Some details of the action, which it may be as well to compare with the other accounts, were published in a Metz newspaper, where it was said :—

"By order of Marshal Bazaine, the camp under the walls of Metz was raised on Sunday morning, and the bulk of the forces made a retrograde movement to gain the road leading from Metz to Verdun. Pontoon bridges were thrown above and below the town across the several branches of the river, and towards the afternoon the columns might be seen debouching from the road, and passing over from the right bank to the left. But, as the greater portion of the French forces was on its way from Longeville to Moulins, a large Prussian corps d'armée advanced on the position it had just evacuated. The first shots were fired about noon towards the extreme left, at Ste. Barbe, a village about eleven kilomètres (about seven miles) from Metz. It soon became evident that the engagement was serious. The French corps, which had not yet passed the river, faced right about, and the battle soon extended from Ste. Barbe to Grigy, its length being about three leagues (seven and a half miles). The Prussians were every minute receiving fresh reinforcements, and the French forces, unable to check their advance, slowly fell back upon Metz, fighting all the while. The Prussians, however, were for a long time kept at bay at the village of Servigny, where a fierce struggle took place. The village and the neighbouring hamlet of Paixe (five miles from Metz) suffered considerably. They were taken and retaken by storm several times, and were partly burnt down. A desperate conflict also took place for the possession of Noisseville, which was also partly destroyed by fire. The Prussians, however, managed to carry it, and debouched by the valleys of Noisseville and Lanvallière. On that latter point they were received by an artillery fire, which committed great havoc in their ranks, and two batteries of mitrailleuses planted in the orchards of the farm of Bellecroix, swept whole ranks away at each discharge. At the same time, the 4th corps (General l'Admirault's), which had already reached the Moselle, retraced its steps, and, debouching into the plain of the valley of Vallières, was able to attack the Prussians in flank, while the French artillery thundered against them from the heights of Vantoux. The Prussians, whose object was to occupy the French outer line of defences, advanced no further ; they continued to fight with coolness and intrepidity, but visibly lost ground. The Château of Colombey was taken and retaken three times. A portion of the Prussian forces having advanced to Borny, fort St. Quentin's artillery fired a few rounds, and received a few harmless shells. As night fell, the Prussians



MITRAILLEUSE (BACK VIEW).

resumed their attack on Servigny; but two regiments, concealed in the vines, opened fire on them at close range, and threw them into confusion."

The encounter of the 14th, however serious for the French in some respects, did not prevent them from continuing their retreat. The whole army had completed the passage of the river by night. On the following day (the Napoleonic fête day), nothing particular occurred. But at nine o'clock on the morning of Tuesday, the 16th of August, Bazaine was attacked at Vionville, a little place some few miles to the south-west of Metz. A considerable part of the German army had by this time crossed the Moselle at or near Pont-à-Mousson, and had penetrated to the west and north-west of that town, so as to be almost between Bazaine and Paris. The line of the invading forces was thus very much extended; but the French generalissimo did not dare to make an offensive movement against it. He continued his retreat along the two high roads running from Gravelotte to Verdun. It was on the southern road that the advancing French column was attacked in flank by the 3rd Prussian corps. When the French had faced half round to meet the enemy, Vionville formed the right of their position, which followed the crest of a range of hills stretching in the direction of Metz, and presenting a convex line towards the Prussians, who were coming up from the south. The French army therefore covered the southern road to Verdun as far as Vionville, its front extending southward towards Gorze. The 3rd Prussian corps, which commenced the battle, commonly called the battle of Vionville, was reinforced, in about six hours, by the 10th corps, and subsequently by portions of the 8th and 9th corps under Prince Frederick Charles. The Germans fought with extraordinary courage and resolution till nightfall; but they were greatly overmatched in point of numbers, and, though they inflicted terrible losses on the enemy, and (if we may so far credit their official accounts) took two eagles, seven guns, and two thousand prisoners, they were unable, in any material degree, to oust the French from their positions.



MITRAILLEUSE (FRONT VIEW).

The battle, according to the *Daily News* correspondent, began on some wooded hills above the village of Gorze, about eight English miles south-west of Metz, on a stream running from Mars-la-Tour into the Moselle at Noveant. At the commencement of the day, the 3rd Prussian corps, commanded by Lieut.-General von Alvensleben II., advanced from Gorze. The writer continues :—

"The Prussians pushed into the woods, gradually, by dint of numbers and sheer hard fighting, driving the French skirmishers from them. What happened in this part of the battle no one knows or can know, as it was entirely in the woods and valleys, and no general view of it could be obtained. General von Barnekow himself told me that no general, either French or Prussian, knows what happened, except that about 1 P.M. the Prussians had cleared the woods, and found themselves in front of an open plain, when the battle proper began. The French position here was a most formidable one, and the wonder is, not that it took the Prussians seven hours to take it, but that they ever got it at all. The woods above Gorze extend to within about two miles of Gravelotte, behind which village the French lay in the morning, as also at Rezonville, another village higher up on the road from Metz to Verdun. Nearly the whole of the Prussian second position was backed by the thick woods they had got possession of in the morning. The plain on which the battle was fought extends from the woods to the Verdun road, about one mile and a half, and is about three miles in length. On the French right the ground rises gently, and this was the key of the position, as the artillery, which could maintain itself there, swept the whole field. More towards the centre are two small valleys, one of which, being deep, was most useful to the Prussians in advancing their troops. In the centre of the field is the road from Gorze to Rezonville and Gravelotte, joining the main road to Verdun between the two villages. From the woods to Rezonville, on the Verdun road, there is no cover, except one cottage midway on the Gorze road. This cottage was held by a half-battery of French mitrailleuses, which did frightful execution in the Prussian ranks as they advanced from the wood"

The Prussians having reached the plain, General Steinmetz, after a rapid survey of the situation, ordered the 11th Regiment of the Line to advance on the French centre :—

"Simultaneously, the 40th, 67th, 69th, and two other regiments, were ordered to advance on the fortified heights on the French right. This, as I said, was the key of the position ; hence the number of men (quite 15,000) sent against it at once. All this, by the aid of a good glass, I could see from my post, except the Prussian movement up the Gorze road; here the woods intervened, and one could only tell the troops were advancing by the smoke. The French, knowing how vitally important it was to keep possession of the hill on the right, as soon as their troops began to fall back in the woods, threw up a hastily-made earthwork, to shelter their infantry lying down. Behind them the 62nd Regiment of the Line lay, with several batteries of artillery firing over their heads. The Prussians came up the slope, but were several times repulsed ; and it was not till after three hours' fighting that they drove the French from the heights, and their own artillery was dragged up them. As battery after battery of Krupp guns clambered up the heights, the gunners using their spurs and whips freely, one could see that it was all over with the French, and that, however bravely they might fight (and the Prussians allow that they fought splendidly), they must ultimately give way."

The correspondent goes on to say that they were eventually compelled to retire to a hill dividing the two valleys to their right, where, at a distance of not more than five hundred yards, a species of artillery duel was for some time maintained :—

"The hills were strewn with the *débris* of men, gun-carriages, limbers, and horses, the horses in greatest number, many of them literally blown to pieces. The ground was ploughed with shells. After two hours' cannonade, I saw the French guns retire to the heights over the second valley, where another set-to with the Prussian batteries took place, as the latter of course galloped to the French position as soon as they had driven the enemy from it. In the meantime, charge after charge was made up the Gorze road by the Prussians on the lone cottage and the half-battery of mitrailleuses, which were admirably served, and did frightful execution. The 11th Regiment, which was the first to charge the French, went into action over 2,000 strong (it had lost heavily at Spicheren), and in the evening only 200 men answered to their names. In spite of the greatest bravery and the most splendid conduct on the Prussian side, they were unable to drive back the French until their artillery gained the hill on the French right, of which I have spoken as the key of the position."

The retrogression of the French here described was but slight as regards the amount of ground lost, and made no essential change in the general position of the two armies. This is apparent from the description given by the correspondent of the *Times* :—

"The French retired towards their left rear, seeming to hold the village of Vionville with great obstinacy, covered by artillery on the heights. This was in turn answered by the Prussians, and they were observed to retire. At eleven, the first brigade of infantry, under the command of General Lehman, came into action, and advanced *en échelon* regiments under the most galling fire of mitrailleuses, three on the right, and five battalions in the same formation on their left rear. The whole force then brought its left forward, and advanced on the enemy. The French seemed to serve their guns far quicker than the Prussians, but with less result ; and I saw on one occasion a French battery engage a Prussian, and, although the former fired seven shots before the other did three, the three completely disabled the French battery, whose shot had been over them all the time. The infantry were all engaged, both right and left, and a regiment of Hussars debouched from the road, with a battery of artillery on their flank, and, coming round the little village at a trot, formed line to the left, and charged the infantry. A squadron of Dragoons, under Prince Witchenstein, took part in the charge, and left half their number on the field. The French right about this time again retired, from the effect of some Prussian artillery which had taken up a position on a small hill, from which they played with the greatest precision on the enemy. Up to this time the soldiers' opinion of the day was that it was throughout a fearful fire on the part of the French, and that their shooting was beyond all praise. One regiment of the 7th Cuirassiers was ordered to charge a battery of artillery, and actually got into it. It went in some 300 strong; when I next saw it, it seemed to me scarcely 100 all told. At 2.30 the reserve artillery was brought up, and the cannonade became heavier than ever. The *Krankenträger*—or bearers of the sick—had now more than they could do, admirably as the whole machinery of the corps worked. The positions of both the combative forces were perfectly stationary for an hour, a sort of duel being carried on between them, which, though at some distance, was quite near enough to have fearful results. Seeing some of the infantry engaged in the extreme right, I went there, and met one regiment just coming out of the action to recruit, being at the moment commanded by a youth of nineteen, having lost thirteen of its officers since the morning. At 4.30 the Prussians changed their mode of attack, refusing the left, and advancing the right into a more prominent position, while, massed in rear of a hill out of fire, almost in the centre of the position, could be seen five regiments of cavalry in contiguous columns—the Guard Hussars, the Dragoons, Ziethan Hussars, and Cuirassiers. At about 4.15 there came a lull in the firing, as if both sides, tired with this incessant slaughter, had determined to cease firing, which, considering the troops had been eleven hours on the march and in the battle, was not to be wondered at. The left then retired still more, the right remaining stationary. Thus the matter stood, till, at five o'clock, the 10th corps came into action. This seemed to give a new impetus to the whole battle, and the firing became heavier than ever, till the French again retired, but scarcely a quarter of a mile, in which position they remained till its close."

The *Times* correspondent got into conversation with the youth of nineteen mentioned above, and found him a very lively and spirited lad, as fond of the "fun" of fighting as an English boy. He gave him a few cigars, and they parted. Two hours later the correspondent saw the poor fellow's dead body laid out with some others, the cigars still sticking between the buttons of his coat.

Both sides claimed the victory in this action; but it was in truth a drawn battle. Marshal Bazaine telegraphed to Paris that at eight o'clock in the evening the enemy was repulsed along the whole line, and that his own army retained all their positions. This is not strictly correct: the Prussians were so far successful that they prevented the Marshal from continuing his retreat. But the assertion in the official telegrams of the Germans, that they were entirely successful, and that the French were driven back to or upon Metz, was a misrepresentation; and, inasmuch as it is impossible that the commanders should have been ignorant of the result of the action, even on the next day (the date of the telegram), the false statement can hardly be regarded as accidental. In all wars, and in all armies, this tendency to resort to falsehood, as a means of concealing discomfiture or magnifying success, is a common, though discreditable feature. Certainly, the French, in the course of the struggle with Prussia, were often disregardful of truth: but it is a mistake to describe the Prussians as immaculate. They were so frequently victorious that, generally speaking, they would only have lost credit by concealing the facts, or substituting fictions for them; but to this extent their adherence to truth cannot be counted a very sublime virtue. Whenever they failed, or partially failed, they were far from scrupulous. We have seen the disingenuousness with which they endeavoured to make it appear that their defeat at Saarbruck was a mere skirmish of outposts. The mis-statement with regard to the 16th of August was of a graver character.*

Bazaine, though still in the main holding his ground on the night of the 16th, felt that his position was not permanently tenable, and therefore partially withdrew on the 17th to a stronger one. It was the right wing which was thus shifted, the left remaining in its former line between Vionville and the Moselle. The two wings thus formed a rather sharp angle at Vionville, where the right wing turned in a northerly direction, with its front to the west, and extended across the north Verdun road to St. Privat, on the road from Metz to Briey. According to this arrangement, Marshal Bazaine had the river Moselle on his left, and St. Privat, a steep hill bare of cover and strongly fortified, on his extreme right; while Vionville, at the angle, formed the centre of the position. The number of men he commanded has been stated at about 110,000, with 20,000 as a reserve; but the sum-total is not known with certainty. The Prussians were equally active, and during the 17th transported from the east side of the Moselle, over several bridges which they threw across the river, the 2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 12th corps, with the Guards and artillery of the 3rd corps. The total force is stated at 190,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and more than 600 guns. The Prussian position was on a line of hills between Rezonville and Gravelotte; and at 10 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, the 18th of August, the German commanders recommenced their attack on the French. Their design was to move a large part of their army across the front of Bazaine's position (the French Marshal's left being too strong to be carried by direct attack), to turn his right wing, while the left was being occupied, and thus to break up the whole line, forcing the French off both the Verdun roads, and driving them under the outer fortifications of Metz—the task which they alleged they had accomplished on the 16th, but which in truth they had not. The Guards, followed by the 12th, 9th, 3rd, and 10th corps, accordingly wound steadily round the angle formed by the French centre at Vionville. The French, posted on their line of hills, which they had strongly fortified with entrenchments, rifle-pits, &c., received the enemy with a tremendous fire from their guns, and from eight mitrailleuses, which swept down the slopes, and up the opposite side of the valley to Gravelotte, commanding every approach. At their back, Bazaine's army had the forts of St. Quentin and Carières, securing their retreat, and of course adding considerably to their strength. The Germans were impeded in their progress by woods and other obstacles, but they steadily made way. The French right and right centre were attacked by swarms of the enemy, issuing from the woods, and dashing up the heights with such fury as to threaten the road to Sedan, and almost to outflank Bazaine's army. The resistance was equally energetic; but in the course of the afternoon St. Privat was stormed by the Prussian Guards. The French left, near Gravelotte, had in the meanwhile been furiously attacked, and the slopes beyond the village became the scene of a most frightful struggle. "The French, posted in their entrenchments, or crowding in the adjoining woods," says a writer in the *Times*, "kept up from their ambush a devastating fire; while their artillery, sweeping every approach, and worked, it is said, with great precision, especially that of the Imperial Guard, mowed down the assailants literally in thousands. The hitherto hardly-tried mitrailleuse proved here a terribly destructive arm; and batteries of these engines, which had been so placed as to be out of the reach of shells, did frightful execution at short ranges. In vain the Germans, charge after charge, endeavoured to storm the fatal heights; the onslaught of infantry was in vain succeeded by the impetuous rush of masses of horse; the battle hung for hours in suspense, while, below, the plain was filled with the dead and dying; and it was not until an attack to the left drove the French out of the first line of their works that any impression was made on them. Even then the struggle raged fiercely, and, though the German guns enfiladed part of the enemy's position, hardly any ground was really won, and the resistance was as heroic as the attack. But, in the interval, the great turning movement of the morning had produced its effect; the right of the French had been outflanked, and their centre slowly compelled to give way." They fell back on Metz, fighting to the last; and it is calculated that they lost 19,000 men in the struggle. The German loss could hardly have been less extreme.

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* That the French were not driven back upon Metz on the 16th of August is evident from the subsequent German statement of the position in which they were found on the 18th. The fact that they maintained their general positions at the close of the former day is admitted by the able military critics in the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews* of October, 1870, to whose articles the present writer here acknowledges his obligations. See also No. 3 of W. & A. Keith Johnston's *War Register*. The retrograde movement of the French, such as it was (and it was very slight), was to the north, and therefore not in the direction of Metz, which was to the east.

An excellent account of the battle was telegraphed to the *Daily News* by its special correspondent with the Prussian army. It was, we believe, the first instance of a whole letter being transmitted in this way; but the journal alluded to exhibited remarkable energy throughout the war. The same correspondent, in a longer letter, sent in the ordinary way, says that shortly after midnight on the night of the 17th he was roused, as he lay in bed at Pont-à-Mousson, by the sound of trumpets blowing for miles around. Trumpet answered to trumpet from all the bivouacs, and the night was filled with their wild music. Hastily dressing, the correspondent sallied forth, and, partly in a wagon, partly on foot, made his way to the front, a distance of about thirteen or fourteen miles. At length he heard the opening thunder of the cannonade, seemingly coming from the heart of a range of hills to the right. Getting to the top of an eminence, he saw before him the scene of the battle of Vionville, on the 16th, the ground still cumbered with dead bodies. A regiment of cavalry now came up from behind, and, on gaining the brow of the hill, burst into a wild hurrah, and dashed forward. The writer was allowed, by special favour, to approach the Royal head-quarters, from which he could see the entire sweep of the Prussian and French centres, together with a considerable part of their wings. On the road to Verdun are six pretty little villages, situated only a few hundred yards apart, and called Mars-la-Tour, Flavigny, Vionville, Rezonville, Malmaison, and Gravelotte. The centre of the fighting was at the last-named of these hamlets. At the moment of the correspondent's arrival, "the French were making a most desperate effort to hold on to the last bit of the Verdun road—that between Rezonville and Gravelotte, or that part of Gravelotte which on some maps is called Malmaison. Desperate, but unavailing! for every one man in their ranks had two to cope with, and their line, at the place indicated, was already beginning to waver. Soon it was plain that this wing—the French right—was withdrawing to a new position. This was swiftly taken up, under protection of a continuous blaze of their artillery from heights beyond the village. The movement was made in good order, and the position reached was one that, I believe, nine out of ten military men would have regarded as normally impregnable." The battle was now transferred to the fields beyond Gravelotte, those in front being completely covered with the Prussian reserves.

"This second battle-field was less extensive than the first, and brought the combatants into fearfully close quarters. The peculiarity of it is that it consists of two heights intersected by a deep ravine. This woody ravine is over 100 feet deep, and at the top from 200 to 300 yards wide. The side of the chasm next to Gravelotte, where the Prussians stood, is much lower than the other side, which gradually ascended to a great height. From this their commanding eminence the French held their enemies fairly beneath them, and subjected them to a raking fire. Their artillery was stationed far up by the Metz road, between its trees. There was not an instant's cessation of the roar; and easily distinguishable amid all was the curious grunting roll of the mitrailleuse. The Prussian artillery was to the north and south of the village, the mouths of the guns on the latter side being necessarily raised for an awkward upward fire. The French stood their ground, and died; the Prussians moved ever forward, and died; both by hundreds—I had almost said thousands; this for an hour or two that seemed ages, so fearful was the slaughter."

Presently, Prussian reinforcements arrived—the men of General Göben's army, who filed out of the wood of Ognons in such vast numbers, that for four hours there was no break in the living stream. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, the French concentrated a furious fire on the wood, and shelled it perpetually.

"Their fire here took effect. The line of Prussian infantry became less continuous from that direction. About five o'clock, however, an infantry brigade emerged from the same point. As soon as they did so, they advanced by double-quick time towards the point where their services were needed. I watched this brigade through a strong glass from the first. It resembled some huge serpent gliding out on the field. But, lo! it left a track behind it—a dark track. Beneath the glass that track is resolved into fallen, struggling men. As the horrid significance of that path so traced came upon me, I gazed yet more intently. Many of those who had fallen leapt up and ran forward, struggling to catch up with their comrades again. I did not see any running backward, though many fell in their effort to rush on. I do not know whether after that another movement was made from behind the wood; but I do know that half an hour afterwards vast numbers of troops began to march over the southern edge of the hill where I was standing towards the battle-field; and I have an impression that these were General Göben's men, moving by a less dangerous route."

For a time it seemed as if, towards Malmaison, the French were gaining the advantage. But suddenly, in the direction of Verneville, bombs were heard and seen. General Steinmetz had effected his junction with Prince Frederick Charles's army, thus seriously threatening the enemy's position. The French receded about nine o'clock at night. At half-past eight there had been a terrible attack by the French on the Prussian right; at a quarter to nine, a fearful volley against the Prussian left, in the roar of which the "growling whirr" of the mitrailleuse was conspicuous. Then all was over, and the Prussians held the heights which commanded the country up to the gun-ranges of Metz. "As I went back to the village of Gorze to pass the night," concludes this writer, "I turned at the last point to look upon the battle-field. It was now a long, earth-bound cloud, with two vast fires (burning houses) at each end of it. The day had been beautiful, and now the stars looked down with splendour, except where the work of agony and death had clouded the glow of heaven."

Count Bismarck, who accompanied the King during the battle, showed great excitement and anxiety while the issue of the fight was yet doubtful, and could hardly be restrained from getting within range of the bullets. The old King, after being about fifteen hours on horseback, made his supper of a plate of rice and soup from a camp kettle, and then slept on the field of battle among his troops.

A great panic occurred among some of the German troops just before the end of the struggle. Cavalry, infantry, and artillery, rushed pell-mell to the rear, where they were stopped by some men of the ambulance corps turning a gun across the road.

The King of Prussia, in telegraphing to the



BRINGING UP THE PRUSSIAN GUNS.

Queen a brief account of the action of the 18th, said that he found the French army "occupying a very strong position to the west of Metz"—an admission which is in itself sufficient proof that on the 16th it was not routed in the sense conveyed by the official telegrams. In a letter to her Majesty, dated Rezonville, August 19th, the King gives a description of the encounter, which clearly and succinctly lays out the movements of the two armies. "In the early morning of yesterday," he writes, "the 12th corps, the corps of the Guard, and the 9th corps, proceeded towards the northern road of Metz-Verdun as far as St. Marcel and Doncourt, and were followed by the 3rd and the 10th corps, while the 7th and the 8th corps, and subsequently also the 2nd, halted at Rezonville, facing Metz. When the first-named corps wheeled towards the right, in a very wooded terrain, towards Verneville and St. Privat, the last-mentioned corps began their attack upon Gravelotte, but not vehemently, in order to await the corps engaged in the great flank movement against the strong position of Amanvillers as far as to the road of Metz. The corps effecting this wide flanking march only entered into the fight at four o'clock, co-operating with the pivot corps, which had been engaged in the action since twelve o'clock. The enemy opposed us in the forest with violent resistance, so that we only slowly gained ground. St. Privat was taken by the corps of the Guard; Verneville by the 9th corps. The 12th and artillery of the 3rd corps now joined in the contest. Gravelotte was taken by troops of the 7th and 8th corps, and the forests were scoured on both sides with great loss. In order to attack once more the hostile troops, forced back by the outflanking movement, an advance was made at dusk across Gravelotte. This was met by such tremendous firing from the parallel ranges of rifle-pits and from the artillery, that the second corps, just arriving, was obliged to charge at the point of the bayonet, and by this means it conquered and



MEETING OF MOLTKE AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA AT GRAVELOTTE.

maintained the strong position. It was half-past eight when on all sides the firing gradually subsided. At the last advance, the shells—of Königgrätz memory—were not wanting, at least where I was standing. This time I was removed from their range by the Minister von Roon. All the troops I met cheered me with enthusiastic hurrahs. They performed miracles of bravery against an equally brave enemy, who defended every step, and often undertook offensive attacks, which were repulsed each time."

The official report of the battle was of a longer and more elaborate character. It stated that, at the commencement of the day, the first army (that of General Steinmetz) kept in concealment, and allowed the second army (Prince Frederick Charles's) to carry out its movement towards Verneville and St. Marie-au-Chiers. When, however, towards noon, cannonading was heard from Verneville, and reports came in that the head of the 9th army corps had already reached that place, and was engaged with the enemy, the first army received orders to advance.

"The 7th army corps brought up strong batteries to the south and east of Gravelotte, who advanced with the greatest precision under an effective fire from the enemy's artillery. The infantry of the corps remained—until a later occasion should arise for them to be employed—in a covered position in the wooded valley separating Gravelotte from the heights of Pont du Jour. Only the brigade of General von der Goltz, which was in position at Ars-sur-Moselle to secure the valley of the Moselle, had already been engaged. They captured the village of Vaux, in the valley of the Moselle, and afterwards stormed the heights of Tussey, the possession of which they maintained. Simultaneously with the 7th army corps, the 8th army corps advanced from Rezonville against the Bois de Genevaux, and attacked the enemy. The 8th corps at once opened a powerful battery from its front on to the road from Vancour-en-Farmisy, whilst the 1st Cavalry Division at once took up a covered position in the rear, and the infantry advanced to attack the Bois de Genevaux in front, which was occupied by the enemy. Here also the enemy's artillery was quickly silenced, while the infantry met with a most obstinate resistance in the Bois de Genevaux. A close and bloody fight raged here for hours. Owing to the density and impenetrability of the wood, the combating parties were completely intermingled, and at certain parts of the Prussian lines so obstinate a resistance was encountered, that they were only able to press slowly forward, whilst in other parts they reached the eastern skirt of the wood, and, even breaking through it, advanced to attack the opposite heights and farmhouses of St. Hubert. The latter were at last taken by slow degrees, after repeated attacks, and held, whilst all attempts to proceed further to the ridge of the heights were baffled by the strongly occupied rifle pits. The infantry encounter came to a standstill, the artillery of the enemy being almost silent, and our guns not having any effective object to be achieved by firing."

It being imagined that the enemy was now about to withdraw, two batteries of mounted artillery and a regiment of cavalry were ordered to pursue; but it soon became apparent that the French had only sought cover from the artillery fire of the Prussians, and the pursuers were very hotly received. They maintained their position, however, and fought against serious odds until relieved late in the evening by the cavalry reserve. More than half of the men and horses were killed. The conclusion of the battle is described with greater picturesqueness than is usual in official documents:—

"From the left wing the heavy roll of infantry rifles, mixed with the thunder of cannon, was heard between Verneville and Amanvillers, which had been eagerly awaited. Apparently the sound came nearer—a favourable sign of the approach of the army of Prince Frederick Charles. Our infantry maintained the battle more tenaciously than ever, the appearance of the second army promising to bring up support, and the brave artillery, despite their severe losses, served their guns as if on the parade ground. The French continued their fire the whole day, especially from the rifle-pits, with their chassepôt rifles, at a range of 2,000 paces, whereby the position was continually held in insecurity, and occasioned considerable loss. The French were in a desperate situation, surrounded on all sides, and nothing remained for them but to retreat into the fortress of Metz, into which their army was forced to disappear. About seven P.M. they made one desperate attempt to break through by Gravelotte from Metz to Paris. Thick clouds of skirmishers, one behind the other, uttering loud shouts, and keeping up a continual volley, rushed forward from behind the heights against the wood in the ravine. Our weak decimated infantry squads were nearly all dispersed, and the danger was great that this attack, made apparently in force, would be successful against our exhausted troops. But our brave artillery opened upon them over the heads of our infantry so effectively, that the attack was repulsed by the combined action with the infantry, which once more made a stand. Material and decisive support was, however, at hand. His Majesty the King had arrived during the battle from Rezonville, in the northern direction towards Gravelotte, and had temporarily placed General von Steinmetz, who had hurried up, in command of the 2nd army corps, giving him permission to draw supports from this corps should he need it. This 2nd (Pomeranian) army corps, which had not yet been before the enemy, hastened up in quick step, inspired by lust of battle, and at nightfall decided the conflict. Under the eyes of General von Steinmetz, who had ridden into the defile with his staff, within rifle range, these brave troops, with loud hurrahs, drums beating, and bugles blowing the advance, rushed down the dark woody ravine to deploy on the other side, and hurt themselves upon the foe. The discharges from the guns shone out brightly in the dark night; but the line of fire grew more and more distant, and although many a brave man sacrificed his life, and the losses were fearfully large, yet the slope and the hostile heights were ours. So ended the battle of the 18th of August. On the following morning the enemy had evacuated the heights and withdrawn within the fortifications of Metz. The battle-field is strewn with corpses and wounded men. The victory was dearly won, but it was brilliant and decisive."

The same official writer, previously describing the action of the 16th, repeats the statement about the French on that occasion having been driven back to Metz, and alleges that this was the result of the German army having executed a flanking movement, by which its front was changed from north to east, thus interposing between Paris and Metz. This account, however, does not agree with others, nor with the position which the respective armies undoubtedly occupied two days later.*

The news of the favourable termination of the battle of Gravelotte, on the 18th, was brought to the King as he was sitting under a garden wall in the vicinity of Rezonville. A correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung*, who describes the scene, says: "A great manufactory was burning close by, and illuminating the whole neighbourhood with its ghastly light. A seat had been made for the King by placing a rail, which had formed the side of a peasant's cart, with one end on a weighing-machine, and the other on the body of a French grey horse. Prince Charles, the Grand-Duke of Weimar, the Hereditary Grand-Duke of Mecklenburg, Count Bismarck, General von Roon, and Count Donhoff were standing at his side, the latter holding his horse. General von Roon had laid aside his helmet, and, against his usual custom, wore a foraging cap. The King wore his helmet. Count Bismarck was hunting after some French letters to read—he wanted to turn his thoughts to some other subjects. All were very silent, for all felt that the fury of the battle, which had just reached its highest point, must bring some decisive results. At this moment Moltke came up to the King, much heated, for he had been in the thick of the fight: 'Please your Majesty, we have conquered; we have driven the enemy out of all his positions.' A loud hurrah from all present was the answer. But now it was time to think of refreshment. A sutler, who was near at hand, was summoned, and all the great people filled their bottles with his abominable red wine, which had never been so honoured before. The King drank out of a broken beer-glass, while Bismarck chewed a great lump of black bread with evident satisfaction." The utmost difficulty was experienced in getting anything at all for his Majesty's supper, and Count Bismarck long searched for a bed, however humble, on which to pass the night, the houses round about being filled with wounded.

In England, the rapid progress of the war, and the extraordinary successes of the Germans, excited profound interest, and home affairs were almost forgotten in the eager curiosity with which the development of events abroad was watched from day to day, and from hour to hour. The perfection to which the telegraphic system has now been brought, enabled the papers to feed the public with news at very short intervals; and when intelligence of great battles arrived, or was expected, the agitation observable in the streets of London and other large towns was a singular feature of the time. At this period the popular feeling was for the most part on the German side.

We had some cause, however, for dissatisfaction with the conquerors. Almost before the war had begun, complaints were raised by Germany that England was violating her neutrality. As early as the 27th of July, the *New Prussian* (*Cross*) *Gazette* inquired whether, in view of the disclosures with reference to the secret treaty, Great Britain would still "allow her manufacturers to provide weapons for the French, and her shipowners to let their vessels be chartered for transporting the requirements of the French army." Great objection was made to the dictum of English statesmen that coal is not contraband of war. Without coal from Newcastle, it was argued, the French fleet could not remain in the Baltic; and it was also alleged that Englishmen were executing orders for cartridges to be used by the French against the Germans. The *North German Gazette*, in alluding to this subject, remarked:—"During the Crimean war, England reproached us for pursuing a legitimate commerce; but what shall we call a traffic by which England is turned into an arsenal close to the French frontier for the use of France, and the British Government does nothing to stop it?" Other German papers were angry with us that we did not at once declare war on behalf of Prussia, and send our fleet to aid the armies of King William in putting down the arch-despot and universal aggressor, Napoleon III. The complaints of violated neutrality were not confined to the newspapers. At the very beginning of the war, Baron Gerolt, the Prussian Minister at Washington, received a telegram from his Government, which said:—"Public opinion in England is favourable to North Germany, but the British Government is *not* favourable; it acts with the neutrality laws against North Germany, as it did against America with the *Alabama*." In the course of the autumn, Count Bernstorff, the North German Ambassador in England, represented to the British Cabinet, on more than one occasion, the wrong which, in the opinion of his Government, had been done to Germany by England. He required that we should prohibit the exportation of coals and arms from this country during the struggle, though at the same time he admitted that such a prohibition is not required by the letter of international law. The Count, in fact, rather argued upon what he conceived *ought* to be the law than upon what the law actually *is*. He made, however, some assumptions as to the actual state of matters, which do not seem to have any just foundation. He took it for granted that a neutral is bound to prohibit the exportation of contraband of war to a belligerent; but (as Lord Granville pointed out in his replies) it appears to be generally affirmed by the expounders of this rather slippery and perplexing department of jurisprudence, that the exportation of contraband, provided it be equally allowed to both belligerents, is not a violation of neutrality, and that the remedy lies in the right of capture and confiscation. On one point Count Bernstorff had a somewhat stronger case. He showed that by the municipal law of England the exportation of arms might be prohibited. It is true that the power is discretionary, not obligatory; but the determination not to put the law in force must have seemed to the Germans an evidence of unfriendliness. The whole question of the laws affecting belligerents is, however, in a most unsatisfactory state, and full of opportunities for disputation, owing to its contradictory provisions, subtle distinctions, and lurking pitfalls. That arms and munitions of war were largely exported to France seems to be certain; and that this operated unfavourably to Germany is obvious. Yet it cannot be doubted that, in refusing to set the municipal law in motion against the exporters, our Government had the sanction of general opinion. On mere grounds of humanity people were averse from weighing severely on a nation so sorely stricken as the French, so deeply involved in the gravest calamities of war, and so gallantly struggling to repair its disasters.

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* See Appendix vi., Vol. II., p. 552, "The Battles before Metz."

CHAPTER V.

The Bitterness of the War to France—Horrors of the Battle-fields—Organisations for Succouring the Wounded—The *Krankenträger* and the Sisters of Mercy—Ferocity of the Turcos—Kindly Reception of French Prisoners at Berlin—Agitation in France against the Germans—Energy of the Empress—Appointment of General Trochu to the Governorship of Paris—Trochu's Ideas on Army Reform—Instances of Indecision on the part of Commanders—Preparations for the Defence of Paris—Movements of the Emperor—General Changarnier—His Visit to the Emperor at Metz—The Emperor at Châlons—His Perils on the Road—Causes of the French Misfortunes—Pitiable Position of Napoleon—Disorderly State of Châlons and the Army there—Creation of a Fourth German Army—Further Advance of the Prussians—The Break-up from Châlons with a View to Relieve Metz—Dangerous Character of the Movement—The Paris Government, MacMahon, and the Emperor—The Siege of Strasburg—Bombardment of Phalsburg—Naval Action in the Baltic—Efforts in England to Relieve the Sufferings of War—Interview of Dr. Mayo with the Crown Princess of Prussia and the Princess Alice.

Disaster had followed disaster with fearful rapidity since the opening days of the war at the close of July. Less than a month had elapsed, and France had been seriously defeated in several engagements; the army of MacMahon was broken, dispirited, and in retreat; that of Bazaine was held as in a prison within the works of Metz; the lines of the Saar, the Moselle, and the Meuse had been successively abandoned; the passes of the Vosges had been relinquished without a blow; the Emperor was a fugitive, and the Ollivier Government at an end. Worse than all this, thousands of Frenchmen in the prime of life had been miserably slain, and lay in obscure graves, of which the foreigner was now the guardian; while others writhed in the agony of lingering wounds, or sullenly brooded over their fate in the dull routine of Prussian fortresses. In every part of France, broken-hearted mothers wept over the sons they should see no more, and wives over the husbands that were snatched from them for ever. In many a mansion, in many a comfortable home, in many a peasant's cottage, the empty chair was terribly eloquent of the absent husband, father, son, or brother, who should be absent always. These, it is true, are the inseparable evils of war. They are hard enough to bear, even when victory accompanies them; but when they are the dismal price of dismal failure, and that, too, in an expedition rashly and unnecessarily undertaken—

even allowing for considerable provocations on the part of the enemy—it is no wonder that the nation thus tortured and thus humiliated should be stricken to the soul. If the Italian mother commemorated by Mrs. Browning felt, not unnaturally, that even freedom from the Austrian did not repay her for the three sons she had lost in helping to achieve that end, what must hundreds of French mothers have felt, who mourned their children with no equivalent but the sad knowledge of national weakness and general humiliation! The waning days of August were days of grief, of shame, of apprehension, and of anger. The country was staggering under repeated blows, and it was feared—and but too truly—that the worst had not yet come.

The condition of the several battle-fields was fearful. A correspondent of the *Times*, who visited the neighbourhood of the Spicheren after the great contest of the 6th, found the earth strewn thickly with the evidences of mortal strife, and, what was even more shocking, crowds of countrywomen wandered about, chattering and laughing. A party was observed picnicing among the blood-stained uniforms, the shattered arms, the empty helmets and képis, &c. One person had actually made use of a stretcher, which had evidently done its duty without stint, as a table. The people who had not themselves suffered from the war looked upon an excursion to a battle-field as one of the pleasantest trips that could be made. A boy was walking about in a Prussian helmet through which a bullet had passed, and jestingly telling his companion, in a dialect made up of German and French, what a wonderful escape he had had. The peasantry also were accused of stripping the dead bodies. Dr. Russell went over the field of Wörth in a pouring rain, and saw the ground covered with dead horses, swollen to an enormous size, their legs sticking up in the air; with Prussians who had fallen dead in the act of charging; and with Zouaves and Turcos (mostly the latter) in attitudes of fantastic rigidity, the faces generally covered with little pieces of linen placed there by the country folk. The burial parties were at work, but they had more to do than they could accomplish at one time. Pools of blood lingered sullenly in hollows, and for two miles on each side of the road "a foul, sour smell" was perceptible. Speaking of a particular spot where the French Cuirassiers had suffered severely, Dr. Russell says:—"One remarkable circumstance is this—not a cuirass was pierced by a bullet. I looked most narrowly; others did the same. And yet what had been the fate of the wearers? That is a problem I cannot solve, nor could any one else; but it was plain that the Cuirassiers were annihilated. It is said that one regiment charged a battery and got in among the guns, but was smitten by the infantry on the flanks with a leaden shower that beat them to the earth, never to rise again—unhorsed, or dead and wounded, the unhurt all taken in a few seconds. The rain cleared up before noon, and that must have been some little relief from suffering to the wounded, who were still met in carts. There were some with faces upturned, cold, and stiff, who cared no more for what the elements might do." On the battle-field of the 18th of August, near Rezonville, some of the heaps of dead bodies, which were accumulated in all directions, reached a height of two yards. In many places the bodies were clasped together, and in one ravine the corpses were so close that they stood erect, buttressed up by one another. A singular story is told of a peasant who was found decapitated by the side of an officer of Zouaves on the morning after the battle of Gravelotte. A lantern was in the left hand of the peasant, and a knife in his right. It would seem that, not being able to take off the officer's belt, the camp-follower had plunged his knife into the wounded man, who, wakened out of a trance by this new pain, seized his sabre, held the miscreant by the hair, and struck off his head. The alleged fact seems hardly possible; but it would have attracted the grim and fantastic genius of Edgar Poe. Among the tender and pathetic incidents of the war was the discovery, on the field of Wörth, of the dead body of a French captain, in the stiff grip of whose hand was found a letter from his little daughter, Marguerite, full of loving messages and fond desires for the return of her father.

A surgeon attached to the German troops gave an account of the methods in which the wounded were attended to. He was passed on the road by four groups bound on different errands.

> "The first, coming from the woods of the Spicherenberg consists of peasants of the district; they carry shovels on their shoulders, and are impressed grave-diggers, who after they are wearied out are relieved by others. They relate that great heaps of corpses of the French yet lie in the woods, poisoning the air; also that wounded men are still being carried by them. The number of dead is so great that seventy bodies are laid in each grave. Fresh columns of these grave-diggers pass by me, reminding me of the brigades of snow-shovellers who clear the roads in winter. This systematic disposal of the dead bodies is an important regulation of the war sanitary police. The second apparition which is noticeable is the troop, organised and uniformed, of the volunteer wounded attendants



GENERAL VON ROON.

from Frankfort, and its suburb, Offenbach. These fine fellows step out smartly and full of tact in all directions, and give one the impression that they are a hearty practical corps, up to and ready for their task. What they have brought with them for the convenience of the wounded is all comfortable in the highest degree, and even elegant, while their personal costume is quite homely and modest. The third group is a simple military escort of the dead. It moves slowly from the hamlet towards our camp, the drums beating low; mournful notes signal its track, and while in the remoter corners of the camp smothered murmurs reach the ear, along the path a solemn silence settles down upon the soldiers as the corpses of their French comrades are carried to their bed. The fourth group consists of a column of prisoners escorted from the


Road to
St.e Marie
St. Privat
Longuyon
Batilly
Habonville
Jouaville
Amanvillers
Verneville
Doncourt
to Verdun
St. Marcel
Gravelotte
Chatel
to Metz
Rezonville
Vionville
Bois des Vaux
Jussy
Bois des Ognons
Tronville
N
S
Anoy
Dornot
GORZE
R.R. to Nancy
Moselle R.
A
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BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE AT SEVEN O'CLOCK A.M.


SCALE_ONE INCH TO A MILE
2 MILES
-----> Direction taken by troops advancing or retreating.
French Army.
A Imperial Guards.
B Second Corps.
C Third ,,
D Fourth ,,
E Sixth ,,
Prussian Army.
G Royal Guards.
H Second Corps.
I Third ,,
K Seventh ,,
M Eighth ,,
N Ninth ,,
O Tenth ,,
St.e Marie
St. Privat
Road to Longuyon
Amanvillers
Verneville
Doncourt
to Verdun
St. Marcel
Gravelotte
Chatel
to Metz
Rezonville
Vionville
Bois des Ognons
Anoy
Dornot
GORZE
R.R. to Nancy
Moselle R.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE AT EIGHT O'CLOCK P.M.

woods by a patrol of Hussars. They halt, apparently startled, as their route crosses that of the funeral procession."

In the church of Forbach the wounded and dying French lay thick; so thick that it was found necessary to break several panes of glass in the church windows for the sake of ventilation, and even then the air was bad. The Sisters of Mercy worked with that noble devotion by which their ministrations are always characterised; but the place echoed with groans, and the unfortunate sufferers stirred restlessly from side to side, or constantly begged that their position might be shifted as the agonies of death came on. The Prussian army is so admirably organised that it possesses a corps whose special duty is to carry the sick and wounded. These assistants are called *Krankenträger*. Some of them are men of the Landwehr; others are students from the hospitals or universities. The former are in uniform, the latter in plain clothes; but all wear the red cross worked or stamped on a white cloth, which is tied round the left arm. Of the Sisters of Mercy it is related that they are on the battle-field before the firing has ceased. They march on foot, each company preceded by a priest or pastor. The *Krankenträger* also go on foot, except when they ride in wagons in charge of the litters and medical stores. This orderly attention to minute detail was observed throughout all the operations of the German army. When the advancing troops cleared out of the little town of Saarbruck on the morning of the 8th of August, after the successful battle of the 6th, the operation took only two hours, though there were 15,000 men and a large siege-train. The whole movement was accomplished without music, without beat of drum, without noise, and without confusion.

A Berlin correspondent of the *Medical Times and Gazette* says of the methods by which the Prussians dealt with their wounded :—

"The system is excellent, and the results up to the present time are very satisfactory. There are three classes of hospitals in rear of the army, called respectively Feld, Kreigs, and Reserve-Lazarethen. The first are on the battle-field itself, and receive all cases. As soon as a wounded man is in a fit state for removal, he is sent off to the hospitals of the second order, which are at a convenient distance in rear of the army. Hospitals of the third class are in and around towns in the neighbourhood of the seat of war. Moreover, as soon as it can be done with safety, the wounded are drafted off by railway long distances into the interior — for example, beyond Berlin — and then dispersed as widely as possible among towns and villages. By these means, accumulation of wounded men are avoided, and the field hospitals are kept as clear as circumstances will allow, while at the same time opportunities are given for the many kindly hands which are everywhere ready to take the charge of their disabled countrymen off the hands of the Government. The enemy's wounded are treated in precisely the same way."

The soldiers of both nations learnt to respect each other's valour in these first combats of the war; but the Germans complained greatly of the ferocious and savage conduct of the Turcos in the French army. These men are native Algerians, with the vices as well as the virtues of the desert. According to the testimony of their enemies, they were in the habit of maltreating the wounded, even lopping off their hands and ears as trophies. It is said that on one occasion a Turco threw himself on his knees before a Bavarian soldier, and begged for mercy; this being granted, he took advantage of the Bavarian being off his guard to spring up and endeavour to stab him with a bayonet concealed behind his back. Another account relates a similar trick performed by a whole regiment of Turcos, who, after making a profession of surrender, suddenly opened fire. Of course no quarter was given after that. There is but too much reason to fear that in many ways the French army has been injured by the importation of these barbarians, who, though courageous, are ignorant of the principles of scientific warfare, as they are indifferent to the restrictions of humanity and civilisation.

Nevertheless, the earlier French prisoners were well and even hospitably treated on their arrival at Berlin, for the war had not then passed into the stage of weariness and exasperation. A great crowd awaited the arrival of the first batch at the railway terminus. It being evening the captives were provided with a substantial and excellent supper, and were waited on by a number of young ladies, who volunteered for the service. At the conclusion of the meal postage-cards were presented to the Frenchmen to enable them to write to their friends, and they were assured that these missives should be safely forwarded. The wounded were specially attended to by the Queen of Prussia. Such are the amenities of warfare; but they flourish only in the first chivalrous enthusiasm of contest. When the conquerors are fatigued with success, when the prizes of victory are withheld, and the vanquished prolong a resistance which to their enemy seems obstinate and vexatious, a spirit of a very different kind is apt to set in.

The German residents in France were, about the same date, subjected to great annoyances, and at times even to great peril, from the violence of mobs. Many foreigners not German were mistaken in the streets of Paris for natives of the hated country, and were grossly insulted or brutally attacked. At one time it was feared that all the Germans in France would be expelled by a decree of the Government; but the decree, when it came, did not go further than to remove from the Department of the Seine all foreigners who had not obtained special permission to remain. It is a singular fact that the printer of the *Journal Officiel*—the Emperor's own printer—was a German. The mere suspicion of holding German sympathies, however, was enough to draw upon any one the ire of the mob. A most frightful incident of this nature occurred on the 16th of August at Hautelaye, near Périgueux. A M. de Moneys, the deputy-mayor of Beaussac, got into a discussion with some of the townspeople about the war. He was supposed to be a Republican and an anti-Napoleonist; and a remark he made was misinterpreted as being in favour of the Prussians, though it really had a contrary tendency. The mob thereupon attacked him with the utmost ferocity, wounded him in several parts of the face, and finally, having lit a fire in the market-place, literally burnt him alive. At least two hundred persons took part in this crime; and twenty-one were tried for it towards the close of the year. Of these, four were condemned to death; one to penal servitude for life; nine to lesser terms of penal servitude; and five to light terms of imprisonment. Two, who were boys, were acquitted.

In many ways Paris showed how deeply it was moved by the unexpected reverses of the time. The Empress, who has shown that she possesses many excellent qualities, unsuspected until periods of trial have brought them into notice, was so unremitting in her attention to public affairs, that she scarcely slept for two hours at a time, and in a few weeks was greatly changed and worn. Her attendants had orders to wake her at the receipt of every telegram; but the waking was only to reiterated sadness. This remarkable woman seems to have two distinct natures. In the days of her prosperity, and when there was no particular call on her energies, she was the graceful head of a glittering, ostentatious, frivolous, and not very self-respectful court—the arbiter of fashions, and the encourager of a wasteful expenditure which, unfortunately, acted as an evil example in many other quarters. When she was not contriving court fêtes, or determining the pattern of a robe or the shape of a head-dress, she was bowing before some shrine or relic in all the fervour of an elegant devotee. Most people thought she had no other capabilities. But when she was made Regent in 1859, during the absence of her husband in Italy, she gave evidence of better qualities. When, in 1866, the town of Amiens was stricken with cholera, she moved all hearts by the cheerful courage with which she visited the sick in hospital, after many others had fled in terror; and her reply to a Marshal, who had expressed his admiration of her self-reliance, was so bright, so apt, and so superior to the affectation of mock-modesty, that it deserves to be remembered. "Sir," said she, delicately insinuating a compliment in return, "it is our manner of going under fire." The Empress, therefore, had already proved that earnestness and courage were not wanting to her nature when the occasion for them should arise. It had now arisen very forcibly and terribly; and it was met with all the resolution which women in adversity can show.

On the 17th of August General Trochu was, by a direct decree of the Emperor himself, signed at Châlons, appointed Governor of Paris and Commander-in-chief of the forces assembled for its defence. The General—who was destined to play a greater part than he perhaps then anticipated—issued on the 19th a proclamation "to the National Guards, the National Guards Mobile, the land and sea troops in Paris, and all the defenders of the capital in a state of siege," in which it is remarkable that he only says he has "been appointed" to the post, without making any allusion to the Emperor or Empress. The proclamation then goes on:—

> "The honour is great, but for me equally so is the danger. Upon you, however, I rely to restore by energetic efforts of patriotism the fortunes of our army, should Paris be exposed to the trials of a siege. Never was a more magnificent opportunity presented to you to prove to the world that a long course of prosperity and good fortune has in no degree enervated public feeling nor the manhood of the country. You have before you the glorious example of the Army of the Rhine. They have fought one against three in heroic struggles which have earned the admiration of the country, and have inspired it with gratitude. It wears now mourning for those who have died.
>
> "Soldiers of the Army of Paris!—My whole life has been spent among you in a close intimacy, from which I now derive hope and strength. I make no appeal to your courage and your constancy, which are well known to me. But show by your obedience, by firm discipline, by the dignity of your conduct and behaviour, that you have a profound sense of the responsibilities which devolve upon you. Be at once an example and an encouragement to all.
>
> "The Governor of Paris,
> "TROCHU."

Trochu was a soldier of great ability, who, long before his appointment, had shown a very exact knowledge of the weak points in the French army, and of the urgent necessity for reform which existed in its constitution. In 1867 he published a work on this subject, which brought his name into prominent notice. His inconvenient habit of exposing abuses, and the fact of his being an Orleanist in politics, had made him unpopular with the more extreme Imperialists; but the Emperor himself had always recognised his talents, and public opinion now pointed him out as the man best fitted for the defence of Paris against a siege which already appeared but too probable. It may be serviceable in this place to reproduce from a recent number of the *Quarterly Review* a summary of General Trochu's remarks on the defects of the French military system—remarks which throw light on the disasters of August, 1870, and on those of succeeding months :—

"The organisation which had been given to the French army by Louvois lasted with no material changes until 1793. Previous to that date, enlistment was voluntary, commissions were objects of sale and purchase, and the army was officered exclusively by nobles. The revolution republicanised both the nation and the army; merit was recognised as the sole qualification for an officer's commission, and every conscript carried a Marshal's bâton in his knapsack. The enthusiasm thus created among the rank and file, when directed by the genius of Napoleon, carried the French eagles into nearly every capital of Europe. But victory is the indispensable condition of the success of such a constitution. Under reverses which try the confidence of the soldier in his superiors, discipline under such a system must surely break down. Since the restoration of Louis XVIII., the French army has been officered on a mixed system of promotion from the ranks, and of direct appointments from the military schools, the former class constituting one-third of the whole.

"The conscription was not established in France by law until 1798; and the statute which placed the whole population at the disposal of the state as each generation completes its twentieth year preceded the supremacy of the man who was to make so tremendous a use of it. The proceeds of the annual conscription, fixed at 40,000 men in 1818, were raised to 80,000 under Louis Philippe. Under the Second Empire it has never been less than 100,000 men, and during the Italian and Crimean Wars it was 140,000. The efficacy of the conscription was, however, materially lessened by the system of 'exonerations,' which permitted drafted men to commute their personal service for a money payment; so that in times of danger the men who were urgently wanted were represented by the unsatisfactory substitute of a bank-note in the Treasury. The result was that, in the Crimean and Italian Wars, France could only place and maintain in the field an army not much exceeding one-fourth of her effective strength on paper.

"The tendency of the military education of the French army has been to give it an overweening idea of its own superiority. With respect to Prussia, as we learn from General Trochu, the doctrine was taught officially in the military schools that the military constitution of that country, which created only young soldiers, was weak, and that the Prussian army would be found deficient in steadiness in the day of battle. This belief was shared up to 1866 by the public, by the army at large, and even with some reserve by himself. Since the day of Sadowa, French military men have come to doubt the correctness of such teaching, and it has been replaced by a different description, of which the 'Conferences Régimentaires,' a series of published military discussions encouraged by the Government, are an example. In these there is constant reference to Prussia as a rival who is to be watched; whose improvements in the art of war are to be met by counter improvements; whose tactics are to be compared with those of the French army; and whose country is to be studied as a probable theatre of war.

"In contrasting the comparative preparedness for war of the French and Prussian systems, General Trochu eulogises that territorial organisation of the latter, by means of which the different corps, divisions, and brigades, with their proper material, field equipment, and staff, all constantly and permanently acting together, and with their proper reinforcements in reserve, are maintained always in a condition to take the field on the order to mobilise. The same authority goes on to say :—'With the exception of the great centres, Paris, Lyons, and the Châlons camp, where the troops may be said to be rather concentrated than organised, the elements of war, both personal and material, are in a state of isolation almost infinitesimal. Organised concentration, the interchange of ideas and sentiments, the relations of the different arms, a common education, combined manœuvres conformable to the practice of real warfare, are out of the question; they are impossible; and when war breaks out, all this has to be improvised in the presence of the enemy, and with a consequent amount of confusion and error fatal to the discipline and coherence of the army.' In his remarks on the Intendance, General Trochu says, —'To be a good administrator, one should have passed his whole life in the study and practice of business.' He therefore considers it a serious error that the heads of the Intendance, the regulators of the existence of the French armies in the field, should be superannuated generals; and that all their subordinate functionaries, having passed great part of their lives as officers or sub-officers of the army, can have no knowledge of the operations of trade by which alone supply can adjust itself to demand. During the Italian campaign of 1859 the troops were often without bread in one of the richest corn-producing countries of Europe. Biscuit was equally deficient. In the Crimea the Intendance broke down so completely that recourse was obliged to be had to a great commercial house at Marseilles, which henceforth successfully supplied the wants of the army."

The fatal indecision and want of preparation evinced at the commencement of the war are shown in a letter from a superior officer in Marshal MacMahon's division, dated August 6th, an extract from which was published in an English journal (the *Guardian*). "I know not what we are about," writes this officer. "We are at present in a condition to move forwards, and yet we do nothing but change from flank to flank, sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left. I seem hardly to know whether we have a commander or not. I could even affirm that we were without one, after the experience of the past night. I was on guard, and had to receive no less than eight despatches from the Emperor and his état-major, addressed to the commandant of our corps—despatches continually contradicting each other, and testifying to a sad amount of hesitation." In the latter half of August, however, matters were looking so serious that, in Paris at least, the reorganisation of the national forces began to be taken in hand with vigour. The National Guards exercised daily; volunteers gave in their names in great numbers; free companies were formed; the populace were armed, without any other condition being required than the production of a certificate of good character from some functionary; the drilling of raw recruits was actively carried on; and the streets were busy with the movements of troops.

To ensure the more efficient defence of Paris, the Empress, on the 19th of August, issued a decree, in which it was provided that the Defence Committee of the fortifications should be composed of General Trochu (President), Marshal Vaillant, Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, Baron Jerome David (Minister of Public Works), and Generals de Chaubaud la Tour, Guiod, d'Autemarre, d'Erville, and Soumain. Other generals, military intendants, &c., were to be attached as occasion might require. The Committee were to meet every day at the War Office, and to receive a daily report of the progress of the works and armaments, and of the stores of ammunition and provisions. Daily reports of the proceedings of the Committee were to be sent in to the Minister of War, who was in turn to report to the Council of Ministers. This was the body that commenced the memorable defence of Paris—a defence which for several months attracted and fascinated the eyes of the world. Seven thousand five hundred workmen were at once employed in cutting through and supplying with drawbridges the roads leading through the fortifications into Paris; whatever constructions or elevations were considered likely to facilitate the advance of an enemy were levelled, and a large number of guns were mounted in the forts. The beautiful pleasure-grounds of the Bois de Boulogne were desolated, the trees cut down, and the elegant entrance-gates removed, to make way for massive stone bulwarks, thick walls loopholed for musketry, and the other features of military defence. Farther away, much of the ancient forest of Fontainebleau—long celebrated for the magnificence of its woodland shades, and for its grand old oaks, some of which were said to have survived more than a thousand years—was set on fire and consumed, with the exception of a few trees here and there, which by some chance escaped the wreck. The other forests in the neighbourhood of the capital were similarly destroyed, that they might not offer a vantage-ground or cover to the foe; and from the towers of Notre Dame, or any other eminence in Paris, the horizon on every side was crimsoned by leaping flames, or shadowed with vast bodies of smoke.

In Paris itself people prepared for the worst. Many stocked their houses with provisions, as if they were about to be attacked by the plague. Prices went up to a great height, and business, if it was depressed in some respects, was stimulated in others. The municipal authorities, acting on some advice given by M. Thiers—a statesman always strongly interested in the defence of the capital—offered gratuitous stowage and accommodation for corn and other alimentary substances, and for live stock of all kinds which should be furnished by the surrounding rural population, with a view to securing them from the enemy, and to supplying the wants of the inhabitants in case of need. The surrounding districts accordingly sent into the city 150,000 sheep, 40,000 pigs, 25,000 oxen, and a large number of calves. A war loan of between twenty and forty millions sterling was raised by general subscription, and largely taken up by the public; and the notes of the Bank of France were made unconvertible into specie on presentation. In the midst of these preparations, a slight revolutionary disturbance on the Boulevard de la Villette created some uneasiness. It took place on the 14th of August, and several of the rioters were condemned to death by court-martial.

While these arrangements were being made at the capital, the Emperor was moving about from place to place, fulfilling no function, and apparently aiming at no definite object. Before he left Metz, he had an interview with General Changarnier, with whom he had been at issue for many years. Accounts differ as to whether he himself sent for the old soldier, or the latter voluntarily sought the Emperor. Be that as it may, the General arrived at Metz on the 8th of August. Changarnier is another of those French officers who acquired



AN INCIDENT AT THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE.

distinction in Algeria. He was made Governor-General of that colony by the Provisional Government of 1848; but he soon relinquished the post, returned to Paris, and sat in the Constituent Assembly. Though a Republican, he assisted General Cavaignac in suppressing the terrible insurrection of June; and a few months later, when Louis Napoleon had been elected to the Presidency, he was appointed to the command, originally of the First Military Division, and subsequently, when a further insurrectionary movement was feared, of the entire armed force of Paris, civic and military. Thus provided with exceptional powers, he crushed the attempted rising of June, 1849, with but little bloodshed. From that time, however, a feeling of mutual jealousy and antagonism arose between Louis Napoleon and Changarnier. Both were ambitious men; one certainly, the other probably, aimed at supreme power; and they watched one another narrowly in the troubled days of 1849, 1850, and 1851. Changarnier was soon removed from his command; and at the period of the *coup d'état*, in the December of the last-mentioned year, he was among the imprisoned generals and members of the Legislature. On being released, he went to reside in Belgium, and refused to take the oath of allegiance to the new Dictator of France. In his letter to the Minister of the Interior conveying this refusal, he alluded to the proscribed generals being granted a delay of four months for making up their minds. "I have no need," he added, "of deliberating so long upon a question of duty and honour. This oath, exacted by the perjured man who has failed to corrupt me—this oath I refuse." The earlier part of the same letter contains a sentence which is particularly interesting in connection with recent events. "The exile which I have undergone in solitude and silence, and which now you force me to break," he writes to the Minister, "has not changed in my eyes my duties to France. Were it to be attacked, I would solicit with ardour the honour of fighting in its defence." It was to redeem this promise that Changarnier went to Metz.



THE KING OF PRUSSIA VISITING HIS SOLDIERS.

The Paris *Figaro* gives an amusing account—a little coloured, perhaps, after the French fashion—of the General's arrival. Changarnier is a dand, of the old school, and, on reaching the city in the midst of a heavy rain, he appeared to the few lookers-on as an old man dressed in grey trousers, tightly strapped, and a closely-buttoned great coat, his head sunk in his shoulders. "On arriving at the Prefecture," says *Figaro*, "he entered the courtyard, ascended the steps, and found himself before a Cent Garde, of whom he inquired for the usher. The soldier looked at the old man so wet and muddy. Perhaps he would have refused him admittance, had he not experienced that impression well known to soldiers, by which those who are accustomed to obey recognise those accustomed to command. The usher was now sent for by the orderly, who, when he saw the visitor, obeyed him with even greater readiness, so that in a few seconds General Reille was informed that General Changarnier wished to speak to the Emperor. His name had a magical effect: the Emperor, who was alone, ordered the General to be immediately admitted. These two men, who had not spoken to each other for nineteen years, were now face to face. 'Sire,' said the General, 'France is in danger; I am an old soldier; I come to offer you my experience and my sword. My sword is, perhaps, not worth much, for I am seventy-eight years of age; but I think my head is still good.' The door was shut, and the interview lasted two hours. When it again opened, the Emperor spoke. 'Get dinner for the General,' said he; 'he has not eaten since this morning. Also tell the Count d'Aure to choose horses for the General: he belongs to us, gentlemen; let his apartment be prepared.' Since then, the Emperor and the General have been inseparable. The old soldier, having come straight off on hearing of the disaster, had nothing with him: linen and clothes had to be found for him. The Emperor is delighted; and the presence of this glory of the past has had a good effect upon the officers who saw Changarnier with the Emperor at Faulquemont." Changarnier's day, however, had passed. The stage awaited younger and fresher men.

The Emperor, with the Prince Imperial, arrived at the Châlons camp on the 17th of August. He visited several army corps on horseback, and was surrounded by the soldiers, who demanded to be led against the enemy. By many, however, he was but sullenly received, and it is said that he excited discontent by too great a regard to his own personal convenience. Every time he moved along the line (so, at least, it was alleged), the reinforcements were retarded four-and-twenty hours for fear of incommoding the Imperial train. Between his departure from Metz, on the 14th, and his arrival at Châlons, on the 17th, his Majesty, while staying at Longeville, at the house of Colonel Hénocque, was nearly captured by the Prussians. A party of the enemy hid themselves at night in the thickets of some neighbouring houses, and opened fire on the village of Moulins, situated to the left of Longeville, so as to intercept all aid. The French engineers hereupon blew up the railway bridge connecting Longeville and Moulins, and some Uhlans, who had already crossed to the former place, were obliged to surrender. On the following day the Emperor and his son slept at Gravelotte, and next morning drove in an open chaise in the direction of Verdun, passing through some of the intermediate villages, and taking the valley the most remote from the Moselle, to avoid the enemy, who were in such force as to render it necessary to protect the road with Grenadiers of the Guard and three regiments of cavalry. At the Verdun station the station-master was obliged to apologise for offering his Majesty a third-class train; but the Emperor contentedly seated himself on the hard board, and refused a cushion from his carriage. He expressed a wish for a glass of wine, which the station-master supplied; and the Prince Imperial, who was much fatigued, asked for accommodation for washing his hands and face. This he did at the station-master's glass, and used his pocket handkerchief for a towel.

The world is not yet sufficiently informed of the intentions of the Emperor during this trying period of his life to permit of a decided opinion being expressed as to what those intentions were worth, if, indeed, he had really conceived any definite project at all. The scattered anecdotes which are recorded of him during the period from the first battle before Metz to the great struggle at Sedan, present to us the figure of a bewildered and dejected fugitive, moving from place to place in vain attempts to escape the grip of a relentless, always-pursuing, never-pausing destiny. There are few things in history more striking than the contrast between the Napoleon of July and the Napoleon of August. When war was declared, it was still believed by most people that the Emperor was the greatest potentate in Europe. He had, it is true, received some rebuffs of late years; he had failed once or twice; and Prussia had grown into a dangerous rival. But it was generally supposed that his power was substantially untouched, and that, if conquered at all, he would only be vanquished after a long and difficult contest, partaking of those vicissitudes, those alternations of success and defeat, which usually characterise the struggles of two great military nations. When men saw his whole



PRUSSIAN ADVANCE AT GRAVELOTTE.

strength exhausted in a few weeks, after a series of battles in which his opponent was almost uniformly successful, they could hardly comprehend the spectacle. A good deal of superfluous moralising on the subject has found its way into print. We have been told that the sudden collapse of the Empire was due to the fact of its having been based on fraud and corruption. All Governments are to some extent corrupt, and it may perhaps be said of the French Empire that it was more so than some, and less so than others. But it was certainly not corrupt to an abnormal degree, and it had many excellent features which redeemed its faults. Its main basis was on the solid foundations of popular consent, and of the necessities of a state of society in which the valuable results of revolution were threatened by anarchy. That Imperial France was so soon vanquished by Prussia, is attributable simply to the fact that the one Power was prepared for war, and the other was not; and the want of preparation on the part of the French resulted from an overweening confidence in their ability to beat any people in the world the moment they took the field. Their army was as little fitted for a great war as our own was when it landed in the Crimea.*

At any rate, the position of the Emperor was pitiable and tragic in the extreme. Even had he committed more faults than can fairly be laid to his charge, it would be impossible for any generous mind to refuse its sympathy to that foiled and vanquished sovereign, so long accustomed to the most splendid realities of power, so suddenly and utterly cast down; to that sick and hunted man, living in fear and hardship, after long familiarity with Imperial ways, desperately endeavouring to re-mass his broken legions, and finding them again and again unequal to retrieve the day. When pressed by several of his generals to return to Paris, he is said to have replied, "Dead or victorious!" He suffered greatly from exhaustion and fatigue, resulting from physical exertion and mental excitement; yet, according to some accounts, he showed great serenity under the trials of the time.

What with the army of MacMahon (by this time re-combined and re-disciplined after the defeat at Wörth), the corps of de Failly, Felix Douay, Canrobert, and Trochu (or that which had been formed by Trochu before his appointment to the Governorship of Paris), and the Garde Mobile, there were now collected at the Châlons camp about 140,000 men, of whom 105,000 were seasoned and experienced soldiers. The other 35,000, forming the Garde Mobile, were as yet in a very raw condition, and, what was worse, disposed to insubordination. They appear, indeed, to have affected the other troops; for a disgraceful scene occurred, in which men of all arms of the service at the camp are reported to have taken part—viz., the pillage of some supply-trains. A correspondent of the *Siècle*, describing this event, says:—"For more than two hours the railway station was pillaged by three or four hundred stragglers from the corps of General de Failly, many of them belonging to the artillery. They fractured or opened a hundred and fifty goods wagons, and threw out on the line, at the risk of accidents, barrels of wine and gunpowder, cartridges, shot, shell, biscuits, bales of clothing, coffee, salt meat, and other provisions. These they sold to hucksters, who waited outside. Among other articles was a part of the Emperor's baggage. His sheets went for four sous each; loaves of sugar brought fifty centimes only, and bales of coffee a franc. The railway servants attacked these brigands with sticks, but were in return pelted with cartridges. About fifty of the plunderers, however, were arrested, and forty of them are soldiers." The camp altogether was in a most disorderly state. Women of the worst character from Paris were there in large numbers; the cheap concert-rooms were crowded; amusement was eagerly sought after, and supplied without stint. The streets echoed with the clang of military preparation; yet there seemed to be plenty of time for singing the old boastful songs, for declaiming, for shouting, and for drinking. Some cried, "Long live the Emperor!" Others made a mock of his name and office, or bespattered him with coarse abuse. All foreigners were regarded as Prussian spies, and the newspaper correspondents ran great risks of being hanged. Nothing could be more depressing than the Emperor's fête-day at the camp. No illuminations were put up, and every one felt the lamentable comment of events on the cherished associations of the dynasty. The Napoleonic star was manifestly setting.

All this while the Germans were gaining a firmer hold on the country. On the same day that General Trochu was appointed to the command of the troops in Paris—the 17th of August—the King of Prussia nominated General von Bonin to the post of Governor-General of Lorraine, and Lieutenant-General Count Bismarck-Bohlen to the same office in Alsace. Two days after the battle of Gravelotte, a large force of Landwehr reached Metz, to fill up the gaps in the army caused by the losses on that and previous occasions, and to set free a portion of the regular forces for other work. The Crown Prince continued to advance steadily westward, with the evident intention of marching on Paris. He was now supported by a detachment from Prince Frederick Charles's army, consisting of the 4th Corps, the 12th (Saxons), and the Guards. These were constituted as a separate, or fourth, army, the command of which was given to the Prince of Saxony. By the 22nd of August they were traversing the country between Verdun and the Belgian frontier, and keeping parallel with the Crown Prince, who was proceeding along the great Nancy-Châlons road. On that same day the Crown Prince's head-quarters were at Vaucouleurs. On the 24th they were at Ligny, a little further to the north-west; and the King of Prussia simultaneously established his head-quarters at Bar-le-Duc, still further in the same direction, and therefore nearer to Châlons. On the 24th, also, Vitry, a small fortress seventeen miles south-east of Châlons, surrendered to a Prussian detachment. The main body of Prince Frederick Charles's army remained to keep watch over Metz, around which city strong lines of circumvallation were drawn, so that the investment was completely effected by the 23rd.

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* See Appendix v., Vol. II., p. 545, "General Trochu on the War."

It now remained for the Emperor and MacMahon to decide whether they would fall back on Paris, withdraw to a flanking position such as might harass and obstruct the enemy, or break up from Châlons, march in a north-easterly direction, and so fall suddenly on the rear of the German army before Metz. The Brussels pamphlet attributed to the Emperor, to which allusion has been made at pp. 17, 18, gives us to understand that Louis Napoleon was himself in favour of a retreat on Paris. It is there stated that at a military council held at Châlons shortly after his arrival, it was resolved that MacMahon should lead the troops back to the capital, together with the Emperor. The Ministers, however, objected, and strongly gave it as their opinion that the army of Châlons ought to go to the relief of Metz. MacMahon protested against any such project as that of a flank march on the city now so closely beleaguered by Prince Frederick Charles, and asserted that he had no chance of operating successfully against the enemy, excepting under the walls of Paris. "But," says the writer of the pamphlet, "the language of reason was not understood at Paris." The Government of the Count of Palikao insisted; Marshal MacMahon had no choice but to obey; and the Emperor, though entirely dissenting from the proposed course, would not set himself against the advice of the Empress-Regent and her Ministers. It was therefore determined to quit Châlons, and endeavour to relieve Bazaine.

Such is the account given in the remarkable pamphlet by "A Staff Officer." How far it is reliable cannot be stated with absolute certainty; but the production is generally held to be authentic, and there is nothing in its assertions at variance with probability. MacMahon must have seen the perils of the suggested expedition much better than Palikao could have estimated them at a distance. The Emperor also had the advantage (such as it was) of a close and personal knowledge of the position, strength, and resources of the Germans; yet, having temporarily yielded his sovereign power into the hands of the Empress and her advisers, he may have felt that he would not have been justified in thwarting their plans. The Government assured MacMahon that his enterprise would be abundantly facilitated by the railroad from Mézières to Thionville, which would carry his stores, and by which he would receive reinforcements. It appears to have been thought that he might, by forced marches, push his way through the hills of Argonne, and so across the Meuse to Montmédy, Longuyon, and Thionville, from which an attack might be directed against the besiegers of Metz. Accordingly, the Marshal broke up from Châlons on the 21st of August, destroying his camp, and marching towards Rheims. The attempt, however, was full of danger, as Metz was by this time strongly invested. The leading German columns entered Châlons on the 24th, on which day the news of MacMahon's departure reached the King of Prussia's head-quarters at Bar-le-Duc. The French commander, in the first instance, sent forward his cavalry and a portion of his guns (450 in number) by Suippe and Vouziers towards Montmédy; the infantry and the rest of the guns followed. His march, however, was far from rapid; and this was an expedition in which exceptional celerity of movement offered the only chance of success. "The guns," says a writer in the *Times*, "were ill-horsed and ill-mounted; the trains insufficient and out of order; the cavalry inferior and too few in number; and the infantry, made up of a medley of regiments, of raw levies, and of disheartened soldiers, was wanting in real elements of power. The Emperor hung on the skirts of the army, self-deposed from the command he had held, unlike the terrible chief of his name, the mighty soul of his armed battalions, but encumbering them with the pomp of idle state; and with him was his Imperial child, taken from the palace to behold the image of triumphant war, but already saddened by the clouds of disaster." According to this authority, MacMahon's forces had not cleared Rheims until the 23rd of August; though the Marshal is said to have addressed some of the columns on the march, and told them that French soldiers had accomplished thirty miles a day under the scorching sun of Africa.

The siege of Strasburg was by this time proceeding with great vigour. Strasburg, the capital of the department of the Bas-Rhin, and the chief town of Alsace, is situated on a plain at a distance of about two miles from the left bank of the Rhine. Its form is irregular, and in circuit it is about five or six miles. When it was ceded by Austria to Louis XIV., the defences were so improved by the great Vauban that it became the strongest city in France, and one of the strongest in the world. It is entered by seven gates, surrounded by a wall strengthened by bastions, ditches, and outworks; and at the eastern extremity is a citadel with five bastions, the outworks of which extend as far as the Rhine, which is crossed by a bridge of boats connecting Strasburg with Kehl, a town in Baden on the opposite bank of the great river. The actual city of Strasburg is watered by the river Ill. It is a picturesque place, with a magnificent Gothic cathedral, and several other public buildings of interest and beauty. The trade and manufactures of Strasburg are considerable, and the inhabitants are mainly of German origin, so that, as in other parts of Alsace, the German language is spoken by some, while others employ a species of mongrel French, largely intermixed with Teutonic phrases. Many of the people, moreover, are Protestants; yet, notwithstanding these influences, the inhabitants, with but few exceptions, are thoroughly French. Their ancestors for several generations have been born subjects of France, and their connection with Germany is an affair of nearly two centuries ago.



COUNT BISMARCK.

Previous to the opening of the siege, several of the inhabitants prepared for flight. A traveller in that part of France, who left Strasburg just before the investment, gives some interesting particulars. "Dark rumours," says he, "were spread by the German residents, and there were violent encounters



ENCOUNTER BEFORE METZ.

at all hours of the day in the populous suburbs of Strasburg. To these rumours the vigorous proclamation of General Uhrich formed a reply. When the commander was seen to be thus determined, the weak and timid sought permission to leave. By the exertions of the military authorities, two trains were organised, one for Basle and the other for Belfort, to carry away those of the Strasburgers who sought to avoid the horrors of a siege. The garrison of Strasburg found itself reinforced by the Garde Mobile of the department, infantry, and artillery, the regiment of pontoon artillery, the depôts of two regiments of artillery, with the depôts of the 13th battalion of Chasseurs, and of two regiments of the Line. A strong body of men was thus thrown into the town, which is well supplied, and, above all, well commanded. General Uhrich, who was born at Phalsburg, is an energetic officer, who knows Strasburg perfectly. If an idea were wanted of the spirit of the inhabitants, it would be found in the reception given to the envoy sent by the Prussian General de Bayer. From the Saverne gate, by which he entered, to head-quarters, he was accompanied by the townspeople, who cried in German, so that he might understand, 'We will not surrender.' When he had delivered his message to General Uhrich, the latter, by way of reply, opened the window and showed him the people, who cried out, 'Down with Prussia! Long live France! No surrender!'" The garrison made a sortie in the direction of Ostwald on the 16th of August, but were driven back with a loss of men and of three guns. Previous to this, the ramparts had been armed, the *glacis* razed, and the approaches to the town barricaded. The regular bombardment of the city, however, commenced at seven o'clock on the morning of the 19th from the direction of Kehl, and was answered by the garrison firing on that town.

Simultaneously with these operations against Strasburg, the siege of Phalsburg, in the Vosges, was vigorously prosecuted. On the 16th of August the Prussians in front of the town were repulsed with loss; but the advantage to the French was only very brief, and at daybreak on the 18th the bombardment of the place commenced. Dr. Russell, writing in the *Times*, painted a lively picture of the Prussian proceedings, and the way in which they were met:—

"On a sloping ground about a mile and a half from the town on the western side were the earthworks thrown up by the Prussians to cover their field guns, which were disposed in three separate batteries some distance apart, so as to give a converging fire on the place, and in the rear of these were considerable reserves near the village of Vesheim. It seemed to me as if there were only three batteries employed. So far had they done their work that Phalsburg was on fire in three distinct places; but from out of the curling black and red-based smoke came the white puff and thick fat cloud of the big gun at the north-west bastion, and then the hurtling of the shot through the air, the thud in the ground behind the Prussian batteries, and now and then the bursting shell. Puff! puff! puff! Three guns reply, one after the other. One shell bursts in the air, one in front of the bastion, one is heard exploding in the town. Puff! puff! puff! Three guns from another battery, all at intervals of ten seconds, so that the town is regularly scored by shell. There is another fire burning now. Boom! There goes the big gun, perhaps a 32-pounder, again; and in a minute more, as the Prussians are plying their fire, there is the roar of another gun from the nearer bastion, and the shot fly far over the batteries, throwing up the earth as they ricochet towards the reserves. Fires break out and burn themselves out, or are put out by the gallant garrison. We hear it is a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry—his name, as well as I can catch it, Tioulle or Thieulle—who commands; and he swears that as long as a man is left to fire a gun, Phalsburg shall be held. The town is now a blaze of fire; smoke rises in suffocating columns from a whole quarter. But the two bastions just go on hammer, hammer, in reply to the incessant crackling fire of the field-pieces, as if all was serene within."

From time to time during the month of August the French were gratified with reports of slight successes on the part of their gun-boats in the Baltic. The most important of these was one which took place on the 16th, to the west of the Isle of Rügen, between a division of the Prussian fleet, composed of the *Grille*, and the gunboats *Drache*, *Blitz*, and *Salamander*, and four French iron-clad frigates, a corvette, and a despatch-boat. A German account of this affair says:—"The *Grille* sailed to within about 3,000 paces of the enemy's fleet, which at once opened upon this single boat a hot broadside fire, and simultaneously gave chase. The *Grille*, by alternately giving way and then coming to, drew the enemy into the neighbourhood where our gun-boats *Drache*, *Blitz*, and *Salamander* were lying, which immediately opened fire. For two hours the fight went on, until it was broken off by the withdrawal of our gun-boats, which, as unarmoured wooden boats, could make no offensive attack on the heavy armour-clad ships of the enemy. Although, as a rule, the French seemed to take good aim, their shots were invariably either too high, or fell short. Moreover, it was not easy to hit our little boats, which were hardly visible above the waves. Our vessels made the harbour again without either killed or wounded." The naval superiority of the French over the Prussians was unquestionable.

The terrible losses and sufferings resulting from the war excited great commiseration in England, and agencies were set on foot in London for sending out medical stores, blankets, linen, and various comforts to the sick and wounded, as well as trained nurses and attendants. The English public generously answered the call that was made on them; and Dr. Charles Mayo, who was sent to Germany as the principal representative of the Society formed for carrying out these benevolent objects, gave an account of his communications with the Crown Princess of Prussia and the Princess Alice. "After four days' delay in Berlin," he wrote, "the prospect of moving forward seemed no nearer than at first, and I determined to break though official obstacles, if possible. I therefore wrote to the Crown Princess, asking her Royal Highness to use her influence to get us sent on, and telling her that our presence in Berlin was consequent upon a telegram which had been received from the Princess Alice. On Friday, I received a telegram desiring me to attend her Royal Highness at the Crown Prince's palace in Berlin on the following afternoon; but, as I had succeeded by Friday afternoon in getting my papers complete, I thought it right to go to Potsdam to see the Princess's chamberlain, and to ask to be excused from the audience, so that I might save twelve or twenty-four hours in going to the front by starting the same evening. Her Royal Highness, however, desired to see me immediately, and received me very kindly. She spoke of various matters relating to the war, and particularly to the medical business of the campaign. I was surprised to find her so conversant with medical terms, and so well informed of the requirements of the army. She inquired particularly as to the supplies that we had brought with us, and in several cases I was able to answer her questions in the affirmative; but she was disappointed that we had not brought a considerable stock of surgical instruments and chloroform. The instruments, she said, were badly needed, and no good English chloroform was obtainable. She also said that instruments were thrown aside and lost, from the impossibility of getting them repaired on the field. The Princess took me to the Crown Prince's room, where a table stood partly covered with bandages, compressers, charpie, &c., made by her own hands, and supporting also a French cuirass, helmet, sabre, and flag, which, she said, were presents from Weissenburg. She took all the charpie she had made from a box on the table, and rolled it up in my pocket-handkerchief, asking me to tell the wounded man for whom I used it that it was of her making." It is well for our common humanity that war brings out some of the best, as well as some of the worst, elements of our nature. To undo with one hand what we have done with the other, may seem illogical; but in this instance it is right with a rightness beyond merely formal reasoning. In no respect does the present age more clearly show its superiority over preceding times than in the care that is taken of the victims of military fury.

CHAPTER VI.

The Prussian Military System—The Army Reforms of the Early Part of the Present Century—Position of Prussia in 1859—Pamphlet by Prince Frederick Charles—Career of that Officer—His Suggestions carried out in the "Tactical Instructions" of 1861—Augmentation of the Prussian Army after the War of 1866—Origin of the Needle Gun—Abandonment by the French, during the Prussian War, of their favourite Tactics—Peculiar Genius of the French Army—Organisation of the Prussian Cavalry—The Uhlans, Hussars, and Dragoons—Their Equipment, Habits, and Efficiency—General Intelligence and Watchfulness of the German Army—Evil Effects of the Prussian System—Dashing Reconnaissances—The French Plan for the Relief of Metz—Gloomy Feeling among the Forces—Dilatoriness of their Movements—Arrangements of the Germans for Counteracting the French Designs—Celerity of their March—Progress of the French and Germans towards the Meuse—Slight Collisions—Important Actions on the 30th of August—The French Defeated, and Driven across the River—MacMahon takes up a Strong Position behind the Meuse and Chiers—Progress of the Siege of Strasburg—Damage to the Cathedral, and Burning of the Library—The Investment of Metz—State of Paris—Expulsion of Bad Characters—Execution of a Prussian Spy—Entry of Trophies into Berlin—Removal of General Steinmetz from the Command of the First Army.

In following thus far the extraordinary career of success by which the Prussians astonished the world in the summer and autumn of 1870, the reader cannot fail to have been struck by the excellence of their arrangements, the methodical way in which most things were provided for beforehand, and the union of system with individual intelligence. Rigidity of discipline and elasticity of resource seem to have been combined in the conduct of the German armies, all of which were modelled on the

Prussian plan, though possibly that plan was seen in its greatest perfection in the forces of the great northern kingdom itself. The result was that in the earlier stages of the struggle the Germans carried all before them; and that some of the most rapid and brilliant successes in history were obtained over a nation which until then had been considered the first military power in the world. Prussia had not always been equally well prepared. Although Frederick the Great won high distinction for himself and his country by many remarkable victories, his system appears to have been in some respects too stiff and pedantic for the necessities of modern warfare; and in the progress of time its faults increased, while its excellences fell into abeyance. In the early part of the present century Prussia was completely crushed by France; but the disastrous years from 1806 to 1813 were turned to account in re-fashioning the national army. The ideas and methods which we have since seen so powerfully developed were then first conceived, and, though they were but imperfectly carried into practice, they enabled the Prussians to drive the French out of the land, and materially to assist the Allies in the subjugation of Buonaparte. In subsequent years it became evident that certain modifications were necessary. Colonel Chesney, in a lecture delivered at Woolwich and Aldershot during the course of the Franco-Prussian war, stated that when the Prussian army was called out in 1859, owing to the Italian war, he (the colonel) went among officers and men, and found that they complained of the system under which they had to act. Great discontent prevailed, and, owing to slowness of movement, the army could not effect all its objects. The military position of the country excited great interest in the minds of practical critics; and in the following year Prince Frederick Charles published his celebrated pamphlet, "How to Beat the French."

This illustrious general is the eldest son of Prince Charles, second brother of the King of Prussia, and was born in 1828. He entered the army at an early period of life, and first distinguished himself, as a general of cavalry, in the war against Denmark in 1864. In 1866 he commanded the First Army in the Austrian war, and, passing through Saxony to Bohemia, contrived, by adroit management and geniality of character, to create a friendly disposition towards Prussia on the part of the Saxons. Much of the Prussian success in that brief but memorable campaign was due to the energy and quickness of action of Prince Frederick Charles. He drove the Austrians before him by victory after victory, and, in concert with his cousin, the Crown Prince, won the battle of Königgrätz. He is a great favourite with his men, to whom his manner is said to be always kind and cheering, and whom he has the happy art of encouraging, by a few timely words and a dashing and spirited demeanour, in moments of fatigue and depression. To him, in the judgment of military critics, are to be attributed those recent reforms which have supplanted the formality of the old Prussian routine by the vigour and promptitude of personal self-reliance.

The Prince had been struck by the rapidity with which the French had vanquished the Austrians in 1859. He saw that the existing Prussian system was in many respects inferior to that of France, and he set to work to enlighten his countrymen as to what the leading principles of that system really were. "A person," he remarked, "who supposes that the French fight in an irregular and disorderly way, like the hordes of Attila, is as much mistaken as one who expects to find in them an adversary subjected to the strict rules of military art. We must look for the truth between these two extremes." The successes of the French, he added, were due to a few simple principles, first carried into practice by them at the period of the first French Revolution, and so on to our own times. These principles, he said, consisted in the omission, on the actual field of battle, of all parade-ground manœuvres and barrack regulations, so that the commanders may not be limited to any special form of tactics, but rely on their general knowledge of the profession; in the familiarity, both of officers and men, with the axiom that moral force is more important than physical; in the rule that, when fighting with irregular enemies, such as the Arabs of Algeria, the close order of formation is to be preferred, but that a looser method is desirable when the enemy consists of over-drilled soldiers, like the Austrians and Russians; in the avoidance of a merely passive attitude of defence, and the adoption of a vigorous policy of offensive movements—a principle held by Marshal Bugeaud to be essential to the efficiency of the French soldier; in the resort to the skirmishing order only as a makeshift, and not as the vital part of an attack; and in the surprising and overwhelming of the enemy by the vehemence and fury of the first assault, for which the Gallic race has been celebrated from the time of Julius Cæsar downwards. The quickness of manœuvering which he observed in the French army excited the admiration of the Prince; but at the same time he observed that, as a consequence of their looser system, French soldiers are more disorderly in retreat than those of any other nation; whilst in the attack or defence of a strong place they are more methodical. The French, he said, use columns of the most varied nature when attacking, and dispose them in every sort of way, so as to keep back a great part of their troops, with a view to defending their flanks, if necessary. In this, he contended, they were simply imitating the "oblique order" of Frederick the Great. "It is the same," he added, "with the majority of the principles of which I have spoken: they are more or less in conformity with true tactics; but, in place of being of French origin, they have been formerly employed by our generals with greater or less success. It rests, then, with each of us to put them in practice in future, which will be the easier for us the more we are convinced of their importance. History is there to prove that these principles are not the exclusive privilege of the French, nor the immediate result of their national character. Now, if Prussia puts to herself this haughty question, What will be our fate in a war with France? We can conquer her, I answer, and we *shall* conquer her with a certain blow, if we know how to detach ourselves, in time of war, from the routine of the drill-ground, from the demands of regulations, and from our system of skirmishing. Here is the difficulty; this is my only anxiety. The motive power which these forces give is insufficient to maintain discipline, to bring the soldiers up to the enemy, and to make them sustain their fire. Thank God we have others, and we shall know how to bring them to our aid."

These remarks led to many replies and comments, to some of which the Prince made rejoinder, declaring at the close of the discussion that "there were three conditions to be observed at once, in order to render the Prussian army capable of conquering that of France. (1.) To develop the military qualities of each individual soldier earnestly in time of peace. (2.) To give the army leaders who have a thorough acquaintance with the three principal arms. (3.) To oppose to the French a more varied and elastic form of tactics."* Among the specific suggestions offered by this military reformer, was one with reference to the disposition of the troops in depth rather than in breadth, so as to make them more ready for flank movements, and to expose less front to the enemy's fire. The reader has doubtless already observed that flank movements were largely resorted to by the Germans in the battles of August, 1870, and with uniform success. The general effect of the Prince's remarks was to discredit the pedantry which made set rules for every conceivable occasion and emergency, and to recommend the encouragement of a spirit of quickness, readiness, and forethought in all the commanding officers.

So soon did the suggestions of Prince Frederick Charles bear fruit, that in 1861—the year after the publication of the pamphlet—a set of "Tactical Instructions" for the army was issued, which carried out his designs. New forms of drill and discipline were adopted, and the troops were constantly exercised in field manœuvres which accustomed the whole body to the ways of actual warfare. Other reforms, giving the State a greater power over the army, and enabling it with more readiness to use the resources of the nation for ambitious purposes, were carried through the Chambers by the resolute will of the King and Count Bismarck combined, though much against the wishes of the Liberal party, who were completely browbeaten and over-ridden; and by these means, followed by the measures consequent on the war of 1866, the armies of Germany became the most formidable and most terrific aggressive power of modern times.

Before the breaking out of the war of 1870 the Prussian field army had been raised to almost double the strength it had had during the war with Austria. The reserves were also greatly increased, and the artillery was brought up to the standard of modern science. In 1866, "Prussia had gone into the war without accomplishing her artillery reforms. Part of her batteries at Königgrätz were of the old smooth-bore construction, and of the breech-loading guns three several patterns had been carried into the field. Now, all confusion and uncertainty has passed away. The simplest and most efficient breech-loading piece yet discovered has been adopted throughout. The artillery service, and the proportion of horses and drivers maintained in peace has been brought up to a higher standard—the experience of 1866 having clearly shown that a large infusion of raw elements into the field artillery, to strengthen it suddenly, defeats its object by crippling the efficiency of the batteries. The Prussian cavalry had borne itself gallantly in action, and proved of abundant utility in outpost work in Bohemia. Yet, here again, there had been experienced difficulties arising from an admixture of half-broken horses and unpractised riders. These evils it was judged necessary to avoid in future by raising the peace effective of the cavalry to at least two-thirds of the war strength—a change which has made the Prussians in this war show a more marked superiority in that arm over the enemy than Europe

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* *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1870. Art. "Campaign of August, 1870."



PRUSSIAN UNIFORMS.



THE CROWN PRINCE OF SAXONY.

has witnessed the like of since the Archduke Charles outmanœuvred Moreau and Jourdan on the Danube by the dexterous use of his horse. On the whole, therefore, General von Moltke entered on his new task not only with a far larger force than in 1866, not only with the prestige of success and the gain of experience for his staff, but with an army more complete in every detail, and, above all, well exercised in those bold, free principles propounded ten years since in the 'Memorial,' and confident in their proved effectiveness in actual war. Never was the transformation of discipline more complete than that which created the light dashing style of warfare of the Prussian infantry of our time out of the stiff stateliness of manœuvre their fathers inherited from the school of the Great

Frederick."* It is a remarkable fact that the needle-gun was invented as far back as 1830. The originator offered it to the Berlin Government, but it was regarded as too dangerous for use. In 1849, however, it was adopted by the Prussians, though it was not until 1866 that its terrible powers first attracted general notice.

Some of the especial features of the French military system pointed out by Prince Frederick Charles seem to have been strangely abandoned by the Imperial armies in the battles of August. They adopted for the most part an attitude of defence and expectation; waited to be attacked; hesitated in their plans; and, when they met the enemy, forgot their ancient and traditional way of dashing forward in swift and fiery movement, so as to sweep all obstacles before them. The explanation of this hesitating policy is unquestionably to be found in their consciousness of want of preparation; yet a bolder initiative, when the war had once begun, might possibly have been attended by better results, while it could hardly have led to worse. A correspondent of the *Daily News*, remarking on these matters, very pertinently observes:—"The French are Celts. The characteristics of the Celt are impulsiveness; quick, sudden, and short-lived fury; impatience of inaction; inability to maintain with dogged phlegm any position, whether of argument or of actual physical ground. In personal physique the Celt is supple, wiry, and swift, possessing great muscular power in proportion to his quantity of bone, but essentially of lighter and lither build than the Teuton. Apply these definitions to the tactics under which the Celt ought to be led in battle. The Scottish Highlanders are Celts, and everybody knows the tactics under which these wild mountaineers achieved success after success over superior numbers of disciplined and better-armed soldiers. The strength of the French soldier lies in attack. Only keep the fellow moving to the front, keep his restless limbs in action, and he will fight like a demon. He will bear repulse after repulse, if you only give him leave to go in again; and he will take a deal of mauling before he owns himself beaten. But insist on his remaining stationary, deny him his natural spurt to the front, and his fidgetiness overmasters him—he trickles away little by little to the rear. No thoughtful and intelligent student of French military history can have failed to observe that this necessity for action is the great capital trait in the French military idiosyncrasy. To give it scope and development would have been, one would have thought, the primary care of every French commander. In doing so lay the only chance for France, looking at the quality and the numbers of the troops that were her enemies: how invariably this only chance has been thrown away, the story of every battle in the campaign abundantly testifies." Other observers also speak of the greater weight of the German, of the extraordinary massiveness of his advance, and of the immense strength of back and thigh which he possesses. Again and again the French were seen to roll before the Germans like india-rubber balls; only that, as a newspaper correspondent said, there was no rebound. It is obvious that the only compensation for deficiency of weight lies in superior impetus or momentum. This, however, was wanting, and the consequence was defeat.

The Prussian cavalry bore a very important part in the operations of the campaign. They seemed to be ubiquitous. They were constantly in advance of the main body of the army, surprising villages and small towns, collecting information, striking terror into the populace, enforcing war contributions, threatening the communications of the enemy, and generally preparing the way for the infantry and artillery. A military correspondent of the *Times* gave, towards the close of the year 1870, an interesting account of their organisation. The very horses appear to be thoroughly trained to their work. They are said to be capable of greater endurance than English cavalry horses. In times of peace they are bought as unbroken three-year-olds, and sent to the re-mount depôts, where they remain until the autumn of the year in which they become five years old. They are then, in connection with their regiments, handled and broken during the winter, and are six years old when put into the ranks. In time of war, 100,000 additional horses are required; these are supplied by the Government calling into requisition certain animals which, although belonging to farmers throughout the country, have been provisionally noted and told off to regiments, the State paying a sum of money by way of compensation whenever the horses are used. Other horses, in case of an emergency, are bought by contract; but care is always taken that they shall not be raw and unformed. So strong are these chargers that they are able to bear a vast amount of fatigue on somewhat scanty forage. From the 15th of November to the 20th of December, the animals belonging to the second army (that of Prince Frederick Charles) were not unsaddled, even at night, more than once.

The Prussian cavalry is divided into Cuirassiers, Uhlans (or Lancers), Hussars, and Dragoons,

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* *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1870. Art. "Campaign of August, 1870."

The Cuirassiers, as in other armies, are heavy cavalry, and wear their armour in war, contrary to the custom of the Austrian Cuirassiers, who lay their armour aside on going into action, as being too cumbrous. The Prussians, however, find the breast-plate, &c., really useful as a protection. The Uhlans, of whom we have heard so much, were originally a Polish corps, as the name suggests. They also are heavy cavalry, though rather less so than the Cuirassiers. "A Uhlan," says the *Times* writer from whom these details are reproduced, "carries, besides his lance, a sword and pistol. With Lancer cap—copied, like our own, from the Poles—worn jauntily on one side of his head, the Uhlan rides, with one companion at least, over the enemy's country (sometimes many miles in front of the army to which he belongs), advances boldly into villages or farm-houses, demands food and forage from the trembling inhabitants, gets what news he can, and sends it back, if important, to his commander. But in this work he is not the sole actor, for the Dragoons and Hussars perform similar duties, and come somehow to be called Uhlans by the country people, whose minds are oppressed with terror of the German cavalry soldiers." The Hussars and Dragoons are reckoned as light cavalry. Many of these regiments, before the close of the year 1870, were armed with chassepôt carbines taken from the French, the range having been found to be greater than that of the Prussian weapon. So admirable a system of signalling from man to man exists among the German cavalry, that the approach of a body of the enemy is at once intimated along the line of scouts, and conveyed to the general, who takes his measures accordingly. The consequence is that the Germans are not often surprised, and the Prussian King, on the occasion of a mishap of that nature, said they ought *never* to be. The Prussian cavalry carry a light equipment, without heavy sheepskin or valise. They wear long boots, but carry in a wallet a pair of shoes, which they wear when off duty, and a few other things necessary to their comfort. A light shabracque is thrown over the horse's back. When a body of Prussian cavalry comes in from a long march, the men attend to the comfort of their horses before seeking their own quarters, and the result is seen in the generally good if not showy condition of the animals. In some English cavalry regiments it is customary to have more men than horses. This is not allowed in the Prussian service, where a dismounted cavalry soldier would be quite useless, as marches of forty miles a day are not uncommon, and the pace for about half the time is at a walk, and the other half at a trot. In marches and manœuvrings, the Prussian cavalry soldier rises in his stirrups, so as to ease the horse of as much of his weight as possible.

The recruits join in the autumn, and are drilled through the winter, spring, and summer. They are accustomed to all the duties of actual warfare, and this training is carried out under the direct superintendence of the superior officers. Thorough efficiency and presiding intelligence are the great principles of the Prussian army. Everything is constantly being tested, and, if necessary, improved. A spirit of criticism is encouraged, and nothing is suffered to remain unreformed, if experience has shown it to be defective.* In one respect there appears to have been a defect in the Prussian army in the early days of the French war. The provisioning of the troops broke down shortly after the battle of Forbach, even when close to their own frontier. A correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, writing from the German camp, says that the supply trains were so far in the rear that, for two days, the men had nothing to eat but a small piece of bread for each man, hardly sufficient for one meal. They were wet through; many were ill; and they had nothing to lie on but wet straw, or the muddy ground. Of tents there were none; but this appears to have been systematic and intentional, the Prussians contending that tents give more trouble than they are worth. The horses also suffered much from want of forage. Had the invaders been less successful, we should probably have heard of other military faults; but their extraordinary luck saved them from being seriously tried.

Never since the days of ancient Greece and Rome has there been anything to equal this severity of military training—this conversion of a whole people into a vast machine, of elaborate workmanship and immense resources, for warlike purposes and ambitious ends. Before the outbreak of the war, it used to be asserted by the Germans, and glibly repeated by their representatives in the English press, that the Prussian military system was formidable only for defence, and powerless for aggression, for which it was never designed. The events of 1870-71 conclusively prove how well it is adapted to carry on a successful invasion, and how carefully it was contrived with a view to national aggrandisement. Mr. Carlyle's ideal has been embodied by Prussia. A whole nation drilled and exercised as one vast army, subjected to military chieftains, governed by a soldier monarch and a feudal aristocracy, educated, indeed, but in accordance with rigid rules, and denied the most primary rights of citizenship where they conflict with State plans, is a spectacle such as the biographer of Frederick the Great has frequently called upon us to worship, and which the world has at length seen in active operation. Whether such a spectacle is after all deserving of admiration is no doubt a matter of opinion. During the course of this war accusations of cruelty, selfishness, and disregard of right have been freely launched against the Prussian army and its leaders, which have called forth equally energetic disclaimers from their supporters; but it must be remembered that accusations of this sort are easily made, and are with difficulty refuted, and years must pass away before we can expect to obtain an impartial account of the moral behaviour of the Prussian army in this campaign.

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* *Times* Correspondent with the Army of Prince Frederick Charles.

But, whatever we may think of the Prussian army on moral grounds, it would be unfair, as well as futile, to deny its admirable qualities for the requirements of war. Two stories of the way in which the Prussians conducted their reconnaissances were told by the *Times* correspondent with the army of Prince Frederick Charles, and may be here repeated. An officer of a regiment of Hussars was sent patrolling with three men and a non-commissioned officer:—

"He started from Saargemünd, and arrived at Püttlange, where he halted some hours. He started at half-past four in the morning, and rode to Arroncourt, where he was fired at by the peasantry; thence he proceeded to Vatermont, where he found a mass of the peasantry armed with muskets, and, with the burgomaster or mayor of the place at their head, barring the principal street. He instantly charged, and, seizing the burgomaster, declared that he would blow his brains out if he was fired on. This, therefore, checked the aggressive movement, and, tying him to his saddle, he trotted through in safety. Then, after having cleared the town, he released his unwilling hostage, and galloped on to St. Epreve, where he came upon the baggage and rear-guard of the enemy. He then, having ascertained their exact position, made a long *détour*, and returned to Landroff alone, his escort being quite done up, and he having been sixteen hours on the same horse without once halting to bait. I saw the animal in question, an Irish horse, and, as may be gathered from its performances, one that a soldier might trust his life to."

The other story has reference to a young Dragoon officer, who was ordered to make a reconnaissance from Falquemont towards Pange, at the head of fifteen men:—

"When near the latter place he fell in with a French patrol, commanded by an officer. He instantly charged, and captured four men, killing two. The officer, however, escaped. He then left his prisoners in charge of ten of his men, and proceeded with five towards the place he was ordered to go to. Seeing a bivouac fire in front of him, he made a *détour* of some miles over some high wooded mountains that lay on his right flank, and, getting round it, was proceeding, when, to his amazement, he found there was another in front of him, and shortly afterwards two more sprang up on either side, so that he was completely in a trap. Concealing himself in a wood, he waited till the dawn of day. While they were in this position he heard the rumble of a baggage train, and, creeping up to the road, discovered that it was the baggage of Marshal Bazaine; thus finding out for his commanding officer the name of the division that was in front of him. On day breaking he got back safely to where he had left the remainder of his escort, and returned with his prisoners to camp, having accomplished sixty English miles, over the most difficult passes, at a stretch. In a war of this sort the cavalry are on incessant duty, either as vedettes or patrolling, and there are many of the regiments which have done thirty-six hours at a stretch, hard at work. The horses, as may be supposed, begin to look a little thin under it, but otherwise are in capital condition."

It was against such an army as this, elated by continual victories, that the ill-organised and dispirited French forces under MacMahon had now to contend in the execution of a most difficult and hazardous enterprise—the relief of Bazaine at Metz. Bazaine himself had received three staggering blows in the actions of August 14th, 16th, and 18th; and it is calculated that his losses in dead alone on those days amounted altogether to between 12,000 and 15,000 men, or, adding the wounded and prisoners, to 50,000. MacMahon had also suffered great losses, and these had been hastily and not very effectually repaired by new levies. We have seen that he entirely disapproved of the scheme for going to the relief of Metz, instead of withdrawing on Paris; but when the former plan was finally determined on, he seems to have put the best face he could on the attempt. Captain Jeannerod, the correspondent of the *Temps*, reports that he said, "I risk the safety of France in leaving open the road to Paris; but how can I abandon the kernel of our forces? and what responsibility would not those who deem me capable of envy place on me if I did not go and help Marshal Bazaine?" The captain states that he saw officers ready to abandon their camp *matériel*, and to throw away all they could of their personal baggage, in view of those disasters which they foresaw as the consequence of the projected movement. Some, indeed, were sanguine of success; but the feeling for the most part was that of gloom. The army of MacMahon, as already stated, was clear of Rheims by the 23rd. It had lingered there more than appears to have been justified by the posture of affairs; and it lingered again at Rethel, which it did not quit until the 25th. Had the Marshal pushed vigorously forward, he might possibly have got to Metz before the investing army could have been reinforced; and supposing him to have succeeded in delivering Bazaine—in that case a very probable event—the whole character of the war might have been changed. But the delay which, from whatever cause, clung to all his movements, was fatal to the whole design.

On the 26th of August the third and fourth German armies were still proceeding westward to Paris; but on the following day, the intentions of MacMahon being now quite obvious, the forces under the Crown Prince of Prussia and the Crown Prince of Saxony faced northward, and at once began the pursuit of the French. The two Bavarian corps of the third army, joined to the 12th corps of the fourth, proceeded up the western bank of the Meuse; the Guards and 4th corps of the latter followed the eastern bank; and the remaining corps of the third army, which were then at Rheims, Châlons, and Vitry, converged in the direction of Sedan. MacMahon and the Emperor continued slowly to advance, with the Prince Imperial rather before them in his arrival at the several towns on the route. The Marshal had divided his army into three bodies, one of which, consisting of about 20,000 men, was sent by rail from Rethel to Mézières, where it was to join an auxiliary corps sent from Paris under General Vinoy, and to close on the rear of the other two bodies when they had passed the Meuse. MacMahon himself advanced at the head of two great columns following parallel routes—one to the north by Stonne and Mouzon, the other more to the south by Vouziers and Buzancy, and both leading through the Lower Argonnes to Montmédy. The route was doubtless the best that could have been chosen; but the army was deficient in cavalry, imperfectly disciplined, out of heart, encumbered with stragglers, badly pioneered, and far from confident in its chief. As the days passed on, the troops still lagged, and by the 29th the right column had only its outposts at Buzancy, while the main body of the left had got no farther than Stonne and Beaumont, though its outposts reached Stenay. Two days earlier than this there had been a slight collision between the French and the outposts of the advancing Prussians at Attigny, near Vouziers, in which the latter were driven back. An engagement was also fought on the same day (the 27th) at Buzancy, between Vouziers and Stenay. The antagonists were the 12th Regiment of French Chasseurs and the 3rd (Saxon) Cavalry, supported by a squadron of the 18th Regiment of Uhlans and the Zwinker Battery; and the result of the action was that the French were dispersed and almost annihilated. On the 28th fighting took place at Dun, Stenay, and Mouzon; and on the 29th the village of Vrizy, between Attigny and Vouziers, which was occupied by French infantry, chiefly Turcos, was stormed and captured by two squadrons of Prussian Hussars. The defenders were taken prisoners; and, on the same day, two officers of the general staff of Marshal MacMahon were brought into Grand Pré by three Uhlans of the Guard. These, however, were comparatively unimportant affairs, in which the main bodies of the French and Prussian forces were not concerned. But on the 30th two very serious engagements occurred, which made still more manifest the desperate nature of the French enterprise.

The Crown Prince of Saxony had reached Dun, on the eastern bank of the Meuse, by the 28th, and was prepared to dispute the passage of the river whenever MacMahon should attempt it. The next day he had possessed himself of both sides of the Meuse at Stenay. On the western bank the Crown Prince of Prussia was close upon the right column of the French army; and, as just stated, collisions of a minor nature took place on the 28th and 29th. Both German armies had moved with great rapidity, and MacMahon found himself caught in a species of trap, threatened at once in flank and rear, and hemmed into a narrow angle of the country, formed by the frontiers of Belgium and Luxemburg. On the afternoon of the 29th his army was concentrated beyond Stonne, and approaching the Meuse; on the morning of the 30th it began to cross the river, and the Emperor telegraphed to Paris that a brilliant victory might be expected. Two corps safely reached the opposite side, and marched in the direction of Carignan, the next stage on the way to Montmédy. Before the others could cross, however, a Bavarian corps from the third German army, arriving at Beaumont through a wooded country, learnt from its scouts that the enemy was in front. De Failly's corps had in fact been posted there to guard the rear of the main army while effecting the passage of the river. The Germans made their dispositions under cover of the woods, and the French were again surprised. Being suddenly attacked, they were driven across the Meuse to Mouzon, and, as a consequence, the whole French army still remaining on the western bank was forced in hasty retreat towards the river. MacMahon for a time held the enemy in check while he conducted his men to the stream that lay not far off; and it is said that he masked this movement with his accustomed tactical skill. Another corps of the third German army, however, soon came into line; this was joined by the chief part of the forces of the Crown Prince of Saxony, advancing from Stenay; and on the French reaching the further side of the Meuse, they were fiercely attacked at Mouzon, and utterly routed with great loss. At the same time the two corps which had already crossed and gone in the direction of Carignan were encountered at that place by another part of the army of the Saxon Crown Prince, and hurled back in great disorder. They retired across the Chiers (a small river which falls into the Meuse near Rémilly, to the south of Sedan), and effected a junction with the main body, which, after its defeat at Mouzon, fell back along the eastern bank of the Meuse in a state of panic, throwing away arms and accoutrements, and not stopping until it had put the Chiers between itself and the enemy. The whole army was collected behind that stream on the night of the 30th, and for the moment out of the reach of attack. The situation, however, was most disastrous; and if it is true, as asserted, that the staff of one of the corps commanders were seen that same evening dancing at a ball at Douzy, it might almost be supposed that the spirit of despair itself had entered into the soul of those who held the fortunes of France within their hands.


MARSHAL MACMAHON.

On the afternoon of the 30th the Emperor was at Carignan; but he retired with the rest, and took up a position with MacMahon around Sedan and the vicinity. That position has been excellently described by a writer in the *Times*, who says :—

> "Behind the Chiers, and in the angle formed between that stream and the course of the Meuse, a series of heights intersected by ravines, and with hills and intricate ground between, stretches from Givonne, on the Belgian frontier, to the ancient town of Sedan, on the Meuse; and, with the villages of Balan and



AFFAIR BETWEEN UHLANS AND CHASSEURS D'AFRIQUE.

Bazeilles in front, on the main road from Sedan to Carignan, make, with the Chiers, like a fosse before them, a succession of formidable lines of defence to an enemy advancing directly against them. Givonne, resting on masses of forest which spread densely across into Belgium, affords a good position to an army's wing, which could not there be easily outflanked; and as for Sedan, on the other side, it presents advantages in many respects as a defensive point to another wing. The town is on the right bank of the Meuse, with a small suburb on the other bank; and the river, as it passes it, forms a huge loop, which, flowing to the north-west and returning southerly, opposes a kind of double barrier to an enemy assailing it from that direction. Behind Sedan, and on its side of the loop, the eminences near Floing and La Garenne, crowned with woods and villages, command the river, and, should it be forced, could be stoutly defended against an attack to the rear of the town.

"The 31st of August was spent by MacMahon in stationing his army in their positions. He had probably not more than 110,000 men, allowing for the losses of the day before (the 20,000 detached for Mézières appear never to have reached him), and about 440 guns; and he must at last have realised the extent of his peril. The Crown Prince of Saxony was in his front beyond the Chiers with his whole army, and to his right, on the other bank of the Meuse, spread the enormous forces of the Crown Prince of Prussia. The Marshal evidently made his arrangements on the supposition that he would be attacked in front and also on his right flank, though it is tolerably clear he did not foresee how the Crown Prince of Prussia was to operate against him. He formed his army on a large salient angle, extending from Givonne on the north-east to its summit at Bazeilles and Balan, and thence backward to the rear of Sedan, on its side of the loop of the Meuse, and just short of a hill which overlooks Floing. His left rested on Givonne and the adjoining forest, and it was composed of his feeblest troops, it being considered that it could not be turned in consequence of the obstacles in the way, and of the close neighbourhood of a neutral frontier. The French line extended thence along the ranges of heights which trend back to Sedan, the right centre occupying Bazeilles and Balan; and MacMahon stationed in considerable force his best divisions in these prominent positions, in order to hold the main road to Carignan, and to give strength to his projecting front. The defensible positions along the line from Givonne to Sedan were made the most of; guns, with masses of infantry, crowned the eminences or commanded the woody valleys between; and at some points entrenchments were thrown up to baffle the attack of the expected enemy. The right of the French, stretching behind Sedan, was protected in part by the course of the Meuse, in part by the western edge of the town, and in part by an artificial inundation of the river which had been hastily made; and beyond Sedan the plateaux and ridges of Floing and La Garenne, towards the town, were occupied by large bodies of troops, though it seems to have been thought that a dangerous attack at this point was not probable. The Chiers, from Douzy to Rémilly, flowed directly across the French front, and opposed a barrier to the Crown Prince of Saxony. In this position, covered by two rivers, and behind obstacles of every kind, MacMahon awaited the German attack; and the unfortunate Emperor, it is said, still looked forward with hope to the issue."

A serious encounter took place on the 31st between Armigny and Douzy, on the road from Montmédy to Sedan, six miles from the Belgian frontier, but the result was indecisive. Here, for the present, we must leave the doomed army, reserving the series of events which led to its destruction for succeeding chapters.

Although the Germans were concentrating the great bulk of their forces for a prodigious effort at Sedan, they were not idle in other directions. The army besieging Strasburg succeeded, on the night of the 23rd of August, in entrenching themselves within a thousand yards of the fortress, and at the same time captured the railway station without loss. This was done under cover of the field-batteries at Kehl. The head-quarters of the besieging force were then established at Lampertheim, five miles to the west-north-west of Strasburg; and on the following day an artillery engagement took place between the fortress and the enemy. It lasted during the whole day, became still more furious as evening advanced, and continued throughout the night until five o'clock on the morning of the 25th. The German fire told with such terrible effect that the right side of the citadel was burnt down, and the arsenal completely gutted. Several parts of the town were in flames, and one battery was silenced. On the other hand, the French inflicted considerable damage on the opposite town of Kehl, where several houses were burnt down, or knocked to pieces with shot. On the 26th the Prussian advanced posts were pushed forward to within 800 yards of the walls; the besiegers began diverting the river Ill, with a view to draining the moat; and matters began to look so serious that on the 28th the Bishop of Strasburg (who died a few days afterwards) made an attempt at mediation. He proceeded from the beleaguered fortress to Schiltigheim, where he was met by the Baden staff commander, Lieut.-Colonel Lezinsky. The Bishop requested that the inhabitants might be allowed to leave the town, but this was refused. Ultimately, an armistice of four-and-twenty hours was agreed to, on condition that after the lapse of an hour the Governor of Strasburg should signify a desire to negotiate. According to a German account of the transaction, the French opened fire on Colonel Lezinsky as he was returning, notwithstanding that he carried a flag of truce. The attempted mediation therefore came to an end, and the bombardment was at once resumed. Parallels were opened on the night of the 29th, and forty-two new guns were placed in position without any endeavour on the part of the defenders to prevent it. The public buildings suffered severely during the progress of the siege. Although not substantially destroyed, the beautiful cathedral, celebrated all over Europe and America as one of the finest Gothic works of the middle ages, was a good deal damaged in parts; the astronomical clock, however, which, though constructed in 1571, is still regarded as one of the most astonishing pieces of mechanism in the world, escaped injury; and so did the organ. The library of the town was not so fortunate. By the 30th of August it was entirely destroyed, and presented nothing but a mass of tottering walls. This calamity was a serious one to the whole learned world, for the library contained 130,000 volumes, and was rich in rarities such as money cannot replace. Among these were the celebrated "Landsberg Missal, or Garden of Delights," full of Byzantine miniatures of the latter part of the twelfth century, and some of the productions of the early German printers. Other buildings were wholly or partially destroyed, and entire streets were laid in ruins. Most of the people spent their nights in the cellars; horse-flesh was the only meat that could be obtained; potatoes were twenty francs a pound, and all other things in proportion. Yet the city continued to hold out, though some of the inhabitants urged its surrender.

Meanwhile, the Prussians continued to strengthen themselves before Metz, and the French did their best to render the position impregnable. The neighbouring country was inundated, and the forces of Marshal Bazaine, strongly entrenched under the walls, awaited the assaults of the enemy, who was busy constructing a semicircular railway about the city, to enable him to use the Metz and Paris line before the capture of the place. In Paris, public opinion was agitated from day to day by the wildest reports of victories that had never been gained, succeeded by corresponding depression when the truth became known; and, although the Government assured the people that they would put forward nothing but what they knew to be fact, it is to be feared that they sometimes lent themselves to the delusions of the hour. It should be recollected, however, that, owing to the state of the country, the presence of the Prussians in so many places, and the isolation of the French armies, it was often extremely difficult to obtain correct information. The preparations for the siege now clearly approaching continued to progress; and in the latter days of August the authorities expelled a large number of bad characters of both sexes, to relieve the city of superfluous mouths, and to assure the maintenance of order in case of the worst. The long procession of these wretches filing out at the gates—some ragged and diseased, some flaunting and insolent; the lame, the blind, and the paralytic, trooping on by the side of sturdy ruffians, flashy desperadoes, and painted courtezans—has been described as a horrible nightmare vision. What became of the outcasts is not recorded; but their fate was perhaps scarcely less bitter than that of the wolves and wild boars of western Germany and Alsace, which were driven out of the forests by the guns of Wörth and Saarbruck, and appeared in the Ardennes and Belgium, where they were hunted down and killed in large numbers by the inhabitants of the frontier towns.

A tragical incident occurred in Paris on the 27th of August. A young Prussian, named Charles Hart, had been arrested at Gien (Loiret) as a spy; and on the 22nd he was tried by a council of war, found guilty, and condemned to death. He appears to have admitted his employment by the enemy, though it has been doubted whether he was not a crack-brained enthusiast, who pretended to an office he did not really fill. The Paris correspondent of a London paper thus describes the final scene:—

"The École Militaire was fixed on as the place of execution. The courtyard was occupied by all the troops quartered there in marching order. Six was the hour fixed for the shooting. The prisoner was led into an angle of the courtyard, where the troop-horses are usually shod, and placed close to the wall. As the prisoner was approached by the turnkeys of the military prison, whose duty it was to tie his hands behind his back, he shrunk back and said, 'No! I wish to die like a soldier.' But on representations being made to him that there was no exception to the rule, he yielded. His eyes were then bandaged, when he expressed a wish to be allowed to give the word 'Fire!' Adjutant Codont, who had acted as registrar to the court-martial, came forward and read the sentence amid an impressive silence. At a pause at one of the paragraphs in the document, the prisoner, fancying the reading had been finished, cried, '*Tirez, coquins, et ne me manquez pas!*' ('Fire, you rascals, and mind you don't miss!') But the squad did not stir; it was waiting another signal. As the last syllable died away on the adjutant's lips, the officer commanding the firing party drew his sword, the soldiers raised their chassepôts to their shoulders and took aim, the sword was lowered, and a dozen shots went off like one, with a sudden startling detonation.

Before the report of the discharge had smitten the straining ears of those who looked on, the prisoner fell forward with an inclination to his right side. Over his left breast, in the region of the heart, his shirt was torn into a jagged hole, where the bullets had entered. As he lay motionless on the ground, one of the sergeants in the rear of the firing-party advanced through the little cloud of smoke, and discharged his piece into the dead man's brain."

The body was then put, in its clothes, into a coffin, and taken off to the cemetery of Mont Parnasse, where it was hurriedly dropped into a grave.

Berlin was rejoiced on the 28th of August by the public entry of captured trophies of war, consisting of four mitrailleuses, twenty-three pieces of cannon, and one eagle, all of which were taken to the Lustgarten, amidst great rejoicing, the Queen appearing in the balcony of the palace to acknowledge the general congratulations. The German triumphs, however, had cost them dear; and General Steinmetz was about this time removed from the command of the first army, on account, it is said, of the wasteful expenditure of life which had attended all his operations.

CHAPTER VII.

The Ardennes and its Scenery—Old Towns with Historic Reminiscences—Sedan, its Situation and Associations—The German Plan of Attack on MacMahon—Operations of September 1st—The Attack on Givonne—Sanguinary Contest in the Neighbourhood of Bazeilles and Balan—The Fighting in the Direction of Floing—Incidents of the Battle—The Hill of La Garenne carried by the Prussians after a desperate Encounter—Closing of the German Line on the French Rear—The French Defeated at all points, and driven into Sedan—Marshal MacMahon Wounded—The Command taken by General Wimpffen—Count Bismarck on Belgian Neutrality—Position of the Emperor Napoleon—Dr. Russell's Account of the Battle—Bombardment of Sedan—Negotiations for a Surrender—Interview of a Prussian Colonel with the Emperor—A French General sent to King William—The Emperor's Letter—Count Bismarck's Observations on the Fortune of the Campaign—Effect of the News on the German Soldiery—Hopes and Fears as to the Conclusion of Peace—Fearful Condition of Sedan—Council of War with reference to the Capitulation—Napoleon and King William, and the Moral of the War—The Emperor's Courage on the Field of Battle—Burning of Bazeilles—Reported Atrocities of the Bavarian Troops—"Why do we kill one another?"

SEDAN, the scene of one of the most tremendous events of modern times, is situated in that portion of France called the Ardennes. The department so designated belongs to the general region distinguished by the same term, which stretches across parts of France, Belgium, and the Prussian province of the Lower Rhine, from the Sambre to the Moselle. Julius Cæsar alludes to it, in his work on the Gallic War, as "Arduenna Sylva," and gives it even larger boundaries than are now assigned. Its sylvan character remains to the present day, and there are few finer specimens of woodland scenery in Europe. All is wild, rugged, and picturesque in this frontier district. The Belgians call their part of it "the black country," probably from the overshadowing of the forests, and the austerity of the rocks and hilly slopes. In the French portion, the hills are broken up into deep gorges with precipitous sides. The northern division of the French Ardennes consists of woods, of heath, of rough pasture, and of small valleys, where little can be done in the way of cultivation. The centre spreads out into larger valleys, of great fertility; and the south is a wide plain, bare of trees, and forming a table-land of considerable elevation above the sea. In the forest-lands, oak, beech, elm, maple, ash, and birch, spread the umbrage of their leafy luxuriance, clothing the rocky hills with greenness, overarching the numerous streams with pendulous shades, or folding quaint old towns in the embowerment of woody dells. A primitive and pastoral people inhabits this land of forests, of heaths, and of ravines. Great flocks of sheep and droves of horses feed upon the more open ground, or dot the long slopes of the hills with moving life. The solitary shepherd is seen in valleys which else would give no sign of human occupation; and across the sterile heaths, wherever an attempt has been made to wrest a precarious produce from the earth, the smoke of the turf-burners, manufacturing an extempore manure from the ashes of the soil, rises from point to point above the gorsy levels. The whole department is laced with rivers and sparkling streams, of which the chief are the Meuse and the Aisne; and down the winding channel of the Semois, coursing from Belgian Luxemburg, rafts of timber are floated in the winter season from the forests of the upper ranges. The climate is rough and boisterous. The winter lasts from November to May, with much rain and cold, and with frequent storms of wind traversing the valleys and defiles. The summers are intensely hot; but the months of September and October are generally temperate and pleasant. This is the woody country in which Shakespeare places his banished duke, with the philosophic recluses who flocked to that sylvan court, and "fleeted the time carelessly, as they did in the golden world." This is the "desert inaccessible" where,

> "Under the shade of melancholy boughs,"

they neglected "the creeping hours of time," and moralised on the pathetic fragility of life. It was here that Jaques indulged his humorous sadness, and Touchstone jested wisely, and Rosalind and Celia wandered, and Amiens sang—

> "Blow, blow, thou winter wind!
> Thou art not so unkind
> As man's ingratitude:
> Thy tooth is not so keen,
> Because thou art not seen,
> Although thy breath be rude.
>
> "Freeze, freeze, thou bitter sky,
> That dost not bite so nigh
> As benefits forgot:
> Though thou the waters warp,
> Thy sting is not so sharp
> As friend remember'd not."

In the days of his ill-fortune, culminating at Sedan, and spreading thence over weary months of exile, Napoleon III. must have had frequent occasion for thinking in the spirit of those lines, whether or not he knew the words.

The towns in the department of the Ardennes have something of the simple character which belongs to the country itself. For the most part old, and often associated with the great wars of former times, they still retain a look of antiquity, though in many instances their aspect has been in some degree qualified by the busy life of modern manufactures. Sedan, the principal town of the fourth arrondissement, is situated on the east bank of the Meuse, at a distance of 160 miles north-east from Paris. It is a fortress of some importance for the defence of France from the side of Luxemburg, and is planted on an uneven site, surrounded by meadows, gardens, cultivated fields, and wet ditches, the last-named forming part of the system of fortifications. The castle, or citadel, stands on an eminence to the south-east of the town. It contains the arsenal, and below it are buildings occupied as stores, stables, and residences of the officers. Near the castle are large barracks, and two others are situated in different portions of the town. The military hospital, built on the north side, at a height of 130 feet above the Meuse, commands the town at all points, and, being elaborately fortified, is considered the most important part of the stronghold. Sedan was the birthplace of the great Marshal Turenne—one of the most remarkable of French generals, whose ghost might well be supposed to have trembled with excitement and indignation at the immense disaster which befell the hosts of France, with a Marshal and an Emperor at their head, in this very town. In our days, until the catastrophe of September, 1870, the place was chiefly noted for its cloth, woollen, hosiery, linen, and other manufactures. It has now acquired a terrible name in history; and its memories of Evrard de la Marck, "the Great Boar of the Ardennes," whose successors ruled as sovereign princes of Sedan, of Henri IV., of Turenne, and of Louis XIV., grow pale before the greater and more pregnant facts of the existing time. This remote nook of north-eastern France, situated in an angle between the projections of foreign territory, was destined to see one of the most crushing disasters that ever befell a mighty nation; and the melancholy old town, overhung by cloudy masses of forest, and wound about by streams and hills that mocked her with the semblance of defence, yet were ineffectual to avert the coming doom, will seem to the eyes of future travellers to partake of the sadness of that tragedy to which it afforded a background and a stage.

Our narrative of events in the last chapter was brought down to the close of August. The early dawn of Thursday, September 1st, found MacMahon, in his position of defence, confronted by enormous masses of the enemy, who opened a vigorous fire shortly after daylight. The Prussians, during the night, had received reinforcements, which occupied the heights of Francheville. The French also had been strengthened by some fresh corps; but they were greatly outnumbered by the enemy, who had at his command nearly 240,000 men, with from 600 to 700 guns. The plan conceived by the Germans on the 31st of August, and carried out by them on the following day, was to envelope the whole French army, to hem it in upon Sedan, and so cut it off from every possibility of retreat. The Crown Prince of Saxony was ordered to turn the extreme left of the French, to assail their front at the same time, and, when these operations should have been crowned with success, to send a force round to the rear, which, meeting a detachment from the third German army, was to close upon the shattered and reeling lines of the adversary; at the same time, the Crown Prince of Prussia was to attack the right centre of MacMahon at the projecting points of Bazeilles and Balan, to overwhelm the French right wing, and to effect a junction with the Saxon Crown Prince to the north. To ensure the success of these movements, the



ENTRY OF CAPTURED CANNON INTO BERLIN.

whole of the 31st of August had been devoted to placing the various corps in the necessary positions: those of the Crown Prince of Saxony along the course of the Chiers, and those of the Crown Prince of Prussia beyond Rémilly in the direction of the Meuse; with supports in other positions where they would be required to co-operate in the great turning movement that was to be the leading feature of the day.*



ATTACK ON A FRENCH BATTERY AT SEDAN.

When the French, on the early morning of the 1st of September, found themselves attacked by the Germans, they must have seen how desperate was their position. Partly by their own rashness and mismanagement, and partly by the admirable plans of the enemy, they found themselves caught in a trap—driven into a corner of the country, with no retreat open to them, except into a foreign land. Under cover of a thick fog, the advanced guard of the Crown Prince of Saxony crossed the Chiers, while the Bavarians, who had already crossed the Meuse, came into line with his left wing, and prepared to attack Bazeilles. By an extraordinary and culpable oversight, the French had neglected to break down the bridges over the Chiers, so that the advance of the Germans met with no obstacles. The forces of the Saxon Crown Prince proceeded towards Givonne, while the Bavarians simultaneously advanced upon Bazeilles. The action did not fully commence until six o'clock A.M., and at nine a furious artillery fight at close range was going forward along the whole line. The troops stationed at Givonne—which, as before explained, were the least good under MacMahon's command, the position being considered too strong to be turned—were panic-struck at the approach of the Germans, and hastily gave way; their adversaries, after a brief combat, turning the French left wing. The beaten troops fled in a disorderly crowd into the woods, or fell back upon the centre, which they incommoded and discouraged by their precipitate appearance on a part of the field where they were not wanted. On the other hand, the victors, by about ten o'clock, were getting far to the rear of the whole French position, so that the junction with the Prussian Crown Prince was shortly afterwards accomplished. Equal successes were obtained in other directions, and the French centre began to recede, though the contest was still prolonged with desperate tenacity, the weaker side fiercely disputing every hill-slope and point of vantage, and inflicting as well as sustaining tremendous losses. Bazeilles and Balan were the two great scenes of carnage; for the French knew the importance of those places, and clung to them as long as it was possible to hold an inch of the ground—indeed, retained them for a while, even in spite of the murderous cross-fire which the Bavarians poured in from their supporting batteries. Headed by the Emperor himself, who exposed his life with a courage which might be called reckless, the French at one time succeeded in driving back the enemy, and it seemed, even late in the day, as if they might possibly win.

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* Retrospect of the war in the *Times* of November 1st, 1870.

The French right was in the meanwhile as hotly engaged. A railway bridge which crosses the Meuse had been broken down by MacMahon; but in the early morning the Crown Prince of Prussia had moved a division over the river on pontoon bridges. This was effected at the loop made by the Meuse in the rear of Sedan, and it enabled the Prince to plant his batteries on the crest of a hill which overlooks Floing and the surrounding country. The French, suddenly attacked in the rear, were astonished by the position in which they found themselves; but, confronting the enemy with all their available strength, they maintained a prolonged resistance. Their musketry fire was poured in with such deadliness and determination, that it was heard even above the deeper notes of the mitrailleuses, now playing with terrific effect upon the Germans. A correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* relates that General Sheridan, of the United States army, who was standing by him at the time, said he never heard so well-sustained and long-continued a small-arm fire. By twelve o'clock, however, the Prussian battery of six guns, on the slope above the broken bridge over the Meuse, near La Villette, had silenced two batteries of French guns near the village of Floing. In another ten minutes the French infantry were compelled to retire from that position; and at five-and-twenty minutes after twelve large numbers of retreating French were seen on the hill between Floing and Sedan, their ranks shelled by a Prussian battery in front of St. Menges. At ten minutes to one another French column appeared in full retreat to the right of Sedan, on the road leading from Bazeilles to the wood of La Garenne. Then a third French column was observed moving up a broad grassy road through the same wood, immediately above Sedan. It seemed designed for the support of the troops defending the ravine of Bazeilles to the north-east of the town. A little before one the French batteries on the edge of this wood and above it opened a most terrific fire on the Prussian columns of the third corps, advancing with a view to gaining possession of the hill north-west of La Garenne. The batteries made so much havoc among these regiments that they were obliged to keep shifting their ground till ready for the final rush. When the first skirmishers arrived at the crest of the hill, General Sheridan remarked to the *Pall Mall Gazette* correspondent that they were too weak to hold the position against so many French; and this proved to be the case, for the Prussians soon receded down the hill. At the bottom they were strongly reinforced, but were still inferior in numbers to the French. The French Cuirassiers now dashed forward to charge the scattered ranks that were again straggling up the slope. Squares, it seems, are not used by the Prussians. On this occasion they did not even form line, but received the cavalry with a fearful fire, at a distance of about 108 yards, reloading and firing as fast as possible. Men and horses were killed and wounded by hundreds; the others turned and fled, and the Prussians actually dashed after them at the double. The French infantry then advanced, firing hotly with their chassepôts; but the Prussians waited until they were within about a hundred yards, when they replied so vigorously that the infantry, like the cavalry, retired behind a ridge on the road to Sedan. Subsequently, another regiment of French cavalry made a renewed attempt to dislodge the enemy, who was now being reinforced every minute. This was as unsuccessful as the former, and shortly afterwards it became apparent that the Prussians, by some extraordinary effort, had got a couple of four-pounders up the steep, and were using them with effect. The French infantry still greatly outnumbered their opponents; but they seemed paralysed, and stood still without doing anything. Further cavalry charges followed; but, although they were executed with immense spirit and resolution, even to the extent of recklessness, they failed to shake the Prussians, who, forming line with the utmost coolness and self-possession, delivered volley after volley, and covered the ground with heaps of dead. Giving up the position for lost, the French rapidly fell back, though, on finding themselves pursued, the cavalry turned round, and charged desperately once more. Nothing, however, could then have changed the failure into a success. The French had lost the hill; the Prussians had gained it; and at two o'clock P.M. the latter received reinforcements which made their acquisition still more secure.*

The closing of the German line on the French rear, which took place at about one in the afternoon, cut off all hope of retreat. The contest in the Bazeilles ravine was no less bloody than that on the slopes of the hill to the north-west of La Garenne. In the ravine the Bavarian regiments suffered terribly from the mitrailleuses; but there, as elsewhere, the Germans continued to make way. At twenty minutes after three the Bavarians managed to get inside the fortifications of Sedan, and to maintain themselves there; at four the ridge above Bazeilles was carried by the attacking force, and Sedan was swept on all sides by the German cannon. Battery after battery was opposed to the advancing armies; charge after charge was frantically directed against their ranks; but the French were steadily pressed back, till, losing all order and restraint, they were driven headlong into Sedan, under a scathing fire of artillery. The Germans had completed their circle of investment, and the French found themselves hemmed in on all sides—held in a grip of iron, and placed beyond all hope of escape.

Marshal MacMahon was wounded early in the day by a piece of shell or ball, which struck him in the back and hip; and the command of the army then devolved on General Wimpffen, who had arrived from Algeria only two days before, and who now had to assume the direction of affairs, without, it is said, knowing the Marshal's plans, or even the disposition of the corps on the plateaux over Sedan, except through others. The battle was witnessed from a hill above Donchery by the Prussian King, accompanied by Moltke, von Roon, Bismarck, Generals Sheridan and Forsyth (of the United States army), and a numerous staff. When the success of the day was evident beyond a doubt to the party so watching, the different members composing it began to talk among themselves, and Count Bismarck informed the correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* of what he had done with reference to the threatened neutrality of Belgium. "I have told the Belgian Minister of War," said he, "that so long as the Belgian troops do their utmost to disarm any number of French soldiers who may cross the frontier, I will strictly respect the neutrality of Belgium; but if, on the contrary, the Belgians, either through negligence or inability, do not disarm and capture every man in French uniform who sets his foot in their country, we shall at once follow the enemy into neutral territory with our troops, considering that the French have been the first to violate the Belgian soil." The Count discredited the idea of the French Emperor suffering himself to be shut up in Sedan, where he would have no chance of getting away. Yet such was really the fact; and, indeed, having once embarked on the perilous and fatal enterprise, he could not have deserted his army without subjecting himself to damaging comments and odious imputations. He could have saved himself personally, had he thought only of his own freedom, and it is possible that, if he had been able to return to Paris, he might have averted the coming ruin of his Government. But, on the other hand, it is at least as likely that the Parisians would have turned fiercely on the man who had failed, and, in the absence of the greater part of the army, have revenged upon him the fault which was equally theirs.

Dr. Russell, writing in the *Times*, gave some very interesting particulars of this tremendous action. Of the fight near Floing he said :—

"The Prussians coming up from Floing were invisible to me. Never can I forget the sort of agony with which I witnessed those who first came out on the plateau raising their heads and looking around for an enemy, while, hidden from view, a thick blue band of French infantry was awaiting them, and a brigade of cavalry was ready on their flank below. I did not know that Floing was filled with advancing columns. There was but a wide, extending, loose array of skirmishers, like a flock of rooks, on the plateau. Now the men in front began to fire at the heads over the bank lined by the French. This drew such a flash of musketry as tumbled over some and staggered the others; but their comrades came scrambling up from the rear, when suddenly the first block of horse in the hollow shook itself up, and the line, in beautiful order, rushed up the slope. The onset was not to be withstood. The Prussians were caught *en flagrant délit.* Those nearest the ridge slipped over into the declivitous ground; those in advance, running in vain, were swept away. But the impetuosity of the charge could not be stayed. Men and horses came tumbling down into the road, where they were disposed of by the Prussians in the gardens, while the troopers on the left of the line, who swept down the lane in a cloud of dust, were almost exterminated by the infantry in the village. There was also a regular cavalry encounter, I fancy, in the plains below, but I cannot tell at what time; the Cuirassiers, trying to cut their way out, were destroyed, and a charge of two Prussian squadrons, which did not quite equal expectations, occurred. The feat of these unfortunate cavaliers only cleared the plateau for a little time. In a few minutes up came the spiked helmets again over the French *épaulement*, crossing their sabred comrades, and, therefore, all alive to the danger of cavalry. They advanced in closer order, but still skirmishing, and one long, black parallelogram was maintained to rally on. As the skirmishers got to the ridge they began to fire, but the French in the second line of *épaulement* soon drove them back by a rattling fusillade. The French rushed out of the *épaulement* in pursuit, still firing. At the same moment a splendid charge was executed on the Prussians, before which the skirmishers rallied, on what seemed to me to be still a long parallelogram. They did not form square. Some Prussians too far on were sabred. The troopers, brilliantly led, went right onwards in a cloud of dust; but when they were within a couple of hundred yards of the Prussians, one simultaneous volley burst out of the black front and flank, which enveloped all in smoke. They were steady soldiers who pulled trigger there. Down came horse and man; the array was utterly ruined. There was left in front of that deadly infantry but a heap of white and grey horses—a terrace of dead and dying and dismounted men and flying troopers, who tumbled at every instant. More total dissipation of a bright pageantry could not be. There was another such scene yet to come. I could scarce keep the field-glass to my eyes as the second and last body of cavalry—which was composed of light horse also—came thundering up out of the hollow. They were not so bold as the men on the white horses, who fell, many of them at the very line of bayonets. The horses of these swerved as they came upon the ground covered with carcases, and their line was broken; but the squadron leaders rode straight to death. Once again the curling smoke spurted out from the Prussian front, and to the rear and right and left flew the survivors of the squadrons. The brown field was flecked with spots of many colours, and, trampling on the remains of that mass of strength and courage of man and horse, the Prussians, to whom supports were fast hastening up right and left and rear, pressed on towards the inner *épaulement*, and became engaged with the French infantry, who maintained for some time a steady rolling fire in reply to the volleys of the Prussians. To me the French force seemed there very much superior in number. But they had lost courage, and what was left of it was soon dissipated by the advance of a Prussian battery, which galloped up to the right flank of their infantry, and opened a very rapid fire, to which there was no French battery to reply. The French left the *épaulement*, and made for a belt of wood, dropping fast as they retreated, but facing round and firing still. In a few moments more the plateau was swarming with the battalions of the 11th corps, and the struggle there was over. Only for a minute, however, because, from the flanks of the wood came out a line of French infantry. The musketry fire was renewed; but it was evident the Prussians were not to be gainsaid. Their advance was only checked that they might let their artillery play while their columns assisted it by incessant volleys. A fierce onslaught by the French, made after they had retired behind the wood, only added to their losses. The Crown Prince's army, notwithstanding the cavalry success at the outset, had by three o'clock won the key of the position of the French right with comparatively small loss."

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* Special Correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette.*

The struggle in the direction of Bazeilles and Balan, the personal conduct of the Emperor, and the results of the final efforts of the French, were described by the same writer with the vivid distinctness for which he is celebrated:—

"The Bavarians of von der Tann's corps, on whom devolved the difficult task of carrying the village or town of Bazeilles, and Balan (a suburb of Sedan outside the fortifications), suffered enormously. They were exposed to a fire of infantry in the houses, and to the guns of the works and the musketry from the parapets. The inhabitants joined in the defence, and as soon as the Bavarians had crossed the Meuse by their pontoons and by the railway bridge, they could receive but little protection from their artillery placed on the heights. The French made the most strenuous attempts to repulse them, in which the marines were particularly distinguished; and three divisions of Bavarians, which began to fight at four o'clock, were exposed to three distinct onslaughts from the town and from the corps under the walls. At one time it appeared as if they would be overpowered, although it seemed as if success against them would scarcely have secured the French army from its ultimate fate

"It is believed by the Bavarians that MacMahon himself was wounded very early in the day, when directing his troops in an offensive movement against Bazeilles. General Ducrot then took command of the whole army, but General de Wimpffen, producing a sealed letter, showed that he was authorised to assume the control of the operations of the army in case of any accident to Marshal MacMahon. The Marshal was wounded early in the morning, and, according to the reports of French officers, prisoners of the Bavarians, there was a difference of opinion between General Ducrot and General Wimpffen respecting the plan of attack which the French adopted at one period of the day as the best means of defence. Having beaten the Bavarians out of Balan at one time, the French made a rush in the direction of Illy, as if determined to cut their way through on the flank of the Saxon army, and pass towards Metz. But the Crown Prince of Saxony had by that time resumed the offensive, and had brought an overwhelming force to block their way. They were driven back, delivering the Bavarians from the stress to which they had been exposed. Their divisions advanced once more, and Bazeilles, or as much as remained of it, was firmly occupied; but the fight about Balan lasted much later.

"Here it was, according to Bavarian reports, that the Emperor, declaring that he only served as a private soldier, went with an attacking column composed of the remnants of various regiments, to drive out the Bavarians. But the artillery on the heights above the river and the cross-fire from the heights above the road were too much for troops shaken by incessant fighting and frightful losses. Shell and shot rained fast about the Emperor, one of the former bursting close to his person and enveloping him in its smoke. The officers around entreated him to retire, and the Bavarians quickly following occupied Balan and engaged the French on the glacis of the fort. I cannot say whether this was previous to the period referred to by General Wimpffen in his address to the army. He speaks therein of a supreme moment when it was necessary to make a final effort and cut their way through the masses of the enemy at any hazard. But of all that great host of 90,000 men, there were only 2,000, he says, left who answered to the appeal. Of the remainder, there were probably 20,000 in the hands of the Prussians; but 60,000 men, deducting killed and wounded, had by this time become an utterly disorganised mass, without cohesion, 'willing to wound, but yet afraid to strike,' and crushed out of all semblance of military vitality by an overwhelming and most murderous artillery, of which the moral effect was at least as great as the physical. The bitterness of recrimination between officers and men shows that long before the battle a radical element of force was wanting. There was not only a deficiency of cordial relations in their kind between the officer and the soldier, but a worse evil still—an actual apprehension on the part of the officers of those whom they were to command, a fear to enforce the ordinary rules of discipline, lest the soldier should become unmanageable altogether. The scene cannot be either imagined or described which occurred when the army, or that uniformed rabble, had been fairly driven in by the beaters, to be shot down at will. The French artillery had practically ceased to exist as a protecting arm. The guns on the works are ridiculously small ordnance of the date of 1815, with a few heavy pieces here and there; and Sedan, commanded completely from the south bank of the Meuse, was to all intents and purposes an open town, with the inconvenience of having a walled *enceinte* to embarrass the movements of the troops. The Emperor retired, I believe, within the place, but not, surely, for safety, but rather to escape from the surging mass of impotent soldiery. There was a rain of Prussian and Bavarian bombs upon the town, filled with terrified citizens who had had no time to escape. The troops outside had been fighting without food since the morning, and there were no resources within the city to meet their wants. They were in an angry and terrible mood, upbraiding their officers, mutinous; and every shell that fell increased the evil of their spirit. To one of many missiles was now reserved a great mission. A shell fell into a warehouse or manufactory in which was stored some inflammable material. A vast volume of flame rushed for a moment into the air, and a volume of thick white smoke, which towered and spread out so as to overshadow half the city, gave rise to apprehension on one side and expectation on the other that some central magazine had gone up. But no noise ensued. Still, at the moment, the resolve was taken that Sedan and all that it contained should be placed in the power of the victor, in the belief that it was impossible to resist with any prospect but that of ruin, complete, however lingering."

The Special Correspondent of the *Daily News* was equally picturesque and powerful. "The battle," he wrote—passing the events of the day before him in a kind of panorama—"is hotly maintained near Bazeilles, and the French respond with energy to the attack of the Germans. It is a very sultry day. The smoke-clouds hang lower and lower over the Meuse, as the mist was hanging a few hours earlier. Bright sunshine glitters upon the cuirasses of a Prussian regiment that trots down to the right, to support the Bavarian guns. A second and yet a third regiment of cavalry follow with great jingling and clatter. The French fire is distracted and dispersed by numerous assailants. The roar of cannon grows more intense with each minute as noontide approaches. Like some ship labouring in the trough of the sea, the beleagured host of France is pitifully helpless. The battle is a mere *battue* by one o'clock, and the circle of white smoke-puffs almost shuts in the French position." Still, the fight was desperately prolonged, until further resistance became impossible, and the French poured into Sedan, a wild and panic-stricken mob.

This was about twenty minutes to five in the afternoon. Seeing no sign of a desire on the part of the enemy to capitulate, the King now gave orders that the town should be bombarded. Sedan was soon burning in several places, and at the same time the numerous villages scattered over the field of battle were wrapped in flames. The King appears to have considered that a sufficient effect had been thus produced, and he accordingly directed that the firing should cease. He then sent Lieutenant-Colonel von Broussart, of the general staff, with a flag of truce, to demand the capitulation of the army and the fortress. According to the writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, the despatch of this officer was preceded by the arrival, at a little past five, of a couple of Uhlans, escorting a French colonel, who came to ask for terms of surrender. His Majesty and Count Moltke consulted for a little while, and the colonel was told that, in a matter so important as the surrender of a great army and a strong fortress, an officer of higher rank should have been sent. "You are therefore," it was added, "to return to Sedan, and tell the Governor of the



FRENCH UNIFORMS.


St. Meuges
Iges
Illy
Floing
Wood of Garenne
Givonne
Road Belgium
R. Meuse
Chateau de Belle Ville
Donchery
Road to Mezieres
SEDAN
Balan
Daigny
La Moncelle
Bazeilles
Road to Montmedy
River Chiers
R. Meuse
Remilly
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THE BATTLE OF SEDAN AT SEVEN A.M.


St. Meuges
Iges
Illy
Floing
R. Meuse
Rail Road
Chateau de Belle Vue
Donchery
Road to Mezieres
SEDAN
Balan
Bazeilles
Chiers R.
Remilly
N
W
E
S
Prussian Infantry.
,, Cavalry.
,, Artillery.
F First Bavarian Corps.
G Fourth Corps.
H Twelfth ,,
K Fifth ,,
I Prussian Guards.
M Eleventh Corps.
N Second Bavarian Corps.
O Wurtemberger Division.
The King's position.
French Infantry.
,, Cavalry.
,, Artillery.
A Lebrun's Corps.
B Ducrot's ,,
C Wimpffen's ,,
D Douay's ,,

THE BATTLE OF SEDAN AT TWO P.M.

town to report himself immediately to the King of Prussia. If he does not arrive in an hour, our guns will open again. You may tell the commandant that it is useless trying to obtain other terms than unconditional surrender." It would seem to have been shortly after the departure of the French colonel that, as reported by the King in a letter to Queen Augusta, Colonel Broussart was sent to Sedan with his demand for capitulation. On being admitted into the town, and asking for the Commander-in-chief, he was unexpectedly introduced into the presence of the Emperor himself, who wished to give him a letter to the King of Prussia. Napoleon asked Colonel Broussart what his message was, and, on being informed, referred him to General de Wimpffen, who had undertaken the command in place of Marshal MacMahon. The fallen Emperor then sent off his adjutant-general, Reille, with the letter to King William.

It was seven o'clock in the evening when General Reille and Colonel Broussart arrived, the latter a little in advance; and it was through him that the King first learned with certainty the presence of the Emperor in Sedan. General Reille, springing from his horse, handed to the King the letter of his sovereign, adding that he had no other orders. Before he opened the letter, King William said to General Reille, " But I demand as the first condition that the army lay down its arms." Upon being opened, this memorable letter—one of the most remarkable, considered with reference to the events to which it referred, and the issue to which it led, in all history—was found to commence with the words, " Not being able to die at the head of my army, I lay my sword at the feet of your Majesty." All the rest was left to the King. The victor wrote a brief reply, in which he deplored the manner of his meeting with the Emperor, and begged that a plenipotentiary might be sent, with whom the capitulation could be concluded. The King gave General Moltke power to negotiate, and directed Count Bismarck to remain behind, in case political questions should arise. Getting into his carriage, his Majesty then drove to Vendresse, south of Sedan, where he arrived at eleven P.M., and was greeted everywhere with loud hurrahs, and the singing of the National Hymn. An extempore illumination was got up, and the soldiers, by this time aware of the great news, were almost wild with joy. Count Bismarck, being complimented on the result of the campaign, modestly disclaimed all skill as a strategist, and said he had had nothing to do with the winning of battles. That was due to the King, and Count Moltke, and the army. But he took some credit to himself for having effected the unity of the various German races; as a consequence of which, Bavarians, Saxons, and Wurtemburgers were found fighting by the side of the Prussians, and even gathering the largest share of the honours of the day.

The effect on the field of battle, as the fact of a surrender being imminent became obvious to the troops, was most extraordinary. The opening of one of the gates of Sedan, to permit the exit of the officer originally despatched to the King, gave the first impression of an approaching capitulation. This gradually gained strength, until it acquired all the force of actual knowledge, and ringing cheers ran along the whole line of battle. Shakos, helmets, bayonets, and sabres, were raised high into the air, and the vast army swayed to and fro in the excitement of an almost unequalled triumph. Even the dying shared in the general enthusiasm. An officer told Dr. Russell that he saw a huge Prussian, who had been lying with his hand to his side in mortal agony, rise suddenly to his feet as he comprehended the meaning of the cries, utter a loud " Hurrah !" wave his hands on high, and then, as the blood rushed from his wound, fall dead across a Frenchman.

The Crown Prince of Prussia, on proceeding to Chimery for the night, was received with the same joyful manifestations that had greeted the King. The street in which the Prince lodged was lined with soldiers holding lighted candles, burning steadily and brightly in the still autumn air. The cottagers—probably through fear of their invaders —pretended to be glad of the Emperor's overthrow. They put up lights in their windows; and the occupant of the house where Dr. Russell slept, begged of him a second candle, that he might look the grander. When the Crown Prince sat down to dinner—or rather supper—he drank " To the King and the Army." The toast was honoured with champagne that had been intended for the Emperor Napoleon, but had been captured, with other stores, by a Prussian dragoon regiment, and presented to his Royal Highness. The mass of the army believed that the fall of Sedan would lead to an immediate peace; and it was not an unreasonable expectation. Recent wars had been short; and it might well have been supposed by the German soldiery on the present occasion, that the surrender of a fortress, the capitulation of an immense army, commanded by a Field-Marshal of world-wide fame, and the seizure of the Emperor himself, would so stagger the French people as to render any continuance of hostilities impossible. To the Prussian Crown Prince and his officers, however, the matter seemed less certain as they discussed the chances of the future over the champagne that was to have been drunk by others under very different circumstances. They did not forget that Bazaine was still in command of large forces at Metz, and that, though ringed about by steel, he might yet make himself felt. They knew that Paris was arming, and they were aware, from the teachings of history, that Frenchmen, however apt to lose heart in a single battle, or in an ordinary campaign, if fortune goes against them, are as determined as any race to resist an invasion of their own soil. Therefore, the natural elation of the Crown Prince and his companions-in-arms, as they sat over their late meal that night, must have been qualified by the prospect of yet harder labours to be encountered in the months to come.

Meanwhile, the state of things within Sedan was terrible beyond words to depict. It is alleged by a member of the Emperor's staff (a son of one of the members of the Ollivier Ministry) that Marshal MacMahon, on being wounded—which was as early as half-past six in the morning—had given orders, in presence of the Emperor, that General Ducrot should immediately mass the troops, and retreat on Mézières, and that the General should at once occupy the heights which overlook Sedan. While measures were being taken to carry out these directions, General de Wimpffen appeared on the scene, and, addressing General Ducrot, said, "I have undertaken the command of the army. Besides, I am an older General than you, and I hold the positions you are about to take to be entirely wrong. On the contrary, the troops must be commanded to advance directly." The staff officer (who writes with a very bitter feeling against the Emperor and General Wimpffen) then continues :—

"The battle soon began at all points, and with intense vigour, especially on the side of the Prussians. Towards eleven o'clock General de Wimpffen communicated to the Emperor that the French troops had the advantage in every direction. At this time shells were falling fast near and round the position occupied by the Emperor and his staff; but all escaped so far unhurt. Suddenly the Emperor perceived a French brigade suffering fearfully from the fire of the enemy. The men fell like wheat battered by a storm. The Emperor asked an officer of artillery, 'Whence come these projectiles?' No one knew. Shortly after, another artillery officer answered, 'Sire, the balls which fall on them and us come from a new Prussian battery, erected at a distance from here of 4,900 mètres.' The Emperor was incredulous; he could not believe in their murderous effects at such a remote range. He, however, immediately ordered cannon to play upon this newly-discovered battery, but to no purpose. The balls chiefly fell into the river Meuse, at a distance of only 1,500 mètres! The Emperor then joined the division, and marched steadily forward. Balls continued to fall near and around him, but he still remained untouched. Again assured that the French troops were gaining advantages at all points, he said to his Etat-Major that he should return to Sedan to breakfast, and would remount his horse, and take the field again in an hour. He had scarcely entered Sedan, when he found soldiers flying in various directions, utterly panic-stricken. They rapidly filled the town. At the same time, a terrific cannonade resounded from the very heights which Marshal MacMahon, with admirable prescience, had ordered to be occupied by the French troops, but which were now in possession of the Crown Prince and a portion of his army corps. This advantage was fatal. Then and there the day was virtually lost."

Some further details of a very interesting character have been furnished by a Frenchman who was with the army in Sedan. He says :—

"The Emperor, who had started early in the morning for the field of battle, returned about the same time that I did, and passed through the streets with his staff. One of my friends was near him on the Place Turenne when a shell fell under his horse, and, bursting, killed the horse of a general who was behind him. He himself was untouched, and turned round smiling, though my friend thought he saw tears in his eyes, which he wiped away with his glove.

"Meantime, shells began to fall in the direction of our street and hotel. We all stood under the vaulted stone entrance as the safest shelter we could find. While we waited, watching painfully for the shell which might have sent us all together into another world, General Wimpffen came past, making a vain effort to rally and inspirit his flying troops. He shouted, 'Long live France! Forward!' but there was no response. He cried out that Bazaine was taking the Prussians in the rear. This news, which had been current all the morning, coming now from the mouth of General de Wimpffen, grew to be believed, and a few thousand men were rallied, and followed him out of the town. People began to have hope, and for one brief moment we believed the day might yet be saved. Alas! need I say that this intelligence was a patriotic falsehood of the brave General de Wimpffen? Mad with anguish, and in direct opposition to the Emperor's orders, he had resolved to rally what men he could, and make a stand. He could not have known that he was bound in the grasp of at least 300,000 men. The bugle and trumpet ring out on all sides. A few thousand men hearken to the sound. A friend, René de Guiroye, of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, got on horseback again, and joined the General. They went out at the Porte de Balan. The houses of the suburb are already full of Prussians, who fire on the French out of every window. The church especially is strongly garrisoned;

the heavy doors are closed. The General sent off de Guiroye to fetch two pieces of cannon. These soon arrived, and with them the door of the church was blown in. Two hundred Prussians were captured, and brought back with the French, who, in spite of all efforts, were soon obliged to retire again into the town. It was the last incident of the battle—the last struggle. Whilst this took place at the Porte de Balan, the Prussian shelling went on, and the shells began to fall into the hotel. Shocking scenes followed. A boy, the son of a tradesman round the corner of the street, came in crying and asking for a surgeon: his father's leg had been shot off. A woman in front of the house met the same fate. The doctor who went to the tradesman found him dead, and, returning, attempted to carry the woman to an ambulance. He had scarcely made a step forward, when she was shot dead in his arms."

When it became evident that there was no sign of Bazaine (whose approach may have been really believed by Wimpffen, as, if possible, it was to have formed part of the general operations of the day), all hope of victory departed. A council of war was called by the Emperor, and it was almost unanimously ackowledged that there was no alternative but to submit. The town was surrounded by the Germans; batteries, planted on all the surrounding hill-tops, dominated the place, and could lay it in ashes in less than an hour; the enemy was intoxicated with a prodigious success; and the French troops were in a state of dissolution —almost of mutiny. The French officers at the parley admitted to the Prussians that the demoralisation of their men was complete, and expressed a fear lest the officers of the King, deputed to carry his Majesty's answer to the Emperor, should be fired at. A soldiery exasperated by defeat, after bloody but impotent struggles, is no less terrible in its excesses than an army drunk with triumph after it has burst into a vanquished city. Rage, and mortication, and fear, perform in the one instance what the insolence of victory and the lust of revenge accomplish in the other. The French army shut up in Sedan, within a space far too small to accommodate it with anything like orderliness, was simply a defeated horde, mad with grief, stung with shame, distrustful of its officers and of itself, relaxed in discipline, and apprehensive of the future. It has been said that on that night hell had broken loose in Sedan. There was clearly nothing to be done under the circumstances in the way of active resistance, and accordingly a colonel, as already related, was despatched to the King of Prussia. While the white flag which preceded the departure of this officer was being fixed on the ramparts, the Emperor sat in the courtyard of the Prefecture, his face buried in his hands. He appeared to be quite overwhelmed with grief and perplexity; and his staff stood at a little distance apart, equally sorrowful and dismayed. When the conqueror's terms were received, the Emperor hesitated for a while as to sending in his acceptance, hoping, it would seem, to obtain some mitigation of their severity. General Wimpffen at first strongly opposed the capitulation. He declared he would die sooner than sign it, and argued that the situation was not so desperate as others represented. To remove these objections, maps were produced, and the position and force of the Germans and their batteries (of which, owing to his recent arrival, he was scarely aware) were pointed out. Bitter as was the mortification, he had no choice but to give way. "And now," he added, "my name will go down linked with a humiliating capitulation for all time!" It was certainly hard measure that he who had not committed the fault should have to bear the shame.


MACMAHON CARRIED FROM THE BATTLE-FIELD OF SEDAN.

Night closed in upon Sedan with gloom and menace. Watch-fires were lighted in every direction, and the heavens reflected a crimson glow, beneath which the threatened fortress lay black and still. That night must have crowded a world of emotion into the mind of Napoleon III. His thoughts must have gone back to the days of his childhood, when he lived in a palace; to those of his early manhood, when he was a revolutionist, fighting at Rome against the temporal power of the Pope; to the later years when he was an exile in

Switzerland or in London; to the wild expeditions of Strasburg and Boulogne; to his imprisonment at Ham, and his escape from that fortress; to the epoch of the Presidency and the *coup d'état;* and to the splendour and triumph of Imperial rule. And now he was once more a prisoner, helpless and cast down, with an irresistible enemy dictating terms, and a frantic soldiery clamouring around him. What must have given additional bitterness to his thoughts was the reflection that his fall from power, the humiliation and perhaps ruin of his country, the death and agony of thousands of Frenchmen, and the cureless misery of innumerable survivors, were all due to a war undertaken without sufficient cause, and with most insufficient preparation. For this he must be condemned; but only the fanaticism of political opposition will charge the entire guilt upon his head. With that tendency to trample on the fallen which is one of the worst features of the French character, an attempt was made, after the unfortunate turn taken by events in the field, to show that the war was due solely to the Emperor and his immediate followers. It was in truth supported by the most influential sections of the people—those by whom public opinion is chiefly fashioned; and this will not be forgotten in the judgment of posterity. Nor will any but the interested advocates of Prussia conceal that the steps which led to war were carefully prepared by that Power, with a degree of subtlety for which few parallels are to be found in recent times, and with a fixed design (evident now, though masked beforehand) of spoliation and aggrandisement. To moralise on fallen greatness is always an easy and effective task; and homilies on the wrong-doing of Napoleon III., and on the swiftness of the retribution that overtook him, have been preached without end. For his error he suffered justly. He would have invaded a neighbouring country, and his armies were hurled back in ruin and dismay. But let us not forget or condone the sins of the victor, or fancy, because they are thinly covered by a veneer of pious words, that they are of no account. It is always far more important to arraign the criminal "unwhipt of justice" than to revile the offender on whom the axe has fallen or the jail has closed.

The French are very much at the mercy of a smart and telling phrase, and to call the Emperor "the Man of Sedan" soon came to be considered a complete summary and exposition of his whole public and private life, and a convincing demonstration that he was a fool and a wretch. It was the fashion also, in the days of September, to accuse him of cowardice in the battle of Sedan; though the reports of the Germans themselves assert that his courage was remarkable, and that he evidently courted death. An account of the battle, written, it is said, by a distinguished general officer of our own service, who was on the spot, saw both camps, and was in communication with the Emperor and the King, says with regard to this point:—

> "The Emperor, on repairing to the battle-field, went at first towards General Lebrun's corps, at Balan, where the engagement was very warm, and thence towards the centre, encouraging the troops by his presence, and displaying the greatest coolness amid the projectiles which fell around him. After remaining four hours on the field, and after traversing the points where the danger was greatest, he returned into the town, and repaired to Marshal MacMahon. Wishing afterwards to go out again, he could not get through the streets, as they were so blocked up, and was obliged to remain at a spot where the shells were hailing on the town, kindling several fires, striking wounded men in the houses, scattering death in the streets, and falling on dense masses of men, heaped one upon the other. General Guyot de Lespars was killed at that moment in one of the streets. Obliged to remain in the town, the Emperor installed himself at the Sub-Prefecture, situated in the centre of the front of the Place. Several shells came bursting on the roof and in the court of this residence, where the commandants of the different corps soon arrived, announcing that resistance was becoming impossible. Their soldiers, after having bravely fought almost the whole day, attacked on all sides, were retiring towards the town, and were crowding against each other in the streets and the fortresses. Confusion soon prevailed, and all movement became impossible. The Prussian shells were falling in this human flood, carrying death at every stroke, and the walls of the town ramparts, far from sheltering the army, had become the cause of its loss."

The most frightful incident of the day was the burning of the village or small town of Bazeilles by the Bavarians. This dreadful atrocity would alone be sufficient to cast disgrace upon the German arms; but, though the greatest, it was far from the only instance of a ferocious spirit of revenge manifested by the invaders of France. There had been a desperate conflict in the streets, and the Bavarians, when they at length got the upper hand, after suffering severely, set the place on fire, and burnt the greater number of the inhabitants alive. The Germans say that they had been treacherously fired on from the houses, and that the people had acted with horrible cruelty to some wounded soldiers whom they had seized. But the villagers most emphatically deny this, and the *Daily News* correspondent, whose sympathies were German, credited their denial, and, from



PRUSSIAN ARMY CORPS MOVING ON SEDAN.



INTERVIEW BETWEEN NAPOLEON AND BISMARCK AT DONCHERY.

personal inquiries, gave the very blackest account of the Bavarian proceedings. It appears that the worst which can be said of the villagers is that some few fired at the enemy from out of the windows of the houses. To call such an act "treachery," when performed during the actual progress of a street fight, is absurd; and to destroy the dwellings of a whole community on such an account is hardly excusable. We are told on the same authority that many persons were dragged from the cellars where they had taken refuge, and shot; others were fastened down and left to the flames. The sick and infirm were bayoneted in their beds. Two infants were thrown out of window by the Bavarians, and then thrown back again, previous to the house being fired. In short, acts were committed which, in their utter horror, have never been surpassed in the least civilised ages; and it has been calculated that, out of a population of nearly 2,000, scarcely 50 escaped. The facts related by the *Daily News* correspondent were confirmed by other independent witnesses—even by those who were very unwilling to admit anything to the discredit of the Germans—but it appears probable that they were exaggerated.* A writer in the *Times*, who went to see the burnt village, said:—

> "The human bodies had by this time been removed from the street, but the charred remains of helmets and shakos, and the stocks of rifles, with every here and there swords and bayonets and every sort of weapon, showed that while the flames were raging all round them, and the helpless women and children were literally being roasted alive in the houses and in the streets, the maddened combatants did not cease from the battle, but died, no doubt in numbers, hemmed in by the flames while they were fighting. It is almost impossible to realise that such things can have occurred in this age of civilisation, and that humanity, and civilisation, and Christianity, should be disgraced by horrors that seem the very outcome of hell. The completeness and suddenness of the destruction were evinced by numberless little circumstances, such as the burnt remains of birds and animals one would have expected of all others to escape—dogs, and pigeons, and even cats in large numbers. Hundreds of the people betook themselves to the cellars, it is said, and there perished of suffocation. Nowhere could there have appeared an asylum for the miserable people—raging flames and suffocating smoke inside their houses, and outside falling walls and roofs, and men like fiends incarnate fighting amid the flames and the blazing wreck. I walked about through the dreary streets. Here and there wretched old men and women were hanging about the ruins of their homes in a sort of stupor. Every now and then, almost, as it appeared, at regular intervals, there was the crashing sound of falling masonry. We kept as much as possible in the centre of the streets. For an hour or so we walked about; the scenes were simply repeated in every house and in every street."

The evil of such acts is unfortunately not confined to the scene or the period of their committal. They excite on the one hand a ferocious appetite for blood, and on the other a fierce desire of vengeance; and the worst excesses of war are thus perpetuated and diffused. It was hoped before the outbreak of the Franco-German struggle that the progress of humanity had reached a point at which even war itself was softened and civilised. In some respects the hope has not been disappointed. The admirable organisations for attending to the sick and wounded are facts of which this age may be justly proud, and of which preceding times can show no parallel. But in actual conflict men are as pitiless as ever. When once the tiger is roused by the exasperation of mortal combat, deeds are committed which recall the atrocities of the old Huns and Scythians. The burning of Bazeilles, however, seems to have been an act of more than usual brutality; and the Germans, so far from expressing regret at the occurrence, have invariably defended it, though on grounds which appear insufficient. It is certain that the act tended to inflame and envenom the whole subsequent course of the war.

On the other side, the French are charged with acts of rage at Sedan fully as inhuman as any of those laid to the account of the Germans, and it was said—but afterwards denied—that one of their generals had been torn to pieces by his own men. That officers were killed by their soldiers seems to be certain. Such are the fruits of war, which nevertheless is recommended to us by certain writers as the only means of regenerating the world and ennobling the human soul. The combatants themselves know better. An English gentleman, who helped the wounded on the field of Sedan, relates that a Frenchman, mortally injured in the chest, said to him, "Monsieur, are the Prussians Christians?" "Certainly," he replied. "Then," said the poor fellow, breathing heavily, "why do we kill one another?"

We can hardly go beyond the moral implied in that question. Emperors and kings may quarrel; nations may be madly jealous of their mutual strength; the altars of Glory may flame with the fires of a thousand Bazeilles; but the worth of it all is unapparent when the drunkenness is past. "*Why* do we kill one another?"

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* See Appendix x., Vol. II., p. 561, "The Destruction of Bazeilles."

CHAPTER VIII.

The Morning of the 2nd of September—The Emperor sets out for Donchery, to visit Count Bismarck—Meeting of the Emperor and the Count—Their Interview in front of a Weaver's Cottage—Divergent Accounts of the Incident—Negotiations between the French and German Commanders—The Terms of Capitulation—General Wimpffen's Address to his Troops—Interview between the Emperor and the King at Château Bellevue—The Palace of Wilhelmshöhe appointed as the Place of the Emperor's Detention—Departure of the Emperor for Wilhelmshöhe—Scene at Donchery—The Journey by Rail, and Arrival at the Palace—The Emperor's Health—Reception of the King of Prussia by his Troops—Rage and Grief of the French Troops at the Capitulation—State of the Town—Entry of French and Prussian Soldiers into Belgium—March of the French Captives out of Sedan—Condition of the Battle-field—Sortie from Metz—Progress of the Siege of Strasburg—False Rumours at Paris—Ministerial Statements—Popular Disturbances—Letter from M. Guizot—Warlike Feeling in Germany—Rejoicings at Berlin—Sufferings of Newspaper Correspondents.

WHEN the French Emperor surveyed the situation early on the morning of the 2nd of September, it must have appeared still more obvious than on the previous night that further resistance was hopeless. Dense bodies of German troops were seen on the heights above the Meuse; the hill-tops bristled with batteries in position; and the plains were covered, as far as the eye could reach, with regiment upon regiment. By noon the town was to be bombarded and the French army shelled, if the capitulation were not signed. Nothing but purposeless slaughter could have resulted from the determination to abide such an attack; and the Emperor wisely and humanely resolved to see the conqueror, and endeavour to obtain a little better terms than those which had been already set down. Accompanied by a few of his staff, he started from Sedan at five o'clock in the morning, and proceeded in a carriage along the road to Donchery, where the negotiations for the capitulation were to take place. When the carriage had got among the Germans, the Emperor put his head out of the window, and asked the soldiers in their own language where Count Bismarck was, as he must see him at once. It was replied that Donchery was the most likely place in which to find him, though no one knew exactly. The carriage therefore continued its course towards the little town.*

Count Bismarck was still in bed at Donchery when an officer entered in hot haste, and announced that the Emperor was coming to see him and the King. The Count at once rose, and, hurriedly dressing in his accustomed uniform, set off to meet the coming visitor. He encountered the carriage and its attendants just outside the town. The Emperor alighted, and Count Bismarck, uncovering his head, stood with his cap in his hand. On the Emperor requesting him to resume it, the Count replied, "Sire, I receive your Majesty as I would my own royal master." The Emperor then returned to his carriage, and, followed by Count Bismarck on horseback, again proceeded in the direction of Donchery. At about ten minutes past seven, the correspondent of the *Daily News*—who, while going towards Sedan, had met the carriage, and, reversing his course, had followed it—saw the Emperor turn round in his seat, and heard him request Count Bismarck to halt at a small wayside house, occupied by hand-loom weavers, and situated in the outskirts of the squalid little town they were approaching. The carriage drew up; the Emperor once more alighted, walked hurriedly to the rear of the house, presently returned, and, with the Prussian Chancellor, went inside for about five minutes. It seems to have occurred to the two illustrious negotiators that, as the morning was bright and pleasant, it would be more agreeable to sit outside; so chairs were placed for them on a little flat esplanade in front of the house and of its companion cottages, and divided from the road by a grassy slope of about twenty feet in extent. The generals who accompanied the Emperor lay on the grass just out of earshot, and close to some newspaper correspondents. Napoleon (who wore the undress uniform of a general, with a decoration on his breast, and the usual képi) looked anxious and careworn, though not ill in health. He asked to see the King, and said that he placed himself at his Majesty's disposal. He surrendered with his army, but added that he could not enter into any engagements of a political character, so as to hamper the French people, or the Government of the Empress Regent.* This was in answer to some suggestion about bringing the war to a termination —a very natural point for Bismarck to urge, but one which Napoleon could not grant without acting treacherously to the country. The Emperor told the Prussian Minister that he had no power to negotiate a peace; that he could not give orders to Marshal Bazaine; and that with the Empress and her Ministers it must remain to decide on the future policy of the State. Count Bismarck hereupon remarked that it was of no avail to hold any further conversation on political matters, and that it would be equally useless to see the King. The Emperor still pressed his desire to have an interview with his Majesty; but Count Bismarck said that the capitulation must be signed first.* The King preferred to arrange the terms of capitulation with the French generals, reserving all matters personal to the Emperor himself for subsequent discussion with that potentate. But the surrender, as Bismarck reminded his visitor previous to their separating, must be complete, for the French were not in a position to demand any modification of terms.

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* See Appendix ix., Vol. II., p. 560, "The Emperor Napoleon on the Capitulation."

* Special Correspondent of the *Daily News*.

Some rather divergent accounts of this momentous interview have been published; but the most reliable narratives in English are those of the special correspondent of the *Daily News*, Mr. Archibald Forbes, who was present at a very little distance, and within sight of the Emperor and the Count, though of course not within hearing of their words. This gentleman, in addition to his letter written at the time, communicated to the *Daily News* of October 27, 1870, another letter, giving further details, in correction of erroneous statements. It is remarkable that Bismarck himself, in his own account of the matter, seems to have made two mistakes. He gives the time of the interview as about ten o'clock in the morning, whereas it was between seven and eight that it commenced; and he says that the conversation took place in the house, instead of on the patch of ground in front. Another correspondent of the *Daily News*, who visited Sedan a month after the battle, and some of whose statements Mr. Forbes corrects, replies to that gentleman by questioning a few of *his* assertions. "My opinion," he writes, "is that Napoleon and Bismarck entered the house from the back, went up-stairs, and remained there for a short time; and that it was after Bismarck's return from the King when they sat on the sloping lawn in front of the house." Such is the certitude of history! Here is an event of recent occurrence, and the exact manner in which it happened is already a subject of dispute, one of the principal actors being corrected by an on-looker. And yet we speak with confidence of the days of Julius Cæsar and of Pericles!

Bismarck's own account of the matter, as given in his official report to the King, is as follows:—

"Here [*i.e.*, at the weaver's cottage], in a very small room, containing one table and two chairs, I had about an hour's conversation with the Emperor. His Majesty was extremely anxious to obtain more favourable terms of capitulation for the army. I declined to discuss this matter with his Majesty, when so purely military a question was pending between General Moltke and General Wimpffen. On the other hand, I asked the Emperor whether his Majesty was inclined to negotiate for peace. The Emperor replied that, as a prisoner, he was not now in a position to do so, and on my further question by whom, in his view, the Executive authority of France was at present represented, his Majesty referred me to the Government at Paris. After the clearing up of this point, which from the Emperor's letter of yesterday to your Majesty could not be certainly judged of, I perceived, and did not conceal this from the Emperor, that the situation, to-day as yesterday, offered no other practical question than the military one, and I signified the necessity which therefore rested on us of obtaining, before all things, through the capitulation of Sedan, a material pledge for the stability of the military results already achieved. I had already, yesterday evening, considered the question on all sides with General Moltke, whether it would be possible, without prejudice to German interests, to offer more favourable conditions than those laid down in deference to the military feeling of honour of an army which had fought well. After due consideration, we had felt ourselves obliged to settle this question in the negative. When, therefore, General Moltke, who meanwhile had come from the town, went to your Majesty for the purpose of laying before you the Emperor's wishes, this was not, as your Majesty knows, with the intention of supporting them.

"The Emperor then went out into the open air, and invited me to sit by him before the door of the house. His Majesty submitted to me the question whether it was not practicable to allow the French army to cross the Belgian frontier, in order that they might be disarmed and interned. I had already, the previous evening, conversed on this eventuality with General Moltke. As regarded the political situation, I on my side did not take the initiative, nor did the Emperor, except that he deplored the misfortune of war, and affirmed that he himself had not desired war, but had been forced into it by the pressure of public opinion in France."

Mr. Forbes relates:—"We could just hear the murmur of Bismarck's voice when he raised it at those points where he thought it necessary to give emphasis by the gesture of bringing the forefinger of the left hand sharp down on the palm of the right. The occupant of the first floor of the right-hand cottage was all the while overlooking the pair out of his front window." At the back of the block of houses, some one, for hospitality's sake, had set out a table with a couple of bottles of country wine and some glasses; and one of the French generals paid his respects to this refreshment rather frequently. The first floor occupant told Mr. Forbes that Count Bismarck began to address the Emperor in French, but that the latter, interrupting him, said, "Pardon me! I have heard that your Excellency has not complete mastery of the French language: let us, if you please, speak in German." The conversation then proceeded in the latter tongue, which the informant did not understand. Mr. Forbes thinks that this speech of Napoleon's to Count Bismarck was a covert stroke of satire, founded on M. Benedetti's explanation that the reason why the famous secret treaty was in his handwriting was because Bismarck, owing to a want of familiarity with French, was not quite equal to writing it himself.

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* Dr. Russell, in the *Times*.

At the conclusion of the interview, the Count went to report to the King, and the Emperor withdrew to consult his generals. "It was a stupendous moment," writes Dr. Russell. "The garrison of Sedan was furious at the idea of capitulation. But there, in grim black lines, on every bluff and knoll, on every ridge above the Meuse, on all the heights around, were drawn up the batteries which would rain a hail of fire on the devoted town. Some 600 guns would burst into a sheet of iron against every house. The town, with a few old guns on the walls, with the French field artillery utterly crushed, completely commanded from three sides, could offer no resistance. The troops outside would have simply been turned into a mass of shattered bones and torn flesh in such a shambles as history has never recorded in its page of horrors." Count Moltke so clearly explained his plans to General Wimpffen, and made it so evident that nothing but a frightful massacre could result from any attempt at further opposition, that the French commander reluctantly agreed to sign the act of capitulation, as the only resource left. The discussion took place, and the document was executed, at Frenois, a little village not far from Donchery. It was dated September 2nd, 1870, and was signed "Von Moltke, Wimpffen." The articles (five in number) provided that the French troops, finding themselves actually surrounded by superior forces, should give themselves up as prisoners of war; that, in consequence of the brave defence offered by the army, all the generals and officers, and the superior *employés* having the rank of officers, who pledged their word of honour in writing not to bear arms against Germany, nor to act in any manner against its interests, until the close of the existing war, should be allowed to retain their arms and personal effects; that all arms, *matériel*, flags, &c., should be delivered at Sedan to a military commission; that the town and fortified works of Sedan should be given up, at latest, on the evening of the 2nd of September; and that those officers who should not have accepted the engagements previously set forth should be marched out, together with the disarmed troops, to the districts bordering upon the Meuse, near Iges, to be handed over to German commissaries by their officers, and the chief surgeons to remain behind to attend the wounded.

The capitulation having been signed, General Wimpffen addressed the following proclamation to the French troops, from which it appears (though the fact is not mentioned in other accounts) that the General himself went on the evening of the 1st to the Prussian head-quarters, in the hope of softening the terms of surrender:—

"Soldiers!—Yesterday you fought against very superior forces. From daybreak until nightfall you resisted the enemy with the utmost valour, and expended almost your last cartridge. Exhausted by the struggle, you were unable to respond to the appeal made to you by your generals and your officers to attempt to gain the road to Montmédy, and to rejoin Marshal Bazaine. Two thousand men only were able to rally, in order to make a supreme effort. They were compelled to stop at the village of Balan, and to return to Sedan, where your General announced, with deep sorrow, that there existed neither provisions nor ammunition. The defence of the place was impossible, its position rendering it incapable of offering resistance to the numerous and powerful artillery of the enemy. The army collected within the walls of the town, unable either to leave it or to defend it, and means of subsistence for the inhabitants and the troops being wanting, I have been compelled to adopt the sad resolution of treating with the enemy. Having proceeded yesterday to the Prussian head-quarters, with full powers from the Emperor, I could not at first resign myself to accept the clauses which were imposed. It was only this morning, when threatened by a bombardment to which we had no means of replying, that I determined to make further efforts, and I have obtained conditions which relieve you as far as possible from the humiliating formalities which the usages of war usually exact under such circumstances. Nothing now remains for us, officers and soldiers, but to accept with resignation the consequences of necessities against which an army could not struggle—want of provisions and deficiency of ammunition. I have at least the consolation of having avoided a useless massacre, and of preserving to the country soldiers who are capable at some future time of rendering good and brilliant service. "DE WIMPFFEN,

"General Commanding-in-Chief."

In his official report to the King, Count Bismarck says:—"The conduct of General Wimpffen, as also that of the other French generals, the previous night, was very becoming. That brave officer could not refrain from expressing to me his great pain at being called on, forty-eight hours after his arrival from Africa, and half a day after taking the command, to subscribe his name to a capitulation so deplorable for the French nation. Want of provisions and munitions, however, and the absolute impossibility of any further defence, imposed on him as a general the duty of restraining his personal feelings, as further bloodshed could not alter the situation. The concession of the release of the officers on their word of honour was accepted with warm thanks, as an expression of your Majesty's intention not to overstep the limits which our political and military interests made necessary with regard to the feelings of an army which had fought bravely. To this sentiment General Wimpffen afterwards gave expression in a letter, in which he thanked General Moltke for the very considerate manner in which the negotiations were on his side conducted."



GENERAL WIMPFFEN.

While the Emperor and Count Bismarck were discoursing at Donchery, the Prussian King was waiting at Vendresse to hear news of the capitulation being either accepted or rejected. At length, having received no intelligence, he drove to the battle-field, according to agreement, at eight o'clock, and met General Moltke, who told him that the Emperor had left Sedan at five o'clock in the morning, and was coming to speak with his Majesty. The King appointed as the place of meeting the Château Bellevue, a country house situated at the village of Frenois, on a wooded



THE MEETING OF NAPOLEON AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

knoll sloping down to the Meuse. This was the residence in which the capitulation was being settled. He then rode on to the height above Sedan, where Counts Moltke and Bismarck appeared at twelve o'clock with the capitulation signed. At one o'clock the King started for the château, accompanied by his staff and by the Crown Prince, and escorted by cavalry. The house is built after the old French style, but is really a modern edifice, with glass conservatories at the angles. It commands a beautiful view of the valley and town of Sedan, and, being surrounded by a pleasure-ground and a small plantation, is quite secluded from the road. Shortly after the arrival of the King, the Emperor reached the château, accompanied by his personal followers, his staff, and an escort, who were drawn up in one of the conservatories, while in the opposite conservatory were stationed the Cuirassiers who formed the escort of the Prussian monarch. The interview between the two sovereigns took place, according to Mr. Archibald Forbes, in a little boudoir opening off the library and the principal bed-chamber in the central turret. The King, in a telegram to Queen Augusta dated the same day, says that Napoleon was cast down, but dignified in his bearing, and resigned; and in a letter to her Majesty, written the next day, he adds:—"We were both much moved at seeing each other again under such circumstances. What my feelings were—I had seen Napoleon only three years before at the summit of his power—is more than I can describe." At the commencement of the interview, according to another account, the Emperor was perfectly calm; received the King with grave politeness; spoke with him for a few moments in an outer room, and then withdrew with his fellow sovereign into the little boudoir. The Crown Prince stepped to the door, and closed it; and for a quarter of an hour the two remained closeted together. When they came out, the Emperor was visibly affected, and, in talking to the Crown Prince, said, with much emotion, that the King had treated him with great kindness and generosity. As he spoke, he brushed the tears away from his eyes with the gloves he carried in one hand, and was overcome for several seconds. The King had appointed for the place of his detention the Palace of Wilhelmshöhe, in Cassel, a house which had once been the residence of his uncle, King Jerome, of Westphalia, and which was at that time designated Napoleonshöhe. The Emperor expressed great anxiety not to be paraded before his troops, to pass as little as possible through French territory, and to travel very quietly. These points were at once conceded, and he was allowed to take with him his personal luggage, his servants, and his carriages, together with a few officers of his household. General Boyen, of the Prussian army, and Prince Synar, formerly Prussian Secretary of Embassy at Paris, were attached to his Majesty as aides-de-camp.

Writing in the *Times*, Dr. Russell gave a very particular account of what was said at the interview between the Emperor and the King. The authenticity of this report was afterwards denied by Count Bismarck's paper; but the Count himself, on being personally referred to, subsequently disavowed the disavowal. Dr. Russell states:—

> "The King spoke first. God, he said, had given the victory to his arms in the war which had been declared against him. The Emperor replied that the war had not been sought by him. He had not desired or wished for it, but he had been obliged to declare war in obedience to the public opinion of France. The King made answer that he was aware it was not the Emperor's doing. He was quite sure of it. 'Your Majesty made war to meet public opinion, but it was your Ministers who created that public opinion which forced on the war.' His Majesty, after a pause, remarked that the French army had fought with great bravery. 'Yes,' said the Emperor; 'but, Sire, your Majesty's troops possessed a discipline in which my army has been wanting lately.' The King remarked that for some years the Prussian army had been availing itself of all new ideas, and watching the experiments of other nations before '66 and subsequently. 'Your artillery, Sire, won the battle. The Prussian artillery is the finest in the world.' The King bowed, and repeated that they had been anxious to avail themselves of the experiences of other nations. 'Prince Frederick Charles decided the fate of the day,' remarked the Emperor. 'It was his army which carried our position.' 'Prince Frederick Charles! I do not understand your Majesty. It was my son's army which fought at Sedan.' 'And where then is Prince Frederick Charles?' 'He is with seven army corps before Metz.' At these words the Emperor started, and recoiled as if he had been struck; but he soon recovered his self-possession, and the conversation was continued. The King inquired if his Majesty had any conditions to make or to propose. 'None. I have no power. I am a prisoner.' 'And may I ask, then, where is the Government in France with which I can treat?' 'In Paris; the Empress and the Ministers have alone power to treat. I am powerless. I can give no orders, and make no conditions.'"

The Emperor passed the night at the Château Bellevue; and the ubiquitous Mr. Archibald Forbes, who slept the next night in the same bed, describes the appearance of this now historic room. "Sheets and a quilt," he says, "were on the bed; but one of the window hangings, with its semicircular canopy, had been torn down, and applied as an additional covering for the couch of the Emperor. He had apparently been reading in bed, for a translation of Lord Lytton's 'Last of the Barons' lay open, turned on its face, on a little table by the bed-head." At that time the château had not been in any degree injured by the German soldiers. But, about five o'clock on the morning of the 4th, a party of Bavarians broke in, and did a good deal of damage to the house. The château belongs to M. Amour, a wine-merchant, who, with his family, was away at the time; and the Bavarian soldiers knocked the place about in searching for wine, of which they at length found a large quantity concealed. On returning to their residence, the Amours regarded with some interest a black stain on a table, resulting, as they supposed, from ink spilt during the drawing up and signing of the capitulation; but it appears from Mr. Forbes's subsequent statement that the accident occurred to an ink-bottle of his own, which was knocked over on the night of the 3rd, the day following the great event.

On the morning of September 3rd the Emperor started for the place of his captivity. The streets of Donchery were cleared for a short time, a little after nine o'clock, of the crowds of soldiers, teamsters, wagons, and horses that blocked the way, in order that the Imperial carriages might pass to the northern road round the great bend of the river. It was raining heavily at the time, and the streets were thick with mud. The carriages were preceded by a troop of Black Hussars, in full uniform, and without cloaks. The Emperor rode in a brougham, and wore the undress uniform of a Lieutenant-General. He looked pale, anxious, and worn, with dark lines under the eyes; but the face was firmly set, and he was evidently observant of everything passing around, for, perceiving an English gentleman raise his hat to him, he at once bowed in return. "He had his hand," says Dr. Russell, "to his moustache, which had the well-known pointed and waxed ends; but there was no nervous twitching visible." A day or two before, the moustache had been all in disorder, with the hair straggling loosely over the mouth. The uttermost bitterness of fate, however, had now been reached and passed, and the Emperor could again think of his personal appearance. After the brougham came a *char-à-banc* filled with French and Prussian officers; then several more Imperial carriages, with superb horses; then some French officers on horseback; next, a long string of saddle and other horses, ridden by grooms; and finally a second troop of Black Hussars. As this long and dismal procession filed through the main street, the townspeople stood out in the rain to watch it passing by, as they might have stood to look at a travelling circus or any other unusual show. If they sympathised with the fallen Emperor, they dared not manifest their sympathy; and the *Daily News* correspondent says he heard many muttered revilings of Napoleon and his generals. Yet a German, writing in the *Cologne Gazette*, asserts (in contradiction of some previous testimony of his own) that Prussian officers, on entering the peasants' houses, had been met with cries of "Long live the Emperor!" and that women, in their presence, had kissed the Emperor's likeness. It has always been well known that Louis Napoleon's greatest supporters were to be found among the peasantry; and it is likely enough that they do not share the despicable vice of abandoning the unfortunate.

To avoid passing through French territory, the Prussian King and the Emperor applied to the Brussels Government for permission to proceed through Belgium. This was granted, and the party arrived at noon on the 3rd at Bouillon. It is said that the Emperor and his suite were compelled, unnecessarily, to pass round Sedan in front of the whole Prussian army, and that vexatious stoppages were made at villages, under pretext of the way being blocked; but this does not accord with the consideration shown in other respects, and is therefore most probably a misapprehension. Proceeding by rail along the Liège route to Germany, the train was delayed for an hour at Libramont, where the Emperor walked for some time up and down the platform, conversing with Count Montholon and other gentlemen, and also with one of the engineers of the railway. At Jemelle, Prince Pierre Buonaparte had a brief interview with his unfortunate relative. It was said at the time that the Prince wept passionately, and that the Emperor was heard to remark that he should soon return. Pierre, however, afterwards denied that he had ever been known to do anything so effeminate as to weep. This was the Prince who, some few months earlier, had attracted universal attention by the tragical affair happening in his own house, where he shot a republican journalist who had waited upon him with a challenge. The Prince was acquitted on his trial, because there seemed to be some evidence that he had been grossly insulted by the person whom he killed; but Pierre, who had never been on very friendly terms with the Emperor, passed under a dark cloud, and it is not likely that any confidences were exchanged between him and the head of the dynasty.

When the Imperial train arrived at Liège, there were about 150 persons already waiting on the platform to see the vanquished of Sedan, though it was not generally known that he was coming that way. They remained perfectly silent; and Napoleon, it is alleged, did not seem at all embarrassed. "He drew aside the curtain of the carriage," says one account, "so as to show himself, and smoked his everlasting cigarette. His calmness and self-possession were much remarked." At five o'clock in the evening of the 3rd they arrived at Verviers. There the Emperor slept at the Railway Hotel, and on the following morning (which was Sunday) resumed his journey. The train passed through Cologne without stopping; indeed, all the way from the German frontier to Wilhelmshöhe, the driver (in accordance with orders considerately given by the King of Prussia) avoided stopping at the stations, and always drew up, when necessary, at some distance from them, so as to avoid any annoyance from popular curiosity.


NAPOLEON LEAVING SEDAN.

Wilhelmshöhe was reached on the 5th, at half-past nine at night, and it was found that a military guard of honour was stationed there. "When the Emperor alighted," says a letter from Cassel, "the drummers and fifers played a tune known to us as the great 'Zapfenstreich,' but which, as I am now informed by an officer, is usually played on the reception of some high personage. Napoleon wore the undress uniform of a general, with a *reitermantel*, something similar to the Garibaldian *capot.* On leaving the carriage the Emperor went up to the right wing of the company, which presented arms, and passed in front, several times taking off his cap and saluting them. At three paces distant followed Generals von Plonski and Graf Monts, Governor of the city of Cassel. There were also present the Chief President von Möller and a large host of railway officials. The demeanour and behaviour of the people present were beyond all praise. When the Emperor came in sight there was not heard a single sound, and in the same silence reigning everywhere he left the station." The writer of another account describes the Emperor as "a short, stout gentleman," who, alighting from the railway carriage, walked slowly to an equipage that had been waiting for him, seated himself in it with another gentleman, and drove off. "His features," says this authority, "were placid, and, as he looked about him, from calm, intelligent eyes, it was evident that he was an observer and a thinker to boot. His was one of those faces which, while indicating habits of reticence, are yet eloquent in the lines marking the inner workings of the mind. A second equipage followed, the train went on, and the closing scene in one of the most notable tragedies that has ever been played was at an end." Napoleon III. had arrived as a prisoner at the palace which his uncle had formerly occupied as a king. The same writer, describing the reception of the Emperor at the place of his enforced retirement, says:—

> "With drum and fife suddenly breaking the stillness of the night, a company of infantry present arms in honour of the new arrival. There is a warm glow inside the splendid hall. Generals and gentlemen of the royal household are standing ready to do the honours of the occasion. They bow low, and are the most obedient servants of his Majesty. They conduct his Majesty up-stairs with the deference due to a sovereign. They take the commands of his Majesty, and will be happy to execute them. Meanwhile, attendants are bustling about outside, and everything is in gala. Napoleon is received as a guest, not as a prisoner, by his generous host. The entire palace is

placed at his disposal. A numerous suite of some forty persons, with a large retinue of servants, have followed him, and will be likewise entertained by the King. He has brought eighty-five horses, and a variety of carriages—greater, almost, than can be stored in the mews of the princely mansion. Royal *valets de chambre* and *chefs de cuisine* have been sent down, and everything will be done to render his stay as pleasant as possible. The movements of the Emperor are apparently without restraint, and if he chose he might drive about in the grounds, see company in the evening, and close the day with a visit to his Majesty's Opera at Cassel. Such is the aspect royal imprisonment assumes in the courtesy of the present age."

The spot is very beautiful, very healthy, and very private; and, after the Emperor's arrival, the grounds surrounding the house were rendered inaccessible to the public, by order of the King. Mountains, valleys, woods, and pretty little villages, form the features of the adjacent country; and the park contains an old castle, with a moat, a drawbridge, and a deserted courtyard.

Nothing is more extraordinary than the way in which the already enfeebled health of the Emperor bore up against the alternate excitement and depression of the time. That he suffered a good deal occasionally, however, is certain. Dr. Horn, writing to the *Cologne Gazette* an account of the capitulation, says that, although his features showed composure and calmness, his figure indicated great debility; and that "after the settlement of the capitulation, which took longer time than could have been wished, he was so exhausted that dinner had immediately to be prepared for him, and so destitute of means that 2,600 thalers had to be given General Boyen, who was commissioned to conduct him to Cassel." On the day of Sedan he was frequently obliged to alight from his horse, when overcome with fatigue or pain. It is remarkable that on the following day, signalised by the Emperor's surrender, the Count de Flahault, one of the most devoted adherents of the Imperial dynasty, and a soldier in the armies of the first Napoleon, died in Paris, at the age of eighty-five.

The interview with the Emperor, on the 2nd, having come to an end, the Prussian King rode through the ranks of his army stationed round Sedan, and, as may be supposed, met with a most enthusiastic reception. This occupied from half-past two to half-past seven—five hours of prodigious excitement, such as might have overcome a younger man. There were then other matters to be seen to, and the King did not get back to his quarters until 1 A.M. on the following morning.

The army in Sedan was in a terrible state on hearing that the capitulation had been concluded. Several of the men were so dispirited as to be ignobly glad that they had escaped from further peril and disaster; but the greater number were convulsed with grief and frantic with impotent rage. They cursed the Emperor and MacMahon, and declared that the country had been betrayed. They cursed the Prussians, and vowed that they would take vengeance on them in any way they could. They cursed their own officers, and threatened them with assassination. Some wept passionately and ceaselessly; some destroyed their arms, and trampled them under foot; others stood apart, sullen and despairing. Many said they would rather die than surrender; not a few sought refuge from their sorrows in drink, and staggered about the town, intoxicated, boastful, and shameless. The cold and phlegmatic Germans looked on, and wondered at the Frenchmen's want of discipline. There were some exceptions, however —men whose bearing was so firm, dignified, and truly martial, that it contrasted favourably with even that of their conquerors. An "English M.P.," writing in the *Times*, says he saw some twenty French officers, mostly of the higher ranks, taking a final meal before leaving the town with their men. They warmly condemned the folly of Marshal MacMahon's plans, apparently not being aware that the plans were none of his, and that he had protested against them. Two Bavarian officers entered the place, followed by a crowd of French soldiers, one of whom threw a bottle at the Germans. The French officers, starting up, vehemently reproached their countrymen, and, crowding round the Bavarians, apologised for the outrage. Then followed much hand-shaking and kissing; and then two or three of the French officers turned their faces to the wall, and cried like children. This writer, adverting to the appearance of the town when he entered it at nightfall on the 2nd, in the midst of a thunderstorm, says:—"I cannot describe the confusion of the place. Discipline there was none. The men of the different regiments were all crowded together indiscriminately—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—with hungry horses, which kept up a dreadful noise all night. Dead horses lay in the streets. Others, wounded and unwounded, wandered at will through the streets where they could move. Others, fastened to cannons and wagons, and left, grew furious with hunger and fright, and kicked and struggled wildly. And the rain fell; and the men huddled themselves up, singly or in groups, on the pavements of the streets, on the sills outside the windows, on doorsteps, under arches. An old lame woman, the *concierge* of some building, let me sit on a chair inside her door all night." From



COMBAT BETWEEN SAXON DRAGOONS AND CHASSEURS.

another account it appears that the streets were littered with broken swords, rifles, pistols, lances, helmets, cuirasses, and mitrailleuses. The Meuse, where it runs through the town, was choked with heaps of these fragments, so that the stream rose above its banks. Even the standards were burnt or buried, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The mud of the streets was black with gunpowder, and splinters of shell lay thickly in all directions. To the other horrors of the scene a deficiency of provisions was added, and the starving soldiers were obliged to cut up dead horses as their only means of getting food. Yet the townspeople were happy to have escaped a prolonged bombardment, and received the invaders with civility. They had already suffered a good deal from the brief shelling to which they had been subjected at the close of the great battle. Some of the houses were burnt or otherwise destroyed, and many of the civilians had been killed, together with the soldiery. The dead bodies of both lay about the streets when the Germans entered the town.

After the signing of the act of capitulation on the 2nd, some 7,000 French troops, with several pieces of artillery, crossed the Belgian frontier at different hours of the afternoon and evening, and laid down their arms. They were followed by 12,000 on the following day. Three hundred German wounded also crossed the frontier and demanded an asylum. The French and Prussian wounded were sent to the military hospital of Namur, the entire population of which town placed themselves at the disposal of the sanitary department. The Belgian Government had consented to a convention between the belligerents, under which the prisoners and wounded of both countries might be cared for in Belgium. The French unwounded were lodged chiefly in the citadel of Namur; but the officers were allowed to retain their liberty of movement, on pledging their word that they would not leave Belgian territory. The Prussians were sent on to Bruges.



VIEW OF WILHELMSHÖHE.

The conquerors of Sedan took possession of the town on the morning of the 3rd, and the march of the captive soldiers then commenced. Many of the officers refused to promise not to fight against the enemy, and preferred to go into captivity. It is said that there was actual danger of bloodshed when the prisoners began to move out of the ill-fated place. The officers in command, however, displayed great tact and firmness; the Germans showed themselves as little as possible; and a collision was fortunately avoided. The prisoners taken in the battle had already been sent off in strong detachments, guarded by German troops. The passage of the men handed over by the capitulation was a longer affair. Altogether, about 95,000 men, with an immense number of horses, and guns that covered acres of ground when parked, are stated to have fallen to the successful army as the result of the battle of Sedan. These men were despatched to Germany at the rate of about 10,000 a day, and the passage was long and dreary. It was soothed, before French territory was quitted, by the kindness of the peasantry. Women were seen cooking for the prisoners, and pushing through the crowd to bring them little delicacies. For those who were waiting their turn to be removed, a great camp was formed on the peninsula made by the bend of the Meuse. In the main, the captives and the conquerors got on tolerably well together, as soon as the first agony of the capitulation had passed. The wounded of both nations were even friendly with one another. "They went amicably along," says a correspondent of the *Daily News*, "the common suffering making them friends. No one seemed to dream of further violence and further fighting. The battle was over, and they were glad to creep together to the rear, with little civilities exchanged in the way of pipe-lights and sips of brandy, and with no more hostile feeling than two patients already in a hospital." The same writer gives a most vivid picture of the battle-field on the morning after the fight:—

"In quiet England whole districts will turn out to see a murdered family, and here on a battle-field the same murdered family would be trampled into the mud without being noticed. This meadow on the hill-side is full of mangled horses and dead cuirassiers. It was here that they made a frantic attempt to break through, and were mowed down by the Prussian fusillade. You must have been on several battle-fields to understand the signs of what has taken place by the look of the spot next morning. This group of dead horses, with a helmet or two and a dozen cuirasses, with a broken trumpet and three dead cuirassiers, means serious work. The dark stains on the ground are where the wounded have lain and been removed. The little heap of swords under that hedge is where some dismounted troopers were forced to surrender. Then we come to Prussian helmets crushed and trampled. Some are marked by shell or bullet, and have blood upon them. They tell of loss to the regiment to which they belonged. Others have no particular trace of violence, and may either be signs of wounded men, or of men who have simply thrown their helmets away in the heat of action, and put on their forage-caps, to march more lightly. These dark stains, surrounded by knapsack and rifle, by great coat and cooking-tin, are where men have lain who have been badly wounded, or even killed, but whose friends have made them as comfortable as could be under the difficulties of the time. One has a little shelter of twigs and branches put to keep off the sun; another has had a blanket propped on two rifles, and his knapsack for a pillow; but he has died in the night, and is left with his cloak over his face until the burying party shall come round. . . . . All honour to the helpers of the wounded—to the regular and volunteer hospital assistants! Their red cross badge must be a joy to many a sufferer. The better sort of volunteers in the work—the Sisters of Charity and surgeons who have donned the badge—are full of zeal. Some of the best families of Germany are represented among these helpers of the wounded; there are several foreigners, too, engaged in the common cause of humanity. Thanks to all that is done, the wounded are so soon removed to villages, or placed under some sort of shelter, that even next morning there are but few of them to be seen on the ground. They are being brought to the nearest ambulance-wagon or stretcher, with many cries and groans, Heaven help them! or are lodged in a cottage near the field, or are carefully bandaged up and laid on straw, and sent jolting painfully away in country carts to a more remote hospital.

"We found the hillside north-west of Sedan covered with dead men and horses. . . . . The Chasseurs-à-cheval and the Chasseurs d'Afrique had dashed along the hillside, half hidden in the dust which they raised, and had been destroyed by a steady fusillade. Here lay the famous light horsemen, with their bright uniforms dabbled in blood, and their fiery little steeds crushed and mangled by Prussian shells. Most of the men and horses now on the ground were dead, but some few wounded men yet lingered in agony, with white rings tied to sticks that were planted beside them as a means of calling the surgeon's attention when he should have time to revisit them."

Dr. Russell, describing the appearance of the battle-field, says:—

"No nightmare could be so frightful. Several times I came on spots where there were two horses lying dead together in harness, killed by the same fragment. Several times I saw four, five, and six men, four, five, and six horses, all killed by the explosion of one projectile; and in one place there lay no less than eight French soldiers who must have been struck down by the bursting of a shell over a company, for they lay all round in a circle with their feet inwards, each shattered in the head or chest by a piece of shell, and no other dead being within a hundred yards of them. A curious and to me unaccountable phenomenon was the blackness of most of the faces of the dead. Decomposition had not set in, for they were killed only the day before.

> Another circumstance which struck me was the expression of agony on many faces. Death by the bayonet is agonising, and those who die by steel, open-eyed and open-mouthed, have an expression of pain on the features, with protruding tongue. A musket-ball which is at once mortal does not seem to cause much pain, and the features are composed and quiet, sometimes with a sweet smile on the lips. But the prevailing expression on this field of the faces which were not mutilated was one of terror and of agony unutterable. There must have been a hell of torture raging within that semicircle in which the earth was torn asunder from all sides with a real tempest of iron, hissing, and screeching and bursting into the heavy masses at the hands of an unseen enemy."

A correspondent of the *Standard*, referring to the appearance of things on the same day, says that the wounded and dying were in every available farmhouse and outhouse, under shady trees and by running water.



NAPOLEON'S ARRIVAL AT WILHELMSHÖHE.

> "Most of the Prussian killed, but not all," he writes, "were already interred; but the French dead still lay unburied, singly, and in heaps of two, three, four, and five. I got rid of my horse, and pursued my way on foot, in order better to converse with those who had been in the fight. I spent three hours in this harrowing task. Go where I would, I met the same havoc, the same tokens of tremendous struggle, and the pale set faces of the fallen. Returning, not without difficulty—for in the anguish of those hours I had taken no note of the compass—to the farmhouse where I had been promised a room for the night, and where I am writing this letter, I tried to avoid the open places, the down-trodden acres of clover, the bruised fields of potatoes, and to reach my bourne by quiet secluded lanes and brushwood. I passed from Scylla to Charybdis. There, all alone with me, in damp hollows, in dank hedge-bottoms, single corpses in their red and blue array burst upon my vision. Three of them, I grieve to say, lay with their lower limbs all naked, testifying to the rapacious prowler of the night. And there was no one to cover them. From the pocket of one of them had fallen a letter, which still lay half on his breast, half on his arm, that was stretched cold and stiff across it. I could no more have read it than I could have rifled his pouch. As far as the eye could reach, I saw nothing but soldiers, and trees, and utter ruin. Lamucelle was reduced to a chaos of black bricks and broken mortar, and Bazeilles itself was still sending the smoke of its utter destruction to the skies."

Both sides had suffered fearfully; but the French seem to have been the greater losers. The sight of their numerous prisoners, moreover, was extremely painful to the observers. The *Standard* correspondent just cited says that twenty thousand unwounded French prisoners passed before his eyes on the 2nd, guarded by a very light escort, armed to the teeth. The officers seemed to be sad, but the soldiers chatted and laughed, and speculated on the fate of the Emperor. The army had lost heart; and it is not difficult to believe that the first feeling of some may have been one of satisfaction at being out of the tempest of fire and death, and relieved from the consequences of incapable generalship.

"An English M.P." who wrote a letter on the subject to the *Times*, was on the field of Sedan with the Bavarian troops from morning till night on the day of the battle; got into the town on the evening of the 2nd; stayed there throughout the 3rd, watching the departure of the captive army; and left on the 4th for England. He went about in the thickest of the fight, assisting the wounded, at great risk to himself. Some of the incidents he relates are very noteworthy :—

> "In a little hollow over which my Bavarians had twice passed, by a willow tree (the only sign of vegetation around), I found some eight or ten wounded men, five French, the rest Germans. With my little stock of bandages and my flask I did what I could for the poor fellows; but before I could return, the firing recommenced. The bullets and balls whistled and hummed over me and around me, and patted or thudded the ground close to my feet. I crept under the slender shelter of my willow stump, and sat down

among my wounded friends. I thought that half-hour would never end. The wounded Frenchmen groaned dreadfully. The Germans, equally badly wounded, were more quiet and less complaining. This, I found, too, in the hospitals. I think the French are more tenderly made. It was miserable to see so much misery I could do little to relieve. I laid this one on his back, with his knapsack for his pillow, turned this one on his side, covered another's head with a cloth to shelter it from the burning sun, put a bit of shirt on this man's wound, unbuttoned the throttling coat of another, took off the boot from the wounded foot of another, gave all a little cognac; then sat me down among my friends, and talked with them. How grateful they were! How polite, in the midst of all his sufferings, one poor French soldier! And, most touching of all, how kindly helpful the poor fellows were to one another, French and German alike!"

While the great struggle was going on at Sedan, Bazaine was anxiously expecting at Metz the result of MacMahon's attempt to relieve him. By some mysterious means—probably an underground telegraph—the two Marshals were for a time enabled to communicate with one another. A subterranean aqueduct, providing Metz with water, was found out by the besiegers, and destroyed; and the secret telegraph may really have existed. It seems certain that Bazaine knew of MacMahon's enterprise, and he endeavoured to second it by a sortie. On the 31st of August he made a desperate attempt to break through the lines of the investing force, reckoning on those lines having been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to meet the movement of MacMahon. With his whole army he attacked the first army corps of the Prussians, the division of General Kummer, and the fourth Landwehr division, on the east side of Metz. The battle lasted through the day and night, and extended some way into the 1st of September; but it ended in the French being driven back at all points. The Germans had, indeed, by this time so strongly entrenched themselves before the fortress, and had so blocked and guarded every road leading up to it, that the success of a sortie became each day less likely. On this occasion they were enabled, by means of the telegraphic communication which they had established all round the fortress, rapidly to concentrate large reinforcements on the weak point selected by Bazaine for his assault. They were thus in a position to hold their ground until the arrival, at the end of five and six hours respectively, of two additional corps from the western side, which were carried over pontoon bridges at Argancy and Hanconcourt.

The siege of Strasburg was continued with great vigour, and encountered with much heroism. Sorties of the garrison took place on the nights of the 1st and 2nd of September; but the French were repulsed, after penetrating to the second parallel. The losses on both sides were severe, and the besieged had the mortification of finding themselves no nearer their object. At one time, however, they seized on the railway station; but from this they were dislodged, after a sharp encounter. The sufferings of the inhabitants grew more and more extreme as the siege progressed. For ten days the civilians remained day and night in their cellars; but even this resource was temporarily denied them, as a flooding of the Rhine inundated the basements of the houses with water. Those whose houses had been destroyed took refuge in the churches. Burials were no longer performed outside the town, but in the botanical garden. The supply of gas was soon exhausted, and every householder was required to place a lighted lantern at night in front of his dwelling. In addition to the public library, the Prussian shells destroyed the Temple Neuf (the largest of the Protestant places of worship in the city, renowned for its fine organ and its mural paintings), the Museum of Art, and the best houses in the best quarter of the city. The damage done to the cathedral has been already noticed. On the 3rd of September the King of Prussia ordered that the besieging force should fire only against the fortifications, and no longer into the town. This was to the credit of his Majesty's humanity; but it is evident that a different plan had been previously followed.

During the progress of these events the Government of Paris continued to put the best face it could upon matters. The wildest reports of victories were circulated, and received for a time the sanction of the Ministers. That they lent themselves willingly to the delusions of the hour is to be feared. It was only on Saturday, the 3rd, that the Government first gave the Parisian public some idea of the overwhelming disaster of Thursday, the 1st, and even then the truth was but partially revealed. The Ministerial statement made in the Senate was as follows:—

"We have learnt from several non-official sources that Marshal Bazaine failed in his recent attempt to disengage himself from the hostile armies which kept him hemmed in round Metz. His effort was an heroic one, and the King of Prussia could not refrain from rendering justice to the valour of our soldiers. Marshal MacMahon, after having attempted to hold out a hand to Marshal Bazaine in a northerly direction, was compelled to retire to the neighbourhood of Sedan, where he fought for several days with alternate successes and reverses; but we were fighting against an enemy too superior in numbers, and, notwithstanding the most energetic efforts, his attempts appear to have terminated in a manner unfortunate for our arms. Other information has been received from Prussian sources which is still more unfavourable, but it does not seem to us worthy of belief. In any case the Government could not undertake to authenticate it to a certain extent by communicating it to the public. Our reverses afflict us; we cannot witness without emotion so much courage, such self-sacrifices, and all rendered useless. But this spectacle, far from depriving us of our energy, only augments and redoubles it. Since the present Cabinet assumed power it has produced for France all that her resources could give. Those resources are still sufficiently powerful, with energy and the concurrence of the nation, to enable us finally to triumph. We hope, with God's help, to drive the enemy out of France."

In the Corps Législatif a Bill was introduced, calling to arms all citizens, married or single, between twenty and thirty-five years of age, and authorising the Government to call out all former officers and subordinate officers up to the age of sixty. Count Palikao, the head of the Ministry, said:—

"Grave events have occurred. The source from which we are informed is not official, but the intelligence must be true. Marshal Bazaine, after a very vigorous sortie, had an engagement with the enemy, lasting from eight to nine hours. The French soldiers fought with extreme valour, but on its termination Marshal Bazaine was forced to retire upon Metz, thus preventing the desired junction. Another event which I have to communicate is a battle between Mézières and Sedan, which resulted in alternative success and reverse. We at first drove the Prussians to the Meuse, but were subsequently compelled to retreat before superior forces. The result is that for some time to come the junction between Marshals Bazaine and MacMahon will not be effected. Other information circulated, especially relating to Marshal MacMahon being wounded, is not of an authentic character. The position is serious. We must no longer dissimulate."

M. Jules Favre then addressed the Chamber, and, while declaring that all parties were unanimous in their determination to defend France to the utmost, delivered a vehement invective against the Imperial rule, and proposed to concentrate all power in the hands of General Trochu. Count Palikao and several other deputies protested against this language, and the discussion ceased for the time. At eight o'clock in the evening, an assemblage of about six thousand persons sent a deputation to General Trochu, to require of him to assume the reins of government. The General (who, it will be remembered, had been, on the 17th of August, appointed by the Emperor Governor of Paris and Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in the capital) answered that he was not in a position to reply to such a proposition, but would fulfil his duty in defending Paris until death. The crowd thereupon shouted, "Abdication, abdication!" Another assemblage, numbering ten thousand, sent a similar deputation to the General, and received the same reply. The Chambers reassembled at midnight, in the midst of a good deal of agitation, which rendered necessary occasional cavalry charges on the mob; and General Palikao then announced in the Corps Législatif that MacMahon's army had capitulated, and that the Emperor was a prisoner. He added:—"In the presence of this news it would be impossible for the House to discuss the possible consequences of the event. The Ministers have not as yet been able to concert together, and I ask that the debate should be postponed till to-morrow." M. Jules Favre then brought forward a motion declaring that the Emperor and his dynasty had forfeited all rights conferred by the Constitution, demanding the appointment of a Parliamentary Committee entrusted with the governing power and with the mission to expel the enemy from French territory, and maintaining General Trochu in his post as Governor of Paris. The proposal was met by a protest from M. Picard; but it led to no regular debate, and the Chamber resolved to hold a sitting at noon on the Sunday. This was the commencement of the revolutionary storm which burst forth not many hours later.

The temper of France at this period was admirably expressed in a letter from M. Guizot to an English friend—a letter which proves that his great accumulation of years had in no respect impaired the intellectual vigour and trained judgment of that veteran statesman:—

"If we were only beginning this unhappy war, I would tell you frankly what I think of its evil origin and its lamentable errors; and I am sure that a large majority of the French nation think as I do about it. But we are not beginning the war. The opinion of the French nation on the main points of the question is unchanged; but no one thinks about them now, and, indeed, we cannot and ought not to think about them. For the present we ought to occupy ourselves—and, in fact, we do occupy ourselves—with war, and war only. We are engrossed by it, not only because of the unexpected reverses which we have experienced, but also, and above all, because of the designs which the Prussians manifest, and the character which they have stamped upon this war. On their part it is manifestly a war of ambition and for the sake of conquest. They proclaim loudly that they intend to take back Alsace and Lorraine, provinces which have been ours for two centuries, and which we have held through all the political vicissitudes and chances of war. The Prussians do more even than this. Although they occupy



these provinces very partially and only temporarily, they already presume to exercise the rights of sovereignty over them. They have issued a decree in Lorraine abolishing our laws of conscription and recruiting for the army. Ask the first honest German whom you meet if this is not one of those acts of victorious ambition which pledge a nation to a struggle indefinitely prolonged, a struggle which can only be terminated by one of those disasters that a nation never accepts—one that if it experiences it never forgives. Be sure that France will never accept the character and consequences which Prussia desires to give to the war. Because of our first reverses we have our national honour to preserve, and because of the claims of Prussia we have to defend and keep our national territory. We will maintain these two causes at any price and to the very end. And let me tell you, and that without presumption, that, being as resolute as we are, we are not seriously uneasy as to the result of this struggle. At the very beginning the Prussians made an immense effort; there is another effort yet to be made; it is on our part, and it has, as yet, scarcely begun. We were greatly to blame that we were not better prepared at first; but with all our shortcomings we have seen what our troops are worth, and this will be seen and felt more and more as time goes on. We are superior to the Prussians in men, money, and territory, and we will equal them in perseverance, even should they persevere, as they will need to do if their projects are to have any chance of success. The age is with us, and we will not fail the age.

"This, I tell you in all frankness and sincerity, is the actual condition of facts and of men's minds in France. I am very anxious that it should be known in England, and that there should be no mistake there as to our national sentiments and the possibilities of the future. I devoted my whole political life to creating and maintaining bonds of friendship and unfettered alliance between France and England. I thought, and I still think, that this alliance is a pledge of the moral honour of the two nations, of their material prosperity, and of the progress of civilisation throughout the world. I can recall the sorrow and apprehension which I felt in 1857, when I thought that the power of England was endangered by the great Indian mutiny. I remember also that the sentiments of France at that time were in complete harmony with my own. It is therefore with sorrow, not unmixed with surprise, that



MARSHAL BAZAINE.

I now see many Englishmen so openly hostile to France."

In Germany the determination to prosecute the war with vigour acquired greater force every day. The alleged breaches of neutrality by England excited much anger; it was vehemently proclaimed that the German people would not submit to any attempt at mediation or intervention on the part of the neutral Powers at the conclusion of peace; and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine was demanded, together with the Federal union of the whole of Germany, as the only guarantees against French ambition.

On the 3rd of September there was a series of grand demonstrations at Berlin in celebration of the capitulation of Sedan. Thus all was brightness in Germany and gloom in France; and the suffering in the latter country sometimes involved those who were non-combatants and neutrals. The newspaper correspondents, in particular, had a perilous duty to perform. Lieutenant-Colonel Pemberton, one of the representatives of the *Times*, was killed by a chance shot on the road to Sedan. Mr. Sydney Hall, one of the artists of the *Graphic*, was arrested by the Prussians as a French spy, but released after a while. Mr. G. A. Sala, while acting as correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, was seized in Paris as a Prussian spy, and treated with horrible brutality and indignities in a prison; and an American journalist narrowly escaped being shot by the Germans, as an agent of the enemy. The services of gentlemen deputed by great journals to follow the track of war, and to report from day to day on its many and changeful features, can hardly be overrated. They lay the foundations of future history with a minuteness, and for the most part with an accuracy, unknown to former times; but they have occasionally to pay the penalty of their courage and devotion.

CHAPTER IX.

The Revolutionary Feeling in Paris—Threatening Outbreaks in June, 1869, and Feburary, 1870—M. de Rochefort and the *Lanterne*—M. Gustave Flourens—The Morning of Sunday, September 4th—Debate in the Corps Législatif—Excitement in the Streets—March of the National Guards towards the Chambers—The Crowds in the Place de la Concorde—The Imperial Flag lowered from the Tuileries—Invasion of the Chamber by the Mob—Formation of a Provisional Government, and Proclamation of the Republic—Rejoicings of the Populace—Scenes in the Hôtel de Ville—Discussion as to the National Flag—Release of Rochefort—Meeting of the Senate—Private Gathering of the Corps Législatif—Composition of the Provisional Government—Jules Favre, Crémieux, and Gambetta—Decrees of the Ministry—Non-recognition of the Government by England, and the Reasons for this Policy—The Revolution not justified by the State of France—Extravagant condemnation of the Emperor—Escape of the Empress, her Arrival in England, and her meeting with the Prince Imperial.

Paris is the most volcanic of cities. Its revolutionary fires, even when suppressed, are not extinguished, and at any moment they may burst forth with consuming fury. The volcano had been comparatively quiet for an unusually extended period in September, 1870; yet there had recently been signs that the old disturbing forces were still throbbing beneath the outer crust of law and order. In June, 1869, and again in the February of the following year, there had been sharp, wild spurts of the long-smothered inward flames; and, although these were quickly trampled out, they made men grave as to the possible consequences of any excessive relaxation of the firm yet temperate rule that had ensured the repose of the country for several years. Nevertheless, it was universally felt that ameliorations in the somewhat provisional state of things established after the *coup d'état* were absolutely essential; and it was hoped that the reforms of September, 1869, would prove the commencement of a political state in which, after many oscillations between two principles designed for mutual support, but which the French have always contrived to place in the position of antagonists, freedom might be founded on the basis of authority, and authority be sanctioned by the assent of freedom. There were many signs which justified such a hope; but the revolutionary movements that occurred now and then, slight and easily repressed though they were, gave earnest of the dangers that might beset the path of careful and regular progress. M. Henri de Rochefort, a man of aristocratic family, who for some reason chose to ally himself with the extreme section of Red Republicans, had for a few years past attacked the Emperor and his Government with the most savage virulence in a kind of periodical pamphlet called *La Lanterne*. When this was suppressed in France (which was not until after it had been tolerated for a long time, and had at length exceeded all measure in ferocity of insult and wickedness of provocation), it re-appeared in Belgium, was smuggled across the frontier with an ingenuity and variety of concealment which baffled the utmost vigilance of the police, and was more widely circulated than ever. It cannot be doubted that the *Lanterne* had a very great influence amongst the working classes of Paris and of the large provincial cities. This was followed by other papers of a similar character, which fanned still higher the flames of disaffection. It was not enough for the writers of these publications that France already possessed a Government founded on universal suffrage, and frequently confirmed by appeals to that source of power. National sovereignty was not what they really wanted, though they made it a pretence. Their real object was, no doubt, the predominance of a faction which had been constantly repudiated by the majority of the people; and for this they were ready to dare the worst. M. de Rochefort was encouraged after a time to present himself to the electors of Paris, by whom, in the summer of 1869, he was returned to Parliament. In February, 1870, he attempted a revolution, taking for his pretext the Pierre Buonaparte affair of the previous month; but, not being a man of courage, he started back in terror at the first serious response to his incitements. Having set the mob in motion, he endeavoured, at the last instant, to dissuade it from actual violence; but of course to no purpose. The riot was continued by the more determined of his friends and subordinates, and was extinguished by the police and soldiery amidst the laughter and contempt of all who were not utterly insane. M. de Rochefort was condemned to a term of imprisonment. M. Gustave Flourens, who took the most active share in the puny revolt, escaped to England; and just before the outbreak of the war all was quiet in France, even to dulness.

The air of Paris was vibrating with revolutionary excitement when, at noonday of Sunday, September 4th, the Corps Législatif re-assembled, according to the agreement of the previous night, to consider the position of the country as affected by the terrible disaster of Sedan. Count Palikao brought in a Bill for instituting a Council of Government and National Defence, to consist of five members elected by the Legislative Body, himself to occupy the post of Lieutenant-General of the Council. M. Jules Favre claimed priority for his own motion, mentioned at the close of last chapter. M. Thiers also brought forward a motion, signed by forty-five members of the Left and Right Centres, the object of which was to appoint a Commission of Government and National Defence, and to convoke a Constituent Assembly as soon as the Government had issued from its embarrassments. This was ultimately endorsed by Count Palikao. The Chamber declared all three propositions urgent, and they were collectively referred to the Bureaux, with a view to the appointment of the Commission. The sitting was then suspended, and it can scarcely be said that it was ever resumed.

Long before this the news of the capitulation at Sedan was known all over Paris. The walls had in the morning been found placarded with a proclamation issued by the Council of Ministers, which stated that a great misfortune had befallen the country; that, after three days of heroic struggles against 300,000 enemies, 40,000 French soldiers had been made prisoners; that Marshal MacMahon had been grievously wounded, and that General Wimpffen had signed a capitulation. It was added:—"Paris is now in a state of defence. The military forces of the country are being organised. Within a few days a new army will be under the walls of Paris, and another is in formation on the banks of the Loire. Your patriotism, your concord, your energy, will save France. The Emperor has been made prisoner in this contest. The Government co-operates with the public authorities, and is taking all measures required by the gravity of events." A singular quiet was observable in the streets; but it was the hush that precedes the storm. Very few persons were abroad in the earlier part of the day, and most of the shops were closed—an unusual circumstance in the French capital on Sunday mornings. Suddenly the streets broke into life. At about eleven o'clock, an immense body of National Guards was seen marching along the Boulevard Montmartre, followed by a large mob of private citizens of all classes. The civic soldiers were fully armed, the officers in their proper places, and the men evidently calm and determined. Some were in uniform, some only in their private clothes, as if they had hurriedly obeyed a call to join in the execution of some important duty. Not one, however, had forgotten his musket and bayonet; and the long line of steel glittered and bristled into the far distance, with a menacing and ominous brilliance. The crowd stirred blindly under the influence of a powerful emotion. Cries of "Deposition! deposition!" "Long live France!" "Long live the Republic!" arose every moment, and to these the National Guards responded with much enthusiasm. General Trochu had issued an order to the National Guards, directing them to muster in force around the Chambers, and this was the duty they were now about to perform. On they marched amidst the gathering excitement of the city and the threatening cries of the constantly augmenting mob. When the first band arrived at the bridge leading into the Place de la Concorde, they were forbidden to cross it by the officer in command of a large body of mounted Gardes de Paris, drawn up before the bridge. For a moment the situation looked serious. The officer of the mounted troops ordered his men to draw their swords. The National Guards responded by shouting "Forward! forward!" and a collision seemed imminent. After a short parley, however, the Gardes de Paris sheathed their swords, and the National Guards marched over the bridge, shouting "Long live the Republic!" When the whole body had passed over, the men took up a position near the Assembly, which was then sitting. A body of regular troops was stationed outside. Within the garden of the Tuileries, also, a few soldiers were on guard; and it was at one time feared that the people would force their way in, and attack these men; but a Zouave inside the railings put the mob in good humour by dancing the *cancan*, and nothing disastrous occurred. The crowd, which increased every moment, and must have numbered many thousands, was remarkably good-tempered; in fact, everybody appeared to be in complete accord with everybody else. The persons present seemed to belong to the respectable classes, and many ladies and children were walking about with no look of apprehension. Exclamations of "Long live the Republic!" "Down with the Emperor!" were shouted again and again. Revolutionary songs were chanted in unison; the people gathered green twigs from the trees, and stuck them in their hats; and the National Guards planted small boughs in the muzzles of their muskets. Some of the mob affixed red flags to the lamp-posts and statues, and were loudly applauded for so doing; others made the sergents-de-ville who passed to and fro take off their hats, and shout for the Republic, which they did with some expressions of reluctance and distaste. The Emperor, of course, was reviled on all hands, for your true Parisian has no pity for failure, however hard the task, and will at all times blame any one rather than himself. In the course of that September morning it was frequently remarked by the people that "An Emperor dies, but does not surrender." This was a very smart little epigram, adapted from the celebrated speech of the Imperial Guards at Waterloo; and when a Parisian is duly supplied with smart little epigrams, his whole intellectual nature is thoroughly satisfied, and it would be unfair to expect him to pay any attention to truth, or fact, or the reasonableness of things. Nevertheless, it will occur to many people not Parisians, and doubtless to many Frenchmen, that even an Emperor cannot command a cannon-ball to come his way, and put an end to him in a blaze of glory when he finds life no longer agreeable or successful; also, that there is nothing very unusual in a man going into the thick of a heavy fire, and yet escaping unhurt. Louis Napoleon might, indeed, have played the Roman fool, and died on his own sword; but suicide, where it is not a form of insanity, is always a vulgar device, and most assuredly, if the Emperor had resorted to it, the manufacturers of smart little epigrams would have been ready with one for the occasion. The whole moral of the Sedan disaster lies in the fact that, owing to the extravagant self-confidence of the French people, and especially of the Parisians, the army had fallen into a state of miserable inefficiency, while at the same time the old love of glory, and the old desire for augmented territory, had suffered no abatement. The consequence was national ruin; but it was convenient to lay the whole guilt on the shoulders of the Emperor, who was in truth guilty only in common with a multitude of others. The jubilation of the Parisian populace over the sovereign's misfortunes is one of the most preposterous facts in history. A Democratic Monarchy had been shattered by a Divine Right Monarchy; and those who made a profession of democratic principles were self-stultifying enough to rejoice in the event.

In the midst of shouting, and singing, and joking, and epigram-making, and dancing the *cancan*, the sunny September morning wore away. There are allegorical statues of the principal French cities stationed about the Place de la Concorde; and the figure representing Strasburg was decked out with flowers, in the midst of which hung a large placard, bearing the words, "Honour and glory to General Uhrich!" A number of orators mounted the parapet at the foot of this statue, and harangued the crowd on the certain victory which the Republic would bring. At twenty minutes past three in the afternoon the tricolour flag over the central tower of the Tuileries, betokening the presence of the Empress, was lowered, and it became evident that her Majesty was no longer there. The hauling down of this symbol must have seemed to the on-lookers like the visible fall of the dynasty. Some time previously the National Guards and the crowd had moved still further towards the Chamber, and, after a slight and bloodless scuffle with the regular troops, whose opposition appeared to be simply formal, a large number of men, armed and unarmed, poured into the building, and invaded the hall where the representatives of the nation hold their sittings. On the Chamber endeavouring to renew the debate that had been suspended earlier in the day, it was found impossible to proceed. The mob had obtained possession of the tribune, of the seats of the deputies, the Ministers, and the President, and of the floor of the House. In the name of the Republic, the elect of universal suffrage were forcibly deprived of their functions by a few thousand persons, elected by no one, and probably representing, at the best, only a small minority of the country. This mockery was so glaring that even the members of the Left, consisting altogether of Republicans, protested against it. M. Gambetta, M. Arago, and some others, entreated the mob to retire, or at any rate to be silent. They might as well have spoken to the walls. The people shouted, gesticulated, grimaced, and sang the "Marseillaise." Some rang the President's bell, while others threatened and intimidated the members. The President tried several times to take the chair, but was violently prevented. At length—having first declared that, deliberation being impossible, the sitting was at an end—he endeavoured to retreat, but could only do so after an encounter with the mob, in which he nearly lost his coat and hat. He was followed by all the members of the Chamber, excepting those of the Left, who proceeded to draw up a list of a Provisional Government. Some seven or eight names having been determined on, the persons so nominated adjourned to the Hôtel de Ville, where they again "constituted themselves a Government," and at once began to appoint various individuals to the different Ministries and offices of State. Before the departure of the members of the Left for the Hôtel de Ville, a cry had gone forth to the people outside the Chamber that the deposition of the Emperor had been pronounced, and that the Republic had been proclaimed. The news was received with a roar of triumph and satisfaction; the National Guards began to move in the direction of the Quays and the Rue de Rivoli, the regular troops fraternising with them; and Paris at once burst into a mood of festal gaiety, as if the enemy had been beaten instead of being overwhelmingly successful, and as if there were not thousands of Frenchmen at that moment suffering the worst disasters of a war in which all the failures had been their own. There is nothing surprising in this with a population such as that of Paris. The Emperor had declared war; the Emperor had commanded the armies; the Emperor had been beaten; "the people" (meaning by that term a handful of Parisians out of more than 38,000,000 of the entire population of France) had deposed the Emperor: therefore all was well. In their illogical way (for the Parisians, notwithstanding their assumption of exactness, are the most illogical of men), they threw off the whole responsibility of war, and all the consequences of defeat, in the single act of proclaiming a Republic. That they had shouted for the war six weeks before—that they had contributed to the inefficiency of the army by neglecting the practical details of politics for the pleasure of inventing and chinking in each other's ears a number of clever and crisp little sentences about "Modern Cæsarism" and "the Man of December"—was all forgotten or denied. How could Paris be otherwise than gay when she had got a fine new Government, self-constituted in the Corps Législatif, and self-proclaimed at the Hôtel de Ville?

There can be no question that large numbers of the Parisian population of all classes were in favour of the Revolution. Whether the majority supported it, admits of neither proof nor denial; for revolutions do not deal in statistics. It may be fairly assumed, however, that there were many dissentients, who stayed at home, and prudently held their tongues, for fear of consequences. The Republicans, therefore, had it all their own way. The army undoubtedly made common cause with the National Guards and the mob, and all fear of armed collisions was at an end. Speaking of the barracks in the Quai d'Orsay, the Paris correspondent of the *Daily News* says:—"From the windows of those great barracks, formerly peopled with troops every man of whom was supposed to be ready to die for his Emperor, I saw soldiers smiling, waving handkerchiefs, and responding to the cries of 'Long live the Republic!' raised by gendarmes, cavalry, soldiers of the Line, National Guards, and people, below. Well-dressed ladies in open carriages shook hands with private soldiers and men in blouses, all crying 'Long live the Republic!' Nay, strangers fell on each other's necks, and kissed each other with 'effusion.' In the neighbourhood of the Pont Neuf, I saw people on tops of ladders busily pulling down the Emperor's busts. I saw the busts carried in mock procession to the parapet of the Pont Neuf, and thrown into the Seine; clapping of hands and hearty laughter greeting the splash which the graven image of the mighty monarch made in the water." The people forced their way into the Tuileries gardens; but the doors of the palace itself were closed in time, and they made no attempt to burst them in. Of the Hôtel de Ville the mob soon



became masters. Portraits of the Emperor and Empress, by Horace Vernet and others, were slashed with knives, thrown out of window, and danced upon by the people. In the streets the symbols of the Empire were cast down and broken, and eagles that could not be at once removed were covered with paper. A great discussion was held at the Hôtel de Ville about the choice of a flag. Some workmen advocated the red; but Messieurs Gambetta and Schœlcher, with a few officers of the National Guards, reminded them that the tricolour was the flag of 1792 and 1793—the only really national flag of France. "It is a bastard flag," shouted several voices; "it has the colour of the Bourbons." "No," was the reply; "white was the colour of old France." "It is a tarnished white," said some. "Then we will wash it," rejoined the other faction. So the tricolour was decided on.



COUNT PALIKAO.

As soon as the Provisional Government had been formed, a deputation was sent off to the prison where Rochefort was confined, and that gentleman was at once set at liberty, the gaol authorities seeming to acknowledge the authority of the new rulers as readily as everybody else. He was paraded along the streets on a triumphal car, escorted by a large mob crying "Long live Rochefort!" A red scarf, indicative of his peculiar shade of Republicanism, decked his person, and his face glowed with pleasure and triumph as he acknowledged the salutations of the people. Ultimately he joined his fellow Republicans at the Hôtel de Ville, and publicly embraced Raspail—a famous popular leader of the extreme section—before a great assemblage in front of the building. At eleven at night he passed along the Boulevards, followed by soldiers of all arms, carrying lanterns, in allusion to the publication which had done so much damage to the Empire.

That evening Paris was in her lightest and most self-satisfied humour. A lovely night followed a day of pure autumnal beauty. The large harvest moon shone brightly out of a serene blue sky, and a warm air was abroad, making the streets more pleasant than the houses. The citizens and citizenesses prolonged their stay out of doors until an unusually late hour. Groups of people sat at the little tables in front of the *cafés*, talking of the great events of the day, exulting over the fallen dynasty, and forgetting the Prussians. The Prussians were not forgetting *them;* but who could think of anything serious with such a charming new toy to admire, with so many embraces to be exchanged, and so many pretty speeches to be uttered and listened to? The war seemed to be actually dismissed from the mind as of no account. With so energetic and swift an enemy before them, a day was of substantial value; yet, for the sake of a change in the externals of Government, the Parisians lost a day, and were content to lose it.

While the revolution was progressing, the Senate met, and protested against the course events were taking. One of the members observed that some deputies in the other Chamber had, in violation of their oaths moved the deposition of the Emperor. They had no right to do so. He was vanquished and a prisoner; but he (the senator) would pay a last homage to him, and cry, "Long live the Emperor!" The exclamation was echoed by many other senators; and M. Rouher, the President of the Senate, then said that if any such vote as that referred to were sent up to them it would be firmly repudiated. He proposed an adjournment for two hours; and when the Senate met again, M. Rouher mentioned that a proposal for the Emperor's abdication had been moved by M. Jules Favre, but that, inasmuch as the populace had broken into the Chamber, the vote amounted to nothing. He might have added that the vote was not that of the House at all, for the House was not formally sitting at the time, the President having left the chair. It was simply a resolution come to by a small knot of members in their private capacity. A senator, on hearing M. Rouher's statement, said, "We are here by virtue of the plébiscite, and we protest against force and violence." The Senate then again adjourned, and it met no more.

A private meeting of the Corps Législatif was held in the evening in one of the rooms of the President's house, M. Thiers in the chair. Messieurs Jules Favre and Jules Simon arrived as a deputation from the Provisional Government, and spoke in a conciliatory manner. Several members expressed a wish to protest publicly against the violation of the Chamber; but M. Thiers dissuaded them from such a course; and finally it appeared to be agreed that it was better to acquiesce in that which there was no available power to oppose.

On the following morning, the official journal—now converted into the *Journal of the French Republic*—published the annexed proclamation :—

> "Frenchmen!—The people have disavowed a Chamber which hesitated to save the country when in danger. They have demanded a Republic. The Republic vanquished the invasion of '92. The Republic is proclaimed. The Revolution is accomplished in the name of right and public safety. Citizens! watch over the country confided to you. To-morrow you will be, with the army, avengers of the country."

The subjoined list of the Ministerial offices was also published :—

General Trochu ...	President of the Government, with full military powers for the national defence.
M. Jules Favre......	Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. Gambetta.........	Minister of the Interior.
General Le Flô	Minister of War.
M. Fourichon	Minister of Marine.
M. Crémieux.........	Minister of Justice.
M. Picard	Minister of Finance.
M. Jules Simon......	Minister of Public Instruction and Religion.
M. Magnin............	Minister of Agriculture.
M. Dorian	Minister of Public Works.
M. Grévy	President of the Council of State.
M. Lavertujon	Secretary.

The Ministry thus formed was called "The Government of the National Defence;" and it is a remarkable circumstance that, although rising out of a revolutionary and republican movement, coupled with the most unsparing abuse of the Emperor, the new Administration had for its supreme head the very man who had been called by the Emperor to the post of Governor of Paris and commander of the forces gathered for its defence against the enemy. The Republican Government had thus a link of connection with the Imperial, and the last appointment of Napoleon III. was tacitly approved even by his bitterest enemies. The revolution, however, had been mainly effected by the help of Trochu, and of course he reserved the chief place for himself. Besides, the General was an Orleanist, and between the more moderate members of the Republican party, such as Jules Favre, Crémieux, Picard, and Jules Simon, and the Orleanists, there has always been a certain affinity and friendliness.

Next in importance to Trochu was undoubtedly Jules Favre. He had long been the leader of the Republicans in the Legislative Body, though considered by the more extreme a little too temperate. His profession as a lawyer had probably corrected in some degree the sentimental exaggerations of the politician; yet no one could be more violent than he in opposition to the Empire. Though only in his sixty-second year in September, 1870, he might have been described as a very old and experienced revolutionist. He took an active part in the affair of July, 1830, by which Louis Philippe was placed on the throne; and when the Republic was established in February, 1848, he served successively as Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Interior, and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. After the election of Louis Napoleon to the Presidency in December, 1848, Jules Favre went fiercely into opposition, and, subsequently to the *coup d'état*, refused to take the oath to the constitution, when elected to the General Council of the Loire-et-Rhone. Nothing, however, brought him into so much prominence as his defence of the assassin, Orsini, in the early part of 1858. His speech on that occasion was a splendid piece of invective, but it was nothing more. It did not touch the merits of the case, as, indeed, it could not. But it gained him the unqualified approbation of the disaffected, to whom an attempt to kill the Emperor, even though it resulted in nothing more than the death of several innocent bystanders, was a most charming and exhilarating fact. It recommended M. Favre to the electors of Paris, and he was shortly afterwards returned to the Corps Législatif, where he became the acknowledged leader of the Opposition. He was an effective speaker, and a writer of some ability; but he had never given any evidence of statesmanlike power, and it is to be feared that his intellect was of that emotional order which is better adapted to the crisis of a revolution than to the ordinary work of politics.

M. Crémieux also is a lawyer. He is of Jewish origin, and was born as far back as 1796. In the reign of Louis Philippe he always voted with the Reform party, and was one of the members of the Provisional Government in 1848, when he was made Minister of Justice. In December, 1851, he was among the public men arrested and sent to the prison of Mazas by the Prince President; and, on being released, he retired into private life. To the middle-aged men of 1870 his appearance in the new Provisional Government was like a reminiscence of their youth; to the younger generation he was almost a stranger.

At this time M. Gambetta was in the prime of life, and since his entry into the political world, he had acquired a distinguished position as one of the Republican Deputies in the Corps Législatif. He was a magnificent orator—a man of a passionate, fervid, southern temperament, gifted with a splendid voice, in spite of a consumptive habit, and possessing, together with a boundless capacity of work, that power of infusing his own enthusiasm into others, which, in times of great national disaster, is worth all the rest. When the Provisional Government was proclaimed, it was not on him that public attention was chiefly concentrated, for he was less known than some of his colleagues; but the progress of events soon showed that he was by far the most remarkable man whom the necessities of the day had produced. The other members of the Government were gentlemen of various shades of Republicanism; all were members for Paris; and it was stated by Jules Favre that this exclusion of any other element was because the defence of the capital was the duty immediately devolving on them. This, of course, was a cloak for covering the real motive. The country had to be defended as well as the capital; and there is no reason in the nature of things why a provincial representative should not have contributed as well to the defence of Paris as a representative of the city. The Government was constituted as we have seen because the Parisian members of the Chamber were Republicans, and it was resolved to exclude men of other opinions, excepting the indispensable General Trochu. In addition to the Ministry, a new Committee of National Defence was formed, of which M. Rochefort was a member. He was to have the organisation of the barricades, in case the Germans should overcome the resistance of the fortifications. The post was supposed to be congenial to his spirit; but circumstances made it a sinecure.



M. GAMBETTA.

A decree of the Ministry dissolved the Corps

Législatif, and abolished the Senate and the Presidency of the Council of State. The manufacture and sale of arms were declared absolutely free. M. Etienne Arago was nominated Mayor of Paris, with Messieurs Flocquet and Brisson as his colleagues; and M. Kératry was made Prefect of Police. A complete amnesty was proclaimed for all political crimes and offences. New Prefects were appointed all over the country, as soon as this could be conveniently effected; the former sergents-de-ville were dismissed, without any others being put in their places; and, that Paris might be amused as well as seriously employed, streets were re-named in accordance with the new order of things, the street of the Tenth of December being called that of the Fourth of September, and the Avenue of the Emperor being devoted to the memory of Victor Noir, the young man whom Pierre Buonaparte shot. As early as the 5th the seditious papers which had been suppressed reappeared under their old titles; and Victor Hugo, Ledru Rollin, Louis Blanc, and other illustrious exiles, were soon back in France.

The Republic was speedily accepted by all the French towns, which could in fact do nothing else under the circumstances. On the 8th the new Government was officially recognised by the United States, which were followed by Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, and Spain. England held back, Mr. Gladstone arguing with great force, in answer to popular demands, that until the Republic had been ratified by the votes of the French nation, it could not be demanded that other countries should recognise it as a legitimate and stable government. The working classes of our great towns were much dissatisfied with this decision; but the position they assumed was hardly reasonable. Surely there can be no greater homage to the principle of popular rule than the refusal to recognise a Government until it can be shown that it is not merely the creation of a few irresponsible politicians, but the choice of the people. Unfortunately, the artisan class in all countries, though moved by sympathies which are often larger, higher, and more generous than those of other classes, and possessing political instincts that frequently spring from the very roots of justice and right, are too apt to be led away by the mere word "Republic." It is assumed that a Republic has a sort of divine commission to do what it pleases, and at once to exact the homage of men, irrespective of title proved or deeds performed. Nothing, however, is more certain than that Republics may be disavowed by the vast majority of a nation. There have been aristocratic Republics and democratic Monarchies; and to take it for granted that a Republic is necessarily supported by the whole people, or by a majority, is to advance a great deal too fast, and to run the risk of sanctioning a despotism, instead of promoting a liberal self-rule. In 1870 the Republican form of government was very popular in France amongst literary men, lawyers, and the workmen of the large cities; but it had hitherto been quite the reverse amongst the peasantry and the trading classes—the majority of the people. Whether the opinion of that majority had or had not been altered by recent events—by the errors and shortcomings of the Empire, and its lamentable failure in the battle-field—could only be determined by a Constituent Assembly elected by a suffrage as wide as that which had existed under the displaced Government, and no such election was then possible. In the meanwhile, the circumstances attending the birth of the new Government were of a nature to excite some suspicion and distrust. The revolution arose out of a conspiracy between an Orleanist General, who was acting treacherously to the sovereign by whom he had been appointed, and a knot of Republican deputies who were breaking the oath they had undertaken to keep. It was carried into operation by a piece of lawless violence committed on a Legislative Chamber, than which no Parliamentary body in the history of the world could show a better claim to be considered the representative of the people in the widest acceptation of that term. The secret history of the Revolution has yet to be divulged; but it is already sufficiently clear that it could never have been successful unless General Trochu had summoned the National Guards to the Assembly, and given them an opportunity of overruling the deliberations of its members by a display of armed force acting in concert with the mob. That there was some previous agreement between the Governor of Paris and the Republican deputies is obvious; and it is apparent that the whole movement, however much it may have been applauded, when accomplished, by those who were glad of any change under circumstances of national disgrace and peril, was rather the result of a private plot than the expression of a general resolve. If Count Palikao had had more force at his disposal, he would probably have been able to put down the demonstration with no great trouble or effusion of blood. But the greater part of the army was away, and in the hands of the Germans; the head of the State was absent; and a faction triumphed, because the nation was taken suddenly and at a disadvantage.

It would be difficult to say what was the justification of the change that had been so violently effected. Revolutions are always regrettable, but they are sometimes necessary. When, however, the law-making power and the determining force in political affairs are in the hands of a Chamber elected by a broad and national suffrage, the correction of abuses is so certain, if slow, and the slowness is so much safer than the perilous speed of revolutionary decrees, that a resort to social disturbance is in such cases a criminal mistake. The tendency to spasmodic action has been the ruin of French progress. A nation which destroys its own constitution once in every twenty years, and begins again from the very foundations, stands self-condemned in the political arena of the world. But we ought rather to charge the fault on Paris than on France.

For the moment, however, all was jubilation at the capital. The errors of the past were heaped on the ruler who had been swept away, and the future appeared in roseate colours to minds excited by the changeful events of the time. So eager were some to revile the Emperor in every possible mode that they even depreciated their own soldiers, and exalted those of the enemy. An old Republican journalist said to the correspondent of an English paper, while sobbing with sorrow at the French reverses, "This proves that Prætorian soldiers are no match for free men." That the Imperial troops were no more a Prætorian soldiery than any other army of professional and paid fighters, and that the Germans are not "free men" in the sense generally understood by Liberal politicians, must be plain to all who consider the facts, and would perhaps have been recognised even by the Republican journalist himself, had he been less hysterical. But anything was allowable as long as the Emperor could be hit hard. Many English politicians were prejudiced enough to echo this tone, and both here and abroad all the evil of the war was imputed to him. On this subject some excellent remarks were made in the *Times*, which said :—

"If we inquire how it is that the Emperor Napoleon has suddenly become so unpopular—if we ask the evidence and require the proofs—nay, if we demand outright what is the fresh crime which has changed the Parisians into his bitter enemies—we are at a loss to assign any adequate reason for this rapid revulsion of feeling. If we are told 'he made war on Prussia'—why, that was as much the work of the whole French Empire, and of Paris in particular, as of Napoleon III. Who was it that yelled 'To Berlin!' not two months ago? Who but these very Parisians, who are now so eager to lay the whole blame of the war on the Emperor, as their scapegoat? 'Ah, but then it was not that he went to war; it was that he made war unsuccessfully, and deceived us.' Here again the blame cannot fall on the Emperor alone. He, at least, was deceived as much as any one else—deceived both as to the efficiency of his arms, the number of his troops, and the capacity of his generals ; deceived also, we may add, in the temper and resolution of his people, who certainly have not responded to his appeal to arms in a way at all worthy of men descended from the veterans of the Great Napoleon. The French nation clamoured for war against Prussia, and the Emperor granted their wish, thinking, perhaps, that by so doing he might restore his waning popularity. Both France and her ruler were deceived as to the strength, discipline, valour, and strategy of the German forces. On each of these points they have been signally worsted in the war ; but, as both Emperor and people are equally responsible for having provoked the contest, so they must share the blame between them. The nation has therefore no right to turn round on Napoleon, and say that it was deceived ; for, as we have shown, it has deluded him as much as he has deceived it."

And the Prussian correspondent of the same journal, referring to a circular of M. Jules Favre, to be hereafter noticed, observes :—"It is really a little too bad that M. Favre should saddle the Emperor Napoleon alone with the guilt of the war, when in another passage of the same document he admits the war to have been popular with his countrymen. It is equally extraordinary to find him stand up for the integrity of his country's soil, when, for very many years past, history has scarcely known a French politician who did not aspire to a slice of Germany." The truth is, that for generations the French and German peoples had coveted each other's possessions with an equal amount of greed and guilt, and that now the rulers and politicians of both countries had precipitated the rival races into war. Count Bismarck had carefully schemed to give France what he knew would be considered a provocation to hostilities ; and the Emperor Napoleon, interpreting the long-cherished wishes of at any rate a large proportion of the people, foolishly and culpably fell into the snare, and was destroyed. But to attribute the whole blame to him is to pervert the facts of history.

We must now turn our attention to the fate of the Empress. It is said that in the early hours of Sunday M. de Lesseps, the celebrated projector of the Suez Canal, waited on her Majesty at the Tuileries, and tried to persuade her to sign a general abdication. The Council of Ministers, however, represented that such an act on her part would exceed her powers, and be only a nullity, as, indeed, was obviously the case. She afterwards hurriedly left the Tuileries, on its becoming evident that the revolution had already commenced ; and on her table was found a despatch from M. Piétri, the Imperial Prefect of Police, announcing that the situation was grave, that the National Guards were hostile, and that the troops would not march. According to one account, it was in a small *coupé*, undistinguished by any regal adornments, and accompanied only by a few officers of her suite, that the Empress escaped from Paris. Another and more particular account, however, says that she left the Tuileries on foot by the gate next the Seine, and that, owing to the pressure of the crowd, she was soon separated from the gentlemen who escorted her. While thus alone, she was recognised by a little boy, who cried out, "There is the Empress!" on which, some of the mob exclaimed, "To the guillotine! to the guillotine!" With great presence of mind, she dived into the thick of the crowd, and was lost to the sight of those who had threatened her. After a time, she got to the house of a friend, by whom she was advised not to venture on the railway, for fear of being recognised. At length she secured a seat in a market cart which was returning into Normandy; and in this she spent the best part of three days and two nights. On arriving at the Channel, in the neighbourhood of Trouville, she was received on board the yacht of Sir John M. Burgoyne, and conveyed to England. How far this account is authentic cannot be precisely stated; but it does not exactly accord with that given in the *Times* "from an authentic source," by which it appears that the Empress drove to the coast "in a plain carriage," without luggage. The same narrative says that, previous to her Majesty's departure from the Tuileries, the Imperial apartments and the private effects of the Empress were plundered by the servants of the household! The appearance of Sir John Burgoyne's yacht off the coast must have seemed the most welcome of sights to the worn and weary fugitive.



M. JULES FAVRE.

"Lady Burgoyne" (continues the *Times* narrative) "had arrived on board that evening from Switzerland; but the yacht, with Sir John on board, had been lying some ten days in the harbour waiting Lady Burgoyne's arrival, which had been much delayed by the present state of things on the Continent. The first intimation Sir



ATTACK ON FRENCH PROVISION CONVOY.

John received that other persons wished to cross to England in the *Gazelle* with Lady Burgoyne was a few hours before the time appointed for the *Gazelle* to weigh her anchor, when the Empress presented herself, announced her rank and difficult position, and claimed his protection as an English gentleman. There had been no suspicion by Sir John Burgoyne of the Empress's presence, or intended presence, in the port. Under such unexpected conditions he acted as an Englishman would act. Lady Burgoyne was introduced to the Empress, who became her guest for the voyage across the Channel. It was not, however, before her time, which had already been fixed—viz., at seven o'clock on the succeeding morning, the 7th inst.—that the *Gazelle* gave signs of leaving harbour for England, and then, with a large British ensign flying from her peak, she sailed leisurely out of the harbour in charge of a French pilot. At 7.30 A.M. the pilot was discharged, and the *Gazelle* stood across Channel for England. For thirty miles from the French land, the little cutter had a fair wind; but then the wind suddenly chopped round to the N.W., and the remainder of the voyage was made under a three-reefed mainsail, foresail, and storm-jib in the teeth of a fresh gale. The *Gazelle's* seamen knew nothing of the Empress of the French being aboard, but they may probably have made shrewd guesses among themselves relative to her rank. However that may have been, no man left the deck during the night's work across, and every one seemed anxious to shorten the distance between the two lands as much as possible. The *Gazelle* completed her voyage across Channel by dropping anchor in Ryde Roads at 3.35 A.M. on Thursday the 8th."

At that early hour of the morning, the only thing to do was to seek the nearest hotel. Accordingly, at about four o'clock, the landlord of the York Hotel was aroused by a violent knocking at the front door. On going down, he found a gentleman and two ladies standing there. The dress of one of these ladies was very travel-stained and torn, and she herself looked tired and dejected. The party engaged the best suite of rooms, and, after a few hours' rest, re-embarked on board the yacht. It was not till after their departure that the hotel-keeper learnt that one of his guests had been the French Empress. On leaving the hotel, the Empress crossed by steamer to Portsmouth, and proceeded to Hastings, where she knew by the papers she would find the Prince Imperial, who had been sent to Belgium shortly before the battle of Sedan, and, crossing from Ostend, had landed at Dover on the 6th.

It is a noteworthy circumstance that the Empress, feeling unwell the day after her arrival, consulted a Hastings physician, Dr. Blakiston, who had attended Louis Philippe under exactly similar circumstances on his landing at Newhaven in March, 1848.

CHAPTER X.

Jules Favre's Circular to the Representatives of France in Foreign Countries—Remarks on that Document—Proclamation to the Army—Address of the International Working Men's Association to the Socialist Democracy of Germany—Intentions of the King of Prussia with respect to France—M. Louis Blanc and M. Victor Hugo on the Revolution—Measures of the Provisional Government—The Orleanists—Republican Fervour at Lyons, Toulouse, and Marseilles—Departure of Emigrants—Condition of Paris—Hopes of Peace Disappointed—The Prussians establishing themselves in Alsace and Lorraine—Their System of Requisitions—Severity of the Treatment experienced by the Conquered Provinces—Confessions of an Uhlan—Fatiguing Duties of the German Scouts and Advanced Guards—Creation of a Corps of French Scouts—The Francs-tireurs and the Landsturm—Bismarck's Terms of Peace (Aug. 28th and Sept. 12th).

As soon as he got settled in his office, M. Jules Favre, on the 6th of September, addressed a circular to the various representatives of France in foreign countries. It was necessary to explain the origin of the new Government, its objects and leading principles, the relation in which it stood towards the war, and the general grounds on which it would be disposed to make peace. The task was discharged much as any French Minister placed under similar circumstances would have discharged it. To the Foreign Minister of England, or of any other State in which affairs progress in a regular manner, it would be very embarrassing to write a despatch informing the diplomatic agents of the country that the Government by which they were appointed was a disgrace to humanity, that a new order of things had been established, and that that new order they must obey. But revolutions are so frequent in France that the difficulty is probably not felt. Certain set phrases are prepared, as for other eventualities; and M. Jules Favre manipulated his words with, perhaps, as much skill as the nature of the case permitted. The events which had just taken place in Paris, he said, explained themselves by "the inexorable logic of facts"—an expression, by the way, originating with the fallen monarch himself. The population of Paris had obeyed a necessity superior to that of their own safety. They "did not wish to perish with the criminal Government which was leading France to her ruin." By an odd distinction, which it is not very easy to comprehend, M. Favre affirmed that the French people had not "pronounced" the deposition of Napoleon III. and his dynasty, but had "registered it in the name of Right, Justice, and Public Safety." This is a very vague kind of registration. It would certainly not be sufficient to secure a patent in any new invention; but it suffices, in France, to give validity to a Government. No one, continued the Republican Foreign Minister, raised his voice to uphold the tottering Empire. It collapsed under the weight of its faults, without a drop of blood being shed, and without one individual being deprived of his personal liberty. Order had not been disturbed for a moment; and the people, "rescued from the shame and danger of a Government which had proved itself a traitor to all its duties," sought for strength in respect for right. The Government had only one thought—the expulsion of the foreigner from French territory. But this obligation, though they resolutely accepted it, they had not imposed upon France. The country would not have been in its existing state, observed M. Favre, if the voices of the men composing the new Ministry had been listened to. They had energetically defended, "even at the cost of their popularity," the policy of peace. They now maintained the same opinion with increasing conviction. They grieved over the human massacres which were being committed, and which "a little good sense and a great deal of liberty" would have prevented; but at the same time they bore glowing testimony to the valour of their heroic army, "sacrificed by the incapacity of the supreme commander, but showing itself greater in its defeats than in the most brilliant victory," and thus redeeming the honour of France from the stain cast upon her by the late Government. The Imperial power, it is added, wished to divide the army from the nation. Misfortune and duty, however, had joined them in a solemn embrace, sealed by patriotism and liberty; and this alliance would render France invincible. M. Favre and his colleagues had desired that Germany should be left mistress of her destinies; and for their own country they had claimed "an arm for every citizen, a civil organisation, and the election of leaders." In that case they would have been invincible on their own soil; but the Government of the Emperor opposed such a policy. Having set forth these principles, the Foreign Minister continued:—

"On his side, the King of Prussia declared that he made war, not against France, but against the Imperial dynasty. The dynasty has fallen to the ground. France raises herself free. Does the King of Prussia wish to continue an impious struggle, which will be at least as fatal to him as to us? Does he wish to give to the world of the nineteenth century the cruel spectacle of two nations destroying one another, and, in forgetfulness of humanity, reason, and science, heaping corpse upon corpse and ruin upon ruin? He is free to assume this responsibility in the face of the world and of history. If it is a challenge, we accept it. *We will not cede either an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses.* A shameful peace would mean a war of extermination at an early date. We will only treat for a durable peace. In this, our interest is that of the whole of Europe, and we have reason to hope that, freed from all dynastic considerations, the question will thus present itself before the Cabinets of Europe. But, even should we be alone, we shall not yield. We have a resolute army, well-provisioned forts, and well-established *enceinte*, and, above all, the breasts of 300,000 combatants determined to hold out to the last. When they piously lay crowns at the feet of the statue of Strasburg, they do not obey merely an enthusiastic sentiment of admiration; they adopt their heroic *mot d'ordre;* they swear to be worthy of their brethren of Alsace, and to die as they have done. After the forts we have the ramparts; after the ramparts we have the barricades. Paris can hold out for three months, and conquer. If she succumbs, France will start up at her appeal, and avenge her. France would continue the struggle, and the aggressor would perish.

"Such is what Europe must know. We have not accepted power with any other object; we will not keep it a moment if we should not find the population of Paris and the whole of France decided to share our resolutions. I sum up these resolves briefly, in the presence of God who hears me, in the face of posterity which shall judge us. We wish only for peace; but, if this disastrous war, which we have condemned, is continued against us, we shall do our duty to the last; and I have the firm confidence that our cause, which is that of right and justice, will triumph in the end."

The passages here quoted, which form the latter part of the circular, are certainly the best in the whole document. They are eloquent, dignified, firm, and self-possessed; words such as all Frenchmen could accept; pathetic without any touch of hysterical agitation, and brave without the least hint of vaunting. They admirably summarise the facts and principles of the situation, and it is greatly to be regretted that the earlier part of the circular was not equally good. With France in the throes of national dissolution, it was lamentable to find one of the leading members of the new Government casting bitter reproaches on the Government that had disappeared, and running the risk of dividing the great mass of Frenchmen at a time when it was most essential they should be united. It is interesting to observe, however, that M. Jules Favre indirectly confirms the fact, often denied by his party, that the war was favoured by the people at the commencement; for he says that the opposition which he and his colleagues had offered to the course followed by the Imperial Government was undertaken "at the cost of their popularity." Where, then, is the justice of imputing the whole blame to the Emperor and his advisers?

A proclamation of the Provisional Government to the army was also issued on the 6th. It was thus expressed:—

"When a general has compromised his command, it is taken away from him. When a Government has imperilled by its faults the safety of the country, it is deposed. This is what France has just done. In abolishing the dynasty which was responsible for our misfortunes, France accomplished an act of justice, and at the same time performed an act of necessity for her own preservation. The nation has only to depend upon herself, and only to reckon upon two things—the Revolution, which is invincible; and your heroism, which has no equal, and which, amid undeserved reverses, excites the astonishment of the world. We are not the Government of a party, but a Government of National Defence; and have but one object and one will—the safety of the country by means of the army and the nation grouped around the glorious ensign which made Europe draw back eighty years ago. To-day, as then, the name of the Republic signifies the hearty union of army and people in the defence of the country."

M. Gambetta, Minister of the Interior, addressed the following circular to the provisional administrators and prefects of departments:—

"In accepting power at a time of such danger to the country we have accepted great perils and great duties. The people of Paris who on the 4th of September found themselves again in existence, after so long an interval, have so understood the emergency, and their acclamations plainly mean that they expect from us the preservation of the country. Our new Republic is not a Government which permits of political dissensions and empty quarrels. It is, as we have said, a Government of National defence, a Republic of war to the knife against the invader. Support us, then, citizens, animated like ourselves, by the paramount desire of saving the country, and prepared to shrink from no sacrifice. Into the midst of these improvised workers bring the coolness and vigour which should belong to the representatives of a power resolved on everything in order to vanquish the enemy. Sustain every one, by your unlimited activity in all the questions which concern the armament and equipment of the citizens and their military instruction. All prohibitory laws, all the restrictions so unfortunately placed on the manufacture and sale of arms have disappeared. Let every Frenchman receive or seize a gun, and place himself at the disposal of the authorities. The country is in danger! Day by day information will be given you respecting the details of your duties. But do much spontaneously, and especially endeavour to gain the co-operation of all minds, so that by a gigantic and unanimous effort France may owe its deliverance to the patriotism of all its children."

It was not merely the Government which published its manifestoes. A body calling itself the International Working Men's Association put forward an address to the Socialist Democracy of Germany, which said:—

"Thy Government has declared that it will wage war against the Emperor, not against us. Republican France invites thee, in the name of justice, to withdraw thy armies. If not, we must fight to the last man, and shed in torrents thy blood and ours. We tell thee again, what we declared to the Coalition of Europe in 1793, that the French people concludes no peace whatever with an enemy occupying its territory. The French people, the friend and ally of all free peoples, does not interfere with the government of other nations. As soon as the Rhine has been recrossed, we shall stretch out our hands, and forget the mutual crimes which despots made us commit. Let us proclaim the liberty, equality, and fraternity of the peoples, and let us form the United States of Europe. Long live the Universal Republic!"

In this document, and in the circular of M. Jules Favre, it is taken for granted that the King of Prussia could not consistently prosecute against the Republic the war which had been begun by the Emperor, as he (the King) had made a distinction between the nation and the dynasty in the proclamation he had issued shortly after the battles of Weissenburg, Wörth, and Forbach. The King had said that the German nation desired to live in peace with the French nation, and that the attack had been made by "the Emperor Napoleon;" to which he added, "I am waging war against soldiers, not against French citizens." On the German side it might no doubt be argued that, as long as French soldiers remained in arms against the Germans, it mattered nothing whether they were Imperialist or Republican; and certainly the words of the King do not amount to a statement that Prussia was acting wholly and solely against the dynasty of Napoleon. But their general tenour assuredly leads to the assumption that, the dynasty being removed, the King would not be exacting with the people, and would be disposed to an honourable arrangement, such as would exclude all suspicion that he was actuated by desire of territorial aggrandisement, or the wish to humiliate and crush a neighbouring country. The subsequent course of events showed that the proclamation of August 11th (the whole of which will be found at page 41) was a hollow pretence, designed to cover projects which it would have been inconvenient at that time to reveal. Nothing tended more to alter the current of opinion in this country with regard to the moral bearings of the controversy than the evident determination of the Germans, shortly after Sedan, to make the war a war of conquest.

This change was noted at a very early date by M. Louis Blanc. Writing in the Paris *Temps*, on the 7th of September, he said:—"I have just arrived from England, and I bring thence an impression which it is of extreme importance should be made known. It is unfortunately but too true that England has up to this time, with but few exceptions, favoured Prussia against us. But within the last few days, even before the Republic had been proclaimed, a change of opinion among Englishmen, and in our favour, became obvious, of which I personally had numerous testimonies in the shape of replies to the accusation of unjust partiality which I had made against the people of Great Britain." Such expressions of sympathy with France were not confined to the sending of contributions in aid of the sick and wounded, but were in some instances based on political considerations, having reference to the dangerous pretensions of successful Prussia. "These persons," continued M. Blanc, "remember with what cynicism the Prussian Government devoured its Danish prey before the face of shocked and indignant England. They remember that the Prussian Chambers justified the annexation of Hanover by a shameless declaration of the right of conquest, not hesitating to vote the adoption of a report in which it was plainly stated that 'the right of conquest, by virtue of the modern international law, constitutes a just title to the acquisition of foreign territory, and that there is no necessity to consult the people upon the question of their incorporation, because that would be substituting semblance for reality.' This brutal theory of brutal force is now recalled to many worthy minds in England; and it is not forgotten under what circumstances, nor with what ostentatious eagerness, the Prussian Chambers professed it. They now again find it in their hunger for the dismemberment of France, which is betrayed by the organs of M. Bismarck; and they ask themselves whether an immense German Empire, subject to men animated by such sentiments, would not be a fearful menace for Europe, including England." M. Blanc proceeded to urge that this change of feeling amongst the English people should be encouraged by the repression in Frenchmen of all sentiments of unfriendliness towards us. One of the causes of the tendency of English opinion to side with Prussia was the aggressive character given to the war by the Emperor. The party that was most strongly opposed to the French was, in fact, the Liberal party. The Republican Government should therefore tell Europe and the whole world that France herself had not desired the war; "that an aggressive war, with no object but that of acquiring territory, would have been impossible if France had been free;" and that, now she had obtained her freedom, she would unreservedly repudiate the principle of the right of conquest, which was opposed to all her revolutionary traditions. France was now on the defensive. "We have taken up arms," concluded M. Blanc, alluding to the projected annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, "to prevent men who are flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bone, from being by force made foreigners. We have our country to save. Europe will not witness with an unmoved heart children dying in defence of their mother."

This appeal would have been the more effective had it been self-consistent. But the conclusion is very much at issue with the commencement. If England was unjustly partial towards Prussia at the beginning of the war, it is clear that, in M. Blanc's opinion, the cause of Prussia was not good. Indeed, he brings a specific charge further on. Prussia, he says, is a Power which has made, in the face of the world, the shameless declaration that mere force constitutes the right to annex foreign territory, without any reference to the wishes of the inhabitants; and which, moreover, has acted in accordance with that declaration more than once. How, then, could it have been so very wicked a thing to challenge this aggressive Power, and dispute its pretensions? If it was unfair on the part of England, even before Sedan, to throw all its sympathies on the side of Germany, does it not necessarily follow from M. Blanc's own premiss that there was some measure of justice on the side of Imperial France? He might, indeed, have argued that the moment was inopportune and the pretext insufficient; but to condemn the war altogether, and yet to blame England for refusing her sympathies, was an exhibition of singular confusion of mind. As regards the non-consulting of populations, it would not have compromised M. Blanc's character for honesty, while it would have advanced his reputation for candour, had he acknowledged that the first to put in practice the principle of effecting no annexation without the clearly-expressed wish of the people, by means of the most unrestricted suffrage, was Napoleon III. himself, whom he here so vehemently denounces.



GERMAN OUTPOST STATION IN CHAMPAGNE.

Periods of revolution are the seasons of manifestoes; and to those already mentioned must be added one of M. Victor Hugo. That gentleman, on arriving in Paris, said, in response to a popular ovation, that he had promised to return when the Republic returned, and that he had kept his word. He had come to do his duty in the hour of danger—to save Paris. "To save Paris," he added, with that insanity of exaggeration which has always characterised his writings, "was more than to save France: it was to save the world—the centre of humanity—the capital of civilisation." Such a city was not to be taken by "a savage invasion." France must inevitably triumph if they were all united: Fraternity would save Liberty. It is by showy and reverberating stuff such as this that M. Hugo deceives his countrymen, and encourages their worst weaknesses. Paris is a city of ancient and splendid renown, in whose prosperity the whole world is interested; but it is no more the centre of humanity and the capital of civilisation than London or New York. Such a phrase might have had some degree of warrant if employed by an


TROCHU
GAMBETTA
REPUBLIQUE
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M. GAMBETTA PROCLAIMING THE REPUBLIC.

ancient Roman in speaking of the great seat of empire on the Seven Hills; but as applied to Paris it is absurd. To indulge in delusions has always been a prominent fault of the French character; and no one has fostered delusions to a more mischievous extent than Victor Hugo.

Garibaldi also hailed the Republic in a letter to his friends, in which he exhorted them to support in all possible ways the system that had been established in France, though, he added, their mission did not consist in combating their German brethren, who, as by the arm of Providence, had overthrown in the dust the tyranny which had weighed upon the world. It is evident that Garibaldi at this period shared the belief of many Frenchmen that Prussia would at once make peace with the Republic. The Archbishop of Paris issued an exhortation to general prayer; and the celebrated Father Hyacinthe gave Jules Favre and the Republican party his cordial support.

The composition of circulars, letters, speeches, and exhortations, however, was not the only work of the day. The Ministry proceeded at once to effect, by the short and peremptory process of decrees, such reforms and temporary arrangements as it considered necessary. The cantonal commissaries of police were suppressed; the restrictions on printing and bookselling were abolished; M. Vandal, the Director-General of the postal administration, was sent to Tours, to organise the postal service for the whole of France during the investment of Paris; and the courts of criminal justice and of Cassation were transferred to the same city. General Trochu, on the 5th of September, established his head-quarters at the Tuileries; and in a few days a Delegate Government was despatched to Tours, in order that, when Paris should be isolated by the besieging Prussians, the general affairs of the country should be transacted at a distance, and the military operations of the provinces be provided with a centre of authority. The original members of this Delegate Government were Crémieux, Glas-Bizoin, and Admiral Fourichon. These were afterwards joined by M. Gambetta, who became their leading spirit. A Constituent Assembly of 750 delegates was convoked for the 16th of October; but the progress of the war rendered this decree a nullity. The Government proclamation on the subject (dated September 8th) said:—"In proclaiming four days ago the Government of the National Defence, we ourselves defined our mission. Power was lying in the dust. What had commenced by a crime had finished by a desertion. We simply grasped the helm which had escaped from powerless hands. But Europe has need to be enlightened. It is necessary that she should know by irrefragable testimonies that the entire country is with us. It is necessary that the invader should meet on his route not only the obstacle of an immense city resolved to perish rather than yield, but an entire people erect, organised, represented—an Assembly, in short, which can carry into all places and in spite of all disasters the living soul of the country." The more extreme Republicans, however, did not wish for an Assembly, as they feared it might be in favour of peace, or disposed to the re-establishment of some form of monarchy. It is stated that, on the creation of the new Government, General Trochu insisted that its precise character should remain undetermined; and M. Rochefort is credited with the advice that the Government should simply be called "the Government of the National Defence." Thus, the Republic, however much talked about by several speakers, can scarcely be said to have had an official existence; and the suspicion of an Orleanist intrigue, to which certain of the Republican party lent themselves, whether wittingly or unwittingly, receives some colour of probability. Immediately after the Revolution, three of the Orleans Princes—the Duc d'Aumale, the Duc de Chartres, and the Prince de Joinville—went over to Paris. Two of their friends made known their arrival to the Government, and gave expression to their desire to undertake military posts, however obscure or perilous. The Government, however, in very courteous and sympathetic terms, appealed to them, in the name of patriotism, to depart, and they started at once for Calais.* This by no means invalidates whatever ground there may be for suspecting that the family of Louis Philippe were not without some understanding with General Trochu, and perhaps with one or two other members of the Provisional Government. The presence of the Princes in France at that time would simply have imperilled the new order of things by creating distrust among the Republicans. In the large provincial towns the Republicans were strong; and at Lyons, on the 4th, a committee seized upon the executive power even before the Republic was proclaimed at Paris. The heads of the movement hoisted the red flag on the Hôtel de Ville, and demanded that the funds of the savings banks should be handed over to them. This was refused, and the movement collapsed after the arrival of the news from Paris, though it was feared for a while that there might be some conflict of authority. "It is reported," said a correspondent of the *Français*, who seems, however, to have written with some animus, "that all the members of the Internationale are flocking to Lyons as a common centre for possible events, and that the municipality is supplying them with arms. The National Guard, which should be a guarantee of order and a defence of the country, has become in the hands of the terrorist committee but a police employed in making the most odious researches and offering the most vexatious annoyances. Magistrates, priests, and well-known citizens, are arrested upon the most frivolous pretexts. A guard has been permanently established at the Jesuits' establishment, where the whole house has been ransacked to discover arms and valuables. The sacred vessels in the sacristy have been carried away, and the Jesuit fathers were taken off to prison, with bayonets on either side, amid the howlings of the lowest of the populace. Even women were not exempt from these persecutions, for the National Guard instituted a rigid search at the establishment of the sisters of Sainte Claire. Persons who wish to leave the city cannot do so without submitting to the most extraordinary formalities. Passports are insisted on, but are only to be obtained with great difficulty. At the railway stations all the luggage, even to the smallest packages, and even to travellers' pockets, are strictly searched. All valuable articles—silver, plate, &c.—are seized under the pretext that no one ought to expose himself to the risk of being called upon to pay contributions to the Prussians. Even family papers, letters, and manuscripts are taken possession of by the National Guard." An abbé, writing to the *Univers*, complained that he and a brother were twice arrested on some frivolous pretence, carried before a revolutionary committee, and seriously threatened. At Toulouse a committee assumed to be invested with administrative powers; and at Marseilles, though no independent Government was formed, the people exhibited the utmost Republican fervour, in accordance with the traditions of the town. On hearing of the defeat at Sedan, they rushed to the Bourse, sawed off the head of the Emperor's statue, rolled it about the streets, and threw the Imperial eagles into the port. Being unable to decapitate another statue of the Emperor, they covered it over with an immense sheet, and broke to pieces, or veiled, various Imperial symbols. All this was truly infantine; but it was not worse than the conduct of the Provisional Government in Paris, which actually, for a while, withdrew all postage-stamps from circulation, because they bore the Emperor's head, and there was no time to produce others! Of course it was found necessary to return to the old ones, which were still in use when Paris succumbed to the Germans.

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* On the 4th of July, M. Jules Favre, and a few others with whom he generally acted, voted in the Corps Législatif in favour of the petition of the Orleans family for the removal of the prohibition to their return to France. The Princes made a similar request on the 9th of August. Both petitions were refused.

On the 6th of September General Trochu issued a proclamation in which he said:—"The enemy is marching on Paris. The defence of the capital is assured. Instructions have been given to organise the defence in the neighbouring departments, and the Government reckons upon the courage and patriotism of all." Some, however, were so deficient in these qualities, that they fled from the threatened city, and came over to England, or went to Belgium. For some days the railway stations in Paris were almost blocked up with the numbers of fugitive families and their luggage. An equally strange scene of another kind was to be observed in the Bois de Boulogne, of which the Paris correspondent of the *Guardian*, a day or two before the Revolution, wrote:—

> "That the Bois de Boulogne! That the rendezvous of monde and demi-monde; of company good, bad, and indifferent, from every corner of Europe and the world! Why, it's full of sheep! As far as ever the eye can reach, over every open space, down the long, long avenue all the way to Longchamps itself, nothing but sheep, sheep, sheep! The Southdowns themselves could not exhibit such a sea of wool. I never saw such a sight. It was not so much seeing the sheep—though really their multitude might have made Don Quixote himself hesitate before he charged them —as seeing them *there!* But there they were, sure enough; literally nothing else to be seen, amidst clouds of pestiferous dust rising high in the air, in spite of the efforts of a number of men with hoses, drenching them plentifully in all directions. Two or three isolated oxen, standing like projecting rocks amidst an ocean of foam—or at least of wool—were wedged in and unable to move. The hoses played upon them too now and then, just to keep them cool, and quiet them. How was this mighty mass of animal life to be nourished and kept alive before it could be eaten? was the first thought that occurred to one. And the next, perhaps, was, what could be done with it supposing the Prussian forces were actually to appear while it remained in its present position? How soon and surely they were expected to arrive seemed to be evidenced by the sad havoc now only too certainly going on in the beautiful pleasure-ground of Paris. A broad belt of trees was lying felled all along the face of the fortifications as far as I could see, and a group of wood-cutters, with the destroying axe in hand, had just gathered round a fine horse-chestnut, not far from the gates, whose pleasant shade has over and over again greeted one after a hot walk from Paris. It is less painful to see trees fall than men, certainly; but the sylvan devastation around

told only too clearly of the further human massacre which is anticipated.

"Paris is a sorrowful place under such aspects. More so, perhaps, to us habitual residents than to passing visitors, because we feel very keenly the painful transformation of favourite spots into something which we can hardly recognise. Then again, Paris is rapidly becoming, I suspect, nearly uninhabitable to all its usual foreign guests. The people are soured and irritated by defeat, and, above all, disgrace, as they think it; and it has become scarcely safe to be seen to smile in the streets. The slightest indiscretion might subject you to the lynch law of the mob, from which no power of the authorities can make you safe."

The hope indulged in by Paris for a few hours, that the Prussians would at once fraternise with the French Republic, or recoil awe-struck before the majesty of the Provisional Government, like the Gauls before the Senate of Rome, soon proved to be fallacious, as every one possessed of his cool reason must have known beforehand. Count Bismarck refused to fraternise (not being very well-disposed towards republics), and appeared but slightly impressed with the sublimity of the gentlemen who proclaimed themselves at the Hôtel de Ville. Nay, it very shortly became evident that to express sympathy with the French Republic was a high crime in Germany. A Socialist club in Brunswick dared to commit this offence, and the members were at once arrested. A certain Professor Jacoby gave utterance to the same sentiment at Königsberg, and was immediately cast into gaol. How these events were viewed by the Republican French journalist who, as previously set forth, found a balm for his wounded national pride in the fact that the soldiers of his own country were merely a "Prætorian" horde, while the Germans were free men, is not recorded; but it is to be hoped that he was led to modify his previous decision. So little were the Germans inclined to give up the provinces they had won, and to throw themselves into the arms of the Parisian Revolutionists, that they every day tightened their hold on the conquered territories. The civil as well as the military government of Alsace and Lorraine was undertaken by Prussia. The Alsatian railways were reorganised with a staff of German officials, and stamps were printed at Berlin for use in the district—stamps which differed from those employed in Germany only by the value being marked in French money. The occupied towns were garrisoned by the Landwehr. A vigorous system of requisitions was set on foot. Every village entered by the invading troops was bound to furnish a certain quantity of provisions for the use of the soldiers. This was paid for in cheques, to be honoured at the end of the war by the vanquished. Thus, should Prussia win, France would have to pay; and *vice versâ*. The power of making requisitions was confined to the officers; everything taken by the men was to be paid for at once in hard cash. Such, at least, was the rule; but these regulations seldom stand the rough test of war. Large bodies of armed men, brought into contact with a cowed and subjected people, are very prone to help themselves to what they want, and to leave the sufferers to any remedy they can get, which is generally none at all. The severity with which the people of the conquered countries were treated by the German scouts and parties of flying cavalry, is vividly shown in the confessions of an Uhlan, published in the *Cologne Gazette* of the 29th of August. The party to which the Uhlan belonged arrived on a certain day at St. Vincent, on the road to Toul. The Mayor of the place, an old man almost out of his wits with fear, was ordered to present himself, and "was menaced with immediate punishment of death" if he did not give information as to whether there were any arms, munitions of war, recruits, or hidden gendarmes in the town. A proclamation in French was also issued, in which every householder who did not deliver up his arms and weapons, and in whose house any soldiers or Gardes Mobiles should be discovered, "would be immediately shot, and his house set fire to." A few guns, swords, and hunting-knives were brought to the *mairie*, and broken to pieces by the Uhlans, as being of no use to them. "Four gendarmes who wished to hide themselves," continues the writer, "were informed against by the anxious inhabitants, and taken prisoners. At the same time, ten to twelve conscripts, who had volunteered to join the French army, and who were on the eve of starting for Paris, reported themselves. As these lads seemed pleased that they would not be required to serve in the army, and as we could not well have taken them with us, they received notice that they should not join the army under pain of death, but remain at home, and report themselves to the commanding officer of each successive advancing Prussian division. The parents were also informed that if their sons should absent themselves their houses would be burned down to the ground. Whilst all this was going on, our troopers were refreshing their inner man with wine and a warm dinner, served them on the Place de la Mairie, which had been ordered to be got ready by the inhabitants, who were further required to furnish a certain quantity of bread, wine, sausages, and cold meat, for our men to put in their *baresses*." At night the party bivouacked about a mile outside St. Vincent. Towards morning, two of the captured gendarmes attempted to escape, and had mastered the sentry placed to watch over them, when the other Uhlans, awakened from their sleep by the noise of the struggle, rushed to the assistance of their comrade, and again secured both prisoners. They were shot at break of day, and it is added that they died with courage and composure.

These parties of scouts and advanced guards had to endure great fatigue. Some of the soldiers of the Line did not take off their shoes for eight or ten days after crossing the French frontier, and were obliged to sleep under the open air in rain and mud. "The horsemen," said a correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, "hardly ever quit their saddles, and the poor beasts, harnessed for whole days together, throw themselves on the ground immediately on coming to a halt. They are as thin as cats, and many of them quite exhausted; nevertheless, the mass still holds on, particularly the horses of Eastern Prussia, which have Arab blood in their veins, and support the fatigue of the campaign better than any other. Those of Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Pomerania, are less good. We have already tried to replace our animals unfit for use by others taken from the French, especially when we can get those of Algerian origin; but they are in a worse state than our own. The mass of the French cavalry is much reduced, and the horses past service." Somewhat late in the day, the French endeavoured to emulate the achievements of these useful bodies of troops. A free corps of scouts was formed at Rheims about the period of Sedan. The men established their quarters under the trees of the promenade, and, like the Germans, lay contentedly on the earth. Their uniform was dark, and resembled that of the Foot Chasseurs; and their special duty was to reconnoitre for the army.

Great complaints were made by the Germans at this time, and later in the war, of the position occupied by the bodies of irregular French troops called Francs-tireurs—a kind of guerillas formed immediately after the first reverses of the Imperial armies. It was alleged by the enemy that these men were dressed in a fashion so similar to that of the peasantry that they could not be distinguished; that, protected by this disguise, they made treacherous attacks on the German soldiers, and then, throwing away their weapons, claimed the protection due to civilians; and that they wore the red cross on their arms, without being in any way connected with the service of the sick or wounded. There can be no doubt that the red cross was often much abused, not merely by combatants, but by idlers and marauders; and that the rules of the Geneva convention, the only object of which was to secure particular immunities for the attendants on the sufferers from war, and thus to diminish the sum of human misery, were, like many other good and noble things, turned to bad account by the thoughtless and the malignant. But, with regard to the general question of the Francs-tireurs, it is evident that the Prussians resented their very existence, and that they made it a crime that Frenchmen should do the best they could to defend their country. We have seen from the Uhlan's narrative that the mere fact of a man having soldiers or Gardes Mobile in his house, even if they were not acting hostilely, subjected him to death, with the destruction of his dwelling by fire. The Prussian military authorities gave notice that the Francs-tireurs would be looked on as banditti, unless, "besides the authorisation of the Minister of War, they were subject to French military law, and commanded by French officers." It seems to have been thought that, the regular armies having been defeated, the country was in decency bound to submit, without giving any more trouble. This was certainly not the way in which the Prussians themselves acted when their country was conquered by France at the commencement of the century. A correspondent of the *Standard* opportunely pointed out the rules laid down by the Prussian Government of 1813 for the formation of the Landsturm, a body similar to the Francs-tireurs. Three sections of the order ran thus:—

> "Sec. 7. On the Landsturm being called out, the fighting for which it is summoned becomes a fight for existence (*Nothwehr*), which *sanctions every means that may be employed. The severest and most unrelenting means are the best, because they are the most likely to bring the just cause soon to a successful issue.*
>
> "Sec. 8. The object of the Landsturm is to arrest the march of the enemy as well as to bar his retreat, to annoy him incessantly, to capture his munition, couriers, and recruits, to surprise him by night, to break up his hospitals; in short to harass, trouble, and molest him *in every conceivable way*, and to destroy him singly or in detachments, whenever or wherever it may be possible. . . . .
>
> "Sec. 39. *A special uniform or distinctive dress for the Landsturm is not allowed*, because this would betray the wearer, and render him more liable to be pursued by the enemy."

The English papers began to talk about the terms of peace even before the battle of Sedan. Under date, "Clermont-en-Argonne, August 29th," a correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* reports a conversation he had had the previous evening with Count Bismarck as to the possible demands of Prussia. "We might," said the Federal Chancellor, "form Alsace and Lorraine into an independent neutral State stretching from Luxemburg to Switzerland, and so protecting the whole of our western frontier against France. But who is to guarantee the neutrality of such a state? Then, too, the people would be always wanting to return to France, to which they have so long belonged. As to our annexing Alsace and Lorraine, I do not see the use, far less the probability, of doing so. We should have discontented people to govern, and, besides, mere increase of territory has no attractions for Germany. But we *must* have securities against an attack from France. So long as she possesses Strasburg, the whole of South Germany is at her mercy; we have no fortress till you get to Ulm. Strasburg therefore, and Metz probably, we shall take and hold permanently, if our arms are ultimately victorious. Strasburg shall be our Gibraltar." The Count granted that the French would hate them fearfully for taking two of their best fortresses; but he added that as it was they would never forgive them for having beaten their grand army so terribly. They must therefore have the most material guarantees against future attack. If this be a correct report of what Bis-



BRINGING IN A CUTTER OF TELEGRAPH WIRES.



VIEW IN THE INTERIOR OF RHEIMS CATHEDRAL.

marck said on the 28th of August, the German demands greatly increased with the prolongation of the French resistance. This, however, was but natural, whatever we may think specifically of the particular terms enforced. A belligerent has the right to enhance his terms in proportion to the amount of trouble given him by the enemy. Every belligerent is justified from his own point of view; and, where he has the power, he will of course exact from his opponent the full measure of compensation which he conceives to be due. The French were unlucky; but they had rashly commenced the war, and the evil consequences accumulated with every succeeding month.

To a correspondent of the *Standard*, Count Bismarck, on the 12th of September, said that they did not propose to bombard Paris, but to cut it off from all communication with the rest of the world, and so compel its surrender by famine.

"When," continues the correspondent, "I suggested that whilst Paris was being thus starved into submission, time would be given for the formation of a new French army south of the Loire, he replied, 'Not an army; only numbers of armed people. We took 1,500 of such near St. Menehould with a single squadron of Dragoons. It is possible that the Frenchman may be made a good soldier in three months; but we shall not give him three months, and in any case the so-called army will be without officers deserving the name. If they insist on fighting, well and good. They will be slaughtered. But it is a pity.' Touching upon the prospects of peace, he inquired, 'With whom? Through whom? With the gentlemen of the pavement and their representatives? When I saw the Emperor,' he went on, 'after his surrendering himself a prisoner, I asked him if he was disposed to put forward any request for peace. The Emperor replied that he was not in a position to do so, for he had left a regular Government in Paris, with the Empress at its head. It is plain, therefore,' continued Count Bismarck, 'that, if France possesses any Government at all, it is still the Government of the Empress as Regent, or of the Emperor.' When I asked if the flight of the Empress and of the Prince Imperial might not be regarded as an abdication, he said, very positively, 'he could not so construe it. The Empress had been forced to go by the gentlemen of the pavement, as the Corps Législatif had been obliged to suspend its sittings; but the action of the gentlemen of the pavement was not legal. They could not make a Government. The question was, Whom does the fleet still obey? Whom does the army shut up in Metz still obey? Perhaps Bazaine still recognises the Emperor. If so, and we choose to let him go to Paris, he and his army would be worth considerably more than the gentlemen of the pavement and the so-called Government. We do not wish to dictate to France her form of Government; we have nothing to say to it. That is her affair.' I pointed out that it would be extremely difficult for the French people at the present moment even to employ the means necessary for ascertaining the national will. 'That is their look-out,' replied his Excellency; 'we know what we want, and that is enough for us.' This observation led up to what Germany will consider indispensable conditions of peace. Count Bismarck disclaimed all desire of increase of territory or population for mere increase sake, and said it was a nuisance to have German subjects who speak French. 'But,' he continued, 'the present is the twenty-fifth time in the space of a hundred years that France has made war on Germany on some pretext or other. Now, at least, our terrible disease of divided unity being cured, we have contrived, by the help of the hand of God, to beat her down. It is idle to hope to propitiate her.'"

The Count then spoke of taking Strasburg and Metz, as he had done to the correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and proceeded:—"At the commencement of this war, had the Emperor displayed energy, he might have attacked Southern Germany before we could have done anything. Why he did not do it we do not know to this day. He had an army of 150,000 men, ready to be moved in a day. We cannot do that—we are too poor. But France can afford it; and having missed doing the energetic and daring thing once, she would know better next time, and would do it if we did not take precautions, and make it impossible by improving our frontier. Had the attack been made at once on South Germany, we should have lost its assistance; not because the South Germans are not well-disposed, but because they would have been crushed."

He illustrated this by repeating what the late King of Wurtemberg had one day said to him. His Majesty put the matter thus:—"You are always very frank with me; I will be frank with you. If the French were to pounce upon my people, and I were eating a soldier's bread in your camp, how should I feel? My people, oppressed with exactions, would beg of me to come home and make terms with the conquerors. The shirt is nearer to the skin than the coat, and I should have to do it."

Count Bismarck was exceedingly frank with the newspaper correspondents; and it is curious to compare his utterances in August and September with the subsequent course of events. The aristocratical pride of the man comes out very characteristically in his phrase about "the gentlemen of the pavement." The Emperor Napoleon went up greatly in the Count's estimation after the events of that Sunday in Paris.

CHAPTER XI.

Advance of the Germans on Paris—Occupation of Rheims by the Invaders—The King's Head-quarters there—Character of the City—Progress of the German Armies, and Effect on the French People—Arrival at Versailles—Memories of the Town, its Palace, and Gardens—The Crown Prince and his Germans in the Château of Versailles—Engagements with the French on the Road to Paris, and in Front of the Southern Fortifications—Action of the 19th of September—Cowardice of some of the French Troops—Paris completely invested (Sept. 19th)—Burning of Forests in the Vicinity of the Capital—Scene on the Martyrs' Hill—Opinions against and in favour of the War—Addresses of Victor Hugo and "Citoyenne Delavier"—French Love of Declamation—The Fortifications of Paris—Desolation in the East of France—Alleged Inhumanity of the Germans towards the French Prisoners—Contradictory Accounts—The Emperor Napoleon's Private Means—Entry of the Italians into Rome.

FOLLOWING up their prodigious success at Sedan with that alacrity which distinguished all their movements, the Germans immediately set their faces towards Paris. The advanced guard of the army at the captured fortress started on their grand expedition as early as the 3rd of September. Others, belonging to the third and fourth armies, followed in the course of a few days, leaving in their rear the fortresses of Strasburg, Metz, Thionville, Mézières, Longwy, Montmédy, Verdun, Toul, and Soissons. The Crown Prince of Saxony proceeded by the valley of the Marne, and the Crown Prince of Prussia advanced by Montmirail, Coulommiers, Charmes, and Brie-comte-Robert. The difficulties of the march were overcome with the usual skill and energy of the Prussians. A writer in the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1871, remarks that, "In order to take up the position relatively assigned to them before Paris, and owing to the positions respectively occupied by them round Sedan, the third and fourth armies had to cross each other's line somewhere on the route. This they did at Rheims; and that one army of 80,000 men, with all its trains and impediments, should have been able to cut across the march of another army, numbering 120,000, without serious inconvenience, is a proof of the excellence of the working staff. Every parallel road was utilised. Each army thus marched in parallel columns, the lateral communications between which, as well as between the two armies, was kept up by the cavalry; and in particular the outward flanks of both armies were protected by strong bodies of cavalry. The front of both armies was at the same time covered by a chain of advanced guards in communication with each other by means of cavalry patrols, thus forming a continuous circle, either for protection or information, enveloping the head of the line of march of both armies, at a distance of from twenty to thirty miles in advance."

On the 5th the invaders occupied Rheims. A little past noon four cavalry soldiers rode into the fine old cathedral city, halted before the shop of a confectioner, and asked for some biscuits, which they paid for. An old man threw himself on one of the soldiers, and said they should never eat what they had got. The Hussar struck the old man with the butt-end of his pistol, but, failing to make him loose his hold, fired at and wounded him. The cavalry then galloped out of the town, and a young man, with more spirit than discretion, fired after them. At three o'clock the whole squadron appeared, and the Mayor went out to meet them, and formally surrendered the town into their hands. Shortly afterwards the main body of the Germans arrived, composed of 25,000 men, with the King of Prussia himself at their head. The King's head-quarters were established in the episcopal palace close to the cathedral, and the head-quarters of the Wurtemberg corps, which garrisoned the city, were in the hotel before the cathedral door. The Mayor advised the townspeople to abstain from violence, and the appeal was not urged in vain. The Prussians were received with a kind of gloomy quiet, and they in their turn abstained from needless outrage. Their requisitions were made on the city, so that the individual citizen had only to provide for the soldiers actually quartered on him. With the poorer classes, however, this was in itself a great hardship, and the Prussian authorities accordingly established a commissariat for troops billeted on those who were unable to support them.

Rheims is a city in the department of the Marne, situated eighty miles in a straight line, and 107 miles by railway, to the north-east of Paris. It was a town of some note in the days of the Roman Empire, and was then distinguished for its literary character. In the twelfth century it became the place where the monarchs of France were crowned—a ceremony which, with a few exceptions, including the first Napoleon, was performed there until its abolition in 1830. Rheims has always had a great name in French history. It was besieged by our Edward III. in 1359; but, though he remained before the walls for seven months, he failed to take the town. It was captured by the English, however, in 1421, and was recovered by

Joan of Arc. On March 12th, 1814, it was seized by a corps of Prussians, and retaken the very next day by Napoleon; and now it was forced to succumb without a blow to the allied forces of Germany. The town is a picturesque old place, with houses built in a series of projecting storeys, supported at the bottom by wooden columns, and forming covered walks or galleries, like those we see in our own cities of Shrewsbury and Chester. The cathedral of Rheims is one of the finest Gothic structures in Europe. It dates from the thirteenth century, and is stately with towers and arches, with flying buttresses and richly ornamented portals, with statues and stained-glass windows, with marbles and paintings, with ancient baptismal fonts and relics of the early Christian ages. Other old churches are to be seen in the city, though in this respect it was a good deal damaged by the iconoclasts of 1793. Old walls, quite valueless as a protection against the assaults of an enemy, girdle the town with an irregular line of harmless ramparts, planted with trees, set here and there with crumbling towers, and pierced with six gates, affording access to the city. Dim traditions of the distant Roman days still cling to the place; and a splendid Roman arch, covered with bas-reliefs, and adorned with eight fluted Corinthian columns, is built into the circuit of the walls. It is but a little town, this ancient capital of the Remi, this seat of regal ceremony and ecclesiastical dominion. Four miles and a half give you its circumference, and the walls include many large gardens and void spaces. Though not without extensive manufactures, and situated in the midst of the great wine-producing district of Champagne, Rheims, like most cathedral towns, is a quiet, somnolent, stagnant place, with grass growing thickly in the streets, and the shadows of antiquity lying grey and ghostly among its gabled houses and across its hushed and winding ways. The entry of the King of Prussia and his clattering men-at-arms must have been a stirring event to the staid and dreamy citizens.



MAP OF THE ENVIRONS OF PARIS.

"All through the fertile province of Champagne," says a correspondent of the *Daily News*, writing on the 12th of September, "down the straight roads, with their lines of poplar trees, and among the pleasant villages on the vine-covered slopes, the Prussians advanced towards Paris. There was a great bend to the northward when the Crown Prince swung round upon MacMahon, and pinned him in against the Belgian frontier at Sedan. There was a momentary pause after the success of September—a pause merely to rest the exhausted troops; and then a second movement, as decided, and almost as rapid, as that of the shutting-in of MacMahon. The German forces returned to the main road to their promised goal. They came slanting back to the line of the Marne, and occupied village after village, town after town, with astonishing quickness. The French had no time to prepare a systematic defence. Before the National Guard could even be armed, far less exercised, those fluttering pennants of black and white which told of the Prussian Lancers, or those spiked helmets of the Prussian Dragoons, were seen approaching. Everything had to be abandoned. The armed force, such as it was, dispersed or retreated, and the people submitted themselves to the inevitable in the way of war contributions." The scouts, as usual, heralded the approach of the main body. Then came the great bulk of the army, with the artillery and the ammunition wagons. They moved in open order, but were so well in hand that it is said they could have been collected at a day's notice. Vast hordes of men, in all the terror of military array, covered the hill-sides, barred the roads against other traffic, blackened wide stretches of plains, or, resting for a while, turned meadow-land and pasturage into temporary camps. The field-telegraph was frequently employed to establish communications between different parts of the army; and the field-hospitals were got ready for the sick and wounded. Of course, such an immense body of men could not pass through a country without making their presence felt. The people complained that they were eaten up. After the human wave had swept by, a great scarcity of food and drink was experienced by the inhabitants. Dr. Russell remarked in the *Times* on this extraordinary invasion:—"One thing which causes astonishment to me is the perfect impunity with which the Prussian communications have been preserved. Their military administration is most vigorous, and its apparent severity prevents bloodshed and secures their long lines against attack. It is 'Death' to have arms concealed or retained in any house. It is 'Death' to cut a telegraph wire, or to destroy anything used for the service of the army. What can a disarmed population, however hostile and venturesome, attempt against even small bodies of armed men who always move with caution, and against troops who do not make night marches unless in large bodies? The Prussian cavalry are everywhere. There is no neglect, no *insouciance;* nothing is taken on trust. Enter a small village in the centre of a district which is full of troops on all sides, and you see two sentries posted on the road, and two sentries further on at the exit; and on every road or lane, out or in, the same precautions are observed. The people in the towns and villages are quite aghast. Everywhere Prussians. 'Where, can you tell me, sir, is the French army?' The question has been put to me dozens of times." The French army, as far as it remained at all, had retired upon Paris.

The most that could be done to oppose, or rather to delay, the advance of the Germans, was to break down the bridges over the rivers. The gaps, however, were speedily repaired with rough timber-work, and the army was not seriously checked. At Nogent-sur-Seine, the Prussians threatened to bombard the town if the bridge should be destroyed. Here and there a tunnel on a railway had been blown up, or trees had been cut down and laid across the roadway. But these obstacles were overcome with a little expenditure of time, labour, and trouble, and the resistless stream poured on. From many of the villages the peasantry fled in dismay, and did not return until after the Germans had passed; but in others, the people were willing to remain, and make as much money out of the strangers as they could by the sale of their wine and other commodities. On the 10th of September the Prussians approached Crespy and Compiègne, north-east of Paris, and two battalions of the Mobile Guards at the latter place fell back upon Beauvais. A camp of between 5,000 and 6,000 Germans was on the same day pitched at Clermont-les-Fermes, north of Paris, and scouts were reported at Montmirail, la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Vailly-sur-Aisne. On the 12th the invaders were in force at Crécy, and some Uhlans, arriving at Provins, south-east of Paris, announced the approach of 20,000 troops; next day, a body of Uhlans appeared at Senlis, to the north of Paris. By the 15th 10,000 Prussians were marching on Joinville, three miles south-east of the fortifications; on the 17th there was a great movement of the Prussians towards the heights of Binoy, south-east of Paris; and on the 18th the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia were at Chaumes, five-and-twenty miles from the outworks of the city in the same direction. The King's head-quarters had by that time been established at Meaux, on the Seine, about the same distance to the east of the capital. When Corbeil was reached, it was found that the stone bridge across the Seine had been blown up, and many of the houses were chipped or otherwise injured by the explosion. The mine was sprung just as the advance-guard of the Prussian Lancers came in sight. In about an hour's time, however, the pontoon train had thrown a temporary bridge across, and the German army passed the river, which was then the only barrier of importance lying between it and the fortifications of Paris. The city was completely invested on the 19th of September, and on the 20th the Crown Prince of Prussia, in command of the third army, set up his head-quarters at Versailles, where 2,000 Gardes Mobiles were captured. The Prussian soldiers found plenty of accommodation in the barracks of the Imperial Guards, and immense stores of hay and oats were discovered, on which the cavalry horses were enabled to feed sumptuously.

The entry of the Germans into Versailles was described by a correspondent of the *Indépendance Belge*, who, writing from the town itself on the 20th of September, said :—

"On the 18th three Death's Head Hussars presented themselves at one of the town gates, and demanded a parley of the authorities. Upon being taken to the mayor, that functionary refused to treat with any but a general, or some one furnished with full powers by him. The next morning an aide-de-camp, followed by a single cavalry soldier, made his appearance, and was taken under an escort of National Guards to the mayor. There a long discussion ensued. It was then a quarter past nine, and since six the cannon had been booming on the road from Versailles to Sceaux, in the plain of Velizy, about three miles from the town. The aide-de-camp required accommodation for the wounded, and also the keys of all forage stores. These points were warmly debated, and the officer departed to consult his general. Within less than an hour afterwards a captain of Engineers, an aide-de-camp to the general commanding the 5th Corps, arrived alone. He was accompanied by two National Guards to the mairie, where the municipal authorities were sitting *en permanence*. Fighting was then going on at the farm of Villecoublay. General Vinoy was endeavouring to break this division of the enemy, or was defending the fortified position upon the heights of Meudon, commanding the left bank of the Seine and the forts of Vanvres and Issy. I have omitted to state that from the previous day the railways on either bank of the river had ceased to run trains. The discussion of terms was carried on until a quarter past eleven A.M., when M. Raureau, the newly-appointed mayor, went out and, taking his station at the Paris gate, read aloud to the assembled crowd the conditions of capitulation that had been agreed to. These conditions were :—'1. That property and person should be respected, as also public monuments and works of art. 2. The Confederate German forces should occupy the barracks with their soldiers, but the inhabitants were to lodge the officers, and if necessary soldiers also, if the barracks should afford insufficient accommodation. 3. The National Guard should retain its arms, and for the common interest should be entrusted with the internal police of the town, except that the Confederates should occupy at their discretion the gates at the barriers. 4. There should be no requisition for money, but the town was to supply at money rates all



GERMAN AMMUNITION TRAIN.

that should be requisite for the passing or stationary forces. 5. On the same day the Grille des Chantiers would be opened to allow the 5th Corps to enter. This announcement having been made, immediate steps were taken to carry out the terms of the capitulation. The officer in command of the French troops in Versailles was taken to the general commanding the enemy's forces at St. Juoy, and on his way had to traverse a part of the battle-field whence the wounded were being removed to the hospitals prepared in the Palace of Versailles and the Trianons. At that moment the French guns were withdrawn, and the force which had maintained the fight fell back into the wood, while the German columns commenced their march. Shortly before one o'clock they began to defile through the Rue des Chantiers, and the procession lasted until after five, the total number being variously estimated at from 25,000 to 40,000 men. Many did not remain in the town, but a considerable force took up quarters there. The general went to the Hôtel des Reservoirs. The artillery bivouacked on the Place d'Armes, and in the Avenue de St. Cloud. Two small incidents are deserving of mention. With the German troops there entered two small groups of Zouaves, who had been made prisoners in the affair at Villecoublay-Velizy. The crowd uncovered to them silently but respectfully, and a few cries of 'Long live France!' were heard. In the Rue des Chantiers, the first officer who came to negotiate for the capitulation was saluted by the same cry, 'Long live France!' from a bystander. 'My friend,' said the officer, 'it is "Long live Peace" that you should cry.' When the marching on of the troops had ended, then began the requisitions. Twenty-six oxen were delivered by the town, and ten casks of wine, and also all the stores of forage, worth 300,000 francs, which the French military authorities wished to destroy, but which the town had purchased in anticipation of actual events. Although these facts are heart-breaking to a Frenchman, justice compels me to add that everything has been done with the most perfect order and regularity, and the most scrupulous discipline has been observed. The German intendance is to pay for the requisitions that are made. Individual soldiers tender the money for what they want to purchase—generally so, at least."



GENERAL TROCHU.

Versailles is a royal suburb of Paris, distant eleven miles by rail from the capital, on the western side of which it lies. It is the chief town of the department of the Seine-et-Oise, and is a place of some importance independently of its association with the Court. Until the reign of Louis XIII. it was a mere village; but in 1627 that monarch built here a small hunting-seat, to which Louis XIV. made a series of additions between the years 1661 and 1672, which resulted in the creation of one of the most magnificent palaces in Europe. The front towards the town consists of a centre and two wings, enclosing three sides of a court, which is open on the fourth or east side to the Place d'Armes. There are also two wings at the back, extending into the park, which is laid out in terraces, parterres, and alleys, with statues and sculptures, ornamental water, and fountains that are among the sights of Paris, whenever (which is only once in a way) their glittering columns and quaintly interwoven devices are set in motion. In this park are the two royal seats called the Grand Trianon and the Petit Trianon, with their respective gardens; names intimately associated with the personal history of the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV.—with their gaiety, their gallantry, their intrigue, their license—with a world of heat and passion that has long burnt itself out, and now lies still and cold in the ashes of old memoirs and letters, and with some better traditions of love that was not venal and courage that was not braggart. Shades of the Louis; and of their wives and favourites—of Madame de Maintenon and of Marie Antoinette—of the great, the witty, the beautiful, and the profligate—haunt these palaces, parks, and gardens, and present to the inner eye the whole history of France during that brilliant, laughing, cynical, sportive, terrible eighteenth century, from the elegant comedy of its commencement to the squalid tragedy of its close. Memories of later days swell the pageant of suffering and of splendour. Napoleon I. delighted in the retirement of the Great Trianon; and it was in the Little Trianon that Marie Louise, his Empress, had an interview with her father after the abdication of 1814. In the theatre of the Palace of Versailles Louis Philippe gave a public dramatic entertainment on the marriage of his son, the Duke of Orleans, June 10th, 1837, after the building had remained closed for nearly half a century; and in the same theatre the Emperor Napoleon III. gave a series of magnificent fêtes to Queen Victoria in 1855. Little did he then think that in fifteen years from that time the King of Prussia would camp with his armies at Versailles and direct the siege of Paris.

The palace and park of Versailles have the state and courtliness of old French history. All is vast, costly, magnificent, luxurious, and formal. Ranges of columns divide windows without end. The gods and goddesses of Renaissance Paganism blush in painting, or glimmer in marble, or sport in bronze and lead, at every available point. Sea-monsters spout cataracts of water from their mouths, or gape in arid vacuity when the water is not there. The Virtues and the Vices, as conceived by fashionable painters of the time of Louis Quatorze, simper from ceilings and exhort from walls, where they have simpered and exhorted to but small purpose for nearly two centuries. Fame, in a hundred fantastic shapes, commemorates the invincibility of French arms, despite the comments of 1814, of 1815, and of 1871. Great suites of chambers open out of one another, and incrustations of gold reflect the sunshine or the lamplight from architrave and cornice. In the park and gardens, Nature is seen dressed and drilled for society. The bowers and alleys are such as Watteau painted, and seem to demand for their perfection the glittering and careless company with which he peopled them.

The town is very much in harmony with the palace and grounds. It is divided into two nearly equal parts by a grand avenue, nearly half a mile long, and proportionally broad, planted with four rows of elms, forming shady walks, and flanked with noble houses. Other avenues, equally embowered in trees, are found in different portions of the town; handsome squares and market-places form pleasant centres here and there; and numerous fountains are silvery and voluble in the public ways. In recent years, however, Versailles has declined somewhat from its former state. It seems never to have entirely recovered the rough work of the first Revolution. In the eighteenth century it had a population of 100,000; now it cannot count half that number.

The entry of the Crown Prince of Prussia into this historic town was described by the correspondent of the *Times*, who wrote:—"As the Prince got nearer the Avenue de Paris, the people in the streets and windows became more numerous, and there were almost crowds at the corners of some streets. But they were not cheerful nor welcome-giving. The only sign of greeting I saw was from an elderly lady, in spectacles and a British pork-pie hat, who waved her hand from under the cover of a Union Jack hoisted from a third-storey window, while a lad beside her took off his Glengarry bonnet; but when the Prince rode across the Avenue de Paris to the Prefecture there was a real welcome. The thousands of silent French men and women stood inside the lines of sentries across the road; the Lancers drew up outside the gates on one side, the Gendarmerie and Jägers at the other.

Outside the railings, on the left, was a guard of honour, with the colours of a Prussian infantry regiment, and, as the Prince entered the court, the royal standard was flung out of the front of the Prefecture, and waved over the portal. All the while the music played a wild martial flourish —drums and trumpets beating and clanging in most heart-moving exultation. Soldiers ran from all sides to see the Prince, who rode along the ranks of the regiment, and then turned into the court of the Prefecture, after which the guard of honour trooped its colours inside, and the Staff rode off to find their quarters." The same writer very vividly depicts the appearance of the Château of Versailles, with the Prince and his Prussians walking about the rooms and galleries :—

"Passing from the Hôtel du Reservoir, I went on to the château with an English acquaintance, whom I met yesterday as we came into Versailles, and who had fled with his family out of Paris to avoid the siege last Saturday. The Duke of Augustenburg was strolling in the same direction. The doors were open at the usual entrance near the chapel on the left, and the tickets for sunshades and umbrellas dangled uselessly from their nails on the rack. The guardian was not there—no porter, no seller of guide-books to the galleries. So we passed out towards the gardens skirting the *Salle des Maréchaux*. All the windows were open, and under each Marshal's picture lay a little iron camp-bedstead with a wounded or a sick man, asleep, or thinking of some distant home—nearly all soldiers of Poland, I was told (18th and 19th Prussian Regiments) —or tossing about in pain or dreamland. The Sisters of Charity were moving about among them so quietly that their great fan-shaped cap wings never moved in the breeze. It was a sight to make one reflect. A burly Bavarian sitting up in bed, and looking at his hideous face with the only eye left to him in a piece of a broken mirror, while Marshal Saxe glowered on him from the opposite side! The youthful Lannes was guarding a sick Prussian, and Ney, close at hand, seemed as if he were recoiling from a case of typhus; for that epidemic is said to be among the sick here, and some of the *salles* are given over to wounded, and others to sick. It was a very hot morning—a blazing sun; all the windows were open, and, as the rooms are lofty and well-ventilated, a better hospital than the Château of Versailles cannot be easily found, and there were breeze and shade enough at this hour to make the galleries agreeable. In the gardens there was scarcely a creature visible; but presently three officers in Prussian uniform came out across the court by the jetless and sprayless fountains, and halted at the top of the steps which lead from the terrace to the alleys, where they stood looking out over the canal and the scene, which is lost in the far distance in the flat, uninteresting plain beyond the St. Cyr road. It was the Crown Prince, attended by Count Eulenberg and Major Misckow. The only others near were a wounded man, shot through the side the day before yesterday, who sat on a bench sunning himself; and the Duke of Augustenburg. The Prince remained for some time with folded arms, as if in meditation, at the top of the terrace; then turned and walked slowly back to the château, which he entered by the door under the gallery of Louis XIII., and thence proceeded through the galleries and wards, visiting the wounded, making inquiries of the men, and so on to the upper floor, where is the theatre, and walked by the endless acreage of battle-pieces which so many unfortunate people are compelled to survey in the Paris season."

The French did the best they could under existing circumstances to protect their capital. The troops that were at Mézières during the battle of Sedan, and which somehow failed to join MacMahon when they were so sorely wanted, were fortunately able to retire upon Paris, together with the untouched corps of General Vinoy, an old officer of great courage and ability, of whom Lord Clyde had a high opinion. Although the Germans met with but little opposition on their road to the metropolis, until they were actually within sight of the fortifications, their passage was not entirely undisputed. On the 11th of September a body of French cavalry drove back a Prussian reconnaissance before Château-Thierry. On the following day an engagement took place between Uhlans and Francs-tireurs at Montereau, and a similar fight occurred on the morning of the 14th between Melun and Brie-comte-Robert, which resulted in several Francs-tireurs being made prisoners. A detachment of Prussians under General Keller repulsed two hundred of these irregulars near Colmar on the 15th; and on the 16th fighting was going on at Athis, south of Paris, where the invaders burnt the railway station, and crossed the Seine with fifty cannon. These, however, were trifling affairs, and nothing of consequence occurred until the Germans were close to Paris. Engagements of an indecisive character occurred on the 17th and 18th, and on the 19th a battle on a serious scale was fought by General Ducrot, who occupied the heights of Villejuif, south of Paris, with four divisions, and who, in extending his lines to Meudon, on the south-south-west, encountered masses of the enemy spread through the woods and villages, and strongly supported by artillery. After some severe fighting, the French were obliged to retreat, and, by the admission of M. Gambetta himself, this movement was effected, as far as the right wing was concerned, with "deplorable precipitation." The remainder of the troops, however, concentrated in good order round the earthen redoubt erected on the plateau of Châtillon. Towards four o'clock the fire of the Prussian artillery was so hot that General Ducrot was obliged to withdraw his men under cover of the forts, after spiking eight guns at the Châtillon redoubt. The Garde Mobile are stated to have evinced great steadiness and calmness; and an order of the day issued by General Trochu on the 20th said that the French artillery inflicted enormous losses on the enemy. The 1st Regiment of Zouaves, however, were severely reproved for retreating in disorder, owing to "an incomprehensible panic;" and in non-official accounts they were described as running into Paris amidst execrations and hootings. They were arrested in great numbers, and some were shot as an example. It was said that Trochu originally intended to defend Paris without the help of an external army; but when General Ducrot arrived from Sedan, from which he escaped in the disguise of a peasant (having broken his parole, according to the Prussians), he was placed in command of 50,000 men, and sent against the advancing Germans. The *Daily News* affirms that, "although a pretence of reconnoitring was made, the French troops were led against an enemy whose strength and position were alike unknown, and the consequences were what might have been expected. When the French troops had been sent into the wood, they found themselves exposed, almost at point-blank range, to a murderous fire. Those corps which had not entered the wood were massed on a plateau under guns which the Germans had planted on the heights above, and mown down with shot and shell until they could bear it no longer, when they fled in utter confusion." According to a correspondent of the *Opinion Nationale*, the French, at seven o'clock on the morning of the 19th (the action had begun the evening before), planted their artillery—composed, it is said, of seventy-two guns — in position, and opened a vigorous fire in the direction of the woods; but for half an hour there was no reply on the part of the Germans. Several French detachments then entered the glades, and the cuirassiers, venturing too far, came upon a strong body of the enemy, and suffered heavy losses. Each tree was a fortification, and the firing was incessant. After a time, a battalion of Mobiles of the Seine came up, and began firing into the wood, where their comrades of the 16th Regiment were stationed, threw them into disorder, and caused their precipitate retreat. The sight of these men rushing out of the wood communicated a panic to the infantry regiments on the plateau, which were composed in great part of reserves and young recruits; and they also fled. The Prussians then advanced, still keeping under cover, and the French, not knowing where to fire, were completely discouraged and thrown into confusion. Another account says that the action was a sortie made by the French upon the line of march of the fifth Prussian army corps, and that, at the commencement, the attack was so far successful that the Germans were impeded in their progress. Ultimately, the second Bavarian corps, also belonging to the Crown Prince's army, arrived on the field, and decided the day in favour of the invaders. Nine guns were taken, and the outwork on the hill behind Châtillon was occupied by the Bavarians. The country south of the capital was thus left completely open to the enemy, and the hostile occupation extended in an unbroken chain all round the ill-fated city.

The Parisians now saw their fate staring them in the face; but they did not lose heart. Great preparations were made to meet the invader. The environs of the city were laid in ruins. From the gate of Neuilly to the gate of Ternes, all the houses were destroyed; but the chapel raised to the memory of the Duke of Orleans was respected. The forests in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital were burnt some days before the arrival of the Prussians; and a correspondent of the *Daily News*, describing the spectacle as seen from Paris, says:—

"From the roof of the house in which I live I have seen the forests of Maisons, Montmorency, St. Prix, and the woods of St. Gratian, all in flames. Human ingenuity must have had a hard struggle with the rain in trying to set the trees ablaze. But, as science in our time is pretty nearly sold to the devil, the tears which Heaven wept are of no avail in saving the sylvan beauties of the environs of Paris. Though the wind blows from the west, we, who are miles to the east of the blazing forests, can smell the burnt wood. As the smoke is driven in the direction opposite to us, by the the aid of field-glasses we can witness the frightful end of many a pretty châlet or elegant villa to which the flames are being communicated. The château of the Princess Mathilde also seems destined to be thrown into the crucible. The woods and copses of St. Prix, St. Gratian, and Montmorency have been fired by means of petroleum and gas-tar, which it would have been dangerous to leave in a city that in a few days may be exposed to a bombardment. Dealers in those combustibles received notice a few days back that they must surrender to the Committee of National Defence what they could not take to a seaport out of the reach of the enemy. The firing of that part of Bondy visible from Montmartre at eleven o'clock last night was a still more awful spectacle than what I have just witnessed from the leads overhead. The trees were perfectly dry, so that the oil and petroleum which were spilt about in the brushwood had no obstacle to contend with. Isolated columns of flame and clouds of smoke suddenly rose, and, before half an hour, were lost in one general blaze, which stood out like a fiery wall against the sky."

The baleful light thus produced revealed to the watcher a number of deep, yawning graves on the Martyrs' Hill—vast trenches, dug to contain three or four hundred persons each, in anticipation of the slaughter consequent on encounters with the Prussians. The writer proceeds :—

> "These common ditches intrude themselves into the reserved burying-places purchased in perpetuity. From the mounds of clay surrounding these hideous trenches, skulls grin out, remains of smashed coffins obtrude themselves, or rags of black cloth, once the undertaker's pride, declare the vanity of all human respectability. As the smoke and flame ascend, a chiffonier, with an eye to business, hooks up the ossuary remains of past generations. Do not think that my palette is purposely charged with garish tints, to catch the eye of the ignorant. I tell in sober earnest, and from no desire to 'pile up the agony,' of how women sickened when they looked at the burning forest, and screamed with terror when they saw at their feet the wide-open maw of death, ravening for human flesh, and set round, in lieu of teeth, with the broken-up skeletons of respectably buried bourgeois. . . . . 'Tis the way of Frenchmen to meet the cruel irony of destiny with jibes; jests were freely uttered by blouses and paletôts. The mocking devil was aroused, and they allowed him the fullest swing in the face of that blazing forest, and that yawning grave into which many of those who fainted, screamed, wept, jibed, or made speeches on its brink last night, may be thrown before the week is over. It was by order of the Hygienic Council, the Vice-President of which is M. Jules Ferry, that the gigantic trenches on the Martyrs' Hill are opened, so that putrefied corpses during the siege may not poison the air of Paris. Some of the men who stood round those charnel-houses were loud in their professions of mock admiration of the foresight, the zeal for the preservation of public health, of which such wholesale receptacles of mortality were an evidence. But would it not be better, urged a shabbily-dressed citizen, if M. Jules Ferry could persuade his colleagues that there is no glory in war, and that a good peace, however fools might think it dishonourable, would answer hygienic purposes better? A man in a threadbare paletôt makes a little discourse on the results of war on human beauty. As a preliminary to holding forth, he lightly kicks a skull aside, and picks up an abnormally carved shin-bone, on which he proceeds to expatiate in a Darwinian strain. The out-at-elbows pedagogue or philosopher assures us that, were it not for war, our eyes would not be perpetually offended with human ugliness and deformity. War is the reverse of the Spartan and Athenian system of eliminating the ill-conditioned, which it only suffers to continue the race. Like father like child. The descendants of the individual whose shin-bone the speaker holds are probably bandy-legged creatures, for the conditions of modern society are far more favourable to the growth of vices, both physical and moral, than of virtues."

Great diversity of opinion as to the advisability of proceeding with the war existed among the Parisians. Many agreed with the shabbily-dressed speaker alluded to above, that a good peace would be worth any amount of glory, and it is said that several battalions of the Mobile and National Guards gave notice of their determination not to fire a shot unless some assurance were given them that they were not fighting for the Orleanists and the trading classes—a fate which they had some reason to apprehend. But the war party was certainly in the ascendant; and on the night of September 5th, an immense mass of people passed along the Boulevards, singing the Marseillaise, and expressing their determination to drive the Germans out of France. The leaders of the extreme Republicans did their utmost to encourage this disposition to pugnacity, and Victor Hugo sent forth a flaming appeal to the patriotism and martial fury of his countrymen. With his well-known passionate accumulation of images, he exclaimed :—

> "Let the streets of the town devour the enemy, let the windows burst open with fury, let the rooms send forth their furniture, let the roof cast down its tiles. Let the tombs cry out; let it be felt that behind each wall there is the people and God; let flame spring everywhere from the earth; let every tuft of grass be as a burning bush. Harass them, overwhelm them, intercept their convoys, cut their traces, break the bridges, destroy the roads, blow up the soil, that France may prove a fatal abyss for Prussia. Make war night and day—the war of the mountains, of the plains, of the woods. Rise up, rise up! No truce, no repose, no sleep. Despotism has attacked Liberty. Germany is assailing France. Before the sombre warmth of our soil let this colossal army melt away like snow. Let no portion of the territory withhold its duty. Let us organise the terrible battle of the country. And you, O Francs-tireurs, do ye wind through thickets, pass over torrents, avail yourselves of darkness and gloom, glide through ravines, creep, crawl, take aim, fire, and exterminate the invasion. Defend France with heroism, with despair, with tenderness. Be terrible, O ye patriots! Stop only when you pass a lowly hut to kiss the forehead of a sleeping infant. That infant is the future. For the future is the Republic. As for Europe, what do we care about Europe? Let her look on, if she has eyes. She can come to us if she likes. We do not ask for help. If Europe is afraid, let her remain so. We shall do a service to Europe, that is, to all. Let her stop at home if she wishes it."

And in another place :—"Lyons, take thy gun; Bordeaux, take thy carbine; Rouen, draw thy sword;

and thou, Marseilles, sing thy song, and become terrible!" In a similar style, a lady, calling herself "Citoyenne Delavier," and dating her epistle "25 Fructidor, An 78," in allusion to the new epoch commencing with the revolution of 1793, addressed an appeal to the women of Paris:—

"Sisters, our fathers, husbands, brothers, sons, all, are now engaged in preserving us from the scourge of war! We tender our thanks to those gallant men who offer to shed their blood in defence of their homes and their flag. But shall we remain wanting in such devotion? No, a thousand times no. In peace time, princesses, marchionesses, or baronesses, have held the first rank in the social scale. Let them now seek shelter elsewhere—those titled women who are wanting in courage because wanting in love. In a period of danger thou hast a part to play, woman of the people, *citoyenne* of the thousand-times-blessed Republic of 1870. Watch over its cradle, thou whose life is one of devotion; guard it well, and especially defend it well, for without care and love this budding Republic may languish and die. Let us, then, say to those men who are going forth to the fight, 'We women, who, alas! in ordinary times do not often share your pleasures, we seek, we demand, our place in the conflict—in the path of danger. We are thirsting to steep our souls in great emotions. All of us, women and children, must take part in the great struggle of a people defending, foot by foot, the sanctity of their city. When the enemy shall behold us all ranged around the same banner, defending our cherished liberty, then they will comprehend our union and our strength. Women of Paris, do not desert your homes, do not fly from this



BRINGING IN A PRISONER.



PRUSSIAN DRUMMER ON THE BATTLE-FIELD.

city, the cradle of the Revolution, at the moment when we hail the reappearance of all that is noble, grand, generous, in short, Republican; at the moment when all the noble proscribed have returned to it, bringing the aid of their intellect and devotion to the defence of the Republic. You owe to such men your presence and your cares. It is a sacred duty we have to fulfil. If they must perish, let us perish with them; let us all be buried, if it must be so, under the ruins of Paris, and let us say to them, 'Be not uneasy, brothers; we will not distress you with our tears; we will be bold, we will be your devoted companions even unto death; we desire our share of the danger, and not only our portion of the victory. You will see us engaged in the work, and we shall be worthy of you.' Sisters of Paris, let us without fear and without boasting proceed to our duty; those who feel themselves strong enough, to the hospitals; others will take charge of our children. There is room for all efforts, and work for all, in the great task of national deliverance. Long live the Universal Republic!"

We are perhaps rather too apt, in our cold insular way, to scoff at this sort of utterance, as being theatrical and insincere. Theatrical to a great extent it is, because it proceeds in part from a love of effect and show; but it is not insincere. Even Victor Hugo was probably thinking as much of the right and justice of the matter as of what "the universe" would say to so fine and imposing an "attitude;" the "citoyenne" undoubtedly was. In the midst of all its tawdry glitter, there are real touches of nature and tenderness, unmistakable throbs of deep womanly feeling, in the appeal of "Citoyenne Delavier." The worst of such manifestations is, that by their excessive expenditure of emotion they waste so much available power, and that they are liable to disastrous reactions of languor and despair. They are too often made to stand in the place of action, or at least of intelligent, orderly, and coherent action. A Frenchman thinks he can do anything in the world with ease, if he only declaims enough. It is to his love of declamation and its kindred weaknesses that most of his failures are to be attributed. If Frenchmen could only learn common sense, and *un*learn their habits of declaiming, epigram-making, and attitudinising, they would be the greatest people in the world; but it is vain to speculate on what might ensue if the impossible were realised.

It must be admitted, however, that the citizens of Paris did not simply declaim in view of the approaching siege. They flocked to their standards in large numbers, and prepared themselves by military drill for the trials of the coming time. The fortifications, also, were constantly strengthened; and when the bombardment at length began, the city was in a position to offer a serious resistance. A writer in the *Times*, who evidently spoke from intimate and technical knowledge, gave a minute description of these forts, which it may be as well to repeat in this place, in order that the reader may be enabled, in conjunction with a map, to follow with the greater ease and closeness the subsequent accounts of actions before Paris:—

"The *enceinte* or main fortress of Paris is roughly pentagonal in form. The sides of the pentagon are broken up into 93 bastions, connected by curtains. The space contained within the ramparts measures from north to south about 8,500 yards, and rather more from east to west. A railway runs all round the city just within the ramparts, and cannot but be of great use for the conveyance of guns, ammunition, and troops to strengthen a threatened point. The escarp, or wall which an enemy must climb before he reaches the rampart proper, is 30 feet high. . . . The distance of the zone of the forts from the *enceinte* varies from 2,000 yards to more than three miles. The chain of forts surrounds the city on the north, the east, and the south. The intervals between them are never beyond the range of rifled guns, so that they are enabled to support each other by their artillery fire. The area of the space contained within the chain of forts measures about 19,000 yards from east to west, and nearly 15,000 from north to south. A strategical road runs round, and connects them all. . . . .

"The stream of the Seine issues through the main ramparts of Paris at its south-western corner, and soon bends northwards, covering the whole west of the city, including the Bois de Boulogne. The river curves round parallel to the fortifications, and about two miles from them, until it reaches the north of the city, when it turns still more northwards, and washes the suburb of St. Denis, at about four miles' distance from the main fortifications. It then turns in a south-westerly direction, and runs nearly parallel to its former course, but this time about four and a half miles from it. By its means a water defence is formed to the whole of the west of Paris, and only one fort is placed on this side of the city. We shall speak of it presently

"The town of St. Denis, with its three forts, forms the most northerly defence of Paris. It stands at the point of the loop made by the Seine which we have previously described. A portion of the town itself is fortified. To the east of it, and actually touching the Seine, stands the Fort de la Briche, which covers the branch of the Northern Railway to Pontoise. About two-thirds of a mile from it, and on the other side of the Northern Railway (or Creil branch), is the double Couronne du Nord, which stands to the north of St. Denis, and contains within it the crossing of all the roads from the north, north-east, and north-west, leading to the suburb, and through it to Paris. The Fort de l'Est is to the south-east of St. Denis, and is a regular bastioned square. About two miles and three-quarters further to the south-east we come to Fort d'Aubervilliers, an irregular bastioned pentagon. It rests upon the main road to Lisle, and closes it against an enemy. Inside the forts we have already mentioned runs the canal of St. Denis, and three Redans are established on its banks in rear of the intervals between the forts just mentioned. So far, all the defences of Paris are situated in a plain; but south of Fort d'Aubervilliers and the Ourcq Canal there commences a plateau which covers all the east of Paris, extending beyond Vincennes. Fortunately for the defence, the plateau slopes steeply down on its side furthest from Paris, and several works have been constructed at the summit of the slopes. The first arrived at in the direction in which we are carrying our readers is the Fort de Romainville, a bastioned square with advanced outworks extending to the road from Paris to Metz and the Ourcq Canal. The artillery fire of the fort and its outworks commands all the plain as far as the Fort d'Aubervilliers, and helps to cover the north-east angle of the Parisian system of defence where it is weakest. Indeed, there is little question that the most vulnerable part of the defence of Paris is to be found between St. Denis and Romainville. Next in order, and always on the plateau we have mentioned, are the Forts de Noisy, de Rosny, and de Nogent, bastioned squares with outworks. The Fort de Noisy, as well as that of Romainville, covers with its fire the Ourcq Canal and the Eastern Railway. Rosny protects the Mulhouse branch of the same railway, and commands a spur of the plateau, running in an easterly direction, which would otherwise be occupied by the enemy. The Fort de Nogent is nearly south of the Fort de Rosny, about two miles and a half from it. It also commands the railway to Mulhouse, as well as the roads from Paris to Coulommiers and to Provins. Besides this, it covers the River Marne. The intervals between the forts on the plateau are not left vacant. Between Romainville and Noisy is the redoubt of Noisy. Between the Fort of Noisy and that of Rosny stand the redoubts of Montreuil and of La Boissière. The redoubt of Fontenoy has been built between Forts Rosny and Nogent. A road on the top of the plateau passes behind the forts and redoubts, and keeps up their communication. . . . .

"The next regular fort is nearly four and a half miles from Nogent; it is called the Fort de Charenton, and is larger than most of those we have hitherto mentioned. It is a bastioned pentagon, and stands within the angle formed by the junction of the Seine and the Marne. The long interval between Charenton and Nogent is covered in front by a salient loop of the Marne, and protected in rear by the Château de Vincennes, which flanks both the forts and the south-east angle of the *enceinte*. The bridge across the Marne leading to the Lyons road and the railway bridge are close behind Fort Charenton, but are also covered by the fire from the main ramparts of Paris and the Château de Vincennes.

"We now come to the left bank of the Seine, which enters Paris at the south-east corner, and we have to describe the southern defences of the city. The first is Fort Ivry, little more than a mile and a half from Charenton. It is a bastioned pentagon, commanding the Lyons railway and road, with the passages of the Seine and Marne. It stands on a plateau between Ivry and Vitry, near the railway to Orleans, which it protects. The next is the Fort de Bicêtre; it is also a bastioned pentagon situated upon a plateau. Within a mile of the *enceinte*, Bicêtre covers the short line of railway to Orsay and the line to Fontainebleau. On the other side of the Orsay railroad is Fort Montrouge, a bastioned square, close to the Toulouse road and the railway just mentioned. Then comes the Fort de Vanvres, an irregular bastioned quadrilateral, protecting the Chevreuse road and the Versailles railway; and lastly Fort d'Issy, a bastioned pentagon, close to the western slopes of the plateau, also commanding the Versailles railway and the road to Versailles, and near to the Seine at its first bend after issuing from Paris.

"The five forts just mentioned, on the left bank of the Seine, are not so fortunate as those protecting the east of Paris; for the plateau on which they are situated extends southwards to a considerable distance, and includes elevations which actually command the forts. But it is not sufficient to establish batteries from which regular forts with casemates may be bombarded; it is necessary for an attacking force to possess themselves of the forts, and to this end they must be approached by regular siege, and the besiegers' trenches would be well commanded when approaching any of the southern forts, not only by direct fire from the work attacked, but flanking fire from its neighbours. and even, in some cases, by the guns of the main defences of the city. All the western side of Paris, from Issy on the south to St. Denis on the north, is protected by the first return of the Seine. We have said that the river makes a second bend, forming a peninsula, within which, and nearly due west of the centre of Paris, is the large bastioned pentagon called the fortress or citadel of Mont Valérien. It stands close to the railway of St. Cloud."

The number of cannon for which the detached forts round Paris were originally constructed was as follows:—Charenton, 70; Vincennes, 117; Nogent, 55; Rosny, 56; Noisy-le-Sec, 57; Romainville, 49; Aubervilliers, 66; Est, at St. Denis, 47; La Double Couronne, at the same town, 52; La Briche, close to the former, 61; Mont Valérien, 70; Issy, 64; Vanvres, 45; Montrouge, 43; Bicêtre, 60; Ivry, 70: altogether, 982 guns. When the siege of Paris became imminent, the strength of the fortifications was increased, and the whole presented a formidable front when the Germans sat down before the city.

If the men who were awaiting attack in Paris could have looked over those districts in the east of France which had already felt the ravages of war, they would have seen enough to discourage them. All round Sedan nothing but devastation was visible. Melancholy processions of maimed and enfeebled soldiers passed incessantly, from morning to night, through the ruined villages, seeking shelter and rest in neutral Belgium. Sedan itself was crowded with wounded; so were the houses and churches for miles in all directions. The red cross waved over every place, and the medical and other attendants, male and female, moved gravely about, discharging with admirable devotion their sad but noble duties. The unhappy villagers whose homes had been burnt or destroyed by shot and shell, were compelled to live in the open fields, with no other covering than what they could fashion out of wicker-work made from the branches of trees. Cavalry horses ran wild about the country, or strayed into the towns and hamlets. A litter of torn uniforms, broken accoutrements, and battered weapons, cumbered the surface of the land; and the dismal heaps of earth, betokening where hundreds of mangled corpses had been buried, gathered thickly in every open space, and by every roadside. Crops and orchards were in many places utterly burnt and blasted; great timber trees were cut in two by cannon balls; hedges were broken and cast down. Of the treatment of the French prisoners by the Germans very different accounts are given. Some say that they experienced great kindness; others report that they were horribly ill-used. Mr. Alfred Seymour, M.P. for Salisbury, and Colonel Carleton, both members of the International Society for Help to the Wounded in War, addressed, on the 10th of September, a protest to the Governor of Sedan, respecting the treatment of the French prisoners at Glaire and Iges, whom they had just returned from visiting. In this communication they stated—

"That there are a great number of prisoners who are almost dying of hunger; and the half biscuit per diem which they are supposed to receive a-piece does not always reach each individual. That there is no means of buying bread, unless they pay from 50c. to 1f. for a small bit, which they get from the peasants, who buy it for their own use. That the soldiers are reduced to taking pieces of the carcases of the horses which float down the river to sustain life. That there is no means of buying the smallest quantity of salt, of which there is an absolute want at the ambulance which is established there, and which is full of soldiers, famished and dying. We were told that many soldiers are already dead of hunger, and we saw one corpse still in the river. We therefore take the liberty of asking if steps could not be taken, under the strictest possible regulations, to establish a place where they could buy for themselves—for many of them have a little money—just the first necessaries of life."

The indisposition of the German authorities to permit external help is shown by the fact that, when an announcement, in English, was placarded in the neighbourhood of Sedan, to the effect that subscriptions were solicited in aid of the people of Bazeilles, the following official notification was issued by the Prussian authorities :—

"Sedan, September 29, 1870.

"I have learned that at the 'Golden Cross' and other hotels the subjoined placard has been posted, soliciting subscriptions in aid of the poor of Bazeilles. I see in this act a piece of censure and a false interpretation of the *sentence executed* against that village in virtue of the laws of war. That cannot be tolerated, above all on the part of foreigners, who allow themselves to judge the behaviour of the German troops, and who, moreover, continue still to manufacture arms and munitions against us. Let these catch-pennies (*Groschenputzer*) do in their own country as they please; I believe that it is to our interest to stop these gentlemen and to send them home. "RICHARD GOELCH."

"The Commissary of Police will take care that no subscriptions be made in the town without the authority of the commandant of the place.

"THE CIVIL COMMISSARY, STREUGE.
"Sedan, September 29, 1870."

According to other testimony, the unhappy French prisoners were kept night and day in the open air, during every variety of weather, in the midst of a muddy slough, sufficient in itself to breed ague and fever; and of warm clothing they were utterly destitute. To the same effect wrote a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, who says that, while suffering from dysentery, fever, and rheumatism, those who were on the march were compelled to move for ten miles at a pace nearly equal to our "double-quick," and were beaten with the butt-ends of muskets if they lagged for an instant. The agent of an English society for relieving the necessitous of both nations allowed, in spite of his German sympathies, that the French were cruelly treated. Other accounts spoke of the drunkenness of the Germans, and of their outrages on women. These latter charges, however, seem to be doubtful, in anything like a general sense. They are contradicted by a large amount of independent testimony from those who had every opportunity of judging, and by the indisputable fact that the discipline of the German armies was firmly maintained. Yet it appears certain that women and children, as at Bazeilles, were slain in all the wantonness of revenge, though the particular outrage alluded to by some travellers was only rarely if ever committed. The ill-treatment of the prisoners likewise rests on strong evidence, though this also has been denied, not only by the Germans themselves, but by several English writers. A letter from the seat of war speaks thus on the German side :—

> "I can vouch, from having seen them every day for nine or ten days, that I have not witnessed a single act of unnecessary harshness on the part of the escort; but, on the contrary, many acts of forbearance and kindness. Often when the prisoners fell out of rank, to drink or receive bread and wine from their sympathising countrymen, I have wondered that the comparatively feeble and anxious escorts did not sooner cry out 'Vorwärts !' The march was severe, especially during five days of incessant rain. The infantry bore the march well, but the cavalry and artillery prisoners were sadly distressed. Bread was very scarce on the route for some days, and many of the prisoners begged for bread from the bystanders; but the escort had marched as much, and had eaten as little; and I assure you that at the same time I could not buy a loaf of bread for any amount of money. Every night, when the prisoners reached their appointed bivouac, fires were prepared, and meat and provisions were in readiness. I have myself entered these bivouacs, and have remained hours among the prisoners, desirous to learn what their bearing would be when their day's march was over. All who did not sleep were cheerful, and the soldiers on guard saw with satisfaction small comforts, such as wine and cigars, given to their prisoners. One night, when no meat was distributed, the prisoners were very much dissatisfied and gloomy; but the meat was withheld from them as a punishment, because the column had proved very unruly on the day's march. I know of only two open attempts to escape. One of the men was slightly, the other severely wounded, the latter because he actually grasped the gun of the sentinel who shot him. Bivouacs are the safest for guarding prisoners, but the authorities were so desirous to protect the health of this large number of men that they ordered them to sleep under cover whenever possible, although it was well understood that by scattering the prisoners, often in three villages, many would and many did escape. To march 80,000 prisoners for five days, with a feeble escort, through an inimical population, was a task which demanded severe discipline, but could not possibly have been accomplished with less hardship to the prisoners, or with more genuine good feeling and sympathy for their unhappy fate. I can also, from personal observation, bear testimony to the fact that in all the hospitals and lazarettes I have visited the German and French wounded and sick were treated exactly alike."

Probably the treatment of the prisoners varied in different places; at any rate, it is impossible to believe that statements so precise as those made by Mr. Seymour and Colonel Carleton could have been invented, though contrary statements are not wanting. It is also to be feared that the conduct of the German soldiery to the people of the towns and villages in the conquered provinces was haughty and violent. But, possibly, any other nation would have been equally intoxicated by a triumph of the same magnitude.

One or two facts, not immediately connected with the main narrative, though related to it, should be here mentioned. M. Piétri, acting as private secretary to the Emperor Napoleon, denied, in a letter to the *Times*, that his Majesty had invested largely in foreign funds. He had not a penny in them. This statement was confirmed by other testimony. The *Times*, in a leading article in its impression of September 21st, referred to the reports that the Emperor had "money in the Dutch funds, in the English funds, in the American funds, and in railways all over the world." These statements, added the journalist, were erroneous.

> "He went poor to France, and poor he has quitted it. Unless we are misinformed, the Emperor Napoleon, who has been the chief of the French State for nearly twenty-two years, and its almost absolute master for nearly eighteen, retains no private property, but a small cottage which came to him from his mother. Whatever he has received from France he has spent in the country, in accordance with the social system which was established with the Empire. That system was, no doubt, extravagant in the extreme; but the Chief of the State has paid the penalty. Fortunes have been made on all sides, but Napoleon and his family have made no fortune; they have spent all they received in maintaining their Imperial establishment at the high pitch which modern France, under their own tuition, has demanded. Napoleon III. will leave his German place of captivity at the end of the war almost as poor a man as he was when he entered France in 1848. The Empress has, indeed, her jewels, gifts at her marriage and on her fête-days; but these are her private property, the State jewels being now in the hands of the French Government at Tours. She has, besides, an hereditary property in Spain, and the Prince Imperial has a house which has been bequeathed to him near Trieste. This, we believe, is all that remains to the family which was lately supreme in France."*

Fourteen carriage-horses and hacks belonging to the Emperor, which were got away in safety previous to the surrender at Sedan, were sold in London on the 19th of September. They were described as belonging to "a French nobleman," but it was well known who was the real owner. The entire lot realised £477 4s. 6d. A travelling landau and a luggage-van, which had been used in the campaign, but from which the Imperial arms had been painted out, were also offered for sale, but found no adequate bidders.

In Italy, one very important result of the war was seen during the dwindling days of September. The French troops having been withdrawn from Rome on the outbreak of hostilities with Prussia, and the French Empire (which had guaranteed the temporal power of the Pope) being at an end, Victor Emmanuel thought the opportunity favourable for fulfilling Italian aspirations towards the Eternal City as the national capital. His soldiers accordingly entered the Papal dominions, and on the 20th of September Rome was taken. The attacking force consisted of five divisions of the Italian army. Inside the gates, the Papal troops resisted with great resolution and obstinacy; but, after a cannonade of four hours' duration, General Cadorna, the Italian commander, effected a breach in the walls, and the defenders then refrained from further resistance, by express order of the Pope. Eight or ten killed, and less than thirty wounded, were all the losses which Victor Emmanuel had to set against the acquisition of his country's historic capital, the city with the grandest memories of any in the world. As soon as the firing ceased Rome was occupied by a contingent from each division of the Italian army, the remainder encamping outside the walls. General Cadorna, after settling with the Papal Commander, General Kanzler, the terms of the surrender, was present next morning at the delivery of the arms of the Papal soldiers. A *plebiscitum* of the population of the Roman States was taken on Sunday, October 2nd, and resulted in the annexation of those States to the Italian Kingdom by a vote which was almost unanimous. The Italian Parliament subsequently passed a Bill for securing the dignity and independence of the Pope. It was only on the 13th of July that the personal infallibility of the Pontiff had been declared by the Œcumenical Council; and in little more than two months from that date the power of the Popes as sovereign rulers was put an end to by the vigorous action of the Italian Government. Among the remarkable events of 1870 none is more important than this. Its effects have been even wider and more permanent than those of the great war itself.

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* See Appendix xi., Vol. II., p. 562, "Investments of the Emperor Napoleon."



M. THIERS.



INTERVIEW BETWEEN COUNT BISMARCK AND M. JULES FAVRE.

CHAPTER XII.

M. Thiers sent on a Mission to Foreign Courts—His Character and Career—Proposal of M. Jules Favre for English Mediation—Interview of M. Thiers with Earl Granville—His Subsequent Visits to Vienna and St. Petersburg—M. Favre and Count Bismarck—Circulars of both Politicians, defining their Position—Mistake Committed by M. Favre—Journey of the French Minister to Ferrières—Discussion between M. Favre and Count Bismarck at the Château de la Haute Maison (Sept. 20th)—Renewed Discussion at the Château Ferrières (Sept. 21st)—M. Favre's Report—Count Bismarck's Report—General Character and Effect of the Negotiations—French and Germans—The Emperor Napoleon's Life at Wilhelmshöhe—Visits of the Duchess of Hamilton and Lady Cowley—Interview of the Emperor with a Correspondent of the *Standard*—The Empress at Chislehurst—Publication of the Private Papers of the Imperial Family—Balloon Post and Pigeon Post.

One of the first acts of the Provisional Government in Paris was to commission M. Thiers to visit the chief courts of Europe, with a view to exciting their sympathies in favour of France, and possibly to obtaining some alliance against the enemy. M. Thiers was both well adapted and ill adapted to the performance of such a work. He was a politician of long and varied experience—a Parliamentary leader of European fame, able to speak with authority on behalf of France. Although in the seventy-fourth year of his age, he was still hale and vigorous; and in many countries—in England especially—age is regarded as far from disadvantageous to a statesman. He had filled many offices under Louis Philippe, and in those days was the great Parliamentary opponent of M. Guizot. During the era of the Second Empire he was in opposition, after spending a few years in exile; and it was he who said, on the failure of the Mexican expedition, and the repeated checks to France which Prussia had succeeded in imposing, that he did not see how there could remain one more blunder for the Imperial Government to make. He was not prophetic enough to anticipate the enormous disasters of the German war. Starting in life as a Liberal, M. Thiers had ended by becoming something very like a Conservative; opposed to Free Trade, strongly in favour of excessive centralisation, inclined to a restricted suffrage, and jealous of the movements by which Italy had been united and restored to liberty. His allegiance appeared to be given chiefly to the Orleanists; yet he coquetted with the Republic of 1848, and would probably have served under the Empire, if he could have got his own terms. As a writer, he certainly exalted the first Napoleon beyond measure, and to him was due in no small degree the revival of that Buonapartist fever which prepared the way for the Empire of 1852. He was a man of brilliant and versatile powers, but a variable politician, on whose support no party could rely for long. The predominance of France in the European system was always the great passion of his life; and, by a singular fate, it was in the hour of his country's adversity and humiliation that he was deputed to go abroad, seeking the support which he was destined not to find.

It is true that M. Thiers condemned the war at the period of its commencement; but rather, it would seem, because he thought the time ill-chosen, and the alleged motive insufficient, than because he quarrelled essentially with the policy thus embodied. The ground of his most bitter attacks on the Empire for several years was the tameness with which it had permitted the aggrandisement of Prussia, and the relative diminution of the power of France. This feeling—modified, of course, by changed events—was perceptible in the ideas which he expressed in various quarters during his diplomatic mission. He was charged to signify the determination of the Provisional Government not to consent to any further accession of territory to the leading State of Germany. That he should so soon have accepted any post from the new Administration may appear strange, seeing that on the day of the Revolution he had taken the chair at a meeting of members of the Corps Législatif, and had regretted the violence and illegality of their dispersion by the mob. But M. Thiers, as we have already remarked, was a politician subject to many and rapid variations of opinion; and on the occasion in question he dissuaded his fellow-members from making any public protest, and recommended them to accept what had been accomplished. He had been out of office many years, and he seems to have thought that his turn had again come.

The mission of M. Thiers was of a somewhat informal character; but he travelled by the direct request of the Provisional Government, and he represented their views on the necessities of the hour. Even before his departure from Paris, some intimation had been given to our representative in France respecting the opinions held by the new Ministers as to the advisibility of an armistice. M. Jules Favre had stated to Lord Lyons that France would certainly agree to an armistice if a neutral Power were to propose one, and that he should be glad if an offer of mediation, on the basis of the integrity of the French territory, were made to Prussia, even though it should be rejected by her. To this, Lord Granville, the Foreign Minister of England, had replied, that the Government would be happy to be the channel of communication between the belligerents with a view to peace, though they doubted whether they should not do more harm than good if they attempted to mediate without some previous assurance that both parties were willing to accept such offices. M. Thiers arrived in London on the 13th of September, and Lord Granville at once called on him by appointment. His Lordship thus relates, in a despatch to Lord Lyons, what passed at the interview :—

> "He (M. Thiers) said it was the desire of the Ministers to conclude an honourable peace, and for this purpose, at great inconvenience and with reluctance, but pressed, not only by the Government, but by all his Conservative and Liberal friends, he had undertaken to come first to this country and then to go to St. Petersburg and Vienna. He asked for no forcible intervention, but he appealed to England to exert her moral influence to obtain peace. It could not be for the interest of this country to abdicate her position as a Great Power. Although an island and a maritime Power, she belonged to Europe. In former times she had shown the interest which she took in the balance of power. She had shown the world what colonies and sailors she could send out. She could not wish to see France—who for forty years had been her ally, who had fought by her side in the Crimea, who, in times such as the Indian mutiny, had taken no advantage of her difficulties—humiliated and weakened. It was not for the interest of England that a dishonourable peace should be patched up which would leave France weak and irritable, unable to assist us, but ready for every occasion to recover her lost prestige. If England would only take the lead, all neutral nations would follow, and it would be impossible for Prussia to withstand the moral force of such public opinion in favour of humanity and the balance of European power. M. Thiers was much fatigued ; so I shortly recounted what had been our course. We had done all in our power to obtain peace ; we went beyond what we had a right to do in urging Spain to abandon a candidate whom she had a right fully to choose. We succeeded in removing the ground of quarrel. But the French Government had not been satisfied, had left us on one side, and had hastened to declare hostilities. We declared to Parliament (and our declaration was approved) that we intended to maintain a strict neutrality, and to endeavour to keep up friendly relations with both countries. From the first, we told all who pressed us that it was not our intention to offer ourselves as mediators unless we had reason to believe that mediation would be acceptable to both parties, and that there seemed to be a basis on which both belligerents would agree to negotiate ; that, by all we could learn, such a state of things had not arisen. We had some conversation as to the advantage of M. Favre going to head-quarters. I thought it would be of use, and M. Thiers was of opinion that M. Favre would not refuse to go."*

On a subsequent occasion M. Thiers pressed the immediate recognition of the Republic ; to which Lord Granville replied that "it would be contrary to precedent to do so at present ; that he wished to be in the most friendly relations with the French Government, but that it had had no legal sanction ; that it called itself a Government only for a special object ; and that it had announced the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, which would decide on the future Government of France." Lord Granville added that he believed her Majesty's Ministers would advise the Queen to acknowledge the Government as soon as the nation had formally recognised it, but that till then all practical ends in a time of crisis would be obtained by the existing relations.

Though his mission to London did not lead to the desired result, M. Thiers is said to have been pleased with the reception he met with from Mr. Gladstone and the Foreign Minister. He left London on the 18th of September, and proceeded successively to Vienna and St. Petersburg. Both the Austrian and Russian Governments, however, received his advances in the same spirit as that which had guided the determinations of our own.

The first of these visits was not without a collateral effect, which was very speedily seen. On the 19th of September the sometime Orleanist statesman arrived at Tours, the seat of the Delegate Government, where, on the previous day, nearly all the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, including Lord Lyons, had temporarily established themselves. M. Jules Favre, on the 19th, put the question (*viâ* London) to Count Bismarck, whether he would receive him at the head-quarters of the King. The reply was in the affirmative, and on the 20th and 21st two memorable interviews took place. Before the meeting, however, there had been some authoritative statements of both these representative men, which, as they clearly define the position of each, and therefore throw light on the points discussed at the personal interviews, it will be necessary here to record. While at Rheims, on the 13th of September, Count Bismarck addressed a circular note to the North German Ambassadors, in which he said :—

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* Blue Book on the War and the Treaty of 1856, presented to Parliament in February, 1871.

"Our relations with France having been misapprehended, even in friendly quarters, I am induced to communicate to you the views of the King, which are shared by the allied German Governments. We regarded the *plébiscite*, and the apparently satisfactory state of France consequent upon it, as guarantees of peace, and as an expression of the pacific disposition of the French nation. Subsequent events have undeceived us, or, at any rate, have shown how easily pacific sentiments may be converted into hostile action in France. Deputies, Senators, and newspapers, almost unanimously insisted upon war with a view to conquest in Germany. So loud and impetuous were they, that the few remaining friends of peace dared not oppose them, and the Emperor Napoleon probably told his Majesty the King no untruth when he asserted that the state of public opinion had compelled him to make war. Remembering this fact, we are not in a position to rely upon French feelings as a guarantee of peace. We must not conceal from ourselves that, in consequence of this present war, France will always be longing to attack us again, irrespective of any conditions we may think fit to impose. It is their defeat, it is our victorious repulse of their culpable attack, which the French nation will never forgive us. Even were we to evacuate France now without requiring any accession of territory, pecuniary indemnity, or other advantage except martial glory, the French nation would, nevertheless, cherish a deep hatred against us, and seek to avenge our offence to their vanity, and the check we have put to their lust of conquest. They would wait for a day when they might hope to act up to these feelings with a chance of success. It was no doubt of the justice of our cause, or of the adequacy of our strength, which made us declare that the war was all but forced upon us in 1867; but we had no wish, by means of our victories, to excite the passions of the French, and to bring on an era of irritation and war, while we yet hoped, by carefully and patiently developing the amicable relations between the two countries, to create a solid basis for an era of peace and prosperity for both nations. But having been compelled to unsheath the sword, which we had wished to leave in its scabbard, we must endeavour to gain some better guarantees against a future attack on the part of the French people than can be found in their friendly disposition towards us. . . . . We are therefore compelled to exact material guarantees for the safety of Germany against future attacks from France—guarantees which (Germany being a pacific nation) will likewise protect the peace of all Europe. These guarantees we shall demand, not of any temporary Government of France, but of the French nation itself, which, no matter who were its rulers, has for centuries been in the habit of invading Germany. Our conditions of peace will, therefore, mainly be directed to render it more difficult for France to make another attack on the German frontier, and more particularly on the South German frontier, so long defenceless. To effect this we shall endeavour to remove our frontier, and with it the point of attack, further west. We shall also endeavour to possess ourselves of those French fortresses, and shall convert them into defensive strongholds of Germany."

In a second circular, dated Meaux, September 16th, Count Bismarck referred to the communication addressed, on the 6th of September, by M. Favre to the French representatives abroad, extracts from which will be found on page 129. He also alluded to the missions of M. Thiers, and said he believed he would "make it his task to create a belief in the pacific disposition of the Paris Government, and would "request the intervention of foreign Powers on behalf of a peace," depriving Germany of "the fruits of her victory," and excluding "all conditions calculated to render the next French attack on Germany more difficult." The Count added that he could not credit the Paris Government with any earnest intention to terminate the war while it continued to stimulate the passions of the French nation, and to declare beforehand that all terms acceptable to Germany would be unacceptable to France. By this demeanour, he thought, the Paris Government impaired its ability to conclude a peace. The "cool suggestion" that Germany should conclude an armistice without any guarantee for obtaining her terms of peace, could be seriously meant only if it were supposed that the Prussian Government was deficient in military and political judgment, or indifferent to the interests of the country. The hope encouraged by the existing Administration that the neutral Powers would diplomatically or actively interfere in their favour, had an important effect in preventing the French from realising the necessity of concluding peace. As regards the final settlement of the Government in Paris, Count Bismarck said:—

"We have no wish to interfere with the domestic concerns of France. It is indifferent to us what Government the French people may choose to select for themselves. We have formally recognised no Government except that of the Emperor Napoleon; but with whatever sufficiently authorised Government we may have to negotiate the terms of peace, they will be independent of the question of how and by whom the French people are to be governed. Our terms will be dictated by the nature of things and the right of self-defence against a restless and aggressive neighbour. The unanimous voice of the German Governments and German people demands that Germany shall be protected by stronger frontiers than she has hitherto had against a repetition of the menaces and reckless invasions that have been practised against us for centuries by all French Governments in succession. While France possesses Strasburg and Metz, she has a better strategical base for attacking Southern

Germany and the left bank of the Rhine than we have to defend them. Strasburg in French hands is an ever-open sallyport against Southern Germany. In German hands, Strasburg and Metz will acquire a purely defensive character. In the course of more than twenty wars with France we never were the attacking party, and even now we have nothing else to ask of the French nation than to permit us to remain in the enjoyment of our safety, so often imperilled by them. But whatever peace we may conclude with France, she will only regard it as an armistice, and, to avenge her present defeat, will attack us as unjustifiably and as ruthlessly as she has done this year the moment she thinks herself strong enough for the enterprise, either by herself or in union with allies. In rendering it more difficult for France—from whom all European troubles have so long proceeded—to assume the offensive, we likewise promote the common interest of Europe, which demands the preservation of peace. No disturbance of European peace is to be apprehended from Germany. Having been compelled to go to war, although we had carefully eschewed it for four years, despite the incessant provocations to our national pride, we now require future security as the prize of the great efforts we have been obliged to make in our own defence. No one will be able to reproach us with want of moderation, if we abide by this just and equitable demand."

Nothing is more remarkable in this document than the assumption, which prevails throughout, that Germany has always been a highly pacific and harmless Power, the quiet victim of wanton attacks which she has never provoked, nor even wished to retaliate. Nevertheless, it is well known that the history of Prussia has been a history of continual aggressions, some of which—especially the taking of Silesia, in 1740, by Frederick the Great, without any previous declaration of war—are unsurpassed in the annals of violence and perfidy. The partition of Poland, in which Prussia was one of the three accomplices; the opposition to the first French Revolution, with its episodes of faithless friendship; and the whole course of events since the accession of King William to the throne, show how dangerous and encroaching a Power is Prussia, and how unscrupulous she can be where advantage is to be gained. Whatever may be said in justification of the Danish war of 1864, and the Austrian war of 1866, they indicated a policy which was anything but pacific, and which was certainly not superior to the vulgar attractions of territorial acquisition. Even if we accept the often-repeated statement that Germany, as regarded her position in Europe, desired nothing but the re-combination, under one native rule, of all outlying members of the German family, France had great cause for anxiety, seeing that a large part of her eastern population, though it had become thoroughly French in feeling, was undoubtedly of Teutonic origin, and partly of Teutonic speech. When, therefore, Count Bismarck said that Germany was "a pacific nation"—that in German hands Strasburg and Metz would "acquire a purely defensive character"—that, in rendering it more difficult for France to assume the offensive, Germany was promoting "the common interest of Europe, which demands the preservation of peace," and that "no disturbance of European peace was to be apprehended from Germany"—he counted a little too confidently on the forgetfulness or the servile acquiescence of men. In view of such well-known facts as the enormous increase of the Prussian army, the conclusion of military conventions with the South German kingdoms, the constant state of preparation for immediate war, the immense provision of siege-guns (which could hardly have been needed for defensive purposes), the vast system of Prussian *espionage* established in France for several years, and resulting in the collection of a great deal of information about French fortresses, the exasperating language held towards France by German poets and journalists, the publication of maps in which Alsace and Lorraine were included in Germany,* and, ultimately, the secret adoption by Prussia of an act of foreign policy which she knew would be accepted by her rival as a provocation to war—it is impossible to charge on France the whole blood-guiltiness of the conflict, however large may be her share.

Bismarck's two circulars confirm the reports of the Count's conversations given by newspaper correspondents. They shadow forth a dark and hopeless future for France and Germany; and, by their quiet assumption of fixed ill-will on the part of the former towards the latter, almost preclude the possibility of any other feeling.

M. Favre issued a circular on the 17th of September, explaining the motives of the abortive decree, which convoked the election of a Constituent Assembly, and enlarging on the general principles set forth in the circular of September 6th. The Minister here says:—

"We have not the pretension to ask disinterestedness of Prussia. We take account of the feelings to which the greatness of her losses and the natural exaltation of victory have given rise in her. These feelings explain the violence of the press, which we are far from confounding with the inspirations of

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* The celebrated geographer, Kiepert, published at Berlin, in 1867, a map thus constructed.



GENERAL VOGEL VON FALKENSTEIN.

statesmen. These latter will hesitate to continue an impious war, in which more than 200,000 men have already fallen. To force conditions upon France which she could not accept, would only be to compel a continuance of the war.

"It is objected that the Government is without regular power to be represented. It is for this reason that we immediately summon a freely-elected Assembly. We do not attribute to ourselves any other privilege than that of giving our soul and our blood to our country, and we abide by its sovereign judgment. It is therefore not the authority reposed in us for a day; it is immortal France uprising before Prussia—France divested of the shroud of the Empire, free, generous, and ready to immolate herself for right and liberty, disavowing all political conquest and all violent propaganda, having no other ambition than to remain mistress of herself, to develope her moral and material forces, and to work fraternally with her neighbours for the progress of civilisation—it is this

France, which, left to her free action, immediately asks the cessation of the war, but prefers its disasters a thousand times to dishonour. Vainly those who set loose a terrible scourge try now to escape the crushing responsibility by falsely alleging that they yielded to the wish of the country. This calumny may delude people abroad, but there is no one among us who does not refute it as a work of revolting bad faith. The motto of the elections in 1869 was peace and liberty, and the *plébiscite* itself adopted it as its programme. It is true that the majority of the Legislative Body cheered the warlike declarations of the Duc de Gramont; but a few weeks previously it had also cheered the peaceful declarations of M. Ollivier. A majority emanating from personal power believed itself obliged to follow docilely and vote trustingly; but there is not a sincere person in Europe who could affirm that France, freely consulted, made war against Prussia.

"I do not draw the conclusion from this that we are not responsible. We have been wrong, and are cruelly expiating our having tolerated a Government which led us to ruin. We admit the obligation to repair by a measure of justice the ill it has done; but if the Power with which it has so seriously compromised us takes advantage of our misfortunes to overwhelm us, we shall oppose a desperate resistance, and it will remain well understood that it is the nation, properly represented in a freely elected assembly, that this Power wishes to destroy."



CAMDEN PLACE, CHISLEHURST.

The argument here set forth, that the French people were opposed to the war, and that the Emperor declared war in defiance of popular sentiment, is in direct contradiction of the avowal, made by M. Favre in his earlier circular, that the dissent of himself and his colleagues from the policy of July cost them their popularity. It is to be suspected that the first statement was one of those accidental admissions which are often more truthful than elaborate after-thoughts. But, whichever assertion be correct, it is obvious that, as a mere matter of policy, M. Favre made a mistake in so vehemently and repeatedly declaring that France had committed a great sin in declaring war, and that so far all the right was on the side of Prussia. That he should have stated briefly at the outset that he and others were against the war from the beginning, and were now desirous of withdrawing from it, would have been nothing more than truthful, reasonable, and wise; but the fewer words the better. To make such passionate avowals of a State crime deliberately planned by a French Government, and carried into execution to the injury of Prussia, was to furnish Count Bismarck with a weapon of which he was certain to make use. It enabled the Prussian Minister to retort, in effect, "You say that you and other Republican members of the Corps Législatif dissented from the policy of the war, and publicly spoke against such a course. Very well; but you were unable to prevent it. If you could not prevent it in July, 1870, you might be equally unable at some future time. True, you are in power now; but who shall answer for the stability of any Government in France? It is the Moderate Republicans to-day; it may be the Red Republicans, the Convention, the Directory, the Orleanists, the elder Bourbons, the restored Buonapartes—what you will—to-morrow. You lose no opportunity of proclaiming that we have been made the objects of a wicked attack—of a ruthless piece of brigandage. How, then, can you object to our protecting ourselves in the future against similar assaults?" Such arguments may not have been conclusive, but they were certainly telling; and M. Favre acted foolishly in putting them into the mouth of his enemy. In his blind fury against the deposed dynasty he did an injury to the cause of his nation whose interests he had now to sustain.

It should also be observed that the clever lawyer overshot his mark, and proved too much. He says that the elections of 1869, by sending a majority of pacific members to the Corps Législatif, showed the desire of the country for peace. This is a tacit but inevitable admission that the Chamber fairly represented France. But when the occasion of quarrel arose, in July, 1870, only a very small minority of this Chamber voted against the war. To say that the majority was one "emanating from personal power" does not help M. Favre out of the dilemma, because, if at all, it was equally so in June, 1869, and in that case how can it be appeale to as faithfully reflecting the inclination of the country for peace, that being then the official policy? M. Favre should have recollected that among his own colleagues of the Provisional Government were some who voted for the war—M. Gambetta among the number.

A very full account of his interview with the Prussian Chancellor was given by M. Favre in a report addressed to his colleagues at Tours. When he took office, he states, he found that the Imperial Government had either neglected to ascertain the feelings of the European Cabinets with regard to the war, or had failed in the attempt to gain their support. It engaged in the war without any alliance, and in the midst of hostility or indifference, resulting from its menaces and pretensions. But immediately on the establishment of the Republic, the new order of things was officially recognised by the United States, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, while other Governments entered into relations which permitted the opening of useful negotiations. M. Favre declares that his object was "to induce the Powers who signed the league of neutrality to intervene directly with Prussia" on the basis of conditions which he laid down. "Four of those Powers," continues he, "offered to do so. I testified to them my gratitude in the name of my country; but I wished to have the co-operation of the two others. One of them promised me an independent action, reserving its liberty respecting it; the other proposed to be my intermediary with Prussia. It even went a step further. Upon the request of the Envoy Extraordinary of France, it was willing to give direct countenance to my proceedings. I asked for much more, but I have refused no co-operation, esteeming that the interest which was evinced for us was a power not to be neglected." However, the exigencies of the time were pressing. The enemy was every hour drawing nearer to Paris, and M. Favre determined to make a supreme effort in the interests of peace.

His original intention was to keep his mission a secret; but it was mentioned in a public journal. On starting, he did not know where the King's head-quarters were then situated. He imagined them to be at Grosbois, and made his way towards the enemy by the gate of Charenton. "I suppress," writes M. Favre, "all the details of this sorrowful journey, full of interest nevertheless, but which would not be in place here." At Villeneuve St. Georges he found the General-in-Chief commanding the sixth corps, from whom he learnt that head-quarters were at Meaux; but on nearing that town he was informed by an aide-de-camp that Count Bismarck had left Meaux with the King, to sleep at Ferrières. "We had passed each other," continues M. Favre, "and by retracing our steps we should both of us meet. I retraced my path, and halted in the courtyard of a farm entirely plundered, as were nearly all the houses I passed on my way." At the end of an hour Count Bismarck joined him there; but, finding it impossible to talk in such a place, they adjourned to the Château de la Haute Maison, belonging to Count de Rillac. The conversation was held in a saloon, disordered and strewn with fragments. M. Favre says he should like to report the whole of the discourse as he dictated it to a secretary on the following day; but he could not give more than an analysis. He proceeds to relate that he began the discussion by stating that, having already published the intentions of the French Government, he wished to know those of the Prussian Prime Minister. The war was the creation of an individual, and had no longer any object now that France had again become her own mistress. He continues :—

"I offered to guarantee her desire for peace, and at the same time her irrevocable resolve not to accept any condition which would render this peace a short and threatening truce. M. de Bismarck replied to me that, were he convinced that such a peace was possible, he would sign it directly. He acknowledged that the Opposition had always condemned the war. But the power which this Opposition represents at present is more than precarious. If in a few days Paris is not taken, it will be overthrown by the populace. I immediately interrupted him by saying we had no populace in Paris, but a population intelligent and devoted, fully aware of our intentions, and who would not become accomplices of the enemy by fettering our mission of defence. With regard to our power, we were ready to place it in the hands of the Assembly which we have already convoked. 'This Assembly,' replied the Count, 'might have designs which nothing can make us foresee. If it listens to the sentiments of France, it will desire war. You would no more forget the capitulation of Sedan than that of Waterloo, or that of Sadowa, which did not affect you.' Further, he maintained strongly the determination clearly expressed by the French nation to attack Germany and to deprive her of a portion of her territory. 'From Louis XIV. down to Napoleon III. these tendencies have not changed, and when war was announced, the Corps Législatif received the words of the Minister with acclamations.' I remarked to him that the majority of the Corps Législatif had a few weeks before received the news of peace with acclamation, that this majority chosen by the Prince (?) unfortunately thought itself obliged to confide blindly in him, but, being consulted twice—at the elections of 1869, and at the vote of the *plébiscite*—the nation had energetically adhered to a political course of peace and liberty. The conversation was prolonged on this subject, the Count maintaining his opinion and I defending mine; and, as I pressed him hard as to the conditions, he replied distinctly that the security of his country demanded that he should retain the territory which guaranteed it. He repeated several times, 'Strasburg is the key of the house; I ought to have it.' I requested him to be more explicit. 'It is useless,' he objected; 'we cannot come to terms; it is a matter which must be decided later.' I requested him to do so immediately; he then told me that the two departments of the Bas and Haut Rhin, and a part of that of the Moselle, including Metz, Château Salins, and Soissons, were indispensable to him, and that he could not recede from these conditions. I remarked to him that the consent of the people whom he thus disposed of was more than doubtful; that the public rights of Europe would not permit him to disregard it. 'Oh, yes, indeed,' he replied to me, 'I am perfectly aware that they do not desire us. We shall have some hard work cut out for us by them; but we cannot do otherwise than take them. I am certain that at a future time we shall have a fresh war with you, and we wish to undertake it under every advantage.' I expostulated, as was my duty, against similar propositions. I said that it seemed to me as if two important elements had been lost sight of in this discussion: in the first place, Europe might find such pretensions exorbitant, and offer opposition; and again, that modern rights and the progress of all customs were entirely antipathetic to such exigencies. I added that, as far as we were concerned, we could never agree to them."

M. Favre further remarked that it was clear that Prussia, led away by the frenzy of victory, desired the destruction of France. The Count protested against this conclusion, and again alleged the absolute necessity of a material guarantee. M. Favre then required facilities for the calling together of an Assembly, which would appoint a definite Government, able to appreciate the conditions imposed by the Germans. To this Count Bismarck replied that an armistice would be necessary for the carrying out of such a design, and he would not grant one on any terms. The conversation then "took a more and more painful turn." Night came on, and M. Favre requested the Prussian Chancellor to grant him a second interview. They parted for a time, and, on meeting again at half-past nine P.M., resumed the discussion, which continued till midnight. The representative of France dwelt much on the necessity of convoking an Assembly. Count Bismarck appeared to allow himself to be convinced by degrees, but referred to the armistice. M. Favre asked for a fortnight, and the conditions were discussed. The Count, however, expressed himself very vaguely, and finally said he must consult the King. The interview was then adjourned to the following day, at eleven o'clock. On the 21st the two Ministers met at another house, the Château Ferrières.

"The Count came from the King at a quarter to twelve, and I heard from him the conditions upon which an armistice would be granted; they were written in the German language, and a verbal communication was made to me of their purport. He asked as a guarantee the occupation of Strasburg, Toul, and Phalsburg; and as, in answer to a question from him, I had told him on a previous day that the Assembly would take place in Paris, he wished in this case to have a fort dominating the city, as, for instance, that of Mont Valérien. I interrupted him by remarking, 'It is much simpler to ask for Paris at once. How can you suppose that a French Assembly could deliberate under your guns? I had the honour of informing you that I should faithfully communicate our interview to the Government, and I hardly know if I dare mention to them that you have made such a proposal to me.' 'Let us seek some other combination,' he replied. I spoke to him of a meeting of the Assembly at Tours, no guarantee being given as far as Paris was concerned. I suggested he should speak of this to the King, and, again speaking of the occupation of Strasburg, he added, 'The town will fall into our hands; it is now only a matter of calculation for our engineers. Therefore I demand of you that the garrison shall surrender themselves prisoners of war.' At these words I could not suppress my feelings, and, rising, I cried, 'You forget you are speaking to a Frenchman, M. le Comte. To thus sacrifice a heroic garrison whose behaviour has been admired universally, and more particularly by us, would be cowardice, and I promise not to say that you have offered me such a condition.' The Count replied that he had no intention of hurting my feelings; that he conformed to the laws of war; and that, moreover, if the King gave his consent, this article might be modified."

Count Bismarck left to consult his Majesty, and returned in a quarter of an hour. It then appeared that the King accepted the proposal as to Tours, but insisted that the garrison of Strasburg should constitute themselves prisoners. It would seem that M. Favre was out of health at the time, for he describes himself as being "perfectly exhausted" on the return of Count Bismarck. For a moment he thought he should faint, and turned away to hide the tears which suffocated him. Asking to be excused for his involuntary weakness, he took his leave in these words:—"I made a mistake, M. le Comte, in coming here; but I do not regret it. I have suffered sufficiently to excuse myself in my own eyes; but in any case I only yielded to a feeling of duty. I will report to my Government all that you have said, and, should they consider it fit again to send me to you, however cruel the task for me, I shall have the honour of returning. I am grateful for the kindness you have shown me, but I fear that all that can be done is to let events take their course. The inhabitants of Paris are courageous, and resolved to make every sacrifice; and their heroism may change the course of events. If you have the honour of conquering them, you will never subjugate them. The whole nation is possessed with the same sentiments. As long as there can be found one element of resistance amongst us, we shall fight you. This becomes an interminable struggle between two nations who should extend their hands to each other. I had hoped for a different solution. I leave, most unhappy, but nevertheless full of hope."

Having consulted with his colleagues, M. Favre, on the 24th of September, reported to Count Bismarck that the Government declined to sanction his propositions. They would accept an armistice in order to proceed to the election and meeting of a National Assembly, but could not subscribe to the conditions by which the armistice was to be surrounded. In concluding his narrative, M. Favre remarked that he and his colleagues had at any rate "abolished the equivocal position in which Prussia enclosed herself, and which Europe did not help to dissipate." Her real intentions were now apparent. France must now either disavow the Government, or fight to the end.

The very dramatic narrative of M. Favre reflects with remarkable clearness the character of the two men—we might say of the two nations also—and shows, as in a microcosm, why the one succeeded and the other failed. M. Favre was all emotion, agitation, and hysterical vehemence; with (perhaps it may be added) a little hint of theatrical or forensic posturing. "I hardly know if I dare mention to my colleagues that you have made such a proposal to me"—"You forget you are speaking to a Frenchman, M. le Comte"—"I made a mistake, M. le Comte, in coming here"—all these elegant little turns of speech betray the Frenchman's besetting weakness for imagining that everything is to be accomplished by a start, an attitude, a sarcasm, or an epigram. On the other hand, we see Count Bismarck, cold, calm, collected, business-like, inexorable as fate, knowing exactly what he wanted, determined to have it, and in the meanwhile playing with his victim in all the quiet superiority of power. Of course, the relative position of the two men should not be forgotten; but a negotiator with a greater command over his feelings than M. Favre possessed would have been better fitted, even with all the disadvantages of defeat, to encounter the iron strength of Bismarck.

In answer to M. Favre's circular, Count Bismarck addressed a despatch to the representatives of the North German Confederation abroad. He admitted that, on the whole, M. Favre had "endeavoured to convey an accurate account of the transaction;" but, with regard to the drift of his entire argument, he observed that the primary topic of their conversation was not the conclusion of peace, but the settlement of an armistice.

"As to our terms of peace, I expressly declared to M. Favre that I should state the frontier we should claim only after the principle of cession of territory had been publicly conceded by France. In connection with this, the formation of a new Moselle district, with the arrondissements of Saarbruck, Château Salins, Saargemünd, Metz, and Thionville, was alluded to by me as an arrangement included in our intentions; but I have not renounced the right of making such further demands as might be calculated to indemnify us for the sacrifices which a continuance of the war would entail. M. Favre called Strasburg the key of the house, leaving it doubtful which house he meant. I replied that Strasburg was the key of *our* house, and we therefore objected to leave it in foreign hands. Our first conversation, in Château de la Haute Maison, near Montry, was confined to an abstract inquiry into the general characteristics of the past and present ages. M. Favre's oddly pertinent remark on this occasion was that they would pay any sum—all the money we have—rather than cede any territory. Upon my declaring such cession to be indispensable, he said that in that case it would be useless to open negotiations for peace; and he argued on the supposition that to cede territory would humiliate—nay, dishonour—France. I failed to convince him that terms such as France had obtained from Italy and demanded from Germany, without even the excuse of previous war—terms which France would have undoubtedly imposed upon us had we been defeated, and in which nearly every war had resulted down to the latest times—could have nothing dishonouring in themselves to a country vanquished after a gallant struggle; and that the honour of France was of no other quality or nature than the honour of all other countries."

The conversation took a more practical turn at the Château Ferrières, where reference was made to the question of an armistice. It was agreed by the two diplomatists that an armistice might be concluded, so as to allow of the election of a French Assembly; but Count Bismarck added that an armistice is always injurious to an army in the midst of a victorious career, and that if, by such an arrangement, the Germans were to be detained in France longer than was absolutely necessary, they must insist upon increased means of bringing up provisions—that is to say, the surrender of those fortresses, such as Strasburg, Toul, and some less important places, which obstructed their communications with Germany. As regarded Paris, they could permit its renewed intercourse with the rest of France only if the importation of fresh provisions thereby rendered possible did not weaken their own military position, and retard the date at which they might hope to starve out the place. After consultation with the military authorities, and having taken the King's commands, Count Bismarck submitted to M. Favre the following alternative:—"Either the fortified places of Paris are to be given into our hands by the surrender of a commanding portion of the works—in which case we are ready to allow Paris renewed intercourse with the country, and to permit the provisioning of the town; or, the fortified places of Paris not being given into our hands, we shall keep them invested during the armistice." Without such an arrangement, Paris would, at the conclusion of the armistice, be reinforced by fresh supplies, and strengthened by new defences. M. Favre at once declined to hand over any portion of the Paris works, and also refused the surrender of the Strasburg garrison as prisoners of war; but he promised to take the opinion of his colleagues at Paris respecting the other alternative under which the military *status quo* before Paris was to be maintained.

"Accordingly, the programme which M. Favre brought to Paris as the result of our conversations, and which was rejected there, contained nothing as to the future conditions of peace. It only included an armistice of from a fortnight to three weeks, to be granted on the following conditions, in order to enable the election of a National Assembly to be held:—Firstly, in and before Paris the maintenance of the military *status quo*; secondly, in and before Metz the continuance of hostilities within a circle hereafter to be more accurately defined; thirdly, the surrender of Strasburg with its garrison, and the evacuation of Toul and Bitsche, their garrisons being accorded free retreat. I believe our conviction that this was a very acceptable offer will be shared by all neutral Cabinets. If the French Government has not availed itself of this opportunity for having a National Assembly elected in all parts of France, those occupied by us not excepted, this indicates a resolve to prolong the difficulties which prevent the conclusion of a valid peace, and to ignore the voice of the French people. From all we see here the conviction is forced upon us, as it no doubt is likewise upon the rulers of Paris, that free and unbiassed general elections would yield a majority in favour of peace."

However absurd it may have seemed to the icy intellect of Bismarck that the French Government should have refused his offers, it is difficult to deny that M. Favre and his colleagues interpreted in this respect the general and natural feeling of their countrymen. A great nation, with centuries of illustrious history at its back, cannot exhibit an alacrity in confessing itself vanquished. It must continue to struggle, even after repeated defeats, and must refuse to succumb while there is yet a distant hope of success. At the period of M. Favre's interview with the Prussian Minister, the prospects of France, though gloomy, were not absolutely desperate; and the guardians of the national honour would not have been justified in consenting to an armistice coupled with terms which would certainly have placed Germany in a position of further advantage, and France in a position of still greater disadvantage, when the time of truce had reached its limits. The surrender of a commanding portion of the Paris fortifications, or, failing that, the continuance of the investment so as to prevent the revictualling of the city, and thus to weaken the defence, while the powers of the Germans for offence were in no degree impaired; the continuance of hostilities in and before Metz, the surrender of Strasburg and its garrison, and the evacuation of Toul and Bitsche; were all stipulations of a most one-sided character, having rather the nature of contrivances for ensuring ultimate victory to Prussia than the qualities of an equitable arrangement with a view to the conclusion of a peace such as both countries might honourably sign. The acceptance of such terms by France would have been tantamount to confessing herself thoroughly beaten, and to placing her fate unreservedly in the hands of her enemy. When, moreover, it is borne in mind that the armistice thus fashioned was to be the preliminary to a peace by which France was to be deprived of a considerable portion of her dominions, and of several fortresses of great strength, it becomes still more obvious that the Provisional Government could not have assented to such terms on their own undivided responsibility, unless they had been reduced to a much greater extremity than that in which they then found themselves. It is easy to say that five months later they were compelled to accept very similar conditions. The argument is not pertinent. In September, 1870, it yet remained to be seen whether Paris could withstand and repel a siege; whether the provinces could raise armies of sufficient size and discipline to vanquish the enemy in the open field; whether Bazaine could break out of Metz; whether other fortresses in the east of France could hold out against the assaults of the



BALLOON STARTING FROM PARIS.



THE EXPLOSION AT LAON.

Germans; and whether the Republic could obtain allies. All these possibilities may have been extremely problematical; but a small band of self-appointed men, precluded by the very conditions in dispute from consulting the nation, would have incurred a great responsibility had they laid their country prostrate at the feet of the invader, while the resources of an active defence were as yet imperfectly developed. During the late autumn and early winter, there were times when success seemed possible. With advancing January, however, the chances of the French rapidly and irretrievably declined; and the humble submission which would have been voluntary in 1870 became scarcely avoidable in 1871.

On the side of the Germans it may be said that, feeling themselves in a position of superiority, they did but endeavour to make the best bargain they could, as an indemnity for the cost and sacrifices of a war in which they believed their country to be right, and which they had not nominally commenced, however apparent it may be to impartial observers that they contributed to the causes which brought it to pass. Yet it is obvious that the war was no longer with them an act of simple self-defence, but an attempt to gain territory, and to exalt Germany by the depression of France. The pretences about guarding against future attack, and rendering France powerless for mischief in the European system, were simply the decent veils with which diplomacy always conceals its purposes. France was willing to give guarantees for the future by paying a large money indemnity, dismantling the eastern fortresses, and sacrificing a portion of the fleet. What was really wanted, however, was not so much protection as aggrandisement and supremacy. Fanatical writers lost no opportunity of preaching that the French were a wicked, God-abandoned race, and that the Germans were the divinely appointed instruments for their humiliation. Anecdotes were told of the devotion of the German troops in church, and of the indifference of the French soldiers to all sacred considerations; of hymn-books being found in the knapsacks of the one army, and of light stories and wanton photographs being discovered in those of the other. It was argued that the French were wholly given up to frivolity, vicious indulgence, and unscrupulous ambition; that French literature was corrupt, that French art was tawdry, that French science was behind the age, that French learning was shallow, that French society was debased. On the other hand, it was maintained that Germany was sound, virile, pure, truthful, and religious; that she was at the head of the world in arms, arts, literature, and science; and that she had a natural right to take priority of the nations. No doubt there was a measure of truth in all this. The French character has some weaknesses and vices from which the Germans are comparatively free; and the latter can boast of solid virtues which it would be folly or envy not to admire and respect. But the German Kingdoms possess no monopoly of goodness; and the French disposition has many amiable and noble features, such as humanity cannot afford to depreciate or deny. We are too apt to condemn the French for the faults of Paris; and even Paris has its heroic and luminous side. In September, 1870, however, there was a fashion of worshipping the Germans and spurning the French; and the Germans turned the feeling to profitable account in advancing their demands and magnifying their pretensions.

Quietly secluded at Wilhelmshöhe, the Emperor Napoleon must all this while have revolved such matters in his mind, and may perhaps have congratulated himself that the burden of continuing the war had passed from his own to other shoulders. He lived very unassumingly, but was not seldom seen by the people of the surrounding country, his movements being free within a radius of several miles. His guard consisted of one officer, two subalterns, one trumpeter, and thirty-one men. He generally passed his mornings, during the earlier weeks of captivity, in promenading with some of his generals on the lawn in front of the castle, or in taking walks, accompanied by Prince Achille Murat, with a servant following at a long distance. Great regularity was observed in his hours of dining, exercise, and sleeping. Dr. Conneau was generally at his side; and it was evident to all observers that he was still an invalid. Yet a correspondent of the *Times* remarked on the ease and agility with which he mounted and dismounted his horse, and on the affable and even cheerful expression of his face. Owing to the delicate state of his health, it was found necessary to keep his room warm all day by steam-pipes; and one night a pipe burst, putting the Emperor and his attendants in some danger of suffocation from the escaping vapour. Napoleon was visited in his retirement by the Duchess of Hamilton (his cousin), and by Lady Cowley, who came on a message from the Empress, with whom she had long been on very friendly terms. The Duchess stayed in the palace for an hour, when she was conducted back to her carriage by the Emperor himself, who, as she drove away, uncovered his head in some emotion, and then returned to the house with slow and meditative steps. Lady Cowley, on the day of her arrival, had a long interview with the Emperor, and returned to England the same evening.

Towards the end of September a correspondent of the *Standard* reported in that paper a conversation which he had had with the Emperor. Having been conducted into a room where Napoleon was sitting privately, he was received with much courtesy.

> "If" (he writes) "I am asked what was the predominant impression left on me by the conversation which followed, I reply unhesitatingly the strong feeling of the Emperor with respect to England. Almost the first words that passed his lips were an expression of gratification at the numerous letters of condolence and sympathy he had received 'since his misfortunes' from persons who were perfect strangers to him, and there was nothing on which he seemed to dwell with so much pleasure as on the advance which has been made during his reign in the cordial understanding between the two countries. 'When I came to Paris,' he said, 'there were still great remains of the old ill-feeling;' and he dwelt with marked gratification on the change that had since taken place. He was much interested, too, in the condition of English feeling at the present time, questioning me closely on the subject, and expressing his regret at the tone assumed by a portion of the London press. The monstrous statement of his having appropriated some fifty millions of the army votes seemed particularly galling to him. 'As if,' he said, 'I could possibly have done such a thing, even if I had desired it.' The assistance given by England to his wounded soldiers had evidently made a great impression upon him. Speaking of France, and of the present condition of affairs there, his tone—which in dealing with other matters had been earnest, but not uncheerful—saddened visibly, and he sighed heavily as he spoke of the state of things at Lyons and elsewhere, and of a not impossible future in store for Paris. There was not the slightest appearance of resentment in the way in which he spoke of the changes that had recently taken place, but a terrible foreboding of what might come. I ventured to express a hope that all might yet go well, and that before long we might see him once more at the Tuileries. He sat for some moments silent; then, with a sigh, turned again to me, and said, 'No one can tell—no one can tell, sir, what may happen now.'"

An offer by the King of Prussia to allow the Empress and the Prince Imperial to reside at Wilhelmshöhe was declined; and the illustrious lady and her son, after quitting Hastings (which was on the 24th of September), took up their abode at Camden Place, Chislehurst, Kent — an old-fashioned mansion in a small park adjoining the west side of the common. Chislehurst is famous as the birthplace of Sir Francis Walsingham and of Sir Nicholas Bacon, father of Lord Bacon. Camden Place was the seat of the Camden family, and the great antiquary of the time of Elizabeth lived and died there. Fifty years ago it was the residence of Prince Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador; and it has now acquired a fresh distinction as having been the place of refuge of the Empress Eugénie during the convulsions consequent on the Franco-Prussian War. The surrounding country, which is in the general direction of Bromley, is beautifully wooded, and characterised by all the most charming features of English rurality.

The greater part of the Empress's money, valuables, clothes, &c., found at the Tuileries, was sent after her Majesty; but a portion of the money was kept back until it could be ascertained whether it belonged to the Empress personally or to the Civil List. Many of the documents found at the Tuileries were published by the Provisional Government, with a view to prejudicing the character of the Emperor and his Ministers. Some scandalous matters were thus revealed, but nothing of first-class importance, or worse than would probably come to light if the private affairs of other Royal and Imperial houses were brought before the public by successful revolutionists.

To mitigate in some measure the inconveniences of isolation, the ingenious Parisians organised a service of balloons, which kept up a degree of communication between the city and the outer world, and enabled the two Governments—that of Paris and that of Tours—to hear of one another from time to time. In the latter part of September the French post-office authorities announced that they would despatch balloons with private correspondence as regularly as the weather would permit, beginning from the 28th of the month. The letters were to be written on very thin paper, and each was to be open, and not to weigh more than three grammes. These were conveyed at the ordinary rates, prepaid; and many will doubtless be preserved to distant times, as memorials of the great siege. M. Jules Durnof, one of the aeronauts who guided these balloons, gave an interesting account of his adventures on a certain occasion. This was summarised in one of the English papers, where it was stated that M. Durnof "left the Place Saint Pierre Montmartre at eight in the morning of September 23rd. A strong east wind was blowing. He rose to the height of 3,000 yards, and was then driven in the direction of the Arc de Triomphe. Going still westward, he perceived the Prussians in clusters like bees below him, and, with a telescope, could distinctly see them pointing cannon at him. He saw the balls ascend almost perpendicularly in the air, exhaust their impetus, and then fall to the ground. Some of the balls arrived high enough to make the balloon vibrate perceptibly. Infantry fired at him with their rifles almost all the way from Paris to Mantes, but he was entirely out of their range. He reports that he distinctly saw the Prussian army in the valley of the Seine, in seven lines, flanked by cavalry. After a voyage of about three-quarters of an hour, he judged that he must have got far enough to come down in safety, and, by a curious coincidence, he descended (near Evreux) in the park of a château belonging to Admiral Roncière La Noury, afterwards in command of the sailors who manned the forts of Paris. M. Durnof was furnished with an authority from the Postmaster-General, and had orders to give his despatches to nobody but a Prefect or a General, and to destroy them rather than let them fall into the hands of any other person." He was fortunately enabled to take them on to Tours. Sometimes, however, the balloons descended inopportunely among the Germans, and when they contained official despatches this was a serious misfortune to the French. But, on the whole, the service was extremely useful, and will doubtless be resorted to in all future wars. France is the native country of balloons, which had before been used for reconnoitring purposes, but never until then for keeping up the communications of a besieged city.

In addition to the balloons, the French made great use of the carrier-pigeon as a means of sending letters and despatches to and fro. The writings were photographed, and reduced to so minute a size that not a word could be read without the aid of a powerful magnifying glass; and in this way one bird would carry thousands of missives. Such are among the ameliorating features of war, when science comes to the aid of humanity.

CHAPTER XIII.

Surrender of Laon—Explosion in the Citadel—Accusations of Treachery against the French—Various Accounts of the Event—Acquittal of General d'Hame of Participation in the Crime—The Town of Laon—Action in front of it in 1814—General Vinoy's Retreat on Laon on his Road to Paris—State of the Defences of the Town—Progress of the Siege of Strasburg—Opening of the Parallels—Description by Berthold Auerbach—Visit of Swiss Delegates to General Uhrich—Refugees from Strasburg—Sharp Encounter before the Walls—Capture of a Lunette—The German Losses—Monotony of the Siege—Terrific Bombardment—Capitulation of Strasburg—Insubordination of the French Troops—Proclamations by General Uhrich and the Mayor—Outrages on the Germans—Distress caused by the Bombardment—Narrative of a Sufferer—Anti-German Feeling in Strasburg—The Ruined Quarters of the City—Destruction of the Library—Damage to Kehl—Popular Excitement in Strasburg—Arrival of French Prisoners at Rastadt.

WE must now quit Paris for a while, and turn our attention to the various operations which were progressing in other parts of France. It happened very unfortunately for the French that, while the Germans were marching on Paris, an incident occurred which greatly exasperated the feelings of the conquerors against the conquered. On the 9th of September the town of Laon surrendered to the 6th Cavalry Division. After the conclusion of the capitulation, the fourth company of the fourth Rifle Battalion occupied the citadel; and, as the last men of the Mobile Guards were leaving, a terrible explosion ensued, by which great damage was caused to the city and fortress, Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was bruised, and ninety-five Riflemen and three hundred Mobile Guards were either killed or wounded. The powder magazine had blown up, and the King of Prussia, in telegraphing to Queen Augusta from Rheims, on the 11th of September, said that, "unquestionably," the disaster was to be attributed to treachery. The *Official Staats Anzeiger*, of September 14th, remarked on the untoward event:—"The French people have lately given but too many proofs of the lowest moral deterioration. The murders and crimes of the African regiments have long since been surpassed by the follies which have grown up on French soil. By the shameful deed perpetrated at Laon, which united a dishonourable violation of plighted faith to the commission of a horrible murder, this new mode of warfare has reached its climax. The question arises, how will it be possible for us to continue to the end our manner of carrying on the war in harmony with German civilisation, if the better classes in France, hitherto rendered dumb by terrorism—if the warning voices, in fact, of all civilised nations—do not make themselves heard in denunciation of the growing barbarism of that country?" It was hardly for those who had fired Bazeilles, and burnt numerous women and children alive, and who, so far from feeling any subsequent remorse, repeatedly and deliberately justified the act—it was hardly for the people thus conducting warfare to reproach the French on the score of "moral deterioration," murderousness, and "growing barbarity," or to boast of carrying on the war "in harmony with German civilisation." If, however, the explosion of the magazine at Laon had been the act of the Governor of the town, or the result of agreement among the officers engaged in the defence, it would undoubtedly have cast great disgrace upon the army. But subsequent investigations clearly showed that such was not the case. General d'Hame, who was in command of the citadel, was placed under arrest by the Prussians, but ultimately declared innocent. The firing of the mine seems to have been the work of a private soldier, who, without any concert with others, and obeying a blind and perverted instinct of patriotism, resolved to revenge the fall of Laon by one terrible blow. He himself is said to have perished in the explosion; and it should be observed that the French lost many more than the Prussians. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, writing to the Duchess, says that the explosion took place at a quarter past twelve, and that the authors of the crime were some of the non-commissioned officers of artillery, acting "with or without the knowledge of the commandant." He adds that all the measures necessary for the springing of the mine must have been concerted some time before; but of this there is no proof. "The following," he continues, "are our losses:—1 officer killed (Captain Mann), 8 officers wounded, including myself and Stab; 34 non-commissioned officers and soldiers killed, amongst whom is Ensign von Amsberg; 63 non-commissioned officers and soldiers wounded, and 7 horses killed. My horse, wonderful to say, was unhurt. Staff-Adjutant Lehmann was slightly wounded in the head, but is with us here now. His horse was killed. Other horses, which were fastened in the lower part of the Faubourg, where the shells and bombs in falling caused terrible damage, broke their tethers, and escaped. That portion of the town which is situated beside the fortress is reduced to ruins. The loss of the Gardes Mobiles may be estimated, without exaggeration, at 400 men, and that of the inhabitants at 700 to 800 men. This treachery brought about its own punishment, for the French suffered more than we did. Our men conducted themselves in an exemplary manner, and, in spite of their natural irritation, committed no excess. Of course, neither the commandant, who is himself wounded, nor his officers, have obtained their liberty."

A French paper, recounting the circumstances of the surrender, says that, "after previous demands from several small bodies of cavalry had been rejected, a force of about five hundred appeared before the town, and an officer with a flag of truce demanded an interview with the Governor. He was taken to the citadel, where he saw the General commanding, Thérémin d'Hame, who, upon learning his errand, gave a blunt refusal to surrender. The Prussian officer then proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville, where he was received by the Mayor. Although the citadel is an acknowledged fortified post, the town of Laon itself is regarded as open, and therefore no resistance could be offered by it. An agreement to surrender the town was made, but the General persisted in his refusal. Late at night, however, he received a telegram from the Minister of War, stating that, as the citadel was not defensible, it should be surrendered. In consequence of that despatch, two officers of the Garde Mobile were sent on the following morning to the Prussian camp to announce the decision which placed both the town and the citadel of Laon at their disposal. At noon, a body of Prussian infantry, about 1,000 strong, preceded and followed by cavalry, entered the town with their band playing. A portion of the force proceeded directly to the citadel, hitherto occupied by the Garde Mobile, who now laid down their arms, and were declared to be prisoners of war on parole." The catastrophe then followed.

One of the most detailed accounts of the capitulation and its terrible attendant event was that of the *Courrier de l'Aisne*, which said:—

"According to the terms of the capitulation signed by the general, the Mobiles who composed the garrison were to lay down their arms and to engage not to serve during the present war. While they were defiling to go through the formalities required of them, a formidable explosion was heard; Frenchmen and Prussians were tumbled down and hurled together pell-mell, and a shower of stones and projectiles fell upon them. It was the magazine, containing 26,000 kilogrammes (about twenty-six tons) of powder, which had blown up. The shock was so great that the hill was shaken to its base, and oscillated four times, while in more than half the town the glass flew in shivers from the windows. Stones, beams, fragments of all sorts, whole masses of buildings, and Gardes Mobiles, were hurled into the air to a great height, and fell at incredible distances. Huge blocks were thrown as far as the Prefecture and the Rue du Chat, from 800 to 1,000 mètres distant. In the parts near the front of the citadel the houses were covered with the fragments, quantities of which fell through the roofs and the floors to the ground. Walls were thrown down, and some houses destroyed; corpses of Gardes Mobiles fell in the streets, and some were found in the lofts. The gardens in the neighbourhood were piled with fragments and rubbish; trees were torn up by the roots, or cut down as if with an axe. In the citadel those who had not been victims of the catastrophe rose and collected themselves. Some of the Mobiles who wished to fly received, it is said, some shots from the Prussian soldiers, who at once thought they had been drawn into a trap. The gates were shut and the streets at once guarded; people could not get back into their houses, and torrents of rain began to fall. The prefect, after some trouble, reached the citadel, and, with a colonel of the Duke of Mecklenburg's suite, gave attention to the wounded. The scene was terrible; corpses and arms encumbered the ground; during the evening, and even part of the next day, there was a continual stream of dead and wounded men borne through the streets, and for two days a stranger would have had no need to ask the way from the citadel to the Hôtel Dieu, for he need but have followed the red stream upon the pavement. The number is set down at 460 victims—200 of the French Garde Mobile killed or missing, and 130 more or less seriously injured. On the Prussian side are thirty dead, two of whom were officers, and sixty-five to seventy wounded."

Dreadful as were the consequences of the explosion, many of the Parisians rejoiced in it as an act of patriotism; so surely does a state of war awaken all the tigerish instincts of human nature. The *Débats*, however, pointed out that such conduct is contrary to the rules of military honour, and expressed great doubt as to whether General d'Hame had committed the act of treachery imputed him. Still, there could be no question that the explosion was intentionally brought about, by whomsoever it was effected; and it was another proof that the Franco-Prussian war rapidly assumed a peculiarly savage character. Such a result is very apt to ensue when all the success is on one side; for the victors become insolent with triumph, and the vanquished frantic with despair.



GENERAL UHRICH.

An officer of the Mobiles, belonging to the garrison of Laon, who left the place on the morning of the surrender, wrote an account of the affair in the Paris *Figaro*, from which we learn that the



RECONNOITRING NEAR STRASBURG.

Mayor dissolved the National Guards two days before the arrival of the Prussians. On the 8th the inhabitants kept General d'Hame a prisoner, in order to make him sign the surrender of the citadel. He was subsequently released, but the bad behaviour, or bad leadership, of the Mobiles is said to have finally determined him to yield the place. The citadel, it is added, was amply provided with guns, military stores, and provisions. The officer of Mobiles whose account we are following escaped from the town early in the morning; but he expresses his conviction that the explosion of the magazine was the work of the soldier who was on guard over the artillery. The chief circumstance which for a time gave colour to the suspicion that the general himself was responsible for the act, is the reluctance which he showed in surrendering the citadel—a point with respect to which he was at issue with the Mayor of the town, and on which he was ultimately over-ruled by the Minister of War. When, however, we find that the Prussians themselves afterwards acquitted General d'Hame of all share in the catastrophe, we may safely conclude that he was not responsible. Nevertheless, a Garde Mobile expressed a different opinion in the *Gaulois*. He said that the Mobiles in the citadel had been advised to leave by the townspeople, and that many had acted on the recommendation. "General d'Hame," continued this writer, "ordered the gates to be opened at the appointed hour, when some 300 Prussians entered the citadel. The detachments of Mobile Artillery first laid down their arms, then the first company of infantry, then the second, &c. A table was brought into the middle of the courtyard for the examination of various documents. The Mobiles to the grade of sergeant-major were liberated on the condition of not serving during the present war; the officers remained prisoners. At this moment the general looked at his watch, and told several of us to run away, as we were free; he then spoke a few words with the Prussian officers, and was about to sign, when a violent detonation took place. It seemed as if everything shook—walls, buildings, ground. I saw no more. I think I was blown aloft—rolled over. I jumped up, and had no hurt, and, running through the Prussian lines, gained my home. We are convinced it was General d'Hame alone who fired the magazine. The leaders of the Mobiles can know no more about it than we do. On General d'Hame lies the responsibility of having caused so many tears; but to him appertains the glory of having blown up a citadel which he was not allowed to hold. We Mobiles had nothing to do with the affair. Our chief was good and brave, but the population paralysed our movements. The general would have been able to hold out for a long time in the citadel, but the inhabitants threatened to fire on us." Notwithstanding the confident opinion of this writer, it is impossible to charge the guilt on General d'Hame after the investigation which established his innocence.

The town which was the scene of this tragical event is the capital of the department of the Aisne. It is seventy-five miles north-east from Paris, and is situated on a steep, isolated hill, commanding on every side an extensive view of the surrounding plains. Tradition says that it originated, in the reign of Clovis, from a castle which stood on the crest of the hill. In the later reigns of the Carlovingian dynasty, Laon was frequently the residence of the French kings, and it was a part of the crown domains. It consists of one principal street and several smaller streets, most of them more or less narrow, though of late years some improvements have been effected whenever the opportunity offered. An ancient wall, flanked with towers, surrounds the town, and on the top of the hill a magnificent prospect is obtained over the green and fertile country stretching for miles away. The cathedral of Notre Dame is the principal building in Laon; it belongs to the early part of the twelfth century, and, though completed in two years, is a massive and beautiful structure. The city was besieged in the civil contests of the Armagnacs and Bourguignons, and was taken from the League by Henry IV. in 1594. On the 9th of March, 1814, it witnessed an engagement between the armies of Napoleon I. and Blücher. The latter was stationed in force, partly on the elevated ground and partly in the plain below. The French advanced under cover of a thick fog, and for a time made great way, but were at length partially repulsed, and pursued in headlong flight to Corbeny. At another portion of the field, however, the French held some villages; but on the following day, after a very prolonged and desperate action, they were foiled in their attempt to enter Laon, and, though they bivouacked at night on the field, were compelled to fall back on Soissons on the morning of the 11th. Napoleon himself commanded in person on the right and centre; but the allies captured forty-eight pieces of cannon, and between five and six thousand prisoners.

Immediately after the disaster of Sedan General Vinoy retreated on Laon in the course of his retrograde movement on Paris, where, as we have seen, he ultimately arrived. He was harassed by 80,000 Prussians, who endeavoured to surround him. The remains of his army gathered about him on the line of his retreat, and marched for hours together without pausing. The general at length found himself at the head of 60,000 soldiers of all arms, with forty-eight guns and ten mitrailleuses. His cavalry, however, consisted of only 600 Hussars, who were not able to render much service. The enemy was unceasing in pursuit, and in the endeavour either to cut off Vinoy's retreat, or to take his columns in flank. The Germans often approached unperceived, under cover of the thick woods which line the road; and it was found necessary to disperse them before they had time to form, and to damage them as much as possible without stopping the march. To effect this, the ten mitrailleuses at the rear of the army were planted, and served with twenty-five men, who withheld their fire until the Prussians were massed at a distance of from 800 to 1,000 mètres. The effect on the enemy was terrible; and as soon as sufficient execution had been done, the batteries closed up to the rear of the advancing column, reloaded, and made preparations for another encounter. On approaching Laon, General Vinoy learned that the artillery of the enemy had outmarched him, and that forty guns were waiting to throw a cross-fire on his road. He immediately turned his men off the road into the fields, and, thus avoiding the Germans, reached Laon after a long and fatiguing march. Very few men were lost on the way, though some, overcome with fatigue, dropped out of the ranks. The fortifications of Laon were found by the general to be in a very bad state. Ditches had been dug across the roads in front of the gates; but they were so narrow that the children of the town, playing at Prussians, could clear them at a bound. The engineers of Vinoy's corps pronounced the works quite incapable of defence. The population were summoned to give their aid in repairing them, and set to work very heartily in the midst of deluging rain. After a time, however, they were dismissed, and the army retreated on Paris, leaving Laon, it is said, with but six guns that were fit for service in the citadel.

The siege of Strasburg became more serious and threatening after the days of Sedan. On the 4th and 5th of September the bombardment was so heavy that from fifteen to twenty shots a minute could be counted. The guns from the French batteries made but feeble response, and their fire caused little damage to the Germans. At the commencement of the bombardment the bomb-shells were charged under the bridge of the barracks at Kehl; but this operation was afterwards carried on partly in Neumühl, and partly in the immediate neighbourhood of the several batteries, by men stationed in huts constructed of railway iron, and covered with beams of wood and masses of earth, which the French endeavoured in vain to destroy by their fire. Many hundreds of persons fled from Strasburg during the siege, and were received into the cottages of the peasantry. They were for the most part exhausted with hunger, fear, and fatigue; and they reported that the city was in a desperate state, and that large numbers of persons had been suffocated in the cellars. A special correspondent of the *Carlsruhe Gazette*, writing from Mundelsheim on the 5th of September, said that continual attempts were being made from the fortress to disturb the progress and occupation of the works of the beleaguering armies. Sorties were frequent, and the artillery upon the ramparts and in the citadel desperately endeavoured to demolish the German batteries. The term "sortie," however, was no longer applicable, for beleaguers and beleagured stood close to each other. Directly in front of a churchyard, about a hundred yards east of the high road, a Prussian battery was planted upon the ruins of two large breweries, and 400 yards further on was the first French bastion. A terrible fire of grapeshot and shells was concentrated on this spot. The rampart-gun, which fires a shell weighing from eight ounces to one pound, was much used for clearing the glacis and ramparts of the enemy. The correspondent, continuing his communication, says:—

"The most satisfactory thing for us is that nearly all this firing proceeds from our guns, as the enemy makes but feeble response to our continued bombardment. Since yesterday all our batteries have been completed according to the plans proposed for the bombardment, and our heavy guns, placed at a distance of from 800 to 1,000 yards, are sending forth messages of destruction against the enemy's ramparts. The earthworks, which have been erected on an enormous scale, exceed the most fertile imagination, and the greatest amount of zeal and energy has been required to complete them in so short a time; the Gemmingen Battalion of the Baden Regiment of Grenadiers was quartered for six whole days and nights in the trenches. Contrary to all expectations, Schelestadt has found time and means to organise most formidable defences. The surrounding country is entirely under water. Since Friday the town has been bombarded, but every precaution has been taken to spare it as much as possible. In several villages and places of the interior of Alsace, force had to be brought to bear against the inhabitants, as in St. Marie-aux-Mines, which had to be submitted to a formal bombardment. A strong body of Francs-tireurs advanced to the support, but were repulsed, and about 2,000 of them were forced to surrender. The Baden troops are actively engaged in forcing submission upon the inhabitants of Alsace. People from Strasburg, who have taken refuge here, state that shortly after the commencement of the bombardment the citizens had thoroughly made up their minds to force the Governor to capitulate, and even a large portion of the garrison had made common cause with them in this resolve. When the Governor received information of the purposed movement, he had copies of a supposed telegram posted at every street corner announcing a great defeat of the Prussians and the arrival of 30,000 prisoners, and expressing a hope that the inhabitants would receive them with all due courtesy. Thereupon the inhabitants retired quietly to their homes, and resolved to act in every way with humanity and kindness towards the poor German prisoners whom the fortune of war had unexpectedly sent into their town."



PRUSSIAN ARTILLERYMAN.

A soldier of the 54th Landwehr Regiment gave, in the *Vossische Zeitung*, a very striking and picturesque account of the making of the first parallel before Strasburg, on the 29th of August. He wrote:—

"Five days have elapsed since we completed the first parallel at Schiltigheim. We were called out on a bright sunny afternoon from Rupprechtsau, where we were stationed as outposts, and led by roundabout ways in a zigzag direction, so as to disguise our design, up to a field behind Reichstett, where a halt was made to await sunset and the arrival of the engineers. When it became dark we started again. Quiet, without speaking a word, we marched along the road through the three neighbouring villages of Hohnheim, Bischheim, and Schiltigheim. Armed with hatchets and spades, the handles turned down and the iron upwards, in order to make no noise, we proceeded through the streets between the shut-up houses, over the doors of which small lanterns were glimmering. At last we reached the spot. Posted at arm's length from each other, we began to dig, eagerly, noiselessly, indefatigably. A trench three feet broad and three feet deep was the task for each. The night was pitch dark. The clear starry sky, with the moon's narrow crescent, had not illuminating power enough to show the faces of the workmen. The fortress was 800 steps before us; but we saw nothing either of it or of the battalions placed before us to protect us. Close behind us a battery launched bombs ceaselessly into the silent city. The loud yelling of dogs resounded from Schiltigheim, they, more vigilant than the besieged, being disturbed by our proximity. Now and then the iron of a spade made a noise, and emitted a spark through contact with a flint. The work lasted almost the whole night. Our feet were chilled by the wet ground; moist dew fell upon us; no morsel of bread, no warming draught, had we with us; we dared not even light a cigar; hunger and thirst spoiled our tempers. At last the task was done, before we had remarked it. Emboldened by this success, we retired amid laughing and talking, lighted cigars in our mouths, and arrived at break of day in our quarters, in order immediately to occupy the small island of Wake. We have since been daily employed—now in the burning sunshine, and now amid pouring rain—in erecting earthworks, which, in spite of the firing and occasional sorties from the fortress, advance with almost incredible rapidity."

This parallel was opened against the north-western front of the city, at a distance varying from 600 to 800 paces from the walls. During the night of the 31st of August the approaches to the second parallel were dug; and on the night of September 1st the second parallel itself was made, at a distance of from 300 to 400 paces. The siege batteries were finished with great rapidity; and by the 9th of

September ninety-eight rifled guns and forty mortars were placed in position. The detachment of Baden artillery stationed at Kehl fired from thirty-two rifled pieces and eight mortars on the citadel. In the nights between the 9th and 11th of September, the approaches to the third parallel were laid, and the work was completed at the latter date.

Amongst others, the siege of Strasburg was described by the celebrated author, Berthold Auerbach, who, having been summoned to the head-quarters of the Grand Duke of Baden, commenced a series of letters on the subject. In one of these, speaking of an early morning towards the close of August, he said :—

"The heavens were obscured with clouds. In a side road, artillerymen with low voices were practising the service of the guns. Higher up we mount between the vineyards; on the horizon flashes are seen leaping forth in quick succession, like summer lightning; the wind blows from us, and yet we continually hear the dull deep sound of the cannonade. There goes a mighty knock for admission. In Strasburg many lights were kindled, but in no long time extinguished. Beneath us, at the foot of the hill on the roadway, the movement of carts and horses went on uninterruptedly. It was like the strange rush of a torrent, and between whiles one heard the frequent cry of the wagoners and the call of commands. From Strasburg a flash, a report, made frequent reply, but of no observable accuracy. Silently we turn back to our quarters. In the hollow of the road a heavy gun had struck against a boundary stone and stood fast. Mysterious figures stand in the dark night beside the gun, and heave away under the cry, 'Steady!' A troop of Uhlans come out of the village. The ponderous mortar-gun is set afloat, and proceeds crashing, crackling, shaking the foundations of the causeway. Another gun follows. The soldiers, who had thrown their grey jackets over their uniforms, and had a weird spectral aspect, rode away from the remounting of the cannon, nimbly leaping on their guns and ammunition, as they proceeded along exultingly. So through the night do our fellow-citizens join in the service of the Fatherland. . . . . . .

"August 25.—Strasburg burns! In this word are crowded all the horrors, terrors, anguish of heart, we experienced in the past night. My eyes yet smart from the fire-flashes, my hand trembles still. So was it to be! Again is there a night of St. Bartholomew—for such was the one just passed—with detestation to be graven in history, but not through fault of ours. On those who must needs deck their heads with glory, on their heads alone lies the blame. The worst injury an enemy can inflict upon a man, upon a people, is to force them to acts from which they recoil with aversion. We are in the position of a man who declines a duel, and yet is compelled to shoot down his adversary. Unhappily it must be done. But yesterday we made offers to the Commandant of Strasburg to come out, or send a trusty officer, to convince himself that resistance was in vain, and that we could only with the utmost pain bring ourselves to fire even a part of Strasburg. He replied that an inspection of our positions would be construed as a first probability of his surrendering the fortress. He had, however, resolved to defend it to the last man and the last cartridge. It was said yesterday, and the broad pillars of smoke testified, that Kehl was again set on fire by the French. We kept quiet until the break of evening; the columns of flame in Kehl flared up wide, mounting heavenwards, and incessantly were fireballs hurled thither from the citadel. Now began on our side the fire—flash for flash, blow for blow, they were returned with interest. There, the citadel blazes up: the fast-falling night revealed every flame. Bombs soared aloft and descended. Now the city was on fire north from the Cathedral. It must have fallen on inflammable material, for instantly the flames shot heavenward. From this point who can paint the scene? Here and there it blazed up; we saw four, five conflagrations, two united, and presenting a vast roaring furnace. The wind blew from the west, and fanned the flames, which darted up forked tongues of fire. A spectator cried out, 'See there, how the cathedral towers aloft above the clouds of smoke, how venerable, as if mutely threatening and reproving the men who hurl reckless flames against each other!' 'If the cathedral does but remain unharmed,' was the cry that ran from mouth to mouth, and meanwhile feelings of deep compassion were expressed for those within the city. In spirit we were transported among those now wailing in vaulted cellars, as they heard the thunder of the guns, ignorant where the fires were raging—perhaps even their own homes. And in the streets the fires must be left to rage unchecked. Who could strive to quench them while each minute further discharges were falling? How many cry out to their own dear ones, seek them, and are like beings bewildered in their own homes. What shrieking, what misery! If one could but compress together the heart-throbs of the people, far louder, quicker, mightier must be the stroke than the deep roar of the guns, which, incessantly discharged, lit up the gloom, here—there—till the eye could no longer follow. Midnight had set in before we decided to go home. We could see each other as in full moonlight. The fields, the vineyards, were lit up; the church of Mundelsheim, with its white gravestones: suddenly the light grew still brighter. Now that we had not seen the flames for a time, they appeared broader, stronger, more voracious. It was difficult to tear oneself away from the fearfully grand spectacle, and yet it must be. The villagers we met professed to know which parts of the city would be saved from the flames. We strove to believe their assurances that the precincts of the cathedral—above all, the cathedral itself—would remain uninjured. And yet for a moment it had seemed that the cathedral terrace, which had been made the observatory of the enemy, was on fire. It was, however, an illusion. The flames illumined our homeward way. The sky was overspread with light clouds of a blood red. The fire must have been visible beyond the Rhine, far into the Black Forest."

On the 4th of September General Uhrich asked for and obtained from the besiegers lint, bandages, and medicine. On the morning of the 6th the gate leading from the town into the citadel, on the side towards Kehl, was completely destroyed. Fire broke out fiercely from behind the ramparts, and it was evident that the defences of the city were greatly weakened. There had been terrible fires on previous days, and that in various parts of the town at once. Two hundred persons, mostly women, perished by the burning of the theatre, in the basement rooms of which they had sought shelter; and many soldiers were burnt to death in those portions of the citadel which were not fireproof. General Uhrich himself, in a despatch dated September 9th, described the situation with much gravity. He spoke of the bombardment as continuing without cessation, and the artillery as deafening. A sortie was made in the morning of that day; but it cost the garrison dearly, and was without any practical result. It was said by the Germans that the Governor had declared that the enemy, if they entered the town, should find it only a heap of rubbish. He had lost a son at the battle of Wörth, and this was supposed to have influenced his resolution. The vow, however, was but partially fulfilled, and perhaps was never uttered.



PLAN OF STRASBURG, SHOWING KEHL AND THE GERMAN LINES OF INVESTMENT.

As the circle of the German batteries approached nearer and nearer to the town, the area of the French batteries receded. By the 19th of September hardly anything but shrapnel shells passed over the first parallel of the besiegers, and those for the most part fell harmless. Requests for safe-conduct poured in from the town in great numbers, several coming even from Gardes Mobiles; but the latter were of course refused. Some of the townspeople demanded the surrender of the place to the enemy; others passionately denounced such a proceeding as long as resistance was possible. A number of Swiss delegates were allowed to visit the town in the latter part of September, and to them it was evident that the surrender was then very near at hand. By that time 1,477 persons had left, consisting for the most part of people who could provide subsistence for themselves. Others were families of small means, and others again belonged to the class of paupers. The safe-conducts of these three classes were distinguished by being respectively of a white, blue, and red colour. The deputation twice visited General



IN THE TRENCHES BEFORE STRASBURG.

Uhrich. On the first occasion he was very silent; on the second he spoke freely, and said, "It is impossible the thing can last long; the end must soon come." The delegates were doubtful whether he was alluding to the condition of the fortress or to the general state of France. He added, "I have made many a campaign; I have been in the Crimea; but I have nowhere met with anything so frightful as this." At the Mayor's house the Swiss found the Municipal Council holding an excited sitting, with a view to deciding whether or not a deputation should be sent to Paris, to describe the condition of the town, and bring back orders. General Uhrich gave his concurrence. Up to about the middle of September French refugees from Strasburg were allowed to choose their own place of abode, but they were then obliged to withdraw from the borders of the high roads, and retire to different neighbourhoods assigned to them. A great impression was caused among the Germans by the sight of a family, of Teutonic origin, which had been expelled from Paris, and which consisted of the father, eighty-four years of age, and a son and daughter born on French soil. They were ordered to quit France within four-and-twenty hours, and arrived in the neighbourhood of Strasburg while the siege was yet progressing. A sharp encounter took place on the morning of the 16th of September. A portion of the German artillery, which is said to have been insufficiently supported, crossed the Rhine with the intention of erecting batteries, for the better and more effectual bombardment of the town, between the Rhine and one of its tributaries, called the Alt Rhein. While at work they were perceived by the French sentries, who fired a heavy volley on them. This was followed by a sortie from the garrison; but the attacking column was driven back with great loss, and the Germans retained the position they had assumed.

Many of the French guns were dismounted during the waning days of September, and breaches were opened in the walls. The first bulwark of the fortress fell into the hands of the besiegers on the afternoon of September 20th. Lunette No. 53, in front of the churchyard of St. Hélène, to the north-west of the city, was captured by the 18th company of the Landwehr Guard, and a body of engineers. When the attacking columns were formed, they found the way made for them as far as the moat, and the dam over which they were to cross was already commenced. The counterscarp, for a distance of from twenty to twenty-five paces, had been destroyed during the night by mines, and the masses of earth and masonry had so blocked a portion of the ditch that only about a third of the space needed to be bridged over. Some of the men brought fascines filled with stones, some sacks of sand, while others bore upon their shoulders a boat, which was soon launched upon the water and pushed off. One of the oarsmen was wounded, and fell into the water; his comrade endeavoured to pull him into the boat, and the next moment he also was shot: both were drowned. The remainder, however, pressed forward, and in the meantime sand-bags and fascines were being thrown into the water. Ultimately a bridge was made, the rest of the company passed over to the opposite side of the moat, and the attacking force stood within the breach. The lunette was captured, and the beginning of the end was now apparent.

During all these operations the losses among the Germans were very slight. They were calculated at only one per cent. in an army of nearly 60,000. The losses in the latter half of September were about twenty a day, and sometimes less. A few regiments suffered severely; but in others not one man was killed or wounded. The French, excepting once in a way, fired feebly; and for one ball that came out of Strasburg a hundred are computed to have been thrown in. The garrison and townspeople, however, contrived somehow to keep up communication with their countrymen outside the walls, notwithstanding the strictness of the investment and the fierceness of the fire. The establishment of a Republic in Paris was made known after a while, and the new Prefect entered the town by swimming across the river Ill. The best place for watching the operations of the siege was Offenburg, from the hills at the back of which the curious could obtain a good view of the city and the batteries encircling it. Thither went the newspaper correspondents, and the tourists who desired to see what they could of the operations. The hills are covered with vineyards, and wounded soldiers were often to be found lying down among the vines, plucking the grapes, or watching through telescopes the proceedings of their comrades. Those proceedings were not often of the most interesting character. The siege of Strasburg was varied with but few incidents of note, and, upon the whole, was dull and monotonous beyond the usual nature of sieges. A cloud of smoke constantly overhung the fortifications and the houses which they enclosed. The magnificent spire of the cathedral loomed dimly through the sulphurous mist. Now and again flames broke out, and painted the sky with lurid brilliance; occasionally a desperate sortie from the garrison would give the besieging army a little excitement. But, as a rule, there was not very much to chronicle until the final scene arrived.

The capitulation was hastened by the terrific fire which had been kept up for some days before that event occurred. On the night of the 26th of September—the last night of the siege—incendiary shells were thrown into the town from an immense distance. Some of these shells weighed a hundred and fifty pounds, and all were furnished with a fuse which burnt during the passagè of the projectile through the air, and ultimately caused the explosion. They could be seen by the besieged rising slowly to a considerable height, and then rushing headlong towards the ground. A frightful noise followed their fall, and many houses were shattered by them. One burst through three storeys, and exploded in the cellar; others ground whole buildings into fragments. The projectiles appear to have been cast from two huge mortars recently erected by the Germans; and it is said that the shells were thrown to a distance never before attained by any artillery. Numerous casualties occurred on that dreadful night. A great many persons were killed and wounded. In the Saverne quarter of the town two shells dropped almost simultaneously, killing six persons and wounding twelve. In the Rue du Bain aux Plantes, four persons were wounded in one house; and in the faubourgs there were several victims. It was to the credit of the townspeople that they should have supported such trials for so long a period. The horrors of a bombardment must be shared alike by military and civilians; and to the sick, the nervous, and the infirm—to women



GENERAL VON WERDER.

and to children—nothing can be more terrible than the constant insecurity, the appalling noises, the glare and smoke, the crashing of buildings, and the sudden smiting down of people in the agony of violent death or lingering wounds. The experiences of the night of September 26th determined the fate of the city.

For some days before the surrender it was evident that the place could be taken by assault, if the German commander chose to sacrifice a large number of lives. The walls in many parts had crumbled into heaps of ruin, and there were two points at which an entrance could have been effected after a fight of sufficient obstinacy to overcome resistance. But General Werder preferred to wait for that submission which he knew could not be long delayed. The investment of the city began on the 10th of August; the capitulation took place on the 27th of September—the very day on which the town surrendered to Louis XIV. one hundred and eighty-nine years before. Some time previous to the fall of Strasburg General Uhrich consulted with the Council of Defence, and it was agreed that the town should not be exposed to the horrors of an assault. The general, however, reserved to himself the sole right of determining when the proper moment for yielding had arrived. Several of the townspeople thought the surrender should take place before General Uhrich had reached the same conclusion; for the brave soldier refused to listen to any terms as long as there appeared the faintest possibility of success. When, however, two formidable breaches had been made in the walls, and the prospect of an assault—to which no effective resistance could have been offered—became imminent, the Governor resolved, with a heavy heart, to display the white flag, though two members of the Council of War voted against surrender. The forces at his command were but few in comparison with those of the enemy, and his troops were greatly demoralised. For some days they could scarcely be got on to the ramparts. Several were intoxicated and reckless; others moody and depressed. Nothing could be done with men in such a state of shattered discipline; but General Uhrich endeavoured, in a nine hours' parley, to obtain for them something like honourable terms. 451 officers and 17,000 men, including the National Guards, laid down their arms; and at eight o'clock on the morning of the 28th the gates of the town and the citadel were manned by the Germans, who at once began restoring the bridges.*

On the day of the capitulation, General Uhrich issued a very feeling and manly proclamation to the inhabitants of Strasburg, in which, after thanking the several branches of the defending force, the civil and military surgeons, the ecclesiastics, the public authorities, and the townspeople generally, for their courage and their devotion, he said:—"To my last day I shall retain the recollection of the two last months, and the feeling of gratitude and admiration which you have excited in me will only be extinguished with my life. Do you on your part remember without bitterness your old general, who would have thought himself happy could he have spared you the sufferings and dangers which have befallen you, but who was forced to close his heart to his feelings for the sake of the duty he owed to that country which is mourning its children. Let us, if we can, close our eyes to the sorrowful and painful present, and turn our looks to the future; there we still find the solace of the unfortunate—hope. Long live France for ever!" The Mayor's proclamation, issued on the 28th, stated that the surrender was inevitable, on account of two breaches and a threatened storm, which would involve frightful loss of life. He exhorted the people to abstain from all offensive demonstrations, as the least act of hostility would entail severe reprisals on the entire population. The laws of war decreed that any house from which a shot was fired should be demolished, and its inhabitants shot down. "Let everybody," said the Mayor, "remember this; and if there are people among you who could forget what they owe to their fellow citizens by thinking of useless attempts at resistance, prevent them from so doing. The hour for resistance is past. Let us accept the unavoidable."* In spite of this warning, however, a Baden soldier was stabbed by a French subaltern. The murderer was immediately shot. Another German was slightly wounded; but his assailant escaped in the darkness. In consequence of these crimes, the Prussian commandant, General Mertens, issued a notice, informing the Strasburgers that the state of siege continued; that crimes and offences would be punished by martial law; that all weapons were immediately to be given up; that all newspapers and other publications were forbidden till further orders;

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* See Appendix xii., Vol. II., p. 563, "General Uhrich on the Defence of Strasburg."

* The Mayor who issued this proclamation was M. Küss, who died at Bordeaux immediately after the conclusion of peace, quite broken in spirit by the cession of Alsace to Germany. He was elected Mayor of Strasburg after the arrival (about the middle of September) of the news of the proclamation of a Republic in Paris. M. Gambetta had himself appointed a Mayor; but the citizens did not choose to submit to the dictation, and accordingly chose M. Küss for themselves. On his death, however, M. Gambetta delivered an eloquent oration over the grave.

that public-houses were to be closed at nine P.M., and that after that hour every civilian was to carry a lantern.

The demeanour of the French troops is reported to have been very bad. Some, it is said, danced to the music of the Prussian bands, as the victors entered the city. Others growled and cursed, and whole companies broke their arms on the ground, or flung them into the moat. At one time there was imminent peril of a collision, owing to the insults of a French soldier, but the danger passed. These instances of misconduct, however, seem to have been confined to the regulars, especially the African regiments. The National Guards, Mobile Guards, Francs-tireurs, and sailors, appear to have behaved very well. Strasburg was declared free from requisitions, but was compelled to lodge 8,000 soldiers. More than 500 French officers signed their parole; but several preferred to go into captivity.

The city yielded a rich booty in cannon, munitions of war, and large sums of public money at the bank. Amongst the populace the utmost distress prevailed, and the King of Prussia sent five thousand thalers as a mitigation of the sufferings endured by the poorer classes. In the last days of the siege many civilians were killed and wounded in the streets; and the horrors of the time were vividly shown by a paragraph in a Strasburg paper, which said:—"We hear that the state of the young girls wounded in the educational establishment of the Rue de l'Arc-en-Ciel by the bursting of a grenade, and who have had to undergo amputations, is very satisfactory. They have been removed to the ambulance of the Petit Séminaire, at the Civil Hospital, where they are the objects of the most constant solicitude." A list of the killed and wounded was officially posted from day to day at the Mairie, and it frequently exhibited a formidable sum-total. As early as August 27th, soon after the first severe bombardment, General Uhrich issued a proclamation, in which he announced the formation of eight medical establishments in various parts of the city, where persons wounded by the enemy's fire would receive immediate attention, and from which they would afterwards be removed either to their own homes or to some hospital. Between two and three hundred wounded were in hospital when Strasburg was taken; of course there were many others in private houses. The deaths from wounds during the last week averaged about ten a day, and exceeded those resulting from natural causes.

A very vivid impression of the incidents attending the siege is derivable from a letter written by one of the inhabitants of Strasburg, and published in a French paper. The writer states:—

"I had been established in Strasburg for many years, and my affairs had never been so prosperous as they were when the war broke out. On the approach of the enemy I sent away my wife and family, but could not leave my warehouses and shops, lest when the town was taken they should be given up to pillage. The first eight days all went well; the quarter I inhabited seemed to be spared; but on the ninth day a shell exploded in front of my house, and broke all the windows on the ground floor. I thought it prudent from that time to take refuge in my cellar; I had some provisions there, so that I seldom went out of it. I spent my days and evenings in reading, little thinking what was about to befall me. On Saturday, the 10th of September, about midday, while I was taking a meal, I heard a tremendous noise overhead. I ran to the stairs to ascertain the amount of damage, doubtless caused by a shell falling into my house. I drew back terrified. The entrance of the cellar was stopped up by portions of the wall. The house had fallen in, and I was buried alive. What passed through my mind in the first hour of my captivity I cannot adequately describe. I had fits of dumb anger, to which general exhaustion succeeded. By degrees I came to myself, for I must confess I completely lost my head; I collected my ideas, and thought I remembered having during the day brought down a petroleum lamp. I felt my way to the piece of furniture on which I believed I had placed it, and by good fortune there it was. I lighted it instantly. It was then that I realised my true situation. All round me there were ruins; the staircase no longer existed; I could no more deceive myself—the house had fallen in, and this cellar was to be my tomb. To clear the rubbish on that side was my only hope, and I began it with the fury of despair. Every brick I took away made others fall; the walls crumbled continually, and I was from one moment to another threatened with destruction by the ruins. Then my lamp went out for want of oil, and for a time I gave up all hope; but the instinct of self-preservation prevailed, and I set to work again in a sort of rage. I had been working, as it seemed to me, more than two days, when the ceiling suddenly fell in, a brick struck me on the head, and I fainted. How long I remained insensible I cannot tell. When I reopened my eyes I perceived an opening above my head; the stars were shining; it was night. I suffered horribly, and dared not move for fear of producing a fresh fall of masonry. I waited for day in mortal anxiety. As soon as I could realise my position hope returned. I made a heap of the rubbish all around me, and, clinging to a beam of the ceiling, I raised myself out of this cellar which had so nearly been my grave. Once out of it I again gave way. When I came to myself once more I crouched down among the ruins of my abode and wept for more than two hours. I had spent four days in that cellar. I went into it without one grey hair, and now my hair is quite white. I had aged more than twenty years in four



STRASBURG DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.



FRENCH TROOPS LEAVING STRASBURG AFTER THE CAPITULATION.

days. As for my shops, all are burnt. I had worked for ten years to set up my family in tolerable comfort. My wife and I looked for an old age exempt from care; now all must begin over again, and I see no prospect of anything but misery for our future days."

A working man told the *Times* correspondent that it was only the rich people who could command the privilege of living down in the cellars; the poor were obliged to go about the streets to buy food, to help to clear away ruins, and to extinguish the fires that were constantly breaking out. "The very poor," says the writer who relates this anecdote, "went twice a day to establishments where, at the expense of a private society, they could receive every morning soup, bread, and wine, and every evening bread and coffee. Those who wished to save their self-respect, or to deceive themselves, could breakfast and dine for nothing, and sign engagements to pay, as the notification on the subject has it, 'in happier days.' The walls of Strasburg not only proclaim the misery of a large portion of the population; they also testify to the delicacy of the fortunate few who were able to relieve the distress of their unhappy fellow-citizens. One announcement sets forth that, 'in consequence of the great and increasing sickness among old people and young children, an appeal is made to healthy persons receiving rations of milk to content themselves with half rations, and to make known their consent as soon as possible.' There was a great scarcity of milk, and potatoes were charged nearly a franc a pound (75 fr. or 80 fr. for a sack containing 100lbs.). Beef cost 3 fr. a pound, horseflesh 1½ fr. a pound; while the price of bread and wine remained stationary. The people of Strasburg, as a mass, were not near being starved; but commerce, trade, and industry were all put a stop to; and workpeople in the habit of living from hand to mouth must necessarily, but for the assistance of the richer part of the population, have died of hunger." Up to the last, bread, horseflesh, and wine were plentiful; but the soldiers were much fatigued by the duties they had to perform, and for weeks they could not undress. The losses in men and superior officers throughout the bombardment were very great.

On the morning of September 30th the German army assembled in the orangery at Ruprechtsau—the Protestant regiments on one side of the gardens, and the Catholic regiments on the other—to offer simultaneous thanks for their success. This was followed by a service in the Protestant church of St. Thomas, where, it is said, the clergy received General Werder at the entrance, and assured him of the devotion of an immense majority of Strasburgers to Germany; to which the general replied that he would do his utmost to heal the wounds of the city. The authority for this statement is a Prussian despatch; but it is to be suspected that the clergy, in making such a representation, were actuated rather by a desire to be on the winning side than by any disinterested regard for truth. The balance of evidence is certainly in favour of the belief that the great majority of the people of Strasburg, and of Alsace generally, looked on themselves as Frenchmen, and were strongly disinclined towards being re-united to Germany. It is of course very easy to understand that among the Protestant clergy a contrary feeling may have prevailed; but this was not widely diffused, and it appears to have been hardly shared by the laity, even among the Protestants. The Germans at once did their utmost to obliterate the French language in Alsace; but they could not so easily get rid of the French sentiment.

The damage to the city was found to be very great. Two large districts—the Faubourg de Pierres and the Faubourg Nationale—were in ruins, and many of the public buildings had been destroyed, as previously related. The houses were pounded to shapeless heaps of rubbish. According to German reports, 200 dwellings were utterly destroyed, and 8,000 persons rendered homeless The poor people thus deprived of a roof were to be seen squatting in gipsy fashion under the bridges, in the huts of the trenches, inside the churches and market-halls, and among the ruins of the theatre. Of houses more or less injured, there were said to be 600; and the devastation assumed greater proportions the more it was inquired into. One account spoke of 200 acres, or more, of houses entirely levelled; but this must surely have been an exaggeration. "There were very few marks of fire," says the *Daily News* correspondent. "Cannon-shot and shells had reduced house after house to its original elements. In front of nearly every shop-window were sloping planks arranged with a view to ward off the falling shot. All the openings made to admit air and light into the cellars were covered over with a mass of earth and straw. In some cases the straw had evidently been taken from the most offensive, though not the least useful, part of the farmyard. The deprivation of light and air, and the presence of noisome smells, which those who occupied the cellars must have had to endure, must have been not only a severe trial, but also most detrimental to health. One house standing at a corner was propped up, lest it should topple over. A cannon-ball had swept a large piece out of the corner, and had cut through one of the beams which supported the two upper floors. On reaching the Place Kleber, one of the largest and finest open spaces in Strasburg, the signs of destruction were most striking. The handsome building which filled the north-eastern side of the square, and in which was a valuable museum of ancient and modern works of art, is now represented by empty walls. Nearly every house has been pierced with shot or shell. The hotel in which I write this, the well-known Maison Rouge, has been struck more than once. Being one of the first civilians who arrived here, I succeeded in getting one of the few rooms which the German officers had not taken possession of. Wishing to breakfast, I called for the bill of fare. It was as long and elaborate as usual. I came to the conclusion that, although the city had been severely injured by the bombardment, the inhabitants had been able to procure not only the necessaries, but also the luxuries, of life. But I was soon undeceived. The bill of fare was a relic of pre-siege days. I could get beef or ham or *pâté de foie gras*. Towards the end of the siege, when provisions became very scarce, *pâté de foie gras* was one of the most common articles of food. Large stores of it, intended for exportation, had accumulated. Coffee and wine could be had in abundance, but milk was unprocurable, and butter could not be purchased under five francs the pound. I had not been many hours in Strasburg before a change took place in all these respects. Carts laden with vegetables entered the city. Butter was again placed on the table. It was announced that milk would be obtainable on the morrow." The writer lost no time in visiting all the points of interest, and of the cathedral he reported that the spire had been injured in more places than one. The cross on its summit leaned on one side, as if it had been struck by a projectile. Some of the ornamental work had been carried away, and in one of the side towers a portion of the stone stairs had been destroyed. The outer roof of the nave was burned, and the windows here and there were broken with balls. "To this place the German soldiers hastened as soon as they got here. They ascended the tower, they explored the interior. The officers were as eager as the men not only to see the renowned cathedral, but also to learn the truth as to the damage done to it. All with whom I conversed expressed their satisfaction at the comparative unimportance of the injury inflicted. They would have lamented the destruction of the cathedral quite as sincerely as the Strasburgers themselves. It is the belief of the latter that the destruction of the cathedral was one of the designs of the besiegers. More than one German artillery officer assured me that orders were daily given not only to spare the city, but also carefully to avoid firing in such a way as would either damage or endanger the cathedral. Other public buildings, however, have not escaped. The Prefecture, the theatre, and the church—whereof the world-renowned Library formed a part—are now represented by bare walls."

The destruction of the Library was more particularly described by a correspondent of the *Times*, who said:—"In the choir of the Temple Neuf, divided from the nave, was lodged the especial glory of Alsace—its Library, the finest on the Rhine, in which the archives, antiquities, topography, and early printing collections were treasured. All have perished. Since the apocryphal burning of the library of Alexandria, perhaps no equally irreparable loss has occurred. The walls are standing; all else is a mass of ruins. In the entrance vestibule was a collection of Gallo-Roman antiquities, altars, inscriptions, bas-reliefs, statuary; a few of these may be restored. A stone let into the wall, in which was cut a head of Louis XIV., and a notice that it had been taken from the *cachots* of the Bastille, had a portion destroyed. In the interior of the choir nothing was visible but heaps of ruin and charred paper. I picked up some fragments on which the old Aldine and early German types were still legible. In the nave of the church the vaulted roofing had fallen to the ground in a huge mountain of ruins. Everything had perished save the old monuments let into the walls, that of Tauler, the mystic preacher, being the most interesting. The utter destruction of this Library seemed to me so incredible that I have yesterday and to-day repeatedly put the question, Was *nothing* saved? Not a single leaf! There was a fatality about the Library. No catalogue of its many treasures exists. An elaborate one in MS. had been prepared by the librarian. It has perished! M. Silbermann, publisher of the *Courrier du Bas-Rhin*, tells me that a whole library of MSS. of his grand work, the 'Alsace Antiquary,' has perished, among them sixteen folio vols. of MSS. upon Strasburg. The greatest loss of all is that of the most precious record connected with the discovery of printing—the documents of the legal process of Guttenberg against the heirs of his partner, Dreisehn, to establish his right as the inventor of typography." The Municipality of Strasburg are blamed for allowing such a catastrophe to occur. They had already had ten days' experience of the bombardment, and twenty-four hours' notice of the commencement of the active siege had been given by the Germans; yet no precautions were taken to save the treasures of the building.

The citadel suffered even more than the town; but in the course of a very few days Strasburg again assumed much of its old appearance. The shops were re-opened; the market-place was filled with buyers and sellers; and, but for the shattered condition of the houses, there was no evidence that the place had just passed through the ordeal of a severe siege.

Kehl, on the other side of the Rhine, was greatly injured by the French guns. In some parts it even seemed to have suffered as much as Strasburg itself. The inhabitants spoke very ill of the French for having fired on an open town; but, as Kehl was made one of the points of vantage from which Strasburg was bombarded, the objection does not seem to be just. The *Times* correspondent, indeed, alleges that it was the French who began deliberately to burn private houses during this siege; but, to say nothing of the obvious fact that he is a very partial witness, his record of the specific events does not support his general statement. He mentions that on the 19th of August the commandant of Kehl, in accordance with orders received from General Werder, fired at the citadel of Strasburg, and at certain barracks in the town itself. This was continued for four hours and a half, and in that time "several private houses, and buildings not of a military character," were injured. During the afternoon the French replied by throwing shells into the town of Kehl, as a consequence of which nearly the whole of the main street was burnt to the ground, for the projectiles were directed against the private dwellings, and not against the German batteries. It seems to be suggested by the *Times* writer that the firing of houses and non-military buildings in Strasburg by the Germans was an accident; but this is merely an inference, or the adoption of a subsequent explanation given by the persons whose motives had been impugned. Even if truthful, the French could not have known that the firing of numerous private houses was simply accidental. The broad fact, that the French did not resort to this exceptional mode of warfare until they had themselves suffered from it, remains upon the showing of the German advocate himself.


RUINS OF THE STRASBURG LIBRARY.

It is painful to relate that the gallant General Uhrich, who did all it was possible to do in defence of the city, was publicly insulted by some of his own men, who called him "a rascal" for surrendering the town. As the French troops were being marched out of the gates, on the way to their place of captivity, they tried to throw away their knapsacks and arms, and vented their rage in shouts and exclamations. Frowning countenances were to be seen among the civilians also; but for the most part the aspect of the population was resigned. They were curious to see the Germans enter the place; but at the cry, "Here come the Prussians!" the children of the lower classes rushed indoors in terror. The Municipal Council were threatened by the mob, and it was found necessary to call out the National Guards to protect them. The more unpopular of the members, it is related, could not venture out for some days before the surrender without a revolver. When the white flag was hung out from the cathedral, several shots were fired at it by the Francs-tireurs; but after a time the excitement wore itself out, and the people accepted their destiny

The taking of Strasburg gave special interest to a letter from General Ducrot to General Trochu, written from that city about the commencement of December, 1866, and published among the papers found at the Tuileries. The letter, which seems to have been intercepted by the Imperial authorities, and copied by them, is thus expressed:—

"Since you are in a position to let wholesome truths be heard by the illustrious personages around you, pray add this. While we are pompously and slowly deliberating upon what is best to be done to obtain an army, Prussia is simply but actively preparing to invade our territory. She will be in a position to bring in line 600,000 men and 1,200 guns before we have thought of organising the *cadres* indispensable for placing under fire 300,000 men and 600 guns. On the other side of the Rhine there is not a German who does not believe in an early war. The most peacefully disposed, who by their family relations or personal interests are most inclined towards France, consider the struggle as inevitable, and cannot at all understand our inaction. As we must look for a cause for all things, they assert that our Emperor has become childish. Unless one is wilfully blind, it is not possible to doubt that war will break out on an early day. With our stupid vanity, our foolish presumption, we seem to think that we shall be allowed to select our own day and hour—that is to say, after the close of the Universal Exhibition—for the completion of our organisation and our armament. Truly, I am of your opinion, and begin to believe that our Government is stricken with madness. But if Jupiter has decided upon our ruin, let us not forget the destinies of our country, and that our own fate is bound up in her destinies; and since we are not yet afflicted with that dangerous madness, let us use all our efforts to arrest this fatal tendency, which leads directly to fearful precipices. Here is a new detail to which I invite your attention, since it is of a character to open the eyes of the most purblind. For some time numerous Prussian agents have been overrunning our frontier departments, especially that portion of them comprised between the Moselle and the Vosges. They sound the opinions of the people; they agitate among the Protestants, who are numerous in those districts, and who are much less French than is generally believed. They are, indeed, the sons and grandsons of the men who in 1815 sent numerous deputations to the enemy's head-quarters to demand that Alsace should be added to the German country. The Prussians acted in the same manner in Bohemia and Silesia three months before the commencement of the hostilities against Austria."

If this letter be genuine, it affords very remarkable evidence of the predisposing causes which led to the war of 1870-1.

The arrival of the French prisoners at Rastadt was a melancholy spectacle. The procession lasted five hours, and the men were so depressed by fatigue that few looked round with any curiosity. The officers were rather defiant than humble, but some of them shed tears. The French were by this time so accustomed to ill-success, that it must have seemed as if some evil fate had entered the lists against them. Yet it was only the close of September, and in the remaining months of the war many other crushing misfortunes were accumulated on their heads.

CHAPTER XIV.

Alteration in the Public Opinion of England with Reference to the War—Unfavourable Effects of the Change of Government in France—Mistakes of the Emperor Napoleon—Disorganisation of the French Army—Insubordination in the Ranks—German Criticism on French Military Reforms—The Emperor and the Declaration of War—Controversy on the Emperor's Conduct at Sedan—Louis Napoleon's Fatalism—Speech of the King of Prussia to his Officers—Siege of Toul—Effects of the First Bombardment—Vigorous Defence—Final Bombardment—Capitulation of Toul, and State of the Town—Bombardment of Bitsche—Situation of Bitsche—Seizure of Beauvais—Socialism in the Provinces—Lawless State of Paris—Illegal Arrests—Dismissal of General Ambert—Arrest of an English Government Courier—Spread of Red Republicanism—Condition of Lyons—Warlike Proclamations to the People of the Provinces—Failure of Guerilla Warfare at the Present Day, and the Reason—Attempts to Rouse the Religious Fanaticism of the French Peasantry—Measures taken for the Protection of Paris—General Order of Trochu—Rumours of Plots—The Count de Chambord and the Duke d'Aumale—The Republic and the English Working Men—Protest of the International Association of Women.

A GREAT change came over the public opinion of England on the subject of the war after the interviews of M. Favre and Count Bismarck. Previous to that event, the sympathies of a large proportion of the people were on the side of Germany. It was felt that, although both belligerents were to blame in having for a long while encouraged a sentiment of mutual antagonism, and although the conduct of Prussia, as regards the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern, had been disingenuous and suspicious—especially when taken in connection with her enormous armaments—the actual declaration of war had come from France, and had been supported by reasons which to most Englishmen seemed insufficient to excuse so grave a step. Finding herself attacked, whatever her share in the evil policy which had fostered a feeling of distrust and anger between the two peoples, Prussia could do nothing less than defend her national life, and was even justified in carrying the war into the



STRASBURG AFTER THE CAPITULATION.

enemy's country, as the likeliest means of bringing it to an end. But when the new Government in France disavowed the error of its predecessor, and offered indemnity for the wrong already committed, a very general impression was produced that the murderous struggle ought to cease. The refusal of King William to make peace, except upon exorbitant terms, put Prussia in the wrong. It was now seen that behind the legitimate purpose of self-protection was a settled resolve to humble France and extend the boundaries of Germany. Moreover, the harshness with which the Germans had conducted the war from the days of Sedan created in this country a feeling in favour of the weaker and more suffering combatant. Of course, Prussia still had her advocates, some of whom, among the literary and intellectual classes, supported her cause with singular power and ability. But with the majority she lost ground after the conversations at Ferrières; and in questions of morals the popular instinct is often far truer than the ingenious elaborations of students. With the working classes in particular, France became extremely popular as soon as her Government became Republican—an illogical reason, certainly, because not really touching the questions in dispute; but a very powerful motive with a large section of the community. The Republic gave France the suffrages of all the artisans of Europe.

There can be no question, however, that in some important respects the change of Government in France operated unfavourably to that country. Count Bismarck and his Royal master cherished a very unfriendly feeling towards Republics, which they regarded as the natural enemies of monarchical and aristocratical systems of Government by Divine Right. The unwillingness to come to some compromise with France—the determination to push the German advantage to the utmost—increased greatly after the Republican *coup d'état* of September 4th. Had the Regency of the Empress been allowed to remain, Bismarck would probably have been far more inclined to listen to offers of peace and compensation. Apart from the question of Monarchy and Republicanism as forms of rule, the Prussian Chancellor felt doubtful of the



GERMANS IN POSSESSION.

competency and permanence of the new Administration at Paris. It had arisen out of a street riot; it might vanish in a popular commotion. It had no sort of warrant from the country at large, nor any means of enforcing its will, if what it might sanction should be repudiated by the general voice. The Count's phrase, "the gentlemen of the pavement," was a most unwarrantable piece of arrogance; but it gave coarse expression to a difficulty which was real, though not insurmountable. The Government of Trochu, Jules Favre, and the others, had no visible authenticity, and only the most precarious tenure. Nothing but a freely elected Assembly could create an Administration with an indisputable title to treat in the name of France. For this purpose an armistice was indispensable; and no armistice could be obtained, except on terms which it was felt would dishonour the country, and permanently weaken her powers of defence.

It is said that the Czar was on the point of making proposals to the French and Prussian Governments for bringing the war to a close without any cession of territory, when news of the fall of the Empire arrived, and wholly changed the inclinations of the Russian sovereign. Even Powers not despotic felt doubtful about entering into relations with a Government which was unable to produce any definite credentials, and which at a moment's notice might dissolve into the foam out of which it had issued. The Revolution of September 4th placed France at a disadvantage with the official world generally; and, in some degree, it impaired the national defence. The changes in local and municipal government to which it led, the disorganisation it introduced into the military commands, and the distrust it inspired among large and influential classes, all tended to hamper and perplex the action of the country at a most grave and critical moment. To effect organic transformations in the face of an advancing enemy, distinguished by the extraordinary vigour and rapidity of his movements, was a piece of singularly bad judgment, temerity, and rashness.

Napoleon, it is now obvious, committed a great mistake in leaving the capital to take command of the army. He could have done much more at Paris than at Saarbruck, Châlons, or Sedan. When numerous defeats had accumulated on his head, return was considered too perilous to be attempted. Among the papers found at the Tuileries after the Revolution, and published by the Provisional Government, was one consisting of a despatch discovered in fragments, and addressed by the Empress to the Emperor, in reply, it would seem, to an intimation from the latter that he contemplated returning to Paris after the first misfortunes of the army. The Empress writes:—"I have received a despatch from Piétri. Have you reflected upon all the consequences which would follow from your return to Paris after having sustained two reverses? For my own part, I dare not assume the responsibility of giving advice. If you are decided upon it, the step must be presented to the public as merely temporary—the Emperor returning to Paris to reorganise the second army, and provisionally entrusting the command-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine to Bazaine." The project was abandoned, and the fall of the Empire, which the presence of the Emperor in Paris might possibly have averted, followed in a few days. A strange fatality seemed to attend all the operations of the war, from the commencement to the end. The Emperor himself was doubtful of success from the very first. He is reported to have said, just before leaving Paris for the scene of action, "Only one thing troubles me: I have not a general who can handle 100,000 men." The fact is, the army had for some years been fearfully mismanaged by men who were more desirous of enriching themselves than of doing their duty to the State. When Marshal Niel became Minister of War, he said to the Emperor, "Sire, you have no army." This must have been a startling piece of information to the ruler who had spent so much money on the military power of the country, and who had been denounced at home and abroad as a despot by the grace of unlimited bayonets. Under the Ministry of Marshal Niel, the forces were enormously increased, and in part reorganised; but the Marshal himself died soon after, and the rule of mismanagement returned in full strength. In the earlier years of Napoleon's reign, the French army showed all its wonted excellence; but the habit of subordination seemed now to be lost. That contempt for the principle of authority which the ultra Republicans had been so industriously disseminating for years, had penetrated the minds of the soldiery, and was not long in producing the disastrous results which it is alone capable of bringing forth. On numerous occasions during the war privates in the French ranks openly defied, jeered at, and insulted their officers. Some of the latter were even shot by their own men. Such a spirit is fatal to an army, and, if not reformed or checked, will soon be fatal to a nation also. Those factious politicians who have condemned beyond measure the faults and errors of the Imperial Government (some of which were disastrous enough to need no colouring) should ask themselves whether they have not contributed to the same end by their insane policy of systematic insubordination. The superiority of the Prussian to the French army was shown in nothing more than in the obedience yielded by every man to the commands of his officers—the self-abnegation which preferred the efficiency of the whole machine to the indulgence of individual caprice. It is possible that on some occasions the French generals might have retrieved their misfortunes if they could have counted on the devotion of their men. Again and again, after defeat, the soldiers refused to rally to their commanders. It was not courage that was needed, nor, for the most part, knowledge of military science. The army was ruined by want of discipline and defiance of subjection.

No such faults were observable up to the time of the Mexican war. A German paper—the *Greuzboten*—bore testimony, shortly after Sedan, to the excellence of the military reforms introduced by the Emperor. "Napoleon," says this writer, "did everything for the French army that it was possible for a clever and energetic man to do who was not himself a field-marshal; and under his Government more was done for the army than under the Orleans or Bourbon dynasties. Since the year 1866, the numbers of the army have been nearly doubled, the men have been well instructed, and an immense amount of pains has been taken to teach them to take advantage of positions under musketry fire. The vivacious *élan* of French soldiers having been always considered as a national virtue, the Emperor gave himself an extraordinary amount of trouble to instil firmness and stability into the infantry when acting on the defensive. On the whole, the equipment of the soldiers was excellent, and far better than in our own army as regards clothing, commissariat, and encampment. The Emperor, in arming his soldiers with the chassepôt rifle, gave his men a weapon which we must openly confess is far superior to our needle-gun, as it can be fired with greater rapidity, and has a much greater range, while the ball does not diverge so much from its course. But these advantages were, unfortunately for the French, counterbalanced by the badness of the aim of the French infantry. The cavalry also had been entirely reorganised, furnished with good horses, and animated with good courage. It was only in the artillery where the reformer had not been able to adopt this plan of reorganisation. His pet invention, the mitrailleuse, is a formidable antagonist when in a strong position, for then at short distances it devastates all around; but it is not at all a useful field-gun, and the French shells with their time-fuses take too long to fire, are difficult to arrange for the different distances, and are uncertain as regards their results. In every case the German artillery, the Prussian howitzers, were far superior to the French guns." This account is certainly much more favourable to the French army than most others; but it may contain some degree of truth. The regiments, however, were below their proper strength; jobbery and corruption had undermined the efficiency of the service in many ways; some of the commanding officers were incompetent and self-indulgent; and the men were ruined by fantastic ideas derived from the *Lanterne* and the other organs of sedition. The ground was carefully prepared for failure; and yet those who had helped to prepare it were wild with astonishment and anger when the failure came.

So distrustful of the issue was the Emperor himself, that, if we may rely on a statement which has been publicly made, he voted against going to war at the sitting of the Council of State which finally determined on that fatal enterprise. He only found one supporter, however, and the die was cast.* These and other matters must have furnished him with abundant food for thought as he walked about the shady paths of Wilhelmshöhe, or smoked his eternal cigarette in the stately apartments of the castle. His share in the final scene of Sedan was one of the subjects publicly discussed during the first month of his captivity. Imputations having been made on his conduct, the Imperial aides-de-camp, Prince de la Moskowa, M. Castelneau, M. Waubert, Count Reille, and Viscount Pajol, wrote a letter to the *Indépendance Belge* in reply to these statements. They affirmed that—

> "On the Emperor being informed that the troops were repulsed, dispersed, and partially driven back into the town, he sent the commandants to General Wimpffen to acquaint him with the facts. The general, at the same moment, sent two officers of his staff with a letter, proposing that the Emperor should save himself by placing himself in the middle of a strong column, and trying with it to reach Carignan. The Emperor refused to sacrifice a large number of soldiers to save himself, and added, 'Carignan is occupied by the Prussians; but if the general thinks he can save some part of the army, let him make the attempt.' General Wimpffen also imparted to General Lebrun his project of collecting 2,000 or 3,000 troops, putting himself at their head, and breaking through the Prussian lines. The latter replied that the scheme would fail, and would only add to the loss of life; and General Wimpffen shortly afterwards admitted that it was

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* A correspondent of the *Morning Post*, writing from Paris on September 7th, says he knows this for a fact. See *Morning Post*, Saturday, September 10th, 1870.

impracticable, and that capitulation was unavoidable. He thought it hard, however, that, having taken the command only *par interim*, he should have to sign such an agreement, and tendered his resignation, which the Emperor refused to accept, it being necessary that the commander should secure as far as possible the safety of the rest of the army; and the general thereupon withdrew his request. The general was not thwarted in any way by the Emperor, whose only communication with him was between nine and ten A.M. The Emperor then asked him how things were going at Balan. He replied that they were going as well as possible, and that the French were gaining ground. On the Emperor remarking that a considerable corps was approaching the French left, General Wimpffen replied, 'So much the better; we must let them do as they like; we will throw them into the Meuse, and gain the victory.' There was not the least altercation between the general and the Emperor; and when they separated, the Emperor warmly embraced him."

To this communication General Wimpffen replied by a letter, in which he stated that the note which he forwarded to the Emperor was as follows:—"I have ordered General Lebrun to attempt to pass through the Prussian lines in the direction of Carignan. Let your Majesty place yourself among his soldiers; they will consider it an honour to open for you a passage." The general then continues:—"The object of this invitation was to spare the Emperor the pain of being made a prisoner, and to make use of his *prestige* in order to facilitate a combined movement, without which it was impossible to cut through. The Emperor did not consent to that proposal, and ordered the white flag to be hoisted, unknown to me. At the same time his Majesty sent an envoy with a flag of truce to the Prussian head-quarters. In spite of my protest and refusal to negotiate, the white flag was not lowered. These acts spoilt the execution of the last offensive movements." The controversy did not end here; for an answer to General Wimpffen was written by a French officer of distinction, apparently with the Emperor's sanction. He alleges that the Emperor, after having taken part in the fight, entered Sedan at the moment when the right wing, utterly shattered, was already blocking up the streets of the town. He then proceeds:—

"The crowd was so dense that it was impossible to clear a passage, even on horseback. The Prussian artillery occupied the heights commanding the position, and was making terrible ravages amongst the thronging masses of French. In the opinion of every general present, all hopes of resistance were gone. It was only at this moment, when the communication with General Wimpffen outside the town had become utterly impossible, that the officer bearing the flag of truce was sent out; and General Wimpffen himself has shown that it was not any interference of the Emperor that could in the slightest degree have impeded the forward movement that General Wimpffen wished to make, since he himself avows, in his own report, 'that the effective of the troops which he had been able to rally for that purpose was far too weak to attempt the only line of retreat possible in view of the disposition of the enemy's forces.'"

The point at issue does not seem a very important one; and, all things considered, there appears to be no doubt that the only choice, after the French had been driven into Sedan, lay between surrender and massacre.

The Emperor took all these matters in his usual calm and philosophic way, as he passed his time in the monotonous repose of Wilhelmshöhe. To a chamberlain of the Queen of Prussia, who accompanied the Duchess of Hamilton on her visit to the Imperial captive, he quietly observed, with reference to his own misfortunes, "It was written!"—a remark very much in the spirit of a devout Mussulman; but the Emperor has always been known to be a fatalist. On this occasion, Louis Napoleon expressed to the chamberlain his deep sense of the courtesy with which he had been treated. "As long as I live," he added, "I shall not forget the interview with the King of Prussia. He was more affected than I myself." Courtesy to vanquished enemies is part of the good breeding of monarchs; but it cannot be doubted that the manner of King William to his prisoner was really kind and considerate, and the Emperor, whose disposition is affectionate and alive to gratitude, felt the kindness acutely.

On *his* side, the King of Prussia had no need to comfort himself with references to fate, and to the inevitable nature of things pre-written. He made decent recognition of Providence, and then gave thanks to the instruments of Providence who had enabled him to achieve such splendid results. At a champagne dinner to his principal officers, the day after the surrender of Sedan (nothing but ordinary wine had been drunk at previous repasts), his Majesty proposed the following toast:—"We must to-day, in gratitude, drink to the health of our brave army. *You*, War Minister von Roon, have sharpened our sword; *you*, General von Moltke, have guided it; and *you*, Count von Bismarck, by your direction of the national policy for years, have brought Prussia to her present pitch of elevation. Let us then drink to the health of the army; of the three I have named in connection with this toast; and of every one present who has contributed, according to his power, to the results now accomplished." The King did well in placing General von Roon even before Moltke; for the extraordinary perfection of the Prussian military machine, by virtue of which the successes of the war were achieved, was due, in the greatest measure, to the capacity and unresting care of the War Minister. It is seldom that a monarch has had three such servants as Roon, Moltke, and Bismarck.

The month of September was to a great extent a month of sieges. Besides those of first-class importance, such as Paris, Metz, and Strasburg, there were others of some gravity, of which one of the principal was Toul. The town so called is situated in the department of Meurthe, a district of France mainly formed out of the old duchies of Lorraine and Bar, and peopled by a grave, industrious, and intellectual race, of mingled French and German descent. Toul stands at the foot of picturesque hills, traversing a fertile plain on the Moselle, and is distant twenty-one miles by railway west of Nancy. Though not a place of great note, it is a fortress of strength and value. As early as the 14th of August the surrender of Toul was demanded by a body of Prussian cavalry, and refused. Shortly afterwards the town was invested, and during September it was subjected to a severe bombardment. On the south-east bank of the Moselle, along the low ridge between Dommartin and Chaudenay, six Prussian field-batteries were placed, and kept up a vigorous and well-directed fire. In front of the Prussian batteries, two Bavarian field-batteries, each of six guns, were brought into position upon the summit of Mont St. Michel. The first cannonade commenced at a quarter to nine in the morning, and was sustained by a quick succession of shots from the Bavarian batteries. The town was soon on fire in several places from the shells that were thrown into it; but a heavy rain from ten to eleven extinguished the flames. The distance from the batteries to the front lines of the ramparts was about 1,200 yards, so that the guns told with considerable effect. "Three shots," says a correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, "were directed against the tower of the cathedral, as it was being used as an observatory by the enemy. All three shots struck the platform of the tower, and splintered some of the ornamental portions of the pilasters, but without materially injuring in any way this marvellous monument of the middle ages. As no more observers were to be discerned upon the towers, our artillerymen were glad to be spared the necessity of making them a target for their firing. At the commencement the French replied vigorously to our cannonade with 24-pounders, with shells and grape from pieces of smaller calibre, and even musketry fire from the chassepôts, some of the bullets from which nearly reached our batteries. None of the enemy's shots did any damage, most of them burying themselves in the sides of the mountain below us, while others burst in the air, or flew in a wide semicircle over our heads to the other side of the mountain. The whole fortress, constructed according to the principles propounded by Vauban, lies in a deep valley, and is completely commanded by the surrounding heights, none of them being protected by forts or bastions. The French seemed to be in a terrible mess. No sooner had they pointed one of their guns, and got our range accurately, than we opened fire upon the gun, and silenced it. Thus they were prevented from effectually answering our fire." At a quarter past one the bombardment was temporarily suspended, and a flag of truce, borne by a body of horsemen from Dommartin, was sent to the fortress, with a demand for its surrender. The commandant of Toul, however, refused to give up the stronghold, and the cannonade was accordingly resumed at half-past five in the evening, and continued for a short time, when the German commanders, finding that no breach could be made in the walls by guns of such slight calibre as those with which they were furnished, determined to wait until their heavy siege-trains should have arrived and been placed in position.

In a few days a number of heavy guns were brought up, though not without a good deal of difficulty, owing to the steepness of the roads. The town was defended by only a few regulars, and 2,000 Mobile Guards. A gallant resistance, however, was kept up for some weeks; and when, on the 16th of September, an assault was made by the Germans, all the male inhabitants that could procure arms assisted in repelling it. On the 23rd, at daybreak, a concentrated bombardment of the works began. The firing continued throughout the day, and the response of the garrison, though active, was not powerful. By evening the town was on fire in twenty-three places, and the commandant was obliged to yield to the pressure of the inhabitants, and to make an offer of capitulation. This offer was at once accepted by the officer in command of the siege corps, and Toul was entered at seven o'clock. The conditions imposed were the same as those at Sedan. Strange to say, there was not one regular artillerist in the garrison. Five hundred of the Mobiles had been trained during the siege to work the guns, and they seem to have discharged their duties fairly. The commandant was Major Huck, an old cavalry officer. It is alleged that the Germans were much vexed that so weak a garrison should have detained them for six weeks, and broken their communication with Paris. In this respect, the taking of Toul was important, for the fortress commanded the railroad, and thus rendered the victualling of the troops in front of the capital very precarious and uncertain. The town was found to be a good deal damaged. The Gothic chapel of St. Gengoulph, dating from the year 814, was almost ruined; but the fine Byzantine cathedral of St. Mausay, believed to be still older, was but slightly injured. Order had been well maintained in Toul; there were few wounded in the town, and the maladies specially attendant on sieges were wholly absent.



GENERAL VON DER TANN.

The surrender of this fortress placed in possession of the victors 109 officers, 2,240 men, 120 horses, 1 eagle, 197 bronze guns, 3,000 rifles, 3,000 sabres, 500 cuirasses, and a considerable quantity of munitions and articles of equipment, besides soldiers' pay for 143,035 days, and rations for 51,949 days. The citizens received the Germans with much good humour. They seemed to be glad that the period of trial was over, and the besiegers were equally well pleased to have obtained possession of the place. There were a good many Alsatians among the garrison, and besiegers and besieged soon began to share the contents of their flasks. The townsfolk made holiday, and excursions into the country were at once set on foot, as a compensation for the dreary imprisonment to which the people had been subjected.

Simultaneously with these events Montmédy, Thionville, Verdun, Phalsburg, and Bitsche, were being either attacked or watched. The bombardment of Bitsche commenced on the 10th of September. Some hours before it began the commander



TENDING THE WOUNDED.

of the German troops, who were Bavarians, sent a *parlementaire* into the place, to apprise the Mayor and the inhabitants of the impending siege, and to suggest their leaving at once, as, after the expiration of the interval allowed, nobody would be permitted to pass the lines. Several civilians immediately took advantage of this offer, without awaiting the decision of the French commandant, who subsequently objected to any further emigration, on the ground that the townsmen would have to co-operate in the defence. Only the women and children might leave. The greater number of the women, however, refused to depart without their husbands; and the Mayor thereupon begged the commandant either to alter his decision, and permit the men to go, or to surrender the fortress, as, in the event of continued resistance, the town would certainly be destroyed. The commandant is said to have replied that the fate of the town did not matter to him, and that, besides, he knew how to protect it. As to the fortress, he would defend it to the last man. The bombardment proved to be very severe, and the town was soon seriously injured. Sorties took place from time to time, but with no great effect. The French troops occupied an advantageous position, being posted on heights from which they could observe all the German movements, while they could make their own arrangements for sorties secretly in the subterranean ways with which the place is provided. Yet little could be done against the terrible fire which the Bavarians poured into the town. After awhile, the population took refuge in the citadel; but even this stronghold was greatly injured. The barracks, the Governor's house, the hospital, and a chapel, all situated in the citadel, were destroyed by the storm of shot and shell; and even the granite rock on which the town is built was cracked and splintered. On the 19th of September the bombardment of the town was suspended, and the fire of the whole of the guns was then concentrated on the fortress, which is built in successive tiers, rising one above another. The place is surrounded by strong stone walls, and entered through iron gates. An iron door leads into the fortress, and the communication between the different tiers is made by stone staircases and covered ways. Bitsche is situated in a pass of the Vosges, thirty miles north of Strasburg, and fifteen east of Sarreguemines. The town stands at the foot of a high cliff, near a wide but shallow lake, from which the river Borne takes its source. The number of inhabitants is not above 3,000; they are chiefly engaged in the manufacture of pottery and glass. The rock, which is vaulted and casemated, with four bastions and a half-moon battery, mounted eighty pieces of cannon at the time of the siege. The approach on one side is by a zigzag footpath, on the other by a winding carriage-road. Both roads meet at a drawbridge leading to a gate at the entrance to the fort, which, in September, 1870, was protected by the fire of ten heavy guns. "The entrance," says an interesting paper in *All the Year Round*, "is by a tunnel cut through the rock, one hundred and twenty feet long, with a massive gate at each end, and one in the centre. The rock is cut through in two places as low as the ditch, one extremity being called the Grosse Tête, and the other the Petite Tête, and both are connected with the body of the fort by drawbridges. On the west side there is a mortar battery. In the centre of the fort stand two large barracks, and at the end are storehouses and magazines. The rock is hollowed to contain the garrison and the provisions, and is divided by compartments connected by narrow passages with massive doors. There is also a subterranean passage communicating with the town below. Although the fort is of solid rock, cut down perpendicularly ninety to a hundred and fifty feet, it is faced nearly all round with masonry. The place cost so much to fortify that Lous XIV., when asked for more money to complete it, inquired, with a smile, if they were building it of *louis-d'ors*." Bitsche was the place of detention of a number of English sailors taken prisoners in the great war.

An energetic attack on Montmedy was made by the Prussians on September 5th; but it was successfully resisted, and the besiegers retired for a while, only to renew the assault on the 8th and subsequent days. A few days earlier than this a lamentable event had occurred at Vitry. It was at first resolved to defend that town; but when the Prussians were approaching, it was determined to send the Gardes Mobiles forming the garrison to Château Thierry, and the guns on the ramparts were spiked and thrown into the fosse. The Prussians appeared in front of the town before the departure of the Mobiles, some of whom made a show of resistance, but, being ill-armed and half-disciplined, were massacred by the enemy, who for a long while refused to regard them as soldiers. The affair could hardly be called a battle; it was simply a piece of ruthless slaughter.

On the 30th of September Beauvais—an ancient episcopal city of Picardy, now the capital of the department of Oise—was taken by the Prussians by surprise, a watchman who was stationed on the tower of the cathedral having had no time to give the alarm. The town was occupied by 2,000 infantry and 700 cavalry, followed by 200 carts for the collection of provisions. A notice was immediately posted up, to the effect that the military authorities of the army of the Meuse purposed obtaining supplies no longer by means of requisitions, but by purchase at a money price. Dealers and farmers were therefore invited to present themselves at the Intendance of Beauvais with various descriptions of produce. The proclamation continued:—"In taking this step, the Prussian military authorities prove that they desire to lessen the pressure of the war, and to assist in the free trade of the inhabitants. It is, therefore, an appeal made to those who may, with perfect safety, present themselves to the Intendance of Beauvais, to deal for their produce to whatever amount they may have. Further, officers shall go with vehicles to each commune, in order to deal for what may be there offered them on the conditions named. Besides, on every Wednesday and Saturday, from six in the morning, the Intendance will establish in the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville at Beauvais a free market, to which farmers are invited to bring their produce. The prices shall be fixed by public auction. The Intendance will also buy every day in their offices." This was so far well; but in many parts of France the system of requisitions was vigorously enforced by the Prussians.

The usual effects of invasion and social disruption were not long in making themselves felt over the unhappy territories thus torn in pieces by foreign armies and intestine disagreements. Bands of robbers infested the country in several parts. In the commune of Toulouse a large body of marauders prowled up and down, demanding employment at exorbitant wages, and devastating the estates of the wealthy on being refused. Three detachments of National Guards from Toulouse attacked them, and took many prisoners; but this success did not at once put a stop to the practice. At Bagnolet, some plunderers broke into houses, and ransacked them; and in other places the most extreme doctrines of socialism were enforced by violence and terror. In Paris itself a good deal of lawlessness prevailed in the early days of the Revolution. A mania for volunteer arrests on suspicion seized upon the people, and much injustice was committed in this way. An old gentleman in a civilian dress was seen on a certain September day walking about the fortifications near Vincennes, taking notes. A National Guard went up to him, and, touching him on the shoulder, said, "You are Marshal Vaillant. I arrest you." With the assistance of some of his comrades, the National Guard forced his prisoner into a hackney-coach, and took him to the office of General Trochu, followed by a crowd, shouting "Death to the traitor!" General Trochu was absent, but M. Garnier Pagés appeared in his place, and, mounting a chair, thus addressed the crowd:—"Citizens! we must have at this time but one thought—to drive away the invader. To do that, what is needed? Revolution? You have that. As for treasons, if any be discovered, speedy justice will be done. You may rely upon the Government for the National Defence. It will watch, and do its duty. Long live the Republic!" The mob responded with the favourite cry, and Marshal Vaillant, who was well acquainted with the place, found means of quietly escaping. It was thought that he was acting as an agent of the Emperor. In consequence of numerous occurrences such as this, the following official notice was issued:—

"The Prefect of Police has learnt that some very lamentable excesses have been committed, and that, upon the pretext of espionage, citizens have been arrested at their homes without any legal warrant. The Prefect of Police reminds the public that no one is entitled without a legal authorisation to enter the abode of a citizen, or to place a hand upon his person. The law visits with severe penalties any violation of domestic privacy, and arbitrary arrests. The Prefect of Police will cause the law to be enforced, and will bring to trial all those who may violate it. But he is convinced that this notice will be sufficient, and he places the liberty of the citizen and of his home under the safeguard of the patriotism of the National Guard. In front of the enemy the most scrupulous regard for law is the first defence of the city."

Another Government notice stated that—

"For some days past the National Guards on duty in the capital, especially at the gates of the fortifications and on the ramparts, carried away by their zealous care of the interests intrusted to their protection, have interpreted their orders with a degree of rigour that may be prejudicial to the defence. Engineers and many agents of different orders, even officers in uniform, some being engaged in important missions, and all having official permits, have been stopped and impeded in their duties. It has even occurred that vehicles laden with useful materials have been stopped. These proceedings cause great difficulty to various branches of the public service engaged in promoting the national defence. It is important that the commanders of posts should free the minds of their subordinates from apprehensions and mistrusts which are not justified by facts."

Revolutionary excesses have a natural tendency to exhaust themselves after a time; but it does not appear that the official proclamations had any immediate effect. General Ambert, who for a short time commanded a section of the Paris fortifications, was arrested by his own men for the expression of an abstract political opinion. He was standing in the midst of his officers, regretting that the new battalions could only be supplied for the present with percussion muskets. A mob of people began to exclaim, "Long live the Republic!" and the general, thinking himself called upon to say something, imprudently observed to his officers that he could only acknowledge a Government which had been ratified by universal suffrage, and that the Republic had not been so ratified. A captain stepped out, and said that, for his part, he would not acknowledge as his commander a general who did not acknowledge the Republic. This was supported by several others; upon which General Ambert replied, "You captains of the National Guard need not think you can frighten me." The officers then took him prisoner, and led him off to the Ministry of the Interior, where what they had done was approved of, and the general was subsequently dismissed from his command. His action was certainly very injudicious; yet the recognition of universal suffrage as the basis of all legal government should have made him popular with the masses, if there were any consistency in French Republicanism. Nothing, however, is more clear than that the followers of Victor Hugo, Rochefort, and Gustave Flourens, regard as the height of treason any acknowledgment of the national sovereignty apart from their own dogmatism and preconceived ideas. Even Louis Blanc, one of the most sensible of the party, has spoken of the Republic as being above universal suffrage.

Foreigners fared as badly as Frenchmen. Captain Johnston, a courier of the British Government, was seized by the mob in the Faubourg St. Honoré. He was taken, at his own request, to the Embassy, where it was at once declared that he had been a Queen's messenger for five-and-twenty years. The mob, however, refused to be pacified, and denounced the captain as a spy paid by the British Government to furnish information to the Prussians. By a singular chance, it had happened the very day before that Captain Johnston was arrested at St. Germain-en-Laye by the Prussian troops. He was now conducted by his French captors to the military post of the Elysée, where the officer in command succeeded, with great difficulty, in calming the suspicion and anger of the crowd. Many other ugly symptoms of the Red Republic made themselves manifest from time to time. At one of the political meetings held in Paris, as reported in the *Rappel*, an organ of the extreme party, "the first speaker complained that certain tradesmen were making a profit out of the public distress by raising their prices, so that working men could not live. Another found fault with the Government for continuing Imperialist officers in their posts, and for preserving a corrupt magistracy. An old ex-soldier placed his badge on the desk, and demanded the abolition of civil and military orders, a proposition which was applauded. Another citizen insisted on the issue of paper money, hypothecated on the property of those who had fled before danger, and abandoned the capital. This was likewise approved." A document, printed on red paper, was posted on the walls of the capital during September, the object of which was to incite the Government to revolutionary measures. It professed to emanate from "the Central Republican Committee of the twenty arrondissements of Paris for the National Defence;" and it stated that on the 5th of September—the day after the proclamation of the Republic—a large number of citizens proposed the constitution of a committee, having for its object to provide for the safety of the country, and to establish the Republican system of government. To this committee each arrondissement sent four delegates; and the central body presented to the Government for the National Defence a series of measures which had been accepted by acclamation at public meetings. These measures were framed with a view to the suppression of the police, "as it had been constituted under the Monarchical Governments, for the purpose of oppressing the people;" the substitution of a police managed entirely by the elected municipalities; the appointment of new magistrates, to be elected by the people, and responsible to them; the abrogation of all restrictive laws against the rights of writing, speaking, meeting, and combining; the taking possession of all articles of food and prime necessity, to be distributed equally to the citizens, and to be paid for at a fixed rate after the war; the reorganisation of the army, and the prosecution of the defence under popular control; the proclamation of a levy *en masse;* the general requisition of everything necessary to the defence of the nation; and the sending forth of delegates charged with the propagation of Republican principles in the provinces, the suppression of reactionary movements, and the gathering of volunteers to the aid of Paris. The paper was signed by upwards of forty names, the most generally known of which were those of M. Millière and M. Cluseret, two notorious Red Republicans. The Government, of course, paid no heed to the suggestions of these citizens; and a counter address was soon presented to General Trochu by a numerous body of the National Guards, who said:—

"We are all devoted to the Government for the National Defence. Committees formed without regular election, without appointment from the Government or from the citizens, have usurped in each arrondissement the name of Committees for National Defence. They have already taken upon themselves to visit the houses in several quarters of the city. We formally demand that a notice should be issued by the Government declaring that these committees possess no authority. At the moment when the enemy is appearing before the walls of Paris, we beseech you, for the sake of necessary union and the public safety, to recall every one to his duty and to his rights. Every violation of home, all illegal arrests, should be firmly repressed by the National Guard, which alone is charged with the maintenance of order in Paris. The culprits, whomsoever they may be, should be at once marched off to the Prefecture of Police. To create a division in the ranks of defence would be to open our gates to the enemy; and all good citizens ought to recognise no Government but that for the National Defence, presided over by M. Jules Favre and General Trochu."

The weak point in this reply was the condemnation of the committees as having been formed "without regular election," coupled with the exhortation to all good citizens "to recognise no Government but that for the National Defence." The Government itself was just as much created without regular election as the committees: nay, the latter had more of an elective character than the former possessed in the early weeks of its existence. Still, the setting up of rival governments is always a highly dangerous proceeding; and the extravagant suggestions of "the Central Republican Committee" rendered even more objectionable the methods by which they sought to agitate popular opinion.

An attempt was even made in one quarter of Paris to establish a revolutionary commune, on the model of that of Lyons, with a view to dictating to the Government. The movement, however, was suppressed by the energy of M. Kératry, the Prefect, aided, it is said, by M. Rochefort. The Commune at Lyons acted in the most arbitrary manner. The former functionaries were thrown into prison, and, when at length released, were recommended to leave the city immediately. Several commissaries of police were long kept in gaol without any formal charge being made against them; and the Carmelites were expelled from Lyons, besides being deprived of the larger part of a sum of money which had been given to them by the treasurer of their order for meeting travelling expenses.

A letter from a Lyons correspondent of the *Indépendance Belge* gives a vivid picture of the state of Lyons during the first few weeks of the Republic. Dating on the 23rd of September, the writer says:—

"After the stormy days of the past week or two, the city has assumed a comparatively calm aspect. The body which styled itself the Commune of Lyons, and which created such great and useless alarm, and caused an extensive emigration, has yielded its authority to the elected municipal commission. That has been a triumph of universal suffrage. But we must not indulge in illusions. The Commune of Lyons was composed of men who are Socialists, rather than politicians, and who have but small respect for the decisions of universal suffrage, which they regard as liable to be affected by ignorance and stupidity. They yield in the first instance, in order not to excite public opinion against them, and afterwards they conspire, These sectarians have great influence over a portion of the Lyonnese population. You have heard of those Jansenist families whose faith in Port Royal has survived alike time and revolution, and which have been for a long period settled round the old church of St. Severin, in Paris. There they form a community which cherishes the treasures of their faith, and worships God according to the niceties of a conscience regulated by the formulæ of Pascal and the great Arnauld. The Croix Rousse is the St. Severin of Socialism. The chiefs of all proscribed and elsewhere forgotten sects there find an asylum, disciples, and resources. Specimens of all schools are to be found there. Icariens, Fourrieristes, Egalitaires, Communists—all have their professors and adepts. The leaders of the movement, who believed that, from fear or approval, they would be allowed a free course at the elections, were astonished at the result of the polling for the municipal offices, which showed a majority in favour of the Moderate Republicans. Still, they do not appear to have abandoned all hope of again seizing their prey, and anxiety is felt lest further troubles should ensue. They seek to excite distrust in the impressionable minds of these southern people. The least act of moderation is stigmatised by them as an attempt against the Republic, for which they really care but little. They have in that manner denounced the liberation of the former civic and political functionaries who had been imprisoned, and who, according to these enthusiasts, ought to have been placed upon their trial, simply because they had been public functionaries."

Further troubles ensued; but the Prefect was invested by the Tours Government with full civil and military powers, and the rioters (whose main avowed object was to obtain the dismissal of all Buonapartist officers, and the appointment by election of others) were finally suppressed by the aid of some concessions.

Meanwhile, the Prefects and others in authority continued to stimulate—sometimes not in the most judicious spirit—the patriotic feelings of the people, in the hope of repelling the ever-advancing invasion. The Prefect of La Manche issued a proclamation, in which he observed that although his fellow-provincials in that part of France were for the moment beyond the radius of the Prussian operations, they might in time be visited by the enemy, and should therefore prepare to defend themselves, their families, their property, and their homes. They must carry on the struggle in detached bands; they must adopt a guerilla warfare, which should harass the invader day and night, and leave him neither rest nor peace. France was eminently fitted for a contest of this description. Every wood, every tree, every ditch, every hedge, should become an ambuscade, from which death should fall into the ranks of an enemy advancing with difficulty over roads intersected with trenches and bristling with felled trees. The Prefect, after setting forth these considerations, urged the formation of free-shooters, for which service sportsmen accustomed to the use of the gun were especially adapted. Each man of all such parties would receive the high pay of three francs a day, and the officers would be treated in the same manner as those of the Mobile Guards. This appeal was well meant, but it led to slight results. Guerilla warfare can do but little against so vast and consummately organised an army as that which Germany directed against France. The experiences of 1870 proved, what might indeed have been suspected before, that irregular troops are almost powerless in face of the enormous and varied resources of professional soldiers. War is every year becoming more and more a scientific operation, conducted by elaborate and costly machinery, such as none but strong Governments can command. Mere personal bravery no longer counts for much, though of course it is as necessary as ever in combination with other requisites. The French appear to have thought that because their own retreat from Moscow, in 1812, was made all the more disastrous by


UHLAN RENDEZVOUS.



GENERAL TROCHU REVIEWING THE NATIONAL GUARDS.

the continual inroads of the Russian peasantry, therefore the advance of the Prussians into France might be similarly and equally harassed. They forgot that there is all the difference in the world between an army defeated and precipitately retiring, and an army rendered confident by victory, and steadily penetrating into the enemy's country. They failed, also, to take into account the tremendous advantage which modern arms of precision give to regular forces over the feeble and uncertain weapons with which the non-professional combatant sallies out from his manor-house, his farm, or his workshop. The trade of fighting is by this time almost a monopoly in the hands of Governments. The days of William Tell are at an end. Garibaldi was probably the last of the guerilla chieftains, as far as civilised nations are concerned; and even the star of Garibaldi paled after the landing of the gallant "Thousand" at Marsala, in May, 1860.

The religious element was not wanting in the several motives for resistance which were urged upon the people. "An old Vendéan soldier," signing himself Cathelineau, issued a proclamation to the West Bretons and Vendéans, having first obtained permission from the Delegate Government at Tours to raise an armed force, of which he was to have the command. The proclamation is dated September 22nd, 1870, and is thus expressed:—

"The enemy is in the heart of France, formidable and terrible; he advances daily. Let us rise to defend our wives and children; let us not wait; let us rise. Let our sole ambition be the safety of our country. Full of confidence in our Holy Mary, and covered by her protection, let us set out. Our fathers fought for the faith, and they were heroes. They are dead, but they were victorious, for their faith was preserved, and their glorified names will survive in every age. You, their worthy children, rise up. France, in her hour of trial, looks to you, calls upon you, expects you to preserve her honour. Let our cry be 'God and France!' and we shall be victorious."

Still more vehement in the direction of religious zeal was another appeal to the Vendéans, which in plain terms raised the perfectly irrelevant question of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism:—

"Vendéans!—France has been attacked by the savage hordes of Protestant Germany. Within a few days, one hundred and twenty squadrons of Uhlans, detached from the enemy's *corps d'armée*, will pour into your departments, to deliver them up to pillage, murder, and robbery. To violate women, cut the throats of children, shoot old men, send all able-bodied men to the convict hulks, pillage houses, burn villages, destroy churches, break the statues of the Virgin Mary, and assassinate prisoners of war—such is the mode of warfare practised by the Prussians. They seek to treat our county as a conquered land. Vendéans, you will remember, held in check the Bleus, those formidable soldiers who kept Europe in terror for twenty-five years. You will remember that in your forests it was that the honour of old France was preserved intact. You will remember that you have never paltered with the religion of your fathers, nor with the love of your country. To arms! and let not one of you be wanting at the rendezvous. It is behind the Loire that your formidable phalanx must collect, to fall upon the enemy when he makes his appearance to levy contributions upon you, to violate your wives, to burn your villages. Your sons are fighting on the ramparts of Paris; you will fight in the *bocage*, in the name of God and in the name of France. Let the priests lead their parishioners to the fight; let the mothers arm the fathers, to avenge their sons slain in the carnage-fields of Alsace and Lorraine. Let the women denounce as accursed all who shall seek to avoid sharing in the national defence. Inhabitants of the western departments, fly to arms! Take your muskets, take pitchforks, pikes, axes; cast bullets, make gunpowder, and unite yourselves with us to wage against the enemy war to the death, without truce or mercy. Vendéans! it is in the name of God, in the name of our country in danger, that we summon you to arms. It is in the name of your children, in the name of outraged religion, that the old Chouans, speaking from their tombs, call you to the combat. Let not one of you be wanting at the rendezvous. It is at Thouars that we shall assemble after September 25th. Let each one come on that day armed; and may God preserve France!

"The Vendéan Headquarters at Thouars.

"The Chief of the Staff of the Vendéan troops in course of formation,

"L. F. de l'Hebergement."

The Vendéans and Bretons are among the most religious of the French provincial population, and it was thought that these appeals would rouse a crusading spirit among the ignorant and excitable peasantry. Intelligent readers, however, do not need to be reminded that a large number of the German soldiers were themselves Catholics, and that some of the worst cruelties of which the army was accused were committed by the followers, not of Luther, but of the Pope; as, for instance, the burning of Bazeilles, which was the work of the Bavarians.

When it became evident that Paris would be obliged to stand a siege, measures were taken for meeting the exigencies of the time. All notices of legal action and appeals were suspended during the continuance of the war. The octroi duties upon articles introduced into Paris were temporarily suspended, in order to enable the inhabitants of the surrounding districts to remove their property from the reach of the enemy. The telegraphic system was closed against private despatches in the Department of the Seine, with an exception in favour of newspapers. The pay of the Mobile Guards was fixed at one franc fifty centimes a day. The Prefect of Police issued an order closing the Paris theatres after the 10th of September, directing the removal from them of all combustible matter, and appointing to the general service of the city the corps of firemen engaged there. The construction of a powerful redoubt was at once commenced in front of the famous porcelain works at Sèvres, which the *Soir* declared to be "the key of Paris," but which had unaccountably been left without defence; and all the forts round Paris were supplied with means of illuminating the ground in front of them with the electric light. The Théâtre Français was converted into a hospital, and several of the leading actresses issued an appeal for contributions of lint, bandages, bedding, and other necessaries.

After a review of the armed forces, General Trochu issued, on September 14th, a general order to the National Guards of Paris and the Mobile Guards of Paris and the Departments, which it will be interesting to compare with the actual results of the siege:—



THE FIRST SIGHT OF PARIS.

"Never before has any general witnessed so grand a spectacle as that which you have presented. Three hundred battalions of citizens, organised and armed, and enveloped by the entire population of the city, unanimously proclaim the determined defence of Paris and of liberty. If those foreign nations which doubt you, if the armies which are marching upon you, could only have heard of this, they would have understood that misfortune has done more in a few weeks to rouse the soul of the nation than long years of prosperity have done to abase it. The spirit of devotion and of sacrifice has infused itself into you, and to it you owe that hearty union which will prove your safety. With our formidable effective force, the daily guard of Paris will be 70,000 men. If the enemy, by a fierce attack, or by a surprise, or by effecting a breach, should pierce our protecting fortifications, he will encounter barricades, which are being prepared, and his columns will be driven back by the successive attacks of ten reserves stationed at different points. Remain, therefore, perfectly assured, and know that the *enceinte* of Paris, defended as it is by the persevering efforts of public spirit and by 300,000 muskets, is impregnable. National Guards of the Seine and Gardes Mobiles, in the name of the Government for the National Defence, of which I am towards you but the representative, I thank you for your patriotic solicitude for the cherished interests which you have in charge. Now let us proceed to work in the nine sections of the defence. Let there be everywhere order, calmness, and devotion;

and remember that you are charged, as I have previously informed you, with the police of Paris during this critical period. Prepare to bear your task with constancy, and then you will not fail to conquer."

Notwithstanding all this commendable activity, Paris continued to be agitated by many and conflicting rumours. The new Government had not been in power above four days when, if the papers are to be believed, an Imperialist conspiracy was detected and foiled. The Prefect of Police received information on the 8th of September that some agents of the Empire had arranged a plan for marching upon the Tuileries, after having called to their aid the Garde de Paris and the garrison of the barracks in the Rue Mouffetard, who were supposed to be favourable to the fallen power. The object, it is thought, was to declare a Regency, of course of a Napoleonic character. In view of this danger, M. de Kératry caused the arrest of several police commissaries and about fifty ex-sergents-de-ville. The police agents employed by the late Government, who together formed a very large body, were ordered to remain at their homes, under penalty of being arrested if found in the public thoroughfares. The Tuileries was occupied by 5,000 National Guards, supplied with cartridges, and all the avenues leading to the building were filled with military. If such a plot was really conceived, it was effectually thwarted by these measures; but it may be questioned whether there was at that time any wide or deeply-rooted conspiracy for upsetting the arrangements of September 4th.

Much more alarm was created by a story of the discovery in Paris of a stock of Prussian guns, amounting to more than 30,000. According to an account given in the *Journal de Paris*, some chests were seized, which were found to contain German cavalry uniforms. This led to the discovery of arms. The plan is stated to have been to distribute these arms and uniforms to the 30,000 or 40,000 Germans who inhabited Belleville and La Villette before the decree of expulsion, and who had been drilled and formed into regiments. "At a given moment, and concurrently with an attack by the besieging forces," continues the account of this most improbable plot, "we should have been taken *in* rear by false Uhlans, who would have charged upon us, and caused us to believe that the city had been entered either by a breach, or through the sewers or catacombs. Some persons appointed for that purpose were to have called out 'Treason!' and then our troops would have been assailed in front and in rear." The rifles were discovered at the railway station of La Chapelle, the authorities of which at first denied all knowledge of them. It is alleged that they had arrived from Sedan a few days before, and that they included several needle-guns bearing the Prussian eagle. The alleged design is incredible; but there may have been a plot of a less audacious character. The Parisians were in a state of morbid apprehension of German machinations. Even some of the ragged fugitives from Sedan were suspected of being Prussian spies.

In the midst of these agitations, the two branches of the Bourbon family contrived to find occasion for bringing themselves before the attention of their countrymen. The Count de Chambord, the head of the family, and the claimant to the French throne on "Legitimist" principles, issued an autograph manifesto, dated September 16th, which is a marvellous specimen of the air of suave patronage that can be assumed by Divine Right in exile when making a bid for popular support. The Count seemed to consider himself a sort of polite Providence, appointed to save the French nation by a sudden avatar. The circular, which was written in the third person, commenced:—

"Monseigneur is greatly affected by the situation of France. He follows with anxious solicitude the disastrous events which have brought the enemy before Paris, and now his generous and patriotic heart is elevated with the thought that to him, if Providence come to his aid, should be confided the honour of saving our unhappy country. The French monarchy, of which Monseigneur is the noble heir, and which is resumed in his person, has done great things in days past, and more than once has saved France. The moments are supreme. Monseigneur is convinced that this noble task is now his, and that to-day, as in former times, right will triumph over might. He is therefore about to devote himself to this great work with all the prudence and energy which the circumstances require; but he calls upon his friends to come to his aid with their devoted co-operation. The cause of monarchy is yet what it ever has been—the cause of France herself. Many things have given way to the course of events, to interest, to various influences and considerations, &c.; but now light has come. Revolution, whatever its form, has never given peace, security, or liberty to the country. From the beginning it has always oscillated betwixt anarchy and despotism, and to-day, for the third time, the country is invaded and its sacred soil defiled by the foreigner. Monseigneur relies upon the teachings of history, which cannot always be vain, and he calls for the co-operation of all Frenchmen devoted to their country, to whatever party they may have formerly belonged. Monseigneur says, therefore, to all, 'Do not be disquieted, but hope. On the proper occasion I will present myself. On the day when France will have need of me, at whatever spot, I shall be there.'"

The Count then went on to recommend his

friends to influence, as far as possible, the elections which it was at that time supposed were just about to be held. It does not appear that the appeal met with any response. The Count de Chambord (who is the son of the late Duke de Berri) left France at the period of the Revolution of 1830, when he was only ten years of age, and he has no adherents beyond the narrow circle of the old nobility.

The Duke d'Aumale, the fourth son of Louis Philippe, replied to the offers which he received, with regard to election to the Constituent Assembly, in these terms:—"Always ready to serve my country, I accept the candidature. This is my programme: —Actual adhesion to the Government which fights and negotiates. Future adhesion to the Government freely chosen by the Constituent Assembly. Honourable peace. Liberty, order, probity."

Though the Republic was not very enthusiastically received by the French themselves, it was most vehemently applauded by English working men. Numerous open-air meetings were held in London, to express, on the part of the assertors of popular rights, unbounded confidence in the Provisional Government which was ruling without any commission from the French people, and immeasurable detestation of the Emperor who had ruled by universal suffrage. A deputation from English working men to the Republican Administration was despatched to Paris, and had an interview with M. Favre, who afterwards sent a letter of thanks to the spokesman of the deputation.

Another feature of the time worth mentioning was a protest against the war, issued by the International Association of Women, which said:—

> "The horrors of the war now being waged between two nominally Christian nations have awakened us more fully to the terrible opposition there is between the deliberate destruction of human life and the spirit and teaching of Christianity. While rendering all honour to the noble efforts now being made for the relief of the wounded, we women of England desire also to aid the still nobler work, and to further the still nobler object, the extinction of war; and we earnestly and respectfully offer to those in power, who are responsible for the continuance of the present war, our petition, urged in the name of God, and on behalf of our friends in France and Germany, for the cessation of this awful struggle, and for the carrying out, at the earliest possible moment, of the great project, which will contribute largely to assuage the wounds of humanity—a general disarmament."

Utterances such as this are apparently lost in the roar of conflict; but they are not really wasted. They form the basis of the legislation of the future.

CHAPTER XV.

Paris shut up from the Outer World—The Defensive Force in the City—Condition of the Forts—Proceedings of the German Investing Armies—Effects of the Continued Resistance of the Eastern Forts—The German Base of Operations—Policy of the Besiegers—Sortie of the French on September 30th—Distribution of Iron Crosses at Versailles—Flight of French Peasantry from the Villages round Paris—Isolated Acts of Resistance—Reprisals of the Germans—Burning of a Village—Severe Treatment of Francs-tireurs—Circular of Baron Thiele in Answer to French Accusations of German Cruelty—Circular of Count Chaudordy—Reply of Count Bismarck—Remarks on the Disputed Points—History of Lorraine—The Doctrine of Nationalities—Lists of Killed and Wounded—Foreign Legion at Tours—The Prussian Crown Prince's Appeal to German Charity.

It was on the 15th of September that Paris shut herself up from the outer world, and prepared for the severest rigours of a siege. From six o'clock on the morning of that day, no person was suffered to enter or leave the city without a permit. Paris sank out of view behind a wall of ramparts and a host of beleaguering men who girdled her round as with triple zones of steel. The isolation, it is true, was not quite so complete as was at first anticipated. The capital was still enabled to communicate occasionally with the provinces, and through them with other countries, by means of balloons and carrier pigeons. But personal intercourse was at an end, and letters were precarious and intermittent. Men looked towards the bright metropolis of pleasure with something of awe and wonder, as if it had been suddenly snatched away into a land of mystery and abstraction. When would it issue forth again? What sorrowful experiences, what tragedies of secret suffering, what novelties of horror, would it have to endure, ere yet the lingering thunder-clouds of sulphurous smoke and fire should pass, and restore to Europe the most frequented of European cities? How would that mobile, vivacious, restless, frivolous population bear its solitude, its deprivations, its dangers, its long-drawn agonies of hope, or iron pressure of despair? Would Paris be stormed or starved? Would it resist to the last, or succumb speedily? Would the German guns shatter to atoms the



THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG.

beautiful and famous buildings which had so long attracted the eyes of the world? or would the material loveliness of Paris survive the wreck of her fortunes and her power? These were the questions which men asked each other and themselves in fear and trembling. To ask them was to feel the terrible significance they bore.

The defensive force in Paris consisted, when all were drawn together and organised, of 121,000 troops of the Line, 120,000 Mobiles, and 300,000 National Guards; together with a certain number of sailors, marines, and gendarmes. Of these the larger number were men unused to arms, newly recruited, and guided in all they did rather by enthusiasm than knowledge. Yet they manfully gave themselves up to the necessities of the



MONT VALERIEN.

time, and, together with the usual amount of declamation and "Marseillaise"-singing inseparable from all French operations in revolutionary seasons, showed a great deal of honest devotion to the work of drilling, of mounting guard at the forts, and of getting the heavy guns into position. The *Journal de Bordeaux* remarked that if Paris held out for a fortnight, the disaster of Sedan would be effaced by its heroic resistance. It held out for upwards of four months, and distinguished itself by courage, constancy, endurance, and quiet self-sacrifice, beyond all praise; yet the disaster of Sedan was not effaced in any material sense. Many antecedent causes had prepared the downfall of France; and even the utmost heroism was unable to prevent what a hundred follies and weaknesses had conspired to render inevitable.

Several new siege works were hastily constructed on the first alarm of an investment created by the early reverses of the war. The fortifications of Paris were commenced in the year 1840, in fulfilment of a long-cherished project of M. Thiers, who was at that time in power, and in accordance with a general suggestion of Marshal Soult, made in 1830. They were augmented from time to time during the reign of Napoleon III.; but the capabilities of rifled cannon have been so largely developed within a very few years (the effective range of shells being now five miles, instead of half that distance, which was the utmost that could be attained thirty years ago), that the defences were in some measure obsolete when the need for them arose. Besides, they were constructed with a view to the co-operation of a large army in the open field; and the French had no such army before Paris. The forts scattered about the suburbs are not sufficiently close to make the city a regular fortress; and thus many weak places were left open to the German attack. Everything that was possible in such an emergency was done with a view to repairing defects; but the Germans gave their adversary no time, and it was found necessary to abandon some of the new works when the invaders were in sight. Others, however, being protected by the permanent forts, were completed, and lines of earthworks were thrown up in the intervals. Defensive works were also rapidly constructed on the Seine. They consisted in part of a system of torpedoes, and in part of two floating bridges; the first resting on small boats, for the passage of troops from one bank to the other, above the island of Billancourt; the second on large boats above the railway bridge, and intended for the passage of cavalry. Floating batteries, gun-boats, iron-plated shallops, armed with single guns, and small steamers, unarmed, for employment in the transmission of orders, were also provided for service on the river. On one occasion, a brisk fight took place between these boats and the Prussians on the banks.

The disposition of the German armies was every day rendered stronger by the securing of a more complete grip on the several points of vantage. The redoubt at Villejuif, south of Paris, was destroyed by heavy guns, and occupied. The Ourcq canal was diverted at Sevran into a rivulet, to deprive the besieged of its water, and to strengthen the position of the Prussian Guards. A battery was erected near Sèvres, opposite to the Bois de Boulogne. At Bougival, a bridge was thrown across the Seine, to communicate with the army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, and the restoration of the broken bridges and tunnels was speedily effected. The bulk of the Prussian troops occupied the heights from Chatillon in the south-west to Bezous in the north-west; but there were large forces also in the opposite directions. The Prussian Crown Prince's army was to the south and south-west. Bagneux, between Villejuif and Chatillon, was fortified by the besiegers, and that so strongly that several attacks directed against it by the French entirely failed. The terraces of Meudon, further to the west, were held as an artillery position; and batteries were established on the heights of St. Cloud. The town of St. Cloud was occupied by the Germans on the 23rd, with the loss of only one killed and twelve wounded, the French retiring to the other side of the Seine. Fort Montretout was speedily taken by the new-comers, and the redoubt of Genevilliers, to the north of Mont Valerien, also fell into their hands, having been deserted by the French.

The numbers of the besieging force are not exactly known, and, indeed, they varied at different times, as the fortunes of war permitted fresh troops to be sent towards Paris; but at their strongest they seem to have reached something between 200,000 and 250,000 men. In the earlier days of the siege the resistance of the fortresses in the east of France diverted a good many German soldiers from the grand enterprise of Paris; but as those fortresses fell one by one, a large number of the invaders were enabled to march for the banks of the Seine. The capitulations of Toul and Strasburg set free 80,000 troops, of whom about 10,000 were added to the investing armies before Paris, while the remainder were sent to take part in those operations in the French provinces which were conducted simultaneously with the siege of the capital. The eastern fortresses were for some time a source of great trouble and of some danger to the Germans. The railroad from Nancy by Châlons and Epernay to Paris was so commanded by the guns of Toul that the invading armies were obliged to unload their trains some distance east of the town, to transport their supplies on wheels by a circuitous route, and to re-load them on trains to the west. The direct railroad from Metz to Paris, passing by Rheims and Soissons, was similarly commanded by Verdun, on the Meuse, which was besieged by detachments from the first army at Metz. Other railways were blocked by the fortresses of Thionville, Longwy, Montmédy, and Mézières. The fortresses of Bitsche and Phalsburg occupied about 18,000 German troops; and all these circumstances together offered considerable obstacles to a vigorous prosecution of the siege of Paris. The base of operations for all the invading forces was formed by the line of frontier extending from Saarbruck on the north to Basle on the south. "The lines of communication for the army engaged in the primary occupation of the siege of Paris," says a military critic, "took their departure from the northern half of this base; and on these lines were situated all the strong places excepting Strasburg, such as Metz, Toul, Verdun, Thionville, &c., which the Germans were besieging at the period of the fall of Sedan. The southern half of the same line formed the base of operations for the troops engaged in the siege of Strasburg, and for those subsequently employed in reducing Schelestadt, Neuf Brisach, Belfort, &c., as well as for the armies operating by Dijon towards Lyons, and to the south of Belfort towards Besançon. The position of the investing army at Paris formed a secondary base, from which radiated the different columns acting towards Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Evereux, Amiens, St. Quentin, &c., for all of which Paris forms the centre of the wheel, of which these columns represent the spokes; and the object of the employment of these columns was at once to collect supplies, and to prevent the siege from interruption by the different bodies of French troops which were organising all over the country."* Such was the military situation. It had many elements of gravity for both sides, and it must be admitted that the Germans, in sitting down before Paris, made an attempt full of difficulty and peril, and one which argued singular confidence in their own resources, and an equally remarkable estimate of their opponents' capabilities of successful resistance.

During the whole of the last week of September, the Paris forts fired almost continually from heavy guns in the direction of the German positions. On one day alone 2,500 rounds were fired, but with no effect. Shoals of French peasants daily reported themselves to the German pickets round Paris, soliciting permission to leave; but this was denied in every case. As the chief hope of the besiegers lay in starving out the place, it was to their interest to keep as many people in it as possible. For this reason, the soldiers were ordered to take but few prisoners, "so as not to diminish the mouths within the city." On the 26th of September Prussian officers demanded the surrender of Fort d'Issy, situated to the south-south-west of the capital, but received from the commander the reply that "as long as breath remained in his body he would refuse to capitulate." On the 27th three hundred Prussians were repulsed before Clermont, to the north of Paris, by the Mobile Guards; but they returned with artillery, and opened fire upon several villages, which they burnt, after which Clermont was occupied. Four telegraph wires from Paris to Rouen and the South of France were discovered underground and in the bed of the Seine on the following day, and were destroyed by the Germans. The Seine was on the same day closed to French steamers above Mantes, thirty miles west of Paris. On the 30th the French made two sorties towards the south and south-west—one in the direction of Choisy-le-Roi, the other in that of Meudon. The assailants crossed the river early in the morning in boats and rafts, and it is said that the operations were performed by two whole divisions of General Vinoy's regulars, assisted by non-professional troops. The most important sally was that which was directed due south. According to General Trochu's report, the French occupied successfully Chevilly and Ilay, and even advanced as far as Thiais and Choisy-le-Roi. The last two positions were mounted with guns, and a brisk artillery engagement with the Germans was maintained for some time. Ultimately the French withdrew in good order. Trochu spoke in high terms of the coolness of his troops, and especially of the firmness of the Mobiles. "In short," he added, "the day was most honourable." A German account states that the sortie was directed against the fifth and sixth army corps, and that at the same time a brigade made a demonstration against the eleventh corps. The Prussian Crown Prince was present during the whole engagement. After two hours' fighting, the French were driven back to the shelter of the guns of their forts. Both sides lost several men in killed, wounded, and captured—the French probably more than the Germans. The sortie towards Meudon was less vigorous and less successful than the other; but both had a good effect in keeping up the spirits of the besieged, and accustoming them to the realities of war.

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* *Quarterly Review*, January, 1871. Art. "Invasion of France."

An interesting ceremonial took place at Versailles on the morning of September 26th. This was the distribution by the Crown Prince of Prussia of a number of Iron Crosses and their accompanying ribands to a body of specially deserving soldiers. The ceremony was conducted in a courtyard of the palace, where an equestrian statue of Louis XIV. attracted general attention. The Prince took his station on the upper step of the two from which arises the pedestal of this statue. "On his left," says Dr. Russell, describing the presentation in the *Times*, "an officer of dragoons held a salver encircled with laurels, on which were placed a heap of the Iron Crosses. The cross is of iron, with a silver edge; on one side is a crown, with the letters 'F. W.,' three oak-leaves, and the date 1813; on the other side a crown with the letter 'W.,' and the date 1870. The riband is broad, black with a white border. On the right of the Prince stood a group of Generals and officers of the Staff. On the step below were ranged the Duke of Coburg, the Princes of Wurtemberg and Mecklenburg, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and the Duke of Augustenburg, with their Staff. In the courtyard, drawn up at right angles to the statue of Louis the Great, a splendid regiment of dismounted dragoons formed one side of the square, of which that facing the statue was constituted by two regiments in masses of grand divisions in close order, with the officers on the flanks; and on the left of the Prince, below, two lines of troops formed a kind of alley for the recipients of the crosses. A band of buglers and drummers, apart at one of the angles of the square, gave a martial welcome to the Prince when he entered and mounted the steps of the statue. The happy recipients of the Iron Cross came up, one



PRUSSIAN OUTPOST.

after another, to the number of more than thirty, and the Prince said a word or two to all, shook hands with some, and, when the ceremony was over, drew his sword, raised it in the air, and with a loud voice called for 'three cheers for the King.' The wounded men in the gilded and pictured galleries far away must have heard the cheers which followed—three great shouts, as of one tremendous throat; and then a General, Voigts-Rhetz or Sandrath, called for 'three cheers for the Crown Prince,' which were also given with immense effect, and the drums and bugles repeated a sort of triumphant blare and ruffle." In the courtyard where this took place the eye involuntarily wandered to the statue of Louis XIV., flanked by groups of sculpture representing France triumphant over Spain and over the German Empire, and by statues of Du Guesclin, Bayard, Condé, Turenne, and other celebrated French generals of old times. An inscription on one of the façades dedicates the courtyard "To all the glories of France." What a dramatic contrast between France in her splendour and France in her decline!

Nothing was more remarkable than the flight of the peasantry from the villages surrounding Paris. When the King of Prussia was on his way from Château-Thierry to Meaux, in the middle of September, the hamlets, in many instances, were found quite deserted, and the houses bare of furniture, which had apparently been removed into the neighbouring woods. The Prussians seem to have taken great offence at this. "Patrol parties of our soldiers," says an account in the *Staats Anzeiger*, "were sent out to guard the approaches to the woods, and oblige all the peasantry they came across to return to their respective villages. All the villages are carefully watched by our patrols, and we must now institute inquiries whether they have left their homes through fear of the Prussian troops, so dreadfully described and calumniated in the Paris journals, or whether they have done so in obedience to orders given them by the Government presiding at this moment in Paris. This is the first instance of a general stampede of all the inhabitants since our entry into France. In some cases, of course, there were people who had quitted their homes; but such a general flight as this, where old men and women and children were carried off, has not occurred before. It is most probable that this universal desertion may be attributed to fear, especially as it appears more marked in and about the neighbourhood of the bridges that have been blown up. The fact that up to the present time no appearance of enmity has been combined with this general flight into the woods is proved by the total absence of any armed peasants in the woods in the neighbourhood of head-quarters. All these things tend to show the worthlessness of the repeated appeals for the organisation of a system of guerilla warfare made in so many of the leading Paris journals—appeals as vain in the immediate neighbourhood of Paris as in all the departments which are at this moment occupied by German troops." The guerilla warfare, however, became a reality a month later, though, for reasons already set forth, it had but little effect in repelling the advance of the Prussians, or preventing the subjugation of France.

Some singular details of this general flight of the French from the country about Paris were given by a special correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, who wrote:—"All eatables and drinkables have disappeared, and the villages are deserted. Through the broken and gaping doors of the houses where our men have quartered themselves may be seen the household utensils all lying in confused heaps, and through the opened windows the stern and reproachful glances that come from the life-size picture of the old grandfather, who no doubt lived at the time when the Prussians entered France in 1815. The clocks upon the chimney-pieces have remained; a thick coat of dust lies upon the silk and damask covering of the chairs and sofas; the flowers in the room hang their heads; and here and there may be seen a red-cheeked milliner's doll in the window, which our men have adorned with the silk bonnet of the absent young lady of the house. Everything seems sad and deserted, and much damage has been done in the several houses; but it is the fault of the people themselves, who have fled, and who later will accuse us of Vandalism if they cannot recognise their superb sofas." By an English writer, however, the damage to the houses and their furniture was attributed to the Germans.* After all that had happened in the east of France, there was nothing really surprising in the fact of defenceless civilians getting out of the way of armed invaders who had certainly not shown themselves more scrupulous than armies generally are. But the Germans resented the least distrust of themselves as an unparalleled insult, and omitted no opportunity of vaunting their own astounding generosity, virtue, and forbearance; though others might have been pardoned for suspecting that the goodness which required such continual self-proclamation was not entirely without flaw. The same correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* speaks of the

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* See letter from Mr. Thomas (dated "Marly, near Versailles, October 8th"), in the *Pall Mall Gazette*.



GERMAN TROOPERS IN A FRENCH CHATEAU.

way in which provisions were concealed. "For instance," he states, "our soldiers, in a house at Couilly, went into a grocer's shop, and found that a new flooring of cement had recently been laid down. Hatchets were brought into use, the cement was torn up, and all the wares and provisions of the grocer were found hidden in the cellar—sausages, hams, cheese, rice, wine, liqueurs, &c. One discovery like this leads to another, and the inhabitants on their return will be astonished to find the Prussians have so well ferreted out their hidden provisions. The roads and highways are deserted, and nothing is to be perceived in the fields save the birds and the ownerless dogs which have been left behind. The gardens of the different mansions are quiet and silent as the grave, and the lakes are undisturbed save by the wind which blows the autumn leaves about the surface of the water. Now and then a car comes along with one or two officers, or else the courier carrying the mails. A blue blouse is seldom to be seen, for they have all left, and are no doubt hidden in the woods." The French army having retired before the in-rolling flood of the German invasion, the pacific population not unnaturally thought that the best thing they could do would be to retire also.



THE CROSS OF VALOUR.

As the invaders got nearer Paris they met with more resistance. The demeanour of the people was threatening, and reprisals were made by the Germans. At Coulommiers fifteen civilians were shot by order of a drum-head court-martial, for having, after the departure of the army, fired upon isolated portions of the rear-guard. On the evening of the same day a village in the vicinity of Fontainebleau was burnt because some of the inhabitants, amongst whom were three Francs-tireurs, two Mayors of neighbouring places, and one wounded Zouave, had fired upon a squadron of dragoons, killing a lieutenant and wounding two men. All of the party were accordingly taken to Corbeil, and handed over to a court-martial; in addition to which, the village was fired. This burning of villages was one of the worst features in the Prussian treatment of France. It had no sort of moral justification, and seems even to have been a mistake on mere grounds of policy, since it necessarily created a feeling of the most vengeful hatred on the part of the French populace—a feeling which is not likely to die out for many years. In the particular instance just recorded, it was surely sufficient to try the offenders by court-martial, which was certain to result in their being shot. Though the act they had committed cannot be regarded as exceeding the limits of patriotism, it must be allowed that the Prussians could not take that view, and that they had a right to protect themselves. To burn the village, however, was a gratuitous piece of cruelty, involving in one act of indiscriminate revenge a number of innocent people. And yet German writers expressed surprise at Frenchwomen regarding their countrymen with hatred. The correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* recently cited seems to resent the fact of the women weeping, or giving black looks. "Even the children," he adds, "are taught to flee from any contact with a Prussian. Thanks to the mercy of the King, several female peasants and working people who had fired upon our soldiers had their sentences of death commuted, and were pardoned. Only a few days ago, at Meudon, a straggler belonging to our 47th Regiment was discovered bound to a tree by the peasants, who were about to split his skull with a hatchet. As far as I know, those who took part in this shameful action have not been pardoned. All things considered, I can find no fault with the order given the other day by one of our generals to his men—'If you catch a Franc-tireur shoot him on the spot, for they are a species of banditti who lie in ambush for our men; no pardon, therefore, for them.' 'Your order will be attended to, general,' was the reply; but, for my own part, I am sure our men will be generous and compassionate with this armed French banditti." It is but too probable that there were several isolated cases of atrocity committed by the Francs-tireurs; but the Prussians were ready to construe any irregular act of resistance as a crime of the deepest dye. They would seem to have been almost astonished and annoyed that they were not received with open arms.

The burning of villages was frequently resorted to by the invaders during the course of the war. If a few Francs-tireurs fired a feeble volley from the shelter of a wood against the enemies of their land, the nearest hamlet, which might have had nothing to do with the act, was destroyed, and numerous women and children, sometimes in the dead of winter, were turned homeless into the fields. Mr. Bullock, one of the correspondents of the *Daily News*, said that on these occasions the linen, clothes, and bed-furniture of the unhappy villagers were generally plundered by the German soldiers, and sold by them to the Jews who followed the camp. A French pastor, writing to the *Times*, alleged that the German troops, acting by order, burnt the village of Cherizy by sprinkling furniture and woodwork with a composition of petroleum, in revenge for their having been repulsed by Francs-tireurs a few days earlier; and he added that on their way back they set fire to a number of detached houses and farms. "The requisitions of the Prussians," continued the same writer, "are without measure; they do not leave a village till they have carried off everything. So great is the terror they inspire that we hear on all sides of suicides, of women throwing themselves into wells, of old men hanging themselves, of whole families suffocating themselves. A great number of people have become mad." This, it may be said, is the testimony of an enemy; but the correspondents of many English papers friendly to the Prussians wrote to the same effect. A writer in the *Daily News*, dating from Thionville, said of the village of Haute Yatz, situated in the vicinity of that fortress:—

> "It has lost everything. Early in the war the inhabitants were driven from it by Prussian orders, and had to take refuge in the country round; in some cases it was only at the point of the bayonet that the people were forced to leave their once happy homes. In the wars of Napoleon I. this village was burnt by the Prussians. In the present instance the houses were left, but the people were forbidden to touch the potatoes in their fields. In disobedience to these orders, one man, Jean Klupp, and two children, were shot in the fields while trying to get some of their own potatoes. By this ruthless act seven orphan children have been left destitute. On their return to the village, after the fall of Thionville, the people found every house stripped to the bare walls, the furniture, doors, windows, and cupboards, broken up and burnt for firewood by the soldiery. Three houses are burnt entirely, and the village altogether is in a sad state of

destitution, two hundred souls requiring immediate relief."

The *Daily News* correspondent before Metz—a gentleman of very strong German sympathies—described, with a zest and levity which did him no credit, the firing of the village of Nouilly, one autumn night. The place was believed to contain considerable stores of provisions, so hidden that the Prussians could not find them; and it was to prevent the French carrying these away into Metz, where the greater number of the villagers had taken refuge, that the destruction of the hamlet was ordered. It appears, however, that the existence of the provisions there was only problematical; and, indeed, it seems more likely that the food was removed at the time the villagers sought protection in the fortress, which otherwise they would hardly have been allowed to enter. Be that as it may, the firing of Nouilly was decreed. The lieutenant deputed to execute the order roared out, "Volunteers to burn a village!" and, though he only wanted fifteen men, the whole company crowded round him, so popular was this species of service. The men being selected, the party went on its way, and, after a long interval, the sky was reddened by blotches of fire. The lieutenant "had taken his time, that he might do his work thoroughly. Not from one isolated house, but in six places at once, belched out the long streaks of flame against the black darkness. Here and there against the flame could be seen a human figure in frantic flight; and on a bluff, just outside the village, I saw in the strong light," continues the same writer, "a woman standing wringing



THE CROSS OF DEATH.

her hands." Up to this point the story was told rather as a good joke, and the airy jollity of the lieutenant in command was represented in the most fascinating colours. But a woman wringing her hands over the sudden desolation of her home was so grave a matter that it was necessary to be severe on some one; so the blame was laid on the shoulders of the most convenient scapegoat that has ever yet appeared—the French Emperor.*

The French people, with the exception of a factious minority, thought differently. An elderly man of sixty-two, who had three sons in the several levies, and who was about to shoulder his rifle as a Franc-tireur, said, in writing to one of his friends at Lyons, "How can we make peace after such sights? They will last us a hundred years. Next spring I shall be dead or in Germany. Good-night! The house is burnt." The execution of Francs-tireurs was conducted in the most merciless manner. On this subject we have the evidence of German papers themselves. The Berlin *Börsen Courier* reports, under date "Versailles, November 20th," that amongst the wounded and prisoners taken in a certain action there were a number of Francs-tireurs, who, with the rest, were brought in to Versailles, where the Royal head-quarters then were. "Short work," says the Berlin journal, "was made of them: they were placed in a row, and one after another got a bullet through his head. A general order for the whole army has been published, forbidding most expressly to bring them in as prisoners, and ordering to shoot them down by drum-head court-martial wherever they show themselves." Many were summarily hung up. Their crime seems to have been simply that they did the best they could to defend their country, and that, like all guerillas, they took advantage of woods and sheltered places to carry on their desultory warfare. It has been already shown (Chapter X.) that the Prussian regulations of 1813, for the formation of the Landsturm, actually enjoined the resort to such measures in prosecuting the defence of the country. These regulations are still in force, and they do not leave Prussia at liberty to denounce as brigandage the use of similar means against herself. The Landsturm were to shoot at their enemies from behind hedges, haystacks, and houses; to hide their weapons if the invaders should appear in superior strength, and to present themselves as simple civilians. On the other hand, the Francs-tireurs seem to have been far more open in their mode of warfare. "They are all uniformed," says the *Quarterly Review* (January, 1871); "in many different fashions indeed, but distinctly and unequivocally. They are regularly commissioned and brigaded; they are attached to the armies of the districts in which they operate, and, if captured, cannot conceal or disavow their character."

While on this painful subject, it may be as well to notice some official statements put forward by both sides. The Prussian Minister, von Thiele, issued a circular (dated September 27th) to the various German Embassies, in which he refutes a number of charges against the German armies brought in the French Legislative Assembly, on the 1st of September, by Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was alleged by the Prince "that German troops engaged in hostilities against French ambulances; that they made Baron de Bussierre prisoner in the midst of a hospital he had organised; that they used explosive rifle-balls, compelled peasants in the neighbourhood of Strasburg to work in the trenches within range of the guns of the fortress, and attempted to cover their trains of provisions and ammunition, as well as their money-chest, with the sign of the Geneva Convention; and, finally, that a French surgeon was killed by a Prussian soldier while he was engaged in binding up his wounds." To these statements Baron von Thiele replied that they rested on no authority, and were devoid of precise details, such as names of persons concerned, times of occurrence, place, &c. Nevertheless he had made inquiries, and had found that the accusations were entirely false, except in one instance, and even that was greatly exaggerated. "It is true that Baron de Bussierre was arrested, and that he had devoted himself to the care of the wounded. The arrest, however, was not made in the midst of a field hospital; it was caused by the suspicion that the gentleman in question kept up an understanding with the garrison of Strasburg, and the arrest itself, as well as the investigation which followed, was carried out with all the consideration due to the position of the baron, and his high character. The length of his arrest had to be determined by military considerations alone." Baron Thiele then brings a counter-charge against the French authorities, on the ground of their totally neglecting to execute the provisions of the Convention of Geneva, for the establishment of which, it is admitted, France displayed much zeal. "The German physicians who, after the battle of Weissenburg, had to treat the wounded French soldiers in the lazareth which stood under the direction of the chief physicians Böger and Wilms, convinced themselves that, with a few rare exceptions, the French soldiers were ignorant of the significance of the white band with the red cross. French military surgeons of high standing, who afterwards visited the same lazareth to attend their countrymen, were compelled to make the protecting sign for themselves as best they could, from the first material that offered; and they gave Prince Putbus, the delegate of the Knights of St. John, the distinct assurance that the French Ministry of War had neither supplied the doctors with the Geneva band, nor directed them to wear it. At a later period the French officers who had been taken prisoners agreed in asserting that the Geneva Convention, and its prescriptions as to the treatment of the ambulances, the physicians, and the wounded, are entirely unknown in the French army." This want of preparation seems to have been part of the general disorganisation of the French forces, and not an evidence of inhumanity.

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* It appears that, after all, the village was only partially burnt.

A more elaborate indictment against Prussia was brought by Count de Chaudordy,* the Tours delegate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, in a circular to the diplomatic agents of France in foreign countries, dated November 29th, 1870, made a number of charges of the gravest kind. Having in the first instance protested against Prussia continuing hostilities now that the aggressor had been dethroned, M. de Chaudordy referred to the exterminating spirit with which, as he alleged, the enemy was prosecuting the war. He would not insist on the enormous requisitions in kind and money that had been made, because he was aware of the necessities entailed by vast strategical operations.

"After having seen their homes invaded, and after suffering all the most severe exigencies of war, families had been robbed of their plate and jewels. The enemy habitually seizes valuables in private houses, packs them up, and takes them away in sacks and wagons. Clothing of all sorts, clocks, watches, and gold, stolen from private houses, have been found on Prussian prisoners. One proprietor, arrested in his château, was forced to pay a personal ransom of 80,000 francs. Another was robbed of his wife's shawls, dresses, furs, and laces. Everywhere the cellars were emptied, and the wines carried off. In one instance, a town was pillaged and set fire to, merely to avenge the act of a single citizen, guilty of having opposed the invaders. This act of barbarity was ordered by superior officers, who thus made an abusive use of the implacable discipline which prevails among their troops. Every house which shelters or feeds a Franc-tireur is burned. So much for property. Human life is no more respected. Although the whole nation is now called to arms, not only peasants made prisoners are ruthlessly shot, but soldiers provided with regular commissions, and wearing uniforms. Many persons have been condemned to death for crossing the Prussian lines on private affairs. Intimidation has become a principal element of warfare; it was desired to strike terror into the populations, and paralyse in them all patriotic impulses. This calculation has led the Prussian generals to acts unique in history—the bombardment of open towns. Hitherto it has never been considered justifiable to throw explosive and incendiary projectiles into a town, except in extreme and strictly defined circumstances. But even in such cases it was a constant rule to give the inhabitants previous warning, and it never before occurred to any leader in civilised warfare to bombard an open town as a preventive measure. To burn houses, massacre old men and women by firing from a distance, and attack the defenders of the country in the persons of their families, so as to force them to humiliate themselves before the conqueror, is a refinement of calculated violence which approaches torture. But the Prussians have gone further still. With cruel sophistry they pretend that every town which defends itself is a fortified place, and that, from the very fact of their bombarding it, they have a right to treat it as a fortress taken by assault. The complement of this barbarous code was the revival of the system of hostages. Prussia has done this. Everywhere she insists upon enforcing indirect responsibility, and this will be considered one of the most iniquitous traits of her conduct towards us. To secure the tranquillity of her camps and the safety of her transports, she punishes every attack upon her soldiers or convoys by the imprisonment, exile, or even death of some of the notabilities of the district. The more respectable a citizen is the greater danger he runs of being taken as a hostage. Many citizens have been forced to answer in their fortunes and their lives for acts which they could neither foresee nor prevent, and which, moreover, were only acts of legitimate defence. They arrested forty hostages among the notable inhabitants of Dijon, Gray, and Vesoul, under the pretext that we had not liberated forty merchant captains made prisoners in the regular course of war. But these measures, however brutally they may have been carried out, at least left intact the dignity of those who had to suffer from them. It was still reserved for Prussia to add insult to oppression. She has forced unfortunate peasants to work in erecting fortifications against the defenders of their own country. Respectable judges, whose age alone should have protected them from insult, have been forced to ride on Prussian railway engines as hostages against the Francs-tireurs, exposed to the inclemency of the weather and the jeers of the soldiery. The sanctuary of churches has been invaded; priests have been beaten, and women ill-used—happy when they escaped a worse fate. After this, what article of that code hitherto called by the noble name of the law of nations has not been violated by the Prussians?"

To this circular Count Bismarck issued a reply, dated January 9th, 1871. It contains only the briefest and most general denial of the French charges, and is little better than a *tu quoque.* The Count accuses the French of repeatedly firing on flags of truce, attacking dressing-stations and ambulances, ill-treating and robbing surgeons, delegates, hospital servants, and attendants, murdering the wounded, killing prisoners, &c. Explosive bullets had been used; German vessels taken by the French had been at once destroyed on the high seas, instead of being submitted to the adjudication of a prize court; and German prisoners in France had been treated with inhuman severity and neglect.

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* See Appendix xv., Vol. II., p. 569, "Counts Chaudordy and Bismarck."



THE CROSS OF CHARITY.

"A convoy of about three hundred Bavarian sick, 'captured' in the hospitals of Orleans, and mostly suffering from typhus, dysentery, or wounds, were penned up in the gangways and cells of the prison at Pau. For a bed they had a bundle of straw, and for six days only bread and water was given them, until English and German ladies took pity on them, assisted them from their own means, and induced the reluctant authorities to take some care of them. In other places, especially with the army of General Faidherbe, the prisoners were kept in lofts without fire, without blankets, without warm or sufficient food, in a cold of sixteen degrees, while in Germany all buildings intended for the reception of prisoners of war were provided with stoves at the commencement of winter. The crews of German merchantmen are not only kept as prisoners of war, but were at first treated as criminals, chained together two and two, and thus transported from one place to another, their food being insufficient in quantity and inferior in quality. A civilian who had been unjustifiably imprisoned, and complained about some money that had been sent for him being withheld, was officially informed by letter that prisoners were not entitled to consideration. Prisoners who are conducted through towns in the provinces are even



FIELD JUSTICE.

now not protected against ill-treatment by the population. It is to be presumed that no case has occurred in Germany where the inhabitants have violated, even by an expression that would give pain, the respect which is vouchsafed by civilised nations to misfortune."

The Turcos are specially condemned for their ferocity to prisoners and wounded; and a quotation is made from the *Indépendance Algerienne*, in which a newly-formed African regiment, called the "Gums," was exhorted to go and cut off heads—the more the better. "Away with the invader!" exclaimed this journalist. "Away with feelings of humanity! The Gums will reap honours when we give them the word—death, pillage, arson!" The Count also denounces the irregular warfare of armed peasants, and the military dictatorship of the Republican Government, which forcibly suppressed all independent manifestations of public opinion; and he concludes by regretting that for these reasons the German authorities had been compelled to exercise the rights of war with a severity foreign to their traditions.

Such were the mutual accusations of the two belligerents. They leave the morality of the case quite unchanged. Some of the French charges may have been exaggerated or erroneous, and doubtless the Germans had real causes of complaint, especially against the savage Turcos. But the misconduct of Frenchmen and Algerians cannot form any justification of such acts as those of which the Germans have been accused—acts which have never been disproved, and some of which have been admitted and gloried in. It is not a question of exceptional severity, which certain circumstances might warrant; it is a question of involving the innocent equally with the guilty (even where we allow the guilt), and it would seem to have been pursued with the obvious intention of overawing a national resistance to foreign invasion. The atrocities charged against the French seem to have been isolated and desultory, and not committed by authority, except in the matter of the armed peasants—a method of defence sanctioned by the practice of all invaded countries, and especially by that of Prussia. The proceedings of the Germans were systematic, inspired from head-quarters, and there is too much reason to fear that they were supported by the countenance of the military and civil power. The story is infinitely sad and sickening; but justice requires that the truth should be stated in all its horrible details, as affecting either side.

These terrible severities naturally enhanced the disinclination of the conquered provinces to accept the rule of the conqueror. Alsace, despite the German origin of its people, showed a very French sentiment; and in Lorraine this was even stronger. The old province or military government of Lorraine was divided, at the period of the first French Revolution, into the departments of Meurthe, Meuse, Moselle, and Vosges. The length of the old province was about ninety-nine miles; its breadth, eighty-seven. It comprehended in former times the Duchy of Lorraine, the Duchy of Bar, and the Pays-de-trois-Evêchés, in the last-named of which Metz is situated. The whole region has been a ground of contention between the Gallic and Germanic races for many centuries. It originally formed part of the province of Belgica Prima, in the days of the Roman Empire, and towards the close of the fifth century was conquered by Clovis. The Frankish Empire being divided among the sons of that monarch, Lorraine formed part of the kingdom of Austrasia. Charlemagne added the kingdom to his own French Empire; but after his death the country between the Rhine and the Meuse was assigned to Lothaire, son of the Emperor Lothaire, after whom it was called by the Latinised name of Lotharingia, in German Lothringen, and in French Lorraine. It was thus united with the Imperial German crown, and the duchy of Upper Lorraine was conferred, in the eleventh century, on Gérard, a noble of Alsace, from whom arose the long line of Dukes of Lorraine who governed the country till nearly the middle of last century. During the whole of that long period, Lorraine, though connected with the German Empire in the nature of a fief, was considered to be, both geographically and in the main ethnologically, a part of France. In the middle ages the reigning dukes often fought on the side of the French when they were at war; and the names of those dukes were French, not German. In the early part of the sixteenth century the Germanic body declared Lorraine to be a free and independent sovereignty; and in 1661 Duke Charles agreed with France that on his death the whole of his states should fall to the French crown. Shortly afterwards, however, he renounced his independent sovereignty, and constituted himself a vassal of the German Empire; but Louis XIV., not choosing to recognise what indeed seems to have been an act of bad faith, seized on his dominions in 1670. At the treaty of Nimeguen, in 1678, the restitution of Lorraine was offered to his nephew and successor, but on terms which he refused to accept. Nineteen years later, Lorraine, by the treaty of Ryswick (1697), was again made into a separate duchy, and governed by a member of the old ducal family; but in 1735 Duke François Etienne acquiesced in a treaty between France and the Empire, by which the duchy was ceded to Stanislaus Leckzinski, ex-King of Poland, whose daughter was married to Louis XV.; and it was agreed that on the death of Stanislaus the duchy should be united to France. He died in 1766, and the country thenceforward became a portion of the French dominions.

It will be seen from this sketch that the connection of Lorraine with Germany has only been of a slight and formal character, and that, even in the days when it was held as a fief of the German Empire, it was rather French than Teutonic in its composition and sympathies. The population, undoubtedly, has a Germanic element; but it has a French element also, and the French seems to have been for many centuries the stronger of the two. Yet the popular party in Germany have for several years laid claim to this province as a part of the Fatherland—that Fatherland which, according to the celebrated definition of Arndt, is co-extensive with the German tongue. The same poet, in a song written in 1841, and quoted on page 2 of this "History," expressed the determination of his countrymen to get back Lorraine—that is to say, to get back what had never clearly belonged to them; and in September, 1870, the popular demand for Lorraine, as well as Alsace, was very general throughout the North German Confederation. Those Germans, however, who had studied the question on the spot, saw the danger of such a course. A correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, who had passed six weeks in the province, and had changed his quarters about thrice a day, so as to mix with all classes of the population, said that the whole people were thoroughly French in their physical and intellectual characteristics, except in a narrow strip along the frontier. It seemed to this writer a piece of political stupidity to talk of acquiring the Moselle line, with Nancy and Metz. "Germany," he argued, "would thereby shackle a country, in comparison with the resistance of which the recent history of Lombardy and Venetia would be only a rehearsal on a small scale. The population, as a whole affluent and intelligent, are possessed by a national fanaticism not at all inferior to that of Austrian Italy. It would be easy for the French bordering districts to fan this feeling; and the community of language, which we should be much less able to root out than the French did with ours in Alsace, would furnish a simple and constant means of so doing. Prussia cannot be more heartily detested in any part of France than here in Lorraine. I do not know how the case stands in Alsace; but whoever would hold and Germanise Lorraine, especially the Metz district, may calculate on a perpetual state of siege." A Landwehr officer, who had also been going through the country, spoke to the same effect. On the other hand, Herr von Sybel, the well-known historian, advocated the permanent retention of Alsace, German (or Eastern) Lorraine, and the district of Metz; but even he wrote strongly against what was demanded by some—viz., the restoration of all the provinces of which France had despoiled Germany since the sixteenth century. Such a policy, he contended, would be highly dangerous, and, besides arousing the fears and jealousies of other Powers, would introduce a malcontent foreign element into Germany, already troubled with hostile groups of Danes and Poles.

The more extreme of German politicians endeavoured to turn to their account the doctrine of nationalities, of which so much had been said and written during the previous ten or twelve years. Italy, they urged, had become free and united in virtue of that doctrine; the French Emperor himself had made it the foundation-stone of his foreign policy. Why should it not also be right for Germany? In thus arguing, they put out of view the consent of the provinces and dominions proposed to be annexed. Sardinia grew into Italy because the other members of the family voluntarily coalesced with her. The initiatory movements came, not from Turin, but from Venice, from Milan, from Genoa, from Florence, from Bologna, from Palermo, from Naples, from Rome itself. Nothing was done primarily or essentially by conquest; at the most, the armed interposition did but help the popular rising. Nor was anything finally settled without that consultation of the whole body of the people which is rapidly becoming the one great basis of political power and of the right to rule. The annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, in 1860, was equally sanctioned by the general vote; and it must be allowed that there is at least a strong probability that Holstein and the southern part of Schleswig were well-disposed to absorption in Germany. But neither there nor in the various countries seized by Prussia in the war of 1866 was there any reference to the people to decide their own destiny. The conquering Government openly laughed at such a course, and frankly asserted the all-sufficiency of military power. The States annexed seem to have yielded little else than a sullen acquiescence up to the outbreak of the war; and the Danish population of Northern Schleswig has never been otherwise than antagonistic. If the principle of nationality is to be paramount, Northern Schleswig should be restored and Poland re-established. Even then, the principle fails if the outlying Germanic communities do not desire to be re-combined with the original stock. To say that Germany may forcibly possess herself of Alsace, because some of the Alsatians still speak German, is to proclaim that England might seize on the United States, that Spain and Portugal might reconquer South America, that France might grasp at Canada, and that Italy might annex several of the mongrel populations lying to the east of the Adriatic.

Such, however, was the doctrine which many German writers put forth. The German authorities in France were less extreme. The Lorraine *Moniteur*, near the close of September, contained a proclamation by the Prussian Governor, calling upon the Government officials to resume their functions. No oath or disclaimer of national feeling was to be required of them; they were simply expected not to be hostile, and to obey orders. Those who did not comply within three days were to lose their salaries. The judges were required to administer justice in the name of the French Emperor, as the Republican Government was not recognised by the German Powers. In Alsace and German Lorraine, all the vacant offices were at once filled up, and the post-office arrangements were permanently settled; whereas in the other occupied provinces the postal administration was placed on a temporary footing—a distinction which of course implied a good deal.



WRITING HOME.

The pause in field operations in September, after the terrible struggle of Sedan, gave an opportunity of counting up the losses on both sides. The account was a frightful one. Herr Wickede, writing from Nancy to the *Cologne Gazette*, and referring to the daily arrival of numerous soldiers of the supplementary battalion, who were to be drafted off into various regiments, said:—

"This reinforcement, which in the case of many regiments already amounts to 600 or 800 men, is very welcome to many of the divisions, as compensating the frightful losses of the month of August, and in some measure filling up ranks which are but too thin. These losses were very unequally distributed, according as accident caused the troops to take more or less share in sanguinary battles. For example, the 4th (Saxon) Army Corps, with the exception of the 27th, 67th, and 31st, has scarcely been under fire, and the entire 6th (Silesian) Corps has suffered only nominal losses through the enemy's bullets. The Fifth Division, with the splendid Brandenburg infantry regiments, and the 2nd and 12th Dragoons, which alone for five hours sustained the attack of three hostile Army Corps, were those who suffered most severely on the 16th at Mars-la-Tour. There are here battalions which have scarcely 500 men under arms, and at most six or eight officers, the others being all dead or wounded. On the 18th, at Gravelotte, the Infantry Guard suffered frightfully, a quarter of the men and half the officers being lacking. The Artillery Guard has hardly half its complement, and only four or six officers still on duty, and the two regiments of the Dragoon Guards were so shattered that they had to be worked into a single regiment; whereas the remaining Cavalry Guards have hardly been under fire. On the 16th the 7th Cuirassier Regiment suffered fearfully, so that in the evening it was hardly 200 men strong. Of the 1st Army Corps some regiments have had heavy losses; the second has suffered loss; the 16th Regiment of the 7th Army Corps very severely, some companies now numbering hardly 100 men. Of the 8th Army Corps the 40th Fusilier Regiment, in spite of every reinforcement, hardly musters 600 men. As to the losses at Beaumont, Sedan, and elsewhere, I know nothing certain. The Saxons had considerable losses, likewise some Bavarian Infantry Regiments, the Würtemburgers relatively less, and the Baden troops which are before Strasburg least of all. It will be tolerably near the truth if one estimates that all the troops up to the present time have been weakened by 60,000 killed and wounded, and 20,000 or 30,000 sick. Prisoners may number 900 or 1,000."

The Hessian troops suffered a great deal from defective commissariat arrangements. On one occasion they were three days without bread; on another, three days without meat. Hunger, wet, and cold decimated the division, and typhus and other diseases made a terrible sick list. It was stated that the soldiers were obliged to resort to private assistance for necessaries, and great indignation was expressed against the Hessian Government for such gross neglect.

Of the French losses, exclusive of killed and wounded, the *Staats Anzeiger* said that they amounted to "one marshal, 39 generals, 3,250 officers, 104,750 men, 10,280 horses, at least 56 eagles, 102 mitrailleuses, 690 field and fortress guns, over 400 standards, several pontoons, magazines, and railway trains; also an almost innumerable mass of arms, munitions, dress, equipments, forage, and provisions." This, it should be recollected, is a German account, and therefore perhaps subject to some deductions. The French seem not to have had the heart to put forth any.

As a help to the shattered armies of the French a Foreign Legion was formed at Tours. It consisted in September of about a thousand men, including Hanoverians who had refused to accept the Prussian yoke, Belgians, Scandinavians, Dutchmen, Poles, Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, Turks, Russians, Austrians, several negroes, and one Chinaman—a motley gathering, speaking a very Babel of tongues, wearing a strange variety of costumes, and obeying no strict discipline.

In aid of the wounded the Crown Prince of Prussia addressed, from Rheims, on the 6th of September, an appeal to the people of Germany for the formation of local and district associations for the collection of subscriptions in connection with the Victoria National Invalid Institution, founded in 1866 for similar purposes, and with which his Royal Highness was associated. The Crown Prince observed:—"The signal victories of our army have opened up to the German people the prospect of a glorious peace. On the battle-fields of France Germany has awakened to the proud consciousness of her might and her unity, and this great gain—consecrated by the blood of many thousands of our warriors—will, we trust, retain its cementing influence for ever in our country. But the enthusiastic exultation of the last few weeks has been alloyed with deep sorrow and mourning. Much of the flower of our youth, many of the leaders of our army, have paid the price of victory with their blood; still larger is the number of those who are hindered by wounds, or the almost superhuman exertions they have made on the field, from henceforth earning their livelihood unassisted. The families of the slain and the living victims of the war have the first claim on the gratitude of the nation. Whoever has shared in the excitement of the struggle, and hopes that a new and happy era of peace will succeed the rising of the whole nation in its strength—whoever humbly recognises in our triumph and the defeat of our enemies the judgment of God—should now prove the sincerity of his convictions by helping to succour the disabled soldiers of our national army and their families."

At about the same time the Germans who had been expelled from France petitioned the King of Prussia to take account of their money losses in the final settlement. With repeated successes, the nation became more and more determined that it would suffer as little as possible by the war, and that France should pay to the uttermost.



A PRUSSIAN DRAGOON.



AT THE POINT OF THE LANCE.

CHAPTER XVI.

General Trochu's Plan—Its Objects and Character—Merits and Faults of Trochu—The Training of the Army of Paris—Popular Demonstrations—State of the City—The Provincial Mobiles and the Parisian Soldiers—Punishment of Runaways—Condition of the Peasantry in the North-East of France—Appeal from Briey for Assistance—"The *Daily News* French Peasant Relief Fund"—Other Funds and Agencies—Russian Sympathy with France—Siege of Soissons—Metz and its Associations—The Town overflowing with Wounded—Mismanagement of the Great Sortie—Condition of the Besieged—Bazaine's Motives—Contradictory Accounts—Mysterious Communications between Metz and the Residence of the Empress—The Mission of "Monsieur M."—The Mission of "General B."—Explanation given by the *Times*—Statement of "Monsieur N."—General Bourbaki's Visit to England—Communication from Chislehurst on the Affair—General Boyer—The Empress and Prince Napoleon—Statement of Prince Napoleon—Reply from Chislehurst—Intrigues and Stratagems—Statement of M. Regnier—Discussions between M. Regnier and Count Bismarck—Remarks on the Plot.

GENERAL TROCHU had "a plan." He announced this from the first, and the subsequent course of events showed that he spoke the truth. The "plan" did not prove successful; yet it had some features to recommend it. His design was to lie securely behind the fortifications of Paris—which he felt pretty certain the Germans would not endeavour to force for some time—to drill his raw recruits, and to await the formation of new armies in the provinces, which after a while would march to the relief of Paris from various points, and, by co-operating with a grand sortie from within the walls, would force the invaders to raise the siege. Trochu knew he had a sufficient stock of provisions in the city to enable him to hold out for a few months. He reckoned, not unnaturally, on the co-operation of the provinces, and he counted, also not without reason, on the winter telling very severely against the enemy. That the scheme ultimately broke down does not necessarily condemn it. It possessed the merits of prudence and probability; and at one time it came so near success as to justify its originator in thinking that in this way he might shake off the iron grip that had been fastened on the throat of France. With Trochu, however, prudence—in itself one of the greatest of military virtues—was carried to the extent of weakness; and that which was commendable at first, became at length a source of disaster and a cause of growing unpopularity. In the final weeks of the siege, a more vigorous procedure might possibly have turned the scale. There were times for waiting and times for action; times for training and times for fighting. Trochu hesitated when he should have struck hard; and the hour came when food was exhausted, and resistance was impossible, and simple submission was the only remaining course.

No great sorties were attempted in the earlier weeks of the siege, though the more vehement Republicans constantly demanded them. The abstention at that period was wise, for the men were undisciplined, and required to learn their business. The comparatively small sorties of September at once showed where the weak points lay, and accustomed the soldiers to go under fire, and face the dreaded Prussians. At the same time military instruction was constantly going on in the streets and open places of the city, as well as on the ramparts, where there was practical work to be done. Paris, which is always fond of soldiering, grew enthusiastic over all this marching, and drilling, and drumming, for as yet there was no scarcity of food, and the terrible Prussian guns were silent. The people looked at the soldiers, and the soldiers looked at one another, and it was agreed on all sides that the attitude of the city was sublime. It was, in truth, creditable. A great deal of real patriotism lay beneath that flowery investiture of French declamation and theatrical self-consciousness. For a while, even the Red Republicans were quiet, or did little more than threaten demonstrations which they shrank from carrying out. Crime of the ordinary vulgar order seemed to be nearly extinguished by the gravity of the crisis, though the disorganisation of the police consequent on the Revolution almost invited attack. Everybody appeared to be aware that a time had come when it was necessary to combine against a common danger, and imperative to forbear from mutual injury. Yet the volatile Parisians did not forget to be amused. The theatres were closed, but the streets were open, and Paris streets are generally rich in entertainment. The idlers sauntered about on the fine autumn days, staring at every passing sight, and wondering what Prussia would do when she had become fully conscious of the "attitude" of Paris. They sang, they made speeches, they walked in procession, they got up demonstrations; above all, they deposited crowns of *immortelles* before the statue of Strasburg. One Sunday a mass was sung by the Abbé Deguerry at the foot of the statue. The external forts were always great objects of attraction. In the Avenue de l'Impératrice, on a certain September Sunday, a large crowd was gazing upon the fort of Mont Valérien. This fort was a particular favourite with the Parisians. They loved it —as an English writer who weathered the siege records—as a sailor loves his ship. "If I were near enough," said a girl, "I would kiss it." "Let me carry your kiss to it," replied a Mobile; and the two embraced amidst the cheers of the crowd.* People looked at the Prussians through opera-glasses. Hand-organs were played, and the swings were as full of occupants as if the enemy were not in sight.

Yet in the midst of all this gaiety one or two facts stood grimly forth, suggestive of coming famine. A maximum of prices for bread and meat was fixed, though it was a somewhat difficult matter to get the butchers to observe the tariff. The official *Gazette* contained a decree regulating the price of horseflesh. Dogs, cats, rats, and other creatures usually regarded as unclean, were talked of as possible resources against hunger when more ordinary food had disappeared. Public tables were suggested, at which the poor might be fed gratis. But these were far-off prospects, and in the meanwhile the people were full of hope. They would shatter and disperse the German armies. They would deal with them so terribly that not a man but should find a grave in France. They would carry the war into the enemy's country, and dictate a peace at Berlin. They had made a pact with death, and would conquer or perish. Victor Hugo, once more seized with a spasm of lyric fervour, dared the Prussians to do their worst openly. "No more forests, no more thick fogs, no more tortuous tactics, no more gliding along in the dark;" so ran the prose war-song of this Ossian out of date. "The strategy of the cat will not avail when you meet the lion. In vain you will step softly; the very dead will hear you. Paris is watching you—the thunder in her hand...... You are about to meet a great soldier whose name was Gaul when you were Borussians, and who calls himself France now that you are Vandals...... Paris will defend herself. Paris, which has been accustomed to amuse mankind, will now terrify it. The world will be amazed when it sees how grandly Paris can die. The Pantheon is already asking itself where it is to put the crowds of heroes who are

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* "Diary of a Besieged Resident," in the *Daily News.*



ARREST OF A PRUSSIAN SPY ON THE BOULEVARDS.

about to acquire a title to the shelter of its dome." All this rhodomontade was due to that spirit of boasting, which now seems inseparable from the Parisian character, though at one time it was held to be the peculiarity of Gascons. It was very idle and foolish, but it did not altogether usurp the place of real work. Paris vapoured and attitudinised, as it would seem she always must; but she acted too.

The army collected within the walls was composed of various materials, and had its respectable and its contemptible side. The rhapsodies of the papers were often disgusting in their folly, their outrageous vanity, their extravagant assumptions, and their blasphemous identification of the cause of Paris with that of Providence itself. But the Mobiles from the provinces were, on the whole, a reliable set of men. Not only were they bigger, stronger, and healthier than the Parisians, but their moral tone was far superior. Quiet, orderly, and modest in their ways, they refrained from the vainglorious self-assertion of their metropolitan fellows, and set to work steadily, without noisy demonstrations or showy pretences. They wore blue or grey blouses: some with a red collar, or with a red badge hastily sewn on each arm; others with no distinguishing mark, so rough and rapid was their equipment. They walked about Paris on the early days of their arrival, staring at the grand objects of the city, then beheld for the first time; and their uncouth appearance excited some ridicule, but their conduct was admirable. "The families with whom they lodge," wrote the "Besieged Resident" of the *Daily News*, "speak with wonder of their sobriety, their decency, and their simple ways, and in their hearts almost despise them because they do not ravish their daughters or pillage their cellars, and neither swear every half hour to die for their country, nor yell the 'Marseillaise.'" Although it would be unfair to deny that the Parisians worked as well as declaimed, and fought as well as blustered, they suffered from want of discipline, and discipline is not to be obtained by men who have long accustomed themselves to make a jibe of all authority. The sight of the stragglers from MacMahon's army limping into Paris, dirty, ragged, tired, and utterly disheartened, did not operate favourably on the military spirit of the citizens. Mr. Malet, of the English Embassy, told a newspaper correspondent whom he met between Paris and Tours that, although the individual bravery of the Army of Paris might not be doubtful, the general discipline of the body was so loose and flaccid as almost to destroy its military character. The battle of the 19th of September showed that courage itself was wanting in some instances. Files of unhappy wretches were paraded through the streets of Paris after that encounter, closely guarded, and provided with placards, saying, "This coward fled from the enemy. One is permitted to spit in his face." The boys availed themselves of the liberty thus granted; but it is doubtful whether such an exhibition was not equally impolitic and vindictive. In the pressure of a deadly war it may sometimes be a sad and stern necessity to shoot those who weakly recoil before the foe; but to degrade them in the popular gaze is to degrade the populace also. How many wavering hearts are likely to have been encouraged by seeing this miserable sight?

The condition of the peasantry in the north-eastern parts of France began to attract attention while Paris was preparing for the siege. The sad effects of war in the districts surrounding Sedan, Metz, and other places desolated by the contending armies, were brought before the notice of the English public by several of our papers, and especially by the *Daily News*. In a communication from Briey, in the department of the Moselle, dated September 15th, 1870, a correspondent of that journal translates an appeal which was then circulating in the vicinity, and which, as soon as the necessary signatures were appended, was forwarded to England, to America, and even to Germany. It was addressed "to all neutral nations, and to those among belligerent nations who have not suffered hostile invasion in the war of 1870." The authors of the appeal said they spoke in the name of the people of those portions of France which were occupied by the German armies, particularly of the inhabitants of the departments of the Moselle, Meuse, Meurthe, and Ardennes. They requested aid, to enable them, not to destroy life, but to maintain it, both then and after the advent of that peace which all the world desired. Most generous sympathy, they admitted, had been shown for the sick and wounded; the direct victims of the war had been helped by munificent hands, and brave hearts had interposed to save the injured combatants from death. But other miseries, which threatened to be of still wider extent, had been overlooked.

> "The people of France depend for their subsistence on the grains which they raise and the cattle which they breed. In the sections of country that have been traversed by the German armies, nothing remains of the provisions that had been accumulated in time of peace. Our houses, stables, and barns are burned or riddled with cannon-shots. The fields and meadows are trampled down by the tread of embattled hosts. Neither cereals nor grass have been harvested this

autumn. All our beasts of burden, all our beeves, sheep, and swine, have been taken from us. Our labourers are either pressed into the French army as soldiers, or into the German army as teamsters. There remains not even seed-corn. We are destitute of strength to prepare the trampled ground for seed for next season's harvest; destitute of material to sow; destitute, in many places, of ground to sow upon, as miles upon miles of territory are made inviolable by the plough, by reason of the sacred and terrible seed of human corpses with which they have been sown. Hunger stares us in the face now; famine and pestilence are the legacies which war will surely leave to us for the coming winter and spring; the cry of children, begging the father for bread which he has not, is already upon the air; while the tears of houseless widows and orphans, falling upon the open field where these unfortunates camp, prevent the blood-spots from drying."

This singularly mournful and eloquent production concludes with an address to the people of England, who have not felt the ravages of invasion for centuries; to the people of America, who know the desolation caused by war, but who have quickly recovered from the effects of their own struggle, and whose country is naturally rich, while France is naturally poor; and to the entire human family, "not even excepting victorious Germany," which surely could not desire the annihilation of the vanquished. The original document was signed first by the Mayor of Briey, and then by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of many French towns and villages lying about Metz, Nancy, and Sedan.

The publication of this appeal in the *Daily News* created so sympathetic an interest in the readers of that paper that several sums of money were sent to the publisher, with a request that he would transmit them to the sufferers. Hence arose "The *Daily News* French Peasant Relief Fund," the administration of which was undertaken by Mr. W. H. Bullock, of Balliol College, Oxford, who at once proceeded to the afflicted districts, and, by unresting personal inquiries, made himself acquainted with the most pressing cases, and applied the large sums at his disposal to their relief. In this benevolent work he was materially and heartily assisted by Mr. R. D. Wilson, of Lincoln's Inn; Captain Goodenough, R.N.; Captain St. John Mildmay, Rifle Brigade; Mr. W. Cross, Weybridge Heath; Miss Cross; M. André Ninnin, banker, Sedan; Mr. A. Jerningham; and the Hon J. S. Lumley, Her Majesty's Minister at Brussels. Many thousand pounds were collected and distributed by this agency, and several very interesting letters from Mr. Bullock and others were published from time to time in the *Daily News*. They revealed a lamentable amount of suffering and destitution, and bore striking testimony to the virtues of the French rural population—their patience, fortitude, and grateful sense of kindness. The whole of the Fund (which was closed in March, 1871) was applied without any deduction for expenses of management or agency.* The *Courrier des Ardennes*, of April 4th, 1871, contained a letter from a correspondent who stated that the French Peasant Relief Fund, during six months, and in more than forty localities, gave away bread, bacon, clothes, house-rent, looms, furniture, tools, medicine, grain, and seed; that its action was so comprehensive that it distributed every week about 35,000 lbs. of bread, and 2,000 lbs. of bacon; and that the total of the sum expended amounted to more than 400,000 frs. A vote of thanks was passed in the Municipal Council of Sedan on the 19th of March, 1871.

The other Funds continued to receive large subscriptions, both in money and stores, and a vast amount of useful and beneficent work was performed by the surgeons, assistants, and hospital nurses sent out from this country. The generosity of the British people was never more admirably manifested than during the course of the Franco-Prussian war. But England did not stand alone. By the side of our own surgeons and nurses, and of the French and German, many Americans toiled nobly. The Ambulance Corps represented the intelligence and humanity of both the Old World and the New. Of course there were mistakes and shortcomings; the red cross was sometimes abused; and often it was found that persons who had undertaken the service in a moment of enthusiasm were unfit for its stern realities. But, on the whole, the credit of humanity was advanced by these efforts—in the main successful—to ameliorate the infinite calamity of war.

French politicians of the more enthusiastic order continued to hope for some species of foreign intervention, even after the utter discomfiture of M. Thiers's missions to England, Austria, and Russia. In the last-named country a good deal of sympathy with France was felt and expressed in many quarters. It is true that the Czar and his Ministers were strongly inclined towards Prussia; and it cannot be doubted that between the two countries, officially, there was an excellent understanding, with a view to mutual advantage. But the National party in Russia has always been jealous of German influence, which, ever since the days of Peter the Great, has made itself predominant in the governing circles. To this party it now appeared desirable to encourage France in opposition to Prussia. After the fall of Napoleon III. the supporters of these views attributed all the reverses of the French to the demoralising influence of his system of rule—a criticism which was, of course, intended to apply, by implication, to the Czar himself. The proclamation of the Republic was hailed as the commencement of French regeneration and the pledge of future victory—a very unfortunate forecast, as events turned out. An agitation against Prussian spies was actively prosecuted, and the Government was somewhat troubled by the turn which public opinion had taken among politicians of the pure Muscovite stamp. The supporters of this party were, of course, most numerous and most powerful at Moscow, the old historic capital of the Empire, the holy city of the Muscovite race. The *Gazette* of that city endeavoured to prove that it was not France which originated the Crimean war, but England, which had always been the cause of Russia's misfortunes, and whose interests were in collision with those of Russia at all points.

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* "The War Correspondence of the *Daily News*, 1870." Chapter XIII.


Plesnois
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Noisseville
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St Julien
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Chatel
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Road to St Arold
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St Privat
F.O.
Laquenexy
to Strasbourg
Mercy les Hauts
to Nancy
R.R.
Ars
P.O.
to Pont a Mousson
Marly
P.O.
Peltre
Jury
GB.

PLAN OF METZ AND THE FRENCH ENTRENCHED CAMP.

F.O. ≫ French Outposts.
P.O. ≪ Prussian Outposts.

SCALE MILES
1 2 3

AA. 2nd Corps.
BB. 3rd ,,
CC. 4th ,,
DD. 6th ,,
EE. Imperial Guard.

Encouraged by their successes, their constantly-augmenting strength, and the evident determination of other Powers not to interfere, the Germans struck on all sides with amazing vigour. In addition to the towns already mentioned, they now prepared to lay siege to Soissons, in the department of the Aisne. The town is seated on the left bank of the river Aisne, sixty miles north-east from Paris, on the high road from the French capital to Brussels. It has on several occasions suffered severely in the civil and religious wars of former centuries, and in the campaign of 1814 it was twice taken by the Allies, twice retaken by the French, and ultimately besieged by the former, bombarded, and much damaged. A similar fate was reserved for it in 1870. The Prussians massed their forces before its walls on September 28th, and, having thrown a bridge over the Aisne, they fired the suburbs. Several sorties were made from the fortress, and repelled by the Prussians; but the regular siege did not begin until a fortnight later.



PRUSSIAN PROVISION WAGONS.

Metz now claims our renewed attention. The repulse of the great sortie of August 31st and the following day, made in connection with the tremendous battle before Sedan, left the garrison with darkened hopes, yet with a large remaining stock of courage and resolution. The city was extremely strong. It had acquired the name of "Metz the Virgin," because it had never been violently taken, though it has had its share of warlike operations. It was captured by a clever stratagem, however, in 1552. During the wars between Maurice of Saxony and the Emperor Charles V., the French, as allies of Maurice, sent an army into Lorraine. The Constable Montmorency obtained permission to pass through Metz with "a small guard," but he managed that the guard should be large enough to enable him to seize the place and hold it. Charles, on learning the fact, advanced at the head of a hundred thousand Germans to besiege the fortress. At that time the defences of the city were extremely weak; but the celebrated Duke of Guise, who had been sent there by the French as soon as Montmorency had gained possession, exhibited so much energy and skill in strengthening the fortress, and inspired the 66,000 inhabitants of the town with so martial a spirit, that the Emperor, after a siege of fifty-six days, retired in great vexation of soul. From that time up to 1870 Metz remained a French town, although it was not formally secured to France until the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. It was elaborately fortified by Cormontaigne and Vauban, and afterwards by Marshal Belleisle. It has nine gates and drawbridges, a citadel commanding the river, several powerful forts, and seventeen bridges. A large gunpowder factory is situated on an island in the Moselle; an immense military hospital, built by Louis XIV., occupies a prominent position in the town; and the inhabitants take great pride in their school for military engineers, their regimental school of artillery, their arsenal with its 80,000 stand of arms, their barracks and magazines, their old cathedral, and their other ancient buildings. That portion of the place which is situated on the left, or western, bank of the Moselle is flat; but the opposite bank of the river rises steeply, and the quays and esplanade—the latter planted with acacia trees—are among the handsomest in Europe, at least in the estimation of the townspeople. Some picturesque bits of mediæval architecture are yet to be found in various corners of the city; but a great many old conventual buildings, which would have been interesting to the present generation, were destroyed when the military engineers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries set about their work of fortification.

The town overflowed with wounded after the great actions of August 14th, 16th, and 18th. Accommodation could hardly be found for them. They were placed in hospitals, in public buildings, in barracks, in convents, in hotels, in private houses; and yet more room was required. Accordingly, temporary shelter was provided by fastening long rows of boards together in sloping fashion like tents. Hospital tents were planted under the trees of the Esplanade, and lines of railway vans were drawn up on the Place Royale, and furnished with hammocks. The women of the city devoted themselves in the most exalted spirit of humanity and religion to the necessities of the miserable sufferers, and worked unflinchingly in the midst of appalling sights and smells. The people kept up their spirits by the thought that MacMahon would soon arrive, and disperse the investing Prussians; and in the meanwhile they held a meeting with a view to establishing a limited liability company for insurance against bombardment.* The scheme was abandoned after some little discussion, because insurmountable difficulties were discovered in its path, and because it was thought that such an insurance would compromise the claim of the townspeople on the State; but the fact of the idea being entertained shows the business-like mood in which the Metzers entered upon the siege.

The sortie of August 31st and September 1st, of which we have given an account at p. 112, was looked forward to by the townsfolk with feelings of great confidence; but it appears to have been sadly mismanaged, and its failure threw a cloud over the city. Canrobert, Lebœuf, Frossard, and Changarnier, were actively concerned in the operations of the day, which at one time seemed to be very nearly successful; but suddenly and unaccountably the retreat was sounded. "Never again," says Mr. Robinson, the Special Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, who was actually on the spot, and who has since republished his letters in a volume, "had we any confidence in the military qualities of the commander-in-chief. We saw a movement, commenced at daybreak, suspended until evening in view of the enemy. We saw an army sent out with divided councils. We saw the movement arrested when a night's march could have carried the position. We saw a force, weakened by a fair day's work and a long night's watch, left unsuccoured. We saw our victory snatched from us when, in spite of these disadvantages, we had almost grasped it; and the shock was too rude. Confidence refused to grow again; and when we found political trickery added to military incapacity, we ceased to consider our commander-in-chief either wise or honest." The responsibility for these statements and opinions must rest with Mr. Robinson; but he had good opportunities of judging, and there were undoubtedly many circumstances which threw a degree of suspicion over the conduct of Bazaine.

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* "The Fall of Metz." By G. T. Robinson. Chapter VIII.

The condition of Metz in the early part of September was described in a letter from the Second German Army, published in a German paper, which said:—"The situation of the French in Metz is beginning to be serious. They have already, apparently out of anxiety for their supplies of food, unconditionally released six of our officers and 730 of our men. One inducement to this act was the humanity of two of our military chaplains, Gerlach and Prince Radziwill, who gave up the body of a French general lying on the field of battle. According to the description of our released soldiers, the wounded in the battles which have occurred are packed together in Metz to the number of 20,000 or 30,000. The number of the troops in the town is 100,000 or 120,000, including 20,000 Gardes Mobiles. Reckoning the customary population of 60,000, there are altogether about 200,000 persons in the place. It is scarcely conceivable that such a multitude can for any length of time have sufficient food. Moreover, the drinking water, conveyed by pipes from a neighbouring hill, has been cut off by our troops. The uncleanliness which prevails will also be destructive. The bodies of fallen horses lie about, exhaling miasma; and in the hospitals sufficient attendants are lacking. Everything possible is being done to strengthen the fortress and its vicinity. It is doubtful whether the motive is fear of attack, or a desire to employ the troops. The treatment of the prisoners in the French camp is not particularly tender. The released soldiers complain of defective and insufficient diet, and of being obliged the first few nights to sleep in the casemates on the bare stone; subsequently the requisite straw was found for them."

The prince mentioned in this extract—Prince Edmund Radziwill—was a chaplain in the Prussian army, and, having been taken prisoner by the French on the day before the battle of Gravelotte, was sent back a week afterwards. During his retention, he was allowed to reside at an hotel, and to walk about the streets, on his giving his word that he would make no attempt to escape. The Prince afterwards reported that the prevalent feeling of the population seemed to be hatred of the Prussians. No one at that time (the latter part of August) appeared in the least degree alarmed or anxious, except one or two generals. Food was plentiful, save in the matter of sugar, which was scarce. The hospitals were found by the Prince to be in a very satisfactory state; but what he chiefly remarked was the perfect knowledge of the German military arrangements exhibited by the French staff officers.

Very contradictory accounts are given as to Bazaine's motives in holding out at Metz. According to some he declared to a Prussian officer with whom he had a parley, that he kept the city, and the army in and about it, for the Emperor, and that he disclaimed the Republic altogether. According to others he said he regarded himself, not as an Imperial Marshal, but as a Marshal of France, and that his first duty was to the country. Herr Wickede, writing in the *Cologne Gazette*, alleged that he spoke with the utmost disdain of the Emperor. "Bazaine," wrote this German correspondent, "will not surrender until compelled by the direst hunger, for he is a rough, passionate, ambitious man, quite the opposite of the unselfish and noble MacMahon, who belongs to the few real chivalrous characters, and is a true gentleman as well as a courageous and able soldier. Bazaine began his military career as a common drummer, and owes all that he has become to his resolution and talents. He is anxious to play a part in France—perhaps that of Dictator, or even Emperor; and he knows that this can only succeed if he defends Metz to the last. When informed of Napoleon's surrender, he replied, 'What the deuce does that *fanfaron* Napoleon concern me? I alone am master in Metz, and will not dream of surrendering the place.' Famine, however, must ultimately bring him to it." This view is supported by a passage in a letter from Bazaine to Palikao, said to have been intercepted by the Prussians on the 25th of August—ten days before the Revolution in Paris. The Marshal is reported to have written to the then Prime Minister:—"Prevent orders or proclamations from his Majesty being published. I have appealed to my soldiers in the name of the country." Nevertheless, it seems more probable that Bazaine was all along acting for the Empire. His conduct, however, was so dark and mysterious, and the whole of this portion of the war is so little known to the public as regards the secret springs of action, that it is impossible to speak with any confidence. General von Zastrow, who held the woods of Vaux on the morning after the battle of Gravelotte, pronounced a very decided opinion that Bazaine could, if he pleased, have avoided being enclosed in Metz. The Metzers themselves believed that he could have broken out of Metz had he been more determined; and we have seen that, according to Mr. Robinson, the sortie terminating on the 1st of September was strangely countermanded on the very eve of success. After the investment of the city Bazaine was seldom seen in the camps, the hospitals, or the streets, but kept himself very private; and, as a natural consequence, his unpopularity with the soldiers was great. Some observations which he is recorded to have made when a prisoner of war in Cassel would place his conduct on a perfectly intelligible footing, if they were not contradicted or confused by other parts of the story. He is stated to have said:—

> "I have sworn loyalty to the Emperor and the constitution. The Emperor is a prisoner, but the constitution is in force; and neither I nor any of my comrades will ever acknowledge any other Government until we shall have previously obtained a discharge from our oath at the hands of the Emperor himself. I proposed to march out with the army, and to pledge our honour that we would not fight again in this war, but that we should be permitted to convene and protect the French Chambers against the mob, or, as Bismarck called them, the street idlers. I detest politics. We only wanted to do what Gambetta asserts that he wishes to do—that is, to re-establish legality, by calling together the representative body. Even had we not been forced by hunger, I should have opened negotiations on the day when I learned that it was not the Republicans, but the mob, who governed at Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles—on the day when I learned that the army was insulted, that the memory of men whom I venerate was reviled. But, as the case really stood, it was hunger, and nothing but hunger, that compelled my surrender."*

Whether Bazaine was acting for the Emperor, or for some other member of the Napoleonic family, or for the Republic, or simply for the deliverance of the country, or for the furtherance of his own ambitious ends, or out of jealousy of MacMahon, cannot well be determined upon the meagre evidence before us. That he was fighting for the Republic is the least probable supposition of the whole.



GENERAL BOURBAKI.

The mystery in which the affair was enveloped did not receive much enlightenment from some reports which, under the heading of "A Strange Story," appeared in the English papers, concerning various communications that had taken place between Metz and the residence of the Empress. It was stated that in the second half of September a Monsieur M. arrived at Hastings, and demanded an audience of her Majesty. As his name was not known, the request was refused. He contrived, however, to address the Prince Imperial while out walking; professed great devotion to the Napoleonic cause; and managed to repeat the interview on subsequent days. At length he requested the young Prince to make him a present of one of his photographs, with his autograph attached. This was given, and Monsieur M. disappeared from Hastings. He immediately made his way to the German army before Metz, and obtained a pass through the lines into the city. On arriving there he addressed himself to one of the principal French generals, described in the narrative as "General B." He alleged that he had come as a messenger from the Empress, and presented as his credentials the photograph of the Prince, with his signature beneath. The Empress, he said, desired the immediate presence of General B. in England. She had a special mission to entrust to him, on the successful issue of which the future of the war would mainly depend, but she dared not put it in writing, lest it should fall into the hands of the enemy. The general at once proceeded to England, escaping the Prussians, as he supposed, with difficulty, but, according to the story, it was with the connivance of the investing force that he got through. On reaching this country he had an interview with the Empress at Chislehurst, and was astounded to learn that her Majesty knew nothing of the matter, and that he had been made the victim of a trick, the object of which appeared to be to get him away from Metz, of which he was known to be one of the ablest defenders. This would make it appear that the hoaxers were the Prussians; but it is very improbable that they should have been so afraid of General B. as to get him away by a *ruse*. The truth of this extraordinary story was said by the *Times* to be as follows:—

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* "The Franco-Prussian War." By Melville D. Landon. New York. 1871.

> "The General B. in question is General Bourbaki [Commander of the Imperial Guard shut up at Metz]. The general has been mystified by some person who thought to render a great service to the Empress by finding means to bring him through the Prussian lines to her at Camden Place. But it is likewise true that the Prussian authorities have been victims as well of the same mystification. The general having cleared up the misunderstanding in a letter written on the 29th of September to an influential quarter, the contents of which have been forwarded by telegraph to the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, his Majesty has already given orders to the Prince Frederick Charles, Commander-in-Chief of the besieging armies before Metz, to give every facility for the general resuming his command of the Guards, and thus restoring to the army of Metz the advantage of his services. General Bourbaki will pass through the Prussian lines to Metz."

After a time it appeared that the initial letter of the agent's name was "N.," not "M." A version of the affair, professing to be by this person, was published in the *Standard*, October 7th, 1870. It left the story in all its obscurity, but it showed that there really had been some negotiations. Monsieur N. states that he went to Hastings to impart to the Empress certain information, and to urge on her certain ideas; that they were not accepted by her Majesty, and that, therefore, he addressed himself to Count Bismarck for permission to go to Wilhelmshöhe. A special and personal pass was given him to traverse the territory occupied by the Germans, and at the German head-quarters he was received with great attention. While there, a letter arrived from the Grand Duke of Hesse, who insisted on the necessity of procuring the passage out of Metz of about a dozen prisoners of the Hesse International Society whom he believed to be there. Monsier N. undertook to obtain their release, in conformity with the convention of Basle. He got into Metz, had a long interview with Marshal Bazaine (to whom he declared that he had no commission from Hastings), and obtained leave to include General Bourbaki among the Hessians who were to be released. It was specially agreed that the general, while in England, should be known as Monsieur N., and by no other name, and that he should employ his influence—an influence not possessed by the real N.—in acquainting the Empress with the position of things, as known to the negotiator, "and to him, perhaps, only in France," so that she might "derive advantage from a position which she had scarcely hoped for," but which the events now being directed by him (the real N.) would have brought about without her knowledge. All this was agreed to by General Bourbaki, to whom Monsieur N. gave his passport, together with an order from Marshal Bazaine, which, being written in the name of the Emperor, put an end to the doubts as to the Marshal's fidelity, and served as a personal guarantee to Bourbaki. On leaving the city, he was not challenged, and he and the Hessians were conducted to the first station of the Prussian lines, and thence to the frontier of Luxemburg or Belgium, with leave to go where they pleased. Some time later, Monsieur N. himself arrived in England, and, on presenting himself at Chislehurst, was told that General Bourbaki had been there, and that the Empress and her suite had been very much surprised when he announced that he came by her Majesty's order, when she knew nothing about it. In following up his story, Monsieur N. gives this explanation of the catastrophe:—"In a minute Monsieur N. understood that General Bourbaki, admirable soldier as he is, and one of the bravest of French generals, but unhappily little skilled in diplomacy, had, diplomatically speaking, quite lost his head; that he had met with some comrade in Belgium; that the words 'treason and dishonour' had produced their usual effect; that he had then exhibited the authorisation of his superior, and, by this unpardonable indiscretion, which can only be explained by his exaggerated susceptibility on the point of military honour, had broken probably one link of the chain which maintained the scaffolding reared by N. amid such trouble and danger; had destroyed the last hope of those persons who looked for the maintenance of order in France during the years that are coming." Here the story terminates, according to the version of this particular writer. It receives a certain amount of credit from the fact that General Bourbaki was undoubtedly permitted by the Prussians to leave Metz on some secret mission, and also allowed to go back. Though, on his return, he reached the walls of the fortress, however, he did not re-enter them, but after a time went to Tours, offered his services to the Republican Government, and received the command of an army.



GENERAL VON ZASTROW.

There were other and more authoritative statements on this strange transaction. The *Daily News* of October 26th, 1870, contained a communication, evidently emanating from Chislehurst, in which the general who had been sent to England as the envoy of Bazaine is spoken of as General Boyer. The writer states that, notwithstanding what had been insinuated, and even affirmed, in certain English journals, the Empress Eugénie had taken no part in any one of the combinations having for their object either peace or an armistice; that the *salon* at Chislehurst had not become, in any sense, an official *salon;* that it was still simply the home of an exile, and that, though open to visitors, it was not that they might make it a place for the discussion of peace or war. The communication then proceeds :—

"General Boyer, the envoy of Marshal Bazaine, may have approached the Empress with a view to propositions of peace or war to be submitted to Prussia; but he was received with no more favour than were the emissaries of M. de Bismarck on a previous occasion. When a former envoy of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation came to propose peace, declaring that King William was disposed to content himself with 250,000 French inhabitants, Strasburg included, the Empress replied with great energy that so long as an enemy was in France, and so long as there was any question of the smallest cession of territory, she would hold aloof from every negotiation. The events of the last month have made no change in her resolution; and so far as the efforts of General Boyer have been directed to this point, they have completely failed.

"Nor could the mission of General Boyer have had for its object to consult the Empress as to the propriety of surrendering Metz at this moment. That is only one way of concealing the real object of his journey. Marshal Bazaine, confident in the strength of his position as a general who has suffered no defeat, and at the head of the only French army which still exists, thinks himself entitled to exercise not a little influence on the question whether peace shall be made or hostilities continue. He would gladly make himself indispensable; would gladly be the dictator with whom the enemy should have to treat, taking the lead both of the Government which sits at Tours, and of that which is shut up in Paris. He would rejoice that France should owe peace or victory to him, and to him only. That is a respectable ambition, exaggerated as it may perhaps be; but it must not be inferred that Marshal Bazaine would rather conclude a peace favourable to the Napoleonic dynasty than in accordance with the true interests of his country."



PREPARING FOR THE DAY'S WORK.

The writer concludes by stating that there was no particle of truth in the stories told about the interview at Chislehurst, and that Prince Napoleon, "who had taken sides with those who would, perhaps, have wished to induce the Empress to commit an indiscretion," had lost his labour, while, owing to his violent attacks on the past policy of the Empire, he had been received very coldly at Chislehurst, which he had quitted somewhat suddenly, in consequence of the harsh truths he had been compelled to hear from his illustrious cousin.

This provoked a reply from Prince Napoleon, who said:—"I have come to England on private business. I have not seen General Bourbaki, who left before my arrival; I have not seen General Boyer, whose mission I heard of through the newspapers. As to my relations with Chislehurst, the facts are these:—On my arrival I went to pay my respects to my cousin and her son; I returned there summoned by a telegraphic despatch. As to what passed with the Empress, permit me to say nothing to the public; those who know me know that my opinions have always been as loyal as they are liberal. I have the highest esteem for Marshal Bazaine, for his glorious army so devoted to France, as well as to its oath, and for the preservation of which, it seemed to me, everything ought to be attempted." On the following day (October 28th), the *Daily News* contained a long and authoritative statement on behalf of the Empress, in which it was affirmed that her Majesty had not only remained a stranger to every intrigue, but had "repelled with energy and dignity everything which looked like a Buonapartist conspiracy." She had not lost all hope of a restoration, nor was her silence to be construed to the prejudice of the future; but she perceived that the moment for dynastic speculations had not arrived, and at that time her anxieties were of another kind. Her thoughts were occupied solely with the national defence; and upon that point her ideas were "in complete accord with those of the Government at Tours." She would refuse all cession of territory. The document continues:—

> "The evidence of this may be found in her answer to the first emissary, sent to her by M. de Bismarck on the 15th of last month (September), when she had been only a few days in England, and when the events that had brought about her exile were still so recent that she might perhaps have been excused if she had seized on the first opportunity of exercising her authority as Regent. Prussia at that time was ready to make peace. The victories of Weissenburg, of Forbach, and of Sedan, were enough for her glory. Public opinion in Germany had not then been embittered by the continuance of a war which the surrender of the Emperor promised at first to terminate; and the Chancellor of the North German Confederation did not then feel himself obliged to propose to a country exhausted by the struggle any considerable territorial compensation. Accordingly, he proposed to the Empress to conclude a peace on the basis of the surrender of Strasburg, 'the key of the house,' as he calls that French city, with a portion of the Department of the Bas Rhin, including but 250,000 inhabitants, and with a war indemnity of two thousand millions of francs. The Empress, rejecting long before the Provisional Government the idea of territorial cession, refused this proposition, which has remained so completely unknown that views are to-day imputed to her which would be wholly inconsistent with her past acts, and as hostile to her interests as to those of France."

Reference is then made to "the intrigue in which General Bourbaki became an involuntary tool," and to a certain manifesto (written with a view to conciliating Germany, and establishing a species of alliance between that nation and a restored French Empire) which had been published in the name of the Emperor Napoleon III., but the authenticity of which was immediately denied. It is a remarkable fact, by the way, that this false manifesto originally appeared in *La Situation*, a journal established in London, after the Revolution of September, to express the views of the Imperialists. The writer of the document put forward in the interest of the Empress goes on to say that it was the desire of her Majesty "to take part in none of the intrigues of which it was sought to make Chislehurst the centre." The arrival of General Bourbaki and that of General Boyer were equally unexpected. "It was only natural," continues the writer, "that the envoy sent by Marshal Bazaine to the Prussian head-quarters should have thought it a duty, when his mission was accomplished, to pay his respects to the Empress at Chislehurst, and to apprise her of what was passing in Metz." But nothing in the nature of a military revolution was discussed; and to suppose that the conversation had reference to any other subject than the possibility of continued resistance, was to hold light the military honour of Marshal Bazaine, and to exhibit ignorance of the relations existing since the Mexican war between the Marshal and the Empress, with whom he had never been a favourite. Equally false was the statement that the Empress contemplated a journey to the Prussian head-quarters. Only when Alsace and Lorraine should no longer be in question would the Empress endeavour to put herself in agreement with the country, with a view to obtaining an honourable peace. The document concludes with some pointed allusions to Prince Napoleon:—

> "It is well known that the Emperor's cousin has never been in any great odour of sanctity at the Tuileries, and that the Empress personally has taken little pains to conceal her prepossessions against one whom she has always considered the Emperor's enemy. The political temperament of Prince Napoleon, and his philosophical and moral opinions, were, it is true, but little in accordance with those of the Empress; and the sad events of which France has been the

victim did not in any way tend to reconcile views or feelings between which there had been no possible point of contact. Be that as it may, and not to push an inquiry into psychological peculiarities, it is certain that the second and last visit of Prince Napoleon at Chislehurst ended in an explosion. The Prince may protest as much as he likes; that will not alter the facts.

"During this last visit, Prince Napoleon, with his usual impulsiveness, allowed himself to express somewhat harshly his opinions touching the different Ministries of the last month of the Empire, and he went so far as to call one of them a Ministry of idiots (*crétins*). Now, the sentiment of gratitude is very strong with the Empress, and she made a reply to her illustrious cousin, of which the following sentences convey the substance, if not the precise words:—'I know not, Monseigneur,' said the Empress, 'what you mean by a Ministry of idiots; but what I do know is that down to the last moment the Emperor was served by devoted and faithful friends. For the last eighteen years you have opposed the Empire. You and those about you have never ceased to undermine it; and to-day, when the Emperor is fallen, you pursue him still. Had you been at Paris on the 4th September, you might have been able to give us good advice; but you were absent, as you have so often happened to be at the moment of danger—of course, to your great regret, as I do not doubt.' Upon this, Prince Napoleon tarried no longer; he took up his hat and left the room."

The mystery was hardly made any clearer by these semi-official utterances; and it was not long before another narrative came out. On the 10th of November—some days after the fall of Metz—Mr. Ridgway, of London, published a pamphlet by a M. Regnier, who described himself as a French landowner, at that time living in England, and who stated that the mysterious negotiations were conducted by him. He alleged that on the 12th of September he sent a letter to Madame Lebreton, one of the Empress's ladies, requesting that it should be communicated to her Majesty, who was then at Hastings. In this letter he wrote:—



A LOOK-OUT POST.

"The Ambassador in London of the North German Confederation, who will soon be the Ambassador of a German Empire extending from the Baltic to Trieste, with 55,000,000 inhabitants, may possibly say, 'I think the King of Prussia would prefer treating for peace with the Imperial Government rather than the Republic.' If so, I shall start to-morrow for Wilhelmshöhe, after having paid a visit to the Empress. The following are the propositions I intend to submit to the Emperor:—1. That the Regent ought not to quit French territory; 2. That the Imperial fleet is French territory; 3. That the fleet, which received the Empress Regent with so much enthusiasm on its departure for the Baltic, or at least a portion of the fleet, howsoever small it proves, be taken by the Regent for her Government seat, thus enabling her to go from one to another of the French ports where she can count upon the largest number of adherents, and so prove that her Government exists *de jure* and *de facto*. That the Empress Regent issue from the fleet four proclamations—viz., to foreign Governments, to the fleet, to the army, and to the French people."

Madame Lebreton afterwards told M. Regnier that the Empress's feelings were that the interests of France should take precedence of those of the dynasty, and that she had the greatest horror of any step likely to bring about a civil war. She therefore rejected his proposition. M. Regnier then determined to go to Wilhelmshöhe; but he first contrived to get the Prince Imperial to write on a photographic view of Hastings—which, together with some stereoscopic views, M. Regnier proposed to take with him—the following words to the Emperor:—"My dear papa, I send you these views of Hastings, hoping they will please you.—Louis Napoleon." The two stereoscopic views were also signed. We are assured by M. Regnier that it was with the Empress's consent that this was done; but he also states that she added, to the gentleman in attendance with whom the affair was transacted, "Tell M. Regnier that there must be great danger in carrying out his project, and that I beg him not to attempt its execution." M. Regnier left England, and on the 20th of September (the day of the first interview of M. Jules Favre with the Prussian Chancellor) he saw Count Bismarck, and unfolded his plans. This was what passed:—

"Count Bismarck sat down at his desk, inviting me to do likewise. I opened my portfolio, and drew from it the photographic view of Hastings on which the Prince Imperial had written, and presented it to him. After he had deliberated upon it for some time, I looked fixedly at him, and said: 'I come, Count, to ask you to grant me a pass which will permit me to go to Wilhelmshöhe, and give this photograph into his Majesty's hands.' He also looked fixedly at me; there were a few moments of silence, and he then addressed me thus, as I felt firmly convinced he would do:—'Sir, our position is before you; what can you offer us? With whom can we treat? Our determination to profit by our present position—to avoid in the future, for a long time to come at least, any fresh war with France—is fixed. To obtain this, an alteration of the frontiers of France is indispensable to us. On the other hand, we find ourselves in the presence of two Governments—the one *de facto*, the other *de jure*; we cannot alter their position, and it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to treat with either the one or the other. The neutral Powers will be glad to see the situation cleared up. The Empress Regent has quitted French territory, and since then she has given no signs of life. After the taking of Sedan a treaty ought to have been signed; and a few words that I dropped then, in an interview at which were present Messrs. de Castelnau and Piétri, might, if they had been willing, have given rise to more serious *pourparlers*, but they appeared unwilling to understand them. The Provisional Government for the Defence either will not or cannot accept this condition of a diminution of territory, but proposes an armistice in order to consult the French people on the question; and we can afford to wait. We have here 400,000 men who live on occupied and conquered soil. When Metz and the other towns surrender we shall have from 500,000 to 600,000 who can remain here for the winter. When we find ourselves face to face with a Government *de facto* and *de jure* able to treat on the basis we propose, then we will treat. For the present we need not make known our requirements as to a cession of territory, seeing that it is declined *in toto*.'"

The conversation was here broken off by the interview with M. Favre; but M. Regnier saw the Count again at eight in the evening, and made to him these proposals and suggestions:—

"1stly. I will go at once to Metz and Strasburg, and see the Commander-in-chief of each place; and I will make an agreement that those two towns shall only be surrendered in the Emperor's name. 2ndly. By virtue of a proclamation, the members of the Senate, the Corps Législatif, and the State Council shall re-assemble in the town of . . . . on the . . . . 3rdly. Another proclamation to the people, in which it must be stated that the Left, by the violent manner in which they seized on the Government, compel us now to make a less advantageous treaty of peace than we need otherwise have done. That all Imperial functionaries shall resume their functions after October 1st, when the Empress Regent should resume the reins of government."

The Count replied by begging M. Regnier to do what he could to bring forward some one with power to treat, and by promising that he should have a general safe-conduct, which would allow of his travelling in all German possessions, and in all places occupied by the German army. A telegram to Metz should, moreover, precede him. In a letter to Count Bismarck, M. Regnier said:—

"In the event of Marshal Bazaine acceding to all my conditions, either Marshal Canrobert or General Bourbaki (to whom I shall give an exact account of all that will be requisite for the success of my plan) must consent to enforce it with all his influence on the army. He might go out with my papers, dressed in my clothes, wrapped in my shawl, after giving me his word of honour that he was to be, for every one except her Majesty the Empress, simply M. Regnier. He would reside with my family at Hastings. A letter from me to her Majesty, of which he would be the bearer, would acquaint her with everything under the seal of secresy. If everything were to succeed as I have anticipated, then, but only then, he might establish his identity, and might make known that he left Metz in the night in a balloon; but only in the event of his placing himself at the head of the army, with orders to defend the Chamber, re-assembled if possible at a seaport town, where a portion of the fleet on which they could depend might also be present. The treaty would be signed the same day, I myself not being present. If nothing could be done, the Marshal or the General would return under my name, and resume his post."

On the 23rd of September M. Regnier saw Marshal Bazaine at Metz, and was told by him that it would be as much as he could do to hold out till October 18th, and that he could only get on so far by living on the officers' horses. The Marshal was delighted with the proposal that he should be allowed a free passage for himself and army, the artillery, ammunition, &c., on the understanding that he was not to fight against the Germans, but to put himself at the disposition of the Chamber and of the Imperial Government. All this was to be explained to the Empress by General Bourbaki on his arrival in England; but it would appear that he explained nothing, and, according to M. Regnier, he passionately regretted having quitted Metz the moment he found himself outside its walls. M. Regnier himself, before leaving Metz, got Marshal Bazaine to sign his name under that of the Prince Imperial on the stereoscopic view of Hastings, in order that Count Bismarck might see he was speaking with the Marshal's authority. It was the 28th of September when this indefatigable emissary, or rather this self-appointed agent, again saw the Prussian Minister, who said that the conditions of an armistice had not been agreed to by M. Favre; that that gentleman was nothing but a lawyer; but that he (the Count) was surprised and sorry to find that M. Regnier, who appeared to be a practical man, had returned from Metz without any more formal attestation of his right to treat than a photograph with Bazaine's signature, and a letter from the Marshal to his wife, in which allusion is made to the bearer acting for him. He therefore declined any further communications until the powers of M. Regnier were made clearer. Nevertheless, he sent this telegram to Marshal Bazaine:—"Does Marshal Bazaine authorise M. Regnier to treat for the surrender of Metz?" The Marshal's reply was as follows:—"I cannot reply in the affirmative to this question. I have told M. Regnier that I cannot arrange for the capitulation of the city of Metz." M. Regnier then went to Chislehurst, and saw the Empress; but her Majesty, fearing that, if she yielded, posterity would only see in the fact a proof of dynastic selfishness, and that dishonour would be attached to the name of any one who should sign a treaty based on a cession of territory, refused to authorise any further negotiations. M. Regnier endeavoured to alter her views by presenting in the most vivid colours the terrible state of France and of large portions of the French population; "and," adds the chronicler, "it was half-past eight o'clock when I took leave of her Majesty, whose dinner had been awaiting her since seven o'clock." But he could not shake her resolution; and so the matter ended.*

The account thus given by M. Regnier is the most detailed and specific of any of those which were from time to time put forth in connection with the very remarkable transactions of which Metz was the centre or the object. It derives an additional degree of force from the fact of the author giving his name, instead of concealing his identity under the veil of initials. M. Regnier states that he is a Parisian and a man of substance, but that, on the first rumours of war, he invested money in an English and American patent, and that, consequently, he was quite independent of his property in France. Yet, although he may have had no mercenary motives for desiring to hasten his return to his native country, it is possible that he may have been influenced by other reasons which should incline us to receive his narrative with some amount of caution. According to his own account, he acted in the matter on his own motion and authority. He was apparently desirous of acting the part of restorer of the Napoleonic dynasty—a service which, had he been able to accomplish it, would of course have placed him in a position of great power. He had no commission for doing as he did, or none that is revealed; indeed, the Empress declined his assistance, and begged him not to attempt the execution of his project. Count Bismarck, after to some extent favouring the scheme, saw clearly that M. Regnier's credentials were anything but regular. The whole plot broke down for want of a true and authoritative centre; yet there is no reason for doubting that it had some existence. Periods of

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* "What is your Name? N. or M.? 'A Strange Story Revealed." London: Ridgway. 1870.



GENERAL MANTEUFFEL.

national excitement are generally rife in strange conspiracies; and in September, 1870, the air of Europe was filled with them.

It is obvious that we are not yet in complete possession of the facts of this strange negotiation. In the imperfect state of our knowledge, it is difficult to form any exact idea of its origin, conduct, and objects. Neither the Emperor nor the Empress, however, would seem to have been mixed up in it. It was apparently the scheme of one who hoped to turn an Imperialist restoration to his own advantage, and who found in Marshal Bazaine a willing coadjutor, and in Count Bismarck (who desired the establishment in France of a Government which would conclude peace on terms of territorial cession) a cautious assistant. The story, at any rate, throws some light on the peculiar conduct of Bazaine during the siege of Metz.



CAPTURE OF A FRENCH EAGLE.

CHAPTER XVII.

Situation of the French around Metz—Their Resources—The German Army and its Positions—The Fortifications of Metz—Prussian Mode of Living in Camp—The Firing of the French Forts—Interchange of Civilities between the Foreposts—Disease and Depression in Metz—Attempts to communicate with the Outer World—Making of Balloons for the Despatch of Letters—Mr. Robinson and Captain Schultz—Carrier Pigeon Service—Bazaine's Communications with the Germans—Seizure of German Provision Wagons—Escape of a small Body of French Troops—Reception of the News of Sedan at Metz—Proclamations of General Coffinières and Marshal Bazaine—Strength of the Prussians before Metz—Opinions on this Point of Mr. Robinson and the Vicomte de Valcourt—French Sorties of September 21st, 22nd, 24th, and 27th—Extension of the French Circle—German Treatment of the Francs-Tireurs—Experiences of a Wounded German.

The army of Bazaine, which (including non-effectives) numbered about 180,000 after the sorties to which allusion has been made, was encamped under the fortresses and round some of the villages of Metz. Their position, in the opinion of military judges, was impregnable to assault; and the King of Prussia accordingly gave orders that no such attempt should be made, but that the investing army should maintain its position of watchfulness, and await the fall of the city by the agency of famine. Before the middle of September Bazaine's soldiers were eating their horses—a fact which soon became known to the Prussians from the confessions of deserters, and by the observations of outpost officers, who, through telescopes, could see the French killing their steeds, large numbers of which were perceived feeding on the *glacis*. This of course told a very important tale as to the rapidly diminishing resources of the army and the town. It likewise showed that sorties would become more difficult every day, since the cavalry—generally an important element in a sally—was being reduced to the condition of a less effective infantry. The determination of the French to hold out to the last, unless in the event of some arrangement being made by Bazaine, of the nature indicated in the previous chapter, was, however, very apparent. They threw up gigantic earthworks before the citadel, strong as it was already. They sent bottles down the Moselle containing sham despatches, which, for a little while, deceived the Prussians, who set nets to catch them until they saw though the trick. From time to time they endeavoured to drive away the enemy by desperate and unavailing assaults. But the Germans only drew their lines closer round the city, and provided for the inevitable future. After the affair at Laon, the Prussian monarch countermanded an order which he had given that Metz was not to be bombarded; and, on the night following the receipt of the new order, a thousand grenades were thrown into the town—a vindictive as well as unreasonable proceeding, since one cannot see why Metz should suffer for the fault of Laon, nor how the Metzers could have known what it was they were being punished for.

The besieging force at the end of September was disposed in a number of very strong lines, and the event showed that the utmost efforts of the French were unable to break through. From the Moselle, on the east side, the Seventh Army Corps held the villages of Magny, Peltre, and Mercy-le-Haut, and extended as far as Ars Laquenexy. Their foreposts and field-watches were a little further forward. The left of the First Army Corps lay at Colombey, and touched the right of the Seventh at Mercy-le-Haut. Its second line extended northward, and included the villages of Ogy, Flanville, Retonfay, Gras, and Sainte Barbe. The first line lay in Coiney, Montoy, Noisseville, Servigny, and Failly. Between these two lines there was an interval of only about a mile; and the whole of the first line was within range of the great guns on the outwork of St. Julien, occupying the summit of a mamelon. In front lay the foreposts, the field-watches, and the single sentries, within eight hundred yards of St. Julien. A continuous entrenchment was made by the Germans right round Metz. The roads were thickly set with rifle-pits. All the villages were roughly fortified by barricades and other obstructions, and the houses were loopholed for firing through. The foreposts lay either in single houses, strongly fortified, or in the fields behind earthworks. The field-watches chiefly occupied woods, or the gardens of châteaux, and, being always ready for action, were greatly relied on by the rest of the army. To the right of the First Army Corps was posted the Landwehr Division, consisting of three brigades, each six battalions strong, under the command of General von Kummer. This division covered the ground nearly to the Moselle on the north. General von Manteuffel was in command of the First Army Corps, and the chief executive officer was General von Pritsolwitz, who had charge of the second division of the corps, and whose quarters were in the little village of Puche.* The whole of the investing force, amounting to nearly 200,000 men, was under the command of Prince Frederick Charles.

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* *Daily News* Special Correspondent before Metz.

The fortifications before which this army was arrayed were of the most formidable kind. The greater part of Metz lies on the east side of a branch of the Moselle, which, following a rather serpentine course, forms, with other branches, and with the main body of the stream, the little islands of Chambière to the north-east, and Sauley and St. Simphorien to the south-west, of the town. Of these islands, Simphorien is the largest and Sauley the smallest. Chambière is partially covered by a large suburb of Metz. "The inner fortifications," wrote the Special Correspondent of the *Daily News*—a gentleman of military training, knowledge, and experience—"surround the town continuously, with the exception of one gap to the southward, which is covered efficiently by the branch of the Moselle which divides the islands of Sauley and Simphorien. On the north of the Ile de Chambière are two important forts on the inner line, one at the north-western angle of the *enceinte*, the other detached in the plain of the island, but connected with the *enceinte* by a covered way. On the south of the inner line are the Redoubt du Pâté to the east, and the Lunette d'Arcon to the west, both connected with the *enceinte* by a covered way. The western side of the inner line is covered by the great Fort Moselle, on the further side of the main stream of the Moselle—a double-crown work of immense strength and magnitude, inclosing great magazines and arsenals. To the south of it the bastion of Ile Sauley sends out a long spur of fortifications, which crosses the Moselle, and terminates in a redoubt on the further side. Nor is the eastern side of the inner line less strongly protected. In front of the *enceinte* looms the great double-crown work of Belle Croix, Cormontaigne's masterpiece, to the full as large as Fort Moselle, and more highly favoured by its natural position. To the south of it stands Fort Gisors, a minor detached fortification which serves to complete the circuit of connection with the Redoubt du Pâté on the south." Metz is thus surrounded by two lines of fortifications—the continuous *enceinte*, with its bastions, and what the correspondent terms the outer cordon of the inner circle, intimately connected with the outer line.

In addition to these works a circle of detached fortifications still further defies the assailant, being enabled to enfilade him, whichever point he may select for attack. Fort St. Julien, to the north-east of the town, is a work of great magnitude, covering the whole of the low summit of a natural eminence, and having on three sides a natural *glacis*. About a mile and a half south of this fort, and a mile east of Fort Belle Croix, is (or was) Fort les Bottes, composed chiefly of earth, and hurriedly constructed, probably in view of the war. A mile from Les Bottes, in an easterly direction, and situated on the great *chaussée* from Metz to Saarlouis and Saarbruck, just before it bisects, is the village of Belle Croix, a place distinct from the fort named after it, to which allusion has already been made. "About a mile and a half south of Fort Les Bottes, and about the same distance from Metz," continues our authority, "is Fort Queleu, also an important structure, dominating the main road to Strasburg and the adjoining flat country as far as the telegraph on the elevated ground before Mercy-le-Haut. Turning now westward, and inclining to the south, we come to Fort St. Privat, at a distance of about two miles and a half both from Les Bottes and Metz. Its value consists in the command it has of the eastern side of the valley of the Moselle, of the road from Nancy, and of the railway lines which converge behind it. Leaving it, we come to the Moselle again, this time on the south-west side of the town, and, striking up due north, we have nothing in the shape of fortifications till we climb the great hump, on the top of which stands Fort St. Quentin, the greatest outwork of Metz. It dominates the country to the south, south-west, west, and north-west. North-west of it, about a mile on the top of the bluffs, lies Fort Plappeville, or Les Carrières, the natural position of which is not so strong as that of St. Quentin, though it acts as a defence over a great tract of country to the west, and keeps a besieging force at a respectful distance. Due north from Metz, about two miles, and standing in the middle of the plain bounded by the Thionville Railway on the west and the Moselle on the east, lies Fort St. Eloy, the last and not the least important of the outworks of Metz. Its province is, in combination with St. Julien, to take care of the valley of the Moselle to the northward, and to dominate the great road to Thionville." These fortifications were heavily armed, and the French might well imagine they were impregnable to the ordinary operations of war. No fortifications, however, can keep out famine, and it was to famine that Metz at length succumbed.

Determined to await the issue quietly, the Prussians, as soon as they had made their positions sufficiently strong, confined themselves, for the most part, to watching, to occasional shell-firing, and to the repulse of French sorties. They seem to have led almost a jovial life, and to have beguiled the tedium of the investment in a variety of ways.



PLUNDERERS ON THE BATTLE FIELD.

There is in truth not much to be done in a siege such as that which the Prussians were now conducting, except on a few special occasions; and officers and men are obliged to tax their wits to kill time. The Germans before Metz kept up their discipline by a few military exercises, and from day to day the sub-officers of each battalion inspected, at a species of parade, the clothes and accoutrements of the privates. This was early in the morning. Then came breakfast; then visiting and beer-drinking; then reading and letter-writing, with intervals of smoking and sleeping; then dinner, which was made to spread over a very long time; and then a much-cherished *siesta*. The evenings were spent in card-playing, singing, and dancing; and at ten o'clock all were in bed. Such was the life of the officers. The soldiers, of course, had the rough work of the camp to perform, but it left them plenty of leisure for idling, and for such enjoyment as they could find or make. One important drawback, however, was the prevalence of disease. Some of the invading forces suffered severely from typhus, dysentery, and other complaints. Several of the villages became centres of pestilence, and the meat was often unwholesome.

Every now and then the French forts opened a hot fire on the German positions, and did a certain amount of damage, though less than might have been expected. On one occasion a cannon-ball from Fort St. Julien struck the back wall of a house in the village of Noisseville, passed clean through it, and fell in the open street, making an immense hole in the earth. The house was full of officers at the time, but, by an extraordinary chance, nobody was wounded, though one of the officers was half smothered by the fragments and rubbish of the wall. The fire from St. Julien was shortly augmented by a vigorous cannonade from Les Bottes, so that Noisseville, which had previously suffered a good deal, was almost entirely ruined. The church was greatly damaged, and the ground in the neighbouring fields was perforated with large holes, many feet in depth, by the falling shells. Other villages were also nearly destroyed, and the Prussians were sometimes obliged to shift their quarters.

The hostile armies, in their outermost lines, approximated so closely that they could distinctly hear each other's military bands and martial songs, and could even see small parties of soldiers going their rounds, or performing the ordinary duties of camp life. The women and children in the villages within the French fortifications were visible to the German troops; and the less important proceedings of the Germans must have been equally apparent to the French. The foreposts of the two armies often exchanged little civilities. One day, a Prussian mounted patrol left a note under a stone, addressed to the French officer in command at that point, asking if he could accommodate the Prussian forepost officer with a bottle of champagne. The champagne was supplied, and the donor asked in return for a little salt, which, of course, he received. Salt was greatly needed in Metz, and the want of it added terribly to the maladies of the townsfolk. These civilities, however, were not the only things exchanged between the foreposts. Sometimes there were collisions, and brisk interchanges of shots. A proportion of the Prussian troops were by this time armed with chassepôts. The superiority of that weapon to the needle-gun was thus admitted, and the Germans showed that they were not above learning from their enemy. In the town itself, matters were assuming a serious aspect. The Prussians having cut off the water from the side of Gravelotte, the inhabitants suffered a good deal from insufficient supply; and this added very greatly to the unhealthiness of the place, crowded as it was with wounded and with fever patients. The people also were depressed by their isolation. They could hear nothing of the outer world, except by some rare chance, nor could they communicate with their external friends and relatives, unless once in a way by the precarious means of balloons. When one of these was sent up, laden with letters, it always contained a paper, imploring the finder, whether friend or foe, to transmit the notes to their addresses. The balloons sometimes fell among the Germans, who were unable to comply with the request. Many attempts were made to send messengers through the Prussian lines with letters. Numbers of persons would club together, and offer very high rewards for this species of service, but in vain. M. Servier, the director of the Gas Works, advertised that he would give 500 francs to any one who should take a letter through the martial environment, and secure its transmission to Paris, and an equal sum to any one who would bring into the city any news of the rest of France. Other offers of the same kind were made, and some were accepted; but the letters thus sent never got through. The messengers were either killed or obliged to return; and one lay hidden in a village within the lines from the 1st of September to the day on which Metz was taken.

The idea of sending out balloons originated, as far as Metz was concerned, with Mr. G. T. Robinson, the Special Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, who, having been swept into the city with the retreating French army after the battle of Gravelotte, was unable to get out, though he made



PRUSSIAN MILITARY POST.

several attempts at the risk of his life. This gentleman—whose account of the siege of Metz, related from the point of view of the beleaguered inhabitants, is of the highest value—mentioned his idea to Lieutenant Bréguet, an officer belonging to a scientific corps, and a man of considerable attainments. He regarded it with great favour, and the two waited on General Coffinières, the commandant of Metz, who also approved of the scheme. "Our proposition," says Mr. Robinson, "was, firstly, to begin by building small balloons for the transport of letters, and then to proceed to the construction of a larger one, to be used first as a captive balloon, by which we could mount to a sufficient height to survey the enemy's doings in the valleys beyond us, communicating these by telegraph to our friends, and then fly away to some safe quarter with those despatches which the Marshal always said he so much wished to send." Mr. Robinson was introduced to Colonel Goulier, of the Military Engineering College, who gave his assistance, but was sometimes rather troublesome by his pedantic demands for scientific accuracy, which, under the circumstances, was impossible. Another assistant was Captain Schultz, the inventor of the mitrailleuse, who had himself conceived the idea of opening communication by balloons; but Mr. Robinson was the first to place the conception in a tangible form before the Government, and was therefore created "aërostatic commander-in-chief." He and his fellow-labourers had the greatest difficulty in obtaining the necessary materials for the construction of the balloons; but at length they succeeded, and the work progressed. The first balloon was made on the 4th of September; it was fashioned out of the ordinary white lining-paper used by paper-stainers, and, on being experimentally inflated with lighted straw, after the primitive method of Montgolfier (for the stock of coal in the city was too small to allow of gas being used), was found to succeed


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PRUSSIANS THRESHING CORN IN A FRENCH SCHOOL-ROOM.

extremely well. It was accidentally destroyed, however, and it became necessary to produce another. An office for the "aërostatic post" was opened; and on the 15th of September the first balloon was launched. It carried 8,000 letters, fastened in an india-rubber cloth, and accompanied by a notice, promising a reward of a hundred francs to any one who, finding the packet, and taking it to the nearest post-office, or to the Mayor of the commune, should there obtain a receipt for it. The balloon first went nearly due south, in the direction of Vesoul and Besançon, at the rate of about thirty miles an hour. Several others were then made, either of thin paper lined with muslin, or of cotton cloth, the ordinary "Manchester goods," of which there was then a fair stock in Metz. Both were inflated with atmospheric air, by means of a huge fan-bellows. The cloth balloon was made by Captain Schultz. It was heavier and stronger than those made of paper, and could therefore carry a greater number of letters. It took up a freight of 45,000; but, after rising to an immense height, it slowly descended, was fired at by the Prussians, and fell within their lines. The cause of this failure was never ascertained; but it had the effect of discrediting the captain, who was not allowed to make another trial, though, according to Mr. Robinson, his idea was a very good one.

Nevertheless, the aërostatic plan was not abandoned. "We still kept working away," says Mr. Robinson, "building paper balloons, improving each one, and ending by adding an hydraulic apparatus to serve as an automatic ballast, and so correct the too rapid ascent and the loss of gas by the sudden expansion thus created. This hydraulic ballast consisted of a flask holding about two litres of water; its neck was corked and turned downwards, and two glass tubes, a long one and a short one, were inserted in it. The long one admitted the air, the short one emitted the water, and the gradual leakage thus created corrected the sudden ascensional power of our balloons. To one of our balloons we appended a couple of carrier pigeons, with a notice attached to their cage offering a supplementary reward of another hundred francs for any one who would send them back with news of the outer world. Poor birds! their fate was pie. The balloon was captured by a distant band of devouring Prussians, who ate the pigeons, and sent us word back by a *parlementaire* that they were both welcome and tender; so we never despatched any more. I do not know if our postal balloon service with pigeon-postmen preceded any attempt at Paris, or if we at Metz may claim the invention of the idea." Some of the letters forwarded by Mr. Robinson fell into the hands of the Prussians, who sent them back to Marshal Bazaine; and the clever inventor fell into disgrace, as it was thought that his communications to the paper which he represented might reveal important facts to the enemy, though Mr. Robinson assures us he was always very careful on this point. The returning of the letters to the French commander afforded, in the opinion of the correspondent, "proof of the intimate accord which, even at this date, was existing between the head-quarters of the two armies, and one which, when added to other facts, corroborated the rumour that Bismarck and Bazaine were already haggling about the price to be paid for the army of the Rhine and the city of Metz. After this, days of waiting and weariness ensued. Often had we the balloon inflated, and no letters came. When the wind was unfavourable—that is, when it blew right for Prussia—we were told to send off a balloon. When it blew towards Belgium or Luxemburg we were not permitted to launch it. Annoyed by this evident intention merely to keep us employed for public amusement, but for no useful purpose, I gave up all further attempt to thus communicate with the outer world, and my last balloon was despatched at 3.30 on the 3rd of October. The affair terminated; and when I left Metz there yet existed several postal balloons quite ready, and some thousands of letters written to accompany them. More than 150,000 letters we did send off."

The grand project for constructing a big balloon, with a view to making observations, never came to anything. The cost would have been 14,000 francs. Prince Murat offered to pay a portion of the amount, on condition that he might be allowed to accompany Mr. Robinson after the machine had served as a captive balloon. The Marquis de la Motte Fenélon offered to pay another portion; but Marshal Bazaine would not listen to the scheme. According to the narrator of these facts, the head of the army had his reasons for not wishing the world to know much of his doings at Metz. He certainly had frequent communication with the Prussian military authorities. It is said that at first he asked to be allowed to issue forth with arms and the honours of war, on condition of not serving against Germany for three months. Of course Prussia was not likely to grant such a request in her position of command. Bazaine then asked for egress without arms, in order to go to the south of France. The answer was that only an unconditional capitulation could be accepted; and Prince Frederick Charles, at the same time, sent him the terms at Sedan as an ultimatum. Yet it seems pretty clear that, beneath the surface, something was being bargained for by both sides. The Special Correspondent of the *Daily News* relates that Bazaine was kept carefully informed of the progress of the Prussian arms in France, and that, whenever any important event took place, a *parlementaire* was sent forward with the news. One day the Marshal sent a request to Prince Frederick Charles for some papers, and files of English, German, and French journals were transmitted to him. After the battle of Sedan a French general officer was forwarded to the Meuse, that he might become acquainted with the results of the engagement. All these things are unusual in warfare, and seem to point to some secret purpose.

The victualling of an army in the field is always a difficult task; and the German army before Metz underwent a misfortune in this respect. A provision column destined for that force, and consisting of 192 wagons, was attacked on the 20th of September, at Königsmacher, on the Lorraine frontier, by a body of French soldiers. The wagons were escorted by only seven men of the Landwehr infantry—a very weak guard, considering that there were but few Prussian troops in that part of the country. The Landwehr men endeavoured to retreat; but the villagers joined in the attack, and barricaded the road with ploughs and harrows. The wagons, which were laden with bacon, bread, oats, and other provisions, were seized, and two of the escort captured. Only forty-nine out of three hundred wagoners made their escape to Trèves, with thirteen horses; the rest were forced to take the wagons to Thionville. Exploits of this kind had rather the effect of raising the spirits of the French than of doing the Germans any serious harm. The investing army before Metz was never troubled for want of food; it was the beleaguered army and the townspeople who suffered. Horse-flesh was largely eaten, and the price was regulated by the Municipal Council. Donkeys, and even mules, were killed for food. Milk, butter, cheese, sugar, and salt, soon disappeared; potatoes were sold at a penny each; and water was scarce and bad. Provisions after a while ran so low that any prisoners whom the French were so unlucky as to capture were always sent back, that they might not add to the number of mouths to be fed. At one time, in the course of September, a small body of French troops, of all arms, succeeded in getting away. They were about six hundred strong, and, by means of hiding in the woods as long as it was light, and marching after dark, they managed to reach Mézières. The fact was announced in Paris as an escape of Bazaine, and perhaps for a time was really believed to be such.



REQUISITION PARTY.

The news of Sedan was known in Metz as early as the 7th of September, on which day Mr. Robinson received a short note (by what means he does not explain), briefly relating the defeat of MacMahon, the capture of the Emperor, and the surrender of the whole army. Mr. Robinson immediately made the facts known; but they were discredited, and he himself was regarded with disfavour for circulating such monstrous statements. On the 11th a German newspaper got into the town, and it was found to contain intelligence of the terrible defeat on the Belgian frontier, the fall of the Empire, and the establishment of a Republic. Still the news was disbelieved, and set down as a device of the enemy. A brigadier of the Engineers, who had been a prisoner, and was exchanged, returned to Metz, and produced a copy of a French newspaper reporting the same events; but even then people generally refused their credence. The paper, which had but recently started in Paris, was unknown in Metz, and it was regarded as a Prussian forgery. At length, however, it became impossible to disbelieve the disaster any longer; and then the Orleanist sympathies of portions of the army, and the Republican leanings of others, were made manifest. According to Mr. Robinson, it was only the Guards who were decidedly Imperialist. The situation was felt to be very awkward. Bazaine maintained a dead silence; but General Coffinières issued the following grave, well-felt, and temperate proclamation:—

> "INHABITANTS OF METZ,—We have read in a German journal—the *Gazette de la Croix*—the very sad news of the fate of a French army crushed by the numbers of its enemies after a three days' struggle under the walls of Sedan. This journal also announces the establishment of a new Government by the representatives of the country. We have no other evidence of these events; but we are not able to contradict this.
>
> "In these very grave circumstances our only thoughts should be for France. The duty of each one of us, whether as simple citizens or as officers, is to remain at our posts, and to vie with each other in defending Metz. In this solemn moment, France, our country, is summed up for each one of us in the word METZ! that city which has so many times before successfully resisted our country's foe.
>
> "Your patriotism, of which you have already given such proofs by your care for our wounded soldiers, will never fail. By your resistance you will make yourselves honoured and respected, even by your enemies. The memory of the deeds of your ancestors will sustain you in the coming struggle.
>
> "The army which is about our walls, and which has already shown its valour and its heroism in the combats of Borny, Gravelotte, and Servigny, will not leave you. With you it will resist the enemy which surrounds us, and this resistance will give the Government time to create the means of saving France—of saving our country.
>
> "Metz, September 13th, 1870.
>
> "L. COFFINIÈRES,
> "General of Division, Commandant of Metz.
> "PAUL ODENT,
> "Prefect of the Moselle.
> "FELIX MARÉCHAL,
> "Mayor of Metz."

This proclamation was not issued without a violent protest against it by Bazaine, who desired that nothing should be said; but, after a stormy discussion, General Coffinières took his own course.* The result was that the army felt angry at not receiving any official information of that with respect to which the town was informed; and on the 16th the Marshal felt compelled to issue an order of the day, stating that, according to two French journals brought in by a prisoner who had made his escape, the Emperor had been interned in Germany after the battle of Sedan, that the Empress and the Prince Imperial had quitted Paris on the 4th, and that "an executive power, under the title of the Government for National Defence," had "constituted itself" in Paris. The names of its members were then given, and the Marshal continued:—"Generals, officers, and soldiers of the Army of the Rhine, our military obligation towards the country in danger remains the same. Let us continue then to serve it with devotion, and with equal energy defend its territory from the stranger, and social order against evil passions. I am convinced that your *morale*, of which you have already given such proof, will rise to the height of the circumstances, and that you will add new claims to the admiration of France." The announcement was a good deal criticised, and political factions of all shades of opinion started up, and reviled each other with the utmost heartiness from day to day.

But for these dissensions, dulness and mortification would have almost extinguished the Metzers. The people believed that there was no great force of Prussians around the city, and they could not understand why the army did not break through. Mr. Robinson is quite of this opinion. "As for the force we had," he writes, "it was more than ample at this time to have cut its way out in any direction. I myself saw, on the 15th of September, the returns of our available force. On that day we had 138,000 men, fit in every respect to take the field. Six thousand cavalry were then able to be mounted, besides having horses available for a large body of artillery; and I firmly believe that at this time the Prussian forces which beleagured us could not have brought anything like that number into the field. The rains had washed a large portion of the army into their mother earth; they died from dysentery and fever in large numbers daily. Personally I know that at this time at many points there were but little more than sentries there, and no force capable of making a resistance. I have been out at night with our *éclaireurs*, and seen only hundreds where we were led to suppose thousands existed. I have seen camp-fires lighted in the woods where no camps were, merely that their smoke might rise up, and impress us watchers in Metz with the awe of the numbers of our enemies which lay lurking in those woods around us." This account was confirmed by some statements made by the Vicomte de Valcourt in a lecture delivered in London on April 17th, 1871. The Viscount was on the staff of Marshal Bazaine, and was afterwards private secretary to M. Gambetta. He escaped from Metz with a despatch in cypher fastened by a top-dressing of gutta-percha into a hollow tooth; and he says that in passing through the Prussian lines he noticed with astonishment that the works of defence were nothing like so considerable as Marshal Bazaine had tried to convince his army they were. This gentleman is emphatically of opinion that Bazaine might have done a great deal more, had he chosen, but that he purposely withheld, in order that he might make arrangements in his own interest, and so become powerful enough to decide the future of France. This identity of view between Mr. Robinson and M. de Valcourt is certainly remarkable, and possessed of great weight; yet it is doubtful whether either of those observers was in a position for correctly estimating the strength of the Prussians round Metz. We have seen that their force amounted to nearly 200,000 men; and the *Daily News* correspondent—the best authority as to what was going on outside the city—represents their positions as very strong. The conduct of Bazaine is unquestionably open to grave suspicion; it has never been explained why he did not do much more than he even attempted; and his communications with the Prussians, and with the mysterious agents of obscure plots, are circumstances that do not speak to his credit. But it can hardly be doubted that the enemy held him in a vigorous grasp.

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* Mr. Robinson's "Fall of Metz," Chapter IX.

Though a good deal less was done than might have been anticipated, the French every now and then made sorties. On the 21st of September they broke out in force towards Thionville, to the north of Metz, at the same time making a feigned attack on Mercy-le-Haut, lying to the south-east. A heavy cannonade continued for four hours, and the fighting extended over several miles. Ultimately the French were driven back, after suffering considerable losses. On the same day some skirmishing took place in the direction of Plappeville, on the western side of the city; and a furious artillery duel was kept up for some time between the fortress of Queleu, occupied by the French, and the Prussian battery of Colombey. This was resumed on the 22nd, on which day another sortie occurred. The French, about one o'clock P.M., advanced in force on the village of La Grange-aux-Bois, lying some way to the south-east of Metz, under cover of a heavy cannonade from Fort Queleu, preceded by a shower of shells, some of which reached as far as Ars-Laquenexy, and damaged the church there. The attacking force consisted of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The Germans, having already reconnoitred the enemy from a good point of view, were thoroughly informed as to their composition and strength, as well as the direction they were taking. The French infantry were thrown into the woods round La Grange in skirmishing order, and occupied a line extending for about a mile to the Prussian right. The Prussians accordingly withdrew their outposts from the position they had been occupying, and, in retiring, fired with great effect from behind a series of breastworks which they had thrown up. Between the place at which they were first attacked and the place where their main supports were concentrated lay about half a mile of ground, every inch of which was obstinately contested. The roads were blocked by frequent and strong barricades of hewn trees; and these, together with the dense woods which covered the ground, so obstructed the French artillery and cavalry, that they were not able to act. Forts Queleu and St. Julien, however, poured an unceasing storm of shells on Mercy-le-Haut and Ars-Laquenexy. The German supports were stationed at the junction of the roads leading from Mercy and Ars. They comprised troops of all arms, and were posted in strong positions. At once assuming the offensive, and springing forward with great spirit, they opened a terrific fire on the French, and drove them back at a rapid pace. The woods for a time afforded the latter some protection; but when they got to the open ground, their losses were heavy. La Grange-aux-Bois was re-occupied by the Germans, and by five o'clock in the evening the French had been again forced within their own lines. They left some prisoners in the hands of the Germans, and otherwise suffered a good deal; while on the other side only one man was killed, and not more than fifteen were wounded.* These attacks kept the Germans constantly on the alert. At one point the men were under arms for more than thirty-six hours, with only short intervals for rest and food.

The sortie was renewed with still greater determination on the 24th. A strong body of troops was formed under the walls of Fort St. Julien. The infantry were again supported by artillery and cavalry, and they proceeded in marching order and in solid masses. Information of the movement was conveyed to the Germans by orderlies and by telegraph, and preparations were made

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* Special Correspondent of the *Times*.



THE PRINCE OF WURTEMBURG.

for immediate concentration. Shortly after two o'clock P.M. the firing began. The guns of Fort Queleu threw a large number of shells into the woods where the Prussians were stationed. Fort les Bottes also opened fire for the first time. A good many of the shells, however, passed over the woods, and fell in the meadows beyond. The roar of cannon was continuous on both flanks, and after a while the infantry were engaged at close quarters. Suddenly the mitrailleuses were heard. "The sound," says the Metz correspondent of the *Times*, "was as if a ship had let go her cable, and the chain was running out, making hoarse and grating music as it scraped through the hawsehole. The fire began to take effect, and we could see men falling on both sides. It was certain, as indeed



SKIRMISH IN THE WOODS BEFORE METZ.

the preparations at Fort St. Julien had foretold, that the real attack was being pressed on the Prussian left, in the direction of Thionville, and by Bazaine himself. It was towards that flank that the heavy body of troops which we had seen issuing from the left gates of Metz had taken their course, and, though part of the attack was at a distance of six miles from us, we could see the smoke and hear the sounds which told of heavy fighting. The guns on the French right which had threatened our own position were now silenced; but while the light lasted we could watch the clouds of smoke which burst in thick puffs from the French positions on the left, and they seemed to advance further and further into the Prussian lines. Later on, as the dusk fell, the flashes of light which broke from the now grey woods, and the louder roar of cannon, seemed to tell us that the Prussians had once more held their own, and were driving back the French under shelter of their forts. Fort Queleu was now ablaze with signal lights, and Fort St. Julien responded with similar fires; the meaning of them, of course, was known only to the French themselves." It was stated that the French were enticed into advancing well into the Prussian lines by a feeble defence; that they captured a provision train, and made some prisoners; and that the Germans then closed round, re-took the provision train, and captured 700 Frenchmen. Wiles of this kind were occasionally resorted to. On one occasion the Prussians made a show of retreating from before Metz, in the hope of drawing the French into a trap, but the latter refused to be duped.

On Sunday the 25th of September there was a grand review of the National Guards in the Place d'Armes in front of the cathedral. They numbered four corps, and, together with the volunteer artillery, mustered about 7,000 men. They were clad in blouses, but with distinctive marks, giving roughly the character of a uniform to the dress. Their arms were old-fashioned percussion muzzle-loaders, of various patterns, and very ineffective. It is said that there were plenty of chassepôts in store; but the National Guards were suspected of Republicanism, and were therefore neglected and discouraged by the military authorities, though very popular with the townsfolk.

A spirited affair took place on the 27th. The French sent a railway train, containing several infantry battalions, drawn by two locomotives, and accompanied by cannon and mitrailleuses, on the Saarbruck road as far as Crepy. The twenty or thirty pickets stationed there delivered fire; but the French got out of their carriages in rear of the pickets, captured 150 of the Prussians, broke their rifles, and set them free again. A desperate fight afterwards ensued with some Prussian reinforcements, especially in a convent which the Prussians had seized, but which was carried by the French with great slaughter; and also at the railway station. The French took a great many oxen, cows, and sheep, together with stores of sugar, coffee, hay, and straw, and regained Metz in triumph. Another raid, also with a view to getting in provisions, was made simultaneously. At the village of Colombey, where the Prussian foreposts were rather weak, three large chateaux were situated, in the upper storeys of which was a large amount of grain. The French seem to have been aware of this, and in the afternoon they advanced in considerable numbers, supported by the artillery of St. Julien, and followed by several empty wagons. The Prussian outposts being surprised, and not being in force, were obliged to fall back from Colombey; and the French, covering their operations by throwing tirailleurs into the woods and towards La Planchette, filled the wagons with grain, and despatched them back to Metz. Some Prussian artillery, however, soon came up, and shelled the French vigorously. The troops retreated under the guns of St. Julien, and out of thirty-six wagons only fourteen got within the fortress; the other twenty-two were seized by the Prussians, the animals which drew them having been struck by the projectiles. The losses in killed and wounded on both sides were but small.

While these things were going on at Crepy and Colombey, the 90th and 60th Regiments of the Line, belonging to the 3rd Corps, and acting under General Montaudan, attacked Mercy-le-Haut, and met with a determined resistance. The Prussians had barricaded the village, and loopholed the walls of a large house, from which they fired on the enemy. The French broke into the ground floor, where terrible slaughter took place; but, being unable to ascend the staircase, they followed the evil example of the Bavarians at Bazeilles, and set fire to the house, shooting down every one who appeared at the windows. It does not seem, however, that there were any women or children in the building. Attacks were also directed against Maxe, on the other side of the river, and Ladonchamps. At the former place stores were seized; but from the latter the French were driven out by Prussian reinforcements.

To protect themselves against these attacks the Germans set fire to several villages; and from that date until the time when Bazaine began to treat definitively for the capitulation of Metz, scarcely a day passed, according to Mr. Robinson, without the investing forces setting fire to some farm or village. By some authorities, however, it is alleged that the French were themselves extremely reckless in their proceedings of this nature; but there can be no doubt—for it is so stated by German writers—that it was part of the Prussian plan to render these raids impossible by burning the villages. "We took advantage of these excursions," says Mr. Robinson, "to enclose some fresh bit of green land, to add some little bit of food to our exhausted territory. Occasionally the Prussians would attempt to re-take the positions we had thus forced them from, but they never succeeded." By thus extending their circle, the French not merely increased their supply of fodder, but occasionally obtained a potato field. Between the Seille and the Moselle, the ground which the French had re-annexed before the sorties just described was very considerable. "Magny," says Mr. Robinson, "was evacuated by the Prussians so soon as an outwork we had commenced at La Horgne showed symptoms of becoming dangerous; and then we pushed our lines nearer to Augny and Frescati: thus we gained a large and valuable acquisition of cultivated ground, this being the market-garden quarter of Metz; and for a fortnight or three weeks after this we had vegetables for ourselves, and green fodder for our horses. On the left bank of the river we acquired, after some small struggles, the village of Moulins, and pushed out a line of earthworks across the valley formed by the brook here, giving us complete possession of Scy and Chazelles, and also preventing any attack by the Prussian forces marching down the ravine from Amanvillers and that fatal St. Privat. On the other side of Plappeville and St. Quentin, the village of Lorry and the wood of Vigneulles fell into our hands; after these we took possession of Woippy, from whence, running a line of entrenchments right across the plain by the Maison Rouge, and the farm of St. Eloy to the Grange-aux-Dames, we obtained a valuable increase of flat meadow land. There, making a tresselled bridge across the river, we connected our lines on this with those on the other side of the Moselle. Here our progress was slower and more contested; but we never ceased gaining something, and that gain, too, was effected with very little loss. Occasionally, of course, there would be a struggle; but our big guns, which, by this time, we had mounted on all our forts, swept a wider area for us, and the Prussians could no longer hold in force anything within that area."

The Prussians made great complaint of the French custom of firing on sentries and outposts, and at one time it was agreed between the two armies that this should not be done; but it is said that the French broke the agreement. On the other hand, it is urged that the French were provoked into doing so by the Prussian proclamation denouncing the Francs-tireurs as "traitors," and condemning them to instant execution. These troops, as far as he saw them in Metz, Mr. Robinson commends very highly. He describes them as fresh, healthy, clean, intelligent-looking men. They volunteered for outpost duty, and appear to have discharged it with resolution, courage, and quiet zeal. The German proclamation roused in them a feeling of the deepest ire. The insult of being called "traitors" added to their sense of natural indignation at the cruelty of the Prussian mode of dealing with such bodies of troops. It was determined to act with corresponding severity, and the war became one of bitter reprisals, and, as far as possible, of extermination. There can be no question that the Prussians did themselves a great injury with neutral nations by this injudicious and indefensible act of power.

Of personal adventures before Metz there were not many. An account, furnished to the *North German Gazette*, of the experiences of a soldier wounded in one of the battles in front of the town, is, however, interesting in its vivid realism. At daybreak, previous to the action, the commander of the regiment rode up, and briefly addressed his men. The camp-preacher followed, and the soldiers engaged in prayer. After alluding to the hunger and thirst which they suffered during the morning, the writer continues:—

"There! a blow in the breast, a tearing in the body, a fall with a loud cry and terrible pain; there I lay, one of the victims of this bloody day. My first sensation was anger at the blow, my second an expectation of seeing myself explode, for, judging by the sound of the ball, I believed I had a grenade in my body; then came the pain, and with it helplessness and falling. Oh, how frightful are those first moments! Where I was hit, how I was wounded, I could form no idea; I only felt that I could not stir, saw the battalion disappear from my sight, and myself alone on the ground, amid the fearful howling and whistling of the balls, which were incessantly striking the earth around me. With difficulty could I turn my head a little, and saw behind me two soldiers attending on a third, who was lying on the ground. Of what happened I can give no account, except that I cried for help several times as well as I could, for the pain and burning thirst had the upper hand. At last both of them ran up to me, and with joy I recognised the doctor and hospital attendant of my company. 'Where are you wounded?' was the first question. I could only point. My dress was quickly opened, and in the middle of the breast a bloody wound was found, which the doctor hastily bound. The balls still constantly whizzed round us; one struck the doctor's helmet, and immediately I felt a violent blow on the left arm. Another wound! With difficulty I was turned round, to look for the outlet of the bullet; but it was still in my body, near the spine. At last it was cut out. 'Is the wound dangerous?' I asked. 'I hope not.' 'Pray tell me the truth.' 'Not *very* dangerous, it is to be hoped;' and with the emphasised 'very' my hopes melted. They were going away—'The wound in the arm, doctor.' This, fortunately, was looked for in vain; the ball had merely caused a blue spot, and had sunk into the ground harmlessly. I extended my hand to the doctor, and thanked him, as also the attendant, whom I commissioned to ask the sergeant to send word to my family. The doctor had carefully laid me on my cloak, with my helmet firmly on my head, in order, in some measure, to protect me from the leaden hail. Thus I lay alone with my own thoughts, amid the most terrible fire, perhaps for an hour and a half. All my thoughts, as far as pain and increasing weakness allowed, were fixed on my family. Gradually I got accustomed to the danger which surrounded me, and only when too much sand from the striking bullets was thrown on my body did I remember my little enviable position. At last, after long, long waiting, the sanitary detachment came to me."

The writer then describes his lingering agony as he lay in a stable surrounded by other wounded, and attended by an old woman who did not understand German. None of the soldiers but this particular one understood a word of French; so that the narrator was obliged to act as interpreter for all, and found enough to do in his then weak condition. He was ultimately removed by railway into the Palatinate, where he slowly recovered. It is when brought in contact with individual suffering like this that we perceive the enormous misery of war, too often forgotten in the glare and picturesqueness of military actions.



UNDER FIRE.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Monotonous Days in Metz—Spy-hunting—Numerous Arrests in the Streets—Imprisonment of Innocent Persons—Career of Nicholas Schull, a Spy—Hitter, the Leader of the Metz Guerillas—Condition of the City—Affair at Ladonchamps—Perilous Expeditions—The Sortie of October 7th—Scene of the Operations—Fighting at Ladonchamps—Contradictory Statements—Advance of the French through the Valley of the Moselle—Fierce Struggle at Les Grandes Tapes—Polish Landwehr—Progress of the Sortie on the Left and Right Banks of the Moselle—Singular Effect in the Midst of the Battle—Difficult Position of the French—The Retreat—Charge of the Prussian Landwehr—Fight at the Château of Ladonchamps—Isolated Struggles—Bazaine's Alleged Design—Results of the Action—Hunger and Disease in Metz—Economising of Bread—Orders of the Authorities—The Food of the Townspeople—The Army Commissariat—Arbitrary Suppression of Newspapers.

Autumn wore on heavily at Metz. There was little to be done; there was less to be hoped; there was much to be feared. To calculate the duration of the food supply; to speculate on what Bazaine was doing, or meant to do; to build frail anticipations on the prospect of a relieving army, and to find them crumble into ruins; to make paper balloons, which, with their freight of letters, frequently fell into the hands of the enemy; to split into coteries, and wrangle about the future of France; to hunt down spies, to vex the Prussian outposts, and occasionally to engage in sorties—these were now the sole resources of the beleaguered citizens and army. The weather was often rainy and cold, and the spirits of the people were depressed by the sense of confinement and the monotony of existence. The Prussians were in no hurry; they could very well afford to let the Metzers wear themselves out. The Metzers fretted against the manacles that bound them, but fretted in vain. Every day brought the end nearer; yet still the way seemed long and wearisome. The citizens felt that they were shut up in a large prison, under sentence of being slowly starved; and they knew that their fate had been decreed by a Power which never faltered in its will or failed in its resources.

Spy-hunting was, perhaps, the chief resource of the townsfolk. Arrests were frequently made; in one week alone there were as many as sixty-six. People were seized in the streets, and sometimes so roughly handled that they would have been killed on the spot but for the interposition of the gendarmes. Several were kept in prison for days, and ultimately released on its being discovered that there was not the least evidence against them. A Mr. Hamilton, the English tutor at the Jesuit College, and the only resident Englishman in the town, was detained five days in gaol, whither he had gone to act as interpreter to another Englishman who did not understand French. A Dane who had fought on the side of France, and who was taken prisoner by the Germans, and afterwards exchanged, fell under the suspicion of the authorities for having rendered some small civilities to a Prussian captive at Metz. He was kept for ten days in the military prison, and then released, on the innocence of his intentions being made manifest. Other cases of the same kind occurred, and a great deal of hardship was suffered in this way. But it is certain that Prussian spies really did get into the city, and conducted their inquiries with astonishing boldness. The Prussian army has a regularly organised "Intelligence Department," and the disgrace of acting as a spy is lost in the credit of being connected with a branch of the military service.

One of the German spies had the misfortune to be caught, and, like Hart at Paris, he paid the penalty of his life. His name was Nicholas Schull; he was a Hungarian of high family, educated at Vienna, and acquainted with many parts of the world. While in the United States he had caused himself to be naturalised; and he served in Mexico as a partisan of the Emperor Maximilian, from whom he received the order of Guadaloupe. His career as a spy puts his conduct in no favourable light, even if we allow that the profession which he followed may be honourably pursued. It seems unquestionable that he took money from both sides, and it is therefore likely that he was a faithful servant of neither. Schull appears to have been one of those "citizens of the world" who interpret their superiority to national predilections as a license to prey equally on all people with whom they come in contact. In the early days of the war he was presented to General Ducrot at Strasburg, and, having described himself as a foe to Prussia and a friend to France, was engaged on secret service, and despatched in the direction of the German forces. After a time he returned with some information, and received 800 francs in German cash, to enable him to enter the Prussian camp. He seems then to have been employed by the Germans, for, on his arrest by the French, he was found to be in possession of a pass from Soleski, the Quartermaster-General of the army at Mayence, requiring the military authorities to let him go where and when he would; also, of the medal furnished by the Prussians to all members of the Intelligence Department, as a voucher. A thousand



UHLAN ATTACK.

francs in gold were likewise discovered on him, and he was surprised one night while surveying the new earthworks which were being thrown up by the French round Metz. He had for some time been free of both armies, and the French attributed their disasters at Weissenburg and Wörth to intelligence which he had conveyed to the Germans as to the numbers and disposition of the opposing forces. Be that as it may, there could be no doubt as to his unfaithfulness to the cause of France, and he was condemned to death by a council of war. "Schull," relates Mr. Robinson, in the work already cited, "heard his sentence without betraying any emotion, and demanded a council of revision with a calm tone, as though it were an ordinary request. This appeal—the right of all condemned to death in France—was immediately accorded; but it was of no avail. His sentence was approved of by the council of revision, and at five o'clock that Sunday morning, in a drizzling rain, his prison door opened for the last time for him. He ended his life stoically; he simply requested that he might be buried decently, and that a couple of prayer-books might be sent to his children, both of which requests were accorded him, and a simple stone in the Chambière cemetery marks his grave." Mr. Robinson gives some dates in connection with these transactions; but they are so confused and contradictory that it would not be worth while to reproduce them.

Of one of the German spies, the same writer records that he rode right through Metz in the uniform of a sub-intendant, "asking all sorts of questions about the supplies, and only betraying himself by inquiring where the bread for the army was baked—a question so needless for a commissariat officer to make, and which so utterly astonished the gendarme to whom it was put, that before he could reply the clever Prussian had read the history of the mistake he had made, and decamped. Orders were sent round to all the gates to let no sub-intendant out that night without strict



CHARGE OF HUSSARS BEFORE METZ.

examination, and those who found themselves in the town had to prove themselves to be themselves before they were allowed to join their quarters; but the spy was a great deal too clever for the gendarmes."

The affairs with Prussian outposts furnished plenty of excitement. One of the most daring leaders of the French guerillas was a man with the suggestive name of Hitter. He was a good shot, and used to bring down the Prussian videttes and sentinels with deadly skill. He used also to intercept convoys of provisions and forage, and ultimately he organised a regular body of sharpshooters for night service. A great deal of execution was done on a small scale, and Hitter became so popular in Metz that Marshal Bazaine offered to decorate him. The blunt patriot, however, said that if he was forced to accept the decoration he would wear it on his back, and very low down too; and the Marshal, of course, thereupon ceased to insist.

A few particulars as to the state of Metz about this time were given in the *Journal d'Amiens*, which derived them from a man who had just escaped from the town. They do not in all respects correspond with other accounts, but are worth reproduction, as presenting a distinct view of the case. The writer says, referring to the commencement of October:—

"The situation is extremely good. Bread costs 20 c. the half kilogramme, and wine 75 c. the litre. In the hotels a tolerable dinner may be had for 3 fr., and a good dinner for 5 fr., if you are somewhat of an epicure. Beef is very scarce, and only within reach of the wealthy. Horse-flesh is at a reasonable price, and is what is principally consumed; and I assure you that every one likes it and enjoys it heartily. It is called 'cavalry beef.' Mutton and pork are not scarce. Coffee, chocolate, sugar, haricots, and fruit are abundant, and have not risen in price. The Moselle furnishes good fish, both large and small, which form no small portion of the food of the place. The want of salt has been spoken of; there is no deficiency, since at the time of my departure every one was provided with it; but if the supply should fail there would be no difficulty on that score, as there is in Metz itself an inexhaustible salt spring. In passing through the streets of Metz no one asks you for alms. To sum up, provisions are not failing, and I presume, along with persons worthy of credit, that so far as they are concerned Metz may hold out for some months yet, without feeling a want of them. The army of Bazaine reckons at the present moment about 100,000 men,* resolute, ardent, and patriotic. The proclamation of the Republic was well received, and above all with great calmness. Bazaine has lost in all about 30,000 men *hors de combat*. The three days of the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August have given us about 15,000 wounded in all. Among these wounded we had about 1,000 Prussians. Small sorties are made daily, either to procure forage, which is wanting (as they only give a kilogramme of hay and half a kilogramme of oats daily for each horse), or to carry off a train of provisions, which often succeeds. The Prussians do not acknowledge their defeats and their losses; but I assure you I have often seen them. Two-thirds of the 15,000 wounded are able to rejoin their respective corps. We have lost about seven per cent. Owing to the want of surgeons, many have succumbed from delay in attending to their needs."

The Prussians occasionally endeavoured to re-take some of the positions which the French had seized in the course of their sorties. On the 1st of October they made a night attack on Lessy, and some severe fighting took place; but the French succeeded in retaining the position. The same day witnessed a singular affair at Ladonchamps. This was a position of importance to both sides, and the French determined they would secure it, if possible. The Prussians had seized on the old château at this place in the early days of the blockade; but the French now brought a field battery against it, and opened fire. To the surprise of the assailants, there was no reply. Several guns were visible, together with a sentinel; but nothing was done. In a little while, smoke rose from behind the château: the farm had caught fire, and, as the château itself was valued on account of its historical associations with the time of the Emperor Charles V., a rush was made to save it. A few musket-shots were then fired by the Prussians, but still no big guns. The Prussians evacuated the place, and the French entered; and it then appeared that the seeming guns were only portions of the trunks of poplar trees mounted on the wheels of broken carts, and that the sentinel was a lay figure. The fire of a mitrailleuse afterwards dispersed, with deadly effect, a group of officers who used to hold a daily meeting in front of the château, at a point on the road to Thionville; and next day, at two o'clock in the morning, two battalions of French infantry occupied the position. At eight o'clock A.M. the Prussians established a battery at Les Petites Tapes, and shelled the French, in the hope of driving them out of Ladonchamps; but the French battery at the farm of St. Eloy replied so briskly that the enemy was compelled to retire.

Mr. Robinson, from whom we have derived so much information with regard to the siege of Metz, and to whom all future historians will be equally indebted, relates that the French were always well informed of the exact position and strength of the Prussian batteries. They had plans of all of them, and these they obtained by the daring of men who devoted themselves to the task of observing the works of the enemy. Night after night they went forth, bearing a pocket compass, a pistol, and a poignard; and in secrecy and danger they did the work that was required of them. The knowledge thus gathered should have proved of greater service to the French than seems to have been the case; but there was some great mismanagement at head-quarters, which constantly counteracted the best arrangements of subordinates.

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* This appears to be understated.



CHARGING A BARRICADE.

The sortie of October 7th was the last effort on a grand scale made by the army of Marshal Bazaine. It is generally held to have been an attempt on the part of the French troops to cut their way through, and reach the fortress of Thionville, which was still holding out. Mr. Robinson, however, asserts that it was simply a great foraging expedition, undertaken with a view to obtaining some stores of corn which were said to exist at the farm of Les Grandes Tapes, situated in the centre of the wide alluvial valley of the Moselle, and almost equidistant from the Prussian batteries of Sémécourt and Malroy. The valley was traversed by the road to Thionville, and was in many places strongly occupied by the Prussians. The tract is about four English miles wide. On the west it is bounded by a range of heights; on the east, by a lower series of bluffs, on which stand the villages of Olgy and Malroy. At the bottom runs the Moselle. "Across this bottom, at the narrowest part," wrote the special correspondent of the *Daily News*, "lies a series of villages—the two Tapes and St. Rémy, with Maxe and Ladonchamps respectively slightly to the east and west front. More or less, there were Prussian troops in all these." The same gentleman gave some details which will enable the reader to understand more clearly the operations of the day:—

"In the bombardment of the two previous days, the position occupied by the batteries of German heavy guns was at Fremecourt, near the commencement of the rise of the hills some distance to the south-west of Mézières. To speak more precisely, they were stationed on the low heights of Le Horiment, on the rising ground behind which stands an observatory, which commands the whole plain. Marange, the head-quarters of the Prussian Third Army Corps, is considerably in rear of this position. These heavy guns belong to the State of Hesse-Darmstadt. But the Prussians made batteries considerably beyond Fremecourt. They had six field batteries midway between it and Sémécourt, and on the 6th they had pushed forward a seventh battery as far as Sémécourt itself. From these several positions the bombardment of Fort St. Eloy had been going forward, and also a shell fire into the village of Ladonchamps, some little distance nearer Metz than St. Rémy, on the line of railway. Till lately this village had been reckoned neutral territory; but on the 2nd of October the French had seized it, and established a battery in front of it. The village itself was burnt the same night by Prussian shells; but still the French retained the position, and the Prussian fire of the last few days had been partly directed to the dislodgment of the enemy from a position which was important, as the occupants of it could enfilade the whole front across the valley. On the 6th nearly a thousand shells had been thrown into Ladonchamps and the neighbourhood, and late in the evening the French had evacuated the shattered fragments of a once smiling village. The Prussians at once threw forward troops in its direction, establishing their reserves in its rear, and sending forward sergeants' parties to occupy it, and Grandes and Petites Tapes villages, to which its possession was the key. St. Rémy constituted the chief support, and here lay the 59th Regiment of the Landwehr. Maxe, close to the river and considerably in advance, was occupied by outposts sent forward from the 10th Army Corps, on the other side of the Moselle. The two divisions of the Landwehr stretched right athwart the valley from the bridge at Argancy, where they touched the 10th Army Corps, to near Marange, where they met the fifth; and to them was confided the duty of keeping the flat alluvial tract on the western bank of the Moselle."

Bazaine seems to have conducted his operations with great skill. The morning was very foggy, and under cover of the thick mist he made his dispositions so secretly that the Prussians were entirely ignorant of anything being on foot. When the fog lifted, a little past one P.M., his arrangements were almost complete, and the enemy was compelled to muster in hot haste to counteract them. The action, according to the *Daily News* writer, commenced with a strong assault directed by Bazaine against Ladonchamps. The place, as we are told by this authority, was occupied by only a very small force, consisting of a hundred men of the Landwehr; but they stood their ground with great steadiness. A numerous body of French infantry was poured into the place, and the artillery played upon it. The Prussian guns, however, replied from every available point round the valley. "On the right front," says the *Daily News* correspondent, speaking from the Prussian side, "the batteries at Sémécourt were hard at work, while the great guns at Fremecourt were sending shells at a low range right over Ladonchamps in among the advancing French. On the left, at Amelange, two other batteries were maintaining a semi-cross fire; and from the bluffs on the other side of the Moselle, between Olgy and Malroy, the Prussian field-artillery were also roaring."

The attack on Ladonchamps, however, was only a diversion; indeed, it seems doubtful whether there was any such attack at all, for, according to Mr. Robinson, the French were in possession of Ladonchamps from the beginning of October to the capitulation of Metz, in spite of numerous attempts on the part of the Prussians to drive them out, after the exploit related a short way back. The battery at Ladonchamps, we are told by this gentleman, did good service on the 7th in answering the Prussian guns, while the little battery at the farm of St. Eloy (the strength of which the Germans seem to have greatly overrated) helped to check the advance of the adversary. The contradictory statements with regard to Ladonchamps will probably take their place among the noted controversies of history; but, however the fact may have been, it is certain that the chief part of the day's fighting was in other localities. The Imperial Guards, who had done nothing since the great battles of August, came down from the hills of Plappeville, and several regiments of infantry, under the command of General l'Admirault, made their way through the woods to the left of the French line in the direction of Nassoy and Feves. These troops were supported by some few regiments from the sixth corps, and the whole advanced steadily into the valley. They encountered a very determined resistance. In addition to several fixed batteries, the Prussians were enabled to bring on to the ground a large number of field pieces, all converging on the French line of advance. Nevertheless, the attacking force continued to press forward with great resolution. The German shells dropped thickly among their ranks, but the soldiers pushed on without wavering. "Never fear, my lads," cried General Gibbon, "I'll serve as a bastion for you;" and he placed himself at the head of his brigade. In a few minutes he fell, mortally wounded; but nothing checked the ardour of the French. The rush of the Guards was irresistible; inch by inch the ground was won, and Les Grandes Tapes was at length reached. A picked body of seventy-five men of the 12th Regiment of the Line passed twice round the outworks to discover a point of vantage. Having found one, they leaped the trenches, followed by the Guards; and Les Grandes Tapes was in possession of the French. It was found to be occupied by Polish regiments forming the 58th and 59th Landwehr. Many of them fell on their knees before the French: those who did not were bayoneted. To raise the butt-end of the needle-gun in the air, in token of submission, was not considered sufficient; for the Prussian troops were accused of frequently resorting to this gesture in a treacherous spirit, and of firing on their adversaries as soon as they had got them at a disadvantage. The Germans, by the way, make precisely the same charge against the French, especially the Turcos. Perhaps it is true of both armies in special instances, and true of neither in a general sense. At any rate, in the struggle at Les Grandes Tapes, only those who sued for mercy on their knees were spared and taken prisoners. Some of these, on their way to the rear, encountered a priest of the Voltigeurs of the Guard. Being Roman Catholics, they begged his blessing, and, seizing the sacred image he wore round his neck, kissed it with fervour, "whilst, in broken French"—to follow the narrative of Mr. Robinson—"they told the tale of fathers borne from distant homes, of wives and children left behind them, of friends who had fallen by their side, and how that they were brought there to slay a people they loved by the will of a king they did not care for." The correspondent of the *Daily News* says that the battalion occupying Les Grandes Tapes refused to give ground, and was almost annihilated, the men standing with their backs to the wall and their faces to the foe. Les Petites Tapes and Rémy were also carried by the French, who, however, only obtained the mastery of the latter with great difficulty. The Landwehr stationed there would not fall back, but made a desperate stand in the street until driven out by force of numbers and by the terrible fire of the French artillery. As soon as they had gained possession of Les Grandes Tapes, the French began loading their wagons with forage; and, though the Prussians shelled them vigorously, they did not cease until they had got all they wanted.

In the meanwhile the Voltigeurs and Chasseurs pushed on, and carried an entrenched battery of twelve guns at Amelange. The 25th and 26th Regiments of the Line, after scouring the wood of Woippy, carried the farm of Bellevue, and obtained some minor successes; at the same time, the third corps, under General Aymard, created a diversion on the right or eastern bank of the Moselle by threatening the villages of Servigny, Noisseville, Mey, and Nouilly. This drew off some of the fire previously concentrated on the left bank of the river; but, at the best, the effect of the Prussian artillery was terrible. "At one moment," says Mr. Robinson, "the Prussian batteries at Saulny, Norroy, Sémécourt, Feves, Amelange, Mézières, Olgy, and Malroy—a semicircular line eight miles in length—were all converging their fire on the plain of the Moselle." Yet the French still advanced. At this period of the battle a very extraordinary effect was observed by Mr. Robinson. "A sudden stillness," he writes, "spread over everything; shots which had rung out and echoed down the valley when the work began were no more heard; the cannon flashed, and death came, but not a sound. Whether it was the heavy cloud of smoke which deadened the sound, or whether it was that the air, broken into all sorts of erratic currents, turned sulky and refused to convey a note, I cannot say; but this I know, that in the midst of all this devilry came a stillness perfectly appalling, and far more dreadful than the yell and hiss of shot and shell. Death did his work in awesome silence." For a long time the battle hung doubtfully; but suddenly, while the French were still advancing, according to the author just quoted, the signal for retreat was sounded. Reinforcements had not been sent up, and the assailants were unable to contend successfully against the masses of the opposing army. A certain amount of forage, however, was secured; but more might have been seized had there been longer time and a larger number of hands. Previous to the sounding of the retreat the French were in a very good position. They occupied the chain of villages stretching across the valley of the Moselle; their guns were enabled to reply vigorously to those of the Prussians; and, by their rapid and fiery movements in various directions, they had temporarily cut the enemy's lines at the weakest part of the circle, close to the river. But the Prussian artillery, firing from three sides of a parallelogram, made the situation of the French extremely painful. The numbers of the latter have been variously set down. One observer, on the German side, thinks they must have amounted to nearly 30,000; but Mr. Robinson, who had more immediate opportunities of judging, says they were only about 7,000. Looking to the extent of the operations in which they were engaged, and to their partial success, the latter calculation seems too low; yet the whole force was probably much less than that arrayed against it. Why Bazaine did not bring up reinforcements is unknown; but he may have thought he had sufficiently accom-



GENERAL VON HARTMANN.

plished his object. He himself conducted the operations, and was in the immediate front of St. Eloy when the combined attacks were made on Ladonchamps, and Grandes and Petites Tapes. The concluding scenes of the day were excellently portrayed by the *Daily News* special correspondent, who wrote:—

"The moment was a critical one. The Landwehr had all been sent forward against the villages, with the exception of one brigade that was in reserve. But the Tenth Army Corps had been crossing the pontoon bridge, and massing between the river and Amelange. Their general, von Voights, was in command of the day's operations, and he gave the order for several regiments to advance. It was a sight never to be forgotten. First came the Fusiliers, extending at a rapid run into skirmishing order, and covering the whole plain with their long thin lines; then the dense columns of companies of the Grenadiers. But all the



ENCOUNTER IN THE WOODS BEFORE METZ

work was not left for the infantry to do. The artillery left the villages alone, and concentrated their fire on the advancing columns of the French by the Moselle. Bazaine is singularly weak in field artillery, and the only reply was from the sullen sides of St. Julien or from the ramparts of St. Eloy. But the mitrailleuse venomously sounded its angry whirr, making the skirmishers recoil nervously as they crossed the line of fire, and tearing chasms in the fronts of the solid masses of which they were the forerunners. The artillery and the skirmishers were enough for the French. The dense columns staggered, and then broke. But when they had once got the village of Maxe between them and the Prussians, the French were obstinate, and would go no further. In vain the Prussian artillery fired on the villages, advancing closer and closer in alternate order of batteries. That battery in front of Grandes Tapes would not cease, and the French tirailleurs still lined the *chaussée* in its front. By this time it was nearly four o'clock. A shell disturbed a hare, which bounced from its form, and scampered across the battle-field right in a line with the gun-fire. The Landwehr men roared at the sight amid the dropping chassepôts, and, but for the restraint of the officer, I believe that several would have quitted the shelter of the entrenchments to go in chase. As we stood in this suspense, a Staff officer galloped along the front line with orders for a general advance to take the villages by storm. The advance, he told me, was to consist of four brigades of the Landwehr, with two brigades of the Tenth Army Corps supporting. In a few minutes more, the command came sounding along the line, and the men sprang from their cover, and went forward with that steady quick step so characteristic of the Prussian marching. The shells from the battery in front of Grandes Tapes tore through the line, the mitrailleuse and chassepôt bullets poured against it their leaden hail, but still the Landwehr, silent and stern, went steadily to the front. I have been under fire many times, but I never knew a more furious fire than that to which the centre of this line was exposed. General von Brandenstein, commanding the third brigade of the Landwehr, was shot down as he rode close to me, and several of his Staff were wounded. At length the entrenchments were reached, behind which were lying the shattered remnants of the 58th and 59th Landwehr. The fraternisation consisted in the cry of 'Hurrah Prussia!' and then 'Forwards! forwards!' and the line threw itself to its front in a run. The gunners from the battery, brave men and stubborn, had barely time to run round the corner before the Landwehr were upon them. The guns they left perforce. In the villages the French made a last stand; but it had been better for them that they had run away at first. The Landwehr, with less of the conventional warrior in them than the Line, are not so much inclined to give quarter as are the professional soldiers. With many a Frenchman that afternoon, the shrift consisted of a bayonet thrust."

A Landwehr officer told the *Times* correspondent that the Imperial Guards fought magnificently, and that the manner in which they retired was perfection. This writer also relates that "towards dusk the Prussians in the breastwork saw two strong columns of infantry march past within four hundred yards; they got the order to fire, when suddenly the Prussian infantry call sounded 'the retire' from this dark mass. A Prussian officer called out 'They are our own men; don't fire.' When about eight thousand yards off, a volley was fired at them from the Imperial Guard, who were retiring, and who composed this dark column. If the Prussians had only been certain of the troops before, very few of the Imperial Guard would have returned into Metz that night."

A correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* says that from one P.M. to four P.M. there was not an instant's relaxation of the heavy firing from St. Julien and other forts; yet, he adds, the storming French columns had been unable to make any breach in the German investing lines. This statement, however, must be taken with some qualification. The French made no *permanent* breach in the line of investment; but, as we have seen, they fractured it for a while. Nevertheless, they were, in the main repulsed by six o'clock in the evening, and the Prussians re-occupied the positions from which they had been driven out earlier in the day. St. Rémy was re-taken at the point of the bayonet about nine o'clock, in the execution of which task the 81st Regiment of the Prussians lost five officers and more than a hundred men. The French covered their retreat by as much field-artillery as they could bring to bear, and on their way back picked up many wounded men who had fallen in the advance. Darkness was now coming on. The fires of burning villages and farm-houses, and the broad flashes of the heavy guns, lit up the horizon with lurid brightness, or kindled with a sullen glow the heavy masses of smoke. At the château of Ladonchamps a desperate struggle took place between the retreating French and the pursuing Prussians. Mr. Robinson gives a very animated description of the fight, at which he was present, to the imminent danger of his life; and, according to him, it ended in the French remaining masters of the position. They had fortified the place with fascines and earthworks; but so desperate an attempt was made by the Prussian cavalry and infantry to get within the enclosure that for a time it seemed very likely they would succeed. The French soldiers (who were taken by surprise, the enemy having advanced singing French songs as a blind) got nervous and excited, fired at random from the thigh, and loaded and re-loaded their chassepôts with the utmost rapidity, but with a want of definite purpose. The timely arrival of another French regiment, however, decided the conflict in their favour at this particular spot.

Although the general tide of the battle began to turn at four o'clock in the afternoon, and the repulse was complete by six in the evening, the artillery fire of the French still continued to be very heavy as late as nine o'clock. Fort Plappeville, at that hour, threw a great number of shells out into the dark and open fields; and, in the opposite direction, a brisk musketry fire was still going on in front of Chieulles and L'Orme. The French, issuing out of the wood of Grimont, had been making a strategical attack in great force up the valley in that direction; and, though only a feint, it was necessary to meet it with vigour. The total loss of life on both sides was considerable, and several prisoners were taken by each army. Mr. Robinson affirms that the French "captured 800 of those various peoples the Prussians put forward to be killed or captured on all occasions;" but he believes that not a single soldier from Prussia proper was found amongst them. It must not be forgotten, however, that Mr. Robinson is rather bitter against the Prussians. Of the French prisoners, a German writer says:—"The unanimous reports of the prisoners captured to-day are most interesting. They assert that the discontent of Bazaine's troops has reached such a point that the men are determined to cut their way through, or die in the attempt; and during the last few days, it is said, there has been a great want of discipline evinced by the troops." The correspondent of the *Daily News* speaks very highly of the conduct of the Prussian Landwehr. He assigns to them the highest honours of the day. It was they, he says, who checked the rush of the French advance by holding the villages; and to them was entrusted the grand final movement which drove the enemy back. Though non-professional soldiers, they seem to have acted with the utmost coolness, and, being generally men of a massive build, and possessed of great weight and muscular power, their bayonet charges were irresistible. The Landwehr men fully warranted the confidence that had been reposed in them.

In the opinion of the *Daily News* correspondent, Bazaine, in conducting these operations, calculated on the Landwehr being inefficient troops, and it was therefore on their battalions that he concentrated his chief assault. He threw the masses of his trained professional soldiers against these amateurs, and hoped to break through their lines. This attack he supported by movements in other directions, with the object of preventing the Prussians sending reinforcements to the assistance of the Landwehr. The attacks on Vany, L'Orme, and Chieulles were designed to absorb the 10th Army Corps; that on Noisseville and Servigny was with a view to keeping the 1st Corps fully engaged; the sorties against Peltre, Mercy-le-Haut, and Ars-Laquenexy were to draw off the 7th; whilst the operations in the direction of Ladonchamps were to keep the 3rd sufficiently occupied. If the resistance of the Landwehr could have been overcome—and Bazaine might fairly have considered such a result highly probable—that portion of the French army engaged might have got away to Thionville, which is only ten miles off, and, after a brief rest, would doubtless have been able to reach the Dutch frontier, where a surrender to a neutral Power would have been far preferable to succumbing to the enemy. Had this design succeeded, Metz and a part of the army would yet have remained to confront the investing forces, and, as there would then have been so many the fewer mouths to feed, the prospects of famine would have diminished, and the chances of successful resistance have increased proportionally. The steadiness of the Landwehr, however, defeated the whole project, if, indeed, it was actually entertained. Mr. Robinson, as already stated, denies that there was any such design, though he is of opinion that the French might really have made their way to Thionville, if they had been reinforced. But, according to his account, the only object of the sortie was to get in provender, and this object was accomplished. The conflict, however, showed the Prussians to be even stronger than might have been supposed. The French were compelled to evacuate the position of Les Grandes Tapes, and the ground was seized by the Germans, who at once erected there a battery which so completely held the French in check in that direction that they were unable to make any other attack. This battery formed a connecting link between the batteries on the two sides of the valley, and effectually closed the road towards Thionville. The number of the French killed on the 7th was, according to an official statement of Bazaine's, 11 officers and 90 rank and file, while the wounded were respectively 53 and 981. The Germans state that two French battalions and three eagles were captured. It was a heavy price to pay for a quantity of forage; but matters had now come to such a pass in Metz that, in one sense, loss itself was gain.

After the action of October 7th (which has sometimes been called the Battle of Mézières, sometimes that of Sémécourt), no very important military operations were conducted by the French before Metz. A fight occurred at Failly on the 8th, but it ended in the repulse of the French. As the month wore on deserters became more numerous. One of these was brought in on the morning of October 11th; and the *Daily News* correspondent thus described him and what he said:—



CAPTURE OF A FIELD-GUN.

"He belonged to the 59th of the Line, and to the Army Corps of which Marshal Lebœuf has the command. His regiment, along with two others, is lying on the slope on which stands the village of Vauloux, a little behind Mey. He told us that his desertion was a matter of arrangement with a large body of the soldiery. Lots had been drawn who should make the first attempt, and, if the experiment succeeded, the others were to desert likewise. He dodged along the verge of the Bois de Grimont, and then came sneaking through the vine-bergs till he reached the Prussian field-watch behind Nouilly. I am told that many Frenchmen were observed watching his career. The man is an Alsatian—as are most of the men of his regiment—and he speaks German well. He says the men around Metz are tired of their lives. Nominally, the force to which he belonged lives under canvas; but the stench in the tents is so strong, by reason of cutaneous diseases among the men, that almost all sleep in the open air. This for the last two days has been tantamount to sleeping in a water-butt. The skin disease is chiefly of a scorbutic character, caused by the want of vegetables, the absence of salt, and the almost exclusive living on horse-flesh. The poor fellow's mouth and face were in a very bad state from scurvy. He says most of his fellows are similarly affected. The spirit of disaffection is almost universal; even the Guards are tainted with it. Since the defeat of the 7th they positively refuse to make any more sorties, and it is with difficulty that the officers can prevail on the men to go upon outpost duty. The service is very severe. Bazaine is a strict disciplinarian, and insists on his troops lying continually in immediate readiness for action. Of bread, the deserter says there is considerable scarcity, and the quality is bad; the quantity of rice served out is a tea-cupful per day between two men."

The same correspondent speaks of another deserter who had "the wolfish glare of absolute hunger" in his eyes, and who, "wet, dirty, half-rotten seemingly from scurvy, with puffed lips and hollow cheeks," seized on a meaty ham-bone which was thrown him, and fell to worrying it like a dog, in a way that made the on-lookers shudder.

The diminution of the stock of bread in Metz was an alarming fact. An order had been issued on the 16th of September, directing that all private stores of corn should be thrown into a common stock, that a definite sum should be agreed upon for the purchase of the commodity, and that a price should also be fixed for the sale of the bread. Yet, in spite of this decree, many holders of grain hoarded it, in the hope of getting famine prices. In the early days of the siege the commissariat officers placed before Marshal Bazaine a statement of the quantity of provisions in the town, and officially demanded a reduction of the rations; but to this the commander-in-chief would not at first agree. When he at length did so, a large proportion of food had been consumed in what, under the circumstances, must be regarded as culpable indulgence. The reduction then made was from 750 to 700 grammes of bread. It was effected secretly, without anything being said to the troops; but of course the difference was soon discovered. Soldiers, however, were still allowed to purchase extra food in the town; in consequence of which, General Coffinières, the Commandant of Metz, issued, a fortnight later, an order prohibiting the exportation of any food beyond the gates. The soldiers then made a practice of entering the town, eating as much as they desired, and leaving. This occurred so frequently that it was thought advisable to prohibit the soldiers coming into the town without a permit; and General Coffinières issued an order to officers in camp, requesting them to abstain from abusing the hospitality of the civil population. These things occurred in September: with October, the prospect became darker and darker. Flour fell short; it was forbidden that any should be used for other purposes than bread-making; and all the pastrycooks' shops were soon shut up. Bread was to be made of flour mixed with bran; and General Coffinières drew upon himself some little unpopularity by an order (dated October 14th) in which he disallowed the use of white flour alone. The bread thus made of the whole component parts of wheat—viz., flour and bran—was to be sold at forty-five centimes the kilogramme. "Each baker," said the order, "will receive daily a quantity of flour in proportion to the part of the population he is required to serve. The daily ration for each inhabitant or temporary resident is fixed at four hundred grammes for each adult, three hundred grammes for children between four and twelve years of age, and two hundred for children between the ages of one and four. These rations will be delivered by bakers upon presentation of a card bearing the stamp of the Mairie, and indicating, together with the name of the baker, the name of the person, and the number of rations which he is allowed to receive. It is forbidden to all bakers, other than those whose names are borne upon the card, to deliver any bread to the bearer of it; and it is equally forbidden to deliver any greater quantity than that indicated on it. The card, after delivery of the bread, is to be returned to the person presenting it." Unfortunately, there was so great a prejudice against brown bread that people would eat white bread a fortnight old, and at very high prices, rather than what they considered an inferior quality. At the same time vegetables almost entirely disappeared. Horse-flesh and bread formed the staple food of the people. For a while they got a little game and a little fish; but the danger of being shot by the Prussians when out hunting for game was great, and the fish in the Moselle were soon intercepted by the nets which the enemy spread for catching the bottles with false news in them which the French sent down the stream. Eggs rose to one franc each; sugar to nine francs a pound. Mr. Robinson says that the only actual suffering arose from the want of salt. "Horse-flesh," he remarks, "requires some seasoning to make it palatable day by day. All sauces had disappeared, and our food was chevalresque in the extreme." Some of the dishes thus made were, however, by no means bad, and the horse soup was generally excellent. Absolute famine, according to our authority, never existed. The only deaths from positive want of food were the voluntary deaths of a Jew and a Turco (the latter, of course, a Mohammedan), who expired of hunger rather than eat horseflesh, which their religions taught them to regard as unclean. The Turco had been wounded by a shell, and might have died of his injuries in any case; but the actual cause of his decease was his refusal to take the only form of animal food which it was possible to offer him.

The commissariat of the army was very badly managed. The soldiers were often left for a long while without rations; grain was frequently served out instead of bread, and the men were obliged to grind it any way they could—a state of things recalling the unroasted coffee-berries which were supplied to our troops in the Crimea. The towns-



THE KRUPP GUN.



GENERAL VON GOEBEN.

people were of course better off; but they suffered terribly from tedium, which was increased by the frequent suppression of newspapers, so that they had but little to read. The editors of these journals had been ordered to submit their proofs to General Coffinières before going to press; but afterwards the power of revision was exercised by Marshal Bazaine. He appears to have acted very arbitrarily. "What matters it where the Emperor is?" he is reported to have said. "*I* am Emperor at Metz." He strictly supervised, not merely statements on military affairs, but articles giving expression to opinions which he disliked. Mr. Robinson relates that the printing of the *Indépendant* was stopped at eleven o'clock at night, because the forthcoming number contained an article severely condemning the Prussian proclamation which described the Francs-tireurs as traitors, and threatened them with death whenever captured. The author of the article indignantly protested against the suppression, declined writing again under such liabilities, and threatened that, in a day not far distant, he would once more use his pen "to write history." The letter also was suppressed; but Mr. Robinson appears to have seen it, together with the article. It is no small part of the case against Bazaine that he showed this excessive tenderness towards the Prussians, whom he was nominally fighting. "Not an article could appear now," says Mr. Robinson, "wherein any word capable of offending them might be found." The word "Republic," however introduced, also secured the excision of the essay containing it. At length the journals retorted by suppressing everything that came to them from the military authorities, or by refusing to insert any communication with the word "capitulation" in it. Numberless sly hits were made at the Marshal, with that adroitness of inuendo in which the French are always so felicitous; and the town swarmed with secretly-printed pamphlets, not very complimentary to the powers that were. There was a great scarcity of paper in Metz at this time; and the journals came out in all shades of colour, from the brightest red to the deepest blue. The people, however, considered themselves lucky when they could get anything at all to read; and were equally compelled to be satisfied if they could obtain a meal of horse-flesh and a ration of brown bread.

CHAPTER XIX.

Progress of the Siege of Metz—Prussian Movement of the 12th of October—Outpost Skirmishes—Erection of Prussian Batteries—A French Raid—Herr Gregorovius on the German Camp—Exaggeration in that Account—Prussian Observatory at Mont St. Blaise—French and Prussian Positions—Desertions from Bazaine's Army—Attempt of Civilians to Escape—Works constructed by the French—Respective Cleanliness of the French and Germans—Want of Maps in Metz—Sufferings of the Horses from Failure of Forage—False Rumours—Intrigues in and out of Metz—Capitulation talked of—Marshal Bazaine and the People—Popular Demonstration before the Hôtel de Ville—Casting forth of the Imperial Eagle—Consultation of National Guards with General Coffinières—Approaching Exhaustion of the Food Supplies—Another Demonstration at the Hôtel de Ville—Address of the Municipal Council to General Coffiinières—Address of the Citizens and National Guards to the Army—Excitement among the Soldiers—Reply of General Coffinières to the Municipal Council—Despair of the Metzers—Wild Attempts at Independent Resistance—Signs of the Coming End—Surrender determined on by Bazaine.

In retaliation perhaps for the sortie of October 7th, the Prussians besieging Metz made a slight attack on the French during the middle hours of the 12th. The troops stationed at Retonfay were formed in military array by twelve o'clock, and, accompanied by baggage, &c., started for the scene of action. The front line extended to about half way between Colombey and Montoy, to the east of Metz, and two batteries of twelve-pounders, taking up position before the infantry, threw shells into the French camp before Grigny and Borny. A sharp fire was opened by the foreposts; but the French retired, and got under shelter as well as they could. Very little came of the affair, the object or intention of which is indeed not very plain. When the demonstration had nearly ceased, as far as the Prussians were concerned, the guns of St. Julien began to fire with great energy, and, about two o'clock in the afternoon, half a French battalion issued out of the village of Mey, and proceeded on to the slope of the hill below Noisseville. So small a number of men could of course do nothing, and the soldiers seemed very unwilling to advance, notwithstanding the frequent encouragement of the officers. The movement was so weak that the Prussian foreposts did not think it worth while to fall back on their supports; but when the French, having come up to within about three hundred yards, delivered a straggling volley, the Germans replied from their entrenchments with a very hot fire, before which the French retreated. The Prussian loss was only two men killed and three wounded.*

Outpost skirmishes of this nature occurred almost daily; but being of slight consequence, and attended by hardly any results, they did but little to relieve the dulness of the investment. The French appeared to be quite indifferent to waste of ammunition, for a great discharge of shells from the forts regularly took place every afternoon. The object was, possibly, to prevent the erection by the Prussians of the batteries with which they were gradually encircling the town; but, if so, the design was unsuccessful. The batteries steadily progressed, and were of a very formidable character. They were mounted with twelve-pounder brass guns, throwing shells of between twenty-three and twenty-four German pounds' weight. "These batteries," wrote the Special Correspondent of the *Times*, on the 17th of October, "are simple earthworks, surrounded on all sides by rifle-pits and trenches. Each battery has ten guns mounted on it. The batteries in the first line occupy good positions, but not good enough to shell the town of Metz. The Prussians have now resolved, for the present, not to attempt to go further then they are, and will drop their shells into the French camps stationed round and about the villages of Grigny, Borny, and others, which they can very easily do from the positions they now hold. The batteries in the second line are laid out in the same manner; they command several of the military roads coming out of Metz; therefore, as a Prussian artillery officer said to me, 'We are now quite prepared to meet the French on the same terms that they met us at Gravelotte,' referring to the rifle-pits and trenches; 'only,' he went on to remark, 'they had not these.' pointing to the twelve-pounders." By that time the Prussian outposts were so thickly studded in all the villages about Metz, for an area of about twenty miles, that, as the same writer observes, it would have been difficult for a mouse to have come out without being perceived by one or other of the German sentries. As the autumn advanced the Prussians got into their winter quarters, and the sickness which had been prevalent began to abate.

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* Special Correspondent of the *Daily News.*


METZ
Malroy
Woippy
Amanvillers
St. Privat
St. Marcel
Mars la Tour
Doncourt
Jouaville
Batilly
Habonville
Abbéville
Valleroy
Moineville
Labry
Conflans
Tronville
Vionville
Puxieux
Gorze
Chambley
Hagéville
Dampvitoux
Domartin
Charey
Rembercourt
Xammes
Thiaucourt
Regnieville
Noméni
Pont-à-Mousson
Norroy
Lorry
Corny
Coin
Marly
Pouilly
Fleury
Vigny
Silly
Louvigny
Pournoy
Verny
Cherisey
Solgne
Aube
Luppy
Béchy
Ancerville
Remilly
Sorbey
Courcelles
Jury
Peltre
Mercy
Ars Laquenexy
Borny
Grigny
Montoy
Flanville
Noisseville
Servigny
Failly
Vany
Charly
Antilly
Ennery
Argancy
Chailly
Vrémy
Vry
St. Hubert
Aboncourt
Bettange
Avancy
Ste. Barbe
Sanry
Nouilly
Retonfay
Glattigny
Landonvillers
Silly
Courcelles Ch.
Thimonville
Tragny
Vulmont
Moncheux
Eply
Arry
Chérisey
Lessy

MAP OF THE COUNTRY ROUND METZ.

Nevertheless, there was still for some time a rather high per-centage of men off duty from ill-health, and in the low-lying districts of the valley this was particularly the case. Dysentery, ague, typhus, and rheumatic fever, were the ailments that did the worst mischief, and in some places fifteen per cent. of the men were disabled from these causes. The troops did duty for three days in the first line, for four days in the second line, and for six days in the third line, returning after the thirteenth day to the first line. Sometimes very dramatic incidents occurred. "The French one day," says the *Times* correspondent, "sent out some Prussian sick and wounded in a train, and the next day the identical train again came out; but this time, instead of being filled with sick and wounded, it was filled with healthy French troops, having with them two mitrailleuses, who sprang upon the Prussians like wolves, taking them altogether by surprise. The Prussians, however, showed fight, but the odds were too great against them. The French made their way back to the train—first of all setting fire to the village of Peltre—taking with them three officers, two of whom died in Metz from their wounds, and one hundred men." The Prussians afterwards blew up the railway bridge to prevent a repetition of the affair. It cannot be questioned that the French exhibited a good deal of energy and address in these sudden irruptions; but when they resulted in the taking of prisoners, the advantage of them was more than doubtful.

The Prussians every day obtained a firmer hold of the surrounding country, and the excellence of their arrangements was made increasingly manifest. Herr Gregorovius, giving an account of a visit he had paid to the German camp before Metz, wrote:—

"At head-quarters at St. Barbe I found the musketeers' band playing in the churchyard over the graves of old Lorrainers, and close by the newly thrown-up hillocks of many a brave comrade. It was a strange scene. A number of soldiers stood listening by the churchyard walls, and three little girls, perhaps the only ones remaining in the village, formed a ring, and danced in careless wantonness, as children do in Italy when music resounds. The band of the 43rd still take about with them the dog, harnessed to the kettledrum, which they took from the Austrians at Sadowa. This vigorous and sagacious animal is named Sultan. At the end of the performance it stepped proudly forward with its drum, and was caressed by many of the soldiers. About 8.45 the trumpeter blows the retreat; the village then becomes still. Except the attendants, not a man is astir. Orderlies, however, dash to and fro, and the password is heard. During the pouring rains of August and September, our troops suffered much discomfort, being encamped in the open field in straw huts. They are now better quartered; they have barracks, or substantial latticed huts, or sleep in the houses of the neighbourhood. Their health is good, though dysentery and typhus not seldom crop up. In no war was an army better nourished than is ours in France. The Germans have more than 600,000 men in this unhappy country, the blooming manhood of the whole Fatherland—a national levy such as no single people has ever before collected in a hostile country; yet all these thousands of robust men and their horses are abundantly fed. It is said that MacMahon was astonished by nothing in this gigantic war so much as by the uninterrupted rations of the German army. When, on my journey, I saw all the roads covered with endless provision columns, I was constantly asking myself whence could come all those wagons, horses, bales, sacks, chests, and packages, which nobody could count. An army of officials appears necessary to manage all this, and all the 600,000 men have daily enough. The practical mind of the Germans, which abroad was taken for a misty idealism, has nowhere been more strikingly displayed than in the elaborateness of their military organisation and their complete commissariat and administrative arrangements. Even the telegraphs and the post-office are as settled in Lorraine as at home. In every village is seen the signboard with the Prussian eagle, and post-wagons before the door of the station. The so-called 'love-gifts' came also to the various corps. Towns and districts sent their own trains of wagons, laden with food and other necessaries. Those messengers of love, the Mercuries of charity, unite the army with their distant home, the warrior with the people and civilians. At Cheuby, gentlemen from Königsberg arrived one day with presents, and I could thus, after a long absence from my native province, and within sight of Metz, drink beer from Königsberg, or eat cheese from the rich valley of Elbing. Wine is scarce in Lorraine, and the dear stuff sold by sutlers is a nauseous concoction. The Johanniter provided us with capital wine from their depôt, and they administer much of it to the sick and wounded."

The statement of Herr Gregorovius about "the uninterrupted rations of the German army" is not quite accurate. It has been shown at p. 75 of this History that the provisioning of the troops broke down for some time after the battle of Forbach, that the men were almost without food and other necessaries for two days, and that the horses had no forage. Even later than this, the Hessian troops suffered greatly from defective commissariat arrangements, as related at p. 227. The general success of the Germans gave them unusual advantages, and the "uninterrupted rations" were in many cases due to the simple fact of the conquerors living on the enemy's country. It is very certain that the Germans lost no opportunity of vaunting their unparalleled military virtues, and it is equally obvious that they were extremely well served on the English press. At the same time, it is undeniable that the organisation of the German army was really excellent in a general sense—a triumph of intelligence and energy. All that need be said with reference to the excessive pretensions of German patriots and English special correspondents is, that that organisation, however admirable, was not the absolute miracle of perfection they would have us believe.

One of the means by which the Prussians kept a watch on the doings of the French at Metz was a sort of observatory erected on a high peak near the village of Corny, called Mont St. Blaise. At the summit of this mount (which is to the south-west of Metz) are the ruins of a castle and the buildings of a lonely farm-house; and in front of the latter the Prussians erected a wooden look-out post, open towards Metz, and mounted with a powerful telescope. An officer was constantly on duty there, with his eye to the telescope, and no movement could occur without his noting it. A set of telegraph wires from the head-quarters of the different army corps converged in a little office in the rear, and enabled the observer to communicate at once to all the divisions of the investing force any action which the French might show a disposition to take. The post was occupied by two officers, who had at their disposal a detachment of soldiers to act as orderlies, messengers, &c. The positions of the French and Prussians on the south and west of Metz, as observed from this outlook on the 18th of October, were described by the *Daily News* correspondent, who said:—

"Opposite Mercy-le-Haut the French are in force in front of Grigny, from which position they burnt the remaining houses of Peltre. Working westward, the French foreposts are in Bevoye, Magny, in front of Montigny, and thence across the Moselle, at Moulins-les-Metz, which was burnt about a fortnight ago. From Moulins the forepost line runs up towards St. Hubert, between St. Ruffine and Chazelles; hence in front of Scy through the valley close under Mont St. Quentin to Sessy, and thence northward with a slight sweep allowed by Plappeville to Devant-les-Ponts, and thence to Vigneulles and Woippy. Fair play demands that, having detailed the French forepost line, I should be equally precise (as I am fortunately able to be) with regard to the Prussian foreposts which confront them. Beginning then in the same latitude and longitude as I did as regards the former, the Prussian foreposts stand at Peltre, and thence westward in front of St. Thibault, and in La Papeterie (opposite Magny). Then there is a sweep comparatively close to Metz, as the Moselle is neared, and the Prussian foreposts stand impudently at Frescati, whence the sentries must be able almost to discern the complexions of the gunners in St. Privat. The line crosses the Moselle to Vaux, considerably in front of Ars-sur-Moselle, and then makes a dart forward to Jussy, right under the guns of St. Quentin. Tongeau, where there is a battery of 12-pounders, which blazes into Scy and Chazelles, right under the nose of St. Quentin, continues the chain to Chatel St. Germain, a place which I visited on the 19th of August, the day after Gravelotte, when the dead lay in heaps in the little village, and where already General von Göben had thrown up entrenchments to cover his foreposts from the shells of St. Quentin. Across the plateau and the wood of Chatel run the links of the strong forepost chain, giving a wide berth to the big guns of Plappeville, behind Lorry, to Vigneulles, from Vigneulles to Saulny, from Saulny, still further north-east, to Villers-le-Plesnois, and so by Norroy to the bloodstained Ladonchamps, and the villages whose names are known in connection with the combat of the 7th inst., to the Moselle at Maxe.

"So much for the positions of the two hostile armies in this portion of the investiture. A few words now as to the position of the French inside their outposts, yet outside the town of Metz, the gates of which are sealed to Bazaine's army as rigorously as is the road to liberty. The French have in all, in the environed space and outside Metz, four great lagers or camps. The first and probably the largest is on the slope of Mont St. Quentin, looking towards Mont St. Blaise. I could see a row of tents athwart and athwart the slope, past the village of Scy, and stretching almost down to Chazelles. Another great camp begins at Longeville, a village on the west bank of the Moselle, in a line between St. Quentin and Metz; and this lager straggles up the river margin first to St. Martin, where Bazaine has his head-quarters, and so on to the north as far as Devant-les-Ponts. A third great camp is in front of St. Julien, towards Vauloux, Vallieres, &c. The fourth camp is around Corny and Grigny. Besides these camps of soldiers there are two great collections of sick, which I could discern with great ease through the telescope of the observatory. One of these is placed on the esplanade in front of the cathedral at Metz, and along the river brink. I saw the sick being carried about on stretchers, and the curtains of the tent looped up to give air to the inmates. Another great sick camp is on the Island of Sauley, the whole of which seems devoted to the purpose, and I learn that efforts are made to isolate the place as much as possible. It is one huge block of typhus fever. Here the fell epidemic is housed, or rather tented; and I could see the sentries stationed on the bridges, and bidding stand all and sundry. Lebœuf's head-quarters, I should mention, are at Longeville."

After the middle of October there were so many deserters from the French lines that it seemed as if Bazaine were endeavouring to get rid of his army piecemeal, in the hope that the garrison would then be better able to hold out on the small remaining stock of provisions. When these deserters came singly, they were received by the Prussians for the sake of the information they could give; but those who arrived in large bodies—sometimes amounting to fifty at a time—were sent back, under threat of being shot, as the design of the French in permitting their escape appeared obvious. It was remarked that they were never fired upon by their comrades when making their way to the enemy's lines; so that the complicity of the authorities seems a very natural inference. The fugitives were frequently drunk when they reached the Prussian outposts; and it was thought that they were primed for the attempt by being provided freely with strong liquors. Many soldiers, and even officers, also placed themselves in the way of being taken pri-



ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

soners whenever an opportunity offered; and the civilians seem to have envied them this privilege of release. Towards the end of the month a very affecting incident occurred. One rainy day, the Prussian foreposts saw a black mass advancing out of the city. It was at first thought that another sortie was on foot; but as the mass drew nearer it resolved itself into thousands of men, women, and children, who were evidently desirous of escaping from Metz. Orders were at once given to the foreposts not to allow them to pass, and, if they attempted to do so, to fire on them. One man, advancing a little too near, apparently as an envoy, was shot. The rest were seized with a panic, and stood still. A woman then put herself forward, with a white pocket-handkerchief fastened to a stick; but the Prussians opened a sharp fire, aiming over the heads of the crowd, who turned round and fled back to Metz. The woman still advanced very courageously, until, seeing herself deserted by the rest, she also joined in the retreat. A Prussian officer observed, "They will now go back and say, 'What terrible barbarians



BEFORE METZ.

those Prussians are!'" And very probably the remark was really made. It is of course not to be expected that the investing army should have permitted such a wholesale exodus from the city it was endeavouring to starve out; but some parleying might surely have been allowed, some warning might have been given, before resorting to the deadly persuasion of the needle-gun, where the enemy was a crowd of miserable civilians, women, and children. The *Daily News* correspondent, speaking on official authority, says that warning was really given, but that the leader and the women seemed to be maddened with drink, and continued to press forward, so that it became necessary to fire. Mr. Robinson, however, asserts that the Prussians actually drove the people out of some of the small villages, and forced them into Metz, firing at them when they returned, and wounding several.

Again reverting to the interior of the French lines, and regarding the state of affairs there by the aid of Mr. Robinson's observations, we may contrast with the foregoing description of the opposing outposts an account of some works constructed by the French during the progress of the investment. Mr. Robinson says:—

> "Outside Metz—just beyond the Porte Serpenoise, and close to the railway station—was established, in the early days of the siege, a camp of refuge; a sort of rendezvous for those detached fragments of regiments who were separated from their companions by the three great battles of August. It served also as a collecting ground for soldiers who had been left behind to form the guard which protected the retreat. Here, their duty done, they reported themselves, and remained until the precise location of their regiment was known, or until they could be drafted into other regiments to make up those skeletons which had left their flesh behind them on the fields of Borny, Rezonville, and Gravelotte. It might have been expected that in such a camp all would be disorder and confusion, but there was neither here; and never was the handiness of the French soldier more brought out than in this camp, which would in any other army have been one of idleness. Having no regimental duties to perform, all the soldiers here were well employed on other works. Firstly, it was found that this was the weak side of the town. The fort of St. Privat — not that St. Privat where the battle was fought, for that is eight miles away as the crow flies, and twelve miles away by road; but this St. Privat is about two miles without the town, and the fort there, though marked on the maps, was then scarcely commenced, and was never finished during my stay. Strong, then, as this side looked on paper, it was in reality weak, and a considerable portion of the troops thus collected were employed in erecting a formidible demi-lune uniting the Redoubt du Pâté with the Lunette d'Arcon, thus covering more effectually the hitherto weak Porte St. Thibault.
>
> "Under the direction of a most energetic commandant, this work was rapidly and well executed, and in a very short space of time extemporised casemates were constructed; three or four pieces of twenty-four were mounted, some smaller pieces placed in position, and the camp was well protected. Not only was this done well and quickly, but almost immediately some twenty large ovens were constructed, in which some six-and-thirty thousand rations of excellent bread were baked every twenty-four hours. There were field ovens provided in great store when the army first took the field, but where they now were no one could tell. In the confusion which ensued on the ill-advised and badly executed concentration of the troops on Metz they were lost. Nothing daunted by this, the ingenious commandant and his handy men had found at the neighbouring railway station a considerable quantity of rails. Trenches were dug in the ground. The bottoms were paved with bricks and quarries, and the sides and roofs constructed with this railway iron; furnace-doors were fitted to the fronts, and the whole covered up with earth; and most excellent ovens were thus made. Large tents were erected at the mouths to protect the men at work at them from rain and cold; larger tents joined on to these where the process of making the bread was performed, and in the rear huge stores were built for the reception of the clean fragrant loaves. Day and night these ovens never stopped; they were never out of repair, and even on the few last days of the siege there was yet a fire and a loaf to be found in this camp. Many a pleasant hour have I spent there with the highly intelligent officers who utilised this otherwise lost labour; and never did I once hear a question asked without a prompt answer being given, and that answer was always kind and concise. This camp was a little industrial colony, and formed a pleasant relief to the monotony of a regular regimental one. Its officers always lived there. A small tent, with a camp bed, a camp table, and a camp stool, was their home during the whole of the siege; a wooden shed their mess-room, their kitchen the open air; and rare indeed was it that they could be persuaded to dine in town. But then they were not of the Guard, nor was there any one higher in rank than a newly-made commandant there—a rank the English equivalent of which is major; and the officers here were gentlemen by birth and education."

The same writer denies, as a general rule, the alleged profligacy of the French officers, and he remarks on the personally clean habits of the French soldiers, and on their singular handiness, though he admits that the camps are kept in a horrible state of dirt. Of the Germans, judging by the prisoners he saw brought in, he gives a bad account. They seemed to him to be total strangers to the practice of washing; and he broadly hints that they were covered with vermin. It is instructive to contrast the very opposite accounts of the two armies given by the *Daily News* correspondent and by Mr. Robinson — the one reflecting the broadest German, the other the most vivid French, sympathies. Only by this comparison of diverse views, this correction of one personal bias by another, can we arrive at anything like the truth. It must be admitted, however, that Mr. Robinson does not hesitate to speak in plain terms of the shortcomings of his friends—a fact which certainly gives great general reliability to his evidence. He affirms, with an expression of just surprise, that "at Metz, the head-quarters of the engineering and artillery schools of France, a sufficient supply of maps of their own immediate district was unobtainable. Maps of Germany existed in plenty; but the map of the *état major* for the country round Metz had to be reduced by photography, and supplied in very limited numbers to the artillery, whilst each battery of the German army had a small and beautifully executed map of the district round Metz supplied in ample quantities at the outset—the distance from crest to crest of every hill figured, and the elevation of each hill correctly given. These little things win."* It was in such things that the French were wanting, and they paid the penalty in almost invariable ill-success.

All this while the food was steadily running down, and the inevitable capitulation was becoming more and more manifest. Forage for the horses had long since disappeared, and the sufferings of the poor animals from the direst pangs of hunger were terrible to witness. They died in large numbers from this cause, and it was a mercy when they were saved from lingering agonies by being slaughtered for food. The misery of brute animals, consequent on acts which they are in no way able to control, which they are even incapable of understanding, and which they often endure with a dumb pathetic patience, is among the saddest mysteries of life; and it was to be seen on a large scale in Metz during those failing days of ineffectual resistance.

The press did the best it could to keep up the spirits of the people. A number of the *Indépendant de la Moselle*, published in October, contained an article in which it was stated that the diminution of rations and the appeals of the authorities to the inhabitants had placed the Government in possession of a mass of provisions, and that therefore no anxiety as to the continuance of the siege need be felt. The readers of the paper were assured that all France was rising, that the Prussians could only march at night, that the Francs-tireurs were attacking them in the Vosges, and destroying the railways and roads, that a powerful party in Germany demanded peace, and that the peace negotiations would undoubtedly be successful. The outside world of course knew that the greater number of these statements were ludicrously incorrect; but it is assuming too much to say that they were deliberately false. A country in the condition in which France then found herself, with communications destroyed, and a hostile force in possession of a large part of her territory, is necessarily the prey of rumours which she desires to believe, and is not able to examine.

Nevertheless, despondency had by this time settled down on the Metzers, and it was not relieved in any degree by the Marshal at the head of the army. He occupied a château at Ban St. Martin, and before the gates stood two mitrailleuses, which were said to have been placed there for his protection from the popular fury and from the discontent of his own soldiers. Mr. Robinson says they were only there for the exhibition of some improvements; but at any rate there they remained, and it is very certain that the Marshal was generally suspected and disliked. He never showed himself to his troops; he never addressed to them any cheering words. In the seclusion of his house—a pleasant dwelling, screened with trees—he smoked, played billiards, and sent messengers all over Metz for *pâté de foie gras*, to be obtained, if possible, at any cost. Even the ambulances where the wounded lay were unvisited by him. The story of Bourbaki's journey to England was obscurely known in Metz, and people did not augur well from it. Now General Boyer was away visiting Count Bismarck at Versailles, and it was generally agreed that some treacherous design was being hatched. Boyer was described as a creature of Bazaine's, and his actions were regarded with the greatest suspicion. Just previous to his departure (which was on the 12th of October) an inquiry was made by the leading military authorities as to whether the troops would surrender or not, and the commanders of the various corps were required to state their opinion on the subject in writing, as well as giving personal explanations. On the written replies being sent in, it was held that some of them were not sufficiently Imperialist, and these were sent back for alteration. A council was called for the 10th of October, when the capitulation was first openly discussed. Gloomy accounts of the state of the provisions and of the health of the army were put forward, and it was even proposed to surrender at once. General Coffinières stood out for another sortie; but he was overruled. The capitulation was evidently a foregone conclusion, and the end was nigh at hand.

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* "The Fall of Metz." Chapter XVII.



A FORAGING PARTY.

Some strange rumours of French successes at Paris, Nancy, Luneville, and elsewhere, began to circulate among the people of Metz; and on General Coffinières saying that he had no information on the subject, Marshal Bazaine himself was appealed to, and replied that he had not received any confirmation of the statements in question. He added an assurance that nothing was hidden from the inhabitants of Metz, and begged them to believe in his loyalty. "The Marshal," continued this notification, "has always communicated to the military authority of Metz the German and French journals which have fallen into his hands. He profits by this occasion to assure them that since the blockade he has never received the least communication from the Government, notwithstanding all his attempts to establish relations. Whatever may come, one thought alone ought at this moment to absorb all others—the defence of the country; one cry alone should issue from each heart—'Long live France!'" This document was dated "Ban St. Martin, October 11th, 1870." It did not at all reassure the Metzers. They were quite in the dark as to what "Government" the Marshal meant. They felt uneasily apprehensive that they were about to be handed over to the enemy; and they formed a Committee of Defence and determined to request General Coffinières to take the active command of the place, and make a final effort to cut through.

Some of the objectors to Bazaine's conduct even went the length of addressing to him a letter commenting very freely on the Marshal's inactivity, and protesting that they (the writers) would not be sold like sheep; and this letter was widely circulated. Bazaine took no notice of it, and the days passed sullenly by. Tired of endeavouring to influence their military chief, the people, on the 12th, made a demonstration before the Hôtel de Ville while the Municipal Council was sitting. The crowd burst into the council chamber. They required of the Mayor that he should demand of the Commandant that the town and forts should be placed in the hands of the people, or at any rate that the National Guards should be amalgamated with the garrison. The Mayor and council promised to take the matter into serious consideration. At this moment, the people outside, who had observed the gilt eagle in connection with the tricolour hanging from the central window of the building, exclaimed, "Down with the eagle! We have had enough of eagles. Away with them—down with them!" Presently another wave of the populace forced its way into the council chamber. "Don't you hear?" cried the new-comers; "don't you hear that the people won't have the eagle any more on the flag?" The Council at once assented to the popular demand. "Open the window, and throw it down," they said. This was at once done, and the crowd was pacified. Several officers of the National Guard, in the meanwhile, went out at the back door of the Hôtel de Ville, and sought the quarters of General Coffinières, close by. They told the general that the town was in a state of ferment, owing to a belief that Marshal Bazaine was already treating with the Prussians for the surrender of Metz. They asked if *he* had any intention of capitulating, and if he recognised the Government for the National Defence. Coffinières replied that he would never surrender the town which had been confided to him, and that he should consider himself wanting in patriotism if he refused to assist the existing Government. This answer gave general satisfaction.*

On the following day however (the 13th) General Coffinières stated, at a meeting of the committee appointed by the Municipal Council to watch over the state of the provisions, that there was only food for three days' rations left for the army, and that in six days more the town would be reduced to the same condition. The minds of the people, therefore, he added, must be accustomed to the fact that Metz must capitulate. After the general's speech of the day before, this statement seemed almost incredible, and, indeed, it proved not to be correct. Another demonstration at the Hôtel de Ville took place in the evening. The Municipal Council assembled to concert an official address to General Coffinières. This was not agreed upon until ten o'clock at night. A large crowd of people waited outside the building, and, as the sky was cloudy, and Metz was now entirely devoid of gas, they stood, or paced up and down, in almost complete darkness. Occasionally, a little flickering moonlight would struggle forth, touching the delicate tracery of the old Gothic cathedral, or bringing out the massive proportions of the Hôtel de Ville; but for the most part the square was so dark that the citizens could only distinguish each other's position by the low sound of their voices. Suddenly the portico of the Hôtel de Ville was lit up; a gleam of lamp-light widened down the broad central staircase; the people were permitted to enter; and from the upper stairs, in the increasing light, came a procession of burghers, headed by the Mayor. They paused at the bottom of the flight of steps; and, in the midst of a motley crowd of National Guards and civilians, who

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* For these and other details of the last days of the siege of Metz, we are indebted to Mr. Robinson's "Fall of Metz."



TRYING THE ENEMY'S RANGE.

listened in profound silence with uncovered heads, the Mayor then read, by the light afforded by two lamp-bearers, the following address to General Coffinières :—

"General,—The step taken by the officers of the National Guard has been inspired by their serious resolution to associate themselves energetically for the defence of the town. The garrison, to whom the defence is entrusted, may count upon the ardent rivalry of a population incapable of weakness when the time arrives. The united efforts of both will guard, even to the last extremity, the principal fortress of France and the nationality of Metz, both of which we hold most dear. The Municipal Council, being the interpreter for the whole city, cannot avoid expressing its grievous astonishment at the tardy knowledge which you have given only to-day of the resources on which you can count for the maintenance of the place. The people, in submitting to the consequences with courage, will not accept in any form the responsibility of a situation of the approach of which they have had no warning, and of which they have had no knowledge. We beg you, General, to make known to the Marshal this expression of our sentiments, which we sum up in the cry of 'Long live France!'"

With frequent repetitions of that cry the people separated.

An address to the army was afterwards circulated by the citizens and National Guards, the signers of which said they came to offer to the troops their fellowship in defending the threatened independence of the country. They were convinced, they said, that the military would receive the offer with pleasure, and that they would join in opposing the idea of capitulation. "The honour of France, and its flag, which you have always defended with such inimitable valour"—thus the address went on—"the glory of our maiden city, and our obligations to posterity, impose upon us the stern duty of dying rather than renouncing the integrity of our territory. We will shed with you our last drop of



OFF TO THE WAR.

blood; we will share with you our last crust. Let us rise as one man, and victory is ours. Long live our brothers of the army! Long live France, one and indivisible!" It is impossible not to honour the spirit which dictated these words; but it is equally impossible to avoid seeing that this dependence on undisciplined enthusiasm is one of the great faults of the French character, and a fruitful cause of their disasters, both military and political. Mere fervour counts for little in a world where the conditions of success depend much more on organisation, system, and correct appreciation of facts. A wild outburst of frantic and disheartened soldiers, of half-instructed National Guards, and of civilians utterly ignorant of the realities of warfare, could have done absolutely nothing against the trained and serried masses of the German regiments. It may be that earlier in the siege Bazaine might have torn his way through; it may be that in the end he could have succumbed more heroically. But the possibility of success had passed with the deepening days of autumn, and nothing but surrender now remained.

Whether this address had much effect in the army does not precisely appear; though, as several officers were arrested shortly afterwards, and as it was found expedient to close the town gates at four o'clock P.M., so as to lessen the amount of intercourse between the military and the civilians, it is to be presumed that some degree of excitement was created among the former by the exhortations of the latter.

General Coffinières attended the Town Council on the 14th, and read the following reply to the address of the Mayor and burghers, voted on the previous night:—

"The Municipal Council of Metz have favoured me with an address, in which they express their noble and patriotic sentiments. I hasten to thank them for this expression, which has not surprised me, for I have never for a moment doubted of the active co-operation of the inhabitants of Metz with the troops who are now called upon to defend our fortress. They can also equally trust that we shall energetically fulfil our duty. All that can possibly be compassed by human aid will be done without hesitation. But I beg you to announce to the inhabitants that in order to attain the desired result we must needs be circumspect, and maintain all the presence of mind which belongs to people firmly determined, come what will, to remain united, and to avoid anything which has the appearance of want of discipline, tumult, or useless manifestations. More particularly we must abstain from any discussion or disagreement as regards politics, for politics have a most damaging influence, and can only destroy that harmony which is necessary to all of us.

"There is in existence at the present moment a Government *de facto* in France, which has assumed the title of the Government of the National Defence. We must recognise this Government, and wait the conclusions which will be formed by a constituent Parliament elected by free and open vote throughout the whole country. In the meantime we must unite in the one common rallying cry, which you yourselves have raised—'Long live France!'

"You tell me that the inhabitants have been deeply grieved to learn that our resources, as far as provisions are concerned, are very limited. It could, however, have been easily surmised that, after a civil and military population of more than 230,000 souls have drawn their means of sustenance from so small a town as Metz during two whole months, only feeble resources would remain of which we could avail ourselves. Moreover, I have never made any secret of our present position. The reduction of the army rations, the steps that have been taken as to the limitation of the rations for the inhabitants of the town, the different orders which have been issued so as to place the bakers under our control, and my different interviews with the Mayor and other inhabitants, have given ample proofs of the continual exhaustion of our stock of provisions. It is useless to give way to any regrets or reproaches for things which have passed and gone by, or to seek to hold one person or another responsible for what has happened. Let us therefore boldly look our present position in the face, and, as you most wisely say, let us accept the consequences with energy, and with the firm resolve to make the best of the situation we possibly can.

"L. Coffinières,
"General of Division, Commandant of the
"Fortress of Metz."

It was by this time generally believed that Marshal Bazaine and General Coffinières were on such bad terms that they had ceased to have any communication with one another. The absence from the Commandant's address of any allusion to the Marshal, and the recognition by Coffinières of the Republican Government at Paris, which Bazaine was known not to favour, gave countenance to this supposition; and the appearance of serious dissension between two sections of the defence cast additional darkness on the final days of French dominion in Metz. Grief, and apprehension, and fitful accessions of a sort of despairing hope, combined to make the people delirious. Mr. Robinson says that the wildest schemes were listened to patiently, and discussed as though they had been reasonable. A strange hysterical excitement seized upon the town. Men wept in the streets; traders, whose desires in happier times seemed to be bound up in money-making, exhibited a fervid patriotism that was unquestionably genuine. A deputation from the National Guards sought an interview with Marshal Bazaine, and spoke to him very plainly. Several private citizens also went to him, and



UPON THE RAMPARTS.

offered, if he would allow them a sufficient escort, to go forth with money, and obtain supplies at any risk. The Marshal refused, and no doubt rightly, as such an expedition had not the slightest chance of success. The people then again went to General Coffinières, but with no effect. L'Admirault was next appealed to, but he would only promise that, if some one else could be found to take the lead he would serve under him. Other generals were tried, and some progress was being made, when the return of General Boyer from his consultations with Bismarck was announced.

He did not bring back any formal agreement; but Bazaine, at a meeting of the Council of War on the morning of the 18th of October, said he was the bearer of news that France was in a state of anarchy. Rouen had demanded a Prussian garrison to maintain order; the army of Lyons was annihilated at Orleans; and Bismarck had said, "I occupy France with 1,300,000 men, and I make no peace excepting with a Regent. Make Bazaine Regent if you will; but only with a Regent can peace be made." There were those in the Council who cried "Long live Bazaine!" But to many the reported state of France seemed improbable, and they required some proofs that the alleged facts were true—proofs which were not forthcoming. The Marshal, fearing that the desperate men in the army and the town were forming associations with a view to some independent action, held out hopes of another sortie; and as late as the 25th it was believed that something was about to be attempted. But on the previous evening the surrender of the city had been finally determined on, and it soon became manifest that the continuance of even passive resistance was only an affair of hours.

CHAPTER XX.

Preparations for the Surrender of Metz—Bazaine and Coffinières—General Changarnier and Prince Frederick Charles—Interview of the German and French Commissioners at Château Frescati (Oct. 25th)—Resumed Negotiations (Oct. 26th)—Final Arrangements as to the Capitulation (Oct. 27th)—Abstract of the Protocol—Marshal Bazaine's Address to the Army—Order of the Day of Prince Frederick Charles—Effects of the Surrender—The Marching Out of the Imperial Guard—Disarming of the other Troops—Excitement at Metz—Bazaine's Life Threatened—Address of Coffinières—Gloomy Appearance of the City—Insubordination of some of the Military—The Popular Grief and Agitation—Proceedings of the Germans—Spread of Infectious Diseases—Departure of Bazaine—Amount of Food in the Town—Proclamation of the Delegate Government at Tours—Address of M. Gambetta to the Army—The Charge of Treachery brought against Bazaine—Various Statements and Opinions on the Subject—Bazaine's own Statement—Letter from Bazaine's Brother—Disposition of the Prussian Forces—Appendix to the Protocol of Capitulation—Anticipated Results of the Capture of Metz.

Almost up to the last moment General Coffinières desired to make another attempt to break through the Prussian investment; and on the afternoon of the 24th a civilian spy brought information to the Germans that an irruption in force was to be made during the night in the direction of Gravelotte, with a view to forcing the enemy to make prisoners, so as to enable the garrison to hold out a little longer on the small remaining stock of provisions. By seven o'clock in the evening, however, Bazaine had succeeded in convincing Coffinières that, even if successful, such an attempt would only postpone the capitulation for a few weeks, at a great sacrifice of life; and accordingly a messenger was sent to Prince Frederick Charles, intimating an intention to surrender. This was the first proposition which included both the fortress and the army of Bazaine encamped outside. All fear of a sortie being now at an end, the German troops, which had been quietly massed towards Gravelotte, received orders at midnight to retire to their camps. Bazaine, whether rightly or wrongly, had fully made up his mind that further sorties were useless, and that Metz must speedily succumb. The despatch in cypher which Viscount de Valcourt carried with him in a hollow tooth when he escaped from the city, and which was addressed to the authorities at Tours, is said to have run thus:—"I must give up Metz in a day or two. Make peace as soon as you can.—Bazaine, Marshal, &c." On the 25th of October the Marshal communicated to the Council of War that he had received a despatch from General Boyer, stating that the Empress would not accept the Regency. Bazaine added that, as Bismarck had now refused to separate the fate of the town from that of the army, nothing remained to be done but to endeavour to get the best terms possible, and to accustom both soldiers and civilians to the idea of capitulation.

General Cissy was then sent to arrange a meeting between the head-quarters of the two armies. The only point discussed with this officer was as to whether the French should be allowed to march out with bands playing, colours flying, and the "honours of war." Prince Frederick Charles is stated to have refused the honours, but to have said that they might do as they liked about the bands. General Changarnier next had an interview, by appointment, with the Prince. The conversation lasted about an hour and a half, but it led to little result. Changarnier wished to obtain for the soldiers the privilege of returning to their homes and families; but of course such a request could not be granted, and it is surprising that so old and experienced an officer should have thought of making it. Although the general had been in Metz ever since he went there, on the 8th of August, to offer his services to the Emperor, and although he had taken part in some of the sorties, he had no separate command, but he was officially attached to Bazaine, and seems in this matter to have acted with authority. He was led blindfolded from the French outposts to the German headquarters, and so back again. At the conclusion of the interview he was almost heart-broken, and said, with a flood of tears, "We shall fall, but with honour. I wish, gentlemen, that neither you nor any brave soldier may ever experience this." It is asserted, however, that he obtained one concession, which was that a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, as representatives of the army, should leave Metz with bands playing and flags flying, and depart for Algeria; but Bazaine did not care to avail himself of the permission. On regaining the French lines, Changarnier saw some people gathering potatoes in a field, and delivered to them an eulogium on the German soldiers. So, at least, says a German writer.

It was arranged at the meeting between General Changarnier and Prince Frederick Charles that the Prussian officers, General Stiehle and Colonel von Herznurg, the Chief of the Staff and Quartermaster-General of the Prince's army, should ride over to Frescati, a château three miles due south of Metz, and just within the German lines, and should there arrange the preliminaries of the surrender with Marshal Bazaine and General Coffinières. The interview lasted from six to seven o'clock in the evening, and at its close a good many points were still left in dispute. To the Prussian Chief of the Staff the French authorities seemed intractable and obstinate, and he left with a feeling of discouragement. So certain, however, were the Germans of the imminent fall of Metz—even before the discussion of the terms with Marshal Bazaine and his colleague—that the Second Corps received marching orders for Paris at noon on the 25th, and was on its way early in the evening. At night, however, troops were concentrated on the nearest accessible points to Metz, to prevent desertions in mass from taking place, supposing the French commanders to be still inclined to make any such attempt at prolonged resistance. Moving masses of soldiers covered the roads and fields; but the French took no steps. The villages occupied by the Prussians were brightly lit up; bivouac fires were burning in all directions; and during the earlier hours of the night a magnificent Aurora Borealis—the same which attracted so much notice in England—added its shifting and ethereal splendours to the general brightness.

The negotiations were continued on the following day, the 26th. At the request of Marshal Bazaine, Generals Stiehle and Wartensleben had an interview at Frescati, extending over three hours of the afternoon, with the French Commissioners. A good deal of discussion took place on several matters of detail, and it was found necessary to telegraph to the Prussian King at Versailles for specific instructions. At first the interview was stormy on the part of the French Commissioners. They insisted on the officers retaining their side arms; and the King, on being referred to, conceded the privilege in a telegraphic despatch which arrived at three A.M. on the next day. Early on the morning of that day (the 27th) the conference was resumed, and lasted until eight o'clock at night, when a draught was signed for the absolute surrender of Metz and all its fortifications, armaments, stores, and munitions, together with the garrison and the whole of Bazaine's army, consisting of three Marshals (Bazaine, Canrobert, and Lebœuf), sixty-six generals, more than 6,000 officers, and 173,000 men. The material prizes falling into German hands through this extraordinary capitulation were 400 pieces of artillery, 100 mitrailleuses, and 53 eagles. In addition to the leading points of the surrender, the draught stipulated that the French troops should be conducted, without arms, by regiments or regimental corps, in military order, to some place to be afterwards indicated by the Prussians; that the French officers in command of the men should, after their arrival at this place, be at liberty to return to the entrenched camps, or to Metz, on giving their word of honour not to quit either place without an order of permission from the German Commandant; that the troops, after surrender, should be marched to bivouac, retaining their personal effects, cooking utensils, &c.; that the French generals, officers, and military *employés* ranking as commissioned officers, who should engage by written promise not to bear arms against Germany or to agitate against Prussian interests during



GENERAL OBERNITZ.

the war, should not be made prisoners, but should be permitted to retain their arms, and to keep their personal property, in recognition of the courage displayed by them during the campaign; that the French military surgeons should remain in the fortress, to take charge of the wounded, and should be treated according to the rules of the Convention of Geneva, and considered as being attached to the hospitals of Prussia; that all questions of detail, such as might concern the commercial rights of the town of Metz, and the interests and rights of civilians and non-combatants, should be considered and treated subsequently in an appendix to the military paper of capitulation; and that any clause, sentence, or word used in the draught of arrangement, the reading of which might present a doubt as to its exact meaning, should be interpreted in favour of the French people. The



ATTACK ON AN ADVANCED FRENCH POSITION.

German Commissioners at the final meeting, as on the previous occasion, were Generals Stiehle and Wartensleben; the representatives of the French army were General Jarras, Marshal Bazaine's Chief of the Staff, and Colonel Fay and Major Samuele on the part of General Coffinières, the Commandant of the fortress. On the completion of the preliminaries, Marshal Bazaine issued the following address to the Army of the Rhine:—

> "Conquered by famine, we are compelled to submit to the laws of war by constituting ourselves prisoners. At various epochs in our military history, brave troops, commanded by Massena, Kleber, and Gouvion Saint-Cyr, have experienced the same fate, which does not in any way tarnish military honour, when, like you, their duty has been so gloriously accomplished, to the extremity of human limits. All that was loyally possible to be done in order to avoid this end has been attempted, and could not succeed.
>
> "As to renewing a supreme attempt to break through the fortified lines of the enemy—in spite of your gallantry and the sacrifice of thousands of lives, which may still be useful to the country, it would have been unavailing. On account of the armament and of the overwhelming forces which guard and support those lines, a disaster would have been the consequence.
>
> "Let us be dignified in adversity; let us respect the honourable conventions which have been stipulated, if we wish to be respected as we deserve to be. Let us, above all, for the reputation of our army, shun acts of indiscipline, such as destruction of arms and matériel; since, according to military usages, places and armament will be restored to France when peace is signed.
>
> "In leaving the command I make it a duty to express to generals, officers, and soldiers, all my gratitude for their loyal co-operation, their brilliant valour on the battle-field, their resignation in privations; and it is with a broken heart that I separate from you.
>
> "The Marshal of France Commander-in-Chief,
>
> "BAZAINE."

Prince Frederick Charles issued an order of the day to his army, in which he said:—

> "Soldiers of the First and Second Armies,—You have fought and invested in Metz an enemy whom you had vanquished, for seventy days—seventy long days—which have made most of your regiments the richer in fame and honour, and have made none poorer. You allowed no egress to that brave enemy until he would lay down his arms. This has been done. To-day, at last, this army, still 173,000 men strong, the best in France, consisting of more than five entire army corps, including the Imperial Guard, with three Marshals of France, with more than fifty generals, and above 6,000 officers has capitulated, and with it Metz, never before taken. With this bulwark, which we restore to Germany, innumerable stores of cannons, arms, and war matériel have fallen to the conqueror. Besides these bloody laurels, you have defeated him by your bravery in the two days' battle at Noisseville, and in the engagements round Metz, which are more numerous than the surrounding villages after which you name these combats. I acknowledge your bravery gladly and gratefully, but not it alone; I estimate almost higher your obedience, your composure, cheerfulness, and resignation in enduring difficulties of many kinds; all this distinguishes the good soldier. To-day's great and memorable success was prepared by the battles which we fought before we invested Metz, and—as we should remember in gratitude to him—by the King himself, by the corps then marching with him, and by all those dear comrades who died on the battle-field, or through maladies originating here. All this previously rendered possible the great work which, by God's blessing, you to-day see completed—viz., the collapse of the power of France. The importance of to-day's event is incalculable. You, soldiers, who were assembled under my orders for this object, are about to proceed to various destinations. I bid farewell, therefore, to the generals, officers, and soldiers of the First Army and Kummer's Division, and with a God-speed to further successes."

The King of Prussia telegraphed to Queen Augusta with the usual concluding paragraph about Providence; and the good news was also announced to the army before Paris by a royal proclamation, in which the martial sovereign observed, "Whatever the future, I look forward to it calmly, because I know that with such soldiers victory cannot fail." On the 28th the King conferred the dignity of Field Marshal on the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles; and it was about this time that rumour first began to speak of a restored Empire of Germany in the person of the Prussian monarch—a project which was carried into effect not many months later, and to which the extraordinary successes of the war were manifestly leading the thoughts, and probably the desires, of the German people.

The circumstances preceding the capitulation had been communicated to the French officers by their chiefs on the 19th of October, in words which appear to have been substantially the same in each case, and which, being immediately afterwards committed to writing by several officers, and the different reports compared, were agreed to be as follows:—

> "Gentlemen,—I am ordered by the General of Division, and on the part of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, to make you acquainted with important facts which have been accomplished during the last few days. The provisions of the place of Metz decreasing more and more, Marshal Bazaine thought it right to enter into *pourparlers* with the enemy. He appointed General Boyer, his first aide-de-camp, who proceeded to Versailles, the Head-Quarters of King William. The earnest manner with which the Mar-

shal's envoy was received seems to show that the Prussians are very desirous to terminate the war. Thus, General Boyer having travelled by railroad from Metz to Château Thierry, the service of the trains was interrupted in order to make his travelling more rapid. At Château Thierry a carriage, with the armorial bearings of the King of Prussia, was in waiting to take him to Versailles. As soon as he arrived the General was received by Count Bismarck, who forwarded to the King his demand for an audience. He was at once introduced, and found himself in the presence of a council of war, at which the principal chiefs of the Prussian army were sitting, under the presidency of the King. General Boyer having stated the object of his mission, General Moltke spoke, and declared that, in a matter purely military, negotiations could not be long. The Army of Metz was to submit to the same fate as the Army of Sedan, and surrender as prisoners of war. Count Bismarck observed that the political view of the matter must take the lead of the military view. 'I should be inclined,' he continued, 'to admit of a convention which would allow the Army of Metz to withdraw to an appointed place on the French territory, in order to protect there all deliberations necessary to secure peace.' This idea was suggested to M. de Bismarck by the difficulties which arose for the Prussian Government itself from the absence of all Government in France. Indeed, the information gathered by the general on his way from station-masters and various persons, as well as the newspapers which he has been able to bring here, unfortunately leave no room for a doubt on that point. The most complete anarchy at present prevails in France. Paris, invested, starved, and deprived of external communications, must open her gates to the Prussians within a few days; civil discord paralyses her defence; the members of the Committee of National Defence have been overpowered; Gambetta and Kératry have gone away by balloon—the one fell at Amiens and the other at Bar-le-duc. Disorder is at its utmost pitch in the south of France. The red flag is floating at Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux. An army of Breton volunteers has been destroyed near Orleans. Normandy, overrun by bands of brigands, has called on the Prussians to re-establish order. Havre, Elbant, Rouen, are now garrisoned by Prussians, who co-operate with the National Guard for the preservation of public security. A movement of a religious character has been started in La Vendée. The north is ardently wishing for peace. Prussia claims Lorraine and Alsace, and several thousand millions of francs as a war indemnity; Italy claims Savoy, Nice, and Corsica. The Provisional Government being dispersed, the various towns not agreeing as to the form of a new Government, and the Orleans Princes not having presented themselves, this anarchy is the cause of unforeseen difficulty for the Prussians, who are inclined to treat for peace. They cannot think of laying down the bases for negotiations unless they address themselves to the *de facto* Government which existed before the 1st of September—namely, the Regency. It is not yet known whether, under present circumstances, the Regency will consent to listen to proposals for peace; but, in case of a refusal, the Chamber of Deputies, elected by universal suffrage, and which still legally represents the nation, can alone be invoked. However, in order that the Corps Législatif, which continued its sittings up to the 1st of September, may reassemble for deliberation, it must be protected by a French army. Such is the part which the Army of Metz will undoubtedly have to fulfil. While we are waiting for the return of General Boyer, who has gone back to Versailles with full powers, it is urgent that the troops should know that the painful situation in which we are placed is only transitory. The army separates its cause from that of the city of Metz. Waiting till it may leave to fulfil another patriotic mission, it will courageously bear privation for some days longer. Should you, gentlemen, have to ask for some more explanations, I shall willingly give them to you; but I must say that no discussion will be allowed."

If the authenticity of this statement can be relied on, it is proof conclusive that Bazaine was intriguing with a view to political objects, and that both he and the Prussians misrepresented the condition of France in order to advance their ends.

The French soldiers who capitulated at Metz consisted of the Imperial Guard; the 2nd Army Corps, commanded by General Frossard; the 3rd Army Corps, originally Marshal Bazaine's, and afterwards commanded by General Decaen; the 4th Army Corps, General l'Admirault's; and the 6th Army Corps, Marshal Canrobert's. Great as was the disaster of Sedan, this of Metz far exceeded it. The number of men who went into captivity on the earlier occasion was about 95,000; it was now close upon 180,000. By the fall of Metz, as the *Staats Anzeiger* remarked at the time, the strongest point on the line of the Moselle was again transferred to Germany; and the journal in question expressed nothing more than the general feeling of the Teutonic race in saying that it had become a necessity, for military and strategical reasons, to retain so important a bulwark in the hands that had won it. To impartial bystanders the necessity may not have been equally apparent; and, indeed, it is evident that if Metz in French hands enabled France to threaten Germany, its possession by the latter country would equally facilitate a menacing policy towards the former. But all nations judge these matters solely with reference to themselves and their presumed interests; and it is therefore not surprising that Germany should have loudly declared that Metz, however French it might be in spirit and inclination, should never again be given up to the foreigner.

The entry of the Prussian troops was to take place on the 28th, on which day, at ten o'clock in the morning, Major Sandkuhl, Chief of the Engineers of the 2nd Prussian Corps, was to withdraw the mines from under the forts, preparatory to the marching in of the 7th Corps, which was to remain to guard the city and prisoners; and at one o'clock the French were to lay down their arms. These arrangements, however, were postponed to the following day, in consequence of the backwardness of the French authorities, arising out of internal disorders. Prince Frederick Charles generously offered to allow the troops to lay down their arms outside the works, in view of the conquerors, instead of doing so in the arsenals; but Bazaine declined the privilege, as he could not guarantee their behaviour, the discipline of all the troops but the Imperial Guard being terribly relaxed. Accordingly, when the actual surrender came, it was only the Guards who marched out of Metz in possession of their arms, and laid them down at Frescati while passing in review before Prince Frederick Charles. The capitulation was consummated on the 29th of October. At ten o'clock A.M. the forts were manned by the Artillery of the 7th Prussian Corps. At one o'clock the 3rd Division was reviewed by the German Prince on the Nancy and Metz road, near Tourtebride. The march past of the Imperial Guard then took place. This famous and brilliant corps was received by the Prussians in respectful silence, and not a jeering word was uttered. The rest of the troops deposited their arms in the Metz arsenals, and then marched into their cantonments outside the town, to await their transfer to Germany. At four o'clock the French guards at the gates and at the depôts and arsenals were relieved by Prussian soldiers, and General von Zastrow, commander of the 7th corps, took possession of the city and fortress as the German military governor. One of the ancestors of this officer had in remote times held the same post in this very place.*

The surrender of the Guards is described as a most affecting incident. Prince Frederick Charles took up a position at the head of his men, and awaited the coming of the vanquished enemy. A correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* says:—

> "At three P.M. an aide-de-camp came galloping up to say that the troops were coming; the soldiers stood to their arms, and presently, over the railway bridge, appeared the long-waited-for prisoners. Riding at the head of the first detachment was the Town Major, a colonel in the French army, attended by a mounted orderly in full uniform, wearing his sword. Approaching General Franseky, he took off his cap, and reported the arrival of the Guard to surrender themselves prisoners of war. He was so much affected that he could scarcely give utterance to a word. General Franseky replied courteously—his Royal Highness being some forty yards off to the right. The first regiment then marched by; they were the Hussars of the Guard. The colonel of the regiment, riding up to General Franseky, and saluting, handed to him the effective strength of his regiment; then he rode off, followed by his officers, all still wearing their swords. The Empress's Dragoons came next; then a regiment of Chasseurs de la Garde; then the artillery. As each regiment approached, the commanding officers went through the same formula. I never saw more perfect order, or a more quiet, soldier-like demeanour, than that exhibited by this splendid body of men, as they marched past in perfect silence. Not a word was spoken. All that could be heard was the measured tread of thousands of feet, as they splashed along the muddy road. The officers—some of them with tears in their eyes, some with haughty and bold countenances—silently shook hands with their soldiers; for the order was, that so soon as the officers had marched their regiments to the quarters assigned for their bivouac, they were to ride back to Metz, and there await further orders.
>
> "Immediately following the above-mentioned regiments came the Guards Grenadier Regiment, so well known to Englishmen—so familiar at the gates of the Louvre, at the Palace of the Tuileries, and before the principal buildings of Paris. The Prussian officers gazed with wonder and surprise upon this fine body of men, most of them between nineteen and twenty-three years of age; and as regiment after regiment, to the number of at least 30,000, filed past, the Prussians whispered to one another how fortunate it was that they had no longer to fight against such men. The Horse Artillery and the 4th Voltigeurs of the Guard particularly attracted attention, the last regiment that marched past being the Zouaves of the Guard, and a truly splendid regiment they are. It was quite dark when the last troops had filed before us."

At five different points around the fallen stronghold of eastern France the same marching past of French troops might have been witnessed; only that, as already stated, the other regiments had previously given up their weapons, that all chance of collision might be avoided.

Herr Wachenhusen, of the *Cologne Gazette*, said, in describing the marching past:—"Prince Frederick Charles, with his staff and officers, had posted themselves behind Jouy, on the Frescati road. All our corps remained in their old positions; the Hessian division was ordered to receive the prisoners. Bazaine appeared first of all; he rode, at the head of his officers, to the Prince, and addressed him with the words: 'Monseigneur, I have the honour to present myself.' The Prince motioned him to his side, and then began the march of the officers and army, partly classified according to their arms, partly pell-mell. The officers who had a command were on horseback; the others had their arms, as they were allowed to lay them down afterwards in the town. Man and horse did not appear as though the extremest want had reigned in the fortress. The uniform of the men, particularly the Guards, seemed almost new, especially their boots. The horses were generally in good condition, but had bitten off each other's tails. The demeanour of the prisoners was very becoming. The reception of them in the meadows near the Jouy road lasted from one till nine. That within the fortress violent scenes must have prevailed between the garrison commanders and those of the other troops was shown by an incident which happened in the evening. One aged officer, stooping, and his cap pressed over his forehead, walked through the streets with two younger companions, followed by men and women, who reviled and spat on him. I suppose it was the Commandant Coffinières, who supported the capitulation against the will of the population. Bazaine was treated with the greatest respect by the Prince. The 80,000 or 90,000 Guards looked so well that with the majority one vainly searched for traces of long privation. Many, however, who were presented with bread or bacon devoured it with great avidity." The special correspondent of the *Times* wrote to much the same effect. When he saw him, Prince Frederick Charles was "smoking a cigar, and talking to the French officer who succeeded Bourbaki in command of the Guards, and who was there to see that the stipulations in regard to their surrender were properly carried out. With them was General Franseky, to whom from time to time a French officer rode up and placed in his hands a slip of paper which contained the numerical strength of each regiment, as it passed. Some of the officers I observed in full costume, as if anxious to appear to the best advantage; but others, again, seemed desirous to be as little 'in evidence' as possible. There were three Horse Artillery officers riding back to Metz, and, as they passed their regiment, now and then a man darted out of the ranks and seized them by the hands. It was too much for them, though they pulled their busbies over their eyes to hide the tears that gushed to them. I could see that two of them were quite unable to control their emotion. The last corps that finished the procession, as evening closed in, was the finest of all—the Grenadiers of the Guard; and they, as they passed their officers, in several instances embraced them, kissing them on both cheeks. This was the only corps which seemed really to feel their humiliating position. Meantime, long strings of half-starved peasantry, driving altogether-starved horses, kept crawling along the muddy roads, looking woe-begone and haggard, and very seldom having anything in their carts, except the wheels and axletrees of another cart. They had been told that the Germans would appropriate their carts, and so they carried all their spare vehicles into Metz, where probably all their other worldly possessions had been sold for food." The *Daily News* correspondent spoke of the demoralised condition of the French troops. Many were in a state of intoxication, their clothes disarranged in utter disregard of decency. Discipline had evidently been greatly relaxed. The men did not seem to feel the supreme misfortune which had befallen their country, but appeared only anxious to get to some place where they could enjoy a hearty meal. Occasionally they would burst forth into a lively marching song, and, as each body got the order to go forward, a cheer burst from the slovenly and dislocated ranks. The officers, however, were taciturn and downcast. This comprehensive observer records:—

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* Special Correspondent of the *Daily News*. See Appendix vii., Vol. II., p. 556, "Siege Records of Metz."

"The Sixth Corps (Canrobert's) came from its bivouac by Woippy to Longchamps, where on the 7th so many of its members had stained the soil with their blood. Their prison-bivouac is on the plain in the rear of the wrecked and burnt village. The Seventh Corps, that of l'Admirault, came out over the ridge between St. Quentin and Plappeville, and found quarters, inhospitable enough I fear, on the bleak plateau of St. Maurice. The Imperial Guard marched down to Longeville, crossed the railway bridge at Tournebride, passed on to Frescati to the left, and found their bivouac in the plain between Orly and Augny. The garrison of Metz itself, consisting of about 20,000 men, chiefly Mobile Guards, marched by Le Sablon, past the ruined village of Magny, and so forward to the outskirts of St. Thiebault. The Second Corps (Frossard's), with Laveauconfied's division, and the 4th brigade came out past La Posette on the great Strasburg *chaussée*, and found their bivouac behind the village of Grigy. The Third Corps, that of Lebœuf, came out among us of the 1st Prussian Army Corps along the *chaussée* leading to Saarlouis.

"Each corps, as it marched out, was received by the Prussian troops covering the respective section of the environment. They were led by their own officers, who formally handed over their men to the Prussian officers, and then those of them who had given their parole were at liberty to quit the ranks, and return to Metz. The men, under the command of their under-officers, were then marched out to the bivouac places, which had previously been partly prepared, wood for fires having been collected and a supply of provisions being ready for distribution.



THE FRENCH ARMY LEAVING METZ.



"FORWARD!"

"I was with the First Army Corps when it took up its position to receive the corps of Lebœuf. From all the villages around—the villages inhabited for so many weary weeks, the villages made memorable by fights, by burnings, by graves, by sickness, and by deaths—streamed the regiments on to the *chaussée*. There had been much rain during the night, and, although the sun broke out about ten o'clock, the watery haze hung about the bottoms of the valleys, and the mud splashed as the troops strode through it. Mud! why we have had nothing but mud for weeks, and should we mind it now, looking at the errand on which we are bound? No. The 'Watch by the Rhine' rises lustily from the pioneers in the front, and the regiments, as they come down the side roads, catch up the strain. On we go past the Brasserie, with the grenade-pits, the graves, and the entrenchments around it—itself a mere heap of shattered bricks—on to the gentle slope behind the village of Lauvallière. Then right and left wheeled the heavy columns, leaving the *chaussée* open, a parallelogram of about one hundred feet in width on each side of it. In front of the Brasserie stood the artillery, before the artillery the serried ranks of brass-spiked helmets all the way down the gentle slope, almost to Lauvallière. Arms were piled, and there the Prussians waited for the advent of the army with which it almost seemed, through the length of time that we had confronted each other, that we could claim a kind of personal acquaintance."

The excitement produced in Metz when the capitulation became generally known was intense. The announcement was made to the Municipal Council by General Coffinières on the 26th. On the Council refusing to accept his verbal explanation as sufficient, the Commandant promised to issue a statement direct to the people on the morrow. It was already sufficiently apparent, however, that the end was at hand, and the night was passed by many in great agitation. A meeting of the officers of the National Guard, and of some belonging to the regular army, took place; but, although many vehement speeches were uttered, nothing was determined on. At another meeting, at which some of the generals were present, it was agreed that each officer should attend on the following morning at a place appointed, with a list of the names of other officers and men who could be relied on. "There was much going and coming all that dark night," says Mr. Robinson. "When the meeting broke up it was long past midnight. We walked round the ramparts, and spoke to some of the National Guards we knew; and then I bade adieu to my companions and sought my hotel, very sadly depressed by all I had seen and heard." Next morning, it was but too obvious to the cool-headed that nothing whatever could be done. A feverish unrest and passionate indulgence in unavailing grief took the place of all contemplated action. People quoted to one another that clause of the Articles of War which condemns to death, with military degradation, any commander of a fortress "which capitulates without having forced the enemy to adopt all the slow and successive stages of a regular siege, and without having at least repulsed an assault made by the enemy at a practicable breach." The passage was even posted up at the corners of the streets on the morning of the 27th, with the addition of words, "Death to the traitor!" "Death to Bazaine!" and in some places also "Death to Coffinières!" The police quickly tore down the bills; but the idea they expressed remained in the hearts of many, and the killing of Bazaine was seriously resolved on, and would undoubtedly have been carried into effect had he not been closely guarded.

The address of Coffinières to the citizens appeared, according to promise, on the 27th, and, in referring to the approaching surrender, dwelt on the fact that the stock of food in the town was almost exhausted, and that the perquisitions made by the civil and military authorities had failed to discover any more. "Round us," said the general, speaking of the forces of Marshal Bazaine, "is an army which has never been conquered, and which has stood firm before the fire of the foe, and repelled the rudest shocks. This army, interposed between our city and her besiegers, has given us time to put our forts in a complete state of defence, to mount upon our walls more than 600 pieces of cannon, and to hold in check an army of more than 200,000 men." The Commandant also pointed out that the army of Bazaine, already tried by the fire of the enemy, had lost 42,000 men from the inclemency of the season, and from numerous privations. The Prussians would not permit the severance of the interests of the army from those of the town, and four or five days' additional resistance would only lead to greater evils. "Rest assured," said Coffinières, in conclusion, "that your private interests will be defended with the most lively solicitude. Seek to support stoically this great misfortune, and cherish the firm hope that Metz, this grand and patriotic city, will remain to France." The "hope" was purely illusory, and it is hardly to be supposed that any one really entertained it.

The people to some extent relieved their feelings by hanging garlands of *immortelles* on the statue of Marshal Ney, and muffling that of Marshal Fabert in crape. Throughout the greater part of the 27th, the townsfolk wandered listlessly about



GERMAN EXPLORING PARTY.

the streets, hardly speaking to one another, or asking in a whisper what would be the final result of this great change in the fortunes of the city. The local *Indépendant* came out with a deep black border, enclosing a short article, in which the fall of Metz was plainly attributed to treachery. The gloomy appearance of the town was increased by the sight of numerous sick and dying men who, in consequence of a great storm which had overturned several of the camps, were brought into Metz on mules. Many of these unfortunate soldiers were consumptive, owing to exposure to the bitterly cold nights which had prevailed for some time; others were in various stages of fever. So the day passed sadly on to its decline, and at night the more hopeful, or the more desperate, looked forward to something being done against the Prussians by the officers and soldiers who had pledged themselves to that enterprise. But Marshal Bazaine had found out the design, and had baffled it by ordering the immediate disarmament of all suspected regiments. For this it would be absurd and unjust to blame him. He was bound to maintain his own authority, and to keep faith with the Prussians, having once opened negotiations with them; and, besides, he must have seen that such an attempt could only lead to the most disastrous results. More than a thousand officers, however, escaped at the last moment from Metz, and many of these afterwards fought elsewhere.

The document containing the terms of capitulation was placarded on the walls by the morning of the 28th, and was freely and warmly discussed. A cavalry soldier harangued the people in the Place d'Armes, and created so much excitement that a number of troops who were passing at the time to leave their weapons in the arsenal, at first refused to do so, and the National Guards, who had already deposited their arms in the Hôtel de Ville, brought them out again. When General Coffinières appeared three pistol-shots were fired at him. For a moment it seemed as if some wild sally would be attempted; but no concerted plan was put forward, and the effervescence exhausted itself by its vehemence and its want of direction—not, however, before it had thrown the whole town into a ferment. The door leading to the clock-tower of the cathedral was broken in with the butt-ends of muskets; and the alarm-bell of Metz, which is only used on occasions of great importance, was set ringing. A good many officers of the Artillery, the Engineers, and other bodies, assembled in one of the large military buildings of the town, ready to place themselves at the head of various troops who were hidden in different localities, as soon as General Clinchant—who had given a half-promise to head the movement—should appear. But the general had been summoned before Bazaine that morning, and had been induced, or compelled, to relinquish his design. The Voltigeurs of the Imperial Guard were marched into the city, and, in combination with some loyal troops of the Line, disarmed the National Guards, and patrolled the streets.

While the fervour was at its height, a M. Albert Collignon, editor of an ultra-democratic daily paper, the *Journal de Metz*, who had recently performed the magnificent feat of entering the ante-chamber of General Coffinières, and breaking a bust of the Emperor, rode about on a white horse, firing a pistol, and exhorting the populace to rush forth, and seek death or victory. He was followed by a young lady, the daughter of a gunsmith, also mounted on a horse, brandishing a pistol with a white pocket-handkerchief tied to it, and singing the "Marseillaise." In Paris this display would have been considered the very height of noble heroism, and people would have expected the Prussians to be straightway converted to republicanism and universal fraternity; but the more phlegmatic and practical Metzers saw the pitiable absurdity of such antics, and the proceedings of the journalist and the lady were quenched in ridicule. As night came on, however, sounds of grief and indignation filled the streets. Women ran to and fro, tearing their hair, trampling on portions of their dress, and crying, "What will become of our children?" Soldiers—many of them intoxicated—formed irregular groups, their sabres broken, their accoutrements in disorder, and themselves weeping and sobbing. "Oh, poor Metz, once the proudest of cities!" rose the melancholy cry of men and women. "What a misfortune! What an unheard-of catastrophe! We have been betrayed! All is lost! It is all over with France!"

The popular excitement was increased on the 31st by the publication in the *Indépendant de la Moselle* of an official communication made verbally to the officers in Metz by their chiefs on the 27th, and immediately afterwards put in writing by some officers who compared their recollections. This document (which is not to be confounded with the statement made in a similar manner on the 19th of October, and which is quoted in full at pp. 296—7) appeared to the Metzers to confirm their impression that the surrender was the result of some deep plot between Bazaine and the Prussians. The communication of the 31st set forth that "the convention, called the Convention of London, which wished for the re-establishment of the Regency," had not met; neither had that "which would have given liberty to Bazaine's army to uphold with its arms any Government which might be recognised and accepted by the French people." On the miscarriage of this plan being made known to the Marshal by General Boyer and Count Bismarck, it was decided at a Council of War, with but one dissentient, that the capitulation was a necessity. The statement went on to describe the interview of General Changarnier with Prince Frederick Charles. The German commander said he knew perfectly well that Metz was only provided with food for three days more, and, showing Changarnier a train in the railway station full of different kinds of provisions, he continued, "That is for the city of Metz and for your army, which is in want of everything. We wish to put an end to your sufferings." He then added, "We have always known what you were doing, and what you wished to do. To give you only one instance —I may mention that immediately after a Council of War I was informed of the decision it had come to." The communication to the officers then proceded:—

> "In order to prove the correctness of this statement, he mentioned the proposals made day by day by such and such a commander of an Army Corps, giving names, and the resolutions adopted in consequence of those proposals. General Changarnier returned to the Marshal, who then sent General Cissy to the Prince. The following was the result of this second interview: —'We have 120,000 men (*sic*) in France. At this moment an army of 150,000 men is at Dijon, marching upon Lyons. Just as Metz has been invested and taken by famine, so will Paris and Lyons succumb. We do not destroy any town by bombarding it; but we will go to Marseilles, if need be; we will go everywhere—everywhere.' General Cissy having objected that if the army capitulated, that was no reason why Metz should surrender, the Prince replied:—'Before the declaration of war, we knew as well as you, down to the most minute details, the state of the defences of the town. Then the forts were scarcely sketched out, and the town could only make a feeble resistance. It was since the presence of the French army under the walls of Metz that the city became what it is to-day; your men have completed and armed the forts. Metz having become through your exertions a fortress of the first class, must accept, as a consequence, all the conditions of a capitulation which will make no distinction between the town and the army.' General Cissy having asked whether in the clauses of the capitulation the same provision would be made as at Sedan—namely, whether the officers would be liberated on their parole on certain conditions—the Prince replied, 'No! At Sedan two generals and three hundred officers, liberated on their promise not to serve France against us, returned to the French service, and have fought against us anew. Consequently, as for the army of Metz, all the officers, without exception, must unconditionally surrender.' It only remained to arrange the clauses of the capitulation, and General Jarras, of the Marshal's Staff, left for Ars in order to decree this *ne plus ultra* of our shame."

Some little comfort was derived from the general impression that, according to the draught protocol of surrender, only the exterior forts and the Porte Mazelle were to be given up to the Prussians. Nevertheless, when the 29th came, it was found that the hated enemy took possession of the whole town. They marched in at four o'clock in the afternoon, playing German tunes, which must have grated sadly on the ears of the French citizens. The sky was cloudy, the air filled with rain; the windows and doors were all closed and darkened, as in a city of mourning; only a few people of the humbler classes hung about the streets; and in the decaying light of the autumn evening, in silence and in gloom, the Prussian regiments took up the various positions assigned to them, and the humiliation of Metz was complete. At first great fear was felt lest the conquerors should behave with cruelty to the vanquished citizens; but a very good effect was produced by the German soldiers generously giving up their bread rations to feed the French troops. Much satisfaction also was experienced at the news of a thousand wagons being ready at Courcelles to take provisions to Metz, and of funds existing in London for the relief of the people. At noon a Prussian railway inspector made the journey from Ars to a station situated a mile south of Metz, and on the following day perfect railway communication was restored between Saarbruck, Metz, and Nancy, the line having been but little injured. "Only a few German prisoners," says the *Daily News* correspondent, "were found in Metz. The French had not kept those they took when able to return them. I noticed on the faces of all the German soldiers an unmistakable look of quiet satisfaction; nothing more. Of the French officers and soldiers who swarmed all over the place, not one, even when intoxicated, bore any other expression than that of the deepest sadness or of proud defiance. The latter expression, however, was rare, and was seen chiefly in the younger officers. I am informed that the French loss in killed in the various affairs since the 18th of August, added to the deaths from sickness in town, were 12,000." A temporary typhus fever hospital was made out of three hundred and twenty railway vans, and a large number of tents in the park were also filled with sick. The railway vans were drawn up in the great square, opposite the Caserne du Génie, which was crowded with wounded French soldiers. Mr. John Bellows—a Quaker who went out to North-Eastern France as the representative of a body formed by the Society of Friends for the relief of the peasantry and other non-combatants—relates that, owing to the crowding of so many wounded into the city infectious diseases increased to a fearful extent; so that, among the civil population, where the deaths had been 1,500 in 1869, they rose to 4,600 in 1870, even before the completion of the year. Those who wish to derive some idea, at once broad and minute, of the frightful miseries caused by warfare, should read the little book in which this philanthropist relates his experiences.* The knowledge of such facts is appalling to all sensitive minds, yet it may, nevertheless, be a duty to acquire it.

The devastation in the suburbs of Metz was lamentable. The mansions, villas, and country cottages scattered about the vicinity were ruined, the gardens trampled into mud, the trees cut down for bivouac fires, or for strategic purposes. This was done partly by the French, partly by the Prussians, according as either held the ground. The worst destruction was in the space just outside the fortifications, where buildings were only allowed on the condition that, if it should be necessary at any time to pull them down for military purposes, the owners should not be entitled to compensation. On the south side of Metz; all the country was inundated by the overflow of the Moselle. Some of the villages were quite untouched, but others were reduced to heaps of rubbish. In many spots fearful cases of suffering were to be found. One of these cases, in Metz itself, was described by the *Daily News* correspondent, who visited the squalid room of his coachman. "Of bread," he writes, after the surrender, "the family had not had a morsel for three days; then they had received as ration two pounds for six. One of the six—an infant two years old—wants rations no more. The little body lay on two planks under the window, the victim of bodily exhaustion from deficient and improper food. How can a child of two years survive on sinewy horse-flesh, in scanty quantity, and on a casual



GENERAL KAMECKE.

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* "The Track of the War around Metz." By John Bellows. Trübner and Co.



VIEW OF METZ.

morsel of bread, the meal of which is mixed with sawdust and chopped straw to make it eke out? All up and down the poverty-stricken street the wretchedness was much the same. Horse-flesh and want of salt had killed off the children like flies. The mortality among the little ones has been frightful. The elder children are covered with blotches and scorbutic sores, caused by want of salt and of variety in their food." In the hospitals also there was great distress; and the English ambulance corps, which began to arrive on the 29th, had plenty of work to do, and did it with efficiency and promptitude.

The general aspect of Metz on the 30th was vividly described by the *Times* Special Correspondent, who wrote :—

"Early this morning vehicles began to rumble into Metz from the neighbouring villages, the inhabitants of which hastened to gratify their long-suspended curiosity, and flocked into the town in almost as great numbers as the population which has been cooped up here for the last ten weeks flocked out of it. It was curious to witness the greetings of families separated under such novel and trying circumstances; to listen to the anxious inquiries, to hear the oft-repeated story of misery and starvation, to see wagon after wagonful of peasantry returning to the homes which they had foolishly abandoned on the approach of the Prussians, to find devastated cottages and dismantled gardens where they had left comfort and plenty. Generally, these carts contained little beyond piles of bedding, surmounted by women and children, and led by ragged peasants, looking so haggard and tattered that they seemed like professional beggars, while the horses which dragged this forlorn load were so thin and weak that they seemed scarcely able to stagger along. Often the wheels of some other cart, the horses belonging to which had long since been eaten, formed part of the load. Now and then we passed a carriage containing evidently families of the better class, whose appearance contrasted forcibly with that of the peasants, and who evidently had not suffered so much. They were for the most part so delighted at escaping from their long confinement that they sang and laughed as if bound upon some party of pleasure. Then came long strings of pedestrians wading through the mud—for to-day was as showery as yesterday, and the roads, cut up by the constant passage of armies, were ankle-deep in slush; but who cares for mud when it leads from famine to plenty? The roads, tolerably encumbered by this motley throng, were occasionally completely blocked by the passage of troops; for the Germans, with their usual promptitude, are already in full march for the South, and whole army corps are getting rapidly under way. Here were all the regiments of the Guard whom we had seen encamped the night before. Now the whole plain was alive with men collected round the camp fires which had cheered them during the long wet night which closed the melancholy day of their capitulation. It is probable that abundant rations of mutton more than compensated for the humiliation of their position, so bright and cheery they seemed, notwithstanding their lantern jaws and pale cheeks. There are 10,000 men encamped here, and 10,000 at each of the other three gates of Metz, as we were informed. Bazaine and several of the other generals had passed the night in Prince Frederick Charles's château at Corny, where a group of Prussian officers were now collected, watching a scene so full of interest. Our coachman, a small country proprietor, was in great anxiety about his brother; and when he was not responding to the 'chaff' which he received from the Prussian infantry, with whom he was constantly interchanging the most cheerful repartees, he was inquiring in the most lachrymose tones of the French soldiers whether they could tell him where the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs was. At last we passed the former extreme German outposts, and entered the French lines, where now German sentries were keeping guard, and at one of which a whole row of abandoned chassepôts, some more or less broken, were lying, having evidently been thrown there yesterday at the last moment. Further on we passed over the moats and through the gates into the fortress itself, with its cannon, against which no hostile shot has been fired, and which have been comparatively idle throughout the siege, looking angrily down upon us. It seemed scarcely credible that these frowning batteries should never have done anything more serious than frown. A few yards further on we come to the railway station, and on the glacis opposite were piled rows of chassepôts, with the cartouches scattered round them on the ground, and the cartouche-boxes hanging from the bayonets. Here was a pile of drums, there a collection of wind instruments—the whole paraphernalia of a band in fact—all lying confusedly in the mud, with a pouring rain drenching everything, to the German sentry, who was placidly contemplating the spoils of war over which he was mounting guard. On through streets getting more crowded to the esplanade, where rows of railway trucks were arranged like streets, and formed comfortable barracks for the men; behind them was a public garden, where tents were pitched on the ramparts, still full of French soldiers, who could enjoy a lovely view of the valley of the Moselle, with Fort St. Quentin rising above it, where a large force had always been posted, and from which they could command everything except success. In the midst of tents, and railway trucks, and extemporised barracks, stands the statue of a soldier who had led armies to very different scenes; and not far from Marshal Ney, where the untrampled gardens bore testimony to the good taste of the soldiery, stands a fountain, where a beautiful figure in bronze commemorates the name by which engineers love to think of this virgin fortress. Alas! they now say it has been 'sold.' Now we begin to perceive, as we get fairly into the town, that there must indeed be a large population of French officers here. Six thousand have capitulated, and the greater part of these are still in Metz. Many of them, I observed, carried their swords, but all looked utterly crushed and depressed as they found themselves jostled on the crowded pavements by Prussian officers and soldiers, and saw whole columns of their enemies forming in the principal squares, or billeting themselves unceremoniously in the largest hotels. We found it difficult to force our carriage past the dense groups of these lately hostile troops, and more especially past those spots where the townspeople and French soldiery were crowding round the country carts which had come in full of supplies of bread and cheese and salt. This was in special request, and I saw pretty girls running off greedily with handfuls of the precious article, while one large cart, apparently containing nothing but tobacco, was besieged by an eager throng of men of all classes."

The departure of Bazaine from Metz took place amidst great excitement. He passed through Ars on his way to Wilhelmshöhe at four o'clock in the afternoon of October 29th. The close carriage in which he sat bore his name, and was escorted by several officers of his staff on horseback. The women of the village greeted him with exclamations of "Traitor!" "Coward!" "Sneak!" "Thief!" "Where are our husbands, whom you have betrayed?" "Give us back our children, whom you have sold!" Similar outcries were raised in other villages, and the women even attacked the carriage with their fists, and broke the windows. But for his escort the Marshal would in all probability have been torn to pieces on the spot. The feeling against him was very strong and very general. It is even said that he misrepresented the fact when he stated that the army was almost starving. Mr. Robinson affirms that on the 29th the troops appeared to have even an excess of provisions. A widely-diffused opinion existed that there was a large quantity of concealed food in the town, and that Metz could really have held out for a great while longer. The Prussians are said to have found in the magazines, arsenals, and forts an amount of provisions amply sufficient to have maintained the garrison (exclusive, however, of Bazaine's army) until the following March. Private stores were discovered hidden away before the capitulation; and it was openly averred that large quantities of grain and bacon were packed in the casemates of the citadel and of Fort Bellecroix. There was certainly some great irregularity in the management of the stores. The *Daily News* correspondent says that "on the morning of the 29th five soldiers lay dead of starvation at Montigny, while the Staff still indulged in luxurious meals, and four days' rations were given to the entire army that morning, while they had received none for two days previously. No beef or pork had been obtainable at any price for a week, but on that morning, before anything had arrived in the town, the shops had plenty. This is adduced as proof of the charge, current in the town, that speculators had seized much food, and that a rational system of apportionment, such as existed during the last ten days, if introduced at first, and combined with stringent requisitions, would have prevented much waste." Some National Guards denounced Bazaine to Mr. Bellows as a thief and a scoundrel, adding, "There we were starving for nothing at all. Fifty centimes for a little bit of bread no bigger than your fist, and salt at such a price that the shopkeepers in Metz sold the brine that bacon had been pickled in, instead of it, by the litre. There was our soup—nothing but water, and one little bit of horseflesh in it; and all the time there were stores of all sorts in Metz held by the shopkeepers." We must, of course, be careful how we put faith in the gossip of popular grief and rage; yet there is only too much reason to believe that large quantities of food really existed, and were not turned to account. Some portion of this may have been kept back by greedy speculators, in the hope of getting an exorbitant profit at the last moment; the rest seems to have been withheld, or mismanaged, by the heads of the army; and even that which was retained in the hands of traders ought, one would think, to have been discovered, had an honest search been made. That Metz surrendered when it did has never yet been fully explained. The people and the army, it is true, were suffering in many ways; but it seems probable that the suffering was in some degree produced by artificial means, and a heavy suspicion of treachery rests on the military authorities of the place.

At Tours—where the Delegate Government had but recently announced the near approach of grand achievements at Metz—the fall of the great fortress caused an outburst of frantic rage, in which Bazaine was plainly denounced as an agent of the enemy. A circular to the Prefects of Departments, dated "Tours, October 28th," and signed by M. Gambetta, the Minister of the Interior, announced the existence of reports as to the capitulation—reports which the Minister could not then officially establish. Such an event, it was added, could only be the result of a crime, the authors of which should be outlawed. "Be convinced," were the concluding words of the circular, "that, whatever may arise, nothing can abate our courage in this epoch of rascally capitulations. There exists one thing which neither can nor will capitulate—that is the French Republic." The following proclamation was issued at Tours on the 30th of October:—

"Frenchmen!—Exalt your souls and resolutions to the height of the terrible perils which are crushing us down. The country depends upon us to weary out bad fortune, and to show to the universe that it is a great people who will not perish, and whose courage rises in the midst even of catastrophes. Metz has capitulated. A general, upon whom France relied even after Mexico, has just deprived the country, when in danger, of more than 100,000 of its defenders.

"Marshal Bazaine has committed treason. He has made himself the agent of the Man of Sedan, and the accomplice of the invader. Disregarding the honour of the army of which he had charge, he surrendered, without even attempting to make a supreme effort, 125,000 combatants, 20,000 wounded, rifles, guns, flags, and the strongest citadel of France—Metz, until now a virgin free from the contamination of the foreigner. Such a crime is beyond even the chastisements of justice.

"And now, Frenchmen, measure the depth of the abyss into which you have been hurled by the Empire. For twenty years France has submitted to this corrupting power, which exhausted all her sources of greatness and life. The army of France, deprived of its national character, and unknowingly become the instrument of a reign of servitude, has been engulfed, despite the heroism of its soldiers, by the treason of its chiefs, in the disasters of the country. In less than two months 225,000 men have been delivered up to the enemy. Sinister epilogue of the military *coup d'état* of December! The time has come for us, citizens, to draw closer together, and, under the ægis of the Republic, which we are resolved not to allow to capitulate, whether at home or abroad, to derive from the very extremity of our misfortunes the restoration of our morality and of our political and social virility. Yes! Whatever may be the extent of our disaster, it has found us struck with neither consternation nor hesitation. We are prepared to make the last sacrifices, and, in face of enemies whom everything favours, let us swear never to surrender so long as an inch of our sacred territory shall remain under our foot. Let us firmly hold the glorious flag of revolution.

"Frenchmen!—Our cause is that of justice and right. Europe sees it and feels it. Witnessing so many undeserved misfortunes, without having received from us either invitation or adhesion, she is spontaneously moved and agitated.

"No illusions! Let us not permit ourselves to languish or to become enervated; but let us prove, by deeds, that we are able, by our own resources, to maintain our honour, independence, and integrity—all that makes a country free and proud.

"Long live France! Long live the Republic, One and Indivisible!

"Crémieux.
"Gambetta.
"Glais-Bizon."

A day or two later M. Gambetta put forth an address to the army, which ran:—

"Soldiers!—You have been deceived, not dishonoured. For the last three months Fortune has betrayed your heroism by folly and treason. Now, freed from your unworthy chiefs, are you ready to wash out the outrage under leaders deserving your confidence?

"Advance! Fight no longer for despotism, but for the safety of your country, for your burnt homes, for your outraged families. France, your mother, is delivered over to the implacable fury of the enemy; it is a sublime mission, demanding entire sacrifice. Shame on those calumniators who dare to regard the army as the accomplice of the infamy of its chief, and to separate the army from the people! No; having justly stigmatised the treason of Sedan and the crime of Metz, I call upon you to avenge your honour, which is the honour of France. Your brothers of the Army of the Rhine have already protested against the cowardly attempt, and have withdrawn their hands with horror from the accursed capitulation. It is for you once more to raise the banner of France, stained by the last Buonaparte and his assassins. Restore victory to us, but learn to practise Republican virtues—respect for discipline, activity of life, and contempt of death.

"Let the image of your country in danger always be before you. The time of weakness and of treasons is past. The destinies of your country are entrusted to your hands, because you are the youth and hope of the army. Conquer! and when you have restored to France her rank among nations, you shall remain citizens of a peaceful, free, and respected Republic. Long live France! Long live the Republic!"

These proclamations are not without the faults commonly found in French official utterances, and especially in those which proceed from the Republican party. The showy rhodomontade, the facile generalisations, the reckless language towards political opponents, and the spirit of national boasting, to which all parties in the country have long accustomed France, but which have reached their rankest and most offensive development in the writings and speeches of such men as Henri Rochefort, Gustave Flourens, and others of the same order, are painfully apparent in both addresses. Yet it is impossible to deny that for the charge against Bazaine there was considerable warrant. It would be unfair to assume the absolute truth of his treachery. Facts may be found to exonerate him; and an officer of Bazaine's long services should not be finally condemned except upon irresistible testimony. But the case is one of grave suspicion, all the features of which, as far as we see them, are adverse to the supposition that the Marshal was acting honestly towards his country. When first shut up at Metz he had at his disposal an army of more than 180,000 men. The German army, it is true, was somewhat larger; but Bazaine had the advantage of occupying strongly fortified positions, and in the execution of his sorties he could deliver his assault at any point of the compass, and at any part of the widely-extended line of the Prussian investment. In the early days of the siege the environment was decidedly weak. The German outposts were distributed over a circle of nearly thirty miles, their supports over nearly forty; and, until the army was augmented, the positions fortified, and various means adopted for rapidity of communication between the several corps, the opportunities for breaking through were so great that it is an unexplained mystery why the numerous false reports of Bazaine's escape were not true. No doubt the achievement after a while became impossible. Every day the Prussians grew stronger and the French weaker; and when nearly all the cavalry and artillery horses of the latter had been eaten, the utmost that could be done in the way of a sortie was no more than a provision raid. The food question is involved in the greatest obscurity; and if Bazaine really connived at the hiding of stores, with a view to impressing the town with a sense of its inability to hold out any longer, it is obvious that he was not acting for France, but for Prussia. His conduct is undoubtedly rendered all the more suspicious by the strange negotiations of September with Count Bismarck, and with the mysterious agents of an unknown pretender. Dark in themselves, they render still darker all the other features of the defence; and it will take more facts than have yet appeared to the contrary to deliver the reputation of Bazaine from the shadow that now rests heavily upon it.

General Changarnier is stated to have given it as his opinion that Bazaine could have escaped during the first part of his time in Metz; that his sorties were mere pretended movements; and that, although he was not a traitor in the sense of having sold himself for money, he was selfish and ambitious, and wished to become the chief man in the country. The old general spoke to somewhat the same effect in the National Assembly at Versailles, on the 29th of May, 1871, when, in supporting a petition which demanded an inquiry into the capitulation of Metz, he blamed Marshal Bazaine for not having laid in many months' provisions, and also for not making a vigorous sortie. A general with a clear idea and a resolute heart, he observed, was not wont to consult aides de camp; and he thought it an immense calamity that Bazaine adopted the advice of the majority of the Council of War. On this occasion General Changarnier wept while alluding to his mission to Prince Frederick Charles. M. Thiers stated that Bazaine had commissioned him to press for an inquiry; but ultimately the petition was shelved. Coffinières, in a letter to the *Indépendance Belge*, avowed his differences with Bazaine, and said he had always maintained that the fortress of Metz ought to have interests totally distinct from those of the army of the Rhine, and that all political predilections should be avoided, in order to think only of the necessities of the defence; but that he was over-ruled. He did not accuse the Marshal, however, of any criminal intention.

On the 2nd of November Bazaine addressed to the *Nord* the following letter on the capitulation of Metz:—

"I have read your political bulletin of the 1st of October, in which you refer to M. Gambetta's proclamation. You are right; the Army of the Rhine would not have obeyed a traitor. The only answer I shall make to this lying lucubration is to send you the order of the day which was addressed to the army after the Councils of War held on the 26th and 28th of October.

"M. Gambetta does not seem to be aware of what he is saying, or of the position in which the army at Metz was placed, when he stigmatises as he does its chief, who struggled for three months against forces double (?) those at his disposal, and whose effective strength was always kept up.

"I received no communications from the Government at Tours, notwithstanding the efforts made to place ourselves in relation.

"The Army of Metz had one Marshal, 24 Generals, 2,140 officers, and 42,350 men struck by the enemy's fire, and it made itself respected in every fight in which it engaged. Such an army could not be composed of traitors and cowards. Famine and disorganisation alone caused the arms to fall from the hands of the 65,000 real combatants who remained. The artillery and cavalry were without horses, it having been necessary to kill them to alleviate the privations of the army. Had the latter not displayed such energy and patriotism it would have had to succumb in the first fortnight of October, when the rations were already reduced to 300 grammes, and later on to 250 grammes, of bad bread. Add to this dark picture the fact of there being 20,000 sick and wounded, with their medicines on the point of failing, and themselves suffering from the effects of the continued heavy rains.

"France has always been deceived as to our position. I know not why; but the truth will one day prevail. We are conscious of having done our duty."*

On the 31st of October General Boyer (then in Brussels) wrote a letter to the *Indépendance Belge*,

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* See Appendix viii., Vol. II., p. 557, "Marshal Bazaine on the French Army."



GERMAN CAVALRY EN ROUTE FOR PARIS.

in which, alluding to M. Gambetta, he said:—"More moderate than he, I will confine myself to a protest against his unqualified violence, and in the name of the whole Army of the Rhine, from which I received the mission which took me to Versailles and London, and in the name of its glorious leader, I declare that M. Gambetta offends the public conscience, as much as our brave soldiers, in speaking of infamy and rascalities. We did not capitulate with honour or with duty; we capitulated with hunger." About the same period the *Moniteur Universelle* contained a letter from the brother of Marshal Bazaine, who, in a generous and manly spirit which all must admire, even where the conclusions are not accepted, wrote:—"I speak now in the name of that which cannot and ought not to capitulate any more than the French Republic—in the name of calm, impartial, and reflecting justice. That justice will say that the Marshal should be heard before being condemned; it will say that during two months and a half, completely isolated from France, he has been able to receive from the Government neither information, nor a man, nor a loaf; it will say that he resisted until the complete exhaustion of his provisions—an exhaustion which was made known to the Government without their being able to supply a remedy; it will say that the Marshal, who a hundred times has faced death with that cool intrepidity which has been the admiration of all, did attempt all the supreme efforts which the honour of the army demanded. Light will speedily be thrown upon all the acts of the Marshal. You have not waited for that. Against that I protest, and will protest, with all my energy as a patriot and as a brother." The demand for a suspension of the judgment until the other side could be heard was natural and right; but nothing has yet appeared to mitigate the unfavourable aspect of the case. If Bazaine really did his best for France, it is strange and most unfortunate that so many of his acts should suggest the contrary belief.



ARREST OF NAPOLEONIST SPIES IN PARIS.

It must not be forgotten, however, that Bazaine has had his supporters among those who were qualified to give an opinion. "When the history of this war comes to be written," observes the correspondent of the *Daily News*, "the name of Bazaine will have to be inscribed in brighter ink than that of any other French commander. If his subordinates had been capable of co-operating with him, had he been unfettered at the outset, and had the discipline and *morale* of his army not been deteriorated before he took the command of it, it might have been that the chroniclers of this war would have had a different tale to tell." This opinion is certainly not without weight; but it is far from counterbalancing the strong conviction of those who had still better opportunities of judging, and the formidable array of facts tending to the discredit of Bazaine. No one denies that in August he fought admirably, and, though finally beaten, was only overcome after a succession of desperate battles, which cost the Prussians dear. It was not until later that suspicion rested on his conduct. The history of September and October is a history of suspended energy and secret intriguing; and it can excite no surprise that so many of the Marshal's own soldiers should have regarded him with distrust and rage.

When the first agony of surrender had passed, the townsfolk of Metz received the Prussians with civility, and disorders were not numerous. The Metzers are a prudent race: they liked the money which their conquerors spent amongst them; they were relieved at being delivered from imminent famine; and they saw the utter hopelessness of resistance. A Prussian party is said to have been formed; but it is certain that the great majority of the people were as French as they dared show themselves. When the first German regiments entered the city, some of the civilians attacked and wounded them. General Kummer, the German Commandant, accordingly issued a proclamation, informing the inhabitants that it was death to lift a hand against a Prussian soldier, to steal from him, to harbour a spy, or to do anything contrary to the interests of the Prussian army. It was at the same time announced that scrupulous regard would be paid to private property in the town and its vicinity; and, with a view to maintaining order, patrols were sent into the streets. The German garrison of the captured city consisted of less than 20,000 men; the remainder of the immense besieging force was divided among different services, some being sent to Paris, others to the south, and others again to Thionville, Verdun, Mézières, and Belfort. The French prisoners were transported to Germany in enormous batches, guarded by Prussian troops at the rate of 1,600 to every 10,000 men; and Marshals Lebœuf and Canrobert, Generals l'Admirault and Frossard, and the officers of their Staff, were, together with Bazaine, allowed to join the Emperor at Wilhelmshöhe.

An appendix to the protocol of the capitulation was published, providing that the families of members of the garrison, as well as of civil functionaries connected with the army or the town, might go wherever they liked, carrying away whatever was their own property; that no one would be molested for political opinions or participation in the defence of the town; that everything that members of the garrison were obliged to leave at Metz would remain their property; that the Prussian commander would protect the inhabitants against ill-treatment; that property of all kinds would be respected; and that no change would be made in regard to the rights with which corporations, companies, or private individuals might be invested by French law. The Municipal Council addressed a proclamation to the townspeople, exhorting them to bear their misfortunes calmly. "No one of us," said this address, "can reproach himself with having failed in his duty. We must console ourselves with the idea that our trial will only be a transitory one, and that in the facts which have been accomplished the inhabitants of Metz have assumed no share of responsibility, either before the country or before history." The German authorities gave orders that the soldiers from Alsace and Lorraine, captured at Metz, as well as those who might afterwards be taken, should be separated from the other prisoners, as they were thenceforth to be looked upon as Germans; and in various ways the Prussians did their best to conciliate a people whom they had determined not to relinquish.

The rejoicings at Berlin over the capture of Metz and of the army of Bazaine were naturally great. The event seemed at the moment to augur well for a speedy cessation of the war; and, as at the period of Sedan, many people anticipated the immediate conclusion of a peace favourable to the interests of Germany. France, however, was not yet reduced to despair; or, if so, it was that kind of despair which is more determined in its resistance than the most sanguine hope. The war was about to enter on a new phase, more widely spread, more full of vicissitudes, and more irregular in its forms and methods, than that which had gone before, yet as little destined to result in victory to the French as the efforts of the Imperial armies now imprisoned in Germany, or scattered in disheartened fragments over the land.



BALLOON POST FROM PARIS.

CHAPTER XXI.

Effects of the News of the Fall of Metz—The Peace Party and the War Party—The French Emperor and the Capitulation—Orleanist Intrigues—General Incredulity as to the Surrender—Felix Pyat and M. Rochefort—The King of Bavaria's Congratulations—The German and French Press—Condition of the Camp before Metz—State of the Town after the Capitulation—Hatred of the People to Prussian Rule—Execration of Bazaine—Immorality of the French Commanding Officers—The Highest Courage wanting in them—Devastation of the Department of the Moselle—Capitulation of Soissons—Investment of Thionville, Neu Breisach, and Schelestadt—Sortie from Montmédy—Disposition of the German Army from before Metz—Departure of M. Gambetta for Tours—His Perilous Balloon Journey—His Arrival at Tours on Oct. 9th—Arrival of Garibaldi in the same City on the same Day—Formation of a Garibaldian Army—Proclamation of M. Gambetta, and Remarks on it—M. Gambetta's New and Augmented Powers—Antagonistic Views with Reference to the Republic—The Prospects of the War—Relative Condition of the French and German Armies.

THE news of the fall of Metz was variously received in different quarters. To some Frenchmen it appeared hopeless to continue the war after so terrible a misfortune, in addition to the other crushing blows that had descended on the nation. Almost the last regular army of any importance which France possessed had been handed over to the enemy, with weapons and munitions of war that could not easily be replaced. Of the fighting men who remained the majority were raw troops, hastily raised, imperfectly drilled, hardly distinguished by military uniform, and badly armed. It seemed cruel to send such persons against the tried and successful warriors of Prussia; and many who had been hopeful till then, now cried for peace. Winter was not far distant, and, though this would tell against the invader, it would also aggravate the sufferings of the poorer classes of Frenchmen. The harvest had been bad; the fields in many places were cut up by the struggles of embattled hosts; trade and commerce were almost destroyed; rinderpest was spreading with alarming rapidity among the cattle; and the requisitions of the Germans became more onerous every day. In the north of France an appeal to the members of the provincial councils was circulated, with a view to creating a feeling in favour of peace This document stated that as the Ministry had postponed the elections till the retreat of the enemy, while Prussia would only conclude peace with a Government empowered by the nation, and that as these conflicting views might prolong the war, it behoved influential men, such as those composing the councils, to reflect on the best means of restoring to the country its freedom of expression. They should meet, and send a petition or deputation to the Government, to urge the importance of at once enabling the nation to express an opinion on the timeliness of peace, or the continuation of the war if the Prussian conditions should be deemed unacceptable. The Assembly might be restricted to this one purpose, and Count Bismarck would very probably facilitate its election and deliberations, as he must be anxious to send home the German armies, which he could only do on the conclusion of peace. "One must place justice higher even than patriotism," the circular proceeded, "and must confess that it was France which, badly influenced, declared war against Prussia, and that, had the fortune of war been so favourable to it that its armies had penetrated to Berlin, it would scarcely have made peace except on a rectification of frontier at the expense of Germany. France, therefore, should not deem it unreasonable if Prussia to-day makes the same demand, as long as it restricts it within reasonable limits. They will not be humbled who submit to a peace, but rather those senseless people who, in their mad pride and presumptuous patriotism, approved the war, and contributed to its being declared." A copy of this circular was said at the time to have "reached" Count Bismarck's bureau at Versailles; and, looking at the extremely Prussian character of the document, it might almost be suspected that the astute Chancellor had something to do with its production. It may, however, have really expressed the opinions of certain Frenchmen. The *Courrier du Havre*, according to a German paper, exclaimed:—"Peace! That is the cry which at this moment millions of voices raise in all quarters of the earth, as well as in down-trodden France; in Germany, intoxicated with unexpected triumph, in intelligent England, in practical America, in far-sighted Russia, in loyal Spain, and in Italy, where war is still fresh in people's recollection. Everywhere this cry is raised to the Almighty, and seeks to make Heaven gracious, seeing that the leaders of the peoples are without mercy." The *Journal de Fécamp*, commenting on this article, in a strain of abject submission, said:—"Yes; conquered and humbled France desires and demands peace. All resistance is for the future unavailing. It will only add new hecatombs of a million corpses to the million of corpses mouldering on the fields of Weissenburg, Reichshofen, Jaumont, and Sedan. We are conquered, scattered, as a nation has never been before. Let us cease to delude ourselves with new hopes, and to calculate on an impossible resistance. We are honourably conquered. Our army, which is no more, has made heroic exertions. It has even won the respect of the victor. Honour is saved. We are conquered. Let us humble ourselves. Let us assume the dignity of misfortune. Silent and modest, let us submit. Peace, peace alone, which is everywhere demanded by all France, can save the country's future, by its men and resources being spared. In view of the country's misfortune, we must at this hour have the courage to bow our necks, and sue for peace." The country was terribly impoverished, and to the less sanguine it seemed impossible to retrieve the disasters of the past three months.

Yet this was very far from the general view. In the breasts of most Frenchmen arose a resolve not to submit tamely to the pleasure of the victor. The very extremity of their misfortunes seemed to stimulate a corresponding spirit of defiance. This was particularly the case in the southern departments. The body styling itself the League of the South issued a manifesto, concluding with a decree which ran:—

"Art. 1. In all the departments which have adhered to the League all citizens must hold themselves in readiness to quit their homes at the first summons, and to march under the standards of the Republic against Prussian and monarchical despotism. The point of rendezvous for the national forces will be the city of Valence and the surrounding plains. The delegates of the co-operating departments are designated as General Commissioners of the League of the South. They will traverse the departments to preach a holy war, to call together Republican committees in the various localities, and to act in concert with them in order to effect, by all possible means, a general uprising.

"Art. 2. A national subscription, freely assented to by each department, each municipality, and each citizen, shall be raised for the purpose of procuring the arms and accoutrements required by the forces of the League. The product of such subscription shall be paid into the treasury of the League through the Central Committee of each department.

"Art. 3. The General Commissioners shall arrange with the Republicans of each department for the election of cantonal delegates, who shall attend the General Assembly of the League of the South at Marseilles, on November 5. The present manifesto shall be posted, by the aid of all patriots of the South, in every canton and commune of the fifteen departments, and of Algeria.

"Art. 4. The citizens in each locality should make known, as speedily as possible, to the head-quarters of the League at Marseilles, the result of their individual efforts to facilitate the task of the General Commissioners. They should, moreover, place themselves in constant communication with the Central Committee sitting at the Prefecture in Marseilles. In the name of the Republic, one and indivisible, the members of municipal and administrative bodies owe the most energetic assistance, as citizens, to the members of the League of the South, created for the defence of the Republic, and to their representatives.—Done at Marseilles, October 25, 1870."

To those who felt in accordance with this manifesto, it appeared that there was nothing to gain by submission, and much to be hoped from a vigorous resistance. Nay, the more impassioned, or the more fanatical, would not admit the possibility of ultimate defeat. France had not yet risen in her might; the hidden forces of the Republic had yet to be evoked. The defence would even be the stronger for the loss of those armies which were raised by Imperialism and officered by traitors. The opinion may have been foolish, but it was held by many. The Republic, though not generally loved for itself, was accepted as representing, for the time being, the principle of nationality and the determination to fight. M. Gambetta became the most influential man in the Provisional Government, because he was the most earnest in devising means for continuing the war. Men argued that France was lost if she permitted herself to be disheartened, even by such a succession of defeats as those she had endured; and no people that values its own historic reputation can blame them for so thinking. Every great country owes an obligation to the past and a duty to the future, and cannot readily descend from the proud altitudes of glory and of suffering. The prolonged and agonising struggle was destined to fail; yet all generous natures will think the better of France for having made it. Had it gone well, the worshippers of success would have been ready with their servile congratulations. That it was not an utterly vain endeavour is proved by the fact that, during the whole course of the war, France was never so near victory, nor Prussia so near defeat, as in the late autumn months that followed the capitulation of Metz.

The French Emperor was greatly depressed on hearing the intelligence of Bazaine's collapse, though he must have seen for some time that such a result was inevitable. He was informed on the 25th of October that negotiations for a surrender were proceeding; and on the 26th—if we may rely on a statement contained in a letter from Wilhelmshöhe in the *Cologne Gazette*—he neither ate nor drank. The officers of his suite were cold and composed; but to each and all it must have been apparent that the position of France as a predominant military power was at an end. To the Emperor it must have seemed increasingly doubtful with each fresh disaster whether he should ever regain the throne he had lost. The Orleanists conceived that their time had come, and their agents were busy with the captured French officers in Germany. The Countess of Saxe-Coburg, an Orleans princess, was warned by the Prussian Government that certain people were misusing her name and influence for the purpose of a political propaganda among the French prisoners; and in France itself similar intrigues were prosecuted. The loss of Metz was a tremendous weapon in the hands of all who would discredit the Imperial Government with a view to preparing the way for a successor.

For the first few days the French people would not believe the news. It was supposed to be a trick of the party of reaction. At Lyons the crowd rushed to the office of the *Salut Public* to destroy the printing presses, and the place was entered before the demonstration could be stopped. The following note was then issued by the Prefect:—"The news repeated by the *Salut Public* from the newspaper *La France* is in no respect official. It has no appearance of truth. I do not know a word of it, and it has surprised me as much as anybody. I hold it to be false, calumnious, invented by the enemies of order, of the Republic, and of public safety. Those who invent it should be dishonoured. I beg the citizens to remain calm.—The Prefect of the Rhône, Commissary Extraordinary of the Republic,—P. Challemel Lacour." The announcement had indeed come a little before the right time, but it was substantially correct, for the capitulation was already determined on. When an official statement of the fact was placarded at Strasburg, a group of people assembled, and listened to the speech of a man who insisted that the despatch was false. He was at once arrested by a German police officer, and detained in prison for a night. In Paris the same incredulity was shown. It was proposed to shoot Felix Pyat, the well-known Red Republican, for having announced in his journal, the *Combat*, on two successive days, that the Government were aware of Marshal Bazaine having sent a colonel to the camp of the King of Prussia to treat for the surrender of Metz, and for peace, in the name of the Emperor. The statement caused the wildest excitement; it was denounced as an infamous lie, and many persons were strongly in favour of making short work with M. Pyat. Several copies of the paper were seized and destroyed. The unfortunate journalist, however, shrouded himself from the storm, and M. Rochefort expressed his contempt for him as a mean and sneaking coward, who had taken part in the funeral of Victor Noir (the young man shot by Pierre Buonaparte) by hiding behind a Venetian blind, and who afterwards concealed himself for eight days in a coal-barge. The *Journal Officiel* published an indignant denial of Felix Pyat's story; but the Government did not think it worth their while to prosecute him; and in a few days more they learnt the truth of the surrender, though it has never been proved that the Emperor had anything to do with the matter.



LOUIS II., KING OF BAVARIA.

The King of Bavaria, on being informed by telegraph of the great event, sent the following reply to the King of Prussia:—"I hail with the deepest satisfaction the surrender of Metz, so important for the result of the war, and send you my



ENGLISH RESIDENTS LEAVING PARIS.

best thanks for your friendly telegram. When posterity one day reviews the splendid successes which the German forces under your command have uninterruptedly gained, they will justly give you the name of William the Victorious." It was certainly high time, from the German point of view, that Metz was taken. The *Borse Zeitung*, of Berlin, remarked after the capitulation that the position of the besiegers was fast becoming intolerable. The health of the troops was very unsatisfactory. Those who had not been attacked by dysentery or typhus were suffering from violent diarrhœa and similar maladies; cold and wet were producing their usual effects; and, in addition to bodily fatigue and exposure, a great deal of mental depression was caused by inactivity and the constant apprehension of sorties. The German press drew the happiest auguries from the fall of the famous stronghold; the French journals, on the other hand, were mad with rage and sorrow, and in most directions the accusations against Bazaine were loud and unsparing. Only occasionally would a voice be raised in favour of greater deliberation, and of a suspension of the judgment until the facts could be more clearly ascertained. The *Gazette de France* (which, like many other Paris papers, was now published in the provinces) recorded the capitulation "with a broken heart," adding, "It is almost impossible to believe that such a thing is possible. What curse is it that weighs upon France? Formerly, 150,000 men sufficed to gain victories over 400,000 enemies; but now they only serve to hasten the capitulation of a fortress. What a melancholy history is this! Strasburg fell because it had not a sufficient number of defenders; while Metz, in whose walls the enemy's cannon had made no breach, succumbed because it had too many soldiers shut up within its defences." In more independent quarters, however, some different opinions found vent. The *Nord*—a Brussels paper representing French interests—was very severe on the proclamation of M. Gambetta. It pointed out that the Minister was engaged in holding up rather the banner of the Revolution than that of France. "It is the Republic, one and indivisible," said this journal, "that must be greeted before everything. One and indivisible! And how are you to avoid the division of the territory when you scatter broadcast divisions in hearts and minds by charging with treason all those who do not bow the knee before you, or who destroy, even unintentionally, your calculations and your lies?" The article went on to observe that, while Gambetta was stigmatising Bazaine as a traitor, a Marseilles club was condemning Gambetta as a scoundrel. How, it was asked, could any new form of government be permanently established in the midst of such revolting confusion? or what chance existed of the struggle being effectively carried on against the invasion? These were home-thrusts, and it is certainly not to be denied that the Republic in France has always been a source of dissension and division. Yet it was accepted as the *de facto* Government in face of the enemy; and with the majority it gained rather than lost in power by its determination not to lower the national flag.

The camp before Metz, when the Germans entered it, was found to be in a horrible state. Hundreds of dead horses and mules lay about, mingled with the corpses of soldiers who had perished of disease or of deficient food. Strips of horse-flesh hung upon the sides of the bastions, or lay sodden with rain upon the ground. The mud was ankle-deep, and the rain continued for days to descend heavily, adding to the slush with which the ground was thickly covered. The neighbouring roads were alive with crowds of half-famished men and women, who at the beginning of the investment had quitted the adjacent villages and taken refuge in the fortress, where of course they were compelled to share the privations of the citizens and the army. They were now returning to their respective hamlets—to find them, in many instances, reduced to ruins. In the contrary direction peasants and market-folks were hurrying towards the town, bearing large quantities of provisions, for which an eager market was certain to be found. The immediate neighbourhood of the city showed signs of the energy with which it had been defended. Numerous rifle-pits and bastions were to be seen in the fields all round the walls, and the railway was completely blocked. The town itself presented a curious spectacle. In the narrow main street, as one of the newspaper correspondents relates, thousands of French soldiers, with their officers, stood about, chatting in a very friendly way with Prussian infantry and dragoons. Commissariat wagons, army-contractors, and Jewish horse-dealers purchasing half-starved animals at exceedingly low prices from officers who were going into captivity, filled the ways, and kept up a stir of business for several hours. The public squares were as crowded as if a fair were going on; gun-carriages rattled over the pavement; and the German military bands from time to time struck up the favourite national airs. The butchers' shops still contained joints of horse as a substitute for other kinds of meat; and the bakers offered black or brown bread to their customers.

Food of a superior kind, however, was to be found at the best hotels; but prices at first ran very high. The Germans were enabled in most cases to communicate without difficulty with the Metzers, owing to the greater number speaking German. Ten miles east of the town the country people speak scarcely anything else.

A special correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* wrote an account of the appearance of Metz, and of the popular mood shortly after the capitulation, which places the facts in a very vivid light. The walls were covered with inscriptions denouncing Bazaine and Coffinières as traitors and cowards; and citizens and soldiers cried alike, "We have been betrayed! Metz has not been taken! Metz is virgin as it was! Metz has been betrayed by both the scoundrels who have delivered over this impregnable fortress to the enemy!" A great deal of valorous determination was expressed, of which the writer seems to have made small account.

> "On all sides we hear the inhabitants of this fortress protest that they never consented to surrender; that they would all have preferred death to this dishonour; that no sacrifice would have been too great for them had they only been permitted to defend themselves to the bitter end. It is all very fine for them to talk now that the impending danger has passed over. That they have suffered is perfectly true, but I can perceive no traces of those complete and fearful privations which announce the determination to make a desperate resistance. The Commandant of the fortress during the previous six days had served out no provisions regularly to the troops encamped before the walls. There were not provisions enough in store for feeding the garrison for twenty-four hours, and the inhabitants had also consumed all their stores of food. The fortress was only surrendered to the beleaguering forces when those invested were famishing, and there was no possible chance of averting the impending starvation which threatened the town. Bazaine's sortie of the 7th of October was attempted in order to procure a fresh supply of provisions for the fortress; but he was unsuccessful. An army of 173,000 men capitulated without making one desperate attempt to cut its way out of the investing lines. The same thing that occurred after the battle of Sedan occurred here, with the sole difference that Metz was considered impregnable, whilst Sedan is a fortress of an ordinary kind. Sedan was, so to speak, without any provisions; and if there has been any treachery in Metz, it consists in the fact of leaving so large and important a fortress provisioned only for a few weeks. The ramparts of Metz are so gigantic, the numerous fortifications so formidable, that an enemy taking up a position in front of its walls could barely make the necessary preparations for entrenching itself and sustaining the siege in less than four weeks; and a fortress, the garrison of which cannot hold out even during this short space of time without having recourse to their own horses for food, is no longer a fortress. The errors of judgment displayed in Metz are precisely the same which have predominated on the part of the French throughout the present campaign. Most culpably undervaluing the strength and resources of the enemy, owing to that arrogant self-sufficiency which characterises the French nation, they flung down the gauntlet to Germany without having a sufficiently strong army in the field. This same idea of self-sufficiency was the grand reason why Metz was only arranged to serve as a kind of arsenal and depôt for arms and munitions of war for the troops who were to march into Germany. No one for a single moment deemed it necessary to prepare Metz for a serious defence, for no one ever imagined it possible that the Germans could plant their feet upon French soil. This want of thought and frivolity has caused the fall of Metz; and no army, unless stronger and more stable in its defensive operations than were the French, would have been able to hold Metz, even though inspired with all the courage and *élan* derived from despair. The French army is not celebrated for its patience under hardships and privations. This has been proved hundreds of times during the present campaign, when the troops upon the march, if they were suffering any privations or hardships, flung away their guns, stuck their hands in their breeches-pockets, and laughed in the faces of their officers. It is a well-known and acknowledged fact that even as they did at Sedan so they did at Metz; they refused to obey the commands of their superiors, and broke out into open mutiny. The inhabitants of Metz—even the most patriotic amongst them—say that during the last four weeks the soldiers forcibly made their way into the shops and houses, and ransacked them from cellar to garret, carrying off what they found in the shape of provisions, but in most cases offering to pay for what they carried off."

The women were dressed in deep mourning; many of the shops were closed; and an air of resigned grief pervaded the whole town. The writer in the *Cologne Gazette* says that there was hardly one Prussian soldier to every twenty Frenchmen, and that, had the latter wished to exterminate the former, they might easily have done so with no other weapons than their sticks. No excesses, however, were committed. French and Prussians sat at the same table in the *cafés* without any disputes arising. The prospect of once more having white bread was very pleasing to the townspeople, and great comfort was derived from the fact that a million rations were sent from Ars into Metz immediately after the surrender, and from the announcement that the provisioning would be continued in the same proportion. One of the saddest sights in the town consisted of the long files of miserable starved horses and mules wandering about without owners, desperately searching for anything that could be turned into food, and often dying in the public ways. The suburbs were less orderly than the city. In the outskirts dozens of drunken French soldiers were to be seen at night lying in the heavy mud, and sometimes fighting among themselves. The sutlers' carts drove a roaring trade, and even the townspeople sent out to them for liquor. Over all descended the incessant rain, depressing the conquerors quite as much as the conquered. "Every man," says the correspondent from whom we have derived these details, "is wet through to the skin; there are no stoves in most of the houses, and no fuel even where there are any stoves. The roads are dreadfully cut up, and covered with thick and deep mud; and yet our troops must march forward and forward until they stop the vaunting tongues and throats of the good people of Paris." Concerning the disposition of the Metzers towards Prussian rule, this writer makes a remark which, coming from a German source, is not without value. "We can neither hope nor expect," he observes, "any sympathy amongst these people for generations to come. They detest us as thoroughly as we do the French; and if Metz is to remain German, it must be held by an iron arm, and placed under a severe government. The people will disavow every concession, every act of mildness, and our benefits will indeed fall upon a stony and barren soil." If, in the course of succeeding years, this opinion be proved to be correct, the advantage to Prussia of the territory annexed at the close of the war is more than doubtful. What sort of "bulwark" to an Empire is that which consists of unwilling subjects, whose hearts are on the other side of the border, and whose heads are constantly plotting for independence?

Mr. Robinson's account confirms that of other writers with respect to the frequent drunkenness of the French soldiers in those sad days of disgrace and humiliation. In the roads out of Metz they were met repeatedly reeling to and fro in sullen, sodden intoxication. This writer, in leaving the city where he had been held a captive, passed through the Prussian camp; and he avers that he saw no evidence of those three lines of the enemy's fortifications which were said by Bazaine to encompass Metz. He looked in vain for the chain of Prussian forts of which so much had been said. He could only see some few slight earthworks, without one mounted gun. Several officers whom he afterwards met at Luxemburg, and who came by various routes, confirmed the impression thus produced. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that, according to other and independent accounts, the Prussians were really very strongly posted around Metz in the later weeks of the siege. Bazaine's opportunity was in the earlier days; but, from whatever motive, he let it slip. Never was man more unpopular. No one was found to give him a good word. A member of the Municipal Council, on whom he proposed to confer the cross of the Legion of Honour, flatly refused to receive it, because it was associated with the infamous capitulation. The very women scouted the idea of the city being in such extremity as to make the surrender unavoidable. The people, it was generally stated (but the statement must be received with some caution), had as much as they wanted of the necessaries of life, though they were deprived of many of its luxuries. Prices had of course risen, and the poorer classes suffered some misery; but it was generally agreed that matters were a long way off the worst. "If the defence of Metz," said a girl who was passionately denouncing Bazaine, "had been left to the women, it would not have surrendered for a long time." This kind of speech is not unfrequently made when it is no longer capable of being brought to the test; and it would be foolish to place much reliance on it. Yet the fact that such things were repeatedly said and widely believed shows how bitter and general was the impression that Bazaine had not done what he might for the preservation of the stronghold.

The self-indulgence and lax morality of the commanding officers were also dwelt on with great indignation. The special correspondent of the *Times* relates:—"I was positively informed by the man in whose father's house Lebœuf lived during the siege that he had a dairy and a poultry-yard to the very end, and that he, Bazaine, and the superior officers, lived in luxury to the last. They paid exorbitant prices for the delicacies of the table, but always succeeded in procuring them; and I was indignantly assured by a veracious citizen that only a week before the capitulation a friend of his had sold Bazaine a *pâté de foie gras* for 500fr. The total amount spent by the army in the city was estimated at one hundred and twenty million of francs. The townspeople were utterly scandalised by the flagrant immorality of their defenders, who seemed to have preferred *cafés* and the society of the *demi-monde* to duty in the trenches, and who to the last denied themselves no enjoyment or luxury which money could purchase or the town afford. To listen to the *bourgeoisie* of Metz, who had the best oppor tunity of judging, this demoralisation was by no means confined to the higher ranks. Doubtless it began there, but the taint soon extended beyond the Marshals; and the vices which had become fashionable in the Court were soon imitated in the camp. It is possible that Bazaine may be the traitor he is accused of being; but it seems to me more likely that he and all his officers, as soon as they began to run short of truffles, and found that their female friends got bored with the monotony of the siege, determined to bring it to a close." The universal teaching of history shows that the most immoral men will often fight with extraordinary courage; but they shrink from the prolonged and unexciting trials of a siege which is being conducted by the dull slow process of starving out. The brilliance of battle—the vivid emotions of actual conflict, of peril, and of triumph—are attractive to natures of a quick and sensitive fibre, such as feel their life at every point. But to abide from day to day the dull monotony of hope deferred; to pass weary hours of simple endurance; to be hungry, and not complain; to be defeated, and not despondent; to wrestle dumbly with dumb fate; to persist in the teeth of every depressing influence; to be heroic without any opportunity for dramatic action; to find the highest manifestation of courage to consist in waiting, and yet to wait with stubborn and unbending will until the end shall come in light of victory or shades of death—this requires a higher mood, a greater exaltation of soul, a stronger habit even of the sensual nature, than any which the flippant voluptuary can conceive. Perhaps we should also attribute these surrenders in part to the greater mildness of modern times. We pity others, and we pity ourselves, more than our ancestors did. The agonies of famine shake us too deeply to be encountered for the retention of a city or the predominance of a state.

The country round Metz for many miles suffered severely from the Prussian operations. In the opinion of well-informed persons the whole department of the Moselle was ruined for twenty years. The invaders were said to have carried off with them everything that was portable—cattle, horses, grain, fodder, even furniture, bedding, and linen. Most of the vineyards were destroyed, and all the wine that was stored in the villages was consumed or taken away. A large number of trees had been cut down; and one of the most beautiful parts of France was converted, in many localities, into little better than a wilderness. It was a consolation to the peasantry, however, that something like tranquillity had succeeded to the storm and fury of war. The last detachments of French prisoners departed for Germany on the 5th of November, and there was no longer any danger of frantic outbursts of despair. All the French soldiers now left in Metz were the 22,000 wounded and the 3,000 sick lying in the fifty-two hospitals and ambulances of the town.

While Metz was helplessly passing on to its fate through the long torture of the October days, much was being done elsewhere both by the Germans and the French. The minor sieges proceeded with energy. Soissons, before which the Prussians massed their forces on the 28th of September, as related at p. 234, found itself threatened with bombardment. On the 3rd of October the garrison, led by the Duke de Fitzjames, made a gallant sortie, but it had not the effect of shaking off the enemy. The regular siege did not commence until the 12th, but it was then vigorously prosecuted. For four days the town was bombarded by the forces under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and on the 16th it capitulated. The investing army consisted of the Wurtemburg Infantry, the Pomeranian, Hessian, and Magdeburg Artillery, the Schleswig Engineers, the Halberstadt Cavalry, and eight battalions of Landwehr. The defenders counted 4,732 men, who, together with 132 guns, 70,000 grenades, 3,000 cwt. of gunpowder, 92,000 francs in money, three months' provisions, and a large quantity of clothing, were surrendered to the conquerors. Only a few houses were damaged by the bombardment, and the German army occupied the town without disorder. Soissons was not in itself a very important place; but its capture was of value to the Prussians, as removing another of those fortresses which stood between their great army before Paris and their base of operations in Germany. By this success a second line of railway from Châlons to Paris was placed in possession of the invaders, whose position was of course proportionally strengthened, while the defensive power of the French was lessened in an equal degree. The capitulation must have been expected by the French for some time; yet it was none the less felt as an additional misfortune when it came. Every week, as it passed, made the successful defence of Paris a matter of greater uncertainty and trouble.

Some of the heavy guns used against Soissons were among those which had been worked by the French themselves at Toul. In 1814 the town was very feebly defended by old ruinous ramparts; but, inasmuch as it commanded a passage over the Aisne, Napoleon I. enjoined the garrison to defend it against the Allies to the uttermost, and, when surrendered, Paris was no longer tenable. The fortifications had been greatly strengthened



BOMBARDMENT OF SCHELESTADT.

since those days, but they were unable to protect the town from the assaults of the enemy. The heights surrounding Soissons permitted the besiegers, by help of the long-range weapons now employed in warfare, to fire into the place. The French guns were described as numerous and well served, and the Prussians themselves acknowledged that the defence was obstinate. Soissons and Laon, taken together, formed the line of the most advanced fortified positions held by the Germans in that portion of France.

More energetic measures were now adopted against Thionville than had been previously resorted to. The investing army was reinforced, and several of the siege-guns which had been set at liberty by the fall of Strasburg were sent there. Neu Breisach and Schelestadt, south of Strasburg, and not far from the Rhine, were invested by the 9th of October. On the 11th a sortie was made from Montmédy by 500 men of the garrison, who captured the neighbouring town of Stenay, together with 206 men, seven officers, and the German Commandant. Slight successes of this nature, however, made no essential difference in the general situation. The relative strength of the Germans was enormously increased by the surrender of Metz. The great army engaged in the reduction of that fortress was at once utilised for other purposes in the most effective manner. This army consisted of seven corps, numbering about 200,000 men. Of these the 2nd corps was sent to reinforce the besiegers of Paris; the 7th remained in part to garrison Metz, while the rest went to Longwy and Thionville; the 1st and 8th operated towards Lille, under Manteuffel; and the 3rd, 9th, and 10th were led by Prince Frederick Charles in the direction of Orleans, with a view to assisting von der Tann and von Werder. The actions of these various corps must be related in future chapters.

The French, on their part, were not wanting in resolution and activity. It has been already recorded that, immediately before the investment of Paris, three members of the Provisional Government —Crémieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Admiral Fourichon —went to Tours, to act there as a Delegate Administration on behalf of the provinces, from which the capital was about to be cut off. The triumvirate did not at all distinguish themselves by fertility of resource or vigour of direction; and it was felt at Paris that some one of greater mark and power must be sent to the spot. M. Gambetta appeared to his colleagues the fittest man for such a purpose, and his subsequent proceedings in some measure justified that belief. He was the youngest member of the Government—the one most in harmony with modern ideas, and most capable of kindling enthusiasm in others by the electric radiations of his own energy and faith. Whatever his faults, M. Gambetta had much of the heat and brightness of genius. His mind and character showed a certain similarity to those of Mazzini; indeed, Mazzini might almost have claimed him as a countryman and fellow-townsman. The family of M. Gambetta came from Genoa; and the man himself, with dark hair and beard, black eyes and pallid complexion, looked more Italian than French. He was born, however, at Cahors, a town in the south of France, lying towards the Spanish frontier,



ON THE BATTLE FIELD.

in the department of the Lot, of which it is the capital. Here he first drew breath in 1838, so that at the period now being chronicled he was only thirty-two. At college he was regarded by his tutors as rather eccentric; but he worked hard, though somewhat irregularly. His disposition even then was vehement and self-reliant; he insisted very much on his personal independence, and was fond of solitude, probably because he found few to sympathise with his views. Ultimately he went to Paris, studied the law, and was called to the bar as the secretary of M. Crémieux, who conceived so great a regard for him that he always called him his son, and predicted that his future would be brilliant. In Parliament he distinguished himself by the warmth with which he defended republican principles; and the Revolution of September, 1870, brought him prominently forward. An American writer, describing his personal appearance, says that "he has a masculine and intellectual head, solidly embedded in a stalwart pair of shoulders. His frame is thick-set and muscular, his walk brisk and firm, and his speech rapid and energetic. His voice, which never seems to tire, is sometimes full of cadence, sometimes stunning in its intonations. His countenance is a very attractive and sympathetic combination of Italian delicacy and Gascon vigour, full of mingled thoughtfulness and audacity, frankness and haughtiness. His nose is straight and regular, with strongly-marked nostrils, broadly dilated; and his mouth is none the worse for a strongly disdainful lip, that is sometimes brightened by a hearty laugh of Rabelaisian mirth." Nature seemed to have largely qualified M. Gambetta for the part of demagogic agitator which it was his ambition to play.

It was by means of a balloon that M. Gambetta quitted Paris, escaped the clutches of the Germans, and arrived at his place of destination. On the 7th of October two large balloons ascended from the Place St. Pierre, Montmartre. One carried the Delegate Minister and his secretaries; in the other sat two American citizens, who were leaving Paris for the purpose of introducing rifles into the southern provinces. The balloons rose simultaneously a little after eleven o'clock in the morning, amidst many exclamations of "Long live France!" "Long live the Republic!" from the crowd assembled to witness the event. M. Gambetta is said to have evinced some nervousness at the prospect of starting. He changed colour, and clutched at the network. An additional line of rope was thrown round the shrouds of the car to prevent his falling out; and he then regained sufficient self-possession to unfurl the French flag as the balloon mounted into the air. In the car were bags of letters and baskets of carrier-pigeons. Shortly after the start the balloon began to descend rapidly, to the great consternation of the on-lookers, who feared that the Minister, his companions, and the letters they carried with them, would fall into the hands of the Prussians. In a few moments, however, the balloon again rose, and passed safely onward over the German lines. It dropped considerably near Creil, where, a force of Prussians being in sight, the aëronauts threw out shawls and travelling-bags, and once more sailed upward, though not before some shots had been sent after them by the enemy, one of which slightly grazed M. Gambetta's hand. At Mont Dizier, near Amiens, the balloon struck against some trees, and, being much torn, fell to the ground. The Minister and his secretaries then took a conveyance for Amiens, which they reached in safety, though pursued by a party of Uhlans. This was on the 8th, the day after that on which they had quitted Paris. From Amiens M. Gambetta went to Rouen, and thence to Tours, where he arrived at noon on the 9th, in the midst of a storm of thunder, lightning, and rain.

The expedition was well conceived and resolutely executed; but it is difficult to read without a smile the rhapsodical nonsense which was written about it in the Paris press. The *Figaro* suggested the likelihood of an early peace, to be signed at Berlin; and the *Gaulois* imagined this little dramatic scene at the German head-quarters:—"As the balloon passed above the Prussian armies, amid the clouds and the birds, the old William probably turned to Bismarck, and asked, 'What is that black point in the sky?' 'It is a Minister,' replied Bismarck; 'it is the heroic Gambetta, on his way to the Loire. In Paris he named prefects; on the Loire he will assemble battalions.' Favourable winds wafted the balloon on her course; perhaps Gambetta landed at Cahors, his natal town—perhaps somewhere else—perhaps in the arms of Crémieux, that aged lion. To-morrow the provinces will resound with his voice, which will mingle with the rattling of arms and the sound of drums. Like a trumpet, it will peal along the Loire, inflaming hearts, forming battalions, and causing the manes of St. Just and Desmoulins to rise from their graves." It would be incredible that any population of adults should be gratified by such raving as this, had not long and sad experience made it clear that there is no foolishness too great for the delighted acceptance of Parisians.

On the day that M. Gambetta reached Tours, General Garibaldi arrived at the same city to take command of the volunteers. He had landed at

Marseilles on the 7th, and had quitted it for the seat of the Delegate Government on the following day. He arrived at seven o'clock on the morning of the 9th, and was met at the station by M. Crémieux.* The illustrious old soldier was suffering from the wound in his foot, received several years before at Aspromonte; he was also stiff with rheumatism, and appeared fatigued, far from strong, and somewhat subdued in manner. At the Prefecture there was of course an enthusiastic demonstration, with much shouting, and the Francs-tireurs requested M. Glais-Bizoin to embrace the Liberator on behalf of the regiment. Garibaldi replied in a few words which were almost inaudible. One thousand Garibaldians were already collected at Chambery, and it was known that their numbers would largely increase as soon as the chieftain himself appeared on the scene. At the commencement of the war, Garibaldi had given his sympathies to Prussia, because he thought she had been unjustly attacked by his old enemy, the Emperor Napoleon; but with the fall of the Empire, and the change of the Prussian tactics from simple defence to scarcely-disguised aggression, his good wishes were transferred from the German to the French side, and he determined to aid the Provisional Government by his popular influence and his unrivalled power of organising guerilla warfare. The struggle was now to assume a more democratic character, and it was but natural that Garibaldi should take a prominent part in its conduct. He was appointed general of division in the French army, and commander-in-chief of the irregular forces of France, with the design of acting in the Vosges in combination with a brigade of French Mobiles. On the 12th he left Tours to commence active operations.

Immediately after arriving at Tours, M. Gambetta issued the following proclamation, addressed to the citizens of the departments, and dated October 9th:—

"By order of the Republican Government I have left Paris to convey to you the hopes of the Parisian people, and the instructions and orders of those who accepted the mission of delivering France from the foreigner. For seventeen days Paris has been invested, and offers the spectacle of two millions of men who, forgetting all differences to range themselves around the Republican flag, will disappoint the expectations of the invader, who reckoned upon civil discord. The Revolution found Paris without cannon and without arms. Now, 400,000 National Guards are armed, 100,000 Mobiles have been summoned, and 60,000 regular troops are assembled. The foundries cast cannon, the women make one million cartridges daily. The National Guard have two mitrailleuses for each battalion. Field-pieces are being made for sorties against the besiegers. The forts are manned by Marines, and furnished with marvellous artillery, served by the first gunners in the world. Up till now their fire has prevented the enemy from establishing the smallest work. The *enceinte*, which on the 4th of September had only 500 cannons, has now 3,800, with 400 rounds of ammunition for each. The casting of projectiles continues with ardour. Every one is at the post assigned to him for fighting. The *enceinte* is uninterruptedly covered by the National Guard, who from morning till night drill for the war with patriotism and steadiness. The experience of these improvised soldiers increases daily. Beyond the *enceinte* there is a third line of defence formed of barricades, behind which the Parisians will be found defending the Republic with the genius of street-fighting. All this has been executed with calmness and order by the concurrence and enthusiasm of all. It is not a vain illusion that Paris is impregnable. It cannot be captured nor surprised. Two other means remain to the Prussians—sedition and famine. But sedition will not arise, nor famine either. Paris, by placing herself on rations, has enough to defy the enemy for long months, thanks to the provisions which have been accumulated, and will bear restraint and scarcity with manly constancy, in order to afford her brothers in the departments time to gather. Such is, without disguise, the state of Paris. This state imposes great duties upon you. The first is to have no other occupation than the war; the second is to accept fraternally the supremacy of the Republican power, emanating from necessity and right, which will serve no ambition. It has no other passion than to rescue France from the abyss into which Monarchy has plunged her. This done, the Republic will be founded, and sheltered against conspirators and reactionists. Therefore, I have the order, without taking into account difficulties or opposition, to remedy, and, although time fails, to make up by activity the shortcomings caused by delay. Men are not wanting. What has failed us has been a decisive resolution and the consecutive execution of our plans. That which failed us after the shameful capitulation at Sedan was arms. All supplies of this nature had been sent on to Sedan, Metz, and Strasburg, as if, one would think, the authors of our disaster, by a last criminal combination, had desired, at their fall, to deprive us of all means of repairing our ruin. Steps have now been taken to obtain rifles and equipments from all parts of the world. Neither workmen nor money are wanting. We must bring to bear all our resources, which are immense. We must make the provinces shake off their torpor; react against foolish panics; multiply our partisans; offer traps and ambushes to harass the enemy; and inaugurate a national war. The Republic demands the co-operation of all; it will utilise the courage of all its citizens, employ the capabilities of each, and, according to its traditional policy, make young men its chiefs. Heaven itself will cease to favour our adversaries; the autumn rains will come, and, detained and held in check by the capital, far from their homes, and troubled and anxious for the future, the Prussians will be decimated one by one by our arms, by hunger, and by Nature. No! it is not possible that the genius of France should be for evermore obscured; it cannot be that a great nation will let its place in the world be taken from it by an invasion of 500,000 men. Up, then, in a mass, and let us die rather than suffer the shame of dismemberment! In the midst of our disasters we have still left the sentiment of French unity, and the indivisibility of the Republic. Paris, surrounded by the enemy, affirms more loudly and more gloriously than ever the immortal device which is dictated to the whole of France:—'Long live the Republic! Long live France! Long live the Republic, One and Indivisible!'"

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* It was reported at the time that M. Crémieux was accompanied by the Archbishop of Tours, who greeted the Italian democrat warmly, and said they must now overthrow the superstition of monarchy, the cause of all the disasters of France. The Archbishop, however, in a letter to the *Union*, indignantly contradicted this very improbable story; and spoke of Garibaldi as a great Church dignitary in a Romanist country might be expected to speak.

It would be difficult to conceive an address better calculated to arouse those dormant revolutionary passions, and those half-awakened sentiments of nationality and patriotism, on which M. Gambetta relied as his great weapons for carrying on a defensive war. That some of his statements were exaggerated may be true; that he formed far too sanguine a view of the prospects of Paris, and of the country generally, is now clear enough by the light of after facts. But in so deadly a struggle it is necessary above all things to keep up the national spirit; and it can hardly be imputed to M. Gambetta as a fault that he put the best aspect he could on the existing situation and on the probabilities of the future. The worst thing in his address is the atrocious insinuation that the Imperial Government had denuded Paris of arms with the deliberate intention of depriving the citizens of all means of retrieving disasters brought about by itself. It is but too probable that the completion and armament of the Paris forts was delayed by the opposition to military expenditure factiously pursued by the Republican party to which M. Gambetta belonged; and it is in no respect surprising that the resources of the country should have been concentrated on the eastern frontiers in the early days of the war, when it was there that the enemy had to be fought, and when no one anticipated a successful march of the Prussians on Paris. But, in the existing mood of the country, even this injustice may have served its turn.

One verbal remark of M. Gambetta's promised well. Being called for by a noisy crowd outside the Prefecture, he appeared, and, after delivering a few sentences, added, "I have come here to work. Let us be sparing of demonstrations. We must work, for we have not a moment to lose." He then retired, and rejoined his colleagues. In addition to the Ministry of the Interior, he now undertook the Department of War, and, by the authority of the Government in Paris, he was invested with two votes in the Ministerial Council of Tours. He thus acquired nearly dictatorial powers; for, unless all the other three voted against him—a not very likely circumstance—his will would be law. The next few months showed how energetically, almost frantically, he used this power. The national defence during the autumn and winter was mainly due to him; and, though it ultimately failed, it was signalised by much devotion and some temporary success.

The Republic, however, though provisionally accepted by the people as the *de facto* Government, was regarded with distrust in many quarters. The *Gazette de France*, in the early part of October, published a letter from Lille, which said:—"At Tourcoing, Roubaix, and Armentières, which are chiefly manufacturing towns, the Municipal Councils have energetically refused to proclaim the Republic. The commissaries sent to replace the administration have been obliged to retire. It is not admitted here that a Parisian *émeute* should determine the fate of all France. The arrondissements of Dunkerque, Hazebruck, and Flanders, properly so called, are essentially monarchic. The same is the case with Douay. At Lille the majority of the workmen are, on the contrary, republican and socialist. Of Cambray and Valenciennes this may also be said; indeed, at the latter place a revolutionary commune has been established, as at Lyons." Speaking generally, the peasantry and the trading classes were in favour of some form of monarchy, while the artisans were on the side of the Republic. With the working classes all over the civilised world, "the Republic" is a species of superstition. It has been repeatedly proved that in old monarchical countries the republican form of government is incapable of striking root, and that it either withers away in a sort of atrophy, or perishes in sanguinary convulsions. Yet the artisans cling to it with a faith that seems beyond the power of reason and experience to shake. No tyrannies have ever been greater than those committed in the name of Republics; the most autocratic despotisms have never more completely, or even avowedly, denied and flouted the right of the majority to determine the forms and method of government, when there has been reason to suppose that the decision would be adverse. Yet in the workshop and the manufactory "the Republic" is still regarded as the synonym of liberty and popular self-rule. The peasantry and small capitalists of France have too much reason to know the contrary. They fear its violent and sectional character, its intolerance of disagreement, its experimental efforts after an impossible Utopia, its socialistic leanings, its inevitable tendencies towards anarchy, civil war, ruin, and class despotism. For these reasons the Republic of 1870 took no great hold on the majority; but it was tolerated for the moment, as the representative of French nationality in arms against the Prussian.

It was thus that the country entered on the second stage of the great war. The prospect was far from exhilarating. On the one side were the hosts of Germany, by this time impressed with the conviction that they were invincible, as, with their continual successes, their admirable generals, their splendid organisation, their enormous resources, and their perfect discipline and equipment, they might well imagine themselves to be. On the other side were the half-formed armies of France, consisting for the most part of men who had no knowledge of the soldier's trade, who had never been under fire, who had little confidence in themselves and less in their leaders, and who in many instances were but poorly furnished with the weapons necessary for carrying on modern warfare. The regular soldiers which the Empire had led into the field at the close of July were nearly all disposed of by the Prussians. Their successors had been hastily raised, perfunctorily organised, officered at haphazard, and taught to believe that little more was needed in meeting the enemy than to cry "Long live the Republic!" and to sing the "Marseillaise." Those who accepted that teaching relied too much on its sufficiency to acquire the more complex and difficult duties of soldiers; those who rejected it had esoteric virtues of their own, which equally stood in the place of hard, practical, unyielding work. Some put their faith in the Empire, some in the Legitimists, some in the Orleanists, some in the priests, some in the saints. The Germans put their faith in nothing but nerve and iron, discipline and cohesion. They had the supreme virtue of understanding the conditions of success and of obeying them, instead of wildly shrieking after ideal ghosts; and that is the virtue which will always win the day, even (sad as the truth may be) against all other virtues, and against right itself. The Prussians may have been cruel, self-seeking, and remorseless; but they knew how to appreciate facts, and it is facts, not dreams, that govern the world. The fatal error of the French (an error specially encouraged by the Republican party) is their inability to recognise facts, or their determination not to submit to them—a kind of rebelliousness against the proved necessities of life. Yet, with all these faults, their struggle against a pitiless invader had many heroic and noble features. If it showed little capacity, it argued immense devotion. It was brightened with courage and irradiated with self-sacrifice. The pathos of a quenchless faith in the greatness of the country shed a glory even over its defeats; and it dealt the aggressor many grievous blows, from which, now and again, even his iron strength recoiled.

CHAPTER XXII.

Proclamation of the Tours Government on the Prussian Conditions—Reply of Count Bismarck—Remarks on the Point in Dispute—The Real Designs of the German Chancellor—Conversation of Bismarck with Mr. Malet—Circular of the North German Government—Despatch of M. Jules Favre in Answer to Count Bismarck—The Political Ideas of France and Germany—Circular of M. de Chaudordy—Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice on Opinion in Germany—Appeals to England from M. Arles-Dufour and M. Louis Blanc—The Emperor Napoleon's Estimate of M. Favre and Count Bismarck—Siege Arrangements in Paris—A Revolutionary Anniversary—Preposterous Suggestions—Symptoms of Anarchy—The Red Republicans and the Commune—Demonstration on Oct. 6th—Gustave Flourens—The Policy of the Communists—Agitation at Lyons and St. Étienne—Socialist Club in Paris—A new Joan of Arc.

Nothing can be more certain than that any disposition to peace which may have existed in France in the autumn of 1870 was greatly reduced by the hardness of the terms suggested by Count Bismarck whenever he had occasion to speak on the subject. After the celebrated interview between the Prussian Chancellor and M. Favre, described in Chapter XII., the Delegate Government of Tours (not then reinforced by M. Gambetta) issued a proclamation "to the people of France," wherein the determination of the Ministry to continue the war, rather than submit to dishonourable conditions, was strongly asserted. In this document, which was dated September 24th, Messrs. Crémieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon observed:—"Prussia wishes to continue the war, in order to reduce France to a second-rate Power. Prussia demands Alsace, and Lorraine as far as Metz, by right of conquest.



PRINCE ALBERT OF PRUSSIA.

Prussia, before consenting to an armistice, demands the surrender of Strasburg, Toul, and Mont Valérien. Paris is exasperated, and will rather bury herself beneath her ruins. To such insolent pretensions we can respond but by resistance to the last extremity. France accepts the struggle, and counts upon her children." These statements were founded on the report of M. Jules Favre to his colleagues, giving an account of his interviews with Count Bismarck on the 20th and 21st of September, as described at pp. 164—6 of this volume. The Count, however, denied the accuracy of the expressions used by the Tours Government in the proclamation just quoted. On the 1st of October he despatched from Ferrières a circular to the representatives of Germany abroad, in which he specially protested against the assertion that Prussia was determined to proceed with the war until she



VIEW OF BELFORT.

had reduced France to the position of a second-rate Power, and that he (Bismarck) had declared as much. Such a phrase, he observed, could only have been intended to influence circles unacquainted with the language used in international negotiations, and ignorant of the geography of France. But the fact of its having been employed by three gentlemen belonging to the French Government rendered it advisable that an official contradiction should be given. The Count then continued:—

> "In my interview with M. Favre the question of the conditions of peace was not at all formally considered. At his repeated request I communicated to the French Minister in general outlines the same views which formed the principal topic of the circular dated Meaux, September 16. Demands exceeding those therein contained have never yet in any way been made by me. The cession of Strasburg and Metz, which we seek, implies a reduction of French territory equal in area to the increase through Savoy and Nice, while the population of those provinces obtained from Italy is about three-quarters of a million larger. When it is considered that France, according to the census of 1866, numbers 38,000,000 of inhabitants without Algiers, and, with Algiers (now furnishing an essential part of the French war forces), 42,000,000, it is palpable that a decrease therein of three-quarters of a million effects no change in the importance of France as against foreign countries, while it leaves to that great Empire the same elements of power, the possession whereof in the Oriental and Italian wars enabled it to exercise so decisive an influence on the destiny of Europe. These few points will suffice to successfully oppose logical facts to the exaggerations of the proclamation of the 24th ult. I only add, that in conversations with M. Favre I expressly directed his attention to these views; and I need not assure your Excellency that I refrained from every offensive allusion to the consequences of the present war on the future position of France as a great Power of the world."

It is pretty certain that the Count really used no such expression as that contained in the Tours proclamation. That Prussia desired to reduce France to a second-rate Power was rather an inference at second-hand from the suggested inferences of M. Favre. The Foreign Minister, in his report to the other members of the Government, seemed to imply that he considered his adversary's meaning to be tantamount to such an intention; but he records that when he remarked that Prussia desired the destruction of France, Bismarck protested against such a conclusion. In their excitement and wounded pride, however, Messrs. Crémieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon, leapt to the conclusion that the Count had actually stated what it appeared to them obvious he must really mean. This is a common error in the heat of verbal disputation; but it ought not to arise where there is precise documentary evidence to go by. Simply regarded as an inference, however, the statement was not unfair. The design of Prussia was unquestionable. She wished to depose France from her position of supremacy in Europe, and to take that position herself. After the fall of Metz, Prince Frederick Charles, in the order of the day to his army which has been already quoted, said that, by God's blessing, they had completed the great work that had been undertaken by them—"viz., the collapse of the power of France." This, it is true, was more than a month later than the Tours proclamation; but there had been many utterances of the same nature from the outbreak of the war. It was all very well as a piece of rhetoric for Count Bismarck to argue that the territorial loss implied in the cession of Strasburg and Metz would not exceed the gain resulting from the acquisition of Savoy and Nice. But the argument was of no real value, for it was not so much a question of loss of territory as of loss of power that was in dispute. The transfer of two such fortresses as Strasburg and Metz from France to Germany weakened the former to an extent which is not to be calculated in square miles or numbers of people. The German frontier was thus brought so much the nearer to Paris, and Prussia was furnished with two terrible weapons for enforcing her will on the French people, and keeping them in a state of dependence on her pleasure. The peace of 1871 left France in a position of inferiority to Germany, such as must be inexpressibly galling to every Frenchman who values the reputation of his country among the States of Europe. She must either subscribe to everything that Prussia dictates, or run the risk of a new war, undertaken with the most serious disadvantages. The *Kladderadatsch* of Berlin—a sort of German *Punch*—very vividly illustrated the fallen condition of France in June, 1871, by a caricature called "The Theatre of the World," where we see the Queen of England, the Emperor of Germany, the Emperor of Austria, and the Emperor of Russia, seated in the first tier, while Bismarck refuses admission to the genius of France, and tells her that *her* place is on the second tier. Count de Chaudordy, in a despatch from Tours, dated October 10th, plainly shows that the actual effect of Count Bismarck's designs was to destroy the greatness of France. It was in the desperate endeavour to avert such consequences that the war was continued by the Republican Government after Count Bismarck had stated his terms to M. Favre; and it was because they saw only too clearly the real effect of those terms that they imagined the Chancellor had said—what he was doubtless not so injudicious as to put into words—that he desired to reduce France to the rank of a second-rate Power.

Count Bismarck was evidently about this time inspired with a very earnest wish to place himself in a favourable light before the general opinion of Europe, which had begun to look with distrust upon his policy. On the 6th of October he sent from Versailles a telegram for publication in the English papers, which ran:—"I do not hold the opinion that the Republican institutions of France constitute a danger for Germany; nor have I, as asserted in a letter of the 17th ult., published in the *Daily Telegraph*, ever expressed such a view to Mr. Malet, or to any other person." This statement was certainly in harmony with what the Count had set forth in his circular from Meaux, dated September 16th, in which he had written:—"We have no wish to interfere in the domestic concerns of France. It is indifferent to us what government the French people may choose to select for themselves. We have formally recognised no government except that of the Emperor Napoleon; but with whatever sufficiently authorised government we may have to negotiate the terms of peace, they will be independent of the question of how and by whom the French people are to be governed." Mr. Motley, the celebrated American author, recently United States Minister in England, spoke to the same effect when he said:—"The statement that Prussia refuses to treat except with the Regency, and intends to reinstate Napoleon as Emperor of France, is false. Prussia objects to recognising the present Government, not because of the proclamation of the Republic, but on the ground that it is unauthorised, unstable, and incapable of giving lasting guarantees." This was a perfectly legitimate position, and the Count had every right to assert it. So far from attacking, it actually maintained the principle of popular self-rule; and only those fanatics who assert that the Republic is above universal suffrage can consistently object to such a mode of viewing the question. In other respects, however, the intentions of Bismarck were less capable of defence. In a conversation with Mr. Malet, the Second Secretary of the English Legation in France, the Count, a little before the isolation of Paris, expressed with a horrible frankness the relentless determination of himself and his master. Mr. Malet asked, on behalf of France, a Prussian ultimatum. Count Bismarck replied that they must have Metz and Strasburg. On Mr. Malet inquiring if those fortresses were to be dismantled, the Prussian Minister rejoined that, on the contrary, they were to be stronger than ever. "Then suppose the French Government finds your terms impossible?" "We shall invest and starve Paris. If that does not succeed we shall try sharper means." "Would you bombard the city?" "Certainly; and burn it, if forced. The necessity is sad; but how is it to be escaped?" This conversation was reported by Mr. Malet in a communication to Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary. It is well known that at that time the French Government, and probably the French people, would have accepted the dismantling of Metz and Strasburg, and have undertaken to put no other fortresses in their place. Such an arrangement would have given Germany all the protection she had a right to demand; but she was determined to obtain an aggressive or dictatorial power, and, rather than be disappointed, Paris should starve or burn.

Even the stern will of Bismarck, however, seemed at times to tremble before the terrible prospects of the winter. The following memorandum, with reference to the appalling consequences of Paris being reduced to famine, was sent to the representatives of the several Powers on October 10th, as the final comment of the North German Government on the negotiations with M. Jules Favre at Ferrières:—

"The terms of the armistice communicated to M. Jules Favre, and destined to usher in an attempt to restore order in France, have been rejected by him and his colleagues, who have resolved on the continuation of a struggle which, after all that has happened, must be regarded as hopeless by the French nation. Since the rejection of our terms, any chances of victory France may have had in this pernicious war must have considerably diminished. Toul and Strasburg have fallen, Paris is closely invested, and the German troops have penetrated to the Loire. The considerable forces so long detained by the two conquered fortresses are now, therefore, free for employment in another direction. France will have to bear the consequences of the resolution taken by her rulers to engage in a struggle to the uttermost. Her sacrifices will uselessly increase, and the destruction of her social system will be all but inevitable. The commander of the German army regrets his inability to prevent this; but he clearly foresees the results of the resistance recklessly determined upon by the rulers of France, and deems it necessary to draw attention to one point in particular—that is, the state of Paris. The two more important engagements before the capital—those of the 19th and 30th of September—in which the most effective portion of the enemy's forces did not succeed in repulsing even the front line of the investing troops, justify the conclusion that sooner or later Paris must fall. In the event of the capitulation being put off by the Provisional Government till the want of provisions compels the surrender, terrible consequences will ensue. The absurd destruction of railways, bridges, and canals,


AUX GRANDS HOMMES LA PATRIE RECONNAISSANTE
CITOYENS LA PATRIE EST EN DANGER
5me ENROLEMENTS VOLONTAIRES 5e

ENROLLING VOLUNTEERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF PARIS UPON THE PLACE DU PANTHEON.

within a certain distance of Paris has not stayed the progress of the German armies for a moment; and all communications by land and water necessary for our purposes have been restored in a very short period. But we have only restored what we require for the military objects we have in view, and enough remains demolished to interrupt easy communication between the capital and provinces for a long time to come. The German commander will find it absolutely impossible, in the case above mentioned, to provision a population of nearly two millions even for a single day. Neither will the neighbourhood of Paris for a distance of many marches supply any means of succouring the Parisians, all that there is in it being indispensably required for the troops. Nor shall we be able to remove a portion of the population by the country roads, as we have no available means of transport. The inevitable consequence of this will be that hundreds of thousands will starve. The French rulers cannot but foresee this as clearly as ourselves. We can only fight out the quarrel forced upon us; but those who bring on such extreme consequences will be responsible for them."

The event proved that the consequences, bad as they were in actual matter-of-fact, were less extreme than these foreshadowings. But the future certainly bore a most menacing and frightful aspect; and one would gladly believe that Bismarck shrank from the responsibility of such horrors. If he thought by this circular to induce the Parisians to open their gates to his armies, and consent to all his terms, he showed less than his usual penetration.

On his side, M. Jules Favre refused to accept the contradictions of his report on the interview at Ferrières contained in Count Bismarck's circular of September 27th. The French Foreign Minister addressed a note on the 18th of October to the representatives of the country abroad, in which he observes that, although Paris had then been shut out from the rest of the world for thirty days, and he did not know when the despatch would be delivered, he would not for a single day delay the answer which was called for by the Prussian Minister's account of the conference. With reference to the Count's assertion that the conditions of peace were not discussed between them, M. Favre admits that his interlocutor from the first opposed a sort of plea in bar of his absolute declaration that he would not assent to any cession of territory. But he adds that, on his insisting, Count Bismarck categorically explained himself, and stated that, in the eventuality of the principle of a territorial cession being admitted, the conditions would be the abandonment of Strasburg by France, and the giving up of the whole of Alsace together, with Metz and a portion of Lorraine.

"The Chancellor (continues M. Favre) remarks that those conditions might be aggravated by the continuance of war. So, indeed, he declared to me, and I am thankful to him for mentioning it himself. It is good that France should know how far the ambition of Prussia reaches. She does not stop at the conquest of two of our provinces; she coldly pursues her work of annihilating us. After having solemnly announced to the world, through her King's words, that she was fighting only against Napoleon, Prussia now shows a rabid wish to destroy the French nation. She ravages our soil, burns our villages, overwhelms our peasants with requisitions, has them shot when they cannot satisfy her requirements, and uses all the resources of science to aid a war of extermination. France, therefore, can have no illusions left. For her it is now a question of being or not being. In proposing peace to her at the price of three departments united to her by close ties of affection, what was offered to her was dishonour. This she rejected. It is now proposed to punish her with death. All this makes the situation quite clear. In vain she is told that being vanquished is no dishonour, and that to submit to sacrifices rendered necessary by defeat is still less so. In vain it is added that Prussia is but recapturing the violent and unjust conquests of Louis XIV. Such objections are of no import; and well may we be surprised at being called upon to answer them. France does not seek vain consolation in the too easy explanation of the causes which led to her disaster. She accepts her misfortunes, and does not discuss them with her enemy. On the day when she once more assumed the direction of her own destinies, she loyally offered reparation; but this reparation could not be a cession of territory. Why? Is it because it would have been a diminution of herself? No; it is because it would have been a violation of justice and of right, which the Chancellor of the North German Confederation does not seem to take at all into account."

M. Favre then proceeds to ask if Prussia was willing to return to the state which immediately preceded the annexations of Louis XIV., when the monarch of the country wore only a ducal crown, which was placed under the suzerainty of the King of Poland. Was it not owing to conquest that Prussia had grown from a small into a great Power? But during the two centuries which had effected this transformation a change far deeper, and of a higher order, had also occurred. Human right had emerged from the abstract regions of philosophy. It was every day taking greater possession of the world; and it was that right which Prussia trampled upon when she endeavoured to wrest two provinces from France, while confessing that the population would reject her sway. M. Favre proceeds:—

"It is respect for human freedom and for human dignity which forbids France to consent to the abandonment which is asked from her. By abuse of force she may be subdued; she will not add to that the



CUTTING DOWN TREES ROUND PARIS FOR FIREWOOD.



GENERAL VON WITTICH.

moral degradation which would result from her own acquiescence. I was to blame in not making myself sufficiently well understood on this point when I said, which I still maintain, that we could not give Alsace and Lorraine without dishonour. By those words I meant to characterise, not the act that would be imposed upon the vanquished, but the weakness of an accomplice who would join hands with the oppressor, and consummate an iniquity in order to redeem himself. Count Bismarck will not find a Frenchman worthy of that name who thinks and acts otherwise than as I have done; and this is also why I should not acknowledge that a seriously acceptable proposal for an armistice had been made to us. I ardently desired that honourable means should have been offered us for the suspension of hostilities, and the convocation of an Assembly. But I appeal to all impartial men to say whether the Government could accept such a compromise as was proposed. The armistice would have been a mere mockery if it had

> not rendered free elections possible, and for this purpose an actual duration of only forty-four hours was granted. During the rest of the period of a fortnight or three weeks Prussia reserved to herself the right to continue hostilities, so that the Assembly would have held its deliberations on peace or war while the battle would have been going on which would have decided the fate of Paris. Moreover, the armistice would not have been extended to Metz. It excluded revictualling, and condemned us to the consumption of our provisions, whilst the besieging army would have been chiefly living upon the pillage of our provinces. Lastly, Alsace and Lorraine would have nominated no representatives, for the really unheard-of reason that their fate was to be decided upon in the Assembly itself."

The Provisional Government was willing to accept, before France and before history, the responsibility of refusing the Prussian terms. Following, apparently, that noble saying of Socrates, that it is a far happier thing to suffer a wrong than to commit one, M. Favre observes that, were he to choose between the situation of France and that of Prussia, the former rather than the latter would be the object of his aspirations. He preferred the sufferings, perils, and sacrifices of his own land to the inflexible and cruel ambition of her foe. The circular concludes :—

> "I entertain the firm hope that France will be victorious. Were she vanquished, she would still remain so great in her misfortunes that she would stand as an object of admiration and sympathy to the whole world. Therein lies her real strength, and therein she may find her revenge. The European Cabinets which have been making only empty demonstrations of cordiality will, at a future day, perceive it, but it will be too late. Instead of initiating the doctrine of high mediation, advised by justice and interest, they, by their inertness, authorise the continuation of a barbarous struggle, which is a disaster to all, and an outrage to civilisation. This bloody lesson will not be lost on the nations. History teaches us that human regenerations, through some mysterious law, are narrowly connected with ineffable misfortunes. Perhaps France required to pass through a supreme trial; she will issue from it transfigured, and her genius will shine with so much the more brightness since it will have comforted her and saved her from deterioration in face of a powerful and implacable enemy."

M. Favre has rarely appeared to so much advantage as in this admirable paper. The tone throughout is lofty, dignified, and noble; the argument close and irrefragable; the language haughty, pathetic, pungent, or prospectively triumphant, according as the matter varies, and as the mood of the writer changes with it. It is in the assertion of principles such as those which M. Favre here explains and defends that the real greatness of France is seen. Not all the errors and crimes of which that country has been guilty can blot out the fact that ever since the first great Revolution she it is who, on this side of the Atlantic, has chiefly lifted into the universal air those immortal principles of human right to which M. Favre appeals as the final arbiters of all human policy. In this sense France has exercised a vivifying influence in the world such as not even England, excellent as her practical example has been, can boast, because England has made little assertion of abstract principles such as quicken the general pulse of humanity, but has rather followed a series of local experiments, cautious, fragmentary, and hesitating, from want of faith in any higher standard than what is convenient for the day. If France, with her keen perception of the very elements of political right, had possessed self-control enough to abstain from demagogic violence and theatrical exaggeration, we might at this moment have seen Europe a hundred years in advance of where she really stands. But merely to have uttered great ideas is much. Germany, within the region of politics, has conferred no such service on the world. Her work has been rather that of dull and harsh repression; and as a consummate drill-sergeant, with not even the ambition to be anything better, she yet stands before the nations. M. Favre, in pleading the cause of his own country, was asserting principles in which *all* countries are equally interested; and his moral tone was as far superior to any which his adversary has ever evinced as the instincts of philanthropy are higher than the promptings of selfishness.

Another State paper of importance issued during October was a circular addressed by Count de Chaudordy, delegate at Tours of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and bearing date the 8th. The intention of this document was to disprove the assertion of Count Bismarck that France had for many years been the constant aggressor of Europe. M. de Chaudordy admitted that the first Republic and the first Empire, provoked by the attempts of Prussia to put down the new ideas in politics, went too far in their reprisals; but for half a century, under four different *régimes*, France had forborne from territorial aggrandisement. Since 1864, however, Prussia had let loose on Europe a policy of blood and iron.

> "Who was it who despoiled Denmark? who openly compelled Austria to make war? who violently annexed Hanover, Hesse, Frankfort, &c.? who stirred up again all the passions that had been dormant, and so profoundly disturbed Europe? Throughout those crises France intervened only to hasten and consolidate peace. Mention is made of the warlike tendencies of



CONVOY OF DESERTERS—PARIS.

the nation, and of mean jealousies which the Prussian victories had kindled amongst her people. But on the morrow after Sadowa, at the time of the irritating occurrence about Luxemburg, public opinion in France clearly manifested itself against war, and the German publicists themselves were obliged to confess the fact. Moderation was found on our side. Lastly, when war broke out in the month of July, who could deny that Prussia had been doing all she could for the last four years in order to attain this end? Without insisting on her political conduct, or on her wilful neglect to execute the Treaty of Prague, suffice it to say that she was formidably armed, and ready within eight days to enter the field. Events have shown how far she had been for a long time pushing on her preparations. How much France, on the contrary, had neglected her preparations is but too well known. Not only were the armaments of Prussia complete, but her alliances had been concluded. Evidently her intentions were to drag us into a redoubtable conflict. We can freely speak of this war, for the members of the present Government did everything in their power to avert its horrors from the country. We emphatically declare, in spite of the conduct of Prussia, that the motive itself of the struggle was not justified, and M. de Bismarck cannot seriously retort againt us the declamations of over-excited crowds. These were individual acts, which found no echo in the country, and which had no further importance than those confused agitations which every public excitement arouses in large cities. M. de Bismarck well knows the value of those things. And, besides, where is the people who does not easily yield to excitement at the first war-cry? Governments are always certain to rouse enthusiasm whenever they promise glory and triumphs."

France, argued M. de Chaudordy, was not threatening the integrity of Germany, or meditating conquests. Her interests dictated a peaceful path. The increase and greater diffusion of wealth since the beginning of the century, the immense development of investments in securities, and the adoption of the system of commercial freedom, rendered it necessary for the welfare of the country that peace should be preserved.

"Such is the nation against whose incursions M. de Bismarck wishes to protect Germany, and whose territorial dismemberment appears to him to be the sole efficient guarantee for the tranquillity of the German people. The line of the Rhine, according to him, is no longer sufficient; he wishes the line of the Vosges and the Moselle; he now requires Alsace and Lorraine, at the very moment when Germany has just completely altered her internal constitution. After 1815, Europe, already dreading the expansive strength of the Germanic race, exerted herself to give it a constitution the bases of which were calculated for defensive aims only; and France, although the Vienna treaties were directed against her, was left in the state in which she still is. Her frontier on the north side, bordering on Germany, is entirely open. The events of the present war are an indisputable evidence of that fact. And whilst France has made no alteration in her organisation, Germany has transformed herself into the strongest state ever reached by any Power, viz., an absolute military unity, a personal and direct action of the chief who commands, and a military service obligatory upon all. We still ask whether France or Germany is now a menacing Power. Prussia needs no more in 1870 than in 1792 to guard herself against attacks from France. Beyond all doubt, the Prussian Government is seeking facilities for offensive designs, rather than better defensive lines. . . . . And what would be the result of those violent annexations of provinces which do not desire to cease to be French? Not to mention the reluctant feeling with which every honest man would see populations annexed to a nationality not in accordance with their aspirations and their past, suffice it that it would perpetuate war. In fact, can the heart of France ever detach itself from countries which so many misfortunes nobly endured, and so much blood gloriously shed, have united to her by indestructible ties? The consequence would be so disturbed a state of affairs that Europe could not henceforth hope for a single moment of rest. It is clearly to be seen that M. de Bismarck, whilst putting forth such pretensions and asking for such concessions, is himself preparing other wars, which are necessary for his attaining the aim to which he is led by an unbridled ambition. The German people wishes for its national unity and political liberty; and Liberal France has no objection to that. It is a just cause, and we should deny our own past if we opposed it. But an abyss separates those legitimate aspirations from the doctrine advocated and practised by M. de Bismarck. If the events which have been accomplished in Europe during these last six years are considered, it must be acknowledged that Prussia herself has assumed the part which she so unjustly attributes to us."

To M. de Chaudordy's despatch there was of course the one pithy answer that France *had* attacked Germany in this particular war, and had thus shown that the old spirit of aggression had not died out. But in truth neither side was blameless in the matter, both having encouraged a sentiment of mutual distrust, and indulged in dreams of aggrandisement at each other's expense. The fact of the first blow having been struck by France, without sufficient reason to justify such an act, will always render her defence a difficult task; but it is certain that Germany does not come into court with clean hands, and the relentless spirit in which she pursued the struggle after France had shown a willingness to make amends for the wrong she had done under the deposed Government, threw a deep shadow over the whole of her conduct after Sedan. An interesting account of the state of popular feeling in Germany during the month of October was contained in a letter to the *Pall Mall Gazette* from Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, who had recently returned from a tour through a considerable part of the country. On the subject of annexation he noticed four distinct parties. First, there was the party which demanded the retention of Alsace and Lorraine on military grounds, the organs of which were the *Kreuz Zeitung* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. Secondly came the party which required Alsace and a small strip of Lorraine, because the inhabitants are German in race, and which had for its representative in the press the *Kölnische Zeitung*. Many of the "National Liberals" belonged to this party, a section of which advocated the retrocession of North Schleswig to Denmark on the same grounds of nationality. The third party was that which simply required the cession of Strasburg; and the fourth comprised such men as Jacoby, who objected to all annexation as being contrary to the wishes of the populations concerned. These men belonged chiefly to the Democratic body. "The first opinion," wrote Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, "obtains a fair field and favour from the authorities; the second a fair field, but no favour; the third, and still more the fourth, obtain neither a fair field nor any favour. The seizure of newspapers in Southern Germany occurs constantly, more particularly in Frankfort, where the non-annexationists are very numerous, even outside the Democratic party." The letter made mention of the fact that in the same prison with Dr. Jacoby and Max Herbig there was at that time lying Herr Kryger, the representative of one of the North Schleswig districts in the Prussian and Federal Parliaments, together with four other Schleswigers who had excited the displeasure of the Government by advocating the retrocession to Denmark of their portion of the Duchy, in conformity with Art. V. of the Treaty of Prague. "It is worth noting," remarked Lord Edmond, "that the strong demand for annexation comes from North Germany, and not from South Germany, in the interests of which it is generally advocated. I was profoundly struck by the brutality of the expressed opinion both of individuals and of the press in Germany. The principles of the supremacy of the national will, which is the justification of the German national movement, is forgotten in the case of Alsace and Lorraine, as if it had not already been sufficiently forgotten in North Schleswig. 'We are told,' said a newspaper the other day, 'that the people hate us. So much the worse for them. We must wait till they are exterminated (*vertilgt*), and the next generation converted to a proper affection for us.'" The sympathies of Lord Edmond had been with the Germans in July. By October, after what he had seen and heard in Germany, they had been effectually turned to the side of the French, like those of most Englishmen.

Taking advantage of this change of sentiment in the people of Great Britain, M. Arles-Dufour, Vice-President of the International Peace League, and President of the Lyons Committee of Succour for the Victims of the War, issued an address to them, imploring their aid in bringing the war to an end—not by warlike operations, but by active sympathy with a brother in trouble. To justify his appeal, M. Dufour called to remembrance his participation in all the steps of economical and pacific progress accomplished by England from the days of Huskisson to those of Cobden. Again adducing the often-repeated argument that the war ought to cease now that its originator had been removed, he exclaimed, "Awake! stir up those of your Ministers whom our disasters have been so slow to move! Tell them that a day may come when misfortune may be knocking at your doors, and when you will regret the friend, the faithful ally, whom you allowed to be crushed. I heartily pray that so cruel a day may never dawn on Great Britain and its noble people." Such an appeal could obviously lead to no sort of good. M. Dufour himself did not ask us to draw the sword, which, on several grounds, we were not likely to do; and any mere expression of sympathy would have been simply disregarded by the Germans, as was indeed the fact.

Another address to the English people, emanating from Louis Blanc, appeared in the *Official Journal* of October 1st. M. Blanc described the siege of Paris as "a monstrous phenomenon," and "a scandal to history." Civilisation was a prisoner in the French capital, and the King of Prussia was the Attila of the nineteenth century. M. Blanc therefore appealed to the English people, but not for pity, as Republican France had "a right" to the sympathies of all. The Republic, he contended, was in no degree responsible for the war; and it was not true that the French nation had the guilt of the conflict upon its conscience. He wound up by saying:—"If the English people understand that our cause is that of the whole world, being that of justice, it is time for them to act, to ponder on what concerns them, the consequences of leaving the rights of conquest unbridled. A nation which by its indifference sanctions the saturnalia of force, deserves to suffer by force. But it is the business of the English people to look to that; ours is to prove to the world that our cause is just, and, this understood, to die for right, which never dies, or conquer with it." The working-class sympathisers with the Republic would probably have supported a war on behalf of France; but the prevailing tone of opinion in England was always in favour of non-intervention in the quarrel, and the two original disputants were accordingly left to fight it out alone.

It is curious and not uninstructive to observe the estimate which the Emperor Napoleon formed of the chances of M. Favre as a negotiator with Count Bismarck. In a conversation at Wilhelmshöhe with an English correspondent, he said:—"Jules Favre has not ability enough to conduct a discussion with the Minister of King William. He will wind him round his finger. I have been quite duped by him; I, to whom everybody agrees in attributing penetration and taciturnity. How, then, will it fare with M. Favre, whose strength lies in his too great fluency of speech? All these words will be turned against him in the form of an agreement with his pacific intentions. M. Bismarck will throw the responsibility of a refusal on his august Majesty. The talent of this diplomatist consists in his knowing how to throw on others the responsibilities of resolutions that have been taken." The Emperor is said to have confessed to his interlocutor that he was himself without this talent at the Tuileries, adding, "The Chancellor of North Germany is bent on making all Europe think that it was the French people who demanded the war; whereas in reality it was he and I who alike wished it. If I had been able to persuade the French that they urged me to this war I should still be at Paris, or I could have returned without fear. The contrary occurred, and my fall and the capitulation of Sedan are the consequences of that failure." The



M. GRÉVY.



DEPARTURE OF THE TENTH REGIMENT OF NATIONAL GUARDS TO THE ADVANCED POSTS.

correctness of the latter part of this report seems extremely doubtful.* Even if it were true that the French people had no portion in urging the Emperor to war, it is most unlikely that Napoleon would have confessed it, to his own detriment, after repeated asseverations to the contrary.

While these matters were under discussion, various arrangements in connection with the practical business of the invaded country were being settled as best they might. M. Jules Favre addressed a letter to Count Bismarck, in which, in the name of the diplomatic body, he requested that notice should be given before the bombardment of Paris began, and asked for permission to despatch a courier from the city once a week. The Prussian Minister, however, declined on military grounds to give the notice requested, and, as regards the sending of a courier, stated that, though he might permit the forwarding of open letters from the diplomatic agents in Paris, so long as their contents were not objectionable from a military point of view, he could not regard as well-founded the view taken by those who considered the interior of fortifications during a siege the proper centre for diplomatic intercourse. He added that this view appeared to be shared by those neutral Governments which had removed their representatives to Tours. The question of the French elections was another matter which demanded attention as the autumn advanced. Immediately after the Revolution of September 4th it was decreed that the country should elect a Constituent Assembly on the 16th of October. After the interview of M. Jules Favre and Count Bismarck, however, the improbability of a speedy peace became so obvious that the elections were indefinitely postponed by a decree issued at Paris on September 23rd, and at Tours on the following day. By this official act, not merely the elections to the Assembly, but the municipal elections, were suspended; all municipal elections which had been made were annulled; and it was arranged that local affairs should be provided for by the maintenance of existing municipalities or by the nomination of provisional municipalities. On the 29th of September, however, the Tours Government, by some extraordinary blunder or misconception, again fixed the elections for October 16th; whereupon the Ministry at Paris issued another decree on the 1st of October, calling attention to the mistake, pointing out that the holding of such elections was "materially impossible in twenty-three departments, and necessarily incomplete in the others," and consequently adjourning them until they could be carried on "throughout the whole extent of the Republic." The Assembly was accordingly not elected until the virtual conclusion of the war.

Paris all this time continued in full martial fervour. A great day was made of the 21st of September, the anniversary of the proclamation of the first Republic, on which occasion M. Gambetta issued a stilted address, of the usual colour, reminding the Parisians that on that day seventy-eight years before their fathers had founded the Republic, and "had taken an oath to themselves, in the teeth of the foreigner whose presence polluted the sacred soil of their country, to live free, or die fighting." They had kept their oath, had conquered, and had left behind them a great example of national heroism. The Parisians of 1870 were to take pattern by the Parisians of 1792, and they also would conquer. They were to honour their fathers' memories that day; on the next they were to secure victory by facing death. It is difficult for Englishmen to understand the frame of mind of people who, in the midst of deadly disasters and perils, could indulge in such solemn buffoonery as this, and actually imagine that they were promoting the defence of the country. Equally absurd was a proposal made in October to raise ten battalions of women, without distinction of social rank, to be called "The Amazons of the Seine." These female soldiers were principally destined to defend the ramparts and barricades, jointly with the stationary National Guards. They were to be armed with light guns, and their costume was to consist of a pair of black trousers with an orange-coloured stripe, a blouse of woollen stuff, and a cap and black képi. The officers were to be ladies. An appeal was at the same time made to the women of the richer classes to give up their jewels and trinkets to defray the expense of arming 100,000 of their sisters. The placard which announced the formation of this band of Amazons remarked that "women, more than men, are gifted with the divine fire of grand resolution which saves, and the active devotion which sustains and consoles. May Europe," concluded the document, "learn with admiration, that not only thousands of citizens, but thousands of women, defend, inside Paris, the liberty of the world against a fresh invasion of barbarians!" The corps of female warriors was really formed; but little was heard of it until the civil war following the conclusion of the peace with Germany, when the women, as in the time of the first Revolution, were foremost in ferocity. Another suggestion was that prussic acid should be used against the enemy. The women were to carry on one of their fingers a little india-rubber thimble, at the end of which was to be a small, sharp tube, containing the poison. The citizen who propounded this notable device at a public meeting thus described the working of the scheme :—"The Prussian approaches; you hold out your hand; you prick him—he is dead! If several Prussians approach, she who has the prussic finger pricks them one by one, and remains tranquil and pure, having round her a circle of corpses." The women who heard this grotesque nonsense shed tears, either in commiseration of the poisoned Prussians or in admiration of their own Lucretia-like virtue and its novel vindication. The men had the good sense to laugh. Perhaps they detected a grim humour and irony in the idea of Prussians being killed with prussic acid.

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* It was afterwards repudiated by the Emperor's Secretary.

Among the other suggestions of the day there was not wanting the demand for a dictatorship. The *Patrie* observed that what the country required was one military will which nothing could stop, nothing impede; neither superiors, colleagues, nor committees. The civil element, it argued, should entirely disappear. The country neither called for nor desired anything but soldiers and generals. This feeling, which no doubt was shared by many, arose partly out of the military disasters which the nation had suffered owing to the want of supreme and competent direction; partly out of dread of the civil anarchy already threatening France. The *Moniteur*—which was now published at Tours, and which, after losing its official character in the latter years of the Empire, had again become an accredited organ to the extent of giving a portion of its space to Government announcements, while retaining its own independence—contained, in its issue of October 8th, some comments on the recent disturbances at Lyons, which showed how deep was the feeling of all respectable writers against the reckless fury of the Red Republicans. "There remained for us," said the writer, "one grief in the midst of the hard trials through which we are passing. It was to see one of our greatest cities paralysed by its disorderly spirit, and rendering useless for common safety the immense resources which it contains. It was to learn that, instead of joining all its efforts to ours, and aiding us with its whole force, the second capital of France only employs in unprofitable revolts the warlike legions which should aid us in driving forth the enemy. Let the ultras of Lyons take a model from their brethren of Paris, and learn from them to postpone till after the expulsion of the Prussians the application of their doctrines and the pursuit of their political ideal." The Government was exhorted to display as much firmness in the future as moderation in the past; and the disturbers of order were denounced as only deserving to be treated without compassion, as a soldier is treated in time of war when he goes over to the enemy.

The compliment to the ultra-Republicans of Paris for having patriotically postponed the pursuit of their ideal until after the war, had already ceased to be deserved. At first the members of the "Red" party exhibited an unusual degree of self-control; but in October the disposition to mischief became apparent. Not merely were a number of foolish and dangerous doctrines broached at the nocturnal meetings of the political clubs, but a tendency to the employment of violence and terrorism was manifested. The Red Republican journal, *La Patrie en Danger*, openly advocated the assassination of all who did not fully accept the Revolution, remarking that it was "a time to kill and be killed." On the 6th of October M. Gustave Flourens, at the head of 10,000 armed National Guards, waited on General Trochu and Messrs. Gambetta, Ferry, and Arago, at the Hôtel de Ville, and demanded that the National Guards should be armed with chassepôts, that a municipal council should be immediatly elected for Paris, and that the Government should abandon what was described by the chief agitator as the Imperial tactics of sending one Frenchman to fight seven Prussians. A warm discussion ensued, and ultimately M. Flourens resigned his position as chief of a battalion of the National Guards, and his followers returned to their quarters. The excitement, however, did not end there. A meeting of 3,000 persons took place in the evening, and M. Ledru Rollin—one of the most tumultuous, impracticable, and dangerous politicians of the years 1848 and 1849—harangued the gathering in a strain of great violence. He urged the people to insist on the immediate election of a municipality; and this was the favourite project of the Red Republicans at that time, and again later. The "Commune" was to do everything. It was to be a local Parliament managing national affairs. It was to sit from day to day, appointing, removing, or changing generals, directing the army, decreeing the taxes, ruling the city, and dictating the policy of the country during the crisis of the war. It was even to exercise great powers after the war, and to become a permanent institution; but for the present it was to be absolute. M. Flourens was one of the leaders of this party; and though in October he could do little, he made his power felt in the evil days which ensued upon the peace. His object in presenting himself as he did before General Trochu was unmistakable. He desired to overawe the Provisional Government, and by menace to impose his own ideas on the persons who were then carrying on the administration of the country. He was one of those politicians who have no conception of popular power apart from revolution. With him the mob were the people; and a wild demonstration of excited partisans in the streets was the perfection of democratic wisdom. It was he who, in February, 1870, took up the trumpery little insurrection which had been started by M. Rochefort, and abandoned by that agitator because he had not nerve enough to face the issue. The theatrical posturings of Gustave Flourens, and, it should be added, the resolution which he really exhibited, brought him into general notice. M. Rochefort was now a member of the Government, and inclined to be conservative in his views; and Flourens took his place in the popular esteem. No more *Lanternes* were to be expected from the former as long as he should retain his official post; so it was an excellent thing to have the latter as a leader of revolts and a stimulator of the popular passions. Had M. Flourens merely desired to argue the question of the Commune with the Provisional Government, he would not have gone to the Hôtel de Ville accompanied by his 10,000 armed National Guards. He hoped to intimidate where he could not persuade; and, not succeeding, he laid his plans for more determined action.

The Ministers appear to have borne themselves with prudence and firmness; but they were in this difficulty: M. Flourens was using against them the weapons which they had themselves used only a month before against the Empire. General Trochu, M. Favre, and the others, had directed a body of National Guards against the Assembly, and, without any authority whatever, had violently suppressed a Government that was perfectly legitimate in the most democratic sense of the term. Why should not M. Flourens treat them in the same way, if he could? They were merely self-chosen rulers at the best; and had not M. Flourens as good a right to choose *him*self? It is not the least of the vices of a revolutionary state that it has no logical ground of appeal against disorder. What one faction has accomplished another may attempt; and the whole question resolves itself into a practical experiment as to which sect has got the most rifles at its command. The Republic in France has always immediately split into jarring segments, leading to great bloodshed. The principle of partisan violence has each time been consecrated afresh, and every pretender in succession has used it to his own ends.

The policy of the Communists was severely criticised by M. John Lemoinne in the *Journal des Débats* of October 3rd, where, with no less truth than pungency, he wrote:—

"If the investment of Paris could prevent the speeches and the publications of our Communists from reaching the provinces, we should console ourselves for this captivity, however irksome it might be. It is, indeed, necessary that France should not accept such pretensions as the expression of the ideas and opinions of Paris; otherwise we should despair of our ability to maintain the unity and integrity of the territory and of the nation. To dismember France the enemy is not needed; Frenchmen have taken upon themselves the work of demolition. The men of the Commune have to choose whether they shall be regarded as blind or as traitors. If they are aware of what they are doing, they are traitors; if they do not know what must be the consequences of their acts, they must learn. The immense effort of contraction and concentration which the French Revolution made in 1792 might have been necessary then to create and solidify the national unity. Then Paris was the heart whence circulated the blood of the country. The Revolution abolished the provinces to make France. But it must be remembered that the case is not the same now, especially at the present moment. It is no longer France which has need of Paris; it is Paris which has need of France. France is made, but Paris is besieged. And it is at this very moment, when we are calling upon the provinces to come to the aid of Paris, when we expect France to rise and come to the rescue of the metropolis—it is at this moment that some reckless fools are attempting to create a solitary Government—a kind of Council of Ten, which should sit masked, and which the country would refuse to acknowledge, and even to notice. There has already been manifested, not only abroad, but at home, a certain degree of hesitation to accept the Government which sprang into existence on the night of the 4th of September. That arises, not only because it was the product of an irregular movement, which is the necessary character of all revolutions, but also because it was composed exclusively of Parisian representatives. The provinces for a time feared lest it should prove but a revival of the Commune of Paris. Even that is not sufficient for the men of the Commune; they desire to effect a still closer concentration. They will not listen to any mention of a Constituent Assembly which would represent the whole country; they want only the municipal elections of Paris—the Commune of Paris and the Council of Paris imposing without control their laws upon all France. And they imagine that France will submit to such tyranny. It is madness, if it be not traitorous. It is not by heaping insults and outrages upon the provinces that they will be induced to march for the deliverance of Paris. It is not by sending them pro-consuls, who cannot even reach them, that they will be persuaded to rise for our defence; and we may be certain that the country will not accept the government by balloon when it shall find that it has fallen to the hands of the Communists. When we speak of Communists we do not refer to the question of division of property and its consequences; we simply mean that kind of government which some men wish to galvanise and resuscitate by a violent effort, but which is now nothing but an anachronism. These centralists, these unitarians, aim at nothing but federation. They have the pretension to concentrate France within a club or room in the Hôtel de Ville of Paris, and they do not perceive that France may abandon them in their cellular prison; and that the provinces, finding that the Commune of Paris offers them nothing but insolence, will content themselves with their own defence, and will remain at home."

Another attempt was made by the Lyons Red Republicans on the 12th to get possession of the Prefecture, and to constitute a local government of their own. It was at once put down, however, by the National Guards; but these repeated machinations of the party of disorder filled the more respectable classes with apprehension. Delegates from Lyons, about the same time, caused a good deal of trouble at St. Étienne. At a public meeting there the delegates denounced the local authorities for not having adopted more energetic measures; and especially condemned General Moarret for having refused arms to the Francs-tireurs. On the breaking up of the meeting a great crowd proceeded to the Place d'Armes, and, after a scene of disorder, forced the general to resign. They afterwards threatened another of the military authorities, whom they charged with having called out the troops; but the disorder was at length suppressed by the National Guards. Scenes of this nature were of frequent occurrence. General Mazure had been similarly treated at Lyons; and both there and in other large towns of the south, placards were fixed on the walls denouncing the officers as tyrants, and, in the name of the sovereignty of the people, telling the soldiers that they had a right to cashier them, and elect others. The *Union*, an organ of the Ultramontanists, drew a very dark picture of the condition of the country towards the end of October. Every day France was sinking deeper into the abyss. Resistance to the enemy was weak. The Prussian flood was still rising, and anarchy was extending its ravages more and more. There were two Governments—one at Paris, the other at Tours. The investment of the capital rendered concert impossible, and contradictory decisions were arrived at. A self-constituted revolutionary power oppressed Marseilles; Lyons was a prey to demagogic ardour; and in almost all the departments the Prefects were manifesting a tendency to obey both Paris and Tours as little as possible. The object of this diatribe was of course to advance the interests of the party to which the journal belonged; but it is impossible to deny that the account of the state of France was truthful and exact.

The *Débats* reported the proceedings of a club, of which M. Blanqui, a violent Red Republican, was president; and from this report it is evident that a species of socialist despotism was contemplated by the ultra-demagogues. The account stated that—

"The food question was discussed, and naturally excited much interest, for the Parisians have no longer milk for their morning's coffee; eggs are 1½d. to 2½d. a-piece, salt butter is very dear, and fresh is no longer to be had. The butchers can only supply half or a third the quantity of meat ordered by their customers; and charcoal is 6d. a bushel; while a host of working men have no other earnings than the 3d. a day paid them as National Guards. The club found fault with certain shopkeepers for concealing or raising the price of their goods, and it appears that a coal-dealer at Montmartre was visited by a vigilance committee, for the purpose of measuring his stores, and obliging him to dispose of them. The club unanimously resolved that the whole population ought, like an army, to be restricted to certain rations. One of the speakers proposed that, as part of this measure, there should be a census, which would have the incidental advantage of disclosing the names and addresses of the enemies of the Republic and of the Prussian agents. Another proposed an inventory of fowls and eggs, which should be reserved for the wounded. The club next discussed the municipal elections, the postponement of which was generally approved. One speaker argued that only enlightened patriots and good Republicans had a right to vote."

In the prevalent excitement of the public mind, any absurdity that appealed to enthusiasm and the sense of nationality found a certain number of followers. At Tours, a little temporary interest was created by the appearance of a young girl, clad in a fantastic garb, calling herself a successor of Joan of Arc, and carrying a flag with the Madonna on it. The more religious of the soldiers, and many of the women, were impressed and awe-struck for a little while; but the nineteenth century has no appropriate background for displays of this nature, and probably the real Joan herself, had she appeared at the present day, would not have produced the effect which attended her proceedings in the fifteenth century. The successor to the Maid of Orleans soon ceased to be talked about, and the war went on after the prosaic fashion of the age of chassepôts and mitrailleuses.



POULTRY SELLERS IN PARIS.



READING BALLOON DESPATCHES BY THE MICROSCOPE.

CHAPTER XXIII.

The Investment of Paris—Balloon Service—Voyage of M. Luitz—Preparations in the Capital against the Siege—Voyage of M. Tissandier—A Balloon Duel—The Prussian Officers and the Ursuline Nuns—Voyage of the "Bretagne"—The Aeronauts seized by the Prussians—Adventures and Perils of M. Manceau—The Military Situation in October—Four New French Armies—Their Composition, Character, and Disposition—Efforts of the National Defence—Mistakes of the Germans—Their Position one of Danger—Immense Range of the German Operations—State of Affairs before Paris—Liability of the Prussians to Sorties—Despondent Spirit of General Trochu—His Statement before the National Assembly in June, 1871—General Trochu's Plan for the Relief of Paris—The Scheme upset by Gambetta—Trochu's Charges against Gambetta—Ultra-Revolutionary Measures—Divided Counsels in the Provisional Government—Letter of General Trochu to the Mayor of Paris—German Accusation against General Ducrot—Turbulence in Paris—Disgraceful Conduct of the Gardes Mobiles of Macon—Want of Arms—Projects for the Use of Chemical Explosives—The Krupp Gun—Trochu on the Paris Fortifications—State of the Armies being formed in the Provinces—The Misfortunes of France not to be retrieved—Ultra-Republican Criticism on the Provisional Government—Revolutionary Absurdities—M. Jules Favre and the English Working Classes—The Francs-tireurs and the People—The Capture of Private Property at Sea.

ALTHOUGH the investment of Paris was substantially effected on the 19th of September, as already related, it seems not to have been formally completed until the 25th of that month, when King William made known the fact to the world. There was now no other way of communicating with the provinces than by balloons or carrier-pigeons; but both these methods were so vigorously worked that the Governments at Paris and Tours contrived for the most part to keep each other aware of what was being designed or accomplished. On the very day when the Prussian monarch announced the formal completion of the great investment, M. Luitz, who had been appointed Commissioner for this purpose, left the capital in a balloon, accompanied by a professional aeronaut, and succeeded in passing over the Prussian lines. Unlike his predecessor, M. Durnof, whose adventures are related at the conclusion of Chapter XII., he was not fired at by the Germans. On his way he made some observations of a military nature, which were of course valuable to the Government. He found that there were no Prussians at Le Pecq, St. Germain, or Carrière-sous-Bois. Over the plain of Creil he remained becalmed for about three quarters of an hour. He threw out ten sacks of ballast and the seats of the car, but could not rise. He was now unpleasantly close to the Seine, and, moreover, saw on the opposite side, not far from Vernouillet, what he judged to be signs of the Prussians. In order still further to lighten the balloon he cast out three bundles of letters, and a sack filled with the reports of M. Jules Favre. The balloon thereupon rose and crossed the Seine, and M. Luitz effected his descent near Vernouillet. The peasantry of the neighbourhood, having observed the fall of the sacks, and picked them up, afterwards restored them to the voyager. The letters were despatched to the nearest post, and M. Luitz went to the residence of the curé, where he disguised himself as a cowherd. Thence he proceeded by carriage to Tours, passing through several towns, at one of which (Mantes) the Commissary of Police made great difficulty in aiding him, from fear of compromising himself with the Prussians. M. Luitz addressed a report on this voyage to the Prefect of the Eure, to whom he represented the state of Paris at the period of his leaving as highly satisfactory. All the inhabitants, he said, had made a pact with death, if not with victory. "They are determined," he continued, "to bury themselves under the ruins of their beloved city rather than surrender. The women, the children, the old people, the men—in a word, all—will do their duty. The Minister of Public Works, the man of the situation—Dorian—has the true feeling of what is necessary. He speaks little and decrees nothing; but he does many things which will help us very much. He has converted the tobacco factory into a cartridge factory, which turns out 1,500,000 cartridges a day. He has created mitrailleuse workshops; and Botier, who has been appointed to—or rather who has placed himself at the head of—these workshops, seconds him with vigour and intelligence." Two mitrailleuses a week were being turned out from the workshops. The windows of the museums had been protected by sacks of earth. Barricades had been commenced at the extremities of the principal streets, and were composed of heaps of earth, the digging out of which left trenches of considerable breadth and depth. M. Luitz wrote in high spirits, and prophesied the speedy chastisement of the investing army.

A few days later, M. Tissandier started from Paris, and arrived at Tours on October 1st. The solitary and deserted appearance of the country about the metropolis struck him very forcibly.

When passing over Versailles he observed a camp of Prussians, and dropped among them great numbers of Government proclamations, which had been printed in German for that purpose. The Prussians opened fire on the balloon, but it was beyond the reach of damage. Near Dreux, M. Tissandier began to descend, and, seeing some peasants, called out to them, "Have you any Prussians in your parts?" They replied that they had not. At that moment, a gust of wind, blowing downwards, beat the balloon towards the earth with great violence, and almost threw M. Tissandier out of the car. He was furiously dragged along for some time, until at length, with the assistance of the country people, he effected a landing at the very moment that the balloon was split from top to bottom. No fewer than 25,000 letters were taken out by this aeronaut, who gave as sanguine an account of the state and prospects of Paris as M. Luitz had done. The Prussians, he stated, were attacked with shot and shell wherever they appeared, or wherever they tried to erect a battery. They were said to be discouraged and hesitating. Paris, on the contrary, was resolute, and aware of its own strength. A large number of shops remained open, and the promenades were covered with troops at drill. In the outer Boulevards, and in the Champ de Mars, barracks had been erected for the Mobiles. The *cafés* closed at half-past ten at night, and at eleven the city seemed asleep, though it was really observant of the enemy. Watchmen were on the look-out for fires; 40,000 National Guards manned the ramparts; while the forts sent afar the rays of the electric light, to hinder attack or surprise.

Neither of these balloon voyages, however, could compare, for exciting and perilous incidents, with one which was performed at the same period by the well-known M. Nadar. That gentleman left Tours for Paris, with Government despatches, at six in the morning. At eleven he was within view of the capital, and, while floating about three thousand mètres above Fort Charenton, a second balloon was observed on the horizon. M. Nadar at once displayed the French flag, and the other balloon responded by exhibiting the same colours. Gradually the two balloons approached one another, being drawn in the same direction by the same current of air. When they were separated by only a short distance, several explosions were heard. The strange aeronaut continued to fire shots at M. Nadar's balloon, the "Intrépide," which began to descend rapidly. The French flag had by this time been taken in by the other balloon, and the Prussian colours were exhibited instead. Those who were watching the affair from the French fort below, and who now saw the character and object of the pursuer, cried out that Nadar was lost. But they were mistaken. He had scrambled from the car up the network of the balloon, on the first shot from the enemy, apparently to stop a hole made in the tissue; and he now descended as the balloon righted itself, and, on a quantity of ballast being thrown out, again rose high into the air. Shots were then fired in rapid succession from the "Intrépide" into the Prussian balloon, which suddenly sank to the earth with headlong rapidity. On reaching the ground, a detachment of Uhlans, who had watched the combat from the plain, picked up the aeronaut, and rode off to the Prussian outposts. M. Nadar then descended in safety at Charenton.

Hardly a day passed without at least one balloon, and sometimes more, being despatched from Paris. On a certain occasion, two, tied together, sailed out of Paris, and, when directly over St. Germain, dropped a heavy packet into the town. It fell into the Ursuline convent; but the sisters, when visited by some Prussian officers, declared that no such packet was there. "Very well," said the chief officer, "I shall quarter twenty Hussars here to-night, if the packet be not found; twenty more to-morrow; and so on until the letters are delivered to me." One night of this quartering sufficed to produce the desired effect, for on the following morning the packet was given up. For the most part the shots aimed at the balloons failed to reach them; but one day, at Argenteuil, a balloon was struck by three bullets, and rapidly came to earth. Two French officers and about 3,000 letters thus fell into the hands of the Prussians.

Equally unfortunate were the navigators of "La Bretagne," a balloon launched by Messrs. Darton and Yon, and designed to proceed to London. The gas-works at La Villette were quitted at a little past two P.M., on October 27th, and at that time so strong a breeze was blowing that the travellers were carried along at the tremendous rate of seventy or eighty leagues an hour. They seemed to clear the fortifications at a bound, and in a few minutes were engulfed in a mass of vapour. The balloon first took a north-easterly direction; but the wind suddenly veered due west, which carried them straight towards the Prussians. A few minutes afterwards, while they were still in the fog, and still driving through the air at the same frantic pace, they heard a hum of human voices, then the sound of a railway train, and presently the clash of military music. As they did not recognise any French air, they inferred that the band must be German. They were then at a height of 1,200 mètres. The four occupants of the car drank a bottle of Bordeaux to the toast of "Long live France! Death to the Prussians!" M. Manceau, the chief man of the party—who afterwards wrote an account of his adventures to a correspondent of the *Daily News*, for whom he conveyed despatches—threw the bottle overboard when they had finished, sincerely hoping that it might surprise some Prussian under his spiked helmet. Shortly afterwards, the cloud opening a little, they perceived some Prussian detachments marching along, and looking like a black snake wriggling on the ground. They then threw out ballast, and soon got into the fog again. At a quarter to four they determined to descend, as they calculated, judging by the direction from which the wind came, that they must be close to the Belgian frontier. M. Cuzon, the managing aeronaut, accordingly pulled the string of the valve twice, and the balloon rushed downwards at a terrific rate. The voyagers were no sooner through the cloud than they saw the ground, as it were, coming up to meet them at an alarming speed. The car crashed against the earth, and the balloon rolled almost entirely over, at the next moment rebounding into the air. One of the aeronauts, a Mr. Worth, leaped out when from thirty to forty feet from the ground, but, alighting on a newly-ploughed field, he escaped unhurt. The balloon, relieved of his weight, shot up, followed by a number of Prussian bullets. In a little while it again came into collision with the ground, and M. Cuzon jumped out, followed by another of the voyagers, M. Hudin. Once more the balloon darted up into the air, carrying with it M. Manceau, now the sole occupant of the car. From his position of elevation this gentleman saw the Prussians firing at his companions, though they waved their handkerchiefs; but the fusillade soon came to an end, without any damage having been done. The neighbourhood where the three companions had alighted was just outside Verdun, then occupied by the French, but invested by the Prussians. The balloon was now soaring away with M. Manceau. It soon attained a height of three thousand mètres; a torrent of rain was falling, and the situation was painful as well as dangerous. M. Manceau began to feel dizzy; the blood sang in his ears, and he knew that if the balloon went up much higher it would collapse. He therefore discharged what remained of the gas, which was but little, and, quickly dropping through the air, leaped out when he was near the earth, and fell in a quagmire, dislocating his right foot. This was about a quarter of an hour after he had parted from his friends. He marked where the balloon fell, and, as soon as he had in some measure recovered himself, concealed it as well as he could, together with the carrier-pigeons, and then began to think about providing for his own safety. "I was suffering most intense agony," continues M. Manceau; "it was now dark, and the ground was all soppy. Suddenly I heard the tinkling of a bell. 'It is a chime,' I exclaimed. 'It is the Angelus! I am in a Catholic country! The church is not far off! I am saved!' I took hold of my courage with my two hands, and started in the direction of the sound. I crawled along on all fours, and twice fell up to the neck into ditches full of water, as my way lay through a marsh. How I contrived to wade out of them I know not. At last, after tumbling into another watercourse and scrambling out of it again, I reached a garden. A woman was in it, with a lantern. I made a noise, and she uttered a shriek. 'Don't be alarmed,' I said, 'I am no robber. I am a traveller. I came in a balloon, and leaped out of it some distance from here. I have dislocated my foot. Where am I, and whose house is this?' 'You are in the village of Hennepont,' the woman answered; 'and this is the house of M. le Curé.' She then ran in, and presently M. le Curé came out. I must have presented a sorry figure; but he at once assisted me into his house, and soon got me to bed. It was now nine o'clock. I had fallen at six. It had taken me three hours to crawl less than three parts of a mile. The distance to Hennepont from Paris, by rail, is a hundred and ten leagues. What it may be as the crow flies I am unable to say; but we accomplished the distance in an hour and three quarters." The importance of saving the despatches and the balloon being obvious, M. le Curé at once sought the Mayor, and summoned a dozen of the peasantry, by whom the pigeons were stowed away, the despatches secured, and the balloon cut into pieces, and hidden. The curé then volunteered to convey the despatches to a small town about four leagues off, and to hand them to a post-carrier, with instructions to go to a village still further off, and transfer them to a second carrier, who would post them across the frontier in Belgium. This mission the reverend gentlemen accomplished in safety. Hennepont, it seems, is about midway between Metz and Verdun. "The disappearance of every vestige of the balloon, and the safe disposal of the despatches," says M. Manceau, "reassured me respecting my own fate should I fall into the hands of the Prussians. My intention was to make my way into Belgium with all diligence. It was at nine leagues distance by the shortest road. At ten in the morning of the 29th, M. le Curé, under my instructions, sent off the pigeons with a despatch conveying the particulars of my journey, and announcing the fall of Metz. Not one of these messengers appears to have reached its destination. At about twelve the same day the Mayor came in, and announced the arrival in Hennepont of a detachment of Uhlans. A peasant had denounced my arrival, in the hopes of conciliating the colonel, and obtaining exemption from the usual requisitions. He received a thaler for his treachery. At two the colonel came, and, though he abused the peasant who had betrayed me, he none the less informed me, courteously enough, that I must follow him. My papers proved my assertion, that, though I had left Paris in a balloon, my business was strictly personal; and it was well I was able to establish this fact when I was interrogated later. I accompanied him to Corny, where I passed into the hands of another party. Corny was then the head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles. I remained six days there, and was subjected to as many examinations; but as no one could prove I was the bearer of French Government despatches, I was imprisoned, instead of being shot, and finally sent to Mayence, where, at the end of a fortnight, I obtained the privilege of residing in private lodgings, after giving my parole that I would not attempt to escape." M. Manceau says that, had he been without money, he scarcely knows how he should have fared, for he had only such food as he could pay for. The officers treated him with consideration; but the conduct of the soldiers and subordinates he describes as "simply beastly." He was not set at liberty until after the conclusion of peace; but he had the satisfaction of believing that all the despatches of which he had undertaken the charge were safely delivered.

About a month later—viz., on the 24th of November—two aeronauts, whose design was to go from Paris to Tours with sundry bags of letters, were carried northward by a contrary wind, blown over the sea by furious gales, and finally landed in a strange country, covered with snow, black with pine-forests, cruelly cold, and apparently peopled only with wolves. When at length they discovered some human beings, in the shape of woodcutters inhabiting a small cabin, it was found that their language was utterly strange to the half-frozen travellers. They were in Norway, and had come a distance of at least six hundred miles in thirteen hours.

In this manner, with all its drawbacks, some degree of communication was maintained between the Governments of Paris and Tours, so that concerted action was not entirely prevented. It was certainly much needed; for with the month of October the French military authorities began a series of movements requiring great caution and deliberation, and the necessity of a general understanding between the two sets of Ministers was obvious. The plan of national defence was to detain before the walls of Paris, for as long a period as possible, the immense German army engaged in the siege of that city, and in the meanwhile to form armies of relief in the provinces, by which the enemy might be crushed, and the capital saved. Much was hoped from the winter, when it should come; much from the hostility of the peasants, the severing of communications, and the failure of supplies. To isolate the armies of the invader, and to defeat them in detail, were the sanguine anticipations of some of the men who were now at the head of affairs, and notably of M. Gambetta. For effecting this purpose, four armies were raised and organised as well as circumstances would permit. These were designated the Armies of the East, of the North, and of the West, and the Army of the Loire. The first observed Lower Alsace, and covered Besançon and Lyons; the second held the line of the Somme; the third was advanced beyond the Sarthe, with its outposts approaching Nogent and Chartres; and the fourth occupied the country south of the Loire, between Chambord and La Ferté. The three first named were formed, for the most part, of new troops, and were as yet in a very incomplete state of organisation; but the fourth seems to have been composed, in the main, of veteran soldiers, derived partly from Algeria and partly from regiments recalled from Rome and other places, though General Trochu, after the peace, spoke even of this army as nearly worthless. It numbered from 90,000 to 100,000 men, was in possession of 300 guns, and after a while was commanded by General d'Aurelles de Paladines, an officer of experience and ability. The Government of September 4th certainly exhibited much zeal and promptitude in gathering together a large number of men for the defence of the country. Decrees for a levy *en masse* were issued; retired officers and old soldiers were recalled to their standards; gunners and marines were summoned from the navy in large numbers; and recruits are said to have been drawn even from the military schools. The forces thus improvised were extremely numerous, but, on the whole, not very reliable. The number of youths—even of mere boys—in the eastern, northern, and western armies, deteriorated the physical strength and



GENERAL VON HINDERSIN.

endurance of the regiments; the older troops, remaining out of the terrible wrecks of Weissenburg, Wörth, and Forbach, were disheartened and insubordinate; there was a great lack of Staff officers; the supply of field guns was insufficient; and the Commissariat and other administrative departments were in the most chaotic state.

A roving correspondent of one of the London papers gave an account of these rudimentary forces, which shows how great were the difficulties to be overcome. The reorganisation of the fugitives from Sedan gave immense trouble at Tours. Camps were established on various slopes round the city, where the work of formation was steadily prosecuted; but the results were not very encouraging. The men were thoroughly "demo-



BIVOUAC OF GENERAL DUCROT'S TROOPS IN THE WOOD OF VINCENNES.

ralised," in the military sense of the term. Belonging to various regiments, and therefore wearing different uniforms, they lacked that bond of fellowship which springs from a close and particular association, and were wanting in the *esprit de corps* so necessary to the effective prosecution of the soldier's calling. The Zouaves were especially at fault. They were dirty, careless of their arms and accoutrements, reckless of speech and action, and prone to intoxication. The Mobiles of the South were deficient in physical power; many were mere lads of seventeen or eighteen, and most of the rest were undersized, badly fed, and badly set up. The raw troops were drilled with the old-fashioned muzzle-loaders until the day before they were sent off to meet the enemy, when they received a few lessons in the manual exercise of the chassepôt. The infantry of the Marine, and some other bodies, made a very favourable impression, and all the men seemed full of spirit and resolution; but it was evident that, as a whole, they were no fit match for the Prussians. The same correspondent was far from satisfied with what he saw at Bourges. He observed a good deal of lounging, smoking, domino-playing, and caramboling at billiards; but, although certain military movements occasionally took place, there was no attempt at drill. An officer of high rank, who had seen a good deal of active service, told him, after some hesitation, that he felt anxious for the result. The want of artillery and of skilled artillerymen alarmed him; still more so the absence of discipline, which had been aggravated by the Republic. The men knew very little of drill, and were not willing to learn; nor were the officers zealous in teaching them. The various corps, moreover, were too much scattered to be available for effective movement at a day's notice. The Army of the Loire and Cher had for its base a line of more than one hundred and thirty miles, while its front occupied quite one hundred and ninety; and the whole body was divided between Tours, Blois, Orleans, Vierzon, Bourges, and Nevers. On the other hand, the officer who was then organising the Army of the Loire—General de la Motte-rouge—spoke with the utmost confidence of the condition of his force. It was even, he said, well supplied with guns, ammunition, and horses, and the men would acquire discipline and solidity in the face of the enemy. Undoubtedly it was at that date the best of the armies hastily raised for the defence of the country; but it was unable to retrieve the misfortunes of the time. The causes which had ruined France were still at work, and the mischief these had effected, and were yet effecting, was too widely spread and too deeply rooted to be destroyed in a day by any amount of earnestness on the part of political enthusiasts. Still, the effort was worth making, for it showed that the old spirit of a land once noted for heroic valour had not yet utterly decayed.

It soon became evident that the Germans had entered on a more serious task than they at first imagined. At the beginning of October they believed that France was utterly prostrate; by the end of the month, notwithstanding the surrender of Metz, they found that she was erect and defiant. The situation of the invader was such as to inspire some degree of anxiety. Intoxicated by success, the Germans had committed—though certainly in a far less degree—the very fault of which the French had been guilty at the commencement of the war. They had underrated their enemy. They had supposed that Paris would succumb almost immediately on the appearance of the beleaguering hosts. They had discredited the statements as to large stores of food in the French metropolis, and as to its ability to hold out for months. They had assumed that the French people neither would nor could raise fresh armies to replace those they had lost. They had taken it for granted that the war was substantially finished, when, in truth, the most difficult part was only beginning; and, to overawe what they regarded as the last despairing efforts of resistance, they had placed several detachments of their great army in positions where, now that the spirit of the people was re-awakening, they were exposed to considerable danger of being crushed. Comparatively small bodies of troops were stationed at different places to guard the main lines of communication between Paris and the German frontier. Flying columns were sent in every direction to collect provisions. Even Normandy and the Orleannais were not entirely free from the incursions of these raiders; and it was manifest that the German commanders had determined to lay hold upon a great part of France, and to treat it like a conquered country. Enormous as were the resources of the invaders, they were seriously tasked by so extended a design. "Nearly a quarter of a million of men," says a military critic in the *Times*, speaking of the early days of October, before the fall of the great eastern fortress on the Moselle, "were required to maintain the great leaguer of Paris; two hundred thousand had to be kept at Metz, to prevent Bazaine from making his escape; more than a hundred thousand were employed in guarding the communications and in besieging fortresses; and a writer with peculiar means of information has asserted that sixty thousand bayonets could not have been mustered at this conjuncture for any fresh operations in the field." The position before Paris was in itself one of great hazard. The investing lines were necessarily of vast extent, and therefore less closely woven than would have been the case had the city been smaller. To guard as far as possible against surprise, both from within and from without, a double series of lines was accordingly drawn around the capital, the outer line of which, it is said, formed a circle of sixty-six miles, while even the inner extended over more than fifty. The positions were fortified by entrenchments; and the patient Germans, finding that the gates were not opened with the suddenness they had anticipated, sat down to starve out the great city, in the belief that they would have little enough to do in the way of actual fighting.

As time wore on, however, the probability of sorties occurring at any moment became greater and more threatening. At any one point the numbers of the besiegers were weak, because of the immense circuit which they had to occupy. A writer in the *Quarterly Review* has calculated that they could only have been in the proportion of 5,000 men to one mile. "The dispositions of attack," he remarks, "being completed, and the troops in their places an hour before daylight, the Germans could not receive more than one hour's notice of the various points against which the attack was to be directed. The real attack being combined with feints in several different directions, some loss of time would result from uncertainty as to which attack might be real and which feigned; because, should the besiegers mistake a feigned for a real attack, they might be induced dangerously to weaken the point against which the latter was about to be directed. Supposing that point well ascertained, how many men could be assembled within an hour for its defence? Even by drawing off every man from their lines for three miles on each side of the point threatened, which obviously they could not venture to do, they could only muster 30,000 men, who would, by the hypothesis, have to withstand a force more than three times their number. In conducting such a sortie, it is by no means necessary to develop a large front. Where a gap has to be made in an investing line, the operation should be similar in principle to that of carrying a breach; the action that of a battering-ram, or rather, in the case of sorties, that of a wedge, the head hard and weighty, with propelling power behind. But the head must be tipped with steel; or, in other words, the head of the attacking column should be composed of troops whom nothing will turn." It will thus be seen that the relative position of the besiegers and the besieged was such as to place the former in no small danger of a surprise, and to give the latter very considerable advantages in the prosecution of offensive operations. Most unfortunately for the Parisians, however, it happened that General Trochu entered on the task of defending the capital in a spirit of complete hopelessness. There is no more certain way of failing in any work than to start with the assumption that you *will* fail; and this was the view Trochu entertained from the first to the last. In a speech which he made in the National Assembly on the 13th and 14th of June, 1871, he stated that he had told his colleagues, as early as before the end of September, that, in his belief, Paris must be vanquished. As no army of succour existed (for the general would not acknowledge the provincial levies as regular armies), the resistance of the capital was simply "an act of heroic folly, necessary to save the honour of France." He calculated on aid coming from America, England, and Italy—an idle hope, which there was nothing in existing circumstances to justify. But even while this anticipation existed he seems to have been despondent, and when it vanished there was nothing to supply its place. Paris, argued the general, when pleading his case before the Assembly, was unprepared for a siege. The fortifications were not constructed to resist modern artillery. No armaments had been made, and but few soldiers were to be had. In saying this, Trochu, with the true professional spirit, seems to have implied that the National Guards were no soldiers at all, in any proper sense of the word. The citizens, moreover, according to his view, were never in earnest. Even after the investment, his greatest difficulty was to make people believe in the reality of the siege. On the other hand, the Prussians constructed works which rendered their lines unassailable. In the opinion of General Trochu, those works were the most formidable ever seen; and the improvised troops at his disposal were unable, after the most tremendous efforts, to pass even the first of the enemy's lines.

The plan for the relief of Paris which General Trochu endeavoured to accomplish he attributed to General Ducrot. He described it as an excellent plan, thwarted by the intermeddling of others, especially of M. Gambetta. The design was to make a sortie towards Rouen and Havre with 50,000 of their best men, whilst false attacks were made, from the eastern forts, on the Germans in the neighbourhood of Bondy. In the direction of Rouen the Prussians were not prepared to resist an attack. Their forces did not extend beyond Pontoise; in one day's march their lines might have been passed, and the beleaguered troops might have reached, first Rouen, and then the sea-coast. It was for this reason that so many redoubts were raised on the peninsula of Gennevilliers, and that eight bridges of boats were constructed. With Ducrot's plan was connected a project for revictualling Paris by the Lower Seine, for which purpose General Trochu ordered the formation of a flotilla of small vessels, and the storing up of a quantity of provisions in the ports, to be in readiness. These intentions were known to only five persons, of whom, said the general, not more than one was in the Government. That one was M. Jules Favre. Immediately afterwards, however, he stated that the scheme was made known to M. Gambetta, so that the members of the Paris Government alone seem to be referred to in the first statement. M. Gambetta though inspired by patriotic views, laboured, according to Trochu, under two original vices: the first, that he subordinated the interests of the country to the interests of his party; the second, that, in organising the defensive forces of France he was guided by the traditions of 1792, which were altogether misleading. He thought that armed mobs could successfully encounter organised armies. Even in 1792 this could not be done, as was shown by the "Mémoires" of Dumouriez; and still less was it possible now. The "spirit" of a nation, no matter how splendid it might be, was no match in modern warfare for the "arsenal" of a nation; and the arsenal consisted of organisation and the mathematical precision of operations. M. Gambetta insisted on the choice of officers for the National and Mobile Guards being determined by election; and Trochu, though he saw the disastrous character of the arrangement, was obliged to give way. He added that Gambetta himself afterwards repented of this, when at Tours. The abandonment of the general's original plan of a sortie was due to M. Gambetta and others demanding that the sally should be attempted in combination with the advancing army of the Loire, and that the preparations which had been made for one direction should be suddenly transferred to the opposite. The movement failed, and from that time forth the line by Rouen was lost, for the enemy had seized his opportunity to occupy it.

Among other charges brought by General Trochu against M. Gambetta, he accused him of appointing Prefects and Mayors with a view, not to efficiency, but to the promotion of ultra-Republican ideas in politics. It is to be feared that the general had only too much reason for what he said; and when we consider what these officials had to do, the folly, and indeed criminality, of choosing them simply with reference to party ends, must be apparent. Their duty was to carry on the administration of the country at a time when all the ordinary processes of government had been violently subverted; and the Prefects were even entrusted with the military command of their respective departments. This of course led to frequent conflicts of authority, to much wasted energy, and to some discreditable scandals. Admiral Fourichon, who was Delegate Minister of War at Tours in the days of September, resigned his post on the 3rd of October (six days before the arrival of Gambetta, who himself assumed the portfolio, after it had been temporarily held by M. Crémieux), because the Prefect of Lyons had arbitrarily arrested General Mazure, who commanded the troops in that city, and because his colleagues justified and supported the act. The Admiral still remained in the Government at the head of the navy; but he would no longer be answerable for a state of things which rendered intelligent military action almost impossible. Owing to the want of authoritative direction, the Francs-tireurs were sometimes mutinous in the highest degree; and at one time, in Tours itself, the officers of one of these corps were besieged in their hotel, and threatened with death, because the men said they had received no pay for a month, and their colonel was a coward. No wonder that in some quarters there was a strong reaction against this system of disorder, and that thirteen departments agreed to demand the nomination of a general who should be independent of Ministerial supervision, with a view to an organised and efficient defence of the western provinces.

The revelations of General Trochu leave little cause for surprise (if any existed before) at the failure of the French defence. That which always happens after the first enthusiasm of a revolution has spent itself, happened in the autumn of 1870. The leaders of the movement, who had agreed so admirably in destruction, could not combine for any practical purpose. The more vehement overpowered the less determined; and the mob, flushed with its recent triumph, demanded from day to day that its pleasure should be made the standard of action in all the affairs of the commonwealth. A revolution is often set in motion by men who, when their ideal form of government is established, would gladly stop short of still greater innovations, not merely because they have themselves come into power, but because they foresee the danger of unlimited and spasmodic change. Those who have made the revolution, however, insist on being its masters. A wretched necessity for flattering the arbiters of the barricades has been created; and they who are ready to concede the most have the best chance of carrying out their policy. Trochu was nominally the head of the Administration, as well as Military Governor of Paris; but he seems, by his own account, to have had little power. He confessed to the Assembly that twenty times over he had, with bitterness of soul, given his signature against his convictions. Nevertheless, he did not like to resign, for fear of weakening the defence; though it is not easy to see how the defence would have suffered by his absence. The radical members of the Government prevailed for the most part, and Trochu was borne helplessly along. His influence, which was not strong enough to enforce his own views at the council-table, was sufficient to act as a drag on the methods which others had dictated, and which he was reluctantly compelled to carry out. What he did not approve, but could not prevent, he executed laxly, or at least despondently; and, as a necessary consequence, the defence of Paris never succeeded in evoking half the elements of power which the population was capable of affording. General Trochu remarked—and most truly remarked—that the deterioration of the French military character was closely associated with the long succession of revolutions occurring in Paris, which had destroyed the principle of authority, the sentiment of respect, and the habits of discipline and subordination. But, as regards the failure of the defence in which he was concerned, other causes also were at work. Divided counsels and feeble direction contributed largely to the disastrous result.

In one respect, however, General Trochu had his own way. He would not hurry his sorties, though all men cried out with impatience. On the 15th of October he addressed a letter to the Mayor of Paris, rebuking this feeling on the part of the populace. "In the month of July," he wrote, "the French army, in all the splendour of its strength, passed through Paris, amidst shouts of 'To Berlin! To Berlin!' I was far from sharing their confidence, and alone, perhaps, among all the general officers, I ventured to tell the Marshal Minister of War that I perceived in this noisy manner of entering upon a campaign, as well as in the means brought into requisition, the elements of a great disaster. The will which at that period I placed in the hands of M. Ducloux, a notary of Paris, will one day testify to the painful and too well-grounded presentiments with which my soul was filled." Extracts from this will were read by Trochu to the Assembly in June, 1871. "To-day," continued the general in his letter to the Mayor of Paris, "in the presence of the fever which has taken possession of the public mind, I meet with difficulties which present a most striking analogy with those that showed themselves in the past. I now declare that I will not cede to the pressure of the public impatience. Animating myself with the sense of the duties which are common to us all, and of the responsibilities which no one shares with me, I shall pursue to the end the plan which I have traced out without revealing it; and I only demand of the population of Paris, in exchange for my efforts, the continuance of that confidence with which it has hitherto honoured me." The confessions subsequently made in the Assembly show how far General Trochu was from fulfilling what he here promised. The "plan" was abandoned for one in which he had no faith; and, on the failure of the attempt, he had only the dismal consolation of finding that his prophecies of evil were correct.

General Ducrot, referred to by Trochu in his speech to the Assembly, was destined to act a prominent part in the defence of Paris. He had a command at Sedan, and was accused by the Germans of having broken his parole. A Prussian official statement with reference to him was issued from Ferrières on September 29th, in the following words:—"The French General, Ducrot, taken prisoner at Sedan, had pledged his word of honour to proceed thence to Pont-à-Mousson, and to report himself there, in order to be sent on as a prisoner to Germany. Interpreting his word of honour in a Jesuitical manner, General Ducrot did indeed travel in his carriage to Pont-à-Mousson, but did not surrender himself. He has, on the contrary, fled to Paris. When we see other officers serve there with one who has despicably broken his word, we can only regard it as a bad sign of the value attached in the French army to the notions of honour. It is natural that, in consequence of this experience, the word of a French officer can henceforth only be less thought of on the part of Germany, and that the consideration hitherto shown to captive French officers will have to be essentially restricted. The contrary would evidently be foolish weakness." General Ducrot afterwards indignantly denied the truth and justice of these accusations; but it would seem that he did not interpret his word with the most rigid strictness.

The turbulence of the Parisians was a constant source of trouble to General Trochu. He was obliged to issue proclamations condemning those who had taken part in street riots, or who had forcibly entered private houses. It was also found necessary to establish a court-martial for the Na-



MONT VALÉRIEN DURING THE SIEGE.


TEL DU NORD
CAFE DE LA CONCORDE

PRUSSIAN FORAGING TROOP BRINGING IN CATTLE.

tional Guards, to place the Francs-tireurs at the disposal of the Minister of War, and to subject them to the same discipline as the National Guards Mobile. A great deal of disorder broke forth as the autumn deepened, and as the self-satisfaction of the early days of the Revolution wore itself out. Quiet people were robbed by ruffians who pretended to denounce them as Prussian spies; and drunkenness became very common. The case, however, was not so bad as it was made to appear in statements emanating from Prussian sources, which alleged that fighting had taken place in the streets of Paris. At that time this was not the case; but the elements of civil war were already fermenting. In some parts of the country a great indisposition to meet the necessities of the time was exhibited. The Gardes Mobiles of Macon left the town for active service in a very rebellious spirit. The railway station rang with cries and lamentations, and the windows of the carriages in which they sat were adorned with figures of bleeding hearts, made of pieces of red cloth, with *immortelles*, such as are placed on tombs, and with other devices expressive of the gloomy forebodings of the men. As the train moved out of the station the Mobiles roared forth the stanzas of a song, the burden of which was to the effect that they were being sent like sheep to the slaughter, or like rats to a massacre. Their officers reproved them for this indecent display, and endeavoured to put a stop to it; but the men only sang the more, and seemed to glory in their want of spirit. If they were as badly armed as many of the improvised bodies of troops, they had some excuse. Both infantry and artillery were often but poorly equipped. The Delegate Government at Tours accordingly issued a decree, empowering the Prefects to take the arms belonging to the Sedentary National Guard, and give them to the Mobilised National Guard, and requiring all sportsmen to render up their fowling-pieces and other private weapons. These, however, were very unsatisfactory arms with which to meet the Germans; and men sometimes turned their thoughts to problematical means of getting rid of the enemy at a blow. A Parisian chemist averred that he had discovered a method of slaying a vast number of men instantaneously. By a preparation called fulminate of picrate of potass—which he described as ten times stronger than simple picrate of potass—he undertook to sweep the Prussian armies off the face of the earth. The same person also professed to have made another preparation, which would asphyxiate any living creature upon whom it was projected. He was really employed by the Government, and did some service by the production of a very deadly species of torpedo; but the grand chemical agents of wholesale destruction, like a great many similar inventions, remained untried. Either there is no composition capable of effecting these enormous massacres, or Governments shrink from employing such weapons, which, moreover, might at any time be turned against themselves. Yet science is every year entering more and more into the operations of warfare, which increase in deadliness to an equal degree; and it is impossible to say what may not be done in the future, before the ghastly burlesque is played out to the end.

The condition of the Paris fortifications naturally attracted a good deal of attention in the early times of the siege. As we have seen, the additional works, commenced with the intention of strengthening the external defences, were left unfinished; and great complaints were made of this. General Trochu accordingly issued an official note on the subject, explaining that the works in question were undertaken at a time when the siege of Paris seemed a very remote contingency. "They were," he said, "to have had the character of permanent forts, destined to serve as points of support to an army outside Paris, and the works were pushed forward for this purpose with the utmost celerity. But military events were precipitated, with the painful results which every one is acquainted with; and those responsible for the defence of Paris had to change the character of the new forts for that of field works. With that object their completion was pushed forward day and night. But in the midst of the undertaking, and several days before the enemy arrived in the neighbourhood of the capital, the system of labour was suddenly deranged, owing to the anxiety which seized the men for the safety of their families (which for the most part had their homes in the *banlieue*), and the difficulty they found in placing them in a state of safety. Nevertheless, at the date of the investment these works were good redoubts, having wide and deep ditches. If they were not armed with siege guns, the reason was that it is not customary to put pieces of this nature, which are difficult to remove, in mere earthen redoubts at a distance from the body of the place. But all those which could be occupied for external defence were so occupied. The redoubt at Châtillon, for example, rendered a very efficacious support on the 19th of September to the French troops during the obstinate conflict which raged about that point. The redoubts of Hautes-Bruyéres and of the Saquet Mill were similarly of great use on the same occasion. Thus," concluded the general, "the recriminations directed against the defence are unjust: those who have the conduct of the works have displayed the utmost zeal, and made the most of the means at their disposal."

The Germans, on their part, continued to improve their armaments, and to bring forth still more formidable artillery. After a while, the Krupp gun—an enormous piece, which had created a great deal of wonder in the Paris Exhibition of 1867—was sent to the army employed in besieging the French capital. The gun, as exhibited at Paris, was made of solid steel, and was nominally only a 1,000-pounder, though it was constructed to fire a shot weighing 1,212 pounds, or a shell of 1,080 pounds. Its calibre was fourteen inches, and its length seventeen feet. It was furnished with a forged inner tube, and was strengthened with three layers of rings over the powder-chamber, and two layers over the muzzle portion. Like most modern weapons, it was a breechloader. The projectile and charge were inserted at the right side, the wedges having been previously loosened by a screw on the other side, the plug removed by another screw fitted to the front of the rear wedge, and the wedges drawn out, and made to rest upon a bed attached to the left side of the breech. The piece weighed fifty tons, and was mounted on a carriage weighing fifteen tons. The manufacture of this one gun continued without intermission, night and day, for sixteen months, and the cost was £15,750. Krupp's works, at Essen, in Prussia, cover 450 acres of ground, and employ 8,000 men. They include 112 smelting, reverberatory, and cementing furnaces; 195 steam-engines, 49 steam-hammers, 110 smiths' forges, and 318 lathes. The master manufacturer, Herr Krupp, also produces from the same establishment 9-inch guns, throwing a shot of 330 pounds or a shell of 275 pounds; and he has furnished the Russian Government with a number of 11-inch guns. The 9-inch guns he can produce at the rate of one a day.

Great excitement was caused in Paris by the news of the fall of Strasburg. In official quarters there was a good deal of laudation. A proclamation, dated from the Hôtel de Ville on Sunday, October 2nd, and signed by all the Ministers, was issued on the following day, acknowledging the noble resistance of the city, and declaring that the siege had only drawn closer the bonds which attached Alsace to France. Then follows an enactment, "That, inasmuch as during the siege of Strasburg the national feeling of the people of Paris did not cease to lavish testimonies of patriotism upon the statue of Strasburg, and in order to perpetuate the sentiment, the statue now standing in the Place de la Concorde shall be cast in bronze, and have an inscription added to it commemorating the occasion." A very different tone was taken by the ultra-Republican, M. Felix Pyat, who put his journal, the *Combat*, into mourning, and addressed a severe reproof to the Government. "What a confession!" he exclaimed. "But we expect such disasters from your imbecility. Yes, these heroic cities (Toul and Strasburg) have held out, as you say: glory to them! but for you only a cry of malediction. No more phrases, discourses, and placards. Since September 4th you have had the fate of France in your own hands, and what have you done? Nothing. You go on your knees to Bismarck, and immediately after Toul and Strasburg are surrendered. If only half of those who carried garlands to the statue had carried arms and provisions to the town, Strasburg would have held out until to-day. And so you are going to cast the statue; and then you will have the bronze, and Prussia the town. It is in this way that you reinforce the Prussians. Toul is a frontier lost; Strasburg is a gate of Paris. And you find time to scatter the flowers of rhetoric, and to stick up placards, while you put off the Commune, the Revolution, and the arming of the people. Take care! you are the Empire under the disguise of the Republic (*l'Empire Républicain*). Sedan killed your predecessors; Strasburg will be fatal to you. Begone! your deposition is pronounced." The crowning of the statue of Strasburg, and the accompanying rhetoric, were no doubt silly enough. A great deal of strength and earnest purpose is constantly wasted by the French people in these showy displays; and it was certainly lamentable that while the Prussians were working with such grim, quiet, concentrated resolution, the French were thinking so much of idle demonstrations and the exhibition of childish egotism. But the party to which M. Pyat belonged was one of the greatest encouragers of this species of folly; and it is impossible to see what right it had to rebuke the others. Nor is it at all obvious that the Government could have done anything to prevent the fall of Strasburg. Their deposition may have been pronounced by M. Pyat and his followers; but, though their right to rule was by no means clear, the respectable classes among the Parisians saw that there would be nothing to gain, and probably a great deal to lose, by putting more extreme politicians in their places.

The ideas of those politicians, indeed, were strongly condemned in many quarters, as being in the highest degree menacing to the interests of society. The destruction of the Empire had let loose all the pent-up passions of demagogism, as calm observers had foreseen it would do; and it was found, too late, that the mere name of a Republic is not sufficient to allay discord, and restore the Saturnian times of universal good-will, prosperity, and happiness. To some the civil war which ensued on the struggle with Germany was already apparent. The professional revolutionists even went so far as to say that the municipal elections should take place with or without the consent of the Administration. The artisan class was generally in favour of holding the elections; but the demand for them came principally from the political clubs, which, according to the Besieged Resident of the *Daily News*, were attended, not by working men, but by "strong-minded women and demagogues, who never did an honest day's work in their lives." These persons were great in declamation, and the words "revolution" and "revolutionary" were never off their lips. The *Débats* described their principles and methods with great spirit:—

> "Every man who is a functionary is in their eyes necessarily a tyrant, but they themselves are incapable of tyranny. Their authority is legitimate because they alone possess the traditions of the Revolution, and would govern '*revolutionnairement*.' This word is an answer to everything; it is the concentrated essence of statesmanship. These men are not simple mortals—they are pontiffs; they do everything '*revolutionnairement*;' they eat, they drink, they sleep, they rise, '*revolutionnairement*.' At daybreak, the repose of honest citizens is disturbed by the criers of their newspapers. And what do these newspapers tell us?—that the Government is not governing '*revolutionnairement*.' They themselves are infallible and sacred. They complain that the Citizen Thiers has been entrusted with a diplomatic mission. Citizen Brutus ought to have been sent to foreign courts; his very aspect would have struck awe into the breasts of neutral monarchs. Were you to ask one of them to command an army or manœuvre a fleet, he would accept the post at once. If he were asked to write a patriotic opera in five acts, he would call for pen and paper. And were you to ask him how he hoped to succeed, knowing nothing of armies, of fleets, or of music, he would disdainfully reply that everything is easy to a person who proceeds '*revolutionnairement*.' These are the men who by their extravagances enabled Napoleon to reign for twenty years; and if we trust to them, they will paralyse the national defence. But they would not complain of our defeat, if only it were brought about by them '*revolutionnairement*,' according to the rules of their poetical and political art. They would crown themselves with chaplets of evergreen with the serenity which belongs to patriots betrayed by Fortune after having nobly accomplished their duty."

As a concession to these patriots the Mayor of Paris took a great deal of trouble, and wasted a good deal of time, in inscribing over all the public edifices the magic words, "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité," and in changing the names of streets and squares in conformity with revolutionary traditions. The patriots, however, were not satisfied. They required that all memorials of the Empire should be removed and demolished; and in particular they demanded that the column raised to the First Napoleon in the Place Vendôme should be razed to the ground, and the metal portion cast into cannon. The destruction was actually accomplished when the Communists acquired power in 1871. But for the present the patriots were disappointed.

Notwithstanding these divisions, the English working classes continued to believe in the Provisional Government, because it was nominally Republican. Frequent meetings were held in London and elsewhere on its behalf, and M. Jules Favre was deluged with sympathy. In a letter to an English gentleman, written on the 30th of September, the French Foreign Minister, referring to a demonstration in Hyde Park, said:—"We are profoundly moved by this testimony of the sentiments which the people of England have so nobly expressed, and we find in it a powerful support in the hard task which has been imposed upon us. Your generous nation has the right to point out to us the path of liberty, and we shall be happy in treading in its steps. Overwhelming as our misfortunes may appear, they do not shake our faith; we believe in justice, truth, and the fraternity of peoples. Perhaps this war, as criminal as it was insensate, will be a salutary lesson for us all. While it breaks the militarism of France, it will render that of Prussia so odious that it will provoke reaction against it. Then will be restored the glorious and fecund idea of the alliance of peoples, at the head of which your country will certainly march." There is a courtliness of Republicanism, as well as of Monarchy; and these sugared phrases of M. Jules Favre must be ascribed to some such feeling. They have but little meaning beyond civility, and no substance that can abide the slightest strain of passion or self-interest.

Some of the best of the new levies were the Bretons, who were animated by a good deal of religious enthusiasm, and seemed determined to fight to the utmost against invaders whom they had been taught to regard indiscriminately as Protestants, though in fact many were as Romanist as themselves. Of these troops, and of the reception given to the army generally by the country people, the Tours correspondent of the *Daily News* furnished the following account:—

> "The young Breton soldiers are scrupulously devout.

They fight as much for their altars as their homes, and never miss the opportunity, which being on duty at the archiepiscopal palace affords, of going into the cathedral hard by to invoke the succour of the good St. Martin, who has been shelved in France for many centuries. He, too, began life as a soldier. There are priests stationed at the shrine of that open-handed and large-hearted saint, who deliver short discourses on his Christian and military virtues in the Armorican tongue. The ecclesiastics who eulogise him in French have chiefly female hearers. Yesterday I came in for part of a sermon on the efficacy of Martin's intercession, and above all the utility of his example. The preacher was bitten by the revolutionary spirit. He proclaimed himself, like the beatified warrior he invoked, to be a partitioner, and, pointing to a picture representing Martin cutting his mantle in two, to give the best half of it to a beggar, asserted that socialism was no invention of the Republicans, who simply wished to make apostolical institutions political facts. The misfortune was, that, contrary to the patron saint of Tours, it was in our time poverty, and not religious enthusiasm, which drove men into socialism. The principle of fraternity was scoffed at, because those who had nothing were the first to appeal to it. But it was the rejection of this principle which laid France prostrate, first at the feet of Napoleon, and afterwards at the feet of Prussia. Frenchmen had become individually selfish and collectively weak, because they rebelled against the main principle of Christianity being made the mainstay of fiscal and political order. When the sustaining power of monarchical institutions was withdrawn, France fell to pieces, not so much because public funds had been wasted as because of the selfishness which had become the law of nearly every Frenchman's life. It was a pity the cathedral was not filled with peasants when this priest—who might be re-echoing the opinions of Rochefort or his friend Millière, just as Prefects appointed by the Emperor parrot M. Laurier's political ideas—was sermonising on the dissolvent action of selfishness on a nation left to its own devices. Soldiers are refused food and shelter in farms and villages where there are plenty of empty beds and spare provisions. Peasants will not, unless armed force is brought to bear upon them, give hospitality to the footsore and wounded, 'for fear the Prussians might be angry with them.' In self-defence, the Francs-tireurs are obliged to put illegal pressure on those people whose patriotism is entirely regulated by a care of their pockets. If they did not, what with the disorganisation of the military commissariat and finance departments, they would be left to die of fatigue and hunger. This odious spirit is not confined to the fields and hamlets in which the Emperor's soul delighted. I have seen instances of it in this good town of Tours, where, to my certain knowledge, soldiers, harassed with marching and countermarching, were allowed to wander through the streets all night. The Mayor was away, the adjutant was ill, and no lodging-house billets were made out for several companies who arrived here on Sunday evening from Poitiers. The poor fellows went about the streets humbly touching their caps to every one they met, and asking if they knew of any place where they could sleep. Two out of some hundreds succeeded in getting beds. The others threw themselves down in the public gardens, where they passed the night as they could, and food was only given them at a late hour on the day following. I heard a soldier say this evening that a benighted company has no chance of receiving so much as a cup of cold water in the country's name outside of a faubourg inhabited by mechanics and workmen."

The indisposition of the people to succour their own military defenders was undoubtedly due to the terrorism with which the Prussians conducted the war. Of course it was not creditable to the French peasants and citizens to be influenced by any such considerations; but human nature is weak in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, not only in France, but everywhere else. It is easy enough for observers who sit in safety to say that the people should have entertained the Francs-tireurs, even at the risk of having their roofs burnt over their heads, their wives and children driven almost naked into the woods and fields, and themselves hanged by sentence of a drumhead court-martial. But some allowance must be made for those who had actually suffered, or knew that they might any day be in a position to suffer, the vengeance of the invaders. This was the real cause of what, even after all excuses have been made, was no doubt a humiliating spectacle. To attribute it to some peculiar selfishness generated by the Empire was simply to fall in with the vulgar clap-trap of the hour. The Empire was the convenient scapegoat on which all failures and wrong-doings were laid, to the relief of the national conscience. If an army was defeated, if a city capitulated, if a soldier ran away, if a peasant shrank from death, if his children wept at being houseless, if a citizen was selfish, if a Prefect was corrupt, if a Mayor was incompetent, if the rich were ostentatious, if the poor were servile, if the country was ignorant, if the towns were immoral, if there was superstition in Brittany and depravity at Paris—it was all owing to the Empire. Of course, no such things had ever been heard of before. To listen to some writers, it would appear as if every form of vice, as far as France was concerned, had been the special invention of the second generation of the Buonapartes.

It was rather pitiful to find that while German armies were prosecuting the war in France in the most relentless spirit, German merchants were whining over the "inhumanity" of France in seizing German merchant-vessels at sea. Although the French raised the blockade in the Baltic and North Sea on the 1st of October, German merchandise could only be despatched in vessels belonging



THE KING OF SAXONY.

to neutral maritime States, as all German vessels ran the risk of being captured by the cruisers of the enemy. Hereupon, the Chamber of Commerce of Stettin sent a petition to Count Bismarck, complaining that a large number of German ships were then lying idle in neutral ports, suggesting that, on the conclusion of peace, a sufficient money indemnity should be exacted from France for the losses thus occasioned, and praying that a proclamation might be issued in the name of the North German Confederation, ensuring compensation to the owners of all vessels captured in pursuing their voyages to German or neutral ports. The petitioners continued:—

"Your Excellency is not accustomed to do things by halves, and the fulfilment of our respectful petition



COMBAT AT CHÂTILLON.

would be attended by the most important and far-extending consequences; for not only would it give us the immediate and practical benefit of seeing our vessels and their crews return home before the winter sets in, but it would go a step further in the line of policy you so steadily pursue, and tend to the alteration of existing international treaties and the laws of nations by introducing the elementary principle that private property at sea should be as inviolable as it is on land. The history of the proceedings that led to the Paris Declaration of 1856 throws a shadow on England, and opens the door to a conjecture that she opposed the principle, and that it was owing to her influence that the question was shelved. But it is sincerely to be hoped that, after the experience she has since gained, England would now no longer offer any objection or opposition, particularly if Germany, by granting the prayer of your petitioners, were by one blow to neutralise and annihilate all the petty advantages that France thought to achieve for herself by her inhumane conduct. It may be taken for granted that the day is not very distant when France may also modify her views of the case, and follow the magnanimous example set by Germany; so that, as the United States had the courage to decline adherence to the above-mentioned Paris Declaration unless the principle was adopted, we may hope to witness, as we shall greet with joy, the abolition of this barbarous institution. But we have still another request to make. There is a great want of sailors to man the ships, as so many of our seamen have been drafted into the navy. In consideration of the pitiful result of the French naval operations off our coast, we are firmly convinced that our sailors may, without detriment or danger to the country, be discharged, and allowed to return to their more peaceful avocations till called upon again to serve in the defence of their Fatherland, when to a certainty they will respond once more with alacrity to the call, and be found at their post of duty. We therefore urgently implore your Excellency to give such instructions to the naval authorities as may be needful for the immediate discharge from the service of the Federal navy of as large a number of seamen as may be found possible and expedient, that we may send them abroad to bring home our vessels."

Whether the principle for which the petitioners contended was good or bad, it was certainly not surprising, or fairly open to objection, that the French should have taken advantage of the law as it stood, and have seized the enemy's goods under the enemy's flag whenever their superiority at sea gave them the opportunity of doing so. But it was the arrogant assumption of Germany throughout the war that she herself was entitled to use any weapon she could find against the enemy, while every attempt at self-defence or retaliation on the part of France was a high crime and misdemeanour, to be visited by the unsparing vengeance of enlightened and infallible Teutonism.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Progress of German Unity—Appointment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg to various Commands—The Francs-tireurs—Severity of the German Treatment of the French Irregulars—Burning of Ablis—The *Times* on Prussian Reprisals—Fresh Reinforcements of the Germans—The French Army of Lyons—Scattered Actions—Defeat of the French at St. Rémy—Spirited Defence of St. Quentin—Submission of Montdidier—Progress of the Siege of Thionville—Singular Announcement of M. Gambetta—General von Roon on the Siege of Paris—Difficulties in the Way of Immediate Action—Positions of the Investing Force before Paris at the commencement of October—Measures taken to protect the Art Treasures of the City—Renewed Agitation in Favour of the Commune—Sortie on the 13th of October—Shelling of St. Cloud—Memories of the Town and Palace—Complete Destruction of the latter by Fire.

One effect of the extraordinary German success became manifest in the early autumn in the shape of a fresh impulse towards national unity. Bavaria and Würtemberg signified, on the 1st of October, their willingness to become members of the German Confederation; and a new German Union was afterwards arranged, by which the consolidation of the country was substantially accomplished. Thus, that which France had long been labouring to prevent, and which it was hoped the war would effectually crush, was accomplished by the great struggle precipitated in July. To the other mortifications endured by the French, this must have been no slight addition. A jealous feeling with respect to German strength and independence has for many years been shared, in nearly equal proportions, by all French parties; and had the Emperor succeeded in the war of 1870, and put a stop to the growth of Bismarck's great idea, little would have been heard in the way of objection, except from a few solitary thinkers. However much it was now pretended, as a means of casting obloquy on the fallen potentate, that the Republicans had always been in favour of the natural development of Germany, it cannot be doubted that the rapid progress of unity after the time of Sedan was regarded with dislike by the newly-constituted Powers in France, and by the people generally. It was a conclusive sign that traditional French policy had been discomfited beyond hope of retrieval.

The Germans still continued their quiet, business-like way of taking possession of France. A Royal decree, dated October 2nd, appointed the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg Governor-General of Rheims, and placed under his jurisdiction all the districts of France occupied by the Prussian army which had not been included in the jurisdiction of the Governors-General of Alsace and Lorraine. At the same time he was invested with the supreme command of the 13th Army Corps, which was formed to hold in check the roving bands of Francs-tireurs, and others who threatened the communications of the armies before Paris and Metz. This corps was to march about everywhere in brigades or regiments, sparing no effort for the extermination of the irregular soldiery. A good deal of execution was done in this way, and, as we have seen, the Prussians hesitated at nothing which would advance their purpose; yet the irregular troops were not exterminated. They represented a real patriotic impulse, and such impulses are not easily suppressed. Although these guerillas were necessarily unable to meet the Prussians in open conflict with any chance of success, they did some service in the way of harassing, dividing, and in various ways employing the enemy, so as to weaken him for other operations. On the whole, the Francs-tireurs deserve to be spoken of with respect. Doubtless some of their body committed great excesses, and were guilty, not merely of unjustifiable acts of cruelty on scattered German soldiers, but of outrages on their own countrymen and countrywomen. Occasionally, too, they were insubordinate. But these were the exceptions. Many of the Francs-tireurs were as good troops as could fairly be expected of such raw and undisciplined levies. In taking up arms against the invader, they did no more than they were perfectly entitled to do; and had they shrunk from the task, they would have deserved the reproach of being indifferent to the fate of the country which gave them birth. The Prussians, however, throughout the war, continued to treat them with unsparing severity. To defend a hamlet or a small town was treated as an unpardonable crime; and terrible were the reprisals committed, not only on the Francs-tireurs themselves, but on women, children, and old people.

An instance of this is to be found in the treatment of the little town or village of Ablis, lying not far off the rail from Paris to Tours, and containing 900 inhabitants. A squadron of German cavalry and a company of infantry entered the place on the 8th of October, and took up their quarters. In the middle of the night, the townspeople, aided by a body of Francs-tireurs, attacked the Germans while they were asleep, killed several, and dispersed the rest. On what ground of morals you are bound to respect a deadly enemy because he is asleep, it would be hard to say; but the Germans acted on some newly-adopted code, very different from that which guided their conduct at home, when defending their country against the French in the early part of this century. The disaster of Ablis was not to be quietly endured; so on the following day a force was sent against the place, and it was burnt to the ground, together with a neighbouring village from which the Francs-tireurs had come. The village of Chérizy, near Dreux, met with a similar fate on the 10th. It was attacked by a Prussian force, and valorously defended; as a punishment, it was set on fire. St. Dizier was sacked, because the townspeople hesitated about providing a sum of 500,000 francs which had been demanded of them. After a delay of two hours, according to a French account, the pillage commenced, and continued for an hour and a half, when a tender of 150,000 francs was made and refused. Ultimately this sum was accepted; yet the pillage recommenced, and was kept up from noon till six in the evening. A shoemaker was shot for firing on the Prussian troops; and the Mayor, who pleaded for his pardon, was refused. About the same time, Colonel von Kahlden, commanding the 1st Regiment of Mecklenburg Dragoons, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Laon and the neighbouring villages, stating that, in consequence of the hostile attitude of a portion of the inhabitants towards the German troops, the slighest attack or resistance would be vigorously avenged, and that, for every German soldier slain, four Frenchmen, innocent or guilty, would be shot, and the neighbouring towns be made to pay a large indemnity.

General von der Tann also (according to the *Nord* of Brussels) issued a proclamation on the 22nd of September, saying that, as several "murders" had been committed by Francs tireurs hidden in the woods about Versailles, *every man* found in the interior of the woods and thickets would be treated as a Franc-tireur (that is to say, would be summarily shot); that the communes which had not denounced the presence of such persons would be heavily fined; and that in certain cases the municipal authorities would be taken into custody.

The Germans vindicated these proceedings by arguing that they were prepared to treat after the usual fashion all regular bodies of troops, even though they might lie in ambush, resort to strategy, and operate against their communications; but that they had a right to execute as marauders and brigands all who went about assuming the character of civilians when it suited their convenience, and then suddenly transforming themselves into armed bands, when they thought they had got their enemy at a disadvantage. A Prussian officer, explaining to the correspondent of a French newspaper the principles on which they acted, said:—"Every one who belongs to the army and wears a uniform we respect; but we have orders, which we shall carry out, to shoot every peasant found in arms. *We* do not wage a war of assassination: we are fighting honourably, while you Frenchmen call to your aid African savages and these hordes of peasants, who, without respecting the laws of war, commit a thousand atrocities. In spite of all the proclamations which your Government may issue in order to excite the country, you will only succeed in having your countrymen massacred and your towns burnt." This statement is characterised by a quality which has been ascribed to the official utterances of Count Bismarck—viz., a "cynical candour." Massacre and arson are not generally regarded as the concomitants of civilised warfare; yet they were deliberately adopted and openly avowed by the Prussians as portions of their method of overawing resistance. The Francs-tireurs, as already shown, were real bodies of troops, irregular, it is true, but properly officered, and provided with a distinctive uniform, if a rough-and-ready one. Nevertheless, they were frequently shot or hanged in cold blood for acts of resistance; and, what was worse, the villages from which they came, or were supposed to have come, were burnt to ashes, thus visiting the acts of men on unoffending women and children. If a railway was cut, and a train of Prussian soldiers went off the line in consequence, the people of the nearest hamlet, who might have had nothing to do with the act, were made to suffer, not merely in purse and property, but in their actual lives. In consequence of a railway accident near Epernay, resulting from the line having been torn up, the Germans, in the course of October, required of the French authorities to appoint hostages to accompany every train in the front carriage; such persons to forfeit their lives in case of destruction of the line and accident to the train: and it was added that possibly they would not be the only sufferers. The principle of vicarious punishment was never more remorselessly carried out.

These acts at length proceeded to such an extent that even the *Times*, which very strongly supported the German cause, cried out against them. In a leading article, on November 11th, that journal said:—"The French *bourgeois* has commonly attained a degree of education but too little in advance of the peasant. Germany is to him the name of an unknown land. What Germans are, peasant and *bourgeois* learn from the irruption of an invincible army, inflexible in its requisitions, and ruthless in the punishment of imputed offences. What is the character of the peace promised by such preparation for it? But it will be said that the Germans are an educated and an enlightened people. It is true that they are educated; but it may be open to doubt whether their education has been perfectly effectual to break down those narrow limits of mental action which are characteristic of the Teutonic intellect, and to impart instead the gift of sympathetic intelligence. It may be well to remember that the original *Philisters* were Germans. The word 'Philistinism,' which has lately become in a measure acclimatised among us, was first applied to the typical German intellect. If the progress of the war makes Frenchmen look upon all Germans as the degenerate citizens of the Latin Empire looked upon Goths and Huns, it has, on the other hand, developed some of the worst traits of the German character, and thrown the control of the nation into the hands of the narrowest-minded among them. We see them trampling down the civilisation of France with a brutal disdain wholly unwarranted by the degree of their relative superiority to it. They could teach France much, but they could also learn much from it; yet they care neither to learn nor to teach. Their apparent object is simply to extinguish. From those to whom much is given much is required; but the education of the German has been powerless to save the predominating temper of the army from the temptation of ignorant disdain." A letter appearing in the same day's paper remarked that, unlike Europe in 1814, Prussia was vindictive. She should have terminated the war after Sedan, and she would then have been a great nation in every sense of the term. But she was intent on avenging the Germans of sixty years before on the French of 1870, and so had carried on the war in Tartar fashion. Alluding to Count Bismarck's circular of October 10th, quoted on pp. 333—335, the writer (Sir Adolphus Slade) observed that, with Machiavellian subtlety, Prussia had "given notice that, in the event of Paris holding out to the last extremity, hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants will die of hunger, since she will be unable, she avers, to feed them even for a day. An Alva, in other times, when military rigour was usual, might threaten the male inhabitants of a beleagured city with death in return for their obstinate resistance, and the threat might be carried out; but it has been reserved for King William of Prussia to threaten with that fate men, women, and children alike. Every general closely investing a resolute city has to count with the indicated difficulty, and in failure thereof lays himself open to grave reproach. King William is bound in honour to have supplemental supplies in his camp to avert the apprehended catastrophe. His Majesty has not the excuse of want of means—such as General Muravief, who nobly succoured the starving inhabitants of Kars, might have alleged in roadless, wasted Armenia—for his troops scour fertile districts of exuberant France, and rail-communication is free from the Rhine to within a few miles of Versailles." It should be added, however, that, when the fall of Paris really arrived, the Germans did their best to succour the citizens. They were not revengeful when once their enemy had confessed himself vanquished; their fault was in the unscrupulous means by which victory was secured.

For the more effectual prosecution of their designs the Germans brought up reinforcements shortly after the fall of Strasburg. On the 3rd of October General Schmerling crossed the Rhine at Mulhouse with the Fourth Division of Landwehr, with a view to joining General Werder in operations against Lyons and Besançon. This force was very soon heard of. The Grand Duke of Saxe-Coburg, brother of the late Prince Consort of England, remarked to a newspaper correspondent at Versailles:—"The French must be thoroughly beaten; for I am afraid that they will want to go to war again as soon as the recollection of present disasters has in the least degree passed away. We must therefore take from them the power of hurting us. We are now sending an army to Lyons; and the south of France will learn what a terrible thing war is, and will wish for peace as earnestly as do the inhabitants of the east." The French army of Lyons, as we have already seen, was in a most inefficient and unformed state. The Prefect was so dissatisfied with the Francs-tireurs that he dissolved all the companies of that force, and required the men to return to their homes at once, in order that they might be incorporated in the Garde Mobile; and the same authority declared, as his reason for the arrest of General Mazure, that the inertia of the military commanders had long filled both the Government and the country with distrust. The circumstances under which this general was arrested were, however, related by himself in a letter to the newspapers; and they appear quite unjustifiable. He stated that on the 29th of September the Prefect of Lyons announced to him that he had received a despatch from Tours, investing him (the Prefect) with full military powers; but the general was already in possession of a despatch from the Minister of War at Tours (at that time Admiral Fourichon), intimating that the Delegate Government, as well as that of Paris, intended to maintain intact the rights and privileges of the military authorities. In presence of these conflicting directions, it was resolved to telegraph to Tours for further instructions, and General Mazure received from Admiral Fourichon two despatches confirming the first, and telling him on no account to give way. These despatches he forwarded to the Prefect, who, however, still demanded his resignation, in the name of the Municipal Council. Further telegraphing to the Delegate Government ensued, and, no answer arriving, the Prefect threatened to arrest General Mazure. The latter begged for time to send an officer to Tours, as it was impossible for him to disobey orders. The Prefect refused, and the general was ignominiously marched through the streets, in the midst of the jeers, insults, and menaces of the populace. At the Prefecture he found the missing despatches in answer to his last telegrams, and these appointed him to the military command at Nantes, with orders to go there at once. Nevertheless, he was thrown into prison, from which he was not released for some days.

A few scattered actions, of more or less importance, marked the early days of October. Epernon—a small town in the department of Eure-et-Loire, twelve miles to the north-east of Chartres, and thirty-five miles south-west of Paris—was occupied by the Germans on the night of the 4th, after a sharp engagement, in which the Francs-tireurs and the National Guards Mobile are said to have fought valiantly against superior forces. They also occupied La Ferté Alais, twenty-four miles south of the capital. On the 5th the Francs-tireurs, under General Reyan, of the Army of the Loire, defeated a rather large detachment of Prussian cavalry and infantry coming from Fontainebleau, and drove them back from Artenay to Etampes. In consequence the Prussians evacuated Pithiviers. The French Army of the Rhone (commonly called the Army of the East) first came into action on the 6th of October, and sustained a serious defeat. The troops engaged were chiefly Mobiles, commanded by General Dupré, and they were in advance of the main body of the army. The Prussian forces were under General Werder, lately commanding before Strasburg; General von Degenfeld, chief of the Baden division; and General Schmerling, at the head of the Landwehr. The second of these generals, in a report to the Grand Duke of Baden, said that the engagement lasted from half-past nine in the morning until four in the afternoon, and was fought near St. Rémy and Nompatelize, in the department of the Vosges, about forty miles to the south-west of Strasburg. The numerical strength of the French, according to the same report, was double that of the Germans; but other accounts represent that both sides had about 10,000 in the field. The German troops engaged were the 3rd Regiment, the 1st Fusilier Battalion of the 1st Grenadier Regiment, the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment, two squadrons of Life Dragoons, and the Mœbel and Kunz batteries. The French were supported by two batteries of artillery; and General von Degenfeld says that the prisoners alleged that they numbered at least 14,000 men, reinforced by battalions from the south under General Pethevin. St. Rémy, Nompatelize, and the Bois des Jumelles, were carried by the Germans at the point of the bayonet, and three vigorous onslaughts of the French were repulsed. The German loss amounted to twenty officers and 410 men, killed and wounded. The French appear to have suffered much more severely, and, besides their dead and wounded, they left sixty officers and 600 men in the hands of the enemy. At the conclusion of the day, the French, being utterly routed, made for Rambervilliers, to the north-east, and a portion ultimately retreated upon Dijon. An official re-



OUTPOST IN THE SNOW.



BALLOON MANUFACTORY.

port of the action, published in the *Carlsruhe Gazette*, said :—

> "General Degenfeld's mission was to clear the country of Francs-tireurs, to prevent the further organisation of those bodies, and to give a severe lesson to the district which was encouraging them. Starting in three divisions, the force was to unite between Raon l'Etape and Etival. The passage of the mountains was to some extent very troublesome, as most of the passages for a considerable distance had to be cleared of trees and other obstructions, so as to make the road passable for vehicles. No direct defence of these passes was, however, attempted, except at Champenay, on the St. Blaise and Belval route, on the 4th, when the vanguard easily dispersed the enemy. On the same day, a reconnoitring force between Calles and Le Trouche encountered some Francs-tireurs, and completely routed them. On the 5th there was a slight engagement at Raon, which the enemy had occupied ; but, on the heads of the divisions arriving there simultaneously, the Francs-tireurs attempted no real resistance. After a short fire from the edge of the town and of the wood, as also from the houses of the suburbs, they were dispersed, and a large number of them put *hors de combat*. On the 6th the third division was attacked on the right flank by a regular French column, hastily collected from the south and the whole region, which arrived from Bruyeres and Rambervilliers. A thick fog prevailed in the morning, in consequence of which, on the skirmishers encountering a warm fire at day-break, a halt was made on the heights of Etival. At a quarter past nine it was sufficiently clear for the advance to be continued. Nompatelize, which the enemy had occupied, and where he had erected two batteries, was soon taken ; but in the wood beyond there was a warm engagement. At one P.M. the French appeared dispirited, and their fire slackened, the Germans, however, being also nearly exhausted. Many infantry detachments had scarcely any cartridges left, and two guns, which had been firing incessantly since half-past ten, had hardly any ammunition remaining. About half-past one the enemy was reinforced, his artillery resuming fire, and the infantry renewing the attack on all sides. They were, however, received with equal determination, the German artillery displaying its superiority. The reserves were called up, and at half-past three a general advance was ordered. Drums and trumpets sounding, the steep slopes of the wood were stormed. The enemy awaited the attack, but was pushed back step by step up to the crest of the heights. He then, in wild flight, fled down the mountains towards La Bourgence, being fired on with deadly effect. At La Bourgence the French attempted another stand, but were driven back, and fled in confusion to Bruyeres and Rambervilliers. The battle-field, the wood, and the line of retreat, were strewed for a long distance with knapsacks, muskets, and equipments. The column bivouacked at night on the field, the burning village of Nompatelize serving as a watch-fire."

The account states that the Germans engaged numbered 3,600 or 3,800 men ; that the French had at least twice as many, and that their army consisted of troops of the Line, marching regiments, and Mobiles of the Vosges and the Meurthe. Of Francs-tireurs there were hardly any ; and the French army, though supplied with eight or nine guns, had no cavalry. The marching regiments had only arrived in haste the previous night from Bordeaux, Marseilles, and some garrisons of the south. On the following day (the 7th), German skirmishers advanced in various directions, and on the 8th the column united, and occupied St. Dié and Raon without molestation. General von Roon, the Prussian Minister of War, afterwards observed that the German troops had no occasion to fear opposition in that part of France. The defeat of the French was not at all surprising, considering the half-formed state of the army thus brought into action ; but it had an unfortunate effect in augmenting the general feeling of distrust, and adding to the confidence of the invaders.

A slight French success occurred on the 8th. News having been received at St. Quentin on the 7th, that the Prussians were nine miles from the town (which is situated about eighty miles to the north-east of Paris), and were expected to attack it on the following morning, active preparations were made for resistance. The Garde Mobile and the firemen were set to man the barricades, and St. Quentin, although an open town, was enabled, by the courage and resolution of its defenders, to repulse the Prussian assault when it came. The Prefect called upon the population generally to assist in the defence. The workmen demanded arms, and were furnished with them by means of a requisition upon the gunsmiths. They then marched against the enemy ; a barricade was raised near the canal, and this was held for five hours against the onslaught of the Germans, who ultimately retreated. The Prefect himself (M. Anatole de la Forge, an eminent man of letters) headed the defence, and was wounded in the leg. There were losses on both sides, but the townspeople were naturally much elated at their success. The account of the affair in the *Gazette de Cambrai* contains some interesting details. It states :—

> "On Saturday, October 8th, about half-past ten o'clock, the Prussians were announced to be at a few kilomètres distance from the town, on the road to La Fère. The drums beat to arms. The National Guards hastened to their posts. The Prefect, M. Anatole de la Forge, wearing a plain National Guard's uniform, went on to the chief square of the town with a broadsword in one hand and a revolver in the other. He harangued the population, and led them to fight. Four formidable barricades had been constructed

during the past fortnight in the Rue d'Isle—one on the banks of the canal, two others, at 200 mètres distance from each other, in the interior of the town, and the fourth on the road from La Fère to the top of the Faubourg d'Isle. This barricade could be defended for a few moments by ten men only. The fight began at the entrance of the town, close to the Great Canal barricade, which formed, indeed, a very strong position. The Prefect remained in the first post of danger as long as the fight went on. His courage was admirable.

"The Prussians, who were about 900 in number—namely, 600 infantry and 300 cavalry—entrenched themselves in the railway station. Taking advantage of the angles of the houses, as well as of the openings in the railway balustrades, they endeavoured to deploy as sharpshooters. Despite all these combinations, they could not succeed in reaching the National Guard; they even suffered serious losses; every man who showed himself was shot; the celebrated shooter Bosquett, a St. Quentin man, is mentioned, among others, as having killed or wounded six or seven Prussians, one of whom was a superior officer.

"The struggle lasted until about two o'clock. At that time the Prussians retreated, taking the road to Marle. The National Guards, being without quick-firing and long-range muskets, were unable to pursue them. 'If we had only had 300 soldiers provided with chassepôts, not one Prussian would have escaped.' So the inhabitants of St. Quentin said. The enemy carried away his dead and wounded in carts, which had been procured by means of a requisition; consequently, the number of their loss could not be exactly ascertained. According to the most impartial reckoning, it was about forty or fifty. On our side we had three men dead, and five or six wounded. One of the dead, a modeller workman, was the father of eleven children, who have been adopted by the town of St. Quentin. Three Frenchmen were made prisoners; eleven Prussians remained in our hands.

"It is reported that while the fight was going on, and about an hour before the enemy's retreat, the Town Council adopted a resolution, saying that the National Guards had bravely done their duty, but that they could not continne the struggle without the town incurring the risk of cruel reprisals, and that consequently there was reason for entering into negotiations with the enemy. This deliberation was brought to the Prefect behind the barricades. He refused to accept it, saying that he was merely a National Guard, and that it did not belong to him to give orders to his comrades."

St. Quentin, however, only escaped for a time. On the 21st of October it was compelled to surrender to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg.

Several minor movements in different parts of the country took place about the same time, with varying success; the Prussians sometimes occupying small towns, and leaving them in a day or two when they had obtained what they wanted in the way of war-contributions or provisions; and the French occasionally driving back detachments which had ventured too far from their supports. On the 13th of October, for instance, a party of Francs-tireurs attacked some Würtemburg cavalry in the forest of Fontainebleau, and pursued them to Melun, where they captured their barracks and stores. On the other hand, the Germans made their power felt in many directions, and revenged any temporary discomfiture with the utmost rigour. Sometimes the unhappy French were so struck with terror at the appearance of the enemy, that they yielded at once, without any attempt at resistance. In this respect the people of Montdidier presented a marked contrast to the citizens of St. Quentin. The former, like the latter, is an open town; and when the Prussians, about 1,200 strong, with eight guns, were seen approaching, it was determined to surrender quietly. The Sub-Prefect, an old military officer, constructed barricades, and wanted to fight; but, on the commencement of the cannonade, the people compelled him to yield. The extreme severity with which the Prussians carried on the war had much to do with these rather abject, but perhaps excusable, submissions.

Thionville continued to defy its assailants; and on the 14th of October a gentleman, who had just returned from making a journey in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, communicated to the Prefect of the Department of the Nord some details as to the condition of the fortress, which lies near the frontiers of that duchy. He stated that the town was provided with abundance of provisions and ammunition, and that its re-victualling had not been interrupted. The garrison, which was not numerous before the French disasters, had been gradually increased by the remnants of the defeated armies, especially escaped prisoners. It then numbered more than 8,000 men of all arms, not including a body of Francs-tireurs. On the 10th of October the investing army attempted to establish batteries on a hill commanding Thionville, but was compelled to desist on account of a well-sustained and well-directed fire from the ramparts. A vigorous sortie was made by the garrison, when 300 prisoners were taken, while the French losses amounted only to a few killed and wounded. The resistance of the garrison of Thionville was often referred to during the war, as presenting a favourable contrast, in its determination and reality, to the half-hearted defence which, from whatever motive, was conducted by Bazaine at Metz, only ten miles off. It was in these isolated instances of courage and self-reliance that the French mainly had cause for congratulation. In default of more striking successes, they lent an ear to every idle tale of great achievements that was bruited abroad. M. Gambetta, in a proclamation to the inhabitants of Tours, issued on October 14th, said:—"I can announce to you, with unspeakable joy, that I have received news from Paris, dated the 12th, that the citizens, becoming more and more heroic and impatient behind their ramparts, require to be led against the enemy; and here is the bulletin of their first victory along the whole belt round the city: 'The Prussians have been dislodged from the positions they occupied during the last three weeks. In the direction of St. Denis they have been driven back beyond Stains, Pierrefitte, and Dugny. On the east, Joineville, Creteil, Bobigny, and the Plateau d'Avron have been taken. The Germans have also been driven out of Bas Meudon and St. Cloud, being forced to retire to Versailles.' The enemy knows now the value of a people resolved and determined to save its institutions and its honour." M. Lefebre, consul of France at Vienna, who escaped from Paris in a balloon, which descended at Barnières, in the Department of the Nord, on the 12th of October, made a number of statements to the same effect. The Prussians had been forced to fall back in all directions, and to considerable distances. Their batteries had been destroyed, and they were obliged to remain on the defensive. The French had re-taken several positions, and the peninsula of Gennevilliers had been cleared of the presence of the enemy by a cavalry reconnaissance, and would be protected from his return. These reports were afterwards contradicted in the flattest terms by the Prussians, who asserted that they still held the same positions as at first. The propagation of such statements, following on a good many others equally baseless, did much towards shaking the credit of the French beyond the limits of their own country.

While the Parisians were clamouring for a sortie, the Germans were equally impatient for the commencement of active operations against the French capital. This feeling was so strong that the Prussian War Minister, General von Roon, found it advisable to send to the Berlin *Staats Anzeiger* a semi-official note, explaining why it was necessary to proceed with caution. Experience, argued this note, had shown that in a war with France no satisfactory peace could be obtained unless dictated at Paris. The German operations were therefore being directed to that end, and the results of the first part of the campaign were the annihilation of one-half of the French troops, and the shutting up of the rest, so that the Parisians were unable to offer any serious resistance in front of and between the various forts of the *enceinte*. Although thus deprived of an army in the field, the moral and material resources remaining to General Trochu were of no contemptible kind, and, being wielded by an energetic commander, they rendered the task of the German armies "one of the most difficult recorded in the military history of the world." Paris was scarcely to be regarded as a fortress, but was rather a fortified battle-field, with forts covering every point of access. Some of these forts were strong enough to rank as citadels; others exceeded the strength of many fortresses. Behind the forts was a continuous rampart, nearly six geographical miles in circumference. Directly the German generals recognised that reduction by mere investment would not lead to prompt results, preparations for a regular siege were commenced. Although the exhaustion of food might be relied on as guaranteeing ultimate surrender, still, in view of the approach of the inclement season, a partial bombardment, and an attack on some of the advanced forts, might be resorted to as an effective means of accelerating the catastrophe. Yet it was to be borne in mind that the portion of the environs of Paris from which a bombardment could be directed was the most hilly and impracticable of all. It was probable, continued the semi-official note, that the bombardment would not be proceeded with until the fire of several forts had been silenced. The confident belief of the military authorities was, that they would not be long in conquering some of those forts. The investing army had the means of protecting itself against rain and cold; and Parisian winters were generally milder than those of Germany. Paris, on the contrary, would become weaker every day the siege lasted. Provisions would get scarcer and scarcer, and the poor would be likely to rise against the wealthy—"a contingency," adds the writer, with that calm and business-like way of calculating the most terrific consequences of war which seems peculiar to the Prussian nature, "hastened on by our hindering any fresh supplies from reaching the beleaguered town. Our numerous cavalry is quite competent to carry this out." The note concludes:—"The French Minister of the Interior, in his latest circular of the 9th inst., assures his countrymen that Paris can be taken neither by force nor surrender, neither by famine nor rebellion. His self-delusion, it must be admitted, is complete. He enumerates the very calamities which will compel surrender, and in his blind confidence draws a false conclusion. Our task is to possess ourselves of the French capital with as little loss of time and life as possible. We are sure to master the uncommonly difficult problem, but shall scarcely succeed so very rapidly as the anxious expectation of our countrymen would desire." Such was the view of the great siege and its probabilities taken by the Prussian military authorities in the first half of October. It expressed great confidence in the issue, and on the whole that confidence was not misplaced. In some respects, however, the anticipations of the Minister were hardly realised. The forts were not speedily reduced, and the winter, when it came, proved to be of exceptional severity.

The positions of the investing force before Paris at the commencement of October may be thus stated:—Beginning at the right wing of the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, the Würtemberg contingent had its head-quarters at La Lande. On the left was the 11th Army Corps, composed of regiments from Hesse and Nassau. The 6th Army Corps, composed of Silesians, was posted near Chevilly and Choisy-le-Roi, and was supported by the 1st Bavarian Army Corps, under General von der Tann, acting as a general reserve to the army south of the Seine. In front of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps, and touching the left of the 6th Corps (commanded by General von Tümpling), were the 2nd Bavarians, under von Hartmann. The 5th Army Corps, consisting of Poseners, touched with its right the left of the Bavarians, and occupied Bougival and Versailles. The Crown Prince of Saxony's force, to which had been given the title of the Army of the Marne, occupied, together with von Alvensleben's 4th Army Corps of Thuringians, the height in front of St. Brie, with the Guards in the centre before Boissy, and the 12th Army Corps, composed of Saxons, posted before Le Vert Galant, and joining the Würtemberg division near La Lande, thus completing the circle. The intervals were filled up with cavalry in constant movement. Such a position was not devoid of peril. The area commanded by the fire of the Paris forts described a circle of more than forty miles; and there was always the chance of a successful sortie being executed, besides the damage that might have been done by the guns of the forts. Great skill, however, was shown in planting the several masses of men over this large stretch of ground. The army of the Crown Prince of Saxony was dispersed from the western loops of the Seine to the eastern loops of the Marne, extending in a vast semi-circle from the Rouen Railway in the north-west to some of the villages in the south-east. At the latter point it joined the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, which extended from Bonneuil to Châtou, by Choisy-le-Roi, Sceaux, and Versailles. Both armies were kept beyond the fire of the forts.

A complete siege-train arrived before Paris by about the middle of the month; but for a long while no attempt was made to mount the guns. In the beginning of the siege the Germans trusted to the pressure of famine; but they seem to have been misinformed as to the amount of food which was stored within the beleaguered capital. For their own food supplies they at first depended on the zone of country immediately surrounding Paris. When this failed (and it was soon exhausted, owing to the French having themselves swept a portion of the land clear of produce), they were compelled to go further afield; and the foraging parties, which were not very large, sometimes proceeded so far from their supports that, as in the cases of St. Quentin and Dreux, they were exposed to reverses which, though by no means serious, were mortifying.

In anticipation of the bombardment, and the possible damage it might occasion to important buildings in the city, the French Government took measures to protect the art treasures of Paris. In the court of the Louvre the bas-reliefs of Jean Goujon were protected by canvas linings, over which was a thick coating of plaster. Along the quays, the windows were closed by a wall formed of sacks of earth piled upon each other. The rarer pictures were covered up, and deposited in the cellars. The Venus of Milo, and other ancient sculptures belonging to the grand collection of the Louvre, were removed to buildings less open to attack; and the books and objects of art at the Mazarin Library, the Museum of Cluny, and the Artillery and Natural History Museums, were properly cared for. The *Liberté*, in mentioning these facts, said that it was right to anticipate everything, though there could be no doubt the Prussians would never enter Paris. The precautions, however, were in reality taken, not against the Prussian entry, but against the chances of the bombardment.

As they became more accustomed to the use of their arms, the raw levies in Paris felt greater confidence in their ability to meet the enemy. All classes coalesced in the hard work of the defence; the Rothschilds taking their turn of duty on the ramparts as privates in the Garde Mobile side by side with the humblest citizens. So far, the unity was perfect; but, in connection with politics, Flourens continued to excite commotion. After repeated manifestations had been made in favour of the Commune, the Government announced in the *Official Journal* of October 8th that they had resolved—partly in consequence of the siege, and partly because of the threatening conduct of the malcontents—to adjourn the elections. Accordingly, an excited meeting of unarmed citizens took place about one o'clock P.M. in front of the Hôtel de Ville. A strong body of National Guards and Mobiles was marched down to the civic hall an hour later; but the men were well received. "Before long," says a correspondent of the *Times*, "General Trochu appeared on the scene, and, leaving his escort behind him, made his way alone, as he best could, through the dense throng, as if to show his perfect confidence in their loyal behaviour. He was on the whole very well received, even by those who had got up the manifestation. But by this time a counter manifestation by those who supported the Government view had commenced, and it rapidly increased in strength. General Tamisier forced his way into the crowd, and addressed it with marked effect. Whether by accident or by a judiciously diplomatic arrangement, the cannon was thundering away with more than usual constancy, and the speaker naturally made effective rhetorical use of it. At about four o'clock some leading members of the Provisional Government—conspicuous among them Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, and Garnier Pagés—sallied forth from the Hôtel de Ville, and forced their way into the crowd, determined, apparently, like General Trochu, to show that a popular Government need not fear the people; they also were most cordially received. The colonels of the various battalions of the National Guards present were summoned together, and heard from Jules Favre a very eloquent



GENERAL VINOY.



CONVOY OF PRISONERS.

address, in which the thunder of the cannon was naturally again worked." Soon afterwards heavy rain came on, and the crowd dispersed. During the night of the 9th the 55th Battalion of Mobiles was ordered to occupy the chief positions in Belleville (one of the most democratic quarters of Paris), where an armed movement by Flourens and his partisans was expected. Three other battalions of the same force went spontaneously to the Hôtel de Ville, and ranged themselves in front of it, to repel any attempt that might be made to change the Government. When all danger was over, the officers withdrew with loyal shouts. Public meetings were held, denouncing the conduct of the extreme Republicans; and at a gathering on the 10th of the companies forming the 169th Battalion of the Sedentary National Guards, it was resolved not to re-elect M. Blanqui (another violent demagogue) as commander of the battalion. At the same time forty-five officers belonging to the corps of M. Flourens declared that they would not follow that agitator on the path of disorder whither it was his design to lead them. The determination of the better classes of Parisians to resist further revolution was clearly expressed; but the factions were only discouraged for the moment, and soon returned to their plots and machinations.

Emboldened by their better drill and greater self-reliance, the army of defence now resolved on making fresh sorties. Slight actions in various directions took place on the 8th, 10th, and 12th of October, with no important results; but a more serious movement occurred on the 13th. The garrison directed simultaneous assaults on Clamart, Bagneux, and Châtillon, to the south-west of Paris, and appear to have fought with courage and resolution. According to French accounts the enemy was dislodged from Bagneux, though it was ultimately found necessary to abandon the place. Considerable losses were inflicted, and some Prussian batteries were dismounted. The object of the sortie appears to have been to ascertain the positions of the enemy in front of Forts Montrouge, Vanvres, and Issy. General Blanchard was the officer in command, and a large part of the force consisted of Mobiles, in whose conduct was seen a marked increase of steadiness and self-reliance. The right column, going towards Clamart, found the plateau of Châtillon so strongly occupied that it proceeded no farther. The village of Châtillon, however, was charged by General Subzielle, who found it barricaded, and was wounded in the attempt to enter. General Vinoy, in an official report, stated that thirty men were killed and eighty wounded in the execution of this sortie. In the evening the troops returned to Paris in excellent marching order. The Marines of Fort Montrouge did good service in covering their retreat, and the fire from the forts of Montrouge, Vanvres, and Issy, under cover of which the troops advanced, was very effectual. The German account of the sortie was simply to the effect that it was made with ten French battalions, that it was easily repulsed by the 2nd Bavarian Corps, and that only nineteen men were lost on their side.

On the same day a terrific fire from Mont Valérien destroyed the beautiful palace of St. Cloud. This splendid retreat of French Royalty was situated about five miles to the west of Paris, and had a reputation for magnificence second only to that of Versailles itself. It was a favourite country dwelling of Napoleon III. The little town from which it took its name, and which was utterly destroyed by the Germans towards the close of the war, lay on the left bank of the Seine, and on the railway from Paris to Versailles. It was a very ancient place, and as early as the sixth century was selected by Chlodoald, one of the three sons of Chlodomère, King of Orleans, as a spot where he could retire from the world and embrace a monastic life. After his death the prince was canonised, and his name, corrupted into St. Cloud, was given to the town which witnessed the close of his days. The place was pillaged and burnt by the English in 1358, and again by the party of the Armagnacs in 1411. In more recent times, Henry III. of France took up his quarters there during the siege of Paris by his own forces and those of Henry IV. of Navarre; and in 1589 the former was assassinated at St. Cloud by Jacques Clement, the monk. The domain, together with an adjacent one, was purchased by Louis XIV., and given to his brother, the Duke of Orleans. The palace destroyed on the 13th of October, 1870, was built by the directions of the Duke, and was the work of several architects. A little before the great revolution it was purchased by Marie Antoinette, who enlarged and beautified it; and it was at the Palace of St. Cloud that Napoleon Buonaparte assembled the Council of the Five Hundred in 1799, afterwards dissolved them by force, and caused himself to be made First Consul. It was thence that he issued the Act declaring himself Emperor, dated May 18th, 1804; and it was in the same building that his nephew received the Senatus Consultum which restored the Empire, November 7th, 1852. The palace (which was much improved and splendidly furnished by Napoleon I.) was the favourite summer resort of the restored Bourbons; and the ordinances which were the immediate cause of the revolution of 1830 were dated from St. Cloud. Both Louis Philippe and Napoleon III. were fond of the place; and within its walls the latter entertained Queen Victoria in 1855, and signed the declaration of war against Prussia in 1870.

Though of much smaller size than the vast structure of Versailles, the palace was worthy of equal regard for its elegance, tastefulness, and beauty. It was composed of a principal front and two wings, enclosing three sides of a square; the fourth side consisted of a terrace and balustrade, commanding a beautiful view of the park. The interior contained a chapel, a theatre, an orangery, a pavilion, and numerous apartments, brilliantly furnished, and adorned with paintings, statues, porcelain vases, and marble columns. Several allegorical sculptures and reliefs, moreover, appeared on the exterior of the building, which, backed with trees, and surrounded by the beauty of cultivated Nature, was a fine specimen of princely luxury, ennobled by historical associations. The park is a large stretch of land, extending from Sèvres to the town of St. Cloud, on a hill which rises steeply from the Seine. The ground is richly wooded, with frequent interposition of bright lawns and winding dingles, relieving the heavy masses of foliage that overshadow the slopes and acclivities of the hill. A cascade pours from the top to the bottom of the eminence, except where it is detained by basins carved in the form of shells, and adorned with grotto-work, statues of marble, and figures cast in lead; and at the bottom a great jet of water rises to a height of more than a hundred feet. A lofty square tower, built by Buonaparte in 1801, in imitation of the Monument of Lysicrates, or Lantern of Demosthenes, has long been a great attraction in the park. The country all around is very beautiful. Writing of its appearance about a fortnight before the destruction of the palace, the Special Correspondent of the *Times* remarked :—"There are few cities which can boast a more charming suburb than that which lies from St. Cloud to Versailles. Country houses surrounded by gardens, châteaux in their fenced woods, pretty little cottages in patchwork squares of flower-beds inside walls covered with fruit, inns for brethren of the angle, and stretches of market-gardens belted round with forest timber on the undulating ground, present a most pleasing picture to the eye. The houses are now closed and deserted, except by Prussian tenants—not quite 'at will;' and the poor people who have not the means of leaving their humble dwellings about Ville d'Avray look full of apprehension and misery. St. Cloud proper is a city of the dead. The beautiful Avenue de la Reine, near Point du Jour, is cut down; on every side are tokens of a resolution, which was abandoned at the last moment, to make a stand in it." The desolation of war was soon to overtake the place in a more extreme degree.

St. Cloud had for some time been occupied by a number of Prussian officers and their attendants, but not, it is asserted, with any view to offensive operations. The occupation, however, was not entirely for the sake of the comfortable quarters which the palace offered. "Our position at St. Cloud," said Herr Wachenhasen, not long before the catastrophe, "is the most delicate in the whole line of siege. Not because the charpie which the Empress and her ladies plucked with their delicate hands is still lying here; not because everything reminds one of the sudden and contemptible fall of a dynasty which so perversely led its people to destruction; but because it is supposed that there are subterranean communications with Paris, by which intercourse is carried on, and which must be detected. At St. Cloud I found clocks on the console tables of the Imperial château, which marked the day. These recorded 'Sunday, 4th of September.' The end of the week was thus also the end of the dynasty. It is a pity that the splendid grounds have gone to rack. The flowers hang their withered heads; the pheasants run about the park, and look in vain for the hand which used to feed them. In the apartments the finest pictures are torn from their frames, probably by the faithful servants. In the hunting-box still hang two oil paintings, in which the handsome Eugenie, on horseback, surrounded by picadors and matadors, is depicted as presiding over a bull-fight. Our patrols, of course, are stationed in the park. The reservoir is also surrounded by them. The patrols in their huts display the most various styles of buildings. Some are wigwams, some straw huts, some Swiss châlets, and others French cottages. They stand close together. I spent all yesterday with our most advanced patrols. They are comfortably settled under the trees, and one might indulge in the prettiest idyll but for the French grenades sweeping by and over us, the thunder of the guns interrupting our talk every five minutes, and the monotonous clatter of the chassepôts so frequently breaking the thread of conversation."

The Germans accused the French of having shelled the palace without any provocation, whereas they themselves had spared it. The place was doubtless fired because it was held to be a vantage-post to the enemy; and possibly some of those then in power may have felt a certain satisfaction in shattering a building long associated with the traditions of Royalty and Imperialism. The work of destruction was effected by the fort of Mont Valérien, about two miles and a half distant. At one P.M. the garrison began throwing grenades at the palace. Shortly afterwards a shell fell on the right wing, and a slight smoke was seen to rise into the air. Perceiving that the edifice was on fire, the Prussian officers ordered their men to save the furniture, books, paintings, and historical relics contained in those memorable walls; but the bombardment being continued, and the flames bursting out on all sides, very little was preserved. Such objects as could be hastily snatched from the flames were temporarily deposited in one of the alleys of trees at the back of the palace, and a few days later were removed to better quarters: among these was the table on which the Emperor had signed the declaration of war less than three months before. The flames burnt furiously all day; a brisk wind fanned the fire, and, as evening darkened, the Parisians, looking towards the west, saw the horizon blood-red, with great hovering shadows of smoke. Against the scarlet glare, the long lines of statues on the façade of the palace seemed to stand out blackly, while the numerous windows, spouting forth flames, showed how thoroughly the work had been performed. The destruction was complete. By the morning nothing remained but a few smouldering walls. In justification of the act, it was said by the French that St. Cloud was fired in order to show the invader that no consideration would be allowed to interfere with the defence of Paris. "The Prussians," said the *Gaulois*, "are driven from the Château of St. Cloud, as they will be by the same means from the Château of Meudon, if their presence there is suspected, and if the flag which floats over the right wing is not the flag of the Geneva Convention." Nevertheless, there does not seem to have been sufficient reason for a proceeding which robbed France of an interesting historical monument. War, which some passionate writers have eulogised as developing the noblest elements of human nature, falls with a heavy and remorseless hand on all that renders life beautiful, desirable, and dignified. Where it does not slay, it devastates; and, not content with blighting the present, it obliterates the visible mementoes of the past. The French lost a portion of their history in losing St. Cloud; and the injury is all the more lamentable that it was committed by themselves.

CHAPTER XXV.

The German Investment of Paris threatened from the South—A Detachment under von der Tann sent against General Reyan—Defeat of the latter at Arthenay (October 10th)—Incidents of the Battle—Character and Conduct of the French Troops engaged—The "Partisans de Gers"—Want of Artillery and Ammunition in the Army of the Loire—Advance of the Germans on Orleans—The French driven out of the Forest—Desperate Fighting, and terrible Massacre of French Troops—Entry of the Prussians into Orleans—Confused Rout of the French—A German Account of the Affair—Prussian Official Report—Advantages of the Capture—Requisitions and Seizures—Indignation of the French Press at the Fall of Orleans—General de la Motte Rouge succeeded by General d'Aurelles de Paladines—Proclamation of General von der Tann—Operations in the East of France—Operations in the North—Prussian Proceedings at Gisors and Andelys—Various Actions—The Taking of Châteaudun by the Germans—French Successes—The Occupation of St. Quentin—The Investment of Neu Breisach—The Siege of Verdun—Fighting before the Walls—The German Batteries and their Effects—Letter of the Commandant to the German General—A Tragical Incident—The Sieges of Bitsche and of Mézières—Capitulation of Schelestadt.

Orleans and its vicinity were now about to become special objects of contention and the scene of military events of great interest and importance. In the early part of October the Germans seriously threatened the capital of the Loire; whereupon General Reyan, at the head of the advanced guard of the Army of the Loire, made a movement northwards, and, as related in the last chapter, drove back the enemy as far as Etampes, to the north-west of Fontainebleau, thus turning the villages of Janville and Toury (where the Prussians had formed a camp of from two to three thousand men, as a central point for obtaining supplies), and compelling them to evacuate Pithiviers. This victory was of sufficient importance to induce the Germans to take immediate measures against a further advance towards Paris on the part of that army which was now the most formidable of any that France could bring into the field. Accordingly they detached from the investing force before Paris the 1st Bavarian Corps, commanded by General von der Tann, an officer who in 1866 fought against the Prussians as chief of the Staff of the South German armies; and in a very few days the mischief was remedied, and the danger for a time removed. Von der Tann's corps, in combination with the 22nd division of the 11th Prussian Corps, and two cavalry divisions, attacked General Reyan at

Arthenay on the 10th of October, and reversed his success of five days before.

Arthenay is a small town of only 1,000 inhabitants, situated on the road from Orleans to Paris, and about ten or eleven miles to the north of the former city. During the previous week the cavalry division of Prince Albrecht had been scouring the country between Paris and Orleans; and it now contributed to the good fortune of the movement against the Army of the Loire. The French, according to some accounts, had only 15,000 men engaged at Arthenay; according to others, they had 20,000. The Germans seem to have numbered 25,000, and to have been in possession of many guns; whilst the French had only one battery of 8-pounders. Some of Reyan's men were Mobiles, while others belonged to a new organisation called "The Partisans." There had already been some skirmishing on the 8th at Etampes, when the French retreated on Arthenay. The Germans followed in the same direction, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 10th a body of cavalry entered the little place just as two battalions of the Chasseurs de Vincennes were preparing their coffee. As usual, the French were surprised. The Chasseurs, seeing the enemy upon them, rushed to their arms, and held their opponents at bay for a quarter of an hour, when the Prussian cavalry was reinforced by infantry, and enabled to present so formidable a front that the French hastily retreated to Bas-le-Roy. An hour later General Reyan himself arrived, with 5,000 troops of the Line and a battery of cannon—the only one he could bring on to the field. The French thereupon assumed the offensive, and endeavoured to dislodge the Prussians from their position. That position was a very strong one. The Germans occupied the crest of a piece of sloping ground, on which they had planted two large guns—mitrailleuses, it is said. It was necessary for the French to ascend this slope; and, as they did so, the battery opened fire from above with terrible effect. Two or three attempts were made by the French to storm the hill; but, after losing some 500 men, they were compelled to retreat on to the plain of Trinay. They were followed by the White Cuirassiers of the Prussians; but the French in a little while began to re-form their regiments, and the Cuirassiers fell back. General Reyan's one battery replied very vigorously to the furious cannonading of the Prussians between St. Germain-le-Gramal and Trinay; and at one o'clock the French were reinforced by a regiment of cavalry which had been sent for from Orleans. Encouraged by this accession of strength, they once more charged the Prussian lines; the chassepôts maintained a continuous fire; and at two o'clock the French seemed not unlikely to win. Shortly afterwards, however, they were outflanked on their right by a strong detachment of cavalry, supported by a raking fire from the German infantry, and were compelled to retreat into the forest of Neuville, with the loss of two or three pieces of cannon, and many killed and wounded. The roar of the artillery could be distinctly heard at Orleans, from which, at one time, five battalions of Mobile Guards were about to leave for the seat of action, when they received orders to remain for fear of a surprise.* Such was the order of events, according to the French view of them. The Germans allege that the troops whom they encountered were quite demoralised, and fled in precipitate confusion. The railway depôt was destroyed by the Prussian artillery, and several civilians in the town were killed by stones of barricades, which the fire of the cannon scattered abroad.

The French troops engaged on this occasion were of four kinds—Line, Guards, Mobiles, Volunteers, and the new body called "Partisans," forming a sort of guard to the Government at Tours. The regular troops consisted for the most part of the depôts of different regiments formed into battalions; not, it would appear, animated by the best spirit, and far from perfect in discipline. Some were Algerian troops, but they do not seem to have shown the steadiness of old soldiers. Indeed, it is alleged that they did not fight nearly so well as the other portions of the force. According to the Tours correspondent of the *Times*, they can hardly be said to have fought at all. They rather declined the combat, and broke their muskets with unmeaning and disgraceful fury. On the other hand, the Gardes Mobile (who are described as exhibiting superior physical strength to the Line men) fought with the greatest courage and obstinacy. The Pontifical Zouaves, also, who formed part of the Volunteer contingent, and were only a very small body, displayed the most desperate valour, and lost several of their number. The Volunteers, who were composed of various nationalities, were badly provided for by the Government, and not in the best of tempers, owing to their original officers having been superseded by young and inexperienced men from the Military School of St. Cyr, or from other French regiments. So imperfect were the arrangements for feeding this force, that the privates were actually compelled to go out pillaging the neighbouring farms and cottages, to save themselves from starving; and in other matters they were equally ill provided. An

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* Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, who received the details from a French officer engaged in the battle.



RUINS OF THE PALACE OF ST. CLOUD.

English member of the Legion, who contributed to the *Daily News*, in July, 1871, an interesting account of its exploits, says that on the day before leaving for the front, and in the midst of great confusion, "the men received haversacks, blankets of a most light and thin description, tent-sheets of anything but waterproof material, and ninety rounds of cartridge each. Chassepôts had been distributed previously. The men were but indifferently clad, tall men having every article of dress too scanty and narrow, and little men being, as it were, in sacks. All were supposed to have two pairs of shoes, but such was a very rare case. Complaints were made on all sides," but nothing was done to remedy the grievances. The efficiency of the Legion was of course impaired by these instances of bad management; yet the men acquitted themselves well in the field, and made the enemy conscious of their prowess. Nothing, however, could avail against the superior force, the superior discipline, and the superior artillery, of the Germans. The disparity of guns was alone sufficient to account for the defeat of the French, even had all their men behaved as well as some undoubtedly did. This disparity appeared not merely at Arthenay, but in most other actions after the great defeats of August and September; and some French military critics blamed the Government for sending troops so ill-equipped against the heavily-armed Prussians.

Of the "Partisans" some description was given in an official report of the actions on the Loire published at Versailles, which states that these troops had with them certain account-books, setting forth their pay and other emoluments from the Republican authorities. "They were mostly," continued the German chronicler, "men above forty, or youngsters between sixteen and eighteen; those between these two extremes having been previously draughted into the Mobiles. Directly we got to Etampes and Angerville, the Partisans remaining in those towns were either taken prisoners or ran away. They were, indeed, unable to defend themselves, being totally ignorant of everything military, and, moreover, armed with Minié rifles, which cannot compete with modern weapons. In reply to our questions, they said they knew nothing of the service, and altogether represented their situation as pitiable. The peasants would not give them anything to eat, nor even direct


Ormes
Buey
Charmay
Villeneuve
l'Orme
Saran
to Patay
to Paris
R.R. to Paris
Fleury
to Chateaudun
Ingré
Chirache
Darvoy
Fbg Bannier
Faubourg St. Jean
Fbg St. Vincent
Fbg Madeleine
River Loire
Pailly
to Tours
Prevray
Railroad
Road to Blois
Changy
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ENGLISH MILES
Prussian Army.
French Army.
Λ Λ Prussian Cavalry.
B B First Bavarian Corps.
C C Prussian Division.
D D { Pontifical Zouaves and Mobiles.
E E French Army Retreating.

PLAN OF ORLEANS,

Showing the Advance of the Germans under General von der Tann, and Retreat of the French Army of the Loire, on the 11th of October: the retreat being covered by Pontifical Zouaves and Mobiles.

them how to find their way across the country. The fear of the Germans was so universal in those parts that everybody shunned intercourse with the indigenous troops. The costume of the Partisans consists of a short black coat, black trousers, gaiters, and a red sash round the waist. They wear hats with broad brims, those of the captains being about four times as large as those worn by the privates. The commander-in-chief of the body taken prisoners at Angerville was a private gentleman from Nantes. Most of them had the words 'Partisans de Gers' on their hats. The Department de Gers being above four hundred miles south of Paris, and only one hundred and fifty miles north of the Pyrenees, their presence in the Orleannais would seem to prove that the central Departments are already drained of most of the people that can be induced to join." The organisation seems to have been a failure, and it very soon dropped out of use.

General Reyan reported to his Government that he would defend at any cost the forest on which he had fallen back; but the very next day he was obliged to abandon it. General de la Motte Rouge, who had not yet been supplanted in the chief command of the Army of the Loire, though his removal speedily followed, had for some time perceived the imminent danger which menaced the city of Orleans, in consequence of his great want of cannon and ammunition. He accordingly despatched couriers to Tours, with urgent demands for arms; but at the moment there were none to be had. He himself went to Blois, but with no better success; and his aides-de-camp visited the neighbouring towns, making diligent search in all receptacles of arms for anything that might be available. Guns that had been taken from the enemy in wars of former times, and which had since been preserved as trophies, were turned to account; and it is said that an old Spanish field-piece, and another which had been brought from Moscow in 1812, were accepted as welcome additions to the scanty artillery of the army. Rewards were offered to any one who could point out where other guns of the like nature were to be found; and some were hastily forged from such material as could be furnished by church-bells and the stock-in-trade of metal-workers.

While he was making these very ineffectual preparations, the commander-in-chief was rendered still more anxious by the defeat of Reyan at Arthenay, on the 10th. The Germans were not slow to follow up their advantage. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 11th they attacked the French in the forest, throwing a shower of balls into their ranks. The poor fellows had hardly any cannon with which to reply, and they were so much at the mercy of the enemy, that in a little while retreat became unavoidable. All through the night Reyan had sent repeated requests for artillery; yet train after train arrived from Tours, bringing men, but no guns. When the French evacuated the woods, the Prussians rushed forward, and seized Mont Joie, a high plateau visible from Orleans, on which they planted eighty cannon. It was not until eight o'clock A.M. that the French received a number of guns from Tours and Blois. Had these arrived earlier, they might have enabled the French to hold Orleans; but they came too late. Some hours would have been required for getting them in position to repel the Prussians; the latter had already acquired a post of vantage; and there was no choice but to continue the retreat, and give up the city. General Reyan accordingly fell back; and while General Arago, with 3,000 men, held the Prussians in check, the French army began moving out of Orleans. Half an hour later, when the advanced guard had barely got clear of the town, the German artillery on Mont Joie opened fire, and did fearful execution in the ranks of the French. Arago's small force covered the retreat with admirable devotion and constancy; but the loss was terrible. For eight hours this band of heroes held its ground, firing from behind walls, and delaying the advance of the Prussians until the evening. When the latter thought they had made a sufficient impression with their guns, they sent forward bodies of cavalry and infantry, which were four times repulsed by the French, who used the chassepôt with deadly effect. This temporary check to the enemy gave the little army time to retire to a less exposed position behind the walls of Banien and the Gare des Autrais, two suburbs of Orleans. The Foreign Legion, formed mainly of tourists in France, and comprising the representatives of many nationalities, held the first of these places; the Papal Zouaves the second. So desperately did they resist the enemy that out of 1,500 of the Foreign Legion only thirty-six remained at the end of the day, while the Zouaves saved but seventeen out of 370. The houses protected them somewhat for a time, but only for a time. The iron rain from the Prussian artillery on Mont Joie found them out, even under the shelter of buildings, and massacred them as they stood. Some hid themselves in the cellars, when it became impossible to do anything further; others sought shelter in the railway station; but equally in vain. The Prussian shells continually burst over the place, dashing down walls of houses, and burying many wretched creatures in the ruins. Messages were sent to the main body of the army for reinforcements, so as to enable the rear-guard to make a dash at the heights, and drive back the enemy; but no answer came. By five o'clock in the evening the bulk of the army occupying Orleans had got clear of the city; but the devoted three thousand were not made aware of this, and for two hours longer they were exposed to the frightful artillery fire of the Prussians. At seven o'clock the fire ceased, and the Germans advanced in force for the fifth time. They met with absolutely no resistance as they deployed across the open field; not a shot was fired against them; but when they reached the suburbs, a hundred and fifty despairing men rose up to meet them.* The day, however, was now decided, and Orleans was the prize of the victors.

A correspondent of the *Daily News* says that "there had arrived early in the morning some reinforcements; the cannon was roaring outside the town a few miles off, and yet these troops remained the whole morning in town. The officers said they had no orders, and went to the café, where they played at cards, or breakfasted. The men roamed about the town, or lay asleep, or drunk, along the streets. As soon as the flying army began to pass, however, these men hastened to join the torrent; they tossed their guns away, or broke them; and the whole army passed through the town and crossed the bridge over the Loire." The same paper published, on July 18th, 1871, an account of the battle by the English member of the Foreign Legion whose communication has been already quoted. It states :—

"On the morning of October 11th we found ourselves at Orleans. Marching at once to the Boulevard du Moulin de l'Hôpital, we were ordered to camp without pitching tents, and to prepare our soup. Suddenly the booming of the cannon sounded close at hand. 'To arms!' was rung out by the buglers, and, leaving the soup, or snatching a mouthful of bread, the Legion was put *en route* for the front. Filing past General Motte Rouge and his staff, we marched up to and through the Rue Banniers. Here we found scattered sections of Line regiments, Chasseurs, and Gardes Mobiles, all in wild retreat. The coming of the Legion rallied them, and, filing to right and left by company at a point where two roads met, we deployed in skirmishing order through the vineyards.

"The Bavarians—for such they proved to be—were in excellent position; but, despite this and the fearful odds (almost nine to one), we managed to drive them back, and soon advanced into more open country Here on our left were some companies of Pontifical Zouaves; on our right a few Chasseurs and some companies of Line regiments—the two latter the wrecks of the fight at Arthenay; and covering our flanks were the Gardes Mobiles. Artillery and cavalry we had none. Now I could understand our position. We were covering the retreat of Motte Rouge and his army corps. Alternately losing and gaining ground, we fought desperately in the open until about three P.M. Whenever we had a chance to meet the Bavarians at the bayonet's point we drove them back; but their artillery made fearful havoc amongst us, we having no guns to reply with, and their shells, falling fast and thick, rendered our exposed position untenable. What made our position worse was that the Gardes Mobiles, on being hotly pressed, gave way, and were not to be seen afterwards in any part of the field. Retreating in skirmishing order to the vineyards, and then driven thence by a front and flank fire, we took up our positions as best we could in roads and streets, in barns and houses, and in any vantage-ground we could find. Between four and five we could distinctly hear the French retreat being sounded in our rear, but our officers ordered us not to move, unless forward. Meanwhile the streets and roads were being literally swept by cannon, and the houses began to fall about our heads. Several times the men proposed to erect barricades in the streets and roads to protect ourselves from the sweeping artillery fire; but the officers would by no means listen to the proposal. By this time the Germans had, after a fierce struggle, taken the railway, and thus our right was perfectly unprotected, and even destroyed. Officers led us they knew not where, until half the men were massacred, and then ordered retrograde and flank movements. Thus matters went on till dusk, when we found the remnants of the Legion, with two lieutenants only, halted on the bridge that crosses the railway cutting at the extreme end of the Rue des Banniers or its continuation. Here we determined to make our last stand. Dark columns of the enemy began to pour down upon us, but were at first quickly repulsed at the bayonet-point. Further than the end of the bridge we dared not move. However, cannon and shell soon drove us to the town side of it, but not before the bridge was covered with the slain. Here, crouching to the earth, we lay for half an hour, springing to our feet and our bayonets whenever the cannon ceased, and they tried to take the position by a charge. The houses in flames at our back shed a lurid glare on the small handful of the Legion, and we became excellent targets for skirmishers, who had descended the railway cutting, and climbed to the opposite summit. Suddenly from our rear a sharp musketry fire was opened on us, and, turning round, we recognised a strong Bavarian column. Fire in front, fire on our flanks, and fire on our rear—all was over. The remaining lieutenant gave the word 'Save yourselves!' and, scrambling on hands and feet to the left, I reached a small garden, which also the lieutenant and some twenty men had managed to reach. From this position, with a shower of bullets after us, we wandered until we reached a more quiet spot. After a short consultation, during which the lieutenant said he did not know our whereabouts, nor how to save us, and being hotly followed by patrols, we were ordered to disperse into threes and endeavour to make our way into some dwelling-houses, obtain, if we could, civilian's dress, and make the best of our way to the Loire when morning came. Endeavouring to follow up this by no means practicable advice, I and two others managed to walk into the hands of a German patrol about midnight. Being disarmed and led into the town, we became prisoners of war. Being questioned as to the number of men defending Orleans, and the probable route of the retreating corps, and knowing nothing about them, we answered accordingly. Great was the Germans' surprise when we told them, in answer to their questions, that we were volunteers and foreigners, and belonged to the Foreign Legion. Most of the German officers spoke French, and one of them, on learning I was an Englishman, addressed me in my own language, led me away into a café, where he kindly gave me something to eat, to drink, and to smoke, and offered me some money, which I declined, having some still left in my own purse."

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* Account of the battle in "The Franco-Prussian War," by Melville D. Landon. New York, 1871.

General de la Motte Rouge, in a despatch to the French Government, dated the 12th, said that a brigade of the Third Division tried to oppose the enemy's advance, but, being constantly met by forces more numerous, and a superior artillery, it was compelled to fall back on Orleans, disputing the ground foot by foot. He was himself obliged, in order to check the progress of the Prussians, to go forward personally with three battalions of reserve belonging to the Second Division. "The enemy," he adds, "was checked for three hours; but at last we were broken, and overcome by the shells. After very sharp fighting, which does honour to our army, I determined to evacuate Orleans, and to withdraw to the left bank of the Loire. Our retreat, which was not molested, was effected with coolness and in good order." The King of Prussia telegraphed to the Queen that thousands of prisoners had fallen into the hands of von der Tann in consequence of his victory. From another account it appears that the Prussians captured, between Arthenay and Orleans, about 8,000 stragglers. The losses of the French altogether were serious; those of the Germans comparatively small.

Before the arrival of the Prussians in Orleans the inhabitants were much divided as to whether or not they would defend the town. Some were in favour of resisting to the utmost; but a larger number begged that no defence might be made, as they dreaded the consequences. When the Germans reached the suburbs all was in wild confusion. There was no one to give orders, and everybody did as he himself thought best. The people were either mad with rage or distracted with terror. Groups here and there were preparing to hold out; others were making off for the fields. Drums were beating the *générale*, and bells were ringing. At the further side of the town a confused rout of men, women, and children, together with some soldiers, was flying towards Beaugency, a few miles to the south of Orleans. At Meung the excitement was even greater. Soldiers were looking for their officers, and officers for their men. Doubt and apprehension were visible everywhere; and the one thought present to all minds was how to escape the pursuing Prussians.

Herr Wickede, of the *Cologne Gazette*, who was present at the taking of Orleans, wrote an account of it, which may be quoted as showing the German side of the action. He says that the Army of the Loire fought very much worse than the Imperial forces at Wörth, Gravelotte, and Sedan. "They had an excellent position," he remarks; "but, on the Bavarians charging two or three batteries at the top of a hill behind Arthenay, commanding the whole country, and shooting the gunners with their capital Werder guns, these batteries soon ceased firing, and were quickly withdrawn. Three French cavalry regiments, under General Michel, attempted a weak attack on the Prussian cavalry, but were promptly repulsed; and four or five Chasseur battalions, decidedly the best French infantry, scarcely awaited a serious attack, but retired after a few rounds, though they subsequently attempted a street fight in Orleans itself, but without the least success. One of their sergeant-majors, who was captured, exclaimed against their wretched attitude. The battalion, he said, had been newly formed out of various depôts; they neither knew one another nor their officers; they included many recruits, and still more miserable fellows returned into the depôts from the various battalions, probably at the beginning of the war, and now fetched back for want of other soldiers. 'It is a great disgrace,' added the sergeant-major, 'for our Chasseurs; it is that wretched *coquin*, Gambetta, who gives his orders, and makes a mess of it.' While the great body of the Bavarians advanced in front, the Prussian infantry division undertook a flank movement, supported by the cavalry, who, however, could not get through the vineyards and narrow roads as rapidly as they wanted. When the bulk of the French—Mobiles and Francs-tireurs—saw the danger of being outflanked, most of them discharged their guns at haphazard, and a flight set in. Three thousand prisoners were made, and three guns were taken. A partial street fight necessitated the burning of some houses in the outskirts of Orleans, and a few disorders may have been committed." It is very certain that this account of the ill-behaviour of the French troops is overcharged. In some respects it may be true; but it cannot be true in the main, for it is clear that a very small body of French, with scarcely any artillery, held the whole Prussian force in check—despite a terrific fire from powerful batteries—for many hours. German chroniclers appear not to have perceived that in this constant depreciation of French courage they most seriously diminished their own credit in being victorious. Another German account, however—that of a Bavarian regimental chaplain, published in one of the newspapers—admits that the combat was most obstinate and bloody. The last stand of the French, according to this writer, was made at St. Jean de la Ruelle, a suburb on the north of Orleans, where the fighting resembled that at Bazeilles on the 1st of September. The Germans were fired on from the windows, the roofs, and the church-tower, and many houses were in consequence set on fire. From two to seven the struggle went on at this point, and the French (who received reinforcements throughout the day by railway) suffered terrible losses in killed and wounded.

The Prussian report of the actions in front of Orleans, from which we have already quoted, congratulated the country on the capture of the city. It pointed out that Orleans is one of the wealthiest towns in France. The region to the north, called the Beauce, is extremely fertile, abounding in oats, providing Paris with enormous quantities of excellent wheat, and producing grapes and other fruit in great plenty. "The possession of the Beauce," added the official writer, "will sensibly diminish the number of our provision-trains from Germany." The occupation of Orleans was also important from a strategical point of view. Its situation on the right bank of the Loire, and the fact of its being the point of junction for the central railway and the lines from Nantes, Bordeaux, and Toulouse, protected the German army from attack from the south, and rendered it difficult for the French armies in that direction to hold communication with their brethren in the north, especially as an arch in each of the two magnificent bridges over the Loire had been blown up. Gien, higher up the river, was already in the hands of the Germans; and the country lower down, below Blois, called the Sologne, was so barren and destitute of roads that, in the opinion of the Prussian military authorities, it served as a safeguard on that side. "Orleans," says the report, in conclusion, "is known for the pacific disposition of its inhabitants, and has large barracks and other public buildings, which will be useful, should the campaign be prolonged." Subsequent events showed that the Germans were less secure at Orleans than they had supposed.

Having obtained possession of the city, General von der Tann demanded 600,000 francs in cash, which the municipality delivered to him. Some days afterwards he required another sum of 400,000, making in all a million, and threatened the members of the council with arrest if the money were not immediately forthcoming. It is said that the municipality were summoned to meet the general at six o'clock in the morning, in order that the demand might be communicated to them. Remonstrances were disregarded, and by the evening the money, which was only collected with great difficulty, was deposited by the Mayor. "During this time," says a letter from the city containing these particulars—a letter obviously of French authorship, and therefore to be received with a certain degree of reserve—"a species of pillage was going on in some shops of the town. Hosiery shops especially were devastated, and the soldiers laid their hands upon flannels, blankets, pairs of drawers, stockings, and other similar articles. Hairdressers' shops were also pillaged completely. People asked themselves what attraction cosmetics, perfumes, and toilet articles could possess for the soldiery. It appears that no jewellery shop was despoiled. Private cellars were all emptied to the last bottle." The Bishop (Monseigneur Dupanloup) received a notification enjoining him to forbid all ringing of church-bells, which, it seems to have been thought, might have been interpreted as a signal to arms either in or out of the town. Some general officers took up their abode in the Chapelle St. Mesmin, and they required that the cellar and kitchen should be stocked. Cavalry parties actively operated in the valley of the river on the left bank, making requisitions in hamlets, and sweeping off cattle, which were sent to revictual the army before Paris. The Prussians had acquired a prize in capturing Orleans, and they derived as much profit from it as they could.

As may be supposed, the French press rang with indignation at the loss of Orleans, and scant justice was done to the men who fought for hours under such great disadvantages. The *Patrie* wrote:—"It is now certain, from the declarations of the general commanding the 15th Corps, that a part of our troops lost their ground in a pitiful manner before the enemy; and we are even assured that those who ran off, to escape more rapidly, threw away their chassepôts. They lay scattered on the highway from Chevilly to Orleans. It is shameful; it is heartrending." The *Liberté* contained an article dated "Tours, October 12th, eleven o'clock," which confessed the truth in the plainest language, and bitterly condemned the Government habit of misrepresenting facts. In a transport of mortification and rage the writer exclaimed:—"Beaten! Yes, we have been beaten; for our troops have not been able to keep their ground at Arthenay, or in the forest, which the general said he was resolved to defend at any cost; nor yet in the neighbourhood of Orleans, nor in Orleans itself. The official despatches, since the beginning of the war until now—alike under the Ollivier Empire, the David Empire, and the Crémieux Republic—the official despatches for three months have all succeeded each other without improvement. They are all alike. They will announce, perhaps, to-morrow, that our troops have fallen back on some hill or other in some unknown valley, or to the banks of some river. But, heartrending as the facts are, we should have the honesty not to disguise the truth. Our troops falling back on the left bank of the Loire, as they *have* fallen back, means simply that they have abandoned to the enemy the whole of the first line of the military operations of the Army of the Loire. We desire most ardently to find that we are deceiving ourselves. How can one help being deceived? The system of secresy, or of half avowals of the truth, is, in short, still maintained. It controls us all, such as we are; and, by preventing us from seeing things as they are, it makes it the duty of men of sense to entertain all sorts of fears, as much as it encourages fools to foster every illusion." A month later the Army of the Loire showed that it contained good stuff, capable of making the victorious Germans recoil for a time from their advanced positions in dismay and alarm. But for the present it was not in a condition to meet the enemy; and it was unjust to blame its commander for evacuating Orleans, which in truth he had not the means to hold. Not only were his troops still in a very ill-organised state; he was so poorly supplied with guns that it was a hopeless task to endeavour to resist the powerful artillery of the Prussians. Had General de la Motte Rouge attempted to defend Orleans, he would assuredly have been beaten, and would probably have lost the greater part of his army; whereas, by retreating,



MEAT MARKET IN PARIS.



BRINGING IN VEGETABLES FROM THE SUBURBS.

he preserved his forces while sacrificing the town, and the men were of greater value than the position. An unsuccessful general, however, must expect to find no mercy from his countrymen; and de la Motte Rouge fell a sacrifice to his failure at Orleans. He was speedily supplanted by General d'Aurelles de Paladines, of whom report spoke well, and who certainly exhibited ability in the handling of his men during the period of his command. On being appointed, he issued an order of the day, in which he said:—"Soldiers, what I ask of you, above all things, is discipline and firmness. I am, morever, thoroughly determined to shoot any soldier who hesitates before the enemy; and if it should chance that I myself fail to do my duty, I tell you to shoot me." It was not a wise address; for if every soldier is at liberty to determine for himself when his commander has failed to do his duty, and is thereupon invested with the privilege of summary execution, it is clear that the very discipline which General de Paladines most urgently demanded is impossible. Of all the faults of the French army during those autumn months, the worst was insubordination; yet the first order of the day of General de Paladines was a direct incentive to mutiny, though of course not conceived with any such design.

After his entry into Orleans, General von der Tann issued the following proclamation, dated October 13th:—

> "French Citizens,—As I wish to alleviate, as far as lies in my power, the fate of the population visited with the evils of war, I appeal to their good sense in the hope that the sincerity of my words will not fail to open their eyes to the existing state of things, and determine them to range themselves on the side of the reasonable party, desirous of making peace. Your late Government declared war against Germany. Never was a declaration of war more frivolous. The German armies could do nothing else than reply to it by crossing the frontier. Another Government succeeded. It was hoped that it would restore peace; but it has done nothing of the kind. And why? It feared to render itself unpopular, and, under the pretence that the conditions proposed by the German army were not acceptable, it preferred to continue a war which can only lead to the ruin of France. And what are the conditions of the victorious army which it was deemed impossible to accept? The restitution of provinces which belonged to Germany, and in which the German language still prevails, in the towns as well as in the country—viz., Alsace and German Lorraine. Is this claim an exaggerated one? What claims would victorious France have made? You have been told that the aim of the operations of the German armies was to degrade France. This is simply a lie, invented in order to excite the passions of the masses. It is, on the contrary, your Government which, by its way of acting, brings the German armies necessarily into the heart of France, brings ruin thither, and will succeed, if it persists, in really degrading *la belle France*, which might be the best friend of the very nation whom she has forced to fight her."

Victorious generals do not usually condescend to argue the abstract merits of the war they are waging with the people they have subjugated; and perhaps it is as well that they should forbear. What General von der Tann could have hoped to gain by this lecturing it is difficult to conceive. He could hardly have thought to allay national susceptibilities by telling the people that they were not only beaten, but deserved to be.

General Schmerling, after the defeat of the French at St. Rémy, in which he took part with his Landwehr division on the 6th of October, marched on Epinal, which was not far distant, and captured it on the 12th. The population is about 15,000, and the citizens defended the place for some time, but were ultimately obliged to retreat, on account of the superior strength of the German artillery. A good many Freeshooters were in the neighbourhood of the town previous to the attack; but on the approach of the enemy they fled, without giving any warning to the people of Epinal. The town was bombarded for a short time, and then thought it prudent to surrender, the National Guard (who seem to have fought well) falling back across the Monts Faucilles, in the direction of Kertigny. Epinal is the principal town and administrative centre of the department of the Vosges. The Army of the Rhone was again defeated on October 22nd, when General Cambriels, at the head of two divisions, disputed the passage of the river Ognon. The force opposed to him was the 14th Corps, under General Werder. On the march from Vesoul, the capital of the department of the Haute Saône, up to the district of the Ognon, the Baden division was obliged to dispute the hilly ground almost step by step; and in the neighbourhood of the villages of Rioz and Etuz, General Cambriels energetically opposed the further advance of the 14th Corps. General Degenfeld's vanguard brigade sustained the engagement until Prince William of Baden's and General Keller's infantry brigades came up to its support. The contest was long and obstinate; but in the end the French were driven across the river, compelled to quit the village of Auxon-dessus, which they had temporarily occupied, and forced back to Besançon. They were pursued by the 3rd Rhenish Infantry Regiment, drawn from the reserve. On the following day the Germans made an unsuccessful attack on the positions of Châtillon-le-Duc, to the north of Besançon, which town, the head-quarters of the French General Ernest, had been occupied by the invaders on the 22nd. The Army of the Rhone fell back in consequence; but the Prussians retired from Besançon on the 24th.

While these events were going on in the East, the Germans were making equal progress in the North. They continued to occupy the Beauvais district, and to levy requisitions in various directions. Gisors, in the department of the Eure, was taken by the Prussians on the 9th of October, after an engagement in which the National Guards of the town and of Bazencourt gallantly defended the passage of the Epte, while the Mobiles ran away. The French lost eight men killed, and ten prisoners. Five others were shot, "according to the iniquitous system of our enemies," says the report of the Prefect, "who treat as military men only those who are equipped and commanded by a recognised chief." Among those mortally wounded was a woman. After the surrender of Gisors to the Prussians, General Gudin, commander at Rouen, withdrew his forces, consisting chiefly of Mobile Guards and Francs-tireurs, to the Andelle valley, intending, with the assistance of the National Guards of that locality, to oppose the invaders; but the National Guards of Andelys, only half of whom were armed and equipped, and who had heard of the fate of the non-mobilised National Guards shot by the enemy at Gisors, determined not to defend themselves "under the circumstances of abandonment in which they were placed." Forty Uhlans passed through Andelys on the 14th, with a view to ascertaining if the bridge across the Seine had been destroyed. They found that it had just been blown up by the gendarmes, who, together with fifty men of the 94th Infantry, had retreated, leaving their knapsacks behind them. No requisition was made by the Prussians, who returned disappointed; but five days later, viz., on the 19th, about half-past nine o'clock in the morning, their approach to Andelys was announced. "At ten," says the report, "the vanguard entered the town, and asked for the Sub-Prefect. They wanted the Sub-Prefect and the Mayor to proceed to meet the colonel in command of the detachment. The officials refused to do so, and waited at the entrance of Andelys. Soon afterwards the surrounding hills were occupied by cavalry, artillery, and infantry (these last troops were in carts, for which requisition had been made in the communes around Gisors); about 600 men altogether." The colonel in command of the detachment, whose name was Baron von Gorf, and who was a son-in-law of Meyerbeer, the composer, proceeded to the town-hall, and held a conference with the municipal authorities, while the Sub-Prefect (M. Dehays) was led under escort to the Prefecture, where the Prussians informed him that they were in possession of circulars which said that a revision of the conscripts was to take place that day in Andelys, and that the young men must be given up to them (the Prussians). M. Dehays, however, had countermanded the meeting in anticipation of what occurred; but he had much trouble in making the Prussians understand this. The latter asked the Sub-Prefect for official maps of the country, but M. Dehays replied that he had burned them. Enraged at this intelligence, and disappointed in not receiving the conscripts, they then told the Sub-Prefect that they would take him to Gisors, and place him at the disposal of Prince Albrecht, an aide-de-camp of whom, and a nephew of Count Bismarck, had presided over these perquisitions. M. Dehays was accordingly taken to Gisors, and brought before the Prince, by whom he was accused of having made war unfairly. Prince Albrecht represented to the Sub-Prefect that the peasantry had fired on the Prussian soldiers during the fight at Gisors, and that he had organised a body of irregular troops. M. Dehays answered that he was acting under orders, and was therefore merely doing his duty. "Prince Albrecht then said," adds the report, "that he should send the Sub-Prefect back, under condition that he should tell the Mayors of towns in his district that, if no resistance were made, Prince Albrecht would do no harm, but that if the peasants fired on his troops he would burn the villages. The Sub-Prefect replied that he could not use his influence in such service. 'Your influence!' exclaimed the Prince; 'let me not find it again opposed to me. You are waging unfair war. Nevertheless, you are free; but remember the warning!'"

Many other towns were threatened and kept on the alert; and, on the 13th, Breteuil, in the department of the Oise, was occupied, after a very slight encounter with the Mobile Guards to whom was entrusted the defence of the place. Requisitions had been made the day before by a body of 2,000 Prussians, who, however, withdrew in the evening towards Beauvais and Clermont. On the following morning they commenced their attack at eleven o'clock. Their numbers are variously stated at 1,500 and 2,500 men, with cavalry, seven guns, and two mitrailleuses. The 4th Battalion of Mobiles of the Somme, who are said to have hardly numbered 1,200 men, advanced to meet the enemy. A skirmish followed; but it seems to have been of the briefest and slightest description, for the Mobiles, perceiving that they had to fight against the Royal Prussian Guards, supported by ten artillery pieces, retreated towards Amiens, still firing on the Prussians. The shots from the German guns fortunately passed over their heads, or probably few would have remained to carry the news of their discomfiture. After some cannon-shots had been fired on the town, the inhabitants sent a flag of truce, and the Prussians entered Breteuil. The National Guards of the town were at once disarmed, and the enemy took possession of all the silver plate and valuables that could be found. A few of the Mobiles were killed and wounded, and thirty-two Mobile and National Guards were made prisoners, and taken to Beauvais. The Prussians themselves hardly suffered at all in the trifling engagement which placed Breteuil at their disposal. On the 21st the Germans took possession of Chartres (south-west of Paris), with 20,000 troops and forty guns, but allowed the French garrison to depart, and refrained from making any requisitions; and on the same day they entered Jargeau, near Orleans, blew up the bridge at Clery, and encamped round Beaugency. Châteaudun, to the north-west of Orleans, was captured on the 18th, after many hours' hard fighting. The officer in command, in a report addressed to the Tours Government, estimated the German force at 6,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and two batteries; but this appears to have been overstated. Opposed to these were the Paris battalion, the National Guards of the place, and a few Freeshooters from Nantes and Cannes. They prolonged the defence at the barricades from noon till seven in the evening, when the Prussians forced their way in. The struggle, however, was continued in the streets until near midnight; but the French were at length overcome by the larger numbers and superior artillery of their adversaries. Many lives were lost on both sides, and the town was shelled and burnt down. Under cover of the darkness the defending force was able to get off, at the same time protecting the flight of the inhabitants. The defence was so gallant that the Tours Government issued a decree with reference to it. "Considering," said this decree, "that, in the attack of the 18th, Châteaudun resisted heroically a considerable body of Prussian troops, who occupied the town only after it had been bombarded and reduced to ashes, and specially acknowledging the energy and patriotism of the Sedentary National Guards and the bravery of the Francs-tireurs of Paris, the Government decrees that Châteaudun has deserved well of the country, and a credit of 100,000f. has been opened to repair the damages." Châteaudun is the chief town of the second arrondissement of the department of Eure-et-Loire, and is situated on a hill above the river, which at that point flows in two branches through a narrow and very beautiful valley, bounded by hills thickly covered with vines and plantations. The town was rebuilt on a regular plan in the year 1723, after a great fire which destroyed nearly the whole place. The streets, which are all straight, end in a spacious square on the summit of the hill. The castle from which the town is named is an ancient and picturesque structure, one of the towers of which was built in 935 by Thibault le Tricheur. A magnificent view of the surrounding country is obtained from this castle, or château, and there are few fairer landscapes in France. The town has about 7,000 inhabitants, and manufactures of blankets and leather are carried on there.

To set against these misfortunes, the French obtained some successes. An attempt to surprise Ecouis, in the department of Eure, on the 14th, was a failure. The French had about 200 Francs-tireurs and Mobiles, and seventy-six Hussars, in the neighbouring woods. These, while retreating from the town, were attacked by four or five squadrons of Uhlans and some infantry, coming from three or four different directions. So good a reply, however, was made, that the French were enabled to get clear off, and the Prussians thought it prudent to retire from the place. On the 22nd there was an engagement in the forest of Hecourt, when some scouts from the battalions of the Ardèche, and a body of Freeshooters, repulsed the enemy. On the 28th a Baden corps was completely defeated between Besançon and Montbeliard, and 300 of the men were compelled to take refuge in Switzerland,* and, on the same day, 1,200 Prussians, who went to Formerie, in the department of the Oise, to cut the rail between Amiens and Rouen, were repulsed after an engagement with Mobiles, and forced to retire upon Songeons, after which the traffic was restored.

The occupation of St. Quentin by the Prussians, on the 21st of October, seems to have been merely for the purpose of collecting war contributions. A body of troops presented themselves in the town, and asked for a sum of two million francs, under penalty of the place being pillaged. The members of the Municipal Council were declared prisoners of war; but they succeeded in obtaining a reduction of the original demand. The Prussians said they would be contented with a sum of 900,000 francs and fifty horses; and ultimately, not considering the horses good enough, they took 950,000 francs. The officers and soldiers were lodged with the inhabitants; and the conditions imposed provided that each man was to be comfortably and substantially fed, and to receive a bottle of wine a day. On the following morning half the garrison left St. Quentin, in order to reinforce the corps which was to besiege La Fère. A thousand Prussians remained at St. Quentin, and five hundred more watched the neighbouring roads. Directly they had obtained possession of the town, the invaders ordered, under penalty of death, that arms of all kinds should be delivered up to them; and the following notices were placarded on the walls:—

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* This was denied by the Germans.

> "Very Important Notice.—The German military authority informs the public that should a shot be fired on a single German soldier, six inhabitants will be shot.—St. Quentin, Oct. 21."
>
> "French Republic.—Notice.—The undersigned colonel, commanding the German troops at St. Quentin, makes it known to the inhabitants that the administration of the town will provisionally remain in the hands of the municipal committee. If, however, after the departure of the troops, fresh treacherous demonstrations or disturbances of any kind should take place, so as to necessitate the return of the troops, the most rigorous measures will be resorted to against the town, higher contributions will have to be paid, and every individual compromised or suspected will be punished with death.—St. Quentin, Oct. 22, 1870.—The Colonel commanding the troops, VON KAHLDEN."

The force occupying St. Quentin was part of the army of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. By the morning of the 23rd the invaders had gone, and, in combination with the small army which had been besieging La Fère, were hurriedly retreating. They left behind them at St. Quentin, however, a superior official charged with the administration of the town in conjunction with the municipality.

The investment of Neu Breisach, which commenced on the 9th of October, was completed by the 13th, when the number of Prussians drawn up before it was about 5,000. Their lines formed a semicircle, of which the extreme points rested on the Rhine; and it was singular to observe the peasantry working calmly in the fields in the midst of all these warlike operations. A sortie of the garrison was attempted early on the morning of the 16th, when 2,000 troops advanced against the besiegers under cover of a dense fog, but were driven back. The place suffered considerably from the bombardment, yet it was not speedily reduced. Neu Breisach is in the department of the Upper Rhine, and is situated about a mile from the west side of the river, opposite Old Breisach, which is in German territory. The former also had been German up to the conquests of Louis XIV. which transferred Alsace to France; and it is now once more a portion of Germany, owing to the victories of 1870 and 1871. The town was strongly fortified by Vauban, and was regarded by France as one of her protecting outposts towards the east. One of the last acts of Marshal Niel, before his death, was to put the fortress in good order.

The regular siege of Verdun began on the 13th of October. This fortress stands on the river Meuse, in the department of the same name, at a point where the stream (which flows through the town in five branches, uniting outside the fortifications) begins to be navigable. The town is 145 miles east from Paris, 120 west of the Rhine, and 40 west of Metz, and is defended by a citadel constructed by Vauban, and by ten detached redoubts. It is not a very strong place, however, and is only reckoned as a fortress of the fourth class; for it is commanded by the adjacent hills, which are lofty, and the river is fordable in several parts. With a population of 14,000, the garrison at the time of the siege consisted of 7,000 men of all arms. Verdun was besieged by the Emperor Charles V. of Germany, who was ultimately compelled to retire; but in 1792 it was taken by the Prussians, after a bombardment of fifteen hours, and subsequently evacuated by them. From 1803 to 1814 the town was often present to English minds as one of the places of detention of our countrymen imprisoned by Buonaparte when the war again broke out in the former of those years; but from 1814 to 1870 its annals contain no facts of mark. It was now taken in hand by the Prussians with their usual energy. On the evening of the 11th of October all obstacles were cleared away from the ground lying between the besiegers and the fortress, where the French had collected stores of potatoes, and whence they had been accustomed to reconnoitre the position of the German batteries. The Fusilier Battalion of the 65th Prussian Regiment was ordered to take possession of the various villages and farm-buildings in the immediate neighbourhood of the fortress. A little place called Regret was the first position seized by the attacking force. It was situated between the German outposts and the fortress, and had for some time been an object of contention between the two armies. On the present occasion the French appear to have made no attempt to defend it; but they vigorously disputed the possession of Thierville, and the resistance of the men by whom the village was held was seconded by the great guns on the ramparts. The place, however, was ultimately captured by the Prussians,



SKIRMISH IN THE WOODS OUTSIDE PARIS.



DEFENCE OF CHÂTEAUDUN.

who also took St. Barthélemy and other large farms in front of Verdun. Further positions were seized on the following evening; and during the night of the 12th batteries were erected in the midst of a furious storm of wind and rain, which helped to mask the proceedings of the besiegers. The batteries were planted within a few hundred yards of the walls, and at six o'clock the next morning the first cannon-shot was fired from a range of forty-eight guns surrounding the town, and converging on it as their centre. Fire soon broke out in several places. During the night of the 13th a fresh battery was added to those already erected. This battery was mounted with French 24-pounders captured at Toul; and the cannonade was continued throughout the night and during the next day. The French replied with so much spirit and effect that in one of the German batteries, stationed on an eminence near Regret, two out of six 12-pounder guns were dismounted by the fire from the fortress. One of the 24-pounders also was silenced. Some of the besiegers were killed and wounded, but the casualties were not numerous. The town was again in flames on the 14th; some of the magazines were destroyed; and the cathedral was struck more than once. Seeing the effect their fire had produced, the Germans, on the 14th, sent an officer with a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the place; but the commandant refused. An interchange of prisoners, however, was agreed to about the same time; and the commandant (Baron Guérin de Waldersbäch), in writing on the subject to Major-General von Gail, commanding the Prussian troops, made some remarks on the Prussian method of proceeding against the town. He said :—

> "General,—I take the opportunity of this letter to express to you the feeling which pervades me in regard to the manner in which you have attacked Verdun. Until this day I had believed that the war between Prussia and France was to be a duel between the two armies, and I was far from supposing that inoffensive inhabitants, women and children, would see their property and their lives so unjustly involved in the struggle. If you think, general, that this sort of conduct on your part, which I refrain from qualifying, can in any way help to hasten the surrender of the place, you make a grievous error; for what the inhabitants have been suffering up to this day has, you may believe me, only tended to increase among them the self-denial which is dictated by their situation and by their own patriotic feeling. Neither the shower of shells and cannon-balls, nor the privations to which the National Guards and the army may be exposed, will prevent them from doing their duty to the last. Their greatest wish is to measure themselves hand to hand with the Prussian troops. Allow me to say, general, it is at the breach that we await you, and we hope you will one day issue from behind the mountains which keep you hidden from our blows."

On account of this letter, the Mayor of Verdun offered to General Waldersbäch the thanks of the whole population for his patriotism and public spirit. At noon on the 15th the fire of the besiegers ceased, the Prussians having sent for heavier guns; and the batteries were removed some distance further from the place. It is stated that during the bombardment an average of from thirty to forty shots was fired every minute; and it appears, on the authority of a German writer, that incendiary shells were frequently thrown into the town. The pause in active operations lasted from the 15th to the 28th of October, and in the meanwhile the French blew up the small suburbs of Jardin Fontaine and Glorieux, with a view to facilitating their operations. The Prussians, however, afterwards took possession of the ground, and proceeded to erect batteries, in preparation for the expected siege-train. On the 28th some fighting occurred beneath the walls; but it did not last above an hour, and led to no important results. Among the other incidents of the siege was one of a very tragical nature, if we may rely on the account of it given in German papers. Two officers of dragoons and four troopers were invited by the inhabitants of Charney, a small place in the vicinity of Verdun, to breakfast in one of the houses. While they were at table a messenger was sent off to Verdun for a body of Francs-tireurs, who speedily arrived, and killed all the Germans but one, who managed to make his escape. The instigator of this cruel treachery was afterwards taken prisoner, tried by court-martial, and shot.

Other minor sieges were proceeding at the same time, but without presenting many features of interest. The garrison of Bitsche continued to make sorties; but they appear to have been but feebly executed, and to have inflicted little damage on the assailants. The patrol and outpost duty of the besiegers was very severe. Although the bulk of the army was quartered in barracks, the outposts were obliged to lie in the woods or in the open fields; and as the autumn advanced this was trying. Many of the houses in the town were laid in ruins; but, a temporary armistice having come to an end on the 9th, the bombardment recommenced the next day with additional vigour. The fortress was garrisoned in the main by Mobiles from the districts of Saarburg and Sarreguemines; and as Bitsche held out to the end of the war, it is evident that these raw troops fought well. The bombardment of Mézières commenced on the 22nd of October, and on the 24th Schelestadt capitulated, with 2,400 prisoners and 120 guns. The first parallel was opened against the southern fort of the latter place on the night of the 22nd, at a distance of from 500 to 700 paces from the walls, and thirty-two guns were mounted. The effect of these proceedings was so rapid that in less than two days the town was in the hands of the Germans. Like many other places in the east of France, Schelestadt was fortified by Vauban; but, being surrounded by marshes, it was to a great extent defended by Nature herself. It was the chief town of the third arrondissement of the Bas Rhin, and had a population of nearly 10,000. The place was besieged by the Allies in 1815, and has long been regarded by the Germans as a portion of their own country, to which it has now returned. The surrender of Schelestadt preceded that of Metz by only a few days.

In consequence of these successes the eastern provinces lay completely at the mercy of the invaders. Some fortresses, indeed, yet held out with desperate tenacity; but their doom was apparent, and their prolonged resistance did but little to stem the rising flood which threatened to engulf the whole of France.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Paris regaining Confidence—Slow Progress of Events—Prussian Espionage—Arrest of Englishmen in Paris—Gloomy State of the City—The Food Question—Food Riots in Various Parts of France—Paris Journals—The *Gaulois* on the Prospects of the War—Delay in the Active Operations of the Siege—German Armaments before Paris—Relative Strength of Prussian and French Guns—The Making of Gabions—The Armament of Paris—The Mobile Guards—Forsaken State of the Country round the Capital—The Entry of King William into Versailles—Count Bismarck and the Map of Germany—The *Provincial Correspondenz* on the Future of the War—The French to be thoroughly chastised—Remarks on the Prussian Programme—Advantages to France of prolonging the War—Sortie from Paris of the 21st of October—Dr. Russell's and other Accounts of the Engagement—The Prussian Landwehr—Danger of Lighted Windows in the Vicinity of Fortresses.

Paris rather gained than lost confidence while the events described in the last chapter were proceeding. As day after day and week after week went by, and yet the enemy refrained from opening fire on the city, a certain sense of unreality in the whole business came upon the people. It was true that some descriptions of food were getting scarce and dear, and that others had quite run out; but there was no want of absolute necessaries. It was true that the ordinary means of entering and leaving the capital were suspended; but the balloons and carrier-pigeons still kept up a degree of intercommunication with the rest of the world. It was true that the newly-raised armies in the provinces had for the most part recoiled before the invader, beaten, broken, and dispirited; but Paris, behind her ramparts, awaited the attacks of her assailant, and her assailant refrained from attacking. To that volatile population, soon disheartened and soon encouraged, it must have seemed as if the worst had already been endured. The Prussians, indeed, had not retired from the positions they had taken up; but the Parisians were satisfied that they made no way. Their dark, cloudy masses could be seen from the walls all round the beleaguered city; yet their guns were silent, their hands were apparently idle. If they attempted to unmask a battery, the fire from the forts destroyed the whole erection. The French guns were excellently served, and made themselves keenly felt at long ranges. Manifestly, the German commanders kept their men as much out of reach of those deadly projectiles as they could; and as yet they seemed not to be in a position to reply. As the Parisians walked about their streets in the failing October sunshine, and transacted their ordinary business, or followed their accustomed pleasures, the siege and all its possibilities must frequently have passed into forgetfulness. Yet the next moment, it might be, the thunder of cannon from the forts, the stir of military preparation, or the arrival of a pigeon from afar, laden with messages of disaster, brought back the consciousness that Paris was indeed besieged, and France indeed was stricken.

The Parisians continued to live in great dread of spies. The mania for making unauthorised arrests, which possessed almost every one in September, died out in October; but the fear of Prussian espionage was still widely diffused. Without a safe-conduct it was impossible for any one of the general public either to leave the city or to enter it. Even when duly provided with passes, people were liable to perpetual stoppages, followed by minute examination of papers. This increased vigilance was owing to the discovery that a number of abandoned women and other persons of indifferent character had been in the habit of going to the Prussian camp, and giving information as to plans and projected movements. No doubt the Parisians often suspected a spy where there was only an honest citizen; but it cannot be questioned that the Germans had for years established all over France a system of espionage of the most extensive kind, and that their information as to French military resources, the condition of French fortresses and harbours, the state of the army and navy, and, in short, the whole position of the country as affecting its capability of making war or resisting invasion, was astounding for its fulness and accuracy. The discovery of this fact, at a time when its fatal results were being every day experienced, not unnaturally led to some excess of watchfulness, to prevent, if possible, a repetition of the same policy on the part of the enemy; and acts of injustice to individuals were occasionally committed. Dr. Gordon, an English physician in Paris, was arrested on suspicion; and so, shortly afterwards, was Surgeon-Major Wyatt, of the Coldstream Guards, who, together with Dr. Gordon, had been sent to Paris by our War Department to inquire into matters of sanitary hygiene and surgical details. The latter was arrested in the Champs Elysées at mid-day. "There were several thousand regular troops," wrote the sufferer, in a letter published in the *Times*, "resting under the trees on their line of march to St. Denis, and I was on my way from the Palais d'Industrie, with Dr. Herbert, to the Embassy. We addressed a few words to a small group of cheery-looking soldiers, who were lying on the grass eating their excellent bread, respecting their mode of carrying the *tente d'abri*, water-can, cooking-kettle, &c., and walked on; but it appears that immediately after our departure one of the officers of the regiment interrogated the men as to the nature of our conversation (which certainly was not of more than two or three minutes' duration), and then desired them to follow and arrest us, which they did very civilly, expressing great regret at the occurrence." They were taken to the nearest Mairie, and handed over to the charge of an officer of the National Guards; but Surgeon-Major Wyatt was permitted to address a letter to the Military Attaché to the British Embassy. He happened not to be at the Embassy at the time the note arrived; but Mr. Wodehouse, the Chargé d'Affaires, at once interposed, and procured the release of the prisoners. It subsequently appeared that they were reported to have been found on the fortifications examining the guns.

So vexatious were these interferences with unoffending persons, and so serious were the Red Republican menaces, directed not only against the Government, but against the whole system of social order, that many were found to regret the closing of the theatres, which left the Parisians devoid of amusement, and therefore in the right mood for saturnine mischief. But it was considered indecent to make merry while the country was in so much affliction; and the feeling was one which it is impossible not to respect. Accordingly, the theatres were devoted to purposes connected with the siege. The Grand Opera was turned into an observatory and military store; the Théâtre Français, the Italian Opera House, and the Variétés, were used as hospitals; the Gaieté was converted into a place for the manufacture of clothes; and the Circus named after the Empress was given up to the production of cartridges. The great palaces and public buildings of the city were appropriated to the reception of the wounded, and displayed the red-cross flag side by side with the tricolour. The workshops of the railways were changed into foundries for cannon; artillery bivouacked in the Jardin des Plantes; ranges of batteries disfigured the pleasure-gardens on the top of Montmartre; M. Nadar and his assistants worked day and night in the construction of giant balloons in the famous ball-room of the same locality; and the gardens of the Tuileries became a camping-ground of soldiers. In the Champs Elysées cattle and sheep were folded; and everywhere troops were seen, and the din of military preparation was heard.* No wonder if, under all these circumstances, the Parisians were at times a little dull. Yet on the whole they kept up their spirits very fairly; and when a boastful Prussian colonel made a bet with M. Emile de Girardin that before September 15th the Prussian army would be in Paris, the latter took the bet, and announced that, being quite sure of winning, he would pay the money by anticipation to some charity.

The food question every day pressed itself more and more upon attention. Prices became higher week by week; horseflesh, to which the Parisians had been accustoming themselves for some years, was largely eaten; and the flesh of asses was sold at eighty centimes the kilogramme. The daily supply of meat, early in October, was curtailed by two ounces and a quarter for every person in the city; and people began to talk of the nutritious qualities of bullock's blood. Holders of wheat and flour were summoned to make a return of their stocks to the Government. Beef and mutton were sometimes quite unobtainable; for, although the authorities were prepared to serve out 500 oxen and 4,000 sheep a day, the butchers did not see their way to making a profit at existing prices. In the wealthiest quarters of Paris a system for the gratis distribution of rations was organised. The butchers' shops were open only twice or three times a week. On many days the supply of meat was so deficient that people were obliged to go away empty-handed, after waiting their turn for hours; and the crowds were often so great that it was necessary to employ bodies of National Guards to keep order. A correspondent of the *Times*, writing in October, said:—

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* Occasional Correspondent of the *Times* writing on October 12th, 1870.

> "We are henceforward to be rationed for butchers' meat. This rule is to be enforced rigidly, cards being delivered at the Mairies for each household. The price of meat is not very high, however, and the State, up to this time, only charges the consumer twenty-one sous a pound. But horseflesh is abundant, and you may indulge in that without limit at the rate of sixteen sous per pound for the choicest morsels. Some Parisians have learnt to like it. There is flour in store for months, and oceans of wine. Coffee and rice are plentiful; salads, fruit, and a few green vegetables are still to be had, but at high prices. Eggs, not fresh-laid, but good, cost four or five sous each. Milk, of course, is not to be had; and, worst of all, butter (even salt), lard, suet, and all kinds of fat, have quite disappeared from the market, so that all cookery is very unpalatable, unless you have a cook who knows how to use oil. Salt fish is sold at thirty sous a pound, and not a cheese can be had for love or money in all Paris. All men who are in the National Guard receive thirty sous a day, and when on duty they can club together, and so manage. But the women of the working classes, especially the single women, are most to be pitied; for they earn nothing now, and there are many pinched and wan faces to be seen among them. Their fare was always very poor, for no Parisian workman cared to spend much on eating, and they have consequently not much strength in them to resist want. The hog's-flesh, the coffee with milk, the little bit of cheese, which formed their chief food, can no longer be had. There is food still in Paris for many weeks to come, but it must soon be distributed gratuitously to thousands who never dreamt of living upon charity. As it is, almost all the peasants who have taken refuge here are fed at the public expense. They have neither store nor trade in this great town. Shopkeepers sell literally nothing; but, at best, this is with them a 'dead season.'"

Salted and preserved provisions attained to exorbitant prices, owing to the restricted supply of fresh meat; and a writer in the *Daily News* recorded that Australian mutton, beef, and veal, were quadruple their ordinary rates. Hams, until they were all bought up, realised 3f. per lb.; salted cod fetched about 1s. per lb.; and dried herrings were 5d. each. Gruyère cheese was 2f. a pound, and common English or American as much as 2s. Fowls and ducks ranged from 7f. to 10f. each; turkeys fetched 25f., rabbits 6f. and 7f., and pigeons 2½f. each. At the Halles Centrales live geese sold wholesale at 16f. per head, and the correspondent even saw a swan put up for sale, the possession of which was warmly contested.

The question of the food supply was felt to be an important one in other parts of France as well as Paris. Some riots occurred at Granville, in the department of La Manche, on the 8th and 9th of October, in order to prevent the exportation of provisions in a Jersey vessel. Many of the mob belonged to the National Guard; and they vowed that no goods whatever should be shipped, as their withdrawal from the French markets tended to enhance prices. The vessel was obliged to depart without its consignments. About the same time, an English cutter, laden with grain for Penzance, was boarded by a large number of persons, and the grain removed. The authorities either could not or would not interfere; and, inasmuch as the people had recently deposed the Mayor of the town, and set up one more to their own liking, it is not improbable that there was no desire on the part of the chief local officer to stop the proceedings. Further disturbances ensued, and the harbour-master and others were maltreated. The Prefect of La Manche, however, issued a proclamation to the townspeople, remonstrating with them on their conduct, and pointing out its effect in ruining the trade of the town; and this proclamation was also signed by members of the Tribunal of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce, the Municipal Council, and the officers of the National Guard of Granville. Similar scenes occurred in other seaboard towns of France—at St. Malo, Cherbourg, Havre, and Honfleur. The troops and gendarmery on the quay at St. Malo were assailed with stones, and a good deal hurt; some of the mob were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; and it was found necessary to put a military guard on board one of the vessels engaged in the traffic. At this town the authorities gave the utmost assistance to the English merchant captains; and the popular resistance to shipments soon ceased. At Honfleur the mob prohibited the exportation of cattle, under the supposition that they were intended for the Germans; and the Government at Tours was asked for assistance by the local authorities, who were incapable of controlling the violence of the populace. Here also some of the mob were wounded by the National Guards; but the former succeeded in obliging the boats to leave without taking any live stock or produce.

The people of Jersey suffered very much in consequence of these disturbances, as a large part of their food supply is drawn from the north of France. Great deprivations were likewise experienced by the English in Paris, owing to the interruption of business. Several of our countrymen had left at the commencement of the war; but it is supposed that about two thousand remained. These were cut off from all their usual sources of income, and exposed to imminent danger of starving. A British Charitable Fund was opened in London; and much assistance was rendered in Paris by Mr. Richard Wallace, the Rev. Dr. Smyth, Mr. Alan Herbert, Mr. Blount, Dr. Shrimpton, Dr. Cormack, Mr. Saumarez, and other British residents; but a great deal of misery existed, in spite of all efforts to alleviate it.



GENERAL CREMER.

Together with a scarcity of meat there was a scarcity of paper in Paris, and the metropolitan journals, like those of Metz, were driven to great shifts. Some were restricted to a single page, printed on silk paper, copies of which, with the title and margin cut off, in order to make them as light as possible, were despatched by balloon-post, and occasionally reached their subscribers. The *Gaulois*, which prior to the siege was a broadside of four pages, was reduced to the size of a sheet of note-paper. It was lithographed, and consisted of four short and narrow columns, filled with minute writing.

During the pause which succeeded the first appearance of the Prussians before Paris, the *Gaulois* published a remarkable article on the siege and its probable results, which the Germans thought of sufficient importance to reproduce in the official



STREET FIGHTING AT CHÂTEAUDUN.

Staats Anzeiger. The delay in the investment of the capital after the great victory of Sedan the writer attributed to the necessity for the German troops enjoying a little rest after so many murderous battles, and to the advisability of so regulating the movements of the various attacking armies as to make the troops arrive simultaneously in front of the forts. "The greater part of these forces," continued the writer, "is doubtless placed west of the capital, from St. Denis to Versailles and Meudon. Further east, imposing hosts are assembled at a distance of from eight to ten kilomètres from our detached forts, smaller bodies having been pushed nearer the *enceinte*, and keeping a vigilant look-out on our proceedings. To guard against surprise, the enemy has thrown up earthworks everywhere. If attacked, these can be easily held by the advanced posts until supports come up, and compel our sallying parties to retreat. The inferences to be drawn from this are, that the Prussians are either really waiting for their siege-guns, and refrain from attacking us until they can do it effectually, or that they think they can reduce the city by hunger. So averse are the German generals from useless bloodshed in the present preliminary stage of the siege, that even the farthest outposts are prohibited from firing unless attacked. We shall soon see whether our first inference is the right one. As to the second, the blockade of Paris is already so effective that our couriers find it very difficult to penetrate the hostile lines, and balloons are made use of to send off despatches." Food, however, could not be taken into the city by balloons; and, as Paris was only victualled for a couple of months (the article was written on the 4th of October, and the writer therefore greatly undercalculated the food resources of the capital), it was evidently the intention of Bismarck to starve it into surrender. This was the more probable, as the capture of Paris by force, if it could be effected at all, would so sensibly diminish the number of the attacking army that the other German troops in France would be unable to hold the field against the French, and would be overwhelmed and destroyed. They would therefore proceed quietly and deliberately, and the rigours of the winter would not interfere with their design, for they were comfortably housed in the towns, villages, villas, farms, and châteaux in the environs of Paris. "The invaders," the article proceeded, "have everything at hand that they can want. They have houses to live in, beds, linen, furniture, wine in the cellars, and every variety of fruit and vegetable in the fields. They have magnificent forests all round Paris for fuel to protect them against the cold of the winter. Why, then, should they not wait till we are famished? While our provisions are being gradually exhausted, theirs will be replenished by railway; and, if their soldiers suffer from exposure to the weather, ours, bivouacking near the forts or standing sentinel on the ramparts, will have to undergo the same ordeal. If, therefore, the enemy has the best possible motive for prolonging his present inactivity, we, on the other hand, should pursue the opposite policy. Every day that elapses without our gaining an advantage accelerates our doom." The writer then went on to show the impossibility of Bazaine, who was still shut up at Metz, breaking free of the German investment, and coming to the relief of Paris, unless under certain conditions. The Parisians had it in their power to render his march practicable by inflicting such injuries on the enemy before their gates as to compel the invaders to call a portion of their Metz army to the relief of that of Paris. Bazaine, to arrive before Paris in a condition to be of service, should follow the army that kept him in check, not precede it; for, in the former case, that army might be caught between two fires, while in the latter Bazaine himself would be exposed to the danger of pursuit in the rear, and simultaneous attack from the front. Great things, in the opinion of the writer, were to be expected of the Army of the Loire, as soon as it was thoroughly disciplined, and sufficiently acquainted with the work of soldiership to be able to interrupt the Prussian communications, and threaten the enemy's rear. "It might even," said the *Gaulois* speculator, "concert with Bazaine a combined attack upon the Prussians, and make their situation a very dangerous one. But this can only occur if we are the first to strike. All depends upon our taking the initiative in what more immediately concerns us than anybody else. All, in fact, will be gained or lost according as we (the Parisians) fall upon the enemy, diminish his numbers, and disable him from completing his task without sending for reinforcements. A few days ago we might, by strong reconnoitrements, have prevented the enemy from throwing up the earthworks that now protect his front. At present we shall have to fight pitched battles to dislodge him. Let us do so at once if we wish to conquer."

Such were the views of the defence of Paris entertained in October by a critic who was evidently possessed of military knowledge. His arguments were not without a considerable basis of reason; yet they were in some degree vitiated by an imperfect acquaintance with the facts of the case He certainly erred in supposing that the Prussians intended to reduce Paris simply by famine. That was one of their weapons, but only one. The mistake, however, was not unnatural. The continued inaction of the besieging forces must have suggested to the Parisians, in the absence of exact information, a doubt as to their capacity, or their desire, to carry out a bombardment; and it is to be observed that the Germans themselves encouraged some mystification on the subject. Count Bismarck, in September, denied that it would be necessary to besiege the French capital, and talked of leaving it to "stew in its own juice"—by which choice metaphor he would seem to have meant that the city should be allowed to work out its own ruin by the self-generated agencies of hunger and revolution. But in October the besiegers were busy erecting batteries and planting guns. Paris was to be coerced from without, as well as abandoned to disintegrating influences within.

The delay in opening fire was due to the determination of the Prussians not to resort to that measure until they were able to do so effectually. The bringing up a sufficient number of siege-guns to operate with vigour on so large a city as Paris was clearly a work of time; and it would have been imprudent to begin a partial bombardment, which might have provoked reprisals of a damaging nature. The *Provincial Correspondenz*, of Berlin—a semi-official paper—confessed that it was at first thought the Parisians would at once surrender in prospect of a bombardment, but that their attitude had compelled a more energetic course of proceedings. After the fall of Toul, it was added, the railway was only available as far as Nanteuil, near Meaux, owing to the blowing up of a tunnel, and everything had in consequence to be carried fifty or sixty miles by road—a mode of conveyance rendered very slow and laborious by the scarcity of horses and vehicles, and the destruction of the ways. But the work went steadily on, nevertheless. Guns were constantly arriving, and every week the Prussians were in a better position for commencing active operations. Among the ordnance there were several hundreds of short shell-guns for direct fire, throwing a shell of two hundred pounds. These had already been tried at Strasburg, and had proved very effective. An elongated shell, of great penetrative power, having something of the character of a bolt, being three feet in length, with a charge of seventy pounds of powder to each foot, was also included in the projectiles of the besiegers. According to statements published in October, the German siege-train comprised the 6½-ton gun, calibre 8.25 inches, projectile 220 lb. shell; and the 14-ton gun, calibre 9.25 inches, projectile 337 lb. shell, containing a bursting charge of fifteen pounds of powder; both of which were breech-loaders. The extreme range of these guns, with an elevation of 33 deg., was said to be 9,500 yards, or rather less than five miles and a half. The heaviest breech-loading rifle-guns mounted by the French at Paris were—5-ton gun, calibre 6.3 inches, projectile 70 lb. shell; 8-ton gun, calibre 7.5 inches, projectile 115 lb. shell; 14-ton gun, calibre 9.45 inches, projectile 220 lb. shell; and 21½-ton gun, calibre 10.63 inches, projectile 480 lb. shell. By the middle of October the besiegers had so good a position on the Clamart plateau and at Châtillon that they could almost look into Fort Issy, and quite into Forts Vanvres and Montrouge. Their outposts were in fact further advanced towards the city than they were at first, for the edges of the plateaux occupied by the Germans were now quite under the fire of the forts. Large bodies of men were employed in the making of gabions—rough cylindrical baskets filled with earth, used in sieges to protect the assailants from the fire of the fortifications; and for the construction of these defences the districts south and south-west of Paris offered peculiar facilities, the country being covered with timber affording plenty of fascine-sticks and of withies to bind them, while the light sandy soil was excellently adapted for filling the gabions when made. The directing engineer of the siege-works was General Schultz; and every detail of the operations was carried out with that calm imperturbable intelligence which characterised the whole conduct of the German army in the prosecution of the war.

The armament of Paris was officially described, on the 18th of October, as being in a very satisfactory condition. According to this report, the artillery consisted of 2,150 guns, which were served by 18,000 officers and artillerymen. Each gun on the ramparts was supplied with 100 rounds of ammunition, while those in the forts had 500 rounds. Eight million kilogrammes of powder were also in stock. Added to this there was a reserve stock of 350 guns, and cartridges were being manufactured at the rate of six millions a week. The preparations made by the Engineer Corps were immense, and, in co-operation with 100,000 tirailleurs, had rendered Paris (said the official writer) nearly impregnable. The Ministry of Public Works had 102 mitrailleuses of various kinds ordered at different establishments. One hundred and fifteen Gatling and Christopher mitrailleuses were to be delivered on and after the 27th of October; 312,600 mitrailleuse cartridges had already been delivered, as well as 150 mortars, together with their accessories, and 50 gun carriages; 200 carriages for siege-guns, and 500,000 shells of various calibres had been ordered at the different foundries of Paris, whence they were daily arriving; 5,000 bombs, and several big naval guns of long range, were nearly ready; and 300 breech-loading rifled cannons, having a range of 3,000 mètres, were to be delivered from the 25th of October. The organisation of the artillery of the National Guards, it was added, was nearly accomplished. The legion was composed of ten batteries, having 60 guns in all, with from four to twelve horses each; and one of the batteries was composed of people attached to the *Rappel*. This was altogether a very cheering account; and, though it may be subject to some deductions, it was doubtless correct in the main.

Of the Mobile Guards in Paris, our countryman, Surgeon-Major Wyatt, gave a very good impression. He described those from the country districts as young men whom he should be very glad to see as recruits for our own Guards. They were stout, sturdy lads, of five feet ten inches in height, with broad shoulders, expansive chests, and legs to match. They exhibited no symptoms of despondency, but were as cheerful as larks, and commenced singing as soon as they were up in the morning, which was always very early. When departing for the fortifications they would carry enormous loaves of bread stuck on the ends of their bayonets. For the consumption of the troops generally 400 cattle were slaughtered daily in the earlier periods of the siege. Altogether, there were nearly two millions of mouths to be fed, owing to the great ingress of people from the adjacent parts; and it was said that the public expenses for the national defence were upwards of two million francs daily. Round the beleaguered city the open country and pleasant villages bore testimony to the devastating effects of war. Many of the suburbs were quite deserted; in others, only soldiers were visible, or perhaps a solitary peasant going sullenly about some enforced labour under the menacing glances and levelled pistols of the conquerors. Châteaux and villas, the abodes of wealthy and art-loving families, were occupied by rough troops, who slept on luxurious couches, stabled their horses in libraries, and made up the kitchen fire with costly carvings, or with graceful orange-trees from the garden. Herr Wickede, who took note of these facts in the paper by which he was accredited, wondered how the people would find subsistence on the departure of the troops, as the country by that time would be as devoid of provisions as the desert of Sahara. Yet, he remarks, this circle of twenty or five-and-twenty miles belongs to one of the richest districts in Europe. He travelled for two whole days without once seeing a woman, a child, a domestic animal, not belonging to the army, or a man without a military uniform. It was not until he came to Versailles that he again perceived the evidences of ordinary life. The Imperial town presented most of its usual features. Women were sitting at the doors of the houses; children were playing in the streets. The Versaillese appear to have accepted their fate with philosophic composure. People, according to an English correspondent, went to market as if nothing had happened; and, at the commencement of the occupation, men were seen in the streets quietly carrying their muskets to the Mairie, to be registered and kept until peace was declared.

The entry of King William into Versailles on the 5th of October, when he removed his head-quarters from Ferrières, near Meaux, was an imposing ceremonial. Early in the afternoon the Crown Prince, attended by General von Blumenthal, Count Eulenberg, Colonel von Gottberg, and several Staff officers, left Les Ombrages, in order to meet his Majesty. At half-past four various military movements in the town, and the playing of the bands, gave intimation that the Royal carriage might shortly be expected, and several of the populace took up positions in the main street to see the entry of their subjugator. Many of the windows along the route, however, were closed, and there was no dense crowd anywhere. The ways were lined with troops, and a large number of princes, dukes, and generals waited outside the Prefecture. At a little later than half-past five the cheers of the troops heralded the approach of the King; the officers in front of the Prefecture formed in military order; a body of Lancers galloped up to the spot, with their lances lowered; and these were followed by a few Dragoons, by the Stahlmeister and some mounted equerries, and by another troop of Lancers with lances raised, who wheeled round, and halted on the flank of the rest of the squadron. The King rode in an open carriage, and was covered with dust, but looked well and strong. On his left was the Crown Prince. In the midst of cheering and the clangour of trumpets, the lowering of the colours, and other demonstrations of loyalty, King William stepped out of the carriage, and was at once surrounded by his officers, with many of whom he warmly shook hands. A few minutes later he and the Crown Prince inspected the colour company, drawn up on the left of the palace. His Majesty walked along the front of the line, closely followed by his generals and by a miscellaneous crowd of on-lookers. The inspection being completed, the King walked into the courtyard of the

Prefecture, turned round and saluted the multitude, and then passed into the hall, over the portal of which the Prussian standard was displayed.* The popular opinion appeared to be decidedly in favour of the Royal victor, as a gallant-looking gentleman; but a King, it must be added, always stands well with sight-seers, if he only conducts himself with ordinary civility. Count Bismarck arrived at the Hôtel des Réservoirs at half-past six, with a few officers of the Royal Staff, and ordered dinner in the public room. Here he talked for some time with Generals Burnside, Sheridan, and Forsyth, of the United States Army, and, observing a map on the wall, exclaimed, "Ah! a map of Germany—as it was." The events of that day showed the changed condition of Germany in the light of a great success. The head of the chief German Power had entered into possession of Versailles.

Under these circumstances, some tone of elation on the part of the conquerors was hardly surprising. The Germans, however, were not content with sounding their own praises; they lost no opportunity, or rather they made many opportunities, of lecturing the French on their folly in commencing the war, and their unparaleled wickedness in presuming to defend their country against the invader, instead of at once buying peace by granting all that the invader required. On this subject, an official article appeared in the *Provincial Correspondenz*, of Berlin, on October 20th, in which it was remarked that the last stage of the campaign had arrived. The siege of Paris was about to open. After the defeat of the French army at Sedan, the German public expected a speedy conclusion of the war, and would not believe in a serious and prolonged investment of Paris. France, having no regular army in the field, could not, it was believed, continue the struggle, or hold Paris against the assaults of its foe, and would therefore, in all probability, signify its willingness to make peace. Those anticipations had been defeated by the self-delusions of the Republican Government, and the injurious influence of their "vagaries" on public opinion. The French nation, being too proud to believe in its discomfiture, eagerly listened to the absurd assurances of its Republican leaders, that the disasters of the country were to be placed solely to the account of the Emperor, and would be only temporary. The proclamation of the Republic was followed by a pretty general impression that the nation, restored to itself, would create invincible armies, making up by enthusiasm what they might lack in military skill, and would in this way sweep the Germans from the soil of France. "It was the prevalence of this conceited notion of invincibility," continued the official writer, "which prevented the conclusion of peace when all hope of victory had gone. It has forced us to continue the war, and palpably prove to the French that they have been beaten, and are actually and absolutely helpless. Natural as it is to wish for a prompt termination of the war, we are perhaps not wrong in seeing the finger of Providence in the retribution which the French are thus bringing in full measure upon themselves. It seems to be decreed that they are to empty the cup of bitterness to the dregs, and, by having their insolence thoroughly chastised, be weaned from their bellicose propensities, and converted into better neighbours for the future." All Germans would have been delighted had the war concluded with Sedan; yet, had peace been then made, the idea of holding universal supremacy, so firmly rooted in the French mind, would have regained irresistible ascendency. Even as it was, the majority of the French people deemed themselves unconquerable, and indeed unconquered. They had been told of victories, varied with a few insignificant reverses. They were assured that Bazaine could, whenever he liked, get out of Metz, and crush the forces besieging it. "They smile," proceeded the article, "at the thought of Paris ever falling into our hands when it is defended by hundreds of thousands of Mobiles, and attacked only by German soldiers. Lastly, they swear that Europe will come to the rescue of their holy city, and save what they are pleased to call the 'metropolis of the world.' Were peace to be re-established before they have been cured of their self-sufficiency, they would doubtless flatter themselves that they not been vanquished at all—that the war might have been continued, and that its premature conclusion was mainly owing to the pusillanimity and treachery of those in power. With these intoxicating illusions filling their brains, so arrogant a people as the French would not wait long before they attempted to win back what they had lost. Only after the Parisians, and with them the entire population of France, have been humbled to the dust—only when the military strength of their country has been entirely broken, and the hope of creating fresh armies is everywhere annihilated—will they become conscious of the magnitude of their defeat, and perhaps perceive and remember that to invade a neighbour may be attended with unpleasant consequences to themselves." In addition to these considerations, the writer urged that the exhaustion which would ensue on a prolonged

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* Special Correspondent of the *Times*.



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

35 PRUSSIAN ARTILLERYMAN.

war would guarantee the duration of peace. With every day of continued hostilities the French became so much the poorer, so much the more disorganised. The defence did as much mischief as the invasion. Devastations such as those ordered by the Republican Government in a broad belt of country all round Paris could not but exhaust the national resources for years to come. The effect of these warlike operations would be heightened by the loosening of those ties which had long held the contending political and social elements of the country together; and the difficulties thus arising would be so many impediments in the way of reviving prosperity. Such considerations would not induce the Prussian Government to prolong the war if France were inclined to sign a peace such as was imperatively required by the interests of Germany. But, as the French would not have peace, it was as well to reflect that protracted war also had its uses.

These were the arguments by which Prussia endeavoured to fortify its conscience against any compunctious visitings of remorse which might at times obtrude in the midst of the self-congratulations not unnaturally following on unexampled victory. To other nations it was but too apparent that, intoxicated by success, the Germans had entered on a course of ambition characterised by all the moral faults which they denounced in the traditional policy of France. It was hardly for them to assume so lofty a tone of reproof and warning, when at the very same moment they contemplated with undisguised satisfaction the slow ruin and exhaustion of France, the desolation of a flourishing land, and the untying of the wildest revolutionary passions, avowedly because all these evils would help them to impose their own terms when resistance was no longer possible, and would facilitate the transfer of provinces from the weaker to the stronger Power. To contend that the French were so conceited that they would have laid claim to European predominance, even after the defeat of Sedan, had peace at once been made, but that if they were still further beaten they would be cured of their presumption, and converted into better neighbours, was self-contradictory. If their vanity was equal to the one trial, it would be equal to both; and the very excess of rage and mortification would foster the resolve to recover at some future day the position that had been lost. Count Bismarck was more honest when he said that, as the French would never forgive the Germans for Sedan and the preceding victories, but would attack them again as soon as they could, they must make themselves as strong as possible, and acquire the great eastern fortresses, together with the surrounding country. No doubt such a view was almost a defiance to perpetual warfare; but at any rate it had the merit of candour. The official writer in the *Provincial Correspondenz* made a pretence of abstract morality, which was more objectionable than even the Federal Chancellor's cynicism. Whatever may be said in vindication of the course taken by Prussia after the fall of the Empire, it is certain that she was not fighting to teach France a lesson in humility for the benefit of mankind in general and of the European system in particular, but in order to secure to herself certain material prizes which she had long coveted, and which she was now resolved to grasp.

The prolongation of the war by the French, rather than submit to terms which unquestionably involved a great injury to the credit of the country, may in some respects have been injudicious. Certainly, judged by the light of ultimate defeat, it seems so. But we should be careful how we blame a great nation, of ancient military renown, for not at once assuming its own impotence, and accepting the bitter consequences of disasters which might perhaps be reversed. If the continuance of the struggle did no other good, it showed that the subjugation of France, though a possible task, is one attended by terrible sacrifices, by exhausting labours, and by perils that may at any moment become fatal. Had France consented to secure peace in the first weeks of September by the surrender of Alsace and Lorraine, the triumph of Germany would have been so complete, immediate, and unbalanced, that the temptation to commence, or at least threaten, fresh wars, with a view to further aggrandisement, might have seemed almost too great to resist. As it was, the gain was purchased at so high a cost, and developed so many lurking possibilities of mischief, as to damp any strong desire for a repetition of the same experiences. Generals Moltke and von Roon thought that when once the regular armies of France were destroyed the country must immediately collapse, as Austria had done in 1866 after the crushing defeat of Sadowa. They forgot that Austria was only an army, and that France is a nation.

The Parisians, at any rate, were far from considering their case hopeless; and on October 21st they executed a sortie on a large scale, which was characterised by some very hard fighting. Early in the day there was a sortie against the right of the 6th Army Corps and the Würtembergers; but the chief attack was made under cover of the guns of Mont Valérien, and was directed to the south-west against the 9th and 10th Regiments of the Prussian

Infantry Division. Mont Valérien is situated to the west of Paris, on the narrow peninsula of Nanterre, which is formed by the Seine flowing first north, and then south-west. Opposite Mont Valérien is the answering ridge of St. Germains, and between the two lie Rueil, on the left bank of the Seine, and Fasan, Chatou, and Montesson, on the right bank. The sortie was specially aimed at Bougival, a village close to the river, which at that point formed the left wing of the German outposts, and had often been struck by the long-range heavy guns of Fort Valérien. North-east of Bougival is Malmaison, and nearly opposite to it, on the other side of the Seine, is Croissy. The ground between the two armies was formed by the flat land of the water-course, beautifully variegated with masses of forest-trees (at that time arrayed in all the splendid tints of autumn), with gardens, vineyards, villas, mansions, and church-spires. The most prominent objects, serving to mark the progress of the day's fighting, were a large white farmhouse on the slope of Mont Valérien; a red pagoda, belonging to some country seat; and a windmill close to the edge of the forest. The action commenced a little before two o'clock. It began, according to the very circumstantial narrative of Dr. Russell in the *Times*, with a heavy fire from the two southern cavaliers of Valérien, from the redoubt in front of the fort, and from an earthwork facing towards St. Cloud. The French had several batteries in the field, together with large masses of infantry, and a small proportion of cavalry. By half-past two they seemed to be gaining ground, for a battery from the centre advanced along one of the roads of Mont Valérien leading in the direction of Foilleuse, to the east of Bougival. Unlimbering beyond a farmhouse situated on this road, the guns vigorously shelled the woods on the opposite slopes of the valley, while the French skirmishers deployed on the open ground, and, in the picturesque language of Dr. Russell, "covered the green hill-side with a shifting gauze of smoke." At the same time a number of shells were thrown from Fort Valérien, some of which burst towards St. Cloud, while others fell in the neighbourhood of Rueil and Bougival. After a while, the French, becoming still bolder, and being well supported in the rear, gave signs of a disposition to descend the valley, and make a dash at the Prussian ridge, which was but weakly held. A French officer on a white horse rode bravely forward in the midst of the thickest fire, and encouraged his troops; but the Prussian musketry checked their advance. Both sides lost many men, and the Prussians in particular dropped fast among the vines, and soon began to fall back on their supports. The officer on the white horse became still more energetic in urging his men forward; and the French, sallying out from their covering vines, rushed towards the enemy. The battery in support moved on again, and once more opened fire. "The guns on the ridges," wrote Dr. Russell, who saw the fight from some high ground in the vicinity of St. Germains, "specked all the woods with shell-bursts. Another battery came up from behind the farmhouse; but the lines of guns under Valérien never altered their position during the day." The French were now advancing with great ardour; but, as they streamed down the slope of Mont Valérien, the Prussians, re-forming on the opposite ridge, poured into the ranks of their adversaries two such heavy volleys that the French halted, turned, and, dropping men at every step, ran back to the shelter of their vines, from which they opened a sharp fusillade. At five minutes to three there was an explosion in the direction of Rueil, and a few minutes later another was heard. The French artillery directed a heavy fire into the woods wherever they saw any Prussians, or supposed they were likely to be lurking; and this continued for a quarter of an hour with so much energy that at one time Dr. Russell counted seven shells bursting, nearly all together, hundreds of feet high in the air. The Prussians appeared to have little or no artillery, and must therefore have been terribly cut up. For the moment, however, the French were checked; but, on being reinforced, they rallied. The vivid narrative of Dr. Russell proceeds:—

> "Again the white horse came in view. Several mounted officers were with this mass of men, which looked like regulars, some skirmishers of which still stuck to the vines. The Prussians, assailed by shell, shot, and an ever-increasing fusillade, had to relinquish the ridge which they clung to so obstinately. The French made a show as if to carry the position. It was half-past three. The place of the officer on the white horse was taken by one on a brown or bay horse, who walked it outside the vines right under the ridge. He led on his men, seconded by others, one conspicuous among them, who ran waving his sword from group to group, and pointed towards the Prussian ridge. They would not 'face the fence.' In vain their officers set them a brilliant example. I can answer for four or five, at all events. The mass of the men would not leave the vines, but kept up a brisk fire all the same where they stood. To encourage them and support their attack, the foremost battery detached two guns, which were led up at a gallop in very gallant style to the wall by the French windmill, where they unlimbered and opened fire on the Prussian ridge in front, while the other batteries enfiladed it. But there was help coming. The Germans, on the part of the field where this action was going on, had not more

than a couple of thousand men, so far as I could estimate their number, and these apparently not aided by artillery. The first sign of the reinforcements which were at hand was the wavering of the French, who had got some way down the slope, some so far that they were lost to view in the dip, and who now either halted or actually fell back in an oblique direction towards the vines. The Prussians by the red pagoda caught them on the flank with their needle-guns, and stung them sharply. But who are those on the flank of the spiked helmets? White belts and shakoes! What can they be? French? No. See; they fire into the dip. Their skirmishers come out from the angle where the wood shuts the view, and advance through the vines. It is five minutes after four. The French gunners, at the sight of the new-comers, work every gun. What are they? How splendidly they advance! They clear the vines. A battalion follows close on the heels of the skirmishers. Another appears in support. They are the Landwehr of the Guard. On they press through the vines, and a thicker smoke rises out of the dip. Look! There go the skirmishers up the other side. They have crossed the little valley. Their comrades rush after them. There must be hand-to-hand fighting among the vines. The French fly from the rear in confusion. There is a wild stampede of cavalry. No, it is the gunners and drivers of the two guns who are riding away. The guns fire one last round. Black objects flit through the smoke. You can see them rushing along the white wall. The Prussians have captured the French half-battery which the infantry had ceased to protect. They pressed on after the retreating French, but they were met by a column in reserve, which must have been stationed at the other side of the red pagoda wood, and there was a heavier fire of musketry on both sides than had yet occurred. The Prussians won their way, and passed beyond the line of the French windmill at twenty minutes after four. But, whatever the object of the French might have been, it was evident that all the German troops desired or sought to do was to hold their own ground; that was their victory. There could be not only no use, but great folly, in exposing them to the fire of Valérien and of the line of field of artillery. A very considerable body of French appeared on the sky-line on the right front, and would have come down on the Prussians had they advanced along the road; and the last rays of the sun, before it set, lighted up the helmets and breastplates of a regiment of cuirassiers—a weak one, if a whole regiment—which had been kept near the large farm enclosure, and now moved out. There was a lull in the engagement. The French on the brow showed four battalions, and made a slow advance towards the Prussians, who began to fall back with perfect steadiness. The retrograde movement seemed to encourage the French all along the front, for the retreating masses faced round, and the reserves in rear and those on the hill made a decided effort to close on the Prussians. The latter were, however, once more reinforced. The battalions by the red pagoda came down by the wood, and deployed—one of them for a moment, indeed, looked as if it were in square to receive cavalry; and several battalions, partly concealed by the ground, could be distinguished here and there in reserve. It was now five-and-twenty minutes to five o'clock P.M. The general in command seemed to think the moment was come for a great effort, or to press home some advantage. The reserves near the white farmhouse shook themselves up. A column came in sight from a hollow in advance of the farmhouse also; but the retreat was too well pronounced for them to do more than check pursuit, and there was not the least likelihood of General Kirchbach giving his men permission to indulge in the expensive luxury of pressing a retreating enemy. The flashes of the shells in the air illuminated the increasing gloom of the evening, which set in grey and cold. The pillars of smoke which rose from two houses on fire—one in Bougival, and the other in Rueil—reddened at the base, and as night fell turned into fiery columns, which cast a glare over the burial parties and those who sought out the wounded. Before I closed my glass I made out two long trains of ambulances, one returning to and the other going from Paris. One hospital train came into the Prussian lines, and was made use of to carry off the German wounded; but it was allowed to depart next day to Paris."

The correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* says that on the Prussians abandoning Bougival the French took possession of it, and endeavoured to hold it against all comers. They were at length, however, dislodged, after a stout combat; and at that point a great many prisoners were taken. "On this occasion," says the writer, "the 10th Division charged, at the point of the bayonet, two guns which had been placed in position at Bougival, and which they took by storm in spite of the murderous and devastating fire from the mitrailleuses, and the energetic resistance made by the retreating French troops, who were drawn up in the rear of these guns. This, of course, determined the French to continue their retreat, which was so entirely covered and protected by the fire of the guns from the fort that no further pursuit was practicable on the part of our men. A portion of the village of Bougival was set on fire during the engagement by the shells which were thrown from Fort Valérien; and Argenteuil also was in flames." The correspondent adds that two German batteries took part in the action, and that all the guns were held in reserve, so that they could immediately be brought up, if required. It is generally acknowledged that the French fought extremely well in this sortie; and the greater number of the troops under fire were not troops of the Line, but Mobiles. The raw, inexperienced soldiers of Paris proved themselves several times to be worth more than the disheartened regulars.

It appears hardly probable that the French could have hoped by this sortie to occupy Versailles, or to drive the Prussians off from Paris. They doubtless aimed at nothing more than inflicting a certain amount of damage on the enemy, and forcing on him a sense of the insecurity of his position. Yet they came out in great strength, and were supported by forty guns. The Versailles correspondent of the *Daily News* says that, having advanced rapidly to a certain distance down the slopes, they brought their field-batteries into action with great effect, deployed their left in front of Garches (a village lying to the west of St. Cloud), and pushed down their right towards Bougival. The Prussians at first had only three or four battalions engaged; but they were afterwards reinforced. Whether the French really tried hard to enter Garches, is considered doubtful by the authority we are now following. It is true that their fire was so heavy and well-sustained that the Prussian officers in the position just beyond La Celle St. Cloud suffered severely. But at this point the French advanced but little, and suffered themselves to be checked by the musketry of their adversaries. They withdrew in good order, however, except on their extreme right, at Bougival, where they were staggered by the sudden and unexpected appearance of the Landwehr. A lamentable affair took place at this village. While the Prussian vanguard were falling back on their base of operations, before taking the offensive, several of the inhabitants of Bougival, assuming that the German army was in full retreat, loaded some air-guns, and fired on the 46th Prussian Regiment. The troops rushed upon the houses whence the shots proceeded, and seized twenty-nine persons (civilians), who were next day taken before a council of war. Two were condemned to death, and executed on the 24th; and the *Nouvelliste de Versailles*—a small daily paper published under German direction — announced that the commune would be compelled to pay an extra contribution of 50,000 francs, and that the houses from which the guns were fired would be burnt to the ground.

Several of the men belonging to the Landwehr were wounded in the sortie; but they performed their work well. They took a good many prisoners; and when the *Daily News* correspondent met a detachment of them escorting a number of French soldiers to Versailles, the officer in command was careful to explain that they really *took* these captives—that they were not merely guarding them. The Prussian militiamen were all of mature years, yet in the fullest vigour of life. Big, solid, and broad-backed, they seemed capable of doing any amount of work, and enduring any degree of fatigue; and, having gone through the same drill as the regular troops, and that for a number of years, they were in most respects equal to the professional soldiers. The Landwehr regiments engaged in the affair of the 21st had but recently arrived from Strasburg. They presented a marked contrast, in their strength and massiveness, to some of the French volunteers, who were often mere boys, slightly built, deficient in weight and muscular power, and easily knocked up by a long march. The French, however, drew a favourable augury from the employment of the German militia; for they said it argued the exhaustion of the regular army. It did in truth show that Germany was drawing on all her resources; but the Landwehr had been expressly formed in order that the country should be capable, whenever it was thought necessary, of bringing the whole force of its manhood into the field; and it was because Germany was able to do this with the efficiency of long training, while France could only accomplish it by a hurried extemporising, that the former was victorious, and the latter defeated.

When the German troops were departing for the scene of action, the looks of the people of Versailles plainly betokened their hearty desire that they might be defeated; and they waited in large numbers in the streets, expecting to see the beaten invaders in full flight. The force brought on to the field by the Germans is said by Dr. Russell to have been not more than nine battalions of Prussian infantry, including two battalions of the Landwehr of the Guard. They belonged to the 9th Division (Sandiart's) and to the 10th Division (Schmidt's). The French strength was variously estimated at fifteen and eighteen battalions. Dr. Russell thinks there were not as many as fifteen actually engaged, but that more than eighteen were brought out, if the reserves, which never advanced at all, be counted. As soon as the alarm was sounded in Versailles, the King of Prussia drove off towards St. Germains with his Staff, and, together with the Crown Prince and some of the superior officers, watched the engagement from the aqueduct of Marly. The French prisoners taken by the Germans gave a bad account of the condition of the garrison of Paris. Some of these men said that the attack was intended to make the Prussians give proof of whether or not their guns were ready; while others affirmed that the object of the sortie was to drive the enemy out of Bougival, Malmaison, and Argenteuil. On the Prussian side, about 380 were killed and wounded, including six or seven officers. The French loss was stated at double that amount, and the besieged left in the hands of their opponents a couple of guns and nearly 200 prisoners, the latter including Zouaves, Gardes de Paris, Gardes Mobiles, Eclaireurs, and marching regiments of several distinct uniforms. A few were suffering from bayonet-wounds, for there had been some hand-to-hand encounters in front of the windmill. The hospitals of Versailles were very full, and many of the French wounded were lodged and well cared for in the houses of the inhabitants. The people generally showed great commiseration for the sufferers, whether French or Prussian, and the Sisters of Charity were busy with their benign work. The palace was used as a hospital; the wounded, on this as on other occasions, lying in the Gallery of Battles, beneath pictures representing the great victories of the French army—a striking and painful contrast. But the palace was not found to be well adapted for this purpose; indeed, the sanitary arrangements of the Prussian medical service were regarded by our own physicians as far from satisfactory.



PRUSSIANS IN OCCUPATION OF A VILLA NEAR PARIS.

As Dr. Russell was lying in bed after the action of the 21st, he was waited on by an officer of the Landwehr, who warned him that he must not approach the window with a light, for that, if he did, it would most probably be inferred by the sentry below that he was making signals to the French forts, to draw their fire on the Prussian positions. He might keep his candle alight in the room, and read as he lay in bed; but he was not to show a light at the window, on pain of being shot by the sentry. Herr Wickede, about the same time, recorded that, in order not to encourage the French practice of firing at night at lighted windows, all rooms whose windows could be seen from the forts were either not to be occupied, or were to be provided with thick curtains for muffling the glass. This gentleman was one evening on a visit to an officer in a country house near Sèvres exposed to the fire of Fort Issy, when, as they were drinking a bowl of punch in the drawing-room by moonlight, half a dozen grenades from the fort were aimed at the house, and two struck it above the windows. It was supposed that the moon had suddenly illuminated the glass, and so had attracted



ARRIVAL IN PARIS OF PRUSSIAN PRISONERS AFTER THE BATTLE BEFORE BAGNEUX.

the attention of the French gunners. The occupants of the house lost no time in covering the windows; upon which the fire ceased. These things, according to the same authority, were of daily occurrence along the whole line; and there were posts where the men lived under an almost constant cannonade. As, however, the balls seldom hit, the soldiers pursued their ordinary avocations without much minding the interruption. Such exposed posts were relieved every four or five days, and the men were permitted to recruit themselves at Versailles or other positions in the rear. Little incidents such as these present in a very vivid light the constant destructiveness of war, as well as those minor and incidental perils which perpetually threaten the soldier, and even the civilian correspondents of the press.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Anarchical Condition of France—Prevalence of Various Factions in Different Localities—The Prussians and the Legal Functionaries of Laon—Despotism of the Republican Prefects—The *Provincial Correspondenz* on French Dissensions—Hatred of Paris in some of the Departments—Appeal of the *Siècle* to M. Gambetta—*La France* on French Degeneracy—Feeling of Englishmen on the Subject—Mr. Carlyle on Germany and France—Observations on his Criticisms—Mr. Goldwin Smith on the German Question—The Prussian System of Requisitions—French Prisoners in Germany, and their Mode of Life—Vaunting Tone of some of the Paris Papers—Hopes of Foreign Assistance—M. de Kératry and the Spanish Government—Appointment of M. de Kératry to the Command of the Army of Brittany—General Bourbaki and the Army of the North—Garibaldi and the Army of the Vosges—Proclamation of Garibaldi—The Town of Dôle—Garibaldi's Instructions to his Militia—Unpopularity of the Garibaldians—The Guerillas threatened by the German Advance—Actions on October 27th—Resignation of General Cambriels—Dijon taken by the Germans—Alleged Jealousy of Garibaldi on the part of the French Commanders—Failure of Information—Gravity of Garibaldi's Position.

Disorganisation and anarchy continued to be the ruling influences in France. Not only in Paris and the large provincial cities were these symptoms painfully visible; they were manifest also in the smaller towns and in the country districts. Bourbonism and Orleanism had their avowed adherents; the Red Republic prevailed in one place, the Moderate in another; and the Buonapartists could still count their followers, and perhaps, if the question had been put to the vote, would have obtained a large majority. In Toulon and Rochefort troops were raised and armed in the name of the Emperor; and in the latter of those towns soldiers were punished for removing the insignia of the Empire from their uniforms, while in Marseilles officers were arrested for continuing to wear the cipher of Napoleon III.* The Prussians, as far as they interfered at all, favoured the Empire. This was curiously shown at Laon. On the 9th of October, the President of the Tribunal and the Procureur of the Republic in the town were called together by Baron von Lansberg, who had been appointed by the Prussian authorities to govern the department of the Aisne, and a conference was forthwith held as to the administration of justice. The Baron inquired of the legal functionaries whether the Tribunal would agree to administer justice in the name of the Emperor. The President replied that, as the Tribunal had administered justice in the name of the French people ever since the 7th of September, according to a law instituted by the new Government of France the previous day, it could not and ought not to comply with the request of Baron von Lansberg. The latter contended that in a district occupied by the Prussian authorities justice could not be administered in the name of the French Republic, as the new form of government in France had not been recognised by the King of Prussia. "Could not," asked Baron von Lansberg, "another formula be admitted, and justice be administered in the name of the law?" The President and Procureur both answered that the magistrates at Laon had no power to substitute any formula for that which had been prescribed throughout the country, and they must therefore follow the laws without attempting to introduce into them any modifications of their own. The Baron then said that he would consult his Government, which he immediately did; and, the arrest of two beggars the next day rendering a second interview with the French officials necessary, the President of the Tribunal inquired if he had received any answer. The Baron replied that he had not, but that a letter from the Civil Commissary at Rheims had crossed with his report, which informed him that the Prussian authorities had heard that justice at Laon was administered in the name of the Republic, but that, as the Republic had not been recognised by the Prussian Government, this state of things could not be suffered to continue. The Tribunal at Laon thereupon determined to suspend its functions provisionally, whatever might be the consequences as to the judicial administration of the civil and criminal laws. Had the same question arisen at Toulon or Rochefort, the result might have been different.

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* The *Wanderer*, of Vienna.

We have already seen how earnestly Lyons and Marseilles endeavoured to create independent governments of their own, in order to carry out the most extreme political views. It was said by the agitators of Lyons that Paris might, if she pleased, set up a Republic of the North, but that Lyons would form a Republic of the South; that Paris had not proclaimed the Republic until after Lyons, and that therefore it was Paris that had separated herself from Lyons, not Lyons that had forsaken Paris. The dictation of the capital in revolutionary seasons, by virtue of which a few adventurous spirits, seizing on power by a street riot, are enabled to change the whole course of government throughout the country, is unquestionably a great evil; but the creation of divisions in the face of the enemy, when nothing was more essential than unity of purpose and mutual reliance, was surely a greater. Yet these divisions were continual. The Paris journal, *La France*, said of the fomenters of disorder :—"While none more than they have abused the expressions 'the country' and 'the public good,' these incorrigible disciples of political selfishness see in the national peril but an opportunity for establishing their supremacy, and of satiating at length the thirst for despotic rule which they have so long dissembled under the false title of love of liberty. They have struggled against personal power, but they seize it for themselves. They have condemned monarchy under all its forms, but they claim for their authority a veritable Divine right." Many of the Prefects refused to obey the authority of the Paris Government. M. Esquiros reigned supreme at Marseilles, and drove away those sent to control or replace him. The Prefect of Lyons daily signed decrees abolishing laws and imposing new taxes in the interest of the Socialist party. All religious observances were suppressed, and priests were frequently arrested. The Prefect of the Saône and Loire (according to the *Gazette de France*) ordered all the functionaries of his department to subscribe to the departmental loan, and threatened to fine the *Journal de Macon* 20,000f., or to suppress it, if it continued to criticise his proceedings. The Prefect of Agen recalled all the rural guards in Lot-et-Garonne; and in a commune in the Landes a Prefect chose a Mayor from outside the council, and, upon the council protesting, at once dissolved it. The arrogance and despotism of the Prefects were such that, in several instances, when old members were returned to the Municipal Councils, the elections were annulled, and other men were appointed in their places, without election. Even M. Gambetta, the most extreme member of the Provisional Government, condemned these excesses; but he could do little to prevent them. Well might the Berlin *Provincial Correspondenz* remark :—

"A fortnight ago the French Government falsely attributed to Count Bismarck the saying that he would reduce France to the rank of a second-rate Power. The statement, designedly invented to irritate the French against us, was of course a mere fiction; but what we never intended the Provisional Government is actually engaged in bringing about. If they continue carrying on the business of the State with the same criminal frivolity they have hitherto evinced, France will not only be lowered in her position, but experience a long and deep decline.

"All revolutions involve the danger of injuring the moral and material resources of the State, while apparently they change only its Government; but rarely has a nation passed through the double ordeal of revolution and war at the same time—a revolution prolonged by the want of energetic and sensible leaders, and a war which goes on because of the extreme confusion and disorganisation of the people which originally undertook it.

"Wherever we turn our eyes in France we see nothing but disorder and anarchy. The members of the Government have fallen out with each other respecting the most important questions of the day. While the Tours Government calls upon the nation to elect a Representative Assembly, the Paris rulers disapprove the plan, annul the decree, and even depute one of themselves to step into a balloon and try to reach a part of France where he can assert their decision. Over and above these two central Governments, at issue with each other, special Governments have been formed at Lyons, Marseilles, &c.—some of Republican tendencies, others Monarchical in their leanings. In every department—nay, in every large town—a set of local functionaries has gained the upperhand, and, according to its particular bias, directs the public affairs. As to the orders from Paris and Tours, they are respected only so far as it suits the views of the local demagogues.

"The same confusion prevails in military matters. Apparently, indeed, all are agreed that the enemy must be driven out of the country; but there is such diversity of opinion as to the means to be adopted for this end, that no general can be found willing to bear the responsibility, and an old lawyer, M. Crémieux, has actually been entrusted with the conduct of the war. [This was only provisional.] Acting with him, or under him, a council of war, consisting of seven members, has been recently instituted. At the same time the individual departments are engaged in organising individual armies, each according to its own pattern ; and there is no combined action between the regular and various irregular troops on the one hand, and the military leaders and revolutionary authorities on the other. As to discipline, it is sadly loosened, even among the regulars. The irregulars, mostly young men recently called to arms, have never known what military order or obedience is."

Another German paper—the *Cologne Gazette*—contained a letter from Corbeil, which said that those who had suffered heavily through the requisitions of the German troops manifested a single feeling—hatred of Paris and the Parisians. In the districts occupied by the invaders, a very general wish for peace prevailed, and the Republic was looked on with distrust. An intelligent Frenchman remarked to this correspondent, "Believe me, the Republic can only serve as a transitional stage. We have Republican ideas and words indeed, but we have nothing, alas! but Monarchical manners and traditions." The pacific feeling of some of the country districts alarmed the Paris paper, the *Siècle*, and induced it to address to M. Gambetta an appeal containing the following passages :—

"'There is not a minute to lose.' These were your first words on arriving at Tours, and you spoke truly. We must act, and act quickly. You have, we are told, the most extensive powers. Do not fear to use them. Take severe measures. Some rural populations have forgotten they are French. Act rigorously. Let them understand that it is their interest to do their duty. The decree which has established martial law in the army has produced an excellent effect ; complete the decree, and establish martial law throughout the country. You have just seized and imprisoned the Municipal Council of Dreux, which made overtures to the Prussians. That measure is excellent. Bring these unworthy persons before a Council of War, and let them be punished. Decree that every soldier who flies from or deserts his post shall be shot; that every general who runs from the enemy or allows himself to be beaten by inferior forces shall be regarded as a traitor to the country, and put to the sword ; that every Mayor who has made advances or entertained the enemy shall be put to the sword ; that every peasant who has refused provisions to the French, or pointed out to the Prussians the retreats of our soldiers, shall be put to the sword ; that every Prefect who has not roused the population to heroism and preached resistance shall be discharged ; that any one who has paralysed the national defence shall be declared a traitor ; that any one who refuses his aid to the measures taken for that defence shall be declared a traitor ; that any one who, criticising these measures, shall spread discouragement, shall be declared a traitor ; that he who by party spirit seeks to cause divisions among the people shall be declared a traitor. Such are the measures which must be taken. Hasten to execute the work. There is not one moment to be lost."

The *France* was equally emphatic in another spirit. It gave up all for lost, and uttered a cry of despair over French degeneracy. "We are no longer Frenchmen," it exclaimed ; "for our soldiers accustom themselves to being made prisoners, our armies capitulate, our generals have forgotten how to conquer. We are no longer Frenchmen ; for at Paris a regiment flies from the enemy without firing a shot ; at Orleans, our soldiers, who were considered the best in the world, run away ; only the Mobiles and the Volunteers of the West show a good attitude, and set an example which is not followed. We are no longer Frenchmen ; for our officers do not study war, and consequently understand nothing of it. The great art of war, which our fathers had brought to such perfection, they have forgotten. Our military prestige is lost. We are now only a people of chatterers, sybarites, and orators, who, making demonstrations in the theatre and in the public squares, resolve on changes in the form of government, eagerly finding fault with one another, and dividing us when the enemy puts the sword to our throats." The writer added that "the modern Macedonians"—meaning, of course, the Germans—would treat the French as Philip and Alexander treated the Greeks, as Alaric treated the Romans, and as the Turks treated Constantinople. "They will not only," said this patriotic Frenchman, in the bitterness of his heart, "accomplish the unification of Germany; they will bring Europe under their yoke, without us, in spite of us, and against us." What must have made this state of things inexpressibly painful to all thinking Frenchmen was the glaring fact that for their ruin they had mainly to thank themselves. By self-indulgence and self-laudation—by love of glory abroad, and factious distrust at home—by theatrical attitudinising and sentimental clap-trap—by continual substitution of oratory and epigram for those solid bases of sense and knowledge on which alone the permanent greatness of a nation can be reared—they had brought themselves to a pass of wretchedness and ignominy, such as filled many with despair.

This result was not one which Englishmen for the most part regarded with satisfaction. The old feeling of jealous hatred towards France—the reverend tradition that she was the natural enemy of England, and that it was a good thing for us when she was humbled—had died out, or was confined to the survivors of a generation which had suffered from the wars of the First Napoleon. Amongst younger men a generous emotion of friendship to France had taken the place of the former sentiment. An intercourse, both of business and of pleasure, spreading over many years, and strengthened by the common dangers, trials, and triumphs of the Crimean war, had begotten something like affection towards a country once our deadly foe. We thought her wrong in commencing the war with Prussia, but we sincerely commiserated her misfortunes. Mr. Carlyle, however, had no sympathies but for Germany. True to his old convictions that perfection in this world is only possible within the limits of the Fatherland, he loudly proclaimed the exceeding excellence of the Teutonic stock, and the worthlessness of the French. Writing to a German friend, in the month of October, he said:—

> "Your anxieties about the war must have been of short duration; in fact, they must, after the first few days' practical experience, have been changed into bright hope, into a hope increasing in rapid geometrical progression till it obtained its present dimensions. So far as my reading goes, there never was such a war; never such a collapse of shameless human vanity, of menacing, long-continued arrogance, into contemptible nothingness. Blow has followed blow as if from the hammer of Thor, till it lies like a shapeless heap of ruins, whining to itself, 'In the name of all the gods and all the devils, what is to become of us?' . . . All Germany may now look forward to happier days, in a political sense, than it has seen since the Emperor Barbarossa left it. My individual satisfaction in all this is great, and all England—I can say all the intelligent in England—heartily wish good fortune to brave old Germany in what it has accomplished; a real transformation into one nation, no longer the chaotic jumble which invited the intrusion of every ill-disposed neighbour, especially of that ill-disposed France which has inflicted on it such interminable mischief during the last 400 years—wars heaped upon wars without real cause, except insatiable French ambition. All that, through God's grace, is now at an end. I have, in my time, seen nothing in Europe which has so much delighted me. 'A brave people,' as your Goethe calls them, and, as I believe, a peaceful and a virtuous one. I only hope that heaven will send them the wisdom, patience, and pious discretion to turn to a right use all that has been achieved."

A much longer and more elaborate manifesto from Mr. Carlyle on the same subject was published in the *Times* of November 18th, which, coming at a moment when the French were making a really gallant struggle against pitiless invasion, was almost savage in its spirit and accents. Undoubtedly there was a great deal of truth in the letter; but there was also a great deal which was the very reverse of true, together with a fatal facility in that half-witty, half-fatuous gibberish which, as in so many of Mr. Carlyle's writings, bears a terrible similarity to the "shams" he denounces. "Bismarck, as I read him," wrote the eulogiser of that honest and estimable hero, Frederick the Great, "is not a person of 'Napoleonic' ideas, but of ideas quite superior to Napoleonic; shows no invincible 'lust of territory,' nor is tormented with 'vulgar ambition,' &c.; but has aims very far beyond that sphere; and in fact seems to me to be striving with strong faculty, by patient, grand, and successful steps, towards an object beneficial to Germans and to all other men. That noble, patient, deep, pious, and solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation, and become Queen of the Continent, instead of vapouring, vainglorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and over-sensitive France, seems to me the hopefullest public fact that has occurred in my time." In his coarsest and most dogmatic language, Mr. Carlyle denounced the "cheap pity and newspaper lamentation over fallen and afflicted France," which was rather common about that time. "It seems to me," he observed, "very idle, dangerous, and misguided feeling, as applied to the cession of Alsace and Lorraine by France to her German conquerors, and argues, on the part of England, a most profound ignorance as to the mutual history of France and Germany, and the conduct of France towards that country, for long centuries back. The question for the Germans, in this crisis, is not one of 'magnanimity,' of 'heroic pity and forgiveness to a fallen foe,' but of solid prudence and practical consideration what the fallen foe will, in all likelihood, do when once on his feet again. Written on her memory, in a dismally instructive manner, Germany has an experience of four hundred years on this point; of which on the English memory, if it ever was recorded there, there is now little or no trace visible." It may readily be admitted that the question was not one of "magnanimity," or of "heroic pity and forgiveness to a fallen foe;" it was simply one of plain human right and justice—matters which Mr. Carlyle never held in any great estimation, unless they tended to the profit of the chosen race. Alsace, though originally German, had been French for about two centuries; the people, with but few exceptions, were profoundly attached to the country of which they and their ancestors for generations had formed part; and it was the mere wantonness of power to say that they should be transferred against their will to a nationality with which, in spite of blood-relationship, they had evidently lost all sympathy. As for Lorraine, it was never a portion of Germany proper, but only for



PRUSSIAN FIELD-POST IN THE SNOW.



GENERAL VON BUDRETZKY LEADING THE ATTACK ON LE BOURGET.

a time a fief of the Imperial Crown, with a mixed population, partly Teutonic, partly French. For Prussia to denounce aggressiveness, yet seize on Alsace and portions of Lorraine in defiance of the known wishes of the people—to assert the principle of race to her own advantage in one direction, while equally to her own advantage trampling on it in the cases of Poland and Northern Schleswig—was a piece of political morality such as Mr. Carlyle would have visited with his hottest indignation had the offender been French, but which he was ready enough to admire, the offender being German. In what way the prospect of such a Power becoming "Queen of the Continent" offers any better guarantees for peace than the supremacy of France, mischievous as that supremacy often was, has yet to be shown, and certainly receives no light, or only baleful light, from the events of the last few years. What Europe wants is, not the arrogant dictation of any great military Power whatever, but a state of assured peace and industrial progress, founded on sincere respect for the rights of peoples.

The moral aspects of the war were also discussed by Prof. Goldwin Smith, who, on October 6th, addressed a letter on the subject, from New York, to a member of the Labour Representation League, a political body meeting in London. Mr. Goldwin Smith observed that his "exultation" at the proclamation of the Republic in France was "tempered only by the mournful conviction that in no country of Europe is the really Republican element weaker, or perhaps so weak;" a conviction which, one would have supposed, would not merely have "tempered" the feeling of exultation, but have altogether precluded it. He had long looked with far more hope to the German movement, as being deeper and stronger, having its source in profounder thoughts on all the great questions of the day, and being sustained by a sounder personal and domestic morality. The movement was, indeed, not irreligious; but to Mr. Goldwin Smith that was no reproach, as, in his opinion, religion is "the deepest thing in humanity"—a thing for the want of which the first French Revolution failed. With lack of freedom in inquiry of any kind, Germany, he very truly remarked, could hardly be taunted. "War, even a war of self-defence," continued the writer, "is always apt to leave injurious traces on political character; yet there seems no reason for expecting a permanent reaction in Germany, or for apprehending that King William, however loudly he may be cheered on the field of victory, will be able to make the lava torrent flow into the ancient mould of Divine Right. Germany is now securing her unity and her independence; political progress will soon follow." Mr. Smith greatly regretted that England had not been strong enough to put her veto on so iniquitous and horrible a war. The French attack on Germany was "an outrage such as every moral being is bound to denounce, and, if it is in his power, to repress." Some day we too should need the protection of public right, and then the nations would pass by on the other side. "Having left Germany unaided to fight for her life, we cannot now," argued Mr. Goldwin Smith, "presume to protest against her taking advantage of the fortune of war to secure herself effectually against such attempts for the future. If she thinks fit, in the words of a manifesto which I have just read, 'to make the fortresses which have hitherto menaced her the guards of her frontiers,' she will be doing no more than is sanctioned by common justice. No one can doubt that if the French had been victorious they would, besides breaking up German unity, have seized the Rhine provinces; no one can doubt that if the tide of victory should turn in their favour, they would seize the Rhine provinces now. There is a higher morality than this, no doubt; but it has never yet controlled the international conduct of the French people." The moral of the war, in the opinion of this eminent authority, was that, inasmuch as it had originated out of dynastic necessities, it should teach all true Liberals in Europe to labour more steadily, and combine more closely, for the gradual abolition of dynastic and aristocratic institutions, and the tranquil inauguration of Governments in unison with popular interests.

These, however, are considerations which have but little influence in the active prosecution of any war, whatever nation may be the war-making party. The Germans, having been challenged to the duel by the French, used every weapon which they could find or make for the purpose. Their requisitions became every week more and more severe; and a report from Major Schmettow, writing from Chavenay, near St. Cyr, gave a lively idea of the way in which this system of obtaining supplies was managed. He said he first summoned the Mayor and Municipality of any town which he visited, and informed them in writing what they were expected to furnish. As the major had with him an excellent book relating to all the communes in the department he was visiting, he was enabled to make—much to the astonishment of the authorities—the most accurate statements as to herds of cattle, population, &c., and to address the head officials by their name. This, by the way, is one proof of the extraordinary system of espionage by which the Prussians had contrived to know more about French affairs than the French themselves.

One Mayor, relates Major Schmettow, had to deliver sixty sacks of oats. He swore that it was impossible. Without making him any answer, the German officer required in addition two bullocks and four sheep, though he really did not intend to take them. An hour afterwards he received the oats, with the warmest thanks of the authorities for waiving the bullocks and sheep. Cattle, however, were taken in some instances.

The enormous number of prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the Germans gave their captors some trouble. Even before the fall of Metz, the French unwounded prisoners in Germany amounted to 131,577 men, including officers; and, in addition to these, a large number of wounded prisoners, variously estimated between 20,000 and 50,000, were either in German hospitals, or on French territory occupied by German troops. The soldiers belonging to Alsace and Lorraine were separated from the rest, formed into companies, employed in agricultural operations, and treated with all possible consideration; the design, of course, being to create in those provinces a favourable feeling towards Germany. The others were governed with greater rigour, and some showed a disposition to revolt against their conquerors. Five hundred Turcos and Zouaves were removed in October from Wahn Heath, near Cologne, to the citadel at Wesel, on account of insubordination. A search for weapons was made, and resulted in the discovery of sixty-four revolvers and a thousand daggers. Cologne itself, on the 16th of October, was in a state of great excitement, owing to rumours that a mutiny had broken out in the camp of the French prisoners at the Carthaus. The prompt assembly of some squadrons of Hussars garrisoned at Cologne increased the anxiety; and numerous civilians rushed tumultuously to the Carthaus, where the sentries had much trouble in keeping them back. It ultimately turned out, however, that there had been no attempt to escape on the part of the prisoners, but only a rather riotous manifestation on the arrival of some fresh captives who had been wounded at Sedan and elsewhere. Among these prisoners were a few civilians, including a priest, several boys and old men, and a woman who was accused of firing on the Germans at Neu Breisach, and who, together with a number of other women, attacked the besiegers in the rear while the garrison were making a sortie in front. At Ingolstadt, twenty officers who were liberated at Sedan on parole voluntarily gave themselves up to captivity, in order to avoid importunities to break their engagement and re-enter the army. The lives of the prisoners were melancholy and monotonous. Some were occasionally employed in industrial operations; but for the most part they idled away their existence, dreaming of past glories, or anxiously looking forward to the time when they would be restored to liberty and to France. They might be seen in the streets of Ulm, lounging about with a dejected air, staring in at the shop-windows, and especially envying the stores of tobacco, which they had no money to purchase. The writer of a letter from Stuttgardt gave a vivid picture of these fallen warriors in the days of their tribulation. He said:—"They move along the street like shadows, Zouaves, Line, and Turcos, attired in the garments they have been able to pick up on the field of battle; the capote of one regiment and the képi of another. Frequently the capote or the pantaloons have been pierced by a hostile ball, and they carefully preserve this souvenir; for the rest they are always very clean, and bathe every day. But what more impressed me was the sight of a chosen corps of tall and fine gendarmes, who walk the streets in uniform, always two by two, as in France, and who seem to be accustomed to preserve order. They have somewhat of a serious aspect, and are much more admired than the Turcos. They are almost all married men, and are without news of their wives and families. Not one of them had fired a shot. Nearly all to whom I have spoken had been merely posted over the Emperor's baggage. At present a great number of them amuse themselves with line-fishing. They ask earnestly for news, and the *Journal de Genève* is a great boon to them. The soldiers may write and receive letters, in all cases open. The prisoners are under precisely the same regulations as the soldiers who guard them, except their pay. If they wish to earn anything they must work. The day's work is six kreutzers. They must work from eight o'clock till one in certain forts, or from eight to eleven and from two to four in others. They do not complain. Those who are ill are naturally better treated." Obedience and military honours were required from the prisoners, and any insubordination or want of respect, even among themselves, was punished by arrest. A soldier was shot at Ingolstadt for striking a Bavarian lieutenant; and, although it was pleaded that he was drunk at the time the offence was committed, the sentence was rigorously carried out. It was then decreed, with a view to checking intoxication, that no private soldier should be permitted to enter a tavern, even when accompanied.

Notwithstanding all these depressing circumstances, some of the Paris papers maintained a very confident and truculent tone. Writing on the 17th of October, the *Liberté* said that in three weeks from that date no bomb would have reached the heart of Paris; that Bazaine would be free, and Garibaldi master of the Vosges; and that the Prussian armies would be crushed under the forts, decimated by hunger and disease, or scattered and annihilated in the provinces. Paris had issued from behind her shield of stone (this was in allusion to the occasional sorties), and had burst into fragments the girdle of steel which bound her. The Prussians were retreating on all sides; the lion was scattering the herd of buffaloes. All that remained to be done was to close the frontiers, so that they might never depart. This sort of impassioned nonsense was eagerly received by many, who seem to have thought that the Prussians would be frightened away by the blowing of such noisy trumpets. In a despatch addressed by M. Gambetta to M. Jules Favre, on the 18th of October, the former said that affairs seemed to take a favourable turn; that General Cambriels was holding his ground, and that Besançon was well prepared for defence. "We are convinced," added the War Minister, "that this unexpected prolongation of our resistance, and the military preparations made from day to day in the departments, disconcert the invaders, and begin to exasperate them. The sympathy of Europe increases, and the reports of mediation through England or Russia are circulated with increasing intensity. We must make an obstinate war against Prussia, and we shall force her to recognise that in continuing it herself she does not increase her chances of success, but, on the contrary, compromises them." The pertinacity with which the great majority of Frenchmen closed their eyes to facts, and deceived themselves by vain imaginings, was a lamentable feature of the time. It was considered the greatest of crimes not to fall in with the prevalent mood of glorification and ethereal castle-building. A man was mobbed at Tours for repeating a piece of bad news he had read in a paper; and to doubt of ultimate success exposed the sceptic to no small danger of his life.

Hopes of foreign assistance continued to be entertained. In the course of October M. de Kératry, the Prefect of Police appointed by the Revolution, left Paris by balloon, with the intention of sounding the Government of Madrid, then under the direction of Marshal Prim, as to how far Spain would go in behalf of France. In passing through Bordeaux he delivered—or was at least reported to have delivered—a speech containing the most brilliant statements as to the military condition of the country, asserting that no peace was possible until the last Prussian had been driven out, and promising speedy assistance from Madrid. He arrived at the Spanish capital on the 19th; but, being by that time persuaded of the inutility of soliciting military aid, he simply asked for the legalisation of the export of arms and horses. This, however, was of course declined, as a manifest violation of neutrality; and M. de Kératry at once returned to France. He was now charged with another mission, which was, to organise the new Army of Brittany, to the command of which he was appointed. Being himself a Breton, of aristocratic family, it was probably thought that he would meet with a good reception from the very conservative inhabitants of the western departments; and such appears to have been the case. He at once issued the following proclamation:—

"Gardes Mobiles, National Guards, and Free Corps of Brittany,—The Government, by decree of the 22nd of October, did me the honour of placing me at your head. I devote myself entirely to your service. Ten days hence you will be concentrated at the gates of Brittany to encounter the enemy. You will receive what is necessary for soldiers. Guns which can be fired rapidly, cannons of long range, and improved mitrailleuses, will be confided to your courage. Those of our relatives who defend the ramparts of Paris have already proved that the blood of Brittany has not degenerated. It is for us to march in their footsteps. You recollect that strict discipline is the most powerful means of securing victory. I am resolved to enforce it in all its rigour. The timid may remain behind; but the true Bretons will march to the front, and prove to a barbarous people that they rise as free men. Let our rallying cry be, 'God and country!'—Signed, Comte DE KÉRATRY, General of Division, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Brittany."

About the middle of the month General Bourbaki—who, as already related, did not re-enter the fortress of Metz after the failure of the mysterious mission to Chislehurst in which he was engaged—received the command of the Army of the North, which had its head-quarters at Lille. Though a Frenchman by birth, Bourbaki came of a Greek family. He was in command of the Imperial Guard—a force of 32,000 men—when he joined Bazaine at Metz after the defeats of Weissenburg and Wörth. Though without any great reputation as a strategist, he bore a high name as a dashing and brilliant cavalry officer; and his valour at the battle of Gravelotte, when he met the charge of the Brandenburg horse, excited universal admiration. People, however, said of him that he was a mere creature of the Emperor Napoleon, to whom he owed his exalted position; yet he offered his services to the Republic, and fought the battles of his country with fidelity and courage during the terrible winter months. In the first week or two of his command he went about from place to place, forming a Staff, bringing the rudiments of his army together, and surveying the towns included in the district over which he was placed. On the 30th he was at Amiens, conferring with the citizens who had taken the defence of that town in hand; and on the previous day he had issued from Lille a proclamation to the citizens, soldiers, National Guards, and Mobile Guards, in which he said that all his endeavours tended to the creation, as speedily as possible, of an active army corps, which, being duly provided with war material, could take the field, and proceed to the assistance of the fortresses. "As for me," he continued, "who have loyally offered my sword to the Government of the National Defence, my endeavours and my life belong to the common work which it prosecutes together with yourselves, and in the moment of danger you will see me at the head of the troops who will soon be organised. To fulfil this difficult task, and to make our implacable enemy pay dearly for each step on our territory, concord and confidence must reign amongst us, and our hearts must be animated with only one wish—to save and avenge our unhappy France. You may rely upon the most energetic co-operation and the most absolute devotedness on my part, just as I rely upon your courage and patriotism." The services of General Bourbaki were well worth having at that crisis in the military disasters of France; but the Government very nearly lost them by its vehemence and partisanship. Shortly after Bourbaki had accepted the command, M. Gambetta issued his proclamation denouncing Bazaine as a traitor, and casting obloquy on the Empire and its agents. The late leader of the Imperial Guard accordingly resigned his new position at the head of the Army of the North, which he appears to have considered he could not honourably retain after these strictures on his former sovereign and recent comrades. He was persuaded, however, to withdraw his resignation, and this was certainly the most patriotic course he could pursue. It was at first said that he was to operate in concert with Marshal Bazaine; but any such operation soon became an impossibility.

The appointment of General Bourbaki was one of the steps by which Ministers sought to stimulate the lagging energies of the war, and to form and discipline the scattered forces of France. Another was the temporary departure of M. Gambetta from Tours, on a mission to the Army of the Vosges (otherwise called the Army of Lyons), which, as previously set forth, had not been at all fortunate in its encounters with the enemy. While away he visited the principal positions where resistance could best be made; but it does not seem that his presence had much effect in improving the situation. He left Tours on the 17th of October, putting the War portfolio temporarily in the hands of M. Crémieux; and in a few days he was back at his post. The state of affairs in the east was getting serious, and it became still worse a little later. After the defeat of General Cambriels on the river Ognon, described in Chapter XXV., the position of Garibaldi was greatly imperilled. On the 23rd of October he was at Dôle, a few miles south-east of Dijon, and between that town and Besançon, lying further to the east. He was at the head of 8,000 troops, consisting partly of foreigners and partly of French Mobiles—a motley and by no means well-disciplined force. Garibaldi was accompanied by his sons, Ricciotti and Menotti; and the former—as brave a man as his father—did not scruple to give it as his opinion that, if the Prussians should attack them, they would all be killed. It would be almost impossible, according to the *Daily News* correspondent accompanying Garibaldi's force, to conceive any army worse dressed, armed, and organised. Nearly the whole of their guns were flint-lock muskets dating from 1813, but altered so as to work on the percussion-cap system. Some of the Italians loudly objected to fighting with such weapons, and alleged that the caps were too small for the nipples. The members of the Staff, with the exception of Colonel Bordone, the head of the Etat-Major, were mounted on light cart-horses, many of which had never been ridden before, and were therefore inclined to kick, rear, plunge, and gyrate whenever they were bestridden. The force was but poorly provided with artillery, and the money at its command was hardly sufficient for the barest needs. In transmitting a sum of £2,000, the Tours Government begged Garibaldi to be as economical with it as possible, as they had no more to send. Yet the old chieftain, though at times looking grave and anxious, kept up a good heart. He would not allow that the prospects of the French were as bad as they appeared to many; asserted that the Prussians had been allowed to advance too far into that part of the country—which was certainly indisputable; and promised that they should be made to recoil—which was less obvious. There was no more admirable quality in Garibaldi than his splendid self-reliance. Prematurely old with labour and suffering; lame with his wounded foot, so that he could not mount a horse, but was obliged to ride in a carriage; his fingers cramped and drawn back with rheumatism, and his whole figure bent with growing infirmities—he was yet the prince of guerilla leaders, as in the days of Sicily and Naples, and, whether in victory or defeat, his legions grew firmer and stronger at the sight of his calm leonine face.

It cannot be said that Garibaldi was equally successful in the composition of addresses. The one which he issued to "the Militia of the Army of the Vosges" was an unfortunate specimen of the kind of stilted stuff which the general was apt to put forth when he took pen in hand. Too much of the French habit of posturing and soliloquising to the whole universe, instead of quietly setting about the special matter in hand—a habit not merely French, but also belonging to a certain order of Republicanism, and one of the reasons why Republicanism in Europe is so unreal and so little progressive—clung to Garibaldi, and identified him with absurdities to which he ought to have been superior. In the proclamation to the Vosges Militia he began by saying, "The cosmopolitan nucleus that the French Republic is rallying in her midst, composed of men chosen of the *élite* of nations, represents the humanitarian future, and upon the banner of this noble group you can read the motto of a free people, which will soon be the word of order of the human family—'All for one, one for all!'* Selfishness governs the world, and autocracy combats in the French Republic the germ of the rights of man, which it abhors. Genius of evil, it makes every effort for its preservation." He then went on to remark that modern Republics, like ancient Carthage, swim in gold and sybaritism; that Switzerland, believing herself weak, held down her head, and covered with the holy flag of William Tell her money-chests and her banks; and that the President of the United States, who could have aided the insurrection in Cuba by a single sign of his finger, permitted "an entire population belonging to the grand family of Washington to be massacred and destroyed." England, he also suggested, was indifferent to the sufferings of France. The French nation, however, had risen like one



INTRUDERS.

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* This had been adopted as the motto of the new French Republic.



GARIBALDIANS AT DIJON.

man, and would soon cause "the old autocrat," *i.e.*, the King of Prussia, "to repent of his determination to continue his butchery of men." The armies of the French Republic were "apostles of peace and of the fraternity of peoples," and they would fight with the proud consciousness of justice, and of consecrating the formula of the illustrious Chénier —"Republicans are men, and slaves are children." Unfortunately for human progress, it has happened again and again that Republicans have proved themselves to be children of a very infantine order; and, indeed, it would be difficult to produce anything more symptomatic of the political nursery than this address of Garibaldi. Its effect was to encourage that effervescence of emotion—that diffuse, lyric enthusiasm—which is so fatal to the rigidity and self-constraint of discipline. What had the Army of the Vosges, as an army, to do with considerations of Republicanism and Monarchy, humanitarianism and selfishness, or the policy of Switzerland, America, and England? Those were questions for the Government; the only question for the fighting men was how to beat the enemy by the exhibition of a technical intelligence, a discipline, and an organisation equal to his own. "Your courage I do not doubt," said Garibaldi, in conclusion; "all I ask of you is coolness and discipline—indispensable in war." But how this style of writing is likely to promote such desirable ends is not apparent to any one beyond the influence of the sacrificial vapour.

Dôle, the town at which Garibaldi was now stationed, is situated in the department of Jura, and stands on the right bank of the Doubs, a feeder of the Saône, at a distance of 221 miles south-east from Paris, on the road to Geneva. It is built on the crest and slope of a hill, with steep streets and some old buildings. The town formerly belonged to the Dukes of Burgundy, and has stood many sieges. In 1435 the inhabitants repulsed the Duke of Bourbon, who tried to take the place from Mary of Burgundy; and in 1479 it was seized by the French, who massacred the inhabitants and burnt the town. It afterwards passed into the hands of the Spaniards, together with the rest of Franche Comté; but, after several attacks and some changing of hands, it finally fell to France by the treaty of Nimeguen, in the reign of Louis XIV. General Garibaldi made a rather prolonged stay at this town, while he endeavoured to prepare his forces for active operations. The first brigade of his army was placed under the command of General Bossak, and was composed of one regiment of Mobile Guards, one battalion of Francs-tireurs, and many Englishmen and Spaniards, the latter under the direction of Señor Orense. The second battalion was commanded by Colonel Maine, and was formed almost entirely of Frenchmen; while the third battalion, commanded by Menotti Garibaldi, consisted of one regiment of French Mobile Guards, two battalions of Garibaldi's own countrymen, and one battalion of natives of Nice. Each battalion was provided with a company of engineers.

For the instruction of his guerillas, Garibaldi drew up a set of rules, showing the writer's mastery over the species of warfare in which they were about to be engaged. Every detachment, he observed, should endeavour to march at night, and to sleep during the day in some concealed and elevated position, from which the surrounding country can be viewed. If it should be necessary to move in the day-time, every means should be taken to avoid an engagement, unless with the certainty of success. "A surprise," said the general, "is generally fatal to any corps whatever, and more especially to guerillas; but it would be a disgrace to guerillas, whose peculiar mission is to surprise the enemy." The troops should, above all things, obtain the love and esteem of the inhabitants of the country they occupy, as in that case they would easily get provisions and good guides, together with information as to the enemy's positions. Guerillas should not mind fighting against double their numbers, and they should so manage that the invader should be unable to send small detachments to a distance, and, in consequence, be greatly troubled to revictual. The irregular forces should deploy as tirailleurs, and, in case of forming together, should prefer the close column to the square. The general specially warned his infantrymen against being afraid of cavalry, which he thought could always be successfully opposed by the close column, if the men were cool and determined. The serried columns *en masse* offered the most effectual means of obtaining that which all great military men had insisted on, viz., the rule that you are to reunite in the greatest possible force on the tactical or objective point of the field of battle. "Notwithstanding all the tactical modifications necessitated by the improvement of fire-arms," continued Garibaldi, "compact masses, efficiently led, are still those which have decided the great battles of modern times. In the meantime, as we have not at present those great organised masses, we must have recourse to partisan warfare, until the national army is able to assail the invader with advantage." The document concluded with the following statement of what the general required of his militia:—

"(*a*) A severe discipline, more severe than that of the troops of the Line, without which no military force can exist. Discipline consists not merely in obedience to the immediate chiefs, but also in the relations between one guerilla and another—that is to say, in the reciprocal and fraternal aid which they ought to lend. It is necessary that the younger obey the seniors and the superiors in grade. The guerillas ought also to direct each other as to dangers, and in the combined movements to avoid them, in order to co-operate for a common purpose, which is intended to cause the greatest damage to the enemy. The guerilla chiefs should make known as correctly as possible to the nearest head-quarters the movements of the enemy, the number and nature of his troops. For that purpose each guerilla should always have some horsemen to carry his information, and to act as scouts. It is necessary that the chiefs and the guerilla officers of the corps of the national army have this conviction, that, without detracting from discipline, they can and they ought to treat their soldiers with affection, and regard them as their natural children. (*b*) An unshaken constancy to endure fatigues and dangers, until the complete deliverance of the country. (*c*) An indomitable courage, and irreproachable conduct, to gain the love and esteem of their fellow-citizens. Respect for property, even in the midst of the greatest privations, is the first virtue of the militiaman. (*d*) Absolute contempt for the enemy's cavalry: it is a disgrace and treasonable to succumb to panic, and so augment the audacity of our enemies. I conclude by recalling that the defence of Monte Video, against 28,000 men, inured to war, lasted nine years. That town had then but 30,000 inhabitants, amongst whom there were either some English merchants, French, or Italian, who all took part in the defence, and who had the pleasure of seeing at last the triumph of their adopted country. But Monte Video sold its palaces, its temples, its customs rights, present and to come, unearthed the old cannon which served as boundaries in the streets, forged lances to supply the place of missing guns, while the women gave to the country their last jewel. A village of France has more resources than Monte Video had then. Can we doubt of the success of the national defence?"

The Garibaldians were not very popular with the people among whom they found themselves. They paid for what they had, and were therefore not an additional burden on the population; but the priest-ridden peasantry regarded them as heretics, infidels, and emissaries of the devil. It is to be feared that they were not sufficiently forbearing towards the religious feelings of the people, and that they made use of churches for their convenience in a way which shocked the most cherished sentiments of many; though there seems little doubt that the more extreme stories of Garibaldian outrages, appearing from time to time in the French clerical journals, were inventions, or at any rate exaggerations. That the guerillas were much disliked, however, is certain. A letter from a Garibaldian, published in a Florence paper, said that the Italian volunteers were most inhospitably treated, and were left without proper articles of clothing, or a sufficient supply of food. The Francs-tireurs, also, were very insubordinate, and criticised Garibaldi's commands in a way which showed that they had no idea of discipline. The operations of the old chieftain were unquestionably greatly hampered by the character of the force which he had to wield, and the unfriendly disposition of the people on whose behalf he had come to fight. It is said that when first he offered his services to the Provisional Government they were refused; but that when insurrectionary attempts were apprehended in Nice, and the name of the Liberator was mentioned as the probable champion of Nizzard independence, the sword of Garibaldi was accepted by the Republic, as a means of drawing him off from a design which might have ended in further trouble and humiliation for the French. It is certain that the French Government were for a time very uneasy about Nice, where a good deal of agitation was observable; and their representative at Florence was instructed to make inquiries, to which the Italian Government replied by assurances that they would deem it infamous and cowardly to profit by the disasters of France, in order to retract a concession made by them with the consent of the population at a time when France, powerful and victorious, wished to aid the independence and unification of Italy. After the first interview between Garibaldi and M. Gambetta at Tours, the former wrote to the latter, "I see that I have made a mistake. I am useless. I shall return." * However, he was persuaded to remain; but he did not enter on the business with his accustomed spirit, and three times he tendered his resignation. Besides his two sons, he had with him his son-in-law, Canzio, head of the Quartier Générale; Basso, his old friend and secretary; Luigi Castellazzi; and some other of his former comrades. It was suggested that he should send for the rest. He replied, very gravely, "That is what I cannot do. It would be too heavy a responsibility. Each must come on his own account." The correspondent who recorded this speech, added, "I confess my heart is heavy: Garibaldi seems so quietly prepared for death."

The fighting commenced on the 27th of October. For some days previously Garibaldi had been aware, from the reports of his scouts, that the Germans were advancing in two columns, with a view to surrounding the forest of Serre (where some Garibaldians were posted), and gaining the railway, so as to isolate the towns of Besançon and Belfort, turn Auxonne, and march on Dijon. Unfortunately for the Italian general, the officers commanding at Auxonne and Besançon were not in a position to render him any assistance. The Germans accordingly, though in no great strength, continued to advance, and the brunt of their attack was in the first instance borne by the forces under Colonel Lavalle (of the committee which had been formed for the defence of Dijon), who had, by arrangement with his chief, placed his men on the banks of the Saône, with their centre at Pontailler. Garibaldi himself extended his line very near to that of Colonel Lavalle, and established an ambush on a bridge crossing the river Ognon. On the morning of the 27th a force of 1,200 Germans surprised the village of Talmay, which was weakly defended by a few companies of mobilised National Guards from the department of the Côte d'Or, who, being very badly armed, were speedily defeated by the enemy, in whose hands they left many prisoners. The German success, however, was but short-lived; for Colonel Lavalle, on hearing of the affair, marched upon Talmay, and dislodged the intruders. The ambush on the bridge, moreover, repulsed the Germans with heavy loss, the Garibaldians being enabled to pour a damaging fire from their high position into the ranks of their opponents on both sides of the valley. There were also some captures of ammunition and food, and altogether the Garibaldians had reason to be satisfied with their first day's work. Colonel Lavalle, however, was arrested a few days later, and sent before a court-martial on a charge of incapacity on another occasion. The Germans now evacuated Vesoul, a town twenty-seven miles south of Besançon, which they had occupied nine or ten days before, and Garibaldi's head-quarters were removed to Amange, lying between five and six miles to the north-east of Dôle, at the foot of a range of wooded hills at the edge of the forest of Serre. Here the well-known Madame Jessie White Mario—an English lady passionately attached to the cause of cosmopolitan Republicanism, and generally associated with Garibaldian enterprises—was busily engaged in overlooking the ambulances.

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* Correspondent of the *Daily News*.

General Cambriels, who had command of the regular forces of the Vosges, resigned his functions into the hands of General Michel a few days before the close of October, on the ground of bad health. He had exhibited courage and tenacity in resisting the advance of the Germans, but no great ability, vigour, or power of initiative. The enemy certainly made steady progress in spite of him; but it was not until after his resignation that the capture of Dijon took place. This event occurred on the 30th. General Werder, in his report of the action, addressed to the Grand Duke of Baden, and dated October 31st, set forth that Dijon was captured by the brigades of Prince William and Keller, under Lieutenant-General Beyer, after a severe fight. On the 29th, in accordance with orders from head-quarters, General Werder discovered, by a reconnaissance on his return march on Vesoul, that Dijon was not garrisoned. General Beyer, therefore, received instructions to occupy the place. By the night of the 30th the French had again entered Dijon by three roads, and they obstinately contested the German advance on that town. Five battalions of the brigades of Prince William, supported by six batteries of artillery, succeeded, however, in capturing the heights of St. Apollinard, and the suburbs of Dijon were then taken by the Grenadiers of the Guard. The town continued burning until night, and the French withdrew in the darkness. The losses of the 1st Regiment of the Grenadiers of the Guard were 200 men *hors de combat*, and of the 2nd Grenadier Regiment (King of Prussia's) fifty men. The French account stated:—"On the 31st of October a message reached Tours giving a clear account of the engagement of the previous day, and eulogising the sharp and courageous resistance of the troops, especially of several battalions of the 71st and 90th Regiments of the Line, and of the 6th Battalion of Chasseurs. The Baden troops, about 10,000 in number, supported by eight or ten pieces of artillery, occupied the heights of Montmuzard. The fight lasted from ten o'clock in the morning until night. At about four o'clock the bombardment of Dijon commenced, and conflagrations broke out at several points. Colonel Fauconnet (who had just been appointed commander of the Mobile and Mobilised troops in lieu of Dr. Lavalle), as well as a Baden officer, was grievously wounded. Fauconnet expired during the night. By half-past four a flag of truce was hoisted at the top of the central tower; but some of the townspeople fired at it more than two hundred shots, and several times succeeded in bringing it down. The *pourparlers* of the capitulation were conducted during the night, and the surrender was signed and effected the next morning. The town agreed to pay 500,000f. as a guarantee for the victualling of 80,000 men, of whom the Germans announced the approach, on their way to Lyons. From the various accounts, it is clear that if the Municipal Council of Dijon and the Committee of Defence had yielded to the entreaties of the Prefect and of the military commander, and had consented to barricade the town, the main body of the French troops would have found there fortified works, which to a certain point would have afforded them a protection against the deadly effects of the enemy's artillery."

The fall of Dijon went far to shake the reputation of the Garibaldian volunteers.

The *Moniteur Universelle* remarked on the event :—"Although Dijon is not a strongly fortified place, and of no great strategical importance, its fall has afflicted us almost as much as that of Metz, because we were less prepared for it, as, while we knew that for a long time Metz had been invested, and that no army was marching to its relief, we believed that Dijon was not seriously menaced, and that in any case it was covered by considerable, and, as they had proved in some recent engagements, victorious troops. When the 10,000 Baden troops entered Dijon, where were the Garibaldian volunteers, whose renown led us to expect great exploits, and who, we were told, had taken from the enemy both guns and mitrailleuses? Where were the soldiers of Cambriels, who, according to a despatch from Basle, had beaten and routed General Werder?" The fault seems to have lain with the French forces, rather than with the guerilla contingent of Garibaldi. The town was hardly as well defended as it might have been; and the Germans, being in considerable force, added another to the numerous prizes which had fallen to their lot. Garibaldi was not in a position to prevent this fresh calamity to the French cause. His army, such as it was, had not yet been sufficiently organised to encounter, on anything like equal terms, such soldiers as those which the German commanders could bring against it; and to have sent his raw and ill-armed levies to fight the veterans of General Werder, would have been simply to ensure their defeat and capture. It was the misfortune of the French, after the battle of Sedan, to be obliged to improvise fresh armies in the face of the enemy. Yet, as nothing succeeds like success, and nothing fails like failure, Garibaldi fell into unmerited disgrace, at the very outset of his campaign, on account of the loss of Dijon.

Garibaldi moved his head-quarters back to Dôle on the receipt of this adverse news, and there concerted his measures for resisting the enemy. If we may credit the relations of his friends, he was constantly hampered and thwarted by the jealousy of the French commanders with whom he had to act. On the morning of the 31st of October, according to an English newspaper correspondent, Garibaldi was at the railway station with a few officers, when a captain in the Engineers arrived in a special train to see him. The interview took place in the office of the station-master. Loud voices were heard in the room, as if the general and the captain were quarrelling. Suddenly the door was thrown open, and the general called Captain Farcy, late of the *Liberté*, and ordered him to arrest the captain of Engineers, who was accordingly conducted to the Commandant de Place. It then appeared that this individual, who had behaved in an insolent manner to Garibaldi, had been sent from Besançon with orders to blow up all the bridges across the river Doub, between Besançon and Dôle, which, in the event of the French being beaten, would completely cut off their retreat. Captain Farcy went in a special train half way to Besançon to prevent the bridges being destroyed. Four were mined, and the officers said that they had intended blowing them up that night. On the afternoon of the same day, Garibaldi, accompanied by his Staff and an escort, went by train on a reconnoitring expedition as far as Genlis, more than half way on the road to Dijon. On returning, a man in the crowd exclaimed, "To Lyons, General!" Garibaldi at once rejoined, "Why Lyons? Lyons is behind us. We are not yet in such a desperate position as to be forced to fly." This reassuring speech was received with loud cries of "It is true! it is true! Long live Garibaldi!" While on this reconnaissance the general was informed by the Mayor of Callonges—a local officer meeting him at each station—that the road was broken up. "Who by?" he asked. "By the Prussians, of course," was the reply. "Where are the Prussians?" inquired Garibaldi. "On the other side of Dijon," answered the Mayor, who seems not to have been aware that the town was by that time actually in the hands of the invaders. "How could they break the roads, then?" retorted Garibaldi. The roads, however, were ascertained to be actually impassable; so that they had probably been broken by the French irregular troops, to prevent pursuit. At Genlis, Garibaldi himself descended, and questioned every one. "Is the telegraph broken on this line?" he demanded. "Yes." "Who broke it?" "We don't know." "Where are the Prussians?" "We can't tell." "This ignorance is as shameful as it is wilful," burst out Garibaldi, in anger. The Mayor piteously asked, "Where are the French?" "Are not you French?" said Garibaldi; and would not give any other answer.* In this way the Italian chieftain was left in the dark in a remote corner of the country; and in the meanwhile the Germans were advancing, and the prospects of making a successful stand in the eastern provinces became progressively less and less.

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* Correspondent of the *Daily News*.



SORTIE FROM PARIS.



THE SORTIE AT CACHAN.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

French Attack on Le Bourget—Details of the Action—Taking of the Village by the French—Efforts of the Prussians to retake the Position—The French driven out—Death of Count Waldersee—Disorderly Flight of the Mobiles—Desperate Attempts of the Parisians to obtain Food—The Prussians strengthening their Positions—Expedition of Würtemberg Troops—Proceedings of the French Government—The Empress Eugenie at Wilhelmshöhe—Candidature for the Crown of Spain of the Duke of Aosta—Political Measures of the King of Prussia—The Reconstruction of Germany—Accession to the German Federation of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Würtemberg, and Bavaria—Division of German Parties—The Revolutionary Movement of October 31st—Gustave Flourens and the People of the Belleville Quarter—Demonstration before the Hôtel de Ville—The Building entered by the Mob—The Government menaced and held as Prisoners—Attempt to Establish a Communistical Government—Rescue of Trochu and his Colleagues by Breton Mobiles and Loyal National Guards—Compromise with the Insurgents—M. Gustave Flourens' Account of the Affair—Treatment of M. Rochefort—The Government supported by a Vote of the Parisians—Resignation of Officials in consequence of the Events of the 31st.

The sortie from Paris of the 21st of October was succeeded, a week later, by some operations against Le Bourget, which were for a time successful. The village in question is situated to the north-east of Paris, near the Northern Railway. On the 27th General de Bellemare ordered a portion of the troops under his command to attack it. Accordingly, the Francs-tireurs of the Press sallied forth late at night against the advanced posts of the enemy, and were assisted in their movement by the principal guards established in advance of Fort Aubervilliers and of Courneuve. The Prussians appear to have been surprised, for, according to the report addressed to General Trochu by his subordinate, they fled in disorder, without firing a shot. They are said to have been caught in their beds, and many escaped in their night-shirts. The French then advanced through the village, driving their adversaries from house to house, until they reached the church, where a stand was made. This was in the early hours of the 28th. The attacking columns were now, by the order of General Bellemare, supported by a part of the 34th Regiment of the Line, and by the 14th Battalion of Mobiles of the Seine. General Bellemare also despatched Colonel Lavoignet, commander of the 1st Brigade, to take the command, with directions to carry the village, and occupy it solidly; and heavy artillery was brought up, to give greater force to the attack. At eleven o'clock on the morning of the 28th General Bellemare proceeded personally to Le Bourget, of which the French were by this time complete masters. He at once ordered up a strong reserve, composed of the 16th Battalion of Mobiles of the Seine, and a Battalion of the 28th of the Line. Towards noon, the Prussians unmasked two batteries at the Iblon Bridge, and sent forward two others belonging to the field-artillery on the road from Dugny to Le Bourget. These fired upon the latter village almost incessantly until nearly five o'clock, as a consequence of which some houses were burnt. General Bellemare thereupon withdrew his artillery, as it could not contend with that of the enemy. The sappers and miners, however, continued busily at work, making communications, crenelating houses, and erecting barricades. At six o'clock in the evening the troops who had been for some time engaged were relieved by others, in order to give them time for rest and refreshment; and the works necessary for the defence of the position that had been acquired were continued throughout the night.

The French maintained themselves at Le Bourget during the whole of the next day, notwithstanding a vigorous cannonade by the Prussians, and frequent attempts on their part to repossess themselves of the ground. The place was worth a struggle; for, as General Bellemare pointed out, it enlarged the circle of the French occupation beyond the forts, and increased the supply of vegetables for the Parisian population, while, of course, it weakened in an equal degree the grasp of the besiegers on the city they were attacking. The Prussian loss appears to have been greater than that of the French. During the attack the fire of the opposing batteries ceased, and the German troops fell back on Gonesse. After the failure of their attempts to regain the position on the 29th they brought up fresh batteries, and, early on the morning of the 30th, recommenced the attack with shell and grape. This time large masses of infantry were sent into the field, and the village, besides being assaulted in front, was turned by columns coming from the direction of Dugny and Blanc Menil. The French were not in sufficient force to resist so powerful a movement, and, moreover, many were exhausted by want of rest and food. They were now scarcely able to hold the position for an hour, and, although the retreat (according to the official report) was effected in an orderly manner, several Mobiles and Francs-tireurs, who occupied the northern part of the village, were cut off from their comrades, and taken prisoners. The village of Drancy, which had been occupied for only four-and-twenty hours, found itself no longer supported on the left, and, time having failed for placing it in a state of defence, its evacuation was ordered. The military report announcing the events of the 30th to the Parisians said that the village of Le Bourget was not part of the general system of defence; that its occupation was of very secondary importance; and that the rumours which attributed gravity to the incidents which had happened were without foundation. General Trochu even publicly blamed the occupation of Le Bourget as the unauthorised act of a subordinate, who was removed from his command in consequence. Yet the reports of General Bellemare had spoken of the position as well worth keeping; "and," added that officer, "we shall retain it." The Parisian papers severely censured the authorities for having allowed what promised to be a brilliant success to be changed into a defeat. The place, in the opinion of many military men, threatened some of the more important Prussian lines of communication, and could have been held by an adequate force, properly supported by artillery. The attack on Le Bourget seems to have originated in the wild daring and impatience for action of the Francs-tireurs of the Press, who offered to take the village, and did in fact take it, by the suddenness of their onslaught. Once there, however, they seem to have been left without sufficient support; and the Parisians, who were at first wild with delight, and thought the Germans were about to be crushed, were soon obliged to submit to the mortification of a reverse.

The fighting on the 30th was more severe than that on the 28th. The *Staats Anzeiger*, of Berlin, gave some details of the conflict, from which it would appear that the Germans were exasperated by an act of treachery on the part of the French. "In Le Bourget itself, where the French offered an obstinate resistance," wrote that journal, "there was a bloody hand-to-hand fight. General Budretzky had ridden to the front of the Elizabeth Regiment, on its advancing, and, after dismounting from his horse, had seized the standard in order to lead the troops to the storming. With heavy sacrifices a firm foot was planted in the village. The Queen Augusta Regiment had also reached Le Bourget. A detachment was about to advance into a house, when the colonel, Count Waldersee, ordered his men to halt, as, from the windows, white handkerchiefs were waved in token of surrender. The Count had ten days previously so far recovered from his wound at Gravelotte as to rejoin his regiment. He sprang towards the house, to speak with its occupants. While so advancing a ball from one of the windows struck him, and killed him on the spot. An officer was hastening to catch the falling leader in his arms, when he too was shot. When the troops saw this, they were greatly exasperated, and the enemy was repulsed at all points by the vigour of their attack. More than 1,200 unwounded prisoners were made, and thirty officers. Our Augusta and Elizabeth regiments lost thirty officers killed and wounded, and about 400 men. The whole depôt, which the enemy evidently intended to fortify, as large quantities of bread had been sent from Paris on the previous day to the advanced troops south of Le Bourget, fell into our hands. The great number of prisoners shows that the French who made the sortie were closely surrounded." The Prussian Guards, in particular, greatly distinguished themselves, and, though received by a terrible fire from houses, from walls, from the railway, and from the barricades, they pressed on, carrying house after house, and at length driving the enemy out of the place. The Mobiles, according to one account, were to be seen in hundreds flying from the village, swearing at the incapacity of their officers, and vowing that they had had enough of it, and would fight no more. Their mothers and sisters, hearing the news, ran about wringing their hands and loudly lamenting; and in Paris generally the disappointment was felt all the more on account of the temporary success.

Notwithstanding the panic of some of the Mobiles, it is certain that the French on the whole behaved well on this occasion, for the German official account of the doings of the 30th spoke of the fight as "very hot and brilliant," and added that the losses on the Prussian side were "not inconsiderable"—a favourite piece of vagueness on the part of King William's officers. The French no doubt felt that they had a motive for doing their best. The ground which they had won added to the food supplies of Paris, and those supplies, as the reader is already aware, began to run very short. The Bavarian officer, General Hartmann, stated, in a report written towards the close of October, that several hundred women and children from Paris appeared at the German outposts between Montrouge and Bicêtre on the 24th, and, on being told that they would be fired upon unless they returned at once, replied that they preferred death to their miserable life in the city. They were ultimately permitted to cross the German lines. The prisoners taken at the re-capture of Le Bourget stated that the troops in Paris received only half a pound of meat twice a week; and it was well known to the Germans that people were constantly sallying forth from the gates, at the risk of their lives, to dig up potatoes from the fields between and even before the forts, which made a show of covering them by their fire.

In the meanwhile the besiegers were busy fortifying their positions along the whole line, raising earthworks, and building platforms for the great guns to work on. Pits were dug near the batteries, and prepared to receive ammunition; the mouth being thickly covered with earth and timber, so as to prevent shells getting through, and the whole protected against damp. "Look along the German line of attack," wrote the *Daily News* correspondent, "from Bougival, by St. Cloud, Meudon, and Châtillon, to opposite Villejuif, and you will see cannon bristling against the whole south-west of the French position. The villas round Paris are held by riflemen, who watch one another with restless vigilance. The gardens are trampled down, or hastily turned over with spades, to form breast-works in their midst. Loopholes are knocked in the high garden-walls, and trees are felled which were their owner's pride." Besides the Prussian guns already mounted at the date of this letter (October 29th), there was a park of artillery some way further off, waiting to be brought forward. The road from Nogent was blocked with wagons, and ammunition and food were constantly being sent to the front. It was calculated that twenty-eight or thirty wagons were required to bring up the ammunition of each gun.

Among the minor operations of the day should be mentioned the expedition of a flying corps of Würtemberg troops, who on the 27th of October encountered a body of Mobile Guards and Francs-tireurs between Montereau and Nangis, a few miles to the south-east of Paris, in the department of the Seine-et-Marne. The French were scattered, and left in the hands of their enemies a mitrailleuse, a gun, more than 100 men killed and wounded, 297 unwounded Mobiles, and five officers. At Montereau 300 National Guards were disarmed. The Germans lost one ensign and nine men killed, one staff officer, one lieutenant, and forty men wounded. This was one of the actions by which the Prussians before Paris secured their rear from molestation by the flying columns of the French. Montereau was taken by our Henry V. in his conquest of France, and retaken by the French eighteen years later, in 1438. It was repeatedly taken and re-taken during the civil wars of the sixteenth century; and in February, 1814, a body of allied troops was defeated there by Napoleon I.

Shut up though they were in their capital, and compelled to establish a temporary seat of government in a remote country town, the French Ministers contrived to carry on the affairs of the nation pretty much as in ordinary times. They raised, partly in the English market and partly in France, a war loan of £10,000,000 sterling. They decreed that the natives and Jews of Algeria should be citizens of France, and they appointed M. Henri Didier Governor-General over the Prefects. Some of the Algerian tribes were about this time giving a good deal of trouble to their French masters. Encouraged by the large withdrawal of troops from the colony, and perhaps by news of the ill-success of the Imperial and Republican armies, they rose in various places, and exhibited a rebellious spirit. It was not, however, until some months after the conclusion of peace that the revolt assumed anything of a serious character. The French troops were then compelled to act with energy against the desert tribes who dared to dispute their supremacy.

The Empress Eugenie still continued to act in connection with the political affairs of her adopted country, though, it would appear, with excellent discretion and judgment. On the 27th of October she had an interview in London with M. Rouher and M. de Persigny, two of the most prominent supporters of the Empire. The Empress then reiterated in positive terms her resolution not to consent to the proposition communicated to her through General Boyer, with reference to the contemplated conclusion of a peace with Prussia, on the basis of a cession of territory and the restoration of the Empire. M. de Persigny is said to have protested very strongly against the Empress's resolution, but without effect. On the 30th her Majesty arrived *incognita* at Wilhelmshöhe, accompanied only by General Clery. Her stay was but short, for she left for England on the next day but one. The nature of her consultations with the Emperor has of course not been made public; but it is certain that if she found any disposition on the part of the latter to effect an arrangement with the King of Prussia, by virtue of which the Empire should be restored at the price of Alsace and Lorraine—a point, however, which we should not be justified in assuming without proof—she warmly and successfully resisted it. The Empress had the penetration to see that the ignominy of ceding French territory should be allowed to fall on the Republican party in power, if in the result such a sacrifice became unavoidable, as every day it seemed more and more likely to be. It would then be open to the Empire to stand before the country as the representative of the integrity of

France, and to throw on the party of Jules Favre and his associates the odium of purchasing peace by the surrender of French provinces. Had the Republic succeeded in driving the Prussians out of the land, the policy of the Empress would doubtless have recoiled on her own head; but she had only too much reason to see the great improbability of such an issue. Starting from the assumption that the Provisional Government would not be able to make good its proud resolve never to cede an inch of French territory or a stone of a French fortress—an assumption which the event fully justified—she saw that the Empire would have a better chance of restoration if it could escape all direct responsibility for a peace laden with shame and mortification to every French heart.

In the third week of October men's minds were made to revert a little towards the original cause of the war by a renewed attempt on the part of Spain to provide herself with a king. The crown was now offered to Amadeus, Duke of Aosta, second son of the King of Italy, by whom it was accepted, on condition that the great European Powers should assent, and that the choice of the Government should be ratified by a clear majority of the Cortes. The acquiescence of the Powers was at once obtained, and the representative of the North German Confederation at Madrid was authorised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to make the following declaration in reference to the subject:—"In his speech from the Throne, the King of Prussia had, in the first instance, acknowledged the right of Spain to determine her own future, and his Majesty does not intend to depart from that principle. Germany will not imitate the example given by France before the war, in her attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain, and to make her integrity dependent upon the consent of France, but will readily acknowledge the resolutions of Spain in regard to her own future." It has been said that this willing acceptance by Prussia of a non-German candidate to the throne of Spain was a complete justification of her moral position with reference to the earlier candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and a convincing proof that she had no sinister design in favouring that project. It does not by any means, however, show that that candidature was not supported as a method of provoking France into a war which it is evident that Prussia had long desired, and now felt strong enough to attempt. That the election of Prince Leopold would be regarded by France as a *casus belli* appears to have been known to Prussia, and, the object being gained, the substitution of another candidate was a matter of trifling importance. The Duke of Aosta was accordingly accepted by the Spanish Cortes as their future king, his election being carried, on the 16th of November, by an excess of eighteen votes over the required majority.

The continued good fortune of the King of Prussia seemed after a while to inspire him with some clemency towards political opponents. A Royal order was issued on the 26th of October, releasing Dr. Jacoby, Herr Herbig, and six other persons confined at Loetzen for the expression of opinions contrary to those which were approved at Court. Dr. Jacoby had denounced the injustice of transferring the populations of Alsace and Lorraine from France to Germany without first obtaining their consent by a *plebiscitum;* and for this very moderate assertion of a natural right he had been thrown into prison. At the same time that he and the others were released, the Prussian Monarch, in view of the approaching elections, sent the following telegraphic order to Berlin:—"Since the continuance of the war will not allow the state of siege to be raised, and since it is the desire of the King that during the preparations for the elections no hindrance should be placed in the way of the expression of their political opinions by the voters, his Majesty has ordered that in those districts now in a state of siege, until the termination of the elections, the legal authorisation, suspending Article 30 of the Constitution, relative to the right of public meeting and association, shall not be put in force; and that all those persons now under arrest or confined provisionally on account of pending legal proceedings shall be set at liberty." The military perfection of Prussia had been obtained at the cost of her civil liberties; and favours such as these set men thinking whether the nation had not entered on a dangerous path of foreign triumph and domestic subjection. As yet, however, such thoughts could be only cautiously suggested, and the Government pursued its extraordinary career of success.

The negotiations for the political reconstruction of Germany went on without any serious or violent interruption. Two Bavarian Ministers (Herren Bray and Prankh), and two Würtemberg Ministers (Herren Mittnacht and Suckow), accompanied by the Deputy-Chancellor of the North German Bund, Herr von Delbrück, proceeded to Versailles, to consult with the King of Prussia and Count Bismarck on the terms of unification; and on the 22nd of the month the Würtemberg Diet was dissolved, in order that the new Federal Constitution should be submitted to the deliberations of a Chamber elected with a full knowledge of the great question to be brought before it. The chief opposition to the Prussian plan of reconstruction came from Bavaria, which, though desirous of joining the German Confederation, objected to giving the absolute command of its forces, both in war and peace, to the King of Prussia. Conventions, however, were signed with Baden (whose military contingent was thus made an integral portion of the Federal army), with Hesse-Darmstadt, and with Würtemberg. These conventions were concluded during the earlier weeks of October; and on the 23rd the convention with Bavaria was signed at Versailles. By this agreement, Bavaria was, in terms, allowed to retain her independent military administration; but the organisation and formation of her forces were to be in conformity with the rules governing the Federal army, and the Federal Commander-in-chief was to have undisputed command in time of war, together with the right of inspecting the Bavarian troops in time of peace—conditions which rendered the "independent military administration" little more than nominal. These measures were for the most part popular in Germany, and it was declared at public meetings that the country must be made perfect by the accession of all the South German States, and the acquisition of long-lost territories; that the German Bund must comprehend the entire power of the German race; and that one people, one army, one Diet, and one German Constitution, were so many guarantees of lasting peace for Germany and Europe.



GENERAL VON FABRICE.

There were diversities of opinion, nevertheless, and the Germans divided themselves into three great parties, which have been thus described:—"The Junker or feudal and aristocratic party, which still retained much of its old influence at Court, was in favour of a united Empire, with King William at its head, and, instead of a Parliament



MAKING CHARCOAL FOR GUNPOWDER.

of popular representatives, a Council composed of representatives of the various Federal States, which States should retain some of their separate institutions, the central Government dealing only with such matters as affected the interests of Germany as a whole. The South German Liberals, though strongly in favour of union with the North, were for altering the constitution of the Bund so as to make it afford more ample guarantees for public freedom. The National Liberal party, led by Herren Lasker and Unruh, which was the most powerful with the Government and with the middle classes of the North, advocated the dynastic Empire under the Hohenzollerns, and one Parliament for the whole of Germany, the Upper House comprising the mediatised Princes; the whole civil and military administration of Germany, together with its diplomatic and consular organisation, to be eventually concentrated at Berlin."* These divisions, however, were not generally distinguished by the factious and violent character that we see so commonly in France. In the latter country the principle of nationality is almost lost in the mutual jealousy and distrust of the great parties—in the savage animosity towards one another with which men pursue their political objects, and destroy the whole fabric of the State in the fury of periodical revolution. There are extreme thinkers and violent speakers in Germany as in France; but as yet they have been restrained by the general good sense of the community from doing any great mischief, excepting at a few epochs of European excitement and insurrectionary contagion. The events of 1848–9 indicate, indeed, the presence of volcanic fires beneath the somewhat sluggish surface of German decorum and self-control. Yet appearances must be singularly deceptive if the evil has spread to anything like the same extent as in France; and there is ground for hope that if the ruling powers will gradually soften and reduce those absolutist principles of government which seem so dear to every German monarch, the country may permanently avoid the perilous experiment of the barricades. Where there is any practical perception of the plain business of politics, the example of France—notwithstanding her luminous contributions to political philosophy—can hardly be otherwise than deterrent.

The French habit of heaping revolution upon revolution, and multiplying divisions with all the ingenuity of faction, was exhibited in a striking manner on the 31st of October, when the Government of September 4th was temporarily upset, and Paris was for a while threatened with the horrors of civil war. The endeavours of Gustave Flourens and other extreme Republicans to found a Communal Government in the capital, by which the Parisian democracy would acquire, during the period of the war at least, a sort of dictatorial authority over the whole of France, have already been described. The earlier attempts were of a feeble character, but the agitators now resolved on a more serious movement. The project was to overthrow the existing Government, and to substitute one composed of MM. Blanqui, Flourens, Ledru-Rollin, Pyat, Mottu, Greppo, Delescluze, Victor Hugo, and Louis Blanc; to whom were added MM. Dorian and Rochefort, two politicians already in power. Great animosity against the Government had been excited in the revolutionary quarters of the city by the recapture of Le Bourget, the news of the fall of Metz, and the negotiations for an armistice which had just been opened by M. Thiers, and which were regarded as signs of a disposition to surrender to the Prussians. On the morning of the 31st the people of Belleville and Villette—two very Republican localities—met, and discussed the existing situation. Flourens was present, and it was resolved to go with an armed force to the Hôtel de Ville. About half-past one in the afternoon, large crowds assembled in front of the civic hall, and, in spite of a drizzling rain, groups of people, continually augmenting, were formed on the Quai Pelletier, in the Avenue Victoria, and in the Rue de Rivoli. Several National Guards were lounging about, but some were unarmed, and even those who carried their rifles held the butts aloft, in token that their designs were pacific. Cries were raised of "No armistice!" "Down with Thiers!" "Down with Trochu!" "Resistance to death!" These exclamations were varied with commendations of Blanqui, Pyat, the Republic, and the Commune. After a while a member of the National Guard fired a pistol in the air; this was followed by three or four other shots, and a panic at once set in. Men, women, and children fled, as from a charge of soldiers, and the shopkeepers in the Rue de Rivoli began to put up their shutters. M. Gustave Flourens, on horseback, now made his appearance before the Hôtel de Ville, at the head of the Belleville battalion of the National Guards, notwithstanding that he had resigned his command after the events of the 6th; and one of the officers, getting behind the horse's crupper, read a proclamation decreeing a levy *en masse*, and the immediate election of the Commune. General Trochu shortly afterwards came forward, and, addressing the citizens, said, "Will you hear a soldier? It is in vain that you suspect my patriotism, which would lead me to die for the Republic. I found Paris without any defence. It might have been invaded without difficulty. I have devoted my efforts to render Paris impregnable, and now it is. No enemy, however powerful, can now get into Paris. Do you not see that to defend ourselves we require all our undivided resources? If our armies have been conquered, the reason is that they had not the necessary means for conquering; they were short of artillery. We are using the greatest efforts to ensure a triumph. We have collected forces capable of meeting the enemy." Here he was interrupted by the clamour and violence of the crowd, and was finally obliged to retire. M. Jules Simon then endeavoured to obtain a hearing, but in vain; and so time wore on until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when a dense mob made a rush at the doors of the Hôtel de Ville, and, forcing one of them open, passed up a flight of steps into a great covered court in the middle of the building, and thus, by various internal corridors, into the principal chambers.

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* *Annual Register* for 1870.

In one of these the Mayors of Paris were engaged in deliberation; in another, the members of the Government were assembled. After speaking with the Mayors, Flourens, preceded by Joly, Vermorel, Nulliere, and several other officers of the National Guards, and followed by the mob, burst into the room where the Ministers were sitting. A correspondent of the *Standard* describes Flourens as being dressed in the costume of a cavalry officer, with patent-leather jack-boots, and a scimitar dangling by his side. With his Jewish face, his eyes like blazing coals, and his reddish-hued beard flaming beneath, he presented a strange figure. Outside the door were the Belleville battalions, together with a body of Red Republican carabineers, commanded by the Italian conspirator, formerly a convict, Tibaldi. No one was allowed to leave the room without a pass from Blanqui. Round a table were gathered General Trochu, Jules Favre, Dorian, Garnier Pagès, Jules Simon, Jules Ferry, General Tamisier, and Magnin. Flourens, leaping on the table, proclaimed the deposition of the Government, and announced that, by a vote taken on the spur of the moment in a neighbouring hall, the Commune had been established, and an Executive Commission had been named to watch over the elections, and to see that they took place within forty-eight hours. The crowd loudly shouted "Resign! resign!" and when Jules Ferry rose to protest against this invasion of the council-room, his voice was drowned in groans and hisses. Garnier Pagès tried to get on the table and address the mob, but fell back fainting, and was trampled on by the crowd, until rescued and carried to the window by some of his colleagues. "Flourens," wrote the "Besieged Resident" of the *Daily News*, in his very vivid account of the affair, "offered to make a concession, to accept Dorian as a member of the commission. At that moment the crowd discussed whether Rochefort also ought to be included in it. 'Yes, yes,' cried some. 'No, no.' replied others; 'he is a liar, a traitor.' The noise became deafening. A citizen boxed the ears of Jules Simon. All this time General Trochu and Jules Favre talked quietly together. The Governor of Paris pushed away with his hands the feet of the citizens who had climbed on the table. The Minister of Foreign Affairs drew circles with a pencil on a piece of paper. All of a sudden a cry was raised, 'Shut the doors. Let no one pass. To prison with them.' Sentinels were posted at all the issues. A portion of the crowd withdrew. M. Etienne Arago endeavoured in vain to quit the Hôtel de Ville. Recognised as he was attempting to escape, he was brought back, and placed under the guard of two patriots." On Flourens insisting that the members of the Provisional Government should write and sign their resignations, M. Favre replied, "Never to a band of factious men!" The taunt as to faction raised a great uproar; and indeed, although perfectly true, it came with an ill grace from the speaker, who had acquired his own position, barely two months before, by a movement as factious as any that even Paris has ever witnessed. "Away with the old fellow and his broken nose!" cried a mere boy who made one of the mob. Some of the more violent tore Trochu's decorations from his breast; but the general, preserving his calmness, retained his place in an arm-chair near the table.

A so-called Committee of Defence was now organised by the insurgents, or rather a great variety of committees were nominated, every man appointing whom he would, and throwing his bulletin out of window to the crowd below. It was also announced that the armistice was rejected. Among the persons named for the new Government were Victor Hugo, Pyat, Ledru-Rollin, Flourens, Louis Blanc, Rochefort, and Dorian. Rochefort, however, was hissed by the people, and Dorian (the existing Minister of Public Works) refused to serve in the proposed Government, of which at one time he was mentioned as the President. A kind of madness—the madness of utter imbecility and folly—seemed to possess the rioters in an adjoining chamber. Everybody was shouting, gesticulating, or making himself conspicuous by some extravagance of conduct. One man incessantly blew a trumpet; another as pertinaciously beat a drum. Excited orators harangued the citizens; but no one listened, for each was too much absorbed in his own eloquence. Pyat and Blanqui sent a company of the National Guard to the Ministry of Finance with a draught for 15,000,000 francs, payable to the bearer. The person holding the draught asked, on arriving at the Ministry, to be shown to the Treasury, and, on being told that it was closed, demanded to see the Minister (M. Picard, who was by this time known to have escaped from the Hôtel de Ville), or his representative. At the same time he produced his draught, and was requested to wait. The key was then turned upon him, and, after remaining there all night, he was, on the following morning, conducted to the Prefecture of Police. The order was retained as evidence against Pyat and Blanqui. Another of the Communists—Citizen Millière—went, apparently on his own motion, to instal himself as Minister of Finance, but met with a check, and was obliged to retire. A correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* relates that "an officer of Blanqui's battalion, who repaired to the Etat-Major of the National Guard to give orders, was at once placed under arrest. Inferior emissaries were sent by Blanqui to the Prefecture of Police and to the Imperial Printing-office; but the authorities had been forewarned by M. Ernest Picard, and refused to resign their functions. A couple of Mairies were taken possession of—those of the 1st and 11th arrondissements. The former was occupied by a Dr. Pillot; he was ousted at two o'clock on the following morning by the commander of the 11th Battalion of National Guards, and carried off in custody to the hôtel of General Trochu. The other was seized by the ex-Mayor, Citizen Mottu, who had been dismissed a week or two before for forbidding all kinds of religious instruction at the schools under his control, and even interdicting the masters and mistresses from taking their pupils to church. He, however, had been apprised of the order given for his arrest, and thought it prudent to decamp from the Mairie in the course of the night." Had the insurgents succeeded in possessing themselves of the chief Ministries and Mairies, the movement might have had some chance of success; but, as it was, the promptitude and vigour of the principal authorities stifled the attempted revolution before it could establish itself.

In the meanwhile, however, the excitement continued at the Hôtel de Ville. Blanqui made his appearance in the courtyard of the building, and, being mistaken for some one else, was savagely kicked and ill-treated, his age and feebleness serving as no protection against the ferocity of the mob. He himself asserted that it was the "reactionaries"—that is to say, the partisans of the Government—who thus used him; but he was at length rescued by some of his friends. In the council-chamber a rifle was three times levelled at General Trochu, and accusations of treachery were made against M. Jules Favre. M. Dorian, as a favourite with the extreme party, and at the same time a member of the Government, tried to conciliate matters, but was compelled to desist. Trochu and his colleagues were told that they were prisoners; and the mob, having for the moment accomplished their purpose, proceeded to regale themselves. They seized on the dinner that had been provided for the Government, and indulged liberally in the wine they found. This was a fortunate circumstance for the Ministers, as it gave time for concerting measures of repression. Shortly after the entry of the mob, MM. Picard, Ferry, Jules Simon, and Magnin contrived to slip away in the confusion; and M. Picard, proceeding at once to his office, the Ministry of Finance, took all needful measures for the rescue of his comrades. He wrote and signed orders to the staff of the Governor and the chiefs of the National Guard, and commanded the call to arms to be made in all the quarters of Paris. The National Printing-office was occupied by troops, and the *Official Journal* was prohibited from printing anything. M. Picard also sent word to the different Ministries to hold themselves ready for defence; and the effect of these energetic measures was soon visible. A body of National Guards favourable to the Government speedily assembled, and marched on the Hôtel de Ville. Towards nine o'clock the 106th Battalion, with drums beating, forced its way into the council-chamber. The officers surrounded General Trochu, and it was asked whether he would be prevented from going out. Flourens was consulted, and, looking out of the window, saw the street full of National Guards, who were crying, "Down with the Commune!" Struck with the gravity of the situation, he ordered that the general might be allowed to depart, and he accordingly left, together with Jules Favre, amid cries of "Treason!" The other members of the Government remained under the guard of the battalion commanded by Gustave Flourens. The insurgent troops seemed by this time to have made up their minds to pass the night in the Hôtel; for they settled themselves in arm-chairs, and awaited the turn of events.

According to other accounts, the release of General Trochu was brought about in a different manner. M. Jules Ferry, it is said, gathered together a large number of soldiers, and appeared before the Hôtel de Ville, demanding the release of the other Ministers. A messenger went up to Flourens for an answer, and M. Ferry waited more than two hours for the return of his envoy, rather than resort to violence, it being understood that, if a shot were fired, Trochu, Favre, Simon, Arago, and Pagès would be instantly killed. The National Guards, however, at length pushed their way in; and one of their officers—a man of colossal proportions—made a sign to General Trochu, edged his way round the table, suddenly seized the Governor in his arms, and, lifting him out of his chair backwards, carried him down-stairs. On the grand staircase a miscreant fired at Trochu, but fortunately missed him, and a few seconds later he was in the open air. He then addressed the people, thanking them for coming to the rescue of the Government. "Like you," he said, "we have but one great controlling desire, and that is to save the Republic by saving France. Let us be united, and all will be well; and let our rallying cry, now and hereafter, continue to be, 'Long live France!'" The people replied with cries of "Down with the Commune!" "Down with Blanqui!" "Long live Trochu!" and fresh columns of troops marched towards the Hôtel de Ville.

The accounts of the movement are very contradictory, and it would be vain to attempt any reconciliation of their various discrepancies. It is certain, however, that, as the night advanced, the Hôtel de Ville was occupied by so large a body of loyal troops that further resistance became hopeless. A barricade had been formed at the entrance, but this was broken up by a number of Breton Mobiles, who, as they worked, shouted the battle-cries of their province. They then pressed on with fixed bayonets, and were joined by another body of Mobiles, who had got in by a subterranean way. "In the Hôtel de Ville," wrote the "Besieged Resident," "the panic was general. The insurgents literally fell on their knees, and begged for their lives to be spared; others hid in the garrets; as many as could crowded into the closets. In this disorder many were thrown down. Drunkards who had been enjoying the wine of the Republic were trodden under foot by their own friends. The Mobiles, after having conducted the members of the Government who were in durance to the gate of the Hôtel, returned, and led off gangs of insurgents to the Napoleon barracks. The terrified patriots hid themselves everywhere; one was pulled out of a bed into which he had crept." It was now nearly one o'clock in the morning. The leaders of the movement had consulted their safety in flight; but, previous to their disappearance, they came to an arrangement with the Government, by which it was agreed that the Communists should withdraw, on the understanding that the Commune should be at once elected, that the Provisional Government should be replaced by an elected one, and that on neither side, under any pretence, should further proceedings be taken with reference to the affair. At two o'clock in the morning General Trochu reappeared at the Hôtel de Ville, accompanied by his Staff; but the building was not completely evacuated until four or five o'clock. The rooms were a good deal injured. Windows and looking-glasses were smashed, paintings defaced, hangings torn, and furniture broken. The damage done was estimated at 80,000 francs; and, in addition, numerous robberies were committed. Fortunately, however, the safe was guarded, and so escaped untouched. According to the *Gaulois*, a letter was found on the table where Flourens and his associates had been sitting, apparently addressed to the director of the convict establishment at Toulon. It ran:—"Citizen, we must at any price have William's head. Send a hundred resolute convicts. Make haste: time presses." The signature was illegible.

The several narratives which we have hitherto been following reflect the feelings and views of the Government party; and it will now be as well to give in full the version of the affair which was put forward by M. Gustave Flourens on behalf of himself and his fellow Communists. In a narrative published in the *Figaro* of November 4th, he said:—

> "Arriving at the Hôtel de Ville about three o'clock, we met citizens who told us that the levy *en masse* and the election of the Commune had been decreed, and that MM. Dorian and Schoelcher had been appointed to preside over the elections, and form a link between the old Government and the new. We could not be certain of this intelligence, and pushed on to the Hôtel de Ville, to the gates of which I advanced with my tirailleurs. Having entered, I saw the commandant of the place, who told me of the arrangement of which I had heard before, and asked me thereupon to embrace him, as a sign of complete satisfaction. I formed my tirailleurs on the Quai, and then entered the Hôtel alone. There I found the halls full of citizens, nearly all of whom were without arms, and discussing affairs in the greatest disorder. All the discussions, however, led to this result, that a Government so false as that in office was not to be trusted to fulfil any promise, and that a Committee of Public Safety must be formed, having the confidence of the people. The crowd became quiet, and I was asked to speak, and name some persons worthy of trust. I named Dorian, Flourens, Félix Pyat, Mottu, Avrial, Ranvier, Millière,



THE 106TH BATTALION OF NATIONAL GUARDS DELIVERING TROCHU AT THE HÔTEL DE VILLE.



TROCHU RALLYING THE NATIONAL GUARD OUTSIDE THE HÔTEL DE VILLE.

Blanqui, Delescluze, Louis Blanc, Raspail, Rochefort, Victor Hugo, and Ledru-Rollin. I read this list successively in two of the large halls of the Hôtel de Ville, and then to a crowd outside, and everywhere the names were acclaimed with enthusiasm. I was told to go into the hall where the members of the late Government were sitting—for they were deposed by the fact of this new election, much more valid than that of the 4th of September, inasmuch as we had not been chosen as men who had taken the oath to the Emperor, but because the people had confidence in us. Moving to the hall, I found there Trochu, Garnier Pagès, Jules Simon, Jules Ferry, Jules Favre, and General Tamisier. The citizens now surrounded me, and begged me to get on the table and proclaim the arrest of those gentlemen. I read the list of the new Government, but the arrest was not at that moment practicable. I could not effect it myself, and the good-will of the citizens around me did not suffice. At the first appearance of a reactionary company with fixed bayonets, the citizens would have disappeared, leaving me alone with our prisoners. I confined myself, therefore, to keeping them in sight, and sent for my tirailleurs to come to me. But the avenues of the Hôtel de Ville were so crowded that it was half an hour before they arrived. During this time I prayed some of my colleagues of the new Government to join me. I also dictated the notification of the Committee of Public Safety, and sent it off to the National Printing-office, and to the Mairies. When my tirailleurs arrived, I took sixty of them with me, and sent the rest to guard the avenues of the Hôtel de Ville. Millière came, and Ranvier. The former proposed to me to sign an order for the arrest of the members of the deposed Government. To sign was easy enough; to execute difficult. Millière had not brought his battalion with him; at least he did not tell me that it was there. It appeared afterwards that its chief was not disposed to run risks, and it was sent home. With the exception of two companies of another battalion, which remained with me until midnight, I had not, during all these proceedings, more than my own five hundred men at my disposal, and it was with this handful that I held the Hôtel de Ville until five o'clock in the morning. Many battalions of devoted democratic troops came and remained, but separately, and without placing themselves under our orders. If the Belleville battalions which came later had been in time, we should not have lost a single prisoner. I could not detach two hundred of my men to conduct the members of the deposed Government to Mazas; their strength would not have sufficed, and with the other three hundred I should not have been able to occupy the Hôtel de Ville. I therefore contented myself with detaining them on the spot. Suddenly M. Ibos, commandant of the 106th Battalion, entered with his armed men. Those furious churchmen, seeing me standing on the table, menaced me with death. Their chief jumped on the table, and, while he was occupying my attention with his gesticulations, two of my prisoners, Ferry and Trochu, were spirited away. I then got down to make sure of the others. Blanqui arrived, and he and Millière, Ranvier, Delescluze, and Mottu, with myself, held a conference, at the end of which we sent out a summons to all the truly democratic chiefs of battalions to come and join us. Suddenly a messenger came to inform us that by the subterranean passage in the Hôtel communicating with the Napoleon barracks—a passage of the existence of which I was not aware—two battalions of Breton Mobiles had entered with loaded rifles and fixed bayonets. It was plain that a collision would take place between them and my troops, which were now turned. Blanqui, Ranvier, Millière, and I, then consulted, and we agreed that we had better make a convention with Dorian, who had himself been acclaimed by the people. It was plain that with five hundred men we could not make head against the two Breton battalions and others who might enter by the same passage, and against those who might besiege us from without. It would have been useless just now to expose the men to destruction, all the more certain inasmuch as they had not more than six cartridges with them. We therefore agreed with Dorian as follows:—'The elections for the Commune shall take place this day (Tuesday, November 1), under the direction of Dorian and Schoelcher alone. The elections for a new Government shall take place on the following day, Wednesday. In order to show the good understanding that exists between us, we will leave the Hôtel de Ville together, I with my tirailleurs about me.' This agreement was ratified by the members of the Government, and I went down into the lower hall. The Breton Mobiles were at the bottom with crossed bayonets, and carried their rifles in a very menacing attitude. I asked them to send for an officer, who came and gave orders which silenced them. Suddenly Jules Ferry came up, and said to me, 'We have fifty thousand men; all resistance is impossible. Give up your enterprise, and go away with the honours of war.' I told him that we had made an agreement with Dorian, and were about to execute it. As other National Guards continued to arrive, I feared a collision with my tirailleurs. I appealed to General Tamisier, who came and calmed their excitement. I then rallied my men. Garnier Pagès, Jules Favre, and Jules Simon left the Hôtel by other gates. Blanqui gave his arm to General Tamisier, and went first, and Millière, Ranvier, and I followed, at the head of my tirailleurs. I formed them in the square, in the midst of Trochu's Bretons, and marched them to Belleville, where we arrived, proud and happy in having obtained what we required without effusion of blood. But how shamefully have we been deceived!"

It is evident from this account that M. Flourens was but feebly supported in his desperate enterprise, and it is therefore a fair inference that he had not that degree of general approval which could alone have justified or palliated his attempt. He admits that the good-will of the citizens by whom he was surrounded did not suffice to enable him to arrest the members of the Government, and that those citizens would at once have fled at the sight of "a reactionary company with fixed bayonets." He is obliged to confess that even the armed battalions of his own way of thinking hung back, the commander of one not being "disposed to run risks," and most of the others quietly keeping away. On the opposite side, the loyal National Guards mustered in great force to the rescue of the Government; and there can be no doubt that the suppression of the revolt was hailed with satisfaction by the majority of the Parisians. Of course it would not be difficult to make out a case for M. Flourens and his party. They had as much right to upset the Government of Trochu as Trochu and his colleagues had to depose the Emperor; and by seeking to establish the new state of things on the basis of a popular election, by which the Executive should be supported by a species of Legislative Assembly, they gave greater guarantees against the usurpation of self-chosen rulers than the existing Administration had yet done. M. Flourens is said to have discouraged the personal outrages on members of the Government; and he so far restrained the violence of his followers, as to prevent bloodshed. Nevertheless, it was felt by the generality of Parisians that the insurgents were men of extreme views and desperate lives, who, if they had the chance, would set up a despotism of demagogy. The movement, moreover, was regarded as the beginning of a series of violent changes, like those of the first Revolution, when one Government succeeded another in a descending scale of brutality and incompetence; and for these reasons it collapsed.

M. Rochefort made a very singular figure in these proceedings. When the mob burst into the Hôtel de Ville, many voices were raised for this sometime popular leader, and he was at length fetched from another part of the building, and thrust forward amidst the most discordant noises. He was forced to get on a table, against which so many rushes were made by the crowd that, had he not been held up by his friends, he would have fallen. He began by saying that the Government was deliberating; upon which there were loud cries of "No deliberations! No elections! No Commune! Down with Rochefort!" The majority in that particular room at that particular moment would therefore seem to have been well-affected to the existing state of things. There were others, however, who took a different view. Some one exclaimed, "You are a member of the Government: begone!" Rochefort replied, "I am a child of the people, like you." "You! you are a Count." "I, like you, am a child of Paris." "You are an aristocrat. No Rochefort!" M. Rochefort then mentioned the Neutral Powers and the armistice of M. Thiers, but was met with shouts of "Down with Thiers! Arrest him! imprison him! hang him!" The violence and unfairness of the mob effected a perfect revolution in the most cherished opinions of M. Rochefort, if we may believe the statements of the *Paris Journal*. What he saw and underwent at the Hôtel de Ville, said that paper, inspired him with a profound contempt for those in whose cause he had laboured, only to receive unmerited insult. He is reported to have exclaimed to a friend, in his bitterness, "They *are* a rabble, after all!" The rioting, the revolutionary madness, the drunkenness, that day, he said he should never forget. His heart "rose to his throat," and he was glad of an opportunity to slip away.

The events of the 31st were not altogether without their effect. The Government, it is true, repudiated the engagement to elect the Commune, on the plea that the promise was given under compulsion—a piece of very doubtful morality, to which M. Flourens alluded when he spoke of having been "shamefully deceived;" but they submitted to the votes of the Parisians the following question:—"Does the population of Paris maintain ('Yes' or 'No') the powers of the Government of the National Defence?" The voting took place on the 3rd of November, and resulted in a most unequivocal victory for the Administration. The numbers were:—"Yes, 557,976; No, 62,638." General Trochu thereupon issued a proclamation, in which he said:—"You order us to remain at the post of danger assigned to us by the Revolution of the 4th of September. We will remain with the strength derived from your support, and with a consciousness of the great duties imposed upon us by your confidence; the first of which is that of defence, which will continue to occupy us exclusively. We shall prevent criminal movements by the severe execution of the laws." M. Jules Favre, in another proclamation, observed:—"We have all one heart and one thought—the deliverance of our country. This deliverance is only possible by obedience to the military chiefs and respect for the laws." In the evening the National Guard sent to congratulate the Government at the residence of General Trochu, who said in reply, "The Republic alone can save us. If we lost it, we should be lost with it." M. Favre added, "The Government has sworn not to yield one inch of territory, and will remain faithful to that engagement."

Everything, however, did not go off so smoothly. M. Etienne Arago, the Mayor of Paris, having, in consequence of the arrangement with Flourens, issued a placard ordering the municipal elections to take place—a decree which was at once countermanded by M. Jules Favre—resigned his position, together with two of his adjoints. M. Rochefort also resigned, on the ground that he objected to the postponing of the municipal elections, that he was entirely opposed to an armistice, and that he had been an occasion of scandal by revealing to his friend, M. Flourens, the fact of Bazaine's negotiations for the surrender of Metz—a piece of information of which Flourens gladly availed himself for purposes of agitation. General Trochu and M. Favre begged him to return; but he declined, and, to place himself beyond the reach of importunity, disappeared from view, and kept his address a secret. Another resignation was that of the Prefect of Police (M. Adam), who said he could not, without a breach of faith, after the engagement that had been made, arrest the persons concerned in the movement of the 31st. Several arrests, however, were afterwards made, and the chiefs of the battalions of National Guards compromised in the affair were cashiered. The glowing enthusiasm and unanimity of that bright 4th of September, when everything looked so roseate and golden, had departed; but now that the evil days of dissension had come, the Government derived a strength and authority, such as it had not possessed before, from the affirmative vote of November 3rd.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The Position of Prussia before the World—Anxiety of the European Powers for Peace—Intervention of England—Proposal of Lord Granville for an Armistice—Reply of Count Bismarck—Views of M. Grévy on the Subject—M. Thiers authorised by the Tours Delegation to conduct Negotiations—Warlike Circular of M. Gambetta—The Powers of M. Thiers ratified by the Paris Government—Interviews between M. Thiers and Count Bismarck—Rupture of the Negotiations on the Question of the Revictualling of Paris—M. Thiers on the Policy of the Empire—His Opinions on the French and German Armies—Dr. Russell's Account of his Appearance—Count Bismarck and M. Thiers contrasted—Reception of M. Thiers on the Route to Paris—The Consultation with General Trochu and Jules Favre at the Outposts—Effect of the Riots of October 31st on the Progress of the Negotiations—Count Bismarck's Circular—Remarks on the Failure of the Attempted Compromise—Proclamation of General Trochu to the National Guards—Circular of M. Jules Favre—Reply of M. Jules Favre to Count Bismarck—Despatch of M. de Chaudordy—The Policy of Austria—Observations of M. Guizot on the Prussian Terms—What Paris required in the Way of Revictualling—France unfortunate in the Period of the Negotiations—M. Gambetta and the Armistice.

Success has its duties as well as its privileges; and the success of Prussia was now such as to compel the attention of civilised nations to her position in Europe, and to cause all thoughtful politicians to ask themselves what would be the probable effect of the continued humiliation of France. The North German Government was itself impressed with the desirability of coming to some arrangement, and of placing its cause in the most favourable position before the eyes of the world, while at the same time maintaining those demands which were considered necessary to the future safety of Germany. The first approach to anything like an understanding was made through the medium of the well-known American officer, General Burnside, who arrived in Paris on the 3rd of October, bearing a letter from Count Bismarck to M. Jules Favre, concerning the complaint put forward by the members of the Diplomatic Body residing in Paris, that they had not sufficient liberty of sending despatches to their respective Governments. General Burnside had no official capacity; but, yielding to a generous feeling in his own breast, he endeavoured to effect some conciliatory arrangement between the hostile parties. Conversations took place on two occasions, and from these it appeared—according to an official statement issued at Paris, and dated October 16th—"that the views of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation were the same as they were at Ferrières, and that, if he considered an armistice as practicable for the convocation of an Assembly, he would grant it for the actual space of forty-four hours only; that he would refuse to include Metz in it; that he would prohibit all revictualling; and that he would exclude from the elections the people of Alsace and Lorraine." The *North German Gazette* of November 1st spoke of an armistice having, on the 9th of October, been "offered on their behalf" by the American general, and decidedly and unanimously refused. Later in the month, Count Bismarck, communicating in an indirect way with the English Government, stated that Prussia earnestly desired peace, but only such a peace as would give full security. Germany, he added, could stand a long campaign. She had large resources in hand,

and the hardest work was over. Though anxious for peace, she had no fear for the result. Continued war, said the Count, would complicate any negotiations for an amicable settlement. Prussia, in view of the disorganised state of France, was willing to listen to proposals for putting an end to the war, no matter whether they came from the ex-Empire or the existing Provisional Government; but an armistice would be useless, unless made with a positive view to peace.

Encouraged by this expression of opinion, cautious though it was, the English Government, after the sitting of the Cabinet Council on October 20th, determined to make a direct proposal for a suspension of hostilities, in the hope of bringing the war to a termination through the action of a Constituent Assembly. Earl Granville telegraphed to this effect to our Representatives at Tours, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence. On the same day he addressed a long despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, our Representatives at the Court of Berlin, pointing out that, although her Majesty's Government had up to that time thought it inexpedient to interfere in any way between the belligerents, with the exception of recommending that Count Bismarck and M. Favre should personally communicate their ideas—a suggestion which resulted in the interviews of September 20th and 21st—the aspect of the war had now become so serious that it appeared a duty to humanity to endeavour to avert the frightful consequences of a prolonged struggle. Count Bismarck had pointed out (in his memorandum addressed to the several Powers on October 10th) that the inevitable result of the siege of Paris would be the death from famine of hundreds of thousands of non-combatants. It seemed, therefore, right to the English Cabinet to urge the Provisional Government of France to agree to an armistice; and this course had accordingly been taken. The despatch of Earl Granville to Lord Augustus Loftus having been shown to Count Bismarck, that Minister, on the 28th of October, addressed a communication from Versailles to Count Bernstorff, the Prussian Ambassador in London, in which he set forth at large the sentiments of the North German Government on the subject under consideration. The desire of Lord Granville for a speedy termination of the contest was fully appreciated by the King of Prussia; and his Majesty was glad to learn that the English Government shared his conviction that, as a necessary preliminary to successful negotiations, the French people should be permitted to elect a National Representative Assembly. It was on this account that Prussia had, more than a month previously, offered, at Ferrières, an armistice on terms of great moderation; but those terms had been rejected by the French. Since then the King had been willing to promote free and unrestrained elections in France; but the Paris Government was evidently not inclined to allow any such elections to take place. Count Bismarck proceeded:—

"All these experiences did not prevent us from offering our co-operation in any future steps the Paris Government might be inclined to take with a view to enable the French people to elect Deputies, in order to express its opinion on current events, and participate in the responsibilities of the Government, arbitrarily usurped by private persons. The friendly mediation of some distinguished personages, citizens of a neutral State, who repaired to Paris for this purpose, afforded us an opportunity of once more offering the French rulers the means of proceeding with the elections, and thereby liberating France from the anarchy which renders negotiations for peace impossible. We intimated our readiness to accord an armistice for the period requisite for the elections, at the same time declaring that we would either permit the Deputies of the nation to enter Paris, or the Paris Deputies to repair to any other place in case the Parliament were to assemble elsewhere. These proposals, which only on the 9th inst. were, with our consent, laid before the members of the Paris Government by neutrals, met with such a reception that the mediating personages declared that they must give up the hopes they had cherished. Immediately afterwards M. Gambetta left Paris by balloon, and his first exclamation on descending to *terra firma*, if we are to believe French sources of information, was a protest against the election of National Representatives. Events prove that he succeeded in hindering the elections, and the endeavour in the opposite direction of M. Crémieux failed. It appears from this statement of facts that the expedient recommended by her Britannic Majesty's Government, as a means for the promotion of peace—namely, the arrangement of free elections to a Constituent Assembly—is not opposed by us, but by the Paris rulers; that we have been ready to co-operate for this purpose from the very first, and that our offers have been always rejected by the Government of the National Defence. We were therefore fully justified in declining, in our communication of the 10th inst., referred to by the English Minister, all responsibility for the deplorable consequences to which a resistance *à outrance* must expose the inhabitants of Paris. That this communication did not fail to produce an impression upon the English Cabinet is only what we expected. How very much we should deplore it, were the rulers of Paris to carry resistance to the utmost degree, we have proved by directing the attention of the world, and of the Neutral Powers more particularly, to the consequences likely to result from it. We hoped the representations of the Neutral Powers would make some impression on the rulers of Paris, who are sacrificing the life and property of the inhabitants to their own ambition. We looked the more confidently forward to such a result, as the Government of Paris and Tours have assumed the direction of the destinies of France on their own responsibility, and without any other title than that which arbitrary and violent usurpation, coupled with the continued refusal to listen to the voice of the nation, can give."

Count Bismarck could not repress a fear that the well-meaning intervention of the English Cabinet would be misinterpreted by the rulers of France, and would be regarded, not as an evidence of humane sympathy, but as the rendering of actual support by a Neutral Power. Nevertheless, the Prussian Government would be willing to accept and examine any proposition that might be made to it by the French, with the object of commencing negotiations for peace.

In submitting her proposal for an armistice with a view to the election of an Assembly, England had the support of the other leading Powers of Europe; but the prospects of peace were never hopeful, and the progress of the negotiations soon rendered them still less likely of fulfilment. "An armistice, if at present granted," wrote the semi-official *Provincial Correspondenz* of Berlin, on the 27th of October, "must either include a political guarantee of peace, or else a military guarantee that it will not diminish the chance we now have of obtaining a speedy success at Paris and Metz, as well as in the other parts of the country where fighting is going on." These were the very points on which the negotiations at Ferrières had broken off; and it was not likely that they would be more acceptable to France in October than in September. Yet there were many Frenchmen who thought the time had come for making an earnest effort for peace. Towards the latter end of October, M. Grévy, President of the Council in the Provisional Government, waited on M. Gambetta, together with some deputies of the Left and Left Centre of the old Corps Législatif, carrying with him the written authority of many political notabilities of the Republican party. He then, it is said, spoke to the following effect:—"France wishes for peace; Germany desires it, and Bismarck does not refuse to conclude it. But he does not purpose to treat, save with a regular Government, and he does not consider as such the Government of the National Defence. On the other hand, the very conditions of your accession



FALL OF A SHELL IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF PARIS.



PRUSSIAN REDOUBT COMMANDING THE BRIDGE OF SÈVRES.

to power, and the undertaking upon which you so boldly entered, do not allow you, even if Count Bismarck would consent to recognise you as a Government *de facto*, to agree to the conditions which he might consent to, were they moderated from his point of view. We are, then, in a dead-lock, and there is but one way of getting out of it, which is to hold the elections promptly, and to collect a National Assembly, from the heart of which shall issue a legitimate Government, with which Prussia will treat." * M. Gambetta seems at first to have been strongly opposed to these arrangements; and it cannot be questioned that there was something very unsatisfactory in the holding of hurried elections during the crisis of a war, and in a country many parts of which were in the occupation of the enemy. But he ultimately, together with his colleagues at Tours, consented to a proposal of Earl Granville that a meeting should take place between M. Thiers and Count Bismarck. The former was authorised to conduct the negotiations on the part of France; and, having received, through General von der Tann, then commanding at Orleans, a safe-conduct from Tours to Paris (where it was necessary for him to obtain the authorisation of the Ministers presided over by General Trochu), he started on his mission on the 28th of October.

At the same time that he listened, though reluctantly, to the English proposal for an armistice, M. Gambetta continued to incite his countrymen to the most resolute resistance. On October 24th he addressed to the Prefects and Sub-Prefects a Ministerial despatch, in which he said:—"You will inform the Mayors of all your communes that resistance to the enemy is more than ever the order of the day; that every one must do his duty, especially the municipal magistrates, who cannot do less than the mobilised National Guards, after the heroic examples set by open towns, such as Châteaudun, St. Quentin, and others, and also by villages guarded exclusively by companies of firemen. It is an absolute necessity that each town and each commune should pay its debt to the national defence, and that every one should be conscious of the duty imposed upon France. Towns and communes which surrender without having attempted resistance will be denounced to the country through the *Moniteur*." M. Gambetta was obviously not hopeful as to the favourable issue of the negotiations; and, if left to himself, it is probable that he would not have consented to an armistice at all. To send round the red cross, and stimulate to the highest the martial and revolutionary instincts of his countrymen, was at all times a more congenial task with him.

M. Thiers, after leaving Tours, passed through the line which separated the two armies, proceeded in the first instance to Orleans, and thence went on to Versailles, accompanied by a Bavarian officer, with whom General von der Tann assisted him, in order to remove any difficulties that might occur on the road. He reached Versailles on the morning of Sunday, October 30th, but did not remain there longer than was requisite for his introduction to some German officers who were to act as *parlementaires*, and to facilitate the French statesman's passage through the outposts to Paris, where he was to complete the powers which he had provisionally received from the Delegation at Tours. Having arrived at Paris, he presented himself at the Foreign Office, where the night was spent in deliberation. Ultimately, M. Thiers received the requisite authority to negotiate and conclude an armistice; and on the evening of the 31st he again passed through the outposts.

The conferences with Count Bismarck commenced at Versailles on the 1st of November, at noon. It appears from M. Thiers's report of the negotiations, communicated to the representatives of the Great Powers at Tours, and dated November 9th, that the Federal Chancellor made some reservations on the interference of neutrals, to which the French envoy listened without admitting them. With respect to the want of a regular Government in France, the Count casually remarked that some remains of such a Government existed at that moment at Cassel, seeking to reconstitute itself; but he added that he made the observation solely in order to state precisely the diplomatic situation, and not to interfere in any degree with the internal affairs of France. M. Thiers replied that he fully understood this, and that the Government which had foolishly begun and absurdly conducted the war had for ever terminated its existence at Sedan, and would remain for the French nation a shameful and painful reminiscence. The matters for discussion were then agreed to be—"1. The principle of the armistice, having for its essential object to stop the effusion of blood, and to afford France the means of constituting a Government founded upon the expressed will of the nation. 2. The duration of the armistice on account of the delays required for the formation of a Sovereign Assembly. 3. The freedom of the elections fully secured in the provinces then occupied by Prussian troops. 4. The conduct of the belligerent armies during the interruption of hostilities. 5. Lastly, the revictualling of the besieged fortresses, and specially of Paris, during the armistice." Count Bismarck did not appear to entertain any insuperable objections to these five points; and at the conclusion of the first conference, which lasted about four hours, M. Thiers believed that they would be able to agree in all respects, and conclude a convention which would be the first step towards a peaceful settlement of the international quarrel. Several conferences succeeded, and, indeed, on most days two were held; "for," says M. Thiers, "I was anxious to arrive at a result which would put an end to the din of cannon which we constantly heard, and every shot of which caused me to fear fresh devastations, and fresh sacrifices of human victims." On the essential point of the desirability of an armistice, with a view to the constitution in France of a Power with which valid and durable engagements could be contracted, both statesmen were entirely agreed.

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* Tours Correspondent of the *Indépendance Belge*.

"As regards the duration of the armistice (wrote M. Thiers), I asked the Chancellor of the Northern Confederation that it should be from twenty-five to thirty days—twenty-five at the least. Twelve days were required, I told him, to allow the electors to consult and to agree as to their choice; one day more was required for voting; four or five days more to give the elected candidates sufficient time, in the present state of the roads, to assemble at an appointed place; and, lastly, eight or ten days more for a summary verification of their powers, and for the constitution of the future National Assembly. Count Bismarck did not contest those calculations, and only remarked that the shorter the duration, the fewer would be the difficulties in concluding the proposed armistice. He seemed, however, to determine, like myself, on a twenty-five days' duration.

"Then came the grave question of the elections. Count Bismarck was good enough to assert that in the districts occupied by the Prussian army they would be as free as they ever were in France. I thanked him for this assurance, with which I should have been satisfied if Count Bismarck, who at first had asked for no exception to this freedom of elections, had not made some reservations relative to certain portions of French territory bordering on our frontiers, and which were, he said, German by their origin and language. I at once answered that the armistice, if there was any wish to conclude it speedily, as was generally desired, must not prejudge any of the questions which might be agitated on the occasion of a definite Treaty of Peace; that for my own part I declined at that moment to enter into any of them, and that in thus acting I obeyed both my instructions and my own personal feelings. Count Bismarck replied that it was also his opinion that none of those questions were to be touched, and he proposed to me that we should insert nothing on that subject in the draught of the armistice; that thus nothing would be prejudiced on that point; that, although he would not allow any electoral agitation in the provinces in question, he would not object to their being represented in the future National Assembly by notables, whose designation we should determine without any interference on his part, and who should enjoy as complete a freedom of opinion as all the other representatives of France."

With respect to the conduct of the belligerent armies during the suspension of hostilities, the Federal Chancellor was obliged to refer to the Prussian generals assembled under the presidency of the King. It was at length settled that the opposing forces should remain in the very places they occupied on the day of the signature of the armistice; that a line connecting all the points where they had stopped should form the line of demarcation; and that, although they should be free to move within that line, they were not to pass it, nor to engage in any act of hostility. Then came the difficult question of revictualling Paris, on which the whole negotiations were destined to split.

"Count Bismarck (said M. Thiers) had not raised any fundamental objection on this subject, and had seemed inclined only to contest the importance of the quantities claimed, as well as the difficulty of collecting them and having them introduced into Paris, which, however, concerned us alone; and, as regards quantities, I had positively declared to him that they should be the subject of an amicable discussion, and even of important concessions on our part. This time again the Chancellor of the Northern Confederation wished to refer to the military authorities, to whom several other questions had already been submitted; and we agreed to adjourn until the next day, Thursday, November 3rd, for the definite solution of that point.

"On Thursday, Count Bismarck, whom I found anxious and preoccupied, inquired of me whether I had news from Paris, to which I replied that I had none since the Monday evening, the day of my leaving the city. Count Bismarck was similarly situated. He then handed to me the reports of the outposts, which spoke of a revolution in Paris, and the proclamation of a new Government. Was this Paris, from which the most insignificant news formerly was despatched with lightning speed, to be diffused within a few minutes throughout the whole world? Could she, then, have been the scene of a revolution of which three days later nothing was known at her very gates? Profoundly saddened by this historical phenomenon, I replied to Count Bismarck that, should disorder have been for a moment triumphant in Paris, tranquillity would soon be restored, owing to the strong love of the Parisian population for order, which was equal to its patriotism. However, my powers were no longer valid if the reports were well-founded. I was thus obliged to suspend my negotiations until information was received. Having obtained from Count Bismarck means of communicating with Paris, I was able, on the same day (Thursday), to ascertain what had occurred on Monday (October 31st), and to learn that

I had not been mistaken in my assertion that the triumph of disorder could have been but temporary."

M. Thiers again waited on Count Bismarck the same evening (November 3rd), and remained during a portion of the night debating the question of revictualling. The previous suavity of the two diplomatists now gave place to some sharpness of utterance, and the failure of the negotiations became an alarming probability. To M. Thiers it seemed obvious that his opponent was raising a question, not of details, but of principles. He (M. Thiers) urged that it had always been settled in armistices that each belligerent should, at the termination of the suspension of hostilities, find himself in the same situation that he occupied at the commencement; that, in accordance with this custom, it had always been usual to revictual fortresses by providing each day the food for the day; and that, without such an arrangement, an armistice would suffice to capture the strongest fortress in the world. The report continues:—

"The Chancellor of the Northern Confederation, speaking then not in his own name but in the name of the military authorities, declared to me that the armistice was absolutely opposed to Prussian interests; that to give us one month's respite was to afford time for the organisation of our armies; that to introduce into Paris certain quantities of food difficult to be defined was to give to that city the means of indefinitely prolonging her resistance; that such advantages, therefore, could not be granted to us without 'military equivalents'—an expression of Count Bismarck himself. I hastened to reply that undoubtedly the armistice might bring us some material advantages, but that the Prussian Cabinet must have anticipated it while admitting its principle; that, besides, to appease the national passions, to prepare peace and bring it nearer, and, above all, to show a proper deference to the declared wish of Europe, were such political advantages for Prussia as were fully equivalent to the material advantages which she might concede to us. I then asked Count Bismarck what were the military equivalents which were required from us; but he was extremely careful not to point them out.

"He at last stated them, always with a certain reserve. 'It was,' he said to me, 'a military position about Paris;' and, as I further insisted, 'A fort,' he added—'more than one, perhaps.' I at once stopped the Chancellor of the Northern Confederation. 'It is Paris,' I said, 'that you ask from us; for to deny us the revictualling during the armistice is to take from us one month of our resistance; to require from us one or several of our forts is to ask for our ramparts. It is, in fact, to demand Paris, while we should give you the means of starving or bombarding her. In treating with us for an armistice you could never suppose that its condition should be that we should give up Paris herself to you—Paris, our chief strength, our great hope, and for you the great difficulty, which after fifty days of siege you have not been able to overcome.'

"At this point we could proceed no further. I remarked to Count Bismarck that at that moment it was easy to perceive in the resolution of Prussia that the military prevailed over the political spirit, which latter advised peace, and all that could lead to it."

The result was that M. Thiers was obliged to proceed once more to the outposts; but before starting he was assured by Count Bismarck (whose courtesy he fully acknowledged) that, should there be a wish to hold the elections without an armistice, he would allow them to be held with perfect freedom in all the districts occupied by the Prussian armies, and would also provide for easy communication between Paris and Tours. On November 5th, M. Thiers conversed with M. Jules Favre in a deserted house at Sèvres, just within the French lines. It was of course necessary for the latter, after hearing the statements of the former, to communicate with his colleagues; but the determination of the Government was not long in taking shape. M. Thiers received his instructions on Sunday, November 6th; and they were that he was to break off the negotiations on the question of revictualling, to leave the Prussian head-quarters immediately, and to proceed to Tours, in case he should be required for future services.

Some German accounts state that M. Jules Favre and the majority of his colleagues were in favour of the Prussian proposals being accepted, but that General Trochu was strongly against such an arrangement, and that his view prevailed. This, however, seems improbable; for we now know, on the authority of the general himself, that he was hopeless of the war from the first, and that in his heart he despaired of successfully resisting the siege of Paris. It is therefore unlikely that he should have opposed a project for shifting the responsibility of war or peace to the shoulders of the nation at large—a project which had been approved by the majority of his fellow Ministers in the capital. On the other hand, M. Jules Favre was one of the least likely members of either Provisional Government, after M. Gambetta, to counsel a concession to the Prussians which most Frenchmen felt would have prejudiced the defence of Paris.

While on his way from Versailles to Paris, to receive the ratification of his powers, M. Thiers, according to the correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, conversed for three-quarters of an hour with one of his escort. It has been said that the eminent French statesman loved to hear himself talk; and, on the present occasion, he relieved his feelings in long outbursts of oratory.

"He gave a detailed description of that famous sitting of the Corps Législatif, when he, prophet-like, as he imagines, expressed his firm belief in the defeat of France, and the clenched fists of more than forty Buonapartists were stretched out threateningly against him. He then described, but not without betraying a most painful sense of satisfaction for his foresight, the tumultuous scenes which took place on the 16th and 17th of July, just before the official declaration of war had taken place in front of his otherwise quiet and tranquil residence in the Rue St. Georges. M. Thiers seemed utterly to ignore the fact that he was more particularly opposed to this war, and also to the pretext which was assigned for the reason of the same, on account of his being on the benches of the Left, or Opposition; whilst, on the other hand, it was he himself who, since 1866, in continual and fulminating speeches against Germany, had fanned the smouldering embers into a blazing flame. The escort, however, had the presence of mind to recall to the memory of M. Thiers that formerly, in the year 1840, a war against Germany was part of his avowed programme. 'Yes, yes,' replied M. Thiers; 'but then, you must remember, in those times things were entirely different. The French were then most clearly and undeniably in the right. A quadruple alliance and commercial intrigues were entered into against us in secret, and Prussia wanted to create a certain quantity of accomplished facts that we could not allow to pass unheeded. In those days the point we had in view was to prevent Syria being annexed to Egypt; and then we were not unprepared for war—our army was in a most perfect state of organisation, and we had every reason to look forward to an ultimate success. On the late occasion, however,' continued M. Thiers, 'everything seemed in comparison most unfavourably disposed for us. The Emperor earnestly desired war; but on this occasion he only followed blindly the impulses given him by the Empress. Both of these people are in the last degree incapable of holding the reins which govern and guide the State; and Frenchmen now have to repent sadly and deeply for having calmly permitted for so long a period the sway and empire of such a charlatan as Napoleon III.'"

M. Thiers went on to say that he had openly and frequently warned the country and Government, but in vain. He had, in fact, been almost a second Cassandra; and he hoped that in future people would listen to him. He knew of the fall of Metz, but was far from condemning Bazaine. On the contrary, he considered him the ablest French general, and in his enthusiasm went so far as to describe his private character and reputation in France as thoroughly spotless. He did not, however, place Bazaine as a man on the same level as MacMahon, whom he styled a perfect gentleman, a modern knight "without fear and without reproach." He ardently desired peace, that France might be withdrawn from the abyss into which she was sinking. To accomplish this, a Constituent Assembly was necessary, and that Assembly must be elected by universal suffrage. In former times, M. Thiers was opposed to democratic suffrages; but he seems now to have changed his view. Having passed away from the leading principles of French politics, he began to speak of the organisation of the German army, and of its commanders. "He expressed his sincere admiration for Count von Moltke, whom he called 'the greatest strategist of modern times.' He also expressed himself highly pleased with the Prussian officers, and admired their superior education, as well as the wonderful amount of authority and influence they possessed over their men. The troops, when advancing and retreating, seemed to be so thoroughly disciplined and held in hand that they moved almost as one man—a military organisation which unfortunately had not been so well carried out in France. The French army, according to his views, was completely disorganised by the half-measures taken by the Emperor Napoleon III., against whom he seems very bitter, judging him most severely for the slightest thing." Just before taking leave of his escort, the French envoy saw Paris lying before him. Tears gathered in his eyes; a nervous crisis seemed to come over him, and he exclaimed, "Oh, what a grief to see the capital again thus!"

To the members of the Paris Government, M. Thiers, it is said, seemed in very bad spirits, especially when he spoke of the condition of France. On getting back to Versailles, some newspaper correspondents tried to obtain interviews with him; but the harassed Minister refused most of them. To one, an American, he irritably, but not unnaturally, ejaculated, "For the love of God, sir, let me be quiet!" Dr. Russell, however, was received on the 1st of November, shortly after the opening interview of the French envoy with Count Bismarck. M. Thiers told the English correspondent that he was well content with that interview. In appearance he was a good deal aged; but, in speaking, the air of languor and weakness vanished from his face, which was then lighted up with its old animation. He said he had some hope that an armistice would be arranged; but there were great difficulties in the way. He would do his best, and, if he failed, he would return to his family, and await the end. Referring to his journeys to foreign courts, and his more recent movements in France, he said he had travelled three thousand leagues, accompanied by Madame Thiers, who never left him, for fear he should fall ill on the road. Her sister was with her. M. Thiers mentioned to Dr. Russell that he had had palpitations of the heart; but on the whole he was better than he could have expected, and was sustained wonderfully on his journeys. "In the evening," continued Dr. Russell, "M. Thiers dined in a private room, off the large dining-room, of the Hôtel des Réservoirs. He had a small party of French gentlemen with him. By a strange coincidence indeed, as he was passing through the crowded ante-chamber, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern and he were standing side by side, and I doubt if either knew the other, the Prince being in his usual plain Prussian uniform, worn by many around, and M. Thiers being, of course, *en bourgeois*, and in rapid transit to his room. His dinner hour was at half-past seven. The German Princes dined at their usual hour, seven o'clock, and the Crown Prince, who was dining with the Grand Duke of Coburg in the large room, very probably saw the French Minister on his way." The appearance of the two great statesmen—Thiers and Bismarck—was contrasted by the same writer, who observed that there could hardly be two men more unlike in physique: "The Frenchman small in stature, with a low voice, modulated accents, and a very gentle manner; the Prussian huge in bulk, pronounced in speech, and apparently as much of a soldier as a statesman; most winning when he likes, but not slow to anger, it is said, and rivalling the greatest 'glutton' of hard work in his extraordinary powers of application. If M. Thiers rises at four A.M. to his desk, the great Chancellor sits at his till long past midnight. If M. Thiers has read much of the glorious days of France, Count Bismarck knows most things worth knowing of France, of Germany, and of every country in the world; and his wonderful memory enables him to lay his intellectual finger on any article in that storehouse, and bring it out for immediate use." In the progress of these negotiations, the strain on the physical and mental strength of M. Thiers must have been terrible; and it should be recollected, in estimating the powers of endurance of the French and Prussian statesmen, that the former was seventy-three years of age, while the latter was some years short of sixty. Yet a remarkable future was still open to M. Thiers, of which, at that time, he himself was probably unconscious.



THE CROWN PRINCE OF PRUSSIA GOING THE ROUNDS.

In the course of his journey from Tours to Paris,



THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS—A MEETING AT THE BRIDGE OF SÈVRES.

M. Thiers was treated by the people with great respect. In all places occupied by the German troops crowds pressed round his carriage, and told him of their woes and sufferings. He was equally well received in the districts to which the invader had not yet penetrated. Beaugency was the first free town entered by M. Thiers on his route; and here he was surrounded by large numbers of persons, consisting of soldiers and their officers, magistrates and municipal authorities, artisans and country people, who all expressed their gratitude to the eminent statesman for having undertaken to conduct peace negotiations. Some interesting details of the arrival of M. Thiers at Sèvres, on the 5th of November, to consult with M. Jules Favre on the question of the revictualling of Paris, were given in a semi-official account of the negotiations at Versailles published in the French capital. The writer related that, about nine o'clock in the morning, "General Ducrot and M. Jules Favre arrived at the Sèvres bridge. A trumpet had sounded a few minutes previously in the direction of Sèvres, and a cavalry soldier displayed a flag of truce; on the French side a similar flag had also been displayed. At a quarter to ten a small green boat left the river bank in the occupation of the Prussians, having on board a person wrapped up in a black cloak, with a parcel of papers in one hand and a hawthorn stick in the other. This was M. Thiers, whom General Ducrot and M. Jules Favre had come to meet. A conversation at once commenced, the three personages walking along the river bank, while the boat returned towards Sèvres. About half an hour afterwards two Germans embarked in her, and joined MM. Jules Favre and Thiers, and, after a few moments' talking, a mounted orderly, at a sign from General Ducrot, rode up to take a message, and went off towards Paris. The five persons continued walking up and down the river bank, sometimes all together, sometimes in groups of two, General Ducrot frequently remaining some distance behind, quietly smoking a cigar." This was the interview between M. Thiers and M. Favre which led to the breaking off of the negotiations. It is said that a visible change came over Count Bismarck's manner after he had heard of the disturbances of October 31st. He was now less inclined to adopt a conciliatory tone in the consideration of disputed points. He probably felt great doubt as to the way in which the armistice, if concluded, would be carried out by a population so prone to change, so disposed to the excesses of revolutionary violence. The courteous demeanour of the first day or two gave place to a series of witty rejoinders; and, in speaking to M. Thiers of the danger of crossing the lines, even under cover of a flag of truce, on account of the impossibility of putting a complete stop to the firing, the Count, after stating that each letter sent to the French outposts cost a man or two, added (if we may credit an anecdote in *La France*), "I may, however, assure you that you run no risk from our side, as our men in all directions were advised as early as yesterday of your passage. I cannot give you the same assurance as to your own lines; but, after all, to die by the hands of your own people would be a worthy termination of your glorious career." The story is perhaps not very probable; but it is likely enough that the disposition of the Prussian statesman to treat on liberal terms was greatly diminished after the revolutionary attempt of MM. Flourens and Blanqui. The Red Republicans, by their folly and criminality, were working for the cause of Prussia.

Count Bismarck's own account of his discussions with M. Thiers was contained in a circular dated "Versailles, November 8th, 1870." The German Minister observed that the fact of so important and experienced a statesman as M. Thiers having received full powers from the Paris Government allowed him (Count Bismarck) to hope that propositions would be made, the acceptance of which would be possible and conducive to the establishment of peace. He received the French envoy with the respect due to his personal distinction and to their former mutual relations. M. Thiers stated that, at the wish of the Neutral Powers, France was willing to agree to an armistice.

"In the face of this declaration (wrote Count Bismarck) his Majesty had to take into consideration that any armistice in itself involved for Germany all those disadvantages which, for an army receiving its supplies from distant sources, are necessarily combined with every prolongation of the campaign. Besides this, the armistice imposed on us the obligation of rationing those German troops which the capitulation of Metz had placed at our disposal in the positions they might occupy on the day the armistice was signed, and thus of renouncing the occupation of other hostile territories which could now be seized without our having to overcome any very serious resistance. On the other hand, the armistice would have given France the opportunity of developing her resources, of completing her armies now in progress of formation, and, if hostilities should recommence after the expiration of the armistice, of opposing to us troops capable of resistance, which are not now in existence. Notwithstanding these considerations, his Majesty the King allowed himself to be influenced by his wish to receive the French propositions in a friendly spirit, and to promote the restoration of peace; and I was empowered to meet M. Thiers immediately with the concession of an armistice of twenty-five, or even, as he afterwards wished, of twenty-eight days, on the basis of the military *status quo* on the day of signature. I proposed to him that we should draw a line of demarcation for the position of the troops of both countries as it should be on the day of signature, to suspend hostilities, and in the course of this time to proceed with the elections and the constitution of a national representation. On the part of the French this suspension of hostilities would have involved no other military consequence than the renunciation of little and invariably unsuccessful sorties, and of an unprofitable waste of artillery ammunition from the guns of the fortress during the armistice. With regard to the elections, I was able to state that we should insist on no stipulation which would place in question the ownership of France in the German departments before the conclusion of peace, and that we should not call to account any inhabitant of the same for appearing as the representative of his countrymen in a French National Assembly. I was astonished when the French negotiator rejected these proposals, in which all the advantages were on the French side, and when he declared that he would only be able to accept an armistice if it included the admission of the revictualling of Paris on a large scale. I replied that this admission would include a military concession going so far beyond the *status quo*, and every expectation that could be reasonably entertained, that I would ask him whether he was in a position to offer us an equivalent for it, and, if so, what that equivalent would be. M. Thiers answered that he was not empowered to make any military offer in return, and that he must demand the victualling of Paris without being able to offer anything more in exchange than the willingness of the Paris Government to allow the French nation to elect a Representative Assembly which in all probability would appoint some official authority with which it would be possible to negotiate respecting peace."

The King, continued Count Bismarck, was justly surprised at such exorbitant military demands. "The incredible suggestion that we should give up the fruits of all the exertions made and advantages gained during the last two months," remarked the Federal Chancellor, "could only supply another proof that the object in Paris was to find pretexts for refusing the nation its elections." At Count Bismarck's request, however, M. Thiers had a conference with his principals on the 5th, at the line of outposts, in order to propose either a shorter armistice, on the basis of the *status quo*, or else the simple issue of the writs for the elections, without any formally declared armistice; in which case the Prussian Minister would promise every facility not inconsistent with the military security of the German armies. These proposals were not accepted; the negotiations were broken off; and M. Thiers left Versailles for Tours on the 7th of November. The impression produced on Count Bismarck's mind as the result of these discussions was that the existing French rulers had no real desire to consult the nation through the medium of an Assembly, nor any intention of bringing about an armistice; and that they insisted on conditions which they must have been convinced would not be accepted, merely to avoid seeming to give a refusal to the Neutral Powers, for whose support they hoped.

As usual in these cases, each side threw on the other the blame of failure; each negotiator saw in the proposals of his adversary the evidence of monstrous pretensions and absurd self-seeking. A good deal might be said for both, and indeed the situation was hardly one which admitted of satisfactory arrangement. If the French had consented to an armistice of nearly a month, without any fresh food-supplies being taken into Paris, and if the active prosecution of the war had then been resumed, it is certain that the position of the capital, and consequently of the country at large, would have been greatly prejudiced by the delay. Count Bismarck's suggestion that the revictualling of Paris might be allowed if the French would give a material equivalent—in other words, would deliver up a fort, or perhaps more than one—was obviously inadmissible. Such a course, as M. Thiers truly observed, would have been equivalent to the surrender of Paris. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that one effect of a long armistice would have been to leave the invading troops in a worse position than it found them, for the reasons set forth by Count Bismarck in his circular; and it was therefore natural that the German Minister should require some compensation for the military sacrifices he was prepared to make. On the whole, however, it seems that a greater injury to France than to Germany would have resulted from the adoption of the proposed terms, in the event of hostilities again breaking out. This, of course, was no consideration for Prussia; but it was a legitimate consideration for the French Government, and it is difficult to blame them for the decision they formed. The argument of Count Bismarck, that among the advantages to the French resulting from an armistice would be the gaining of time in which to transform their raw levies into efficient soldiers, was overstrained. The time was not long enough to effect any great difference; and that difference would have been far more than counterbalanced by the reduction of the stock of food in Paris (already getting low), or the surrender of external forts. A real disposition to come to some species of amicable arrangement was evinced by the Federal Chancellor's proposal to allow of elections without any actual declaration of an armistice;

but it is not surprising that the French Government declined to entertain it. A general election under such circumstances would have been barely possible, and certainly could not have reflected, with anything like authenticity, the sentiments of the French nation. Neither party seems much to blame for the failure of these peace negotiations. The time was not ripe for a settlement, and so the attempt fell through.

On the opening day of the negotiations—viz., November 1st—General Trochu issued a proclamation to the National Guards of the Seine, in which he took a hopeful view of the situation. After referring to the riots of the previous night, declaring that the Government had not kept back the news of the fall of Metz, and making some reference to "the lamentable occurrence at Bourget, where a detachment, after having surprised the enemy, was itself so wanting in vigilance that in its turn it allowed itself to be surprised," he proceeded to consider the proposition of an armistice. "That proposition," he said, "was honourable for us. The Government indicated the conditions on which they would accept it, in terms which appeared to them to be firm and honourable. We stipulated for a period of twenty-five days at least, and the revictualling of Paris in the meantime, the right of voting for the elections to the National Assembly to be open to the citizens of all the French departments. Those are very different from the conditions that were previously proposed by the enemy, of forty-eight hours' duration, very restricted communication with the provinces for the preparations for the elections, no re-provisioning of Paris, the hostage of a fortress, and the prohibition to the citizens of Alsace and Lorraine from all participation in the vote for the national representation. The armistice now proposed is accompanied by other advantages which Paris can readily appreciate without my specifying them; and for this the Government of the National Defence is reproached with weakness, perhaps with treason." The stumbling-block of the revictualling of Paris had not yet been reached. When the rupture ensued, M. Jules Favre issued a circular on the subject, dated November 7th. By the rejection of the armistice, he said, Prussia had once more proved that she was continuing the war for a purely personal end, without regarding the true interests of her subjects, or of those Germans whom she dragged with her. "She pretends, it is true," observed M. Favre, "that she is compelled to do so by our refusal to yield to her two of our provinces. But these provinces, which we will not and cannot abandon to her, and whose inhabitants strenuously oppose her, she occupies; and it is not to conquer them that she ravages our land, drives before her armies our ruined families, and has for more than fifty days held Paris enclosed within the fiery circle of her batteries, behind which she is entrenching herself." The real object of Prussia was to destroy the French nation for the preservation of her own power, and for the satisfaction of the ambitious men who governed her. In the prosecution of this work, these men professed to be astonished that France should not become their accomplice by yielding to the weakness which their diplomacy recommended to her. Having entered on such a course, Prussia—conscious that she was offending all right feeling, and alarming all conservative interests—adopted a system of isolation, and withdrew herself from the condemnation which Europe would otherwise have pronounced. What could be more rational, more equitable, more necessary, than the proposal made by the four great Neutral Powers—England, Russia, Austria, and Italy—for a suspension of arms, with the definite object of allowing France to consult upon the election of an Assembly? "It was under the efforts of Prussia," continued M. Favre, "that the Imperial Government collapsed. Immediately afterwards, the men whom the necessities of the moment had invested with power proposed peace, and, with a view to arrange the conditions, demanded a truce, which was indispensable for the constitution of a national representation. Prussia rejected the idea of a truce by requiring impossible conditions, and her armies surrounded Paris. They had been told that speedy submission would follow their appearance. The sedition which had been anticipated had long to be waited for: it came at an opportune moment, for the Prussian negotiator announced the fact to our agent as an expected auxiliary. But in bursting forth it afforded the people of Paris an opportunity of making legitimate by an imposing vote the Government of the National Defence, which acquired thereby in the eyes of Europe a consecration of its authority. It had, then, a right to consider the proposition for an armistice made by the four great Powers, and it had a right to expect that the proposition would be accepted. Being desirous above all things of consulting the representatives of the country, and of concluding through their efforts an honourable peace, it accepted the negotiations, and entered upon them on the usual terms of the law of nations." Alluding to the failure of the negotiations on the question of the revictualling of Paris, M. Favre remarked that provisions in such a case are an element of defence. To deprive an invested town of provisions is to create an inequality that is contrary to justice. Paris would be greatly prejudiced by being obliged for a month to exhaust her provisions without fighting, while the invading army, living on French soil, would await the resumption of the war when the Parisians should be weakened by famine. An armistice without revictualling would be a capitulation at a fixed date, without honour and without hope. By refusing the revictualling, Prussia had refused the armistice.

"And yet (pursued M. Favre) if we are to give credit to a published document to which no contradiction has been given, and which proceeds from the Prussian Chancellor, she dares to accuse the Government of the National Defence of exposing Paris to certain starvation. She complains of being forced by us to besiege us and to starve us. Europe will judge of the value of such imputations. They are the last feature of that policy which commenced by pledging the word of the Sovereign in favour of the French nation, and closes with a systematic rejection of all suggestions by means of which France would be allowed to express her wishes. We do not know what the Neutral Powers will think of propositions set aside with such haughtiness. Perhaps they will perceive at last what will be reserved for them by Prussia, risen by victory into a position to accomplish her designs. As regards ourselves, we obey an imperious and simple duty, still maintaining that the proposal for an armistice is the only means of obtaining a solution by a National Assembly upon the formidable questions which the crimes of the Imperial Government have permitted the enemy to place before us. Prussia, which perceives the odious character of her refusal, seeks to dissemble it under a disguise which can deceive no one. To ask us for a month's deprivation of our provisions is to ask of us our arms—arms which we resolutely hold in our hands, and will not lay down without fighting. We have done everything that men of honour could do to stop this conflict; but the issue from it has been closed against us, and we can henceforth take counsel only of our courage, throwing back the responsibility upon those who systematically refuse all compromise. It is to their personal ambition that thousands of men may perhaps still be immolated; and when Europe, moved by the spectacle, wishes to arrest the combatants upon the frontier of the field of carnage, in order to summon together the representatives of the nation, to seek a basis for peace, they say, 'Yes, but on condition that the population of this city who suffer, these women, children, and old men, the innocent victims of the war, shall receive no assistance; so that, the truce having expired, it may be impossible for their defenders to fight us without causing them to die of hunger.'

"This is what the Prussian chiefs do not fear to reply to the propositions of four European Powers. We call right and justice to witness against them, and we are convinced that if their army and their nation were able to give a vote they would condemn this inhuman policy. Let it be well understood that up to the last moment the Government of National Defence, absorbed by the immense interests confided to it, will do everything in its power to render an honourable peace possible. The means of consulting France were refused to it, and it thereupon interrogated Paris. All Paris, in reply, rises to arms to show the country and the world what a great people can do when it defends its honour, its homes, and the independence of its country."

Nothing could be better put from the French point of view, which was undoubtedly a very strong one. But, as already remarked, the Prussians also had a case, considered on purely military grounds apart from feeling and sentiment, which are seldom allowed to have much influence in the operations of warfare; and the Prussians, being the more powerful, were in the position of command. The great problem of the war could only be solved by fighting to the last, and the struggle went on because the conditions for terminating it had not yet arisen.

Count Bismarck's circular drew forth a reply from M. Jules Favre (dated November 21st), recapitulating the whole course of the negotiations, and once more setting forth the case of France. The French Minister pointed out that the recent discussions had originated, not, as the Federal Chancellor seemed to indicate, in a request of the Government of the National Defence, which Prussia granted from a feeling of esteem for the personal character of M. Thiers, but out of a suggestion of the Neutral Powers, originating with England. Referring to the revictualling of Paris, he said:—

"The figures showing the moderate amount of supplies required for the daily consumption of Paris were minutely prepared by the Minister of Commerce, and they served as the basis of our demand, strictly limited to the number of days of armistice. In that we acted in accordance with usage and all equity, with the intention of the Neutral Powers, and, as we believed, with the assent of Prussia herself. Probably she would not have thought of withdrawing had it not been for the surrender of Metz, and without the fatal day of October 31st, which was welcomed by her with ill-concealed satisfaction. The Chancellor of the Northern Confederation dwells upon the inconveniences to which an armistice would expose the besieging army; but he makes no account of those still greater inconveniences to which an armistice without revictualling would expose the besieged town. Those inconveniences are such that they would have rendered absurd the convocation of an Assembly, which would have been necessarily powerless from the very moment of commencing its deliberations, and condemned by the sternest of necessities to submit to the law of the conqueror. An armistice without revictualling, to determine at the end of the month upon the question of peace or war, would, therefore, have been neither serious nor equitable; for us it would have been only a deception and a danger. I say the same of the convocation of an Assembly without an armistice. If it had deemed such an arrangement compatible with the defence, the Government would have accepted it gladly. Prussia may well reproach it with being 'unwilling to permit the free expression of the French people by the election of a national representation.' The need of dividing and weakening the resistance of the country sufficiently explains that accusation. But what honest man could admit it? Who does not feel the immense interest which the members of the Government have to relieve themselves from the terrible responsibilities which events and the vote of Paris have cast upon them? They have constantly sought, with an ardent desire to succeed, the most efficacious means of ensuring the convocation of an Assembly, which was and still is their most earnest wish. It was with that object that I met Count Bismarck at Ferrières. I leave it to the public conscience to determine from which side proceeded the obstacles, and whether the Government ought to be exposed to the condemnation of Europe for not having been willing to place the deputies of France under the guns of a fort delivered up to the Prussian army. A convocation without an armistice would, it is true, have spared us that humiliation; but it would have entailed upon us other cruel misfortunes. The elections would have been conducted subject to the caprices of the enemy, to the chances of war, to material impossibilities enervating our military action, and destroying beforehand the moral authority of the representatives of the country. And yet we felt so deeply the need for ourselves retiring before the regular representatives of France, that we could have braved even these inevitable dangers, if in our hearts we had not been convinced of the imperious, inflexible duty, superior to all personal considerations—the great and solemn duty of preserving the honour and maintaining the defence of France. We have cursed and condemned this war; when unprecedented disasters dragged its criminal instigators down into the dust, we invoked, in order to bring about its cessation, the laws of humanity, the rights of nations, and the necessity for assuring the peace of Europe, offering to contribute to a pacification by submitting to reasonable sacrifices. It was sought to impose upon us such terms as we could not accept, and Prussia has continued the contest, not in defence of her own territory, but to conquer ours. She has carried into many of our departments devastation and death; for two months she has invested our capital, which she threatens with bombardment and famine; and it is to crown this scientific system of violence that she invites us to convoke an Assembly which has been partly elected in her camps, and summoned to discuss peacefully amid the roar of cannon. We did not consider that combination at all practicable."



CLOSE QUARTERS.

The Government of the National Defence had accepted with gratitude the intervention of the Neutral Powers, and it had loyally endeavoured to render that intervention successful. It now willingly submitted to the judgment of those whose well-meant recommendations had not been listened to. The Government was willing to convoke an Assembly, if an armistice, with revictualling, enabled it to do so. But, in refusing this, Prussia, notwithstanding her declarations to the contrary, was seeking to augment the embarrassments of the Provisional Government by preventing it from consulting France.

To the same effect, and in somewhat similar language, wrote Count de Chaudordy, the delegate at Tours of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who, on the 12th of November, addressed a despatch on the subject to the diplomatic agents of France. The proposals of Prussia, he argued, would have resulted in this—that while the Prussians would have maintained their positions, the Parisians would



FUNERAL CEREMONY OVER FRENCH SOLDIERS KILLED DURING THE SIEGE OF PARIS.

have good-naturedly used up the means of preserving their own. "We should, indeed," said M. de Chaudordy, "have saved the ammunition, 'the useless and incomprehensible waste' so well understood by the besieging army during the past two months, which is regretted by the Minister of King William with a wholly disinterested commiseration; but we should have abridged by our own free will the precious and irreparable time during which we should have it in our power to expend it with a prodigality that causes us no uneasiness. For this reason, the longer the armistice the more injurious it would have been to us; and if Prussia had indefinitely prolonged it, the capture of Paris without the striking of a blow would have been the inevitable result of her concession." The Government of the National Defence might therefore well ask whether Count Bismarck considered that Prussia was in possession of a law of nations peculiar to itself. M. de Chaudordy ventured to hope that the Neutral Powers, whose ideas were in conformity with true principles, and who doubtless had been astonished to find Prussia arbitrarily substituting her personal interpretation for that which the law of nations suggested, would not fail to impress on the Federal Chancellor the singular nature of his pretensions, which had resulted in the failure of the negotiations recommended by them. The Delegate Minister then proceeded to show that the desired elections could not take place in a country torn by actual hostilities, large numbers of the population of which—indeed, all able-bodied men—were in arms, and engaged in the operations of war. The French Government strongly desired the elections; but those elections must be carried out under regular conditions.

It was no doubt very natural on the part of M. de Chaudordy that he should indirectly solicit a condemnation of Prussian policy on the part of the Neutral Powers. But where there was no intention of drawing the sword, any such condemnation would have been futile and undignified. The nearest approach to a foreign censure of Prussian policy was contained in a despatch written some time in October by Count Beust to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, in which, after referring to Count Bismarck's circular disclaiming responsibility for the reduction of Paris by famine, the Austrian Premier said he could not withhold the expression of his fear that in the judgment of history a part of that responsibility would fall on the neutrals if they allowed the danger of an unparalleled disaster to be set before their eyes in mute indifference. "I therefore," he went on to say, "beg your Excellency, if the subject is mooted to you, openly to express our regret that in a situation in which the Prussian Government foresees a catastrophe like that indicated in the circular, it nevertheless announces its most decided determination to repel every mediating effort of third parties, as though it feared they would ask Prussia to have shed in vain Germany's noble blood, and would deprive them of the perhaps thankless but not less laudable task of facilitating to the vanquished the acceptance of hard conditions by sparing its feelings. That determination cannot be the means of preventing the excess of horror which Prussia, on grounds of humanity to the enemy, wishes to be able to spare. In order not to be obliged to bear the punishment of the faults of the fallen Government, the Republican rulers in France are inclined to the most extreme resolutions. It cannot be a means of dissuading them from these that one allows no other voice besides the imperious command of the victor to address them. It is not considerations of their own interest which make the Austro-Hungarian Government lament that at the point at which things have arrived any pacific influence of the Neutral Powers is lacking. It is impossible, however, for it to approve and recommend the absolute reserve of unparticipating Europe, as recently evinced by the St. Petersburg Cabinet. It rather holds it to be its duty to state that it still believes in common European interests, and that it would prefer a peace effected by the impartial efforts of the neutrals to the destruction of further hundreds of thousands." At the same time Count Beust wished it to be understood that nothing could be further from the designs of the Austrian Government than to offer counsels or proposals. Only so far as looks were turned to the Neutral Powers did it concern Austria to place the existing state of things in its true light. It is said that Prussia took great umbrage at this despatch; and its prudence is certainly open to question. No one could have supposed that it would in any degree influence the policy of Prussia, or divert one blow from the already stricken head of France. It did the vanquished no service, while it enabled the conquerors to make a still further exhibition of their power by openly and contemptuously disregarding the suggestions of a neutral. If Austria was not prepared to act, a more complete reserve would have been wiser. It seems, however, that when M. Thiers was at Vienna, Count Beust concurred with him in the desirability of collective action by the Neutral Powers, though, owing to the attitude of Russia and England, he saw little hope of such a step.

M. Guizot, from the retirement of his home at Val Richer, addressed a letter, on the subject of the armistice and the failure of the negotiations to the *Times*. With respect to the refusal of the conquerors to permit the revictualling of Paris, M. Guizot gave it as his opinion that "the Prussian disregard of the right of nations had again been flagrant and exceptional." He observed that the essential principle of an armistice is the maintenance of the *status quo*, so that at the termination of the truce the belligerents should find themselves in the same position, and with the same resources, as at the commencement. A besieged city must be allowed to revictual to the extent of providing food for the inhabitants while the armistice lasts, or, at the resumption of hostilities, it would find itself in a worse position than before. "There is in this," said M. Guizot, "a principle of natural justice, and at the same time an essential element of the right of nations, which has been acknowledged in similar cases." The decision as to the amount of provisions necessary during a given time might give rise to difficult questions; but such difficulties were not insuperable. As the Prussians had succeeded in blockading Paris so effectually, and surrounding it so closely, that nothing could get into it, there need be no difficulty in limiting and controlling the sacks of flour, number of cattle, and quantity of food of all kinds, which might be required. The terms insisted on by Prussia made it impossible for the besieged inhabitants to accept the armistice, and showed, moreover, that the besiegers did not themselves desire a suspension of hostilities, and had no wish for the election of a National Assembly capable of treating for peace. France could not but look on such terms as an indirect refusal of the armistice, and must now, with such courage and strength as remained, carry on a war to the uttermost, the responsibility of which no longer rested with her.

To all such arguments the Prussians made the blunt reply that the revictualling of Paris, without a military equivalent for themselves, would be prejudicial to their interests, and that consequently they would not permit it. There is no arguing with the master of legions; and the Germans were not likely to give up an important point out of any abstract considerations. Whether, indeed, the country, in its desolated condition, could have supplied as much as the Parisians wanted, in addition to what the Germans themselves consumed, may perhaps be doubtful. It is stated that in his negotiations with Count Bismarck M. Thiers required the besiegers to allow the admission into Paris, during the armistice, of 34,000 oxen, 80,000 sheep, 8,000 pigs, 5,000 calves, 100,000 cwt. of salt meat, 8,000,000 cwt. of hay and straw, 200,000 cwt. of flour, 30,000 cwt. of vegetables, 100,000 tons of coal, and 14,500,000 cubic feet of fire-wood. At the same time all requisitions were to be suspended by the Germans. If this was really demanded, the Prussian authorities probably thought as much of their commissariat as of their military position when they refused the suggested arrangement. The conflicting interests of the negotiators were in fact quite irreconcileable, and the attempt was hopeless from the first. It was an endeavour to treat on equal terms between a belligerent who had been uniformly and astonishingly successful, and one who had lost almost everything save the furious courage of despair. If Metz had still held out—if the rear of the besieging army before Paris had seemed to be seriously menaced—if the French armies in the provinces had given proof of efficiency and good generalship—if the invaders had suffered a few defeats, and the French in any one direction had been advancing—M. Thiers would have met Count Bismarck on something like terms of equality. As it was, he was terribly overweighted. It would have been to the advantage of the French if the negotiations had taken place only a few days later; for on the 9th of November the Army of the Loire, under d'Aurelles de Paladines, inflicted a severe reverse on von der Tann at Baccon and Coulmiers, in consequence of which the Germans were compelled to evacuate Orleans, and fall back on Toury. Had M. Thiers been able to point to such a success—which he missed by only three or four days—it is pretty certain that Count Bismarck would have been less exacting. For a time the communications of the besieging army before Paris were seriously endangered; and Bismarck would probably have found no trouble in convincing Count Moltke and the King that it would be prudent to conclude an armistice on liberal or even generous terms. But ill-luck pursued the French from first to last; and on the present occasion they were really not to blame.

M. Gambetta, in accepting the armistice negotiations, only did so with reservations. He sent a pigeon-despatch to Paris, tendering his resignation unless substantial guarantees were given that the armistice would not be a snare. Before the pigeon could have reached its destination, he received news that the attempted compromise had failed. It cannot be questioned that he heard that news with satisfaction. The progress of events threw increased and increasing power into his hands; and it was by stimulating the revolutionary and warlike passions of his countrymen, and preaching a kind of holy crusade against Teutonism and monarchy, that he hoped to rescue France.

CHAPTER XXX.

Augmentation of the Defences of Paris—Formidable Redoubts, Barricades, Trenches, and Mines—Theatrical Performance at the Comédie Française—Order of General Bourbaki prohibiting the Singing of Soldiers in the Streets—M. Gambetta and the Prefects—Economy of the Government—Suppression of the Imperial Guard—Prophecy of an Ursuline Nun—Alleged Secret Treaty between Russia and Prussia—The Decreasing Food of Paris—Fights at the Meat Markets—Eating of Horseflesh, Dogs, Cats, and Rats—Tragical Incident at a Hospital—Positions of the Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony—Arrangements of the Germans before Paris—The Firing from the French Forts—Count Bismarck and the Ambassadors of Small States shut up in Paris—General Trochu and his "Plan"—Daring Feat of a Prussian Spy—A Prussian Officer within the French Lines—Distribution of Iron Crosses—Anecdotes of the King and Crown Prince—The Societies for the Relief of Distress—Sufferings in the Neighbourhood of Metz—Mr. Bullock and the Ruined Villages—Widespread Poverty and Disease—Alleged Brutality of German Officers—Death of Dr. Davis, the Black Physician.

ASSURED that their last hope was in vigorous resistance, the Parisians addressed themselves with feverish energy to the defence of the capital. Fresh earthworks, redoubts, and rifle-pits were constructed, and barricades of great strength were thrown up within the walls themselves, at all vulnerable points. Adjoining the railway-station on the Neuilly side of Paris, a stone barricade, five feet high, with apertures left for musketry, was erected across the road, and a similar pile was to be found in the adjoining Avenue de Malakoff. A third appeared in the Avenue de la Grande Armée; and, close by, the iron railings which mark the limits of the *octroi* were lined on the inside with stout timber, pierced with loopholes for musketry, and provided with a wooden stage for the marksmen to stand on. The regular siege-works in advance of these temporary constructions were coloured green on the side towards the Avenue de Neuilly, so as to resemble the turf of the ramparts, and to be almost undistinguishable from it. Beyond the drawbridge at this point, an extensive, angular-shaped earthwork stretched some way into the Avenue, and was strengthened behind with a double row of tall stockades, converting the work into a species of redoubt. Other stockades were carried across the fosse on both sides of the drawbridge, and the large gas-pipes and water-pipes, laid bare by the continuation of the moat across the road, were cased with timber studded with long iron spikes. The trees in the Avenue, for a distance of 800 feet, were all cut down, so as not to offer cover for the enemy, and the stumps were sharply pointed, in order that any Prussians who might trip over them in a night surprise should receive as much injury as possible. The handsome villas of the gentry at this spot were pulled down, and the gardens destroyed. The little mortuary chapel erected to the memory of the Duke of Orleans was the only edifice allowed to stand in that direction. At the foot of the redoubt branches of trees, interlaced and sharply pointed, formed a threatening *chevaux de frise;* and the slope of the embankment was faced with stout planks, bristling with iron spikes, and topped with several rows of short posts, connected, a few inches above the earth, with lines of wire, and forming altogether a kind of man-trap. The ground in front of this earthwork was intersected in various directions with narrow trenches, communicating at intervals, from one end of the Avenue de Neuilly to the other, with large, deep holes, which the sentinels would not allow any one to approach, but which were supposed to form part of an extensive system of mines—an official report having spoken of the sewers at the Bois de Boulogne, Billancourt, Neuilly, Clichy, &c., as so many mines lying concealed below the surface.* At night the besieged frequently used the electric light to discover objects on which they designed to fire.

A writer from Paris said that the city had at this time 500,000 Mobiles, and a regular army of 75,000 soldiers, to hold the villages outside the ramparts, to make sorties, and, in combination with 18,000 sailors, who acted as artillerymen, to man the forts. At the gates, and on the *enceinte*, there were numerous cannon. The National Guards numbered about 300,000; but the weapons of some of these were bad, and the officers generally were ignorant of affairs of war. The attempt to obtain volunteers for active service outside the gates had proved a miserable failure, and the Government did not even venture to carry out the law which subjected all between twenty-five and thirty-five years of age to enrolment in the army. Under these circumstances the defence of the capital did not look very hopeful.

When the investment had lasted several weeks without anything very dreadful occurring, the Parisians fell to some extent into their accustomed life.

They at length, in the course of October, even ventured on a theatrical performance at the Comédie

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* Correspondent of the *Times*.

Française. This was given for the benefit of the sick and wounded in the capital. The thing being a novelty, a large audience assembled, and hundreds of persons were unable to obtain admission. Two very peculiar features of the performance were that there was no change of scenery, and that the actors performed in private costume. The director of the theatre explained that the absence of appropriate background resulted from the destruction or removal of nearly all the scenery belonging to the theatre; and that the non-employment of theatrical dresses was dictated by a scruple of delicacy under the melancholy circumstances in which the capital was placed. A kind of lecture by M. Legouvé opened the evening's entertainment, and was followed by scenes from the "Misanthrope" of Molière, and the "Horace" of Corneille; the whole concluding with the "Marseillaise," sung by Mademoiselle Agar. The net receipts amounted to 3,000 francs; and the *Gaulois* expressed a hope that this timid attempt might be followed by bolder measures, the theatre being, in its view, a necessity for Frenchmen, and especially for Parisians. Shortly afterwards, other theatres were opened in a similarly cautious manner. In a different direction, however, anything like gaiety was discouraged. The commandant of Dunkirk issued the following order with reference to street singing:—"General Bourbaki, superior Commandant of the region of the North, expressly forbids the troops, especially the Garde Mobile, to walk about the streets in bands, singing. It is lamentable, as regards discipline, for the men to whom the country looks for the maintenance of public tranquillity thus to set an example of disorder; and it is scandalous that at a moment when all France is in mourning for brave men fallen in defending her, soldiers called to replace them should sing songs which are insulting to the public grief. The colonel commanding the place, in making this last appeal to the good feeling and patriotic hearts of our young Mobiles, is confident that it will be listened to. If the event were otherwise, the most severe measures of repression would ensure the maintenance of discipline." It is quite conceivable that this prohibition, harsh as it sounds, may have been justifiable. The tendency of some of the newly-recruited soldiers to go about their duties in a semi-theatrical or masquerading spirit was unquestionably detrimental to military exactness and solidity. General Bourbaki probably felt the necessity of issuing some such order to his troops.

To guard against those surprises from which the French so frequently and so severely suffered, the Tours Delegation issued, on October 28th, a circular to the Prefects concerning the measures to be taken to ascertain the enemy's movements. In this circular M. Gambetta observed that by collating all the documents received from the Prefects and Sub-Prefects the Government would be enabled to form an idea of all the invader's marches and counter-marches. The instructions to be addressed to the Sub-Prefects and Mayors were as follow:—

"To all the points where the enemy's presence may be notified the Mayors are to send emissaries, whose duty it will be to observe—1st. The numbers of the enemy's troops, carefully distinguishing the different arms—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. 2nd. The route taken by the corps observed, the place of departure, and the presumed point of its destination. 3rd. The hour of its arrival at any given spot, the duration of its stay, and the hour of its departure. 4th. The minutest particulars should in all cases be sent, because many circumstances, which may appear unimportant to the observer, may have their value in the eyes of military men. The Mayors should every day transmit to you, or the Sub-Prefect of their arrondissement, and that by the most rapid means of communication possible, a bulletin containing the information above indicated. You will instruct these magistrates, in selecting their emissaries, whether for the purpose of observation or the transmission of news, to avail themselves of the postmen, gendarmes, cantonniers, and any intelligent and trustworthy inhabitant. The Mayors will be held personally responsible for any negligence in the organisation of this service, and I am fully resolved to try by court-martial any Mayors who may fail in their duty. The Sub-Prefects, when they receive the documents furnished by the Mayors, will make a concise analysis of them, which they will transmit to you either by telegraph or express. This despatch should always indicate the degree of confidence to be placed in the information conveyed. A duplicate must be addressed to me directly by the Sub-Prefect. In order to be able to check the information, the Sub-Prefects should have recourse to special emissaries, and, in case of need, they may form committees of arrondissement. And you, M. le Préfet, for your own part, will not fail to forward any intelligence which may reach you directly, independently of that supplied by the Sub-Prefects. You will also communicate all you know to the general commanding the department. You will particularly insist upon all communications being made in the quickest manner possible, without the slightest regard to hierarchical routine, as you must perceive that the value of this sort of information depends entirely on celerity."

The project seemed reasonable in itself; but it never bore any fruits. Either the Prefects, Sub-Prefects, and Mayors were remiss, or the disorganised state of the country, and the discipline, energy, and promptitude of the Germans, effectually prevented the transmission to Tours of the desired intelligence.

In the impoverished condition of the land, the Government thought it right to turn their thoughts towards economy. The Minister of Finance called the attention of his colleagues, at an early period, to the necessity of enabling the National Exchequer to meet the exigencies of the time. "Economies," said the *Paris Journal*, "are to be made everywhere, except in the War Department. There are, first of all, the £1,068,000 of the Civil List and the princes and princesses of the Imperial family, which will no longer be paid. The abolition of the Senate saves £220,000, and that of the Council of State £60,000. The new Councillors of State will receive only £6,000, and the Masters of Requests will be reduced to £320. The salaries of Prefects of the first class are reduced to £520, those of the second class to £480, and of the third class to £400. The Sub-Prefects will receive £240, £200, and £160, according to class. The Ministers propose the reduction of their own salaries to £2,000. The Directors-General will have £600, instead of £1,000, and the Sub-Directors £320 or £400. The members of the Government of the National Defence will receive no pay." On October 26th the Imperial Guard was abolished. There was certainly no place for an Imperial Guard under a Republic; yet the brilliant traditions of the corps, and the misfortunes it had so heroically borne, gave an air of pathos to its rather unceremonious dismissal.



THE PRUSSIANS AT VERSAILLES.

It is strange that in the midst of so many grave and serious facts the French should have found time to discuss alleged prophecies supposed to have a bearing on the existing state of things. But periods of great national trial are always periods of superstition. The minds of men and women, perpetually agitated by unlooked-for and disastrous events, are lifted into the regions of mystical speculation, and thrown into that state of emotional sensibility which is most favourable to occult influences, whether real or supposed. The *Constitutionnel* published a document known in certain parts of France as "the Prophecy of Blois."



THROWING UP STREET BARRICADES IN PARIS.

This prophecy was made in 1808 by an Ursuline nun of that city, and she averred that troubles would come upon both Blois and France in 1848 and 1870. "While foretelling terrible troubles to France in 1870," wrote the *Constitutionnel*, "the nun went on to predict the saviour accorded to France, and added that he should be a man whom the country did not expect. According to her prophecy, the great afflictions were to begin after the middle of July, and before the vintage. The troubles foretold were to affect the capital especially, in which there was to be a fearful fight and very great massacre. 'Both good and bad will fall in battle, for all the men will be called out, and only the old men left in the place. The time,' added the nun, 'will be short; for the women will prepare the vintages, though the men will return to complete the work. Meantime no news will be obtained, excepting through private letters. Presently, three couriers will arrive at Blois, of whom the first will bring tidings that all is lost, the second will be in too great a hurry to stop at all, and the third, who will come by fire and water'—probably, that is, by railway—'will be the bearer of good news. A *Te Deum* will then be sung, such as never has been heard sung before; but this *Te Deum* will not be in honour of him who reigned at the first, but for the saviour granted to France.' The prophecy of Blois ends by a statement to the effect that 'the Prince will not be there; they will go and seek him elsewhere; and after the Prince has ascended the throne, France will enjoy peace and prosperity for twenty years.'" Two letters subsequently appeared in the *Abbevillois* relative to the authenticity of this document. The first was from a preaching friar of the Dominican convent at Abbeville. He said that in order to ascertain the truth with regard to the prophecy, which was exciting much interest in France, he had written to the Sister Sainte Claire, the Superior of the Ursulines of Blois, for information, and had received from her a reply, which contained the following passages:—

"I do not know by what train of circumstances our sisters of . . . became convinced that they possessed an authentic copy of a prophecy which never was written. The accounts given by the newspapers, although they reproduce the chief incidents (and that without any information from us), add to and misrepresent a number of the details. What is correct is that in 1804 an attendant of the convent who had lived in the obscurity and simplicity of a life of abnegation and devotedness to our house, which was at the time in extreme poverty, was visited on her death-bed by a young postulant, now Mère Providence. The dying woman seemed rapt in the contemplation of realities that surrounded her. The future appeared to be unfolded before her eyes in a series of animated pictures which she made known by exclamations. Most of the events which she communicated were connected with the house, and have been fulfilled in a most striking manner. The others announced political revolutions, which were verified in 1848. Some, however, seem now to be coming to pass; but no date was stated. The newspapers fixed these afterwards. Mère Providence, on hearing all these predictions, said to the dying woman that it would be better for her to confide matters so serious to a nun than to a postulant about to quit her noviciate in consequence of the violent opposition of her family. The sister replied, 'When you are of age to take your vows, your mother will no longer oppose your doing so; and it is to you alone that I wish to confide these things, because it is you alone who will see their fulfilment.' In fact, six months after the death of the attendant, Mère Providence lost her mother, and was at liberty to devote herself to a religious life, and she alone survives of all her contemporaries. . . . Although she is ninety-two years of age, she enjoys quite exceptional gaiety and health. . . . No precise date was fixed by Sister Marianne; yet Mère Providence never confounded the events of 1848 with those of the present time; and, of late years, when the political horizon became overclouded, she gave the following answer to questions put to her:—'No; it is not the time for "great events."' Now she thinks that the time has come. It was, in fact, very difficult to decide whether Sister Marianne wished to speak of a civil war, or of a war against foreigners. However, some details which have not been given by the newspapers left us in no doubt. The invasion and its consequences were very clearly announced."

It will be observed that the account given by the Superior of the Ursulines considerably reduces the dimensions of that published by the *Constitutionnel*. The "great events" which were to happen in France were not assigned to any precise year, nor does it seem that the exact nature of them was unfolded. The prophecy, therefore, appears to be of much the same vague nature as those to which we are accustomed, at the close of each year, in the obscure announcements of the so-called "prophetic almanacks." That a dying nun, accustomed for years to religious raptures and mystical language, should fancy, in the delirium of the great final change, that the secrets of the future were being confided to her, is not very remarkable. The only surprising part of the business is that so many otherwise sensible persons should attach a supernatural value to such extremely nebulous visions, and should persist in making an arbitrary application of what seems to have been merely general. It is noticeable that these prophecies are always wanting in precise details and names. Still, they command a number of enthusiastic believers. The age of omens, moreover, is not yet past. When the French peasants saw the Aurora Borealis at the close of October, they thought it a sign that the Germans were about to be driven out of France in torrents of blood.

Of more practical importance was a statement communicated to the English papers, at the close of October, by the London agents of the *Moniteur Universelle.* In that statement it was affirmed that when the war broke out the Emperor of Russia declared to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg that it was his intention to preserve the strictest neutrality, provided that Austria did the same. Austria had already made a formal declaration of neutrality; but she had increased her armaments, though slowly, on the ground that they were not adequate to the usual peace footing. At this Russia took offence, and, a few days after the declaration of the Emperor Alexander to the French Ambassador, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris received instructions by telegraph to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and call his attention to the fact that the neutrality of Russia was conditional upon, and entirely subordinate to, the inaction of Austria. Russia, in short, would, under all circumstances, regulate her armaments according to those of the Emperor Francis Joseph; and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires even asked the French Government to declare that they would take no steps whatever having for their object to bring Austria into alliance with France, so that, by causing Austria to desist from arming, they might ensure the neutrality of Russia. This, adds the French writer, occurred at the commencement of the war, before the first reverses of the French arms, and when the assistance of Austria was yet possible. The statement then proceeds:—

"The French Minister replied that he was not informed of the extraordinary armaments of Austria, which seemed so to alarm the Russian Government; that, moreover, if Austria was really arming, he had no pretence to remonstrate with the Cabinet of Vienna with a view to obtaining the cessation of preparations which evidently could in no way be directed against France. Besides, he did not see anything objectionable in Russia arming on her part, if she thought fit, nor would he be any the more disposed to make such a course the object of diplomatic representations, for he was persuaded that such would in no case, on a question of this character, conduce to any alteration in the resolutions of the Russian Government. As to the demand that he should declare in advance that in no case would France seek an alliance with Austria, such a declaration at the commencement of a war would be at least inopportune, and could not justify itself sufficiently by the prospective neutrality of Russia. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires then said that France would, nevertheless, find such a course her interest, and a certain advantage; for the moment that Austria declared against Prussia, that same instant would Russia take the field against Austria. 'Then,' replied the French Minister, 'that must be because you have a secret treaty with Prussia.' That the armaments of Austria should have provoked similar movements in Russia as a measure of precaution, might be regarded as a natural consequence; but the moment that Russia declared her readiness to attack Austria if the latter sided against Prussia, it became evident that, before the war, a treaty had been entered into between Prussia and Russia. And this is what had happened, as has since been made manifest by the course of events. What are the clauses of that treaty? This question will naturally occur to all experienced politicians, and, although the two Sovereigns have preserved absolute secrecy upon the reciprocal conventions, it is not impossible to determine what are their principal points. Those who are acquainted with the traditional policy of Russia—of the two currents of opinion which divide that vast Empire—those, in fact, who can form an estimate of the various elements which at the same time constitute its power and its weakness—will find no difficulty in foreseeing with what object the Emperor Alexander has bound himself by treaty to the King of Prussia. As its further development proceeds, this question will doubtless receive further attention. For the present it may suffice to establish clearly, by information the accuracy of which is guaranteed, that Russia is in the Prussian camp, and that she is there by virtue of a treaty of which England would do well to seek to ascertain the clauses, so as to be able to anticipate their consequences before it is too late to avert them."

The subsequent action of Russia with regard to the Treaty of 1856, and the degree of support which that action received from the Prussian Government—events to which we shall have occasion to allude more particularly hereafter—gave colour to this obscure story, which doubtless proceeded from some member of the Provisional Government. The Emperor of Russia was assuredly well inclined towards his uncle, the King of Prussia; yet it must not be forgotten that, immediately after the battle of Sedan, he offered to make terms between Prussia and France, and to guarantee the territorial integrity of the latter if the terms were rejected by the former—an intention which was put to flight by the Revolution of September 4th. The personal inclinations of the Emperor Alexander were often at issue with the anti-German feelings of a large proportion of the Russian nobility. As the war went on, with continual success to Prussia, the individual admiration of his relative entertained by the Czar must have been in some measure tempered by fear of the effect on Russia of this excessive development of German power; and the policy of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg may have been modified in consequence, although still remaining, on the whole, friendly to Prussia.

With greater and greater sternness each day did the food question present itself to the Parisians. The capital was certainly not yet in the condition represented to the world by over-sanguine Prussian journalists, who kept announcing every week that Paris had only provisions enough for a few more days, and must very speedily succumb, even without a bombardment. Yet the distant approaches of famine began to be seen. In addition to horseflesh, dogs, cats, and rats were eaten, cleverly disguised and seasoned by the ingenuity of French cooks. Some of the animals in the Jardin d'Acclimatation were slaughtered for the table. At the beginning of November beef and mutton were served out at the rate of fifty grammes (or one ounce and two-thirds) per head. A few of the current prices at this time may be appended, for the sake of comparison with those of about a month earlier, given at p. 401. Horse was sold at 1f. 25c. per lb.; ass and mule at 3f. The price of a goose was from twenty-five to thirty francs, whereas before the war the bird fetched not more than seven francs. Chickens were from fourteen to fifteen francs; a brace of pigeons could not be had for less than twelve. Ham was eight francs a pound; and charcoal had risen to a price which must have greatly distressed the poor. The anxiety to get food was such that there were daily conflicts at the markets. The women, according to a Paris journal, literally fought for the articles offered for sale. A lady of distinction, writing to a friend on the 6th of November, said:—"I was two hours and a half getting my piece of horse yesterday (Saturday), and was very much pushed; but it was nothing to the meat crowd on Friday—the barrier thrown down twice, and I very much hurt. I don't remember in the least how I was got out. The women are like devils. I quite understand the scenes of the Revolution. Yesterday, one of the guards was nearly killed, and carried away on a stretcher." The same lady wrote:—"I can't tell you how hungry we often are. . . . . . I am so glad my little baby is in England. I fear she would starve in the arms of her mother here." Still, for the present there was no lack of the coarser and less agreeable sorts of viands. The number of horses still remaining was large; a good deal of salt meat was stored at the Opera; bread, of an inferior quality, was plentiful; and wine and spirits were practically unlimited. In addition to the usual Paris markets for horses intended for slaughter, on Wednesdays and Saturdays, it was decided that extra markets for the same purpose should be opened on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Fridays. On those days the show of horses was very large, and a Government Commission attended to examine the animals exposed for sale, and to brand all which appeared fit for human food. Asses and mules were also sold in the same market, and were in great demand. The French had already introduced the eating of horseflesh, as a useful addition to the food resources of the country; so that to many this substitute for beef did not come as a novelty, nor involve any great violation of accepted tastes, as it would do in England, where hippophagy has never been favourably received. In other respects, however, the Parisians were compelled to make some strange experiments. An English newspaper correspondent speaks of having eaten a *salmi* of rats, and says that the flesh was white and very delicate, like young rabbit, but with more flavour. The price of rats seems to have been sevenpence each; and it is asserted that they were exhibited publicly for sale in some shops. Another writer commends the flesh of cats.

Sometimes very tragical incidents arose out of this terrible food question. One such occurred among the Sisters of Charity of the Cochin Hospital. From that establishment was distributed every day, to all poor persons who called, milk for infants and the sick. One day a woman who was among the usual applicants, called at a late hour, and was informed by the Sisters that by that time very little milk was left, but that they would give her all they could spare. Having been supplied with three-quarters of a jug-ful, the woman became extremely angry, and left the place uttering loud threats. She went the next day, and was still in a very violent mood. On the third day she got into the house, seized a large knife from a table, hid herself in one of the passages, and plunged the weapon into the breast of the poor nun, as she came that way. The injured woman lingered three or four days, and then died.

The Germans before Paris settled themselves more firmly in their military positions every day, and now began to prepare themselves for the winter. A correspondent of the *Times*, early in November, made a tour of the investing lines of the northern semicircle—the theatre of operations of the Meuse or Maas Army, as that of the Crown Prince of Saxony was now officially called. Of the arrangements of this force he wrote:—

"Immediately after the march of the 3rd and 4th

Armies from Sedan to the neighbourhood of Paris, the Crown Prince of Saxony fixed his head-quarters at La Tremblay, a village to the north-east of St. Denis. When he was in a position to completely form his line, he removed his troops to Margency, a village to the north-west of St. Denis, and almost at the other extremity of his field of operations. The various corps of the Maas Army are now thus arranged :—The Garde Corps, commanded by General the Prince of Würtemberg, has its head-quarters at Gonesse, north-east of St. Denis ; the 4th Army Corps, commanded by General von Alvensleben, has its head-quarters at Soisy, a little to the south of Margency ; and the 12th Royal Saxon Army Corps, commanded by General his Royal Highness Prince George of Saxony, has its head-quarters at Le Vert Galant, about two English miles south of La Tremblay, and on the high road between Metz and Paris. The French works against which the Maas army has to contend are those of St. Denis, composed of La Briche, La Double Couronne du Nord, and Fort l'Est, Aubervilliers, Romanville, Redoute de Noisy, Fort de Noisy, Redoutes de Montreuil and de la Boisserie, Fort de Rosny, Redoute de Tontenay, and Fort Nogent. There are several lines of posts on the German side. So faithfully did the French population, for some twenty miles round Paris, act on the advice of M. Thiers, that they deserted all the villages and châteaux within that radius. The result is the German generals have an excellent base of operations and shelter for the main body of their troops. Their outer posts occupy the houses in those districts, and telegraphic communication has been established between each village. The advanced and foreposts, if not always under shelter, are near it, and within signalling distance of the reserves. They have temporary wooden barracks wherever these would not present an object for the enemy's fire. The disposition of the posts is such that a concentration of all branches of the service can be effected in a very brief space of time. Only the foreposts are exposed to constant danger, though shells do now and then fall in the villages occupied by the outer lines. The French advance-posts fire often, and sometimes with field-guns, but hitherto the effect has been very trifling. Some of the German foreposts are within two English miles of French forts, and the French endeavour to shell the sentinels, but with little success. No persons other than the troops actually on duty there are permitted to go to those advanced positions. This is a regulation of which no one can complain, because the moment anybody is visible at one of those points the fort commanding it begins to fire shot or throw shells, and the post is rendered still more dangerous for the sentinels. Argenteuil, to the east of Sartrouville, is exposed to almost perpetual firing, and the advanced posts of both the French and the German armies approach each other at no very great distance from that village. The guns of Valérien are occasionally brought to bear on it, but La Briche is its deadliest enemy. Livry, a village south of these head-quarters, and garrisoned by a portion of Prince George's army, also comes in for its share. Shells from Boligny and the Bondy field-works frequently fall in its streets ; but they have killed no one. It is an almost incredible fact that since the 12th Royal Saxon Army Corps has been in these parts, now a period of six weeks, it has lost only twenty men by the fire of forts and by sorties, though its lines, outer and inner, extend from Auluny to Chelles, a distance of some seven English miles."

The invaders took the best possible methods to defeat the expectation of the Parisians that they would either die of cold and hunger while prosecuting the great siege, or would be shattered and dispersed by sorties. Every house in every village along the lines of investment was filled with troops ; so that the want of tents was not felt. The provisions of the army were chiefly derived from the country itself ; but some were sent from Germany. All the soldiers were well fed, and even the privates were amply furnished with wine and cigars. Brandy was served to all men on outpost duty, and could be procured by others at the canteens—of course at their own expense. Field-works, for the active prosecution of the siege, were thrown up on an immense scale, and extended from the foreposts to the reserves. Points which, in the earlier days of the investment, were full of danger to the besiegers, had by November been converted into positions of great strength. The neighbouring forests had been cleared, to the extent of enabling the Germans to bring their cannon and rifles to bear directly on the advancing French in the event of a sortie. Barricades formed of earth and trunks of trees had been constructed to cover the artillery ; and so complete a system of telegraphy was established, from the outer lines to head-quarters, that on a shot being fired against any of the foreposts the fact was immediately made known to the reserves. Any movement of troops from the forts was instantly communicated to all the head-quarters ; and by this wonderful electric agency the whole army, scattered as it was over a circuit of many miles, was animated by one purpose, one concentrated intelligence, and one simultaneous will.

The outposts were shifted every day ; every eight days all the battalions changed quarters ; and arrangements were made so that no battalion should be long exposed to particularly dangerous or trying work. In one direction the troops were up to their ankles in wet clay ; but they were relieved once a week, and in the meanwhile were provided with special luxuries. At the outposts attention was constantly kept alert by the firing of the enemy from the forts. This firing often appeared purposeless, and a hundred projectiles would be launched against the Germans without hitting a man, or drawing a single shot in return. Dr. Russell relates that one day the outpost officers of the two armies at a particular locality had a friendly chat, in the course of which the Prussians asked the French why they fired so unremittingly. The latter replied that it was not they, the regular troops, who did it, but the Mobiles. The firing, however, had this advantage for the Germans, that it gave them the range of the French guns in every fort; and in this way it was made manifest that the range in some instances was unexpectedly long. Measures were accordingly taken for putting the men beyond reach of danger from this cause.



GENERAL VON ALVENSLEBEN.

The position of the Ambassadors of various small States remaining in Paris was felt by them to be so difficult that they requested Count Bismarck to be allowed to communicate with their Governments. The Count, in his reply, reminded them of his warning of the 26th of September, that such intercourse must be subordinate to military exigencies; and he then proceeded to remark:—

"The present French authorities have thought proper to fix the seat of their Government within the fortifications of Paris, and to select that city and its suburbs as the theatre of war. If members of the Diplomatic Body accredited to the former Government have decided to share with the Government of the National Defence the privations inseparable from residence in a beleaguered fortress, the responsibility for this does not rest with the Prussian Government. Whatever may be our confidence that the signers of the letter of the 6th of October would know how, in their communications to their Governments, to conform personally to the obligations which their presence in a besieged city may impose on diplomatic agents according to the rules of martial law, one must take into account the possibility that the importance of certain facts in a military point of view might escape them. It is evident, moreover, that they are not in a position to give us the same guarantee for the messengers whom they may employ, and whom we should have to let pass to and fro through our lines. Things in Paris are in a position to which modern history offers, with regard to international law, no analogy. A Government, at war with a Power which has not recognised it, has shut itself up in a besieged fortress, and sees itself surrounded by a portion of the diplomatists who were accredited to a former Government, superseded by the Government of the National Defence. In view of such an anomalous position, it is difficult to lay down rules



KILLING AN ELEPHANT FOR FOOD IN THE JARDIN D'ACCLIMATATION.

on principles of international law which, from every point of view, appear incontestable. I hope and believe that your Excellencies will appreciate the accuracy of these observations, and the considerations which prevent me from complying with the wish expressed in your letter of the 6th of October."

The Ambassadors were therefore obliged to remain; but it is difficult to see how they could have done any good to their Governments by staying, nor how the Germans would have been injured had they departed outright. To the latter proceeding, however, Count Bismarck would probably not have objected.

One of the most awkward symptoms among the Parisians at this time was a growing disposition to jeer at General Trochu and his "plan." The "Besieged Resident" of the *Daily News* remarked that, although all the members of the Provisional Government, with the exception of the general himself, were lawyers—and, including Under-Secretaries of State, the Prefect of Police, and the various provincial Prefects, Commissaries, and other high functionaries, there were eighty of them—Trochu, the only soldier of the body, had the most lawyer-like spirit of all. His colleagues said that where they split straws into two, he split them into four. Those who knew Trochu in his native province of Brittany related that, long before he became a great personage, "the plan of Trochu" was a standing joke against him. He was fond of playing at piquet, and whenever he sat down to a game he would observe, "I have my plan." He generally lost; but on rising he was commonly heard to say, "My plan, however, was good." The bystanders never could see the least evidence of any plan at all, good or bad, and it was suggested that he had got "plan on the brain"—but the word, rather than the thing. It should, however, be recollected, in justice to Trochu, that, when speaking in the Assembly after the peace he asserted that his plan had been materially and fatally altered by the more extreme members of the Government, and especially by Gambetta. Whether his own scheme, supposing it to have been carried out in its integrity, would have had any greater success, may be a question; but he must not be condemned for the failure of a method against which he tells us he protested, though ineffectually. In November, however, people did not know the secrets of the Provisional Government, and they supposed that the Governor of Paris was supreme in military matters, whereas he seems, by his own account, to have been subordinate to civilians. "The plan" became a byeword, and it is always a dangerous thing when Parisians are furnished with an excuse for raillery.

Another dangerous feature of the times was the want of cohesion and mutual sympathy between Paris and the provinces. In the country towns, thousands of workmen were now wholly out of employment, and many others were working only half-time. Trade was almost at an end, and in several quarters it was usual to say that Paris had commenced the war, and was now continuing it. People contrasted the comparative safety of the Parisians, who had walls to protect them, with their own defenceless condition in small open cities, where the Prussians came and took everything they had. In Paris itself, the Mobile Guards began to resent the predominance of the capital, and to contend, in published addresses to the citizens, that the provinces must have a voice in the question of peace or war. They complained of being assigned all the hard blows, while the Parisians spared themselves, and of being withdrawn from their own parts of the country, which were thus laid bare to the invader, in order to defend Paris. Some even went so far as to say that they would not fight any more for the capital, and that Paris must save herself.

The Prussians were still excellently served by spies, even in Paris, if we may accept as fact a wonderful story told by an English writer. This gentleman one day saw half a dozen Mobile Guards firing apparently at a stack of chimneys on the roof of a tall house. On closer examination he perceived a man in military uniform holding a blue flag in one hand and a red flag in the other, and wearing in front of him a long apron painted a dull red, with thin white lines, so as to resemble the brickwork of the neighbouring chimneys, between two of which he was crouched. Having been observed waving his flags—of course as a signal to the Germans without the walls—he was repeatedly aimed at by the Mobiles, but was not once hit. In a little while he slid down the slated roof, and dropped into the balcony of the floor beneath, through the window of which he disappeared. The Mobiles at once entered the house—which was a large one, fully occupied—and searched it from top to bottom for upwards of an hour, without, however, discovering any traces of the Prussian spy who had thus dared to signal, in broad daylight, and from a populous quarter of Paris, to his comrades beyond the fortifications. Another story, illustrating the coolness and daring of Prussian officers, was told about the same time. Lieutenant Hoffman, of the 12th company of the Royal Grenadier Regiment, was one day talking before the Crown Prince of what went on at the outposts; upon which his Royal Highness said, in a laughing way, "I wish you would bring me a late Paris newspaper from one of the houses beyond the lines." When next the lieutenant was on duty, he went in advance of the sentries, and in the dusk slipped into a house within a few hundred yards of Fort Valérien. Here he found an Englishman, at whom he levelled his revolver, and at the same time demanded the last Paris newspaper. It was produced, and the master of the house entreated the officer to receive some wine, in order that he (the master) might tell his countrymen that the foray had been made for the sake of drink. The Crown Prince doubtless valued his newspaper when he got it, and the courageous and spirited young officer was not likely to be overlooked. The second of these incidents was trifling in itself; but it showed the stuff of which Prussian officers were made.

Officers and men were alike recompensed in an ungrudging spirit for any special military excellence which they might have exhibited. On the 4th of November, as on the 26th of September, the Crown Prince of Prussia distributed a number of Iron Crosses to deserving officers and privates. Three detachments of Roeder's Horse Cuirassiers, Dragoons, and Lancers were drawn up along the avenue in front of the Trianon. The Prince rode slowly along the front, loudly cheered by the men, especially when he gave them "good morning." Having taken up his position, he commenced the work of decorating the chosen heroes. Each came out as he was summoned, and reined up his horse near to that of his Royal Highness, who spoke a few words, and held out his hand at the close. The soldier placed his own hand in the hand of the Prince, who shook it; and, in riding back to the ranks, he knew that he carried with him the famous decoration. According to a general estimate made by the German Ministry of War after the peace, the number of persons who received the Iron Cross during the campaign amounted to about 40,000. The statement is somewhat startling; but it appears that in the War of Liberation (1813—15), when the army was not more than a fourth the size of that of 1870—71, the number of Iron Crosses distributed was 15,700.

In connection with this mode of rewarding merit, the *Ost Deutsche Zeitung* told a very pleasing anecdote. "The King, in company with the Crown Prince and several generals," said the writer, "lately visited the wounded in the palace of Versailles, and asked them what their wounds were. He stepped up to the bed of a Silesian belonging to the 47th Regiment, whose right leg had been amputated, and who had also been shot in the right shoulder. On the King asking the soldier where he was wounded, he replied in his Silesian dialect, 'Here, your Majesty; I have lost my right leg, and that puts me out, for now I cannot march into Paris; and the rogues have shot me here in the shoulder into the bargain.' All smiled, while the Crown Prince said, 'Well, my son, you shall have an artificial leg, and so advance into Paris with us, notwithstanding.' The frank Silesian rejoined, 'Yes, your Royal Highness, I believe that, but I can no longer merit the Iron Cross.' The bystanders laughed; but the Crown Prince put his hand on the brave fellow's head, and said, 'That, too, my son, you shall have;' and the King nodded approvingly, and walked on. Two hours afterwards an adjutant came and presented the brave Silesian with the Iron Cross." Another anecdote, showing the paternal kindness towards the soldiers exhibited by the King, is to the effect that, seeing a private absorbed in reading a letter, his Majesty asked if he might look at it. On doing so he found that the soldier's sister was about to be married, and that his old mother regretted he should not be present. The King at once gave him leave of absence for a sufficient length of time, and furnished him with money to perform the journey. .

There were other recognitions of good deeds, which should not be forgotten in the midst of purely military details. The Crown Prince, on the 2nd of November, addressed a letter to Colonel Loyd Lindsay, Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War, thanking him for the noble contribution he had brought for the use of the afflicted from that association. He warmly acknowledged that on this as on other occasions of distress the help of the English public had been poured out with a liberal and impartial hand; adding that the gifts which had been offered in so truly Christian a spirit had excited a feeling of heartfelt gratitude among the recipients, and in the whole German race. The Queen of Prussia, on the 8th of November, wrote from Homburg to the English International Society in the following terms:—

> "I have observed with sincere admiration the generous manner in which the English nation are striving to alleviate the fearful sufferings of the present war, taking part in the care of the numerous sufferers, and aiding the different institutions and hospitals by the erection of ambulances of their own equipment, as well as by supplying stores, and by numerous donations. In the position in which I stand to the German committees, I feel it to be a pressing duty to acknowledge this to the English committee for the care of the sick and wounded warriors; and in my own name, as well as in that of my country people far and near who have benefited by the aid and succour thus accorded, I

tender them my most sincere and heartfelt thanks. By such proofs of true philanthropy the nation honours itself, and preserves its old reputation of being in all cases the first to enter the lists in the interest of humanity. The committee may also be well assured that what we have to thank them for in this respect will be acknowledged and received in the most grateful manner amongst us in Germany."

While these great bodies were at work attending to the necessities of the sick and wounded soldiers, various philanthropists were equally busy relieving the distress of the peasantry in the vicinity of Metz and other regions left desolate by the ebbing waves of war. The Society of Friends had a number of agents in the neighbourhood of the great fortress on the Moselle; and the Mayor of Pouilly, a small place situated about seven miles from Metz, gave one of their commissioners some sad details of the sufferings of the people. The commune contained 280 inhabitants, and had been continually occupied by the Germans from August 11th to November 4th. Of many of the houses only the four outer walls remained. Three-fourths of the inhabitants were without any potatoes; no wheat was to be had; all the cows were taken, or were dead of the cattle-plague; fowls, pigs, and sheep were equally wanting; the agricultural implements of the farmers had been destroyed; and neither wood nor coal was forthcoming. One of the agents of the Society of Friends wrote from Metz:—"The distress is heartrending. I have to-day made out our plans for feeding the villages, sixty in number, where the people are starving, and find that we shall next week, when we open the depôt, have, of actually destitute, starving people, nearly 8,000 souls. We do not propose even to give meat; we cannot afford so great a luxury. All we can do is to give a little flour, a few potatoes, and a little salt, with now and then a bit of bacon to flavour the dish, enough to prevent the poor people dying of sheer starvation. This, served out once a week to each village, and entrusted to the Mayor and council of each commune to see to the equitable distribution, and that none who can afford to buy should be allowed to have any of the food, is all that we can do; and even then I have great fears lest the money will not be forthcoming to continue this work. What is the prospect for the future? In England, with our system of poorhouses and oversight, it would be a rare thing, and one made much of, that any should die of starvation. There is no help for the poor in France. Every one has his own misery, and, as one Mayor said, 'If they cannot get food, they must either take to robbery and pillage, or die.' There is no work at this time of the year in the fields, and the forges, mines, and mills have all been standing for three months, the bread-winners prisoners in a foreign land, of whom a Prussian officer said to me the other day at Pont-à-Mousson, 'Ah! one-fourth of all those poor fellows will never see their own land again!' Of the rest, many thousands are in arms in the different districts, or shut up in besieged fortresses. What are the poor wife and mother, and the children, to do?" The same writer speaks of riding over country beaten down by the passage of armies, and ploughed with the wheels of artillery; the land lying waste and unsown, the houses ruined on every side for miles, and the men, women, and children presenting the sad, hopeless, pinched look of hunger. Mr. W. H. Bullock, who had the administration of the *Daily News* Relief Fund, wrote from Falaise, near Vouziers, on November 9th, that although, to eyes accustomed as his had been to the sight of Bazeilles—an awful memorial of human vengeance wreaked on victims of whose innocence he had taken the utmost pains to convince himself—scarcely any sight could appear melancholy in comparison, yet the blackened ruins of several houses at Falaise impressed him anew with the dreadful reality of war. Beaurepaire, nine days before, was a hamlet containing about thirty families, but had since been transformed into a little Bazeilles, with a single family lodging in the single outhouse which remained. Yet Mr. Bullock reported that for the most part the march of the German armies was not traceable by burnt houses and villages, or by any conspicuous marks of wholesale devastation. But of interior pillage he heard everywhere; and, in addition to other evils, the rinderpest had been introduced by the invaders, and had spread so fast, that in the commune of Grand Pré alone, which before the war possessed from 240 to 250 horned cattle, only fourteen remained. The hamlet of Beaurepaire was fired by a party of German troops sent for that purpose by the commandant of Grand Pré, as a punishment for the trouble caused to the invaders by Francs-tireurs hidden in the neighbouring woods. A German captain and several soldiers had been shot dead on the road; and so the village was doomed to destruction, on the presumption that it had "harboured" the irregulars. "But," asks Mr. Bullock, "if armed Francs-tireurs come into a village to provision themselves, how is it possible for the innocent villagers to resist them, even if they had the will?" At Voncq this gentleman found at least 130 houses burnt to the ground. The place had been thus treated on account of a few stragglers from Ducrot's army corps having, on

August 29th, in combination with some civilians, resisted the advance of the Prussians. A third of the village remained untouched, and into this fragment the whole of the population was compelled to crowd. Voncq was visited by a similar fate in 1792; but the National Convention voted 400,000 francs for its restoration. The terrible sufferings which Mr. Bullock had to investigate and relieve may be judged from his description of what he and Mr. Hugman, of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, encountered at the village of Grandes Armoises. The first family they visited was that of a man named Grafteau, a forester, who had served as a guide to General Marguerite, commanding the cavalry of General Ducrot's division, at the head of which he fell at the battle of Sedan.

> "In the first room we entered (writes Mr. Bullock) were Grafteau's two daughters, both in an advanced stage of fever, with hectic cheeks and glazed eyes, which told unmistakably of the fire burning within. In the inner room, in one bed, lay Grafteau's wife, in the same advanced stage of the disease, and in a second bed their only son in a most critical state. All four appeared to have death written on their countenances, and Grafteau himself looked ill and emaciated, and no wonder, for he told me he had not taken his clothes off for three weeks. The curate, a most interesting young fellow, who accompanied us on our rounds, appeared to be sickening of the disease, and complained of its premonitory symptoms. Mr. Hugman prescribed for him some quinine, for which he was very grateful. After visiting three or four other families, Mr. Hugman remarked emphatically, 'It is regular starvation.' In addition to their fever, some patients were suffering from boils and abscesses, indicative of poverty of blood, induced by low diet.
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> "In the four families whom I visited after Mr. Hugman's departure, I found two patients in the first, one in the second, three in the third, and four in the fourth. Out of the seven patients in the last two families, four were in a most critical, almost moribund, condition. Three of them were brothers, named Nivois, all young men; and the fourth, a young man too, of the name of Closquinet. Of the brothers Nivois, I fear all three will die, for the disease had assumed the encephalic form in one if not in two of the cases, and the mouth of the third was filling with blood. I could not ascertain that any doctor had seen them since they were attacked. In the house of Closquinet, who is a miller, there was sitting up by the fire the skeleton of his little daughter, deadly pale, but pronounced convalescent. The mother, who had apparently consulted no doctor, had abstained from giving her milk, for fear of its being bad for the poor child. I prescribed any quantity of milk she could take, and plenty of broth."

One of the daughters of Grafteau subsequently died. At a small farm in the commune of Mon Dieu, Mr. Bullock was told that upwards of sixty German troops, in addition to several officers, had been quartered there. The daughter of the farmer was lying ill in bed; and it was alleged that this poor girl was compelled to give up her room to the officers, who monopolised the small stock of wine which the house contained, in spite of the entreaties of the farmer's son that they would leave a bottle for his sick sister. The whole of the bread was seized by the Germans as it was baked, and devoured by them. The entire family were deprived of their beds, and the conduct both of officers and men seems to have been in the highest degree harsh and arrogant.

Such, at least, was the statement of the poor people after the departure of their unwelcome visitors; but evidence of this nature is of course open to the suspicion of being coloured by personal feeling; and Mr. Bullock, while relating the story, bears testimony to the general courtesy and politeness of German officers. Still, there are rough and dictatorial natures in all armies, and the state of war is not the best for keeping such natures in subjection. The disposition to follow one's own will and pleasure as the sole law is terribly pampered by the unbridled capability of doing so. Every campaign in which one side is hopelessly vanquished, and the other uninterruptedly successful, repeats these scenes of insolence and cruelty. The severest rigour of discipline, the utmost vigilance of commanders, will fail to prevent the recurrence of such incidents; and it is only by noting the greater indignation which they excite in our times, as compared with former periods, that we can measure the progress of humanity even in the rough and gory paths of war. Down to the early days of the present century the fury of conflict was unabated by any consideration of justice, or any sentiment of compassion. The absence of publicity encouraged the excesses of brutal natures; and it is to be suspected that we have never heard, and never shall hear, one tithe of the horrors committed in any war up to the general peace of 1815. Battles, however, are now fought under the manifold eyes of the press, not merely of Europe, but of America. Every field, every city, every village, lies beneath that scrutinising glance, and not an atrocity can be perpetrated, even in the obscurest mountain nook, but the world hears of it, and records its judgment for all posterity. We have yet to see whether this change in the conditions of warfare will materially alter the character of modern fighting. To some extent, indeed, it has already produced an effect. We maim our fellow-creatures with a more infernal ingenuity than ever; but when the mischief is done we have the best of hospitals, the most comfortable of ambulances, the most humane of nurses, the most devoted of surgeons, and the most ample of funds, for mitigating the agonies we have so elaborately prepared. Yet the chief elements of war are what they always have been. Ferocity once aroused still disregards the limits that divide fair contest from illicit tyranny; and when armies are set loose in an invaded country it is impossible to say what cruelties may not be performed, or what sufferings of civilians may not be added to those which the actual combatants are in a manner expected to endure.

One of the most earnest, devoted, and benevolent assistants of the sick and wounded in the east of France fell a victim to his noble exertions. Dr. Davis, a native of Barbadoes, and a man of colour, who had taken the degree of M.D. at the University of Aberdeen, died at Pont Mangy, on November 27th, of confluent small-pox. He was only twenty-eight years of age, but had already given evidence of great capacity. Having recently paid a visit to England for the sake of obtaining subscriptions, he had travelled so continuously in order to get back to his patients that, on arriving at the scene of his labours, he was quite worn out. In this state of prostration he went through the small-pox ward of the Sedan Military Hospital, and there caught his death. In the early weeks after the battle of Sedan, he had devoted himself to the care of several hundred wounded Bavarians; and even before they were off his hands he had formed and carried out the project of establishing soup-kitchens at Pont Mangy and Balan, for the relief of the peasantry. His body was followed to its grave at Fond de Givonne by a large number of sorrowing poor, and the Mayor spoke some eloquent words over the coffin. Such men as Dr. Davis—and they are many—redeem the brutal rage of war from utter devilry. They do more. They raise the common level of our common nature, and bring it nearer to the lights of heaven.



TRANSPORT OF PRUSSIAN AMBULANCE CORPS.



M. GAMBETTA STARTING FOR TOURS.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Dreary Opening of November—Deputation to the Delegate Government—Speech of M. Gambetta—Resignation of Generals in the Regular Army—Circular of M. Crémieux—M. Gambetta and the Schoolmasters—The Freemasons of Paris and the Prussian Royal Family—Letter of M. Guizot—Position of Garibaldi at Dôle—Addresses delivered by him—He leaves Dôle, and proceeds to Autun—Reconnoitring Expedition of Colonel Teinturier towards Dijon—Incidents of the Expedition—Autun, its Situation and History—Opposition of the Priests to Garibaldi—Measures for the Maintenance of Discipline—Alleged Outrage of Troops at the Bishop's Palace—The Peasants and the Garibaldians—Ricciotti Garibaldi and the Francs-tireurs—Investment of Belfort—Situation and Strength of that Town—Action of the Germans—Capitulation of Verdun—State of the Town after the Bombardment—Capitulation of Neu Breisach, of Thionville, and of La Fère—Complete Investment of Montmédy.

NOVEMBER opened with a gloom and darkness, so far as the fortunes of France were concerned, worthy of the month of fogs, of gathering twilight, and of hastening decay. Yet M. Gambetta did not lose heart, if any one else did. He was ready with speeches and proclamations, encouraging resistance to the utmost, and promising success if people would work for it. On the afternoon of November 1st a deputation, accompanied by a crowd of 2,000 persons, proceeded to the Hôtel of the Prefecture at Tours, where the Delegate Ministers were assembled, to present a resolution demanding a levy *en masse*, together with the creation of departmental commissions to push forward the defence, and remedy what they described as the inertia and incompetency of the municipal and general councils of the late Empire. In reply to these demands, M. Gambetta harangued the crowd from the balcony in a fiery speech. He called on the citizens to arm themselves, and to conquer or die. He averred that the Republic would live if they willed it; that the will alone was necessary, and that they *must* will it. The Government, he observed, could not do everything: the people must act for themselves, to make the war really national throughout the country. A cry being raised for arms, M. Gambetta replied that the Government had made the utmost efforts to procure them, but had been met by the competition of the enemy. He shortly afterwards issued a decree calling to arms all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty-one and forty, without any exception whatever. On the present occasion, his address was received with loud cheering; and his auditors doubtless went away with the conviction that, as he had observed, they had only to "will" the success of the Republic, and it would succeed—an act of faith in the power of the human volition to overcome all extraneous obstacles similar to that of the poet Shelley, who believed that evil itself might be made to disappear from our planet if people would only determine that it should do so. Of course the dream of the French statesman was more within the limits of possibility than that of the English poet; yet in those November days it required a sanguine spirit to lay any strong hold on such anticipations.

In one respect M. Gambetta was doing the best he could to prejudice the national defence. He was disgusting the regular generals by his furious accusations of treachery against the commanders who had recently capitulated. In addition to General Cambriels in the east of France, it now appeared that General Briand, at Rouen, and General Hubra, at Toulouse, had resigned their commands; and, as we have already seen, General Bourbaki relinquished his post at the head of the Army of the North a few days after receiving it, but was persuaded to remain. These actions were doubtless owing to the intemperate and hasty language of M. Gambetta and of some of the Republican newspapers. The *Siècle*, for instance—a journal of great respectability—spoke of Marshal MacMahon as "a white-livered captain." Officers who had not been appointed by the Republic could hardly fail to see that while this style of criticism was not only tolerated by the existing authorities, but encouraged and stimulated by them, the position of all who did not belong to the dominant party was highly precarious. M. Crémieux exhibited a creditable superiority to such factious motives in a circular in which he deplored and condemned the illegal arrest in some parts of the country of judges who had served on Louis Napoleon's mixed commissions in 1851-2, by which various persons were transported to Cayenne. The Minister of Justice said that, "however odious and detestable those tribunals were, and even admitting that the judges were guilty of a crime, the statute of limitations applicable to criminal prosecutions absolved them in 1862, and it was a wanton and intolerable breach of the law to molest them." He desired that all judges of this category might be at once released from illegal incarceration, but at the same time promised to take into consideration any measures necessary to purge the judicial bench of judges who were a disgrace to it.

As a means of propagating Republican ideas, M. Gambetta determined on calling the schoolmaster to his aid. He therefore addressed to the Prefects and Sub-Prefects of Departments a circular, embodying the following directions:—

> "Every Sunday absolutely, and at other times in the week if possible, the schoolmaster of each commune should read publicly to the inhabitants, assembled at the Mairie or other convenient place, the principal articles published in the *Bulletin de la République.* The public should be informed of the time and place for such readings. The schoolmaster will have especially to impress upon the people those articles of doctrine or history, the object of which is to enlighten men's minds, to give them a knowledge of their political and social rights, as well as of their correlative duties, and to impress upon them the essential truth that it is the Republic alone which can ensure by its institutions the liberty, the grandeur, and the future welfare of France. I need not point out the high importance of this eminently moralising propaganda. For twenty years the Empire has systematically laboured to retain the people in a state of ignorance, and to corrupt them, in order to use them as an instrument of its despotism. It is our task to elevate the mind of the nation; to develop in it the ideas of justice and independence, the sentiment of patriotism, and the civic virtues; and to prevent by this intellectual and moral regeneration a return of the lamentable catastrophes which are at this moment afflicting the country."

M. Gambetta does not seem to have asked himself—What if the schoolmasters should happen to be of opinion that the Republic, instead of saving, would be the ruin of France? The energetic Minister fell into the error that appears to belong naturally to every French politician—the determination to thrust his own ideal on all men, and to allow of no diversity of opinion. He forgot that what his countrymen really wanted was elementary instruction, not political propagandism, of which at all times they have a great deal too much.

The lamentable disposition of the Parisians to commit blatant acts of folly was exhibited in a citation to appear at a given date, directed by the Freemasons against the King of Prussia and the Crown Prince. The citation was published in the *Opinion Nationale*, and ran as follows:—"In the name of outraged humanity—in the name of violated liberty of conscience—in the name of despised right and justice—the Freemasons William I., King of Prussia, and Frederick William Nicholas Charles of Prussia, Royal Hereditary Prince, are summoned to appear personally, or by representatives having some Masonic qualification, on Saturday, the 29th of October, 1870, in the Masonic Hall, 35, Rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, at seven o'clock in the evening, to answer the charge of perjury brought against them by the Parisian Freemasonry. Should they fail in coming forward, or in sending representatives in accordance with the present citation, an *ex-officio* defender shall be appointed in their behalf, and proceedings shall be taken according to masonic usages." This was followed by the signatures of Venerables and Delegates of the Lodge. Of course the illustrious offenders did *not* appear, and the ultimate effect of the proceedings was that they were condemned, and excluded from the benefits of the Masonic body. It is strange that no one should have seen the childish absurdity of a proceeding which could only have provoked derisive laughter wherever it was known. Some doubt exists, however, as to whether the persons issuing the citation did not belong to a spurious Masonic body.

It was about this period that M. Guizot, in writing to a friend, remarked:—

> "The misfortune of our country is that it is ever ready to console itself with delusions; but discouragement is as bad as delusion. We must undoubtedly possess sufficient moral and material force to resist, and resistance is now the only means for us to achieve such conditions of peace as we could tolerate, and such a peace as would have any chance of being durable. The admirable firmness of Paris has already had a great effect upon the Prussian mind. They now see the difficulty of their enterprise, and are disposed to be less exacting than they were. Do your utmost to urge the provinces to come to the aid of Paris. There is our salvation! Repeat what M. de Calonne said to—I forget now what great lady—who asked him a question, which I don't remember: 'If it's a thing possible, it's done already; and if impossible, it *will* be done.' I am glad that you have been called to a command. You will guide the brave and stimulate the timid. Normandy, in my neighbourhood, is not what may be called enthusiastic. It is far from being Republican, but it understands the situation. It is intelligent and firm; it will defend itself well, and has already begun a little. From all I hear, Paris is prepared to hold out for a very long time. It is well commanded, and has an excellent spirit. 'To Paris! to Paris!' should now be the cry. I have four sons on the ramparts, and in spite of all difficulties in the way of correspondence, I sometimes get a few lines from them, and what they say gives me confidence. But they want help and provisions."

The position of Garibaldi at Dôle became one of great hazard after the capture of Dijon by the Germans. Vesoul was again occupied by the invaders; so also was Beaune; and Belfort was surrounded.

The German line now presented the form of a crescent, extending from Belfort to Beaune, with Dijon, Gray, and Vesoul as central points.* At many of the chief places about Dôle the enemy was strongly posted, and a few skirmishes with the Garibaldians occurred from time to time. On the 7th of November Garibaldi himself addressed the Italian volunteers serving under him, and said, in substance:—"We meet again, my lads: you, young and vigorous; I, old and infirm. In accordance with my principles, we are fighting for the Republic; not merely the French Republic, but the Universal Republic. I am very glad to be at your head again, my old soldiers. Remember that to you is confided the honour of Italy. Many of you have fought with me the battles of our country. I hope I shall be worthy of your cheers for the Republic, Universal and French." Cheers were of course given for both those Republics, and the old chief was duly honoured. Shortly afterwards Garibaldi was ordered by M. Gambetta to remove with his army to Autun, and on his way thither he was again annoyed at finding that the railway bridges had been broken down by the French. However, he at length reached his place of destination. Here he made a speech to some ladies assembled at the Prefecture, whom he reminded that the Empire governed by means of the clergy. Priests had shared the assassinations and the triumphs of Buonaparte, and had led France to the deplorable state in which it then was. "Hence," he continued, "you ought to keep the priests at a distance, because the salvation of France depends on the determined will of the people to maintain the Republic. You know my principles; they are those of humanity, liberty, and emancipation of the people. In America, as in Europe, I have fought for them. The fraternity and equality of men were the moving springs of my actions; and for this I make war on tyrants. Don't think that I love war. I detest it as the most monstrous thing in the world. Believe me, I have the consciousness that my hands are pure of innocent blood; yet for the last forty years I have never sheathed my sword, and I am among you at my old post." Their situation, he said, was by no means desperate; but courage was needed. War must be waged by peasants as well as by armies; and if the former could not fight in the open plain, let them retire to the forests, and there harass the enemy. Then they would no longer see four Uhlans devastate an entire district. "But for this," said Garibaldi, "you must make the priests leave off setting the peasants against the Republic; see that they teach them to respect and desire liberty. You ladies and women ought to take the initiative in this, ought to bring all your influence to bear, so that the priests no longer deprive the nation of the most efficacious part of its army—the peasants." Here a lady in the crowd said, "General, the priests don't deter the peasants; the latter are not provided with arms fit to meet the Prussians." This statement was met with protests from the mass of the people present, many of the poorer women crying, "The priests *do* hinder the peasants from going; the priests are for the Emperor." Garibaldi rejoined that he was glad to find the majority on his side. He did not ask the peasants to attack the enemy in the open field; but he repeated that even the badly armed might do some service in the woods. A voice suggested that many of the Francs-tireurs were peasants. "Some are, I admit," replied Garibaldi; "but if all went, we should have a thousand instead of a hundred companies. Remember what I say. Your priests are at the bottom of the misfortunes under which France is labouring. They tell your peasants that I am a brigand; they prevent them from coming to our aid. Now do you, individually, with your woman's influence, teach them better. You will have rendered as great a service to your country as do your brothers and husbands and sons who have gone out to fight." This exhortation was received with loud cries of "We will! we will!" and Garibaldi, in acknowledging some complimentary words, begged the ladies, in their instructions to the peasants, not to forget that it is impossible to be a good Republican without being perfectly honest.

Of the journey to Autun, the correspondent of the *Daily News* wrote:—

"Although the special train had been ordered for half-past six o'clock, it was nine before we left the station. The packing of the thousand Garibaldians who were to accompany us and the horses of the Staff took a tremendous time. Our train consisted of forty carriages, waggons, and trucks, besides a saloon carriage for the general and the Staff. As eight trains, with the remainder of the troops, were to follow us during the course of the day, we could only have one locomotive, and the consequence was that we moved along dreadfully slow. Our first stoppage was at Mouchard, where we found the two platforms swarming with Mobile Guards, who received us with shouts of 'Long live Garibaldi!' On my happening to ask them to what department they belonged, they told me that they were from the Meurthe. They had left, shortly after the commencement of the war, 1,500 strong, and were now only 350. Besides the Mobile Guards, there were between 200 and 300 regular soldiers belonging to different regiments. At Lons-le-Saunier the train waited for a few minutes while the general received the Mayor of the town. We here caught sight of fifteen trucks of straw piled up as high as a wagon-load of hay, which were to follow us to Chagny. They had come from Besançon. While the Mayor was being received by the general, his carriage was surrounded by a compact crowd, who climbed up the steps, and hung on by the railing, shouting, 'Long live Garibaldi!' 'Long live the Garibaldians!' At Bourg, where we arrived at half-past three, there was a regular rush for eatables; and during the few minutes that we remained in the station the buffet was literally stripped of everything in the shape of food that it possessed. Up to the present we had reached the different railway-stations quite unawares, so that the crowds that awaited us were by no means numerous; but at Maçon, where a telegram to provide rations for the soldiers had been sent, the crowd had assembled in considerable numbers. As the train entered the station, we were received with the same cries as had greeted us all along the road. Garibaldi, who wore the red shirt, an ample grey cloak lined with red, and a scarlet silk neckcloth hanging across his shoulders, took off his black felt hat in acknowledgment of the greeting, and answered, 'Long live the French Republic!' Shortly after our arrival, the Prefect, the Mayor, the commander of the National Guard, and several of the members of the committee for the defence of Maçon, were received by the general. His carriage was then crowded with people, each of whom endeavoured to touch his hand, or to say a word of welcome. It was a peculiarly touching sight to see these crowds of Frenchmen, who cannot fail to have on their conscience the melancholy remembrance of Mentana, welcoming Garibaldi and his thousand red shirts as the saviours of France. . . . . . At Chagny, which we reached tolerably late in the evening, the general left his carriage and proceeded to the office of the station-master, where he was shortly afterwards joined by General Michel and the commander of the troops concentrated in the neighbourhood of that town. During the interview, the news of Garibaldi's arrival got spread in the town, so that during the hour that we remained at Chagny almost all the interior of the railway-station became crowded with Gardes Mobiles, soldiers of the Line, and civilians, all of whom were most enthusiastic in their endeavours to catch sight of Garibaldi. After the interview with the French generals, Garibaldi received a certain number of civilians, probably the officials of the town, among whom I noticed several ladies. . . . . . We arrived at Autun at one o'clock in the morning, and, in spite of the late hour, a welcome even more enthusiastic than that with which we had been greeted all along the road awaited us. One side of the general's carriage was so enclosed by the crowd that for several minutes it was impossible for him to descend. I should mention that Garibaldi is suffering from rheumatism, and it is necessary when he enters or leaves a carriage for certain members of his Staff to give him their arm. For four or five minutes the great patriot stood upon the step, answering the cries of 'Long live Garibaldi!' by those of 'Long live the French Republic!' 'Long live the Universal Republic!' Then the people wanted to bear him in triumph to the carriage that was waiting outside the railway-station, which was only prevented by the earnest supplications of the officers of his Staff. After a great deal of difficulty, the general reached his carriage, which at once drove to the Prefecture, where an apartment had been prepared in advance by the aide-de-camp who had preceded us."

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* Correspondent of the *Daily News.*

In the meanwhile, an expedition on a small scale had been sent by Garibaldi in the direction of Dijon. Captain Farcy, who accompanied this expedition, said, in an account which he afterwards gave of its proceedings, that the 1st battalion of the Francs-tireurs, Volunteers of the Rhone, composed of 178 privates and eight officers, under the command of Colonel Teinturier, left Dôle on the 2nd of November. The men had already seen some service, and were well armed, half with chassepôts, and half with Minié carbines transformed into breech-loading rifles. Captain Farcy was ordered by Garibaldi to accompany the expedition, in order to keep him informed as to what was going on in that portion of the country lying between Chagny—about a mile beyond which town the French advanced posts were stationed—and Dijon, occupied by the Germans, whose advanced posts were at a few hundred yards from the city. The distance between Chagny and Dijon is nearly five-and-thirty miles. In the entire plain between the two towns, there was not, Captain Farcy reports, a single French soldier or National Guard. The expedition left Chagny on November 3rd, and at twelve o'clock the same day passed the last outposts of the French army. They encountered many inhabitants of the several villages escaping towards Chagny with carts laden with furniture, and driving before them their sheep, cows, and oxen. The soldiers, joking them, said the enemy was not in the direction they were taking, and exhorted them to accompany the expedition. "Where are you going to?" asked the peasantry. "To Dijon," answered the Francs-tireurs. A few of the peasants, wishing to show their courage, said, "Ah, if we had but arms!" But, on some being produced and offered to them, they hastened away towards the south, as if afraid of being enlisted by force. In the neighbourhood of Meursault it was thought prudent to send out scouts a certain distance ahead. Having passed through Pommard, the Francs-tireurs reached Beaune early in the evening, and were received by the inhabitants with the greatest joy. The latter expected the Germans, and were afraid of reprisals in the event of any defence being offered. The National Guard, it appeared, had been disarmed, so that the enemy could have entered the place without any resistance, although, according to Captain Farcy, the town is protected by old fortifications which might have been readily defended Had the surrounding hills, he adds, been occupied by armed men, it would have been impossible for the Germans to enter without heavy loss. So wanting in spirit, however, were the townspeople, that the officials at once presented themselves to Colonel Teinturier, and begged of him to abandon the town, and leave it to its fate. With some trouble the colonel and his troops obtained permission to pass the night under cover, and the men were lodged in the barracks at the town-gate. In the course of the evening eight men belonging to the ex-National Guard agreed to enlist in the troop. "This figure," observes Captain Farcy, "gives a very unfavourable opinion of the patriotism of a town of 11,000 inhabitants. In order to put our new recruits to the trial, we dressed them in the familiar blue blouses and trousers, and sent them out, two by two, in different directions, to obtain information of the enemy's whereabouts. They left Beaune at eight o'clock in the evening, and returned at four in the morning with information concerning the position of the German outposts. Fifteen German scouts were at Clos-Vougeot, and twenty-five at Pont de Pani, on the road to Autun, which traverses the valley of the Ouche. Several people from Dijon estimated the enemy quartered in that town at 7,000 men, with artillery. Two of them had seen, at about four o'clock the same afternoon, a pontoon bridge mounted upon wagons, and ready to leave the town. Others informed us that a considerable number of German cavalry scouts had been sent out from Dijon to scour the surrounding country." After deliberating with his officers, Colonel Teinturier decided on leaving Beaune, with a view to surprising the Germans at Pont de Pani. The



GENERAL BLUMENTHAL.



FRENCH FUGITIVE SOLDIERS IN SWITZERLAND.

expedition again set out on the 4th of November, and, after proceeding some distance, was informed that the enemy was marching upon Nuits. The Francs-tireurs, therefore, at once took to the heights, and, dividing into three companies, occupied the hills running from Beaune to Nuits, Corton, and Prumeaux. Thirty men were sent reconnoitring in the direction of Nuits. As night deepened the French lit large fires on the hills, so that the German scouts might think that the road from Nuits to Beaune was well defended; and they had the satisfaction, the following day, to learn that this device had saved Beaune from being occupied by the enemy. At ten o'clock at night they were forced by the cold to abandon the heights. The men had not eaten since the morning; but, after a little foraging, they came upon a farmhouse, where they obtained bread and cheese and wine. On the following day (November 5th) they decided on carrying out their first idea—viz., to surprise the Prussians in the valley of the Ouche. The men sent out as scouts on the 4th had not yet returned; so Captain Farcy was left at Beaune to bring on the baggage, to obtain information of the German movements, and to telegraph the same to Colonel Teinturier, in order that he might arrange his march the next day. The battalion reached Bligny, where they passed the night without hearing anything of the enemy, who retired to Dijon. At twelve o'clock on the 6th fifteen of the scouts had returned, and it then appeared that the Germans had entered Nuits at eleven. At two o'clock several Prussian scouts were at Prumeaux, which is only six miles from Beaune. Captain Farcy therefore found himself almost in the presence of the enemy with only fifteen men. Accordingly, he immediately forwarded the baggage on to Bligny, and, after changing his dress, remained in the town. "Beaune," continues Captain Farcy, "expected to be occupied by the enemy every hour, and the Sous-Préfet, frightened almost out of his wits at the presence of a French officer in the town, came and begged me to go away. At night the Prussians had not arrived, but seven more of our men returned, tired to death, and reported that they had killed two Prussian scouts near Corton. I learnt at Nuits that the enemy was only 400 strong, composed of infantry, sixty horsemen, and two cannon. An inhabitant of Nuits had seen two pieces of cannon near the cemetery, guarded by thirty men." A telegram was sent to Colonel Teinturier, begging him to return immediately, as there seemed to be a good opportunity for attacking the Germans; but the latter, perhaps feeling that their position was insecure, left the town at four o'clock on the morning of the 7th, and the French battalion was then recalled to Chagny. By methods such as this Garibaldi was kept well informed of the positions and movements of the enemy.

Autun, to which Garibaldi had removed his head-quarters, is situated several miles to the west of Dôle, where the old guerilla chief had been stationed for some time. The city where he now established himself is in the department of the Sâone-et-Loire, is built on the river Arroux, a tributary of the Loire, and is distant 179 miles south-east from Paris. It is a very ancient city—one of the oldest in France, having existed before the Roman conquest. When made a Roman colony under Augustus, its original name of Bibracte was changed to Augustodunum, of which the modern name is a corruption. After a period of much prosperity, and of great repute as a place of education, it suffered the usual vicissitudes of cities belonging to the Roman Empire in the days of declining power, and was burnt by Attila, King of the Huns. Again, some centuries later, it encountered the same fate at the hands of the Saracens. The Roman walls (if, indeed, they be not, as some suppose, older than the Roman occupation) are still visible to a great extent, and are models of massive yet delicate workmanship, the stones being so admirably and exactly joined as to give the whole the appearance of solid rock. Two of the ancient gates yet remain in very fair preservation, and several relics of antiquity are to be seen in and about the city. The modern town is built on the slope of a hill, and occupies only partially the site of the ancient. Many interesting Gothic buildings adorn the streets and squares; and the place is the seat of a bishopric founded early in the fourth century. Talleyrand was bishop of the see when the first French Revolution broke out. The people carry on a trade in horses, cattle, wood, and hemp, and they have also several manufactures; but since the burning of the town by the Saracens, in 731, it has never recovered its former eminence. The present number of inhabitants is about 12,000. Autun offered Garibaldi a good position, of which, however, owing to the smallness of his force, and the undisciplined state of some of his troops, he was not able fully to avail himself.

A few days before the removal of Garibaldi, one of his lieutenants—General Bossak, who commanded the advanced guard ten miles north of Dôle—was compelled to fall back, on account of his corps being somewhat disorganised. This rendered the stronger position at Autun all the more desirable; and M. Gambetta probably wished to have the army a little nearer Tours. The Garibaldians, on arriving at Autun, were quartered in the cathedral, in churches, and in convents. The bishop was very indignant at this proceeding, and the curate of a neighbouring village told his flock that the new-comers were heretics and heathens, that the Prussians were their real brethren, and that, if they fed or housed the forces of Garibaldi, their villages would be burnt (by their "real brethren"), their herds destroyed, and themselves sent off as slaves. Colonel Tanara ordered the arrest of this ungrateful priest; but M. Gambetta afterwards directed that he should be released—doubtless a prudent step, since the extremely ill-advised speech of Garibaldi to the women of Autun, and the inconsiderate way in which his officers and men offended the religious susceptibilities of the people, were creating a strong feeling against the foreign volunteers. Gambetta, however, seems to have had a great fondness for letting people out of gaol. About the same time, the hare-brained American agitator, George Francis Train, was arrested at Lyons for having delivered several violent speeches after his accustomed style of noisy folly; but M. Gambetta came to his rescue. He also suspended a sentence of death pronounced by Garibaldi against one of his countrymen for stealing a revolver; and he pardoned a village curé who was to have been shot for inciting his parishioners to rebel against the military authorities.

In irregular forces such as those which Garibaldi was now commanding, it is always a difficult matter to maintain proper discipline; but the chief commander himself, and his principal subordinates, were extremely strict, and sternly checked all tendencies to disorder. Colonel Bordone found it necessary to issue an order calling attention to the fact that many of the soldiers had been in the habit of making private requisitions in shops and houses, and giving in exchange their private signatures. The tradesmen were accordingly directed not to furnish anything save on the receipt of a legal order from the Staff; and the troops were informed that any one guilty of making unauthorised demands on shopkeepers would be handed over to the court-martial, and accused of theft.

A great deal of irritation was caused by a reported outrage committed at the bishop's palace by a number of Garibaldians. It was said by the priests and their partisans that a body of soldiers, headed by a captain, entered the private apartments of the episcopal residence, invaded even the bedroom of Monseigneur, and, under pretence of searching for a Prussian spy, ransacked the building from top to bottom, seized a gold cross worn on special occasions, stole some gold watches, appropriated a quantity of silver, maltreated one of the female servants so that she jumped out of window and broke her leg, and finally got drunk in the cellars; after which they departed, taking with them as much food and as many bottles of wine as they could carry. On investigation, the story dwindled very considerably. The men (on the admission of the bishop's secretary) were not precisely Garibaldians, but Francs-tireurs. The female servant was not actually ill-treated, but, being frightened, jumped out and hurt herself. No names or designations of regiments or brigades could be given, and the furniture alleged to have been damaged was not produced. On the other hand it was affirmed, on behalf of the men who really entered the palace, that they had reason to suppose there were three thousand muskets hidden in the dwelling, and therefore desired to make a perquisition. The troops engaged in this search were ten guerillas of Marseilles, with their captain, who swore that not a pin was touched, and that the fright and fall of the servant was a pure invention. The case would probably have been tried before a Garibaldian court-martial, had not a telegram arrived from M. Gambetta, directing that all ecclesiastical questions should be sent at once to Tours. Garibaldi was very glad to have the affair taken out of the hands of his officers, as the feeling between the military and the clergy had become so bad that it was very difficult in that part of the country to do justice in such instances. The alleged outrage was doubtless greatly exaggerated; but the invasion of the bishop's palace was certainly unjustifiable.

There can be no question that the excessive animosity of Garibaldi and his followers to the priests—however natural in them, considering what Italy has suffered from ecclesiastical bigotry and oppression—rendered them very unpopular in the French provinces, and to some extent curtailed their usefulness. The *Union Liberale* accused Garibaldi of usurping in his own person all civil as well as military functions, expelling the members of religious societies, seizing and disposing of their houses, decreeing the arrest of clergy, and even of functionaries of the Republic, directing domiciliary perquisitions which were thoroughly illegal, and taking along with him wherever he went a court-martial, the jurisdiction of which, by an intolerable abuse of power, was extended over the civil population—to the citizens of towns as well as to the peaceable inhabitants of the country districts. It was first at Dôle, and afterwards at Autun, that these things had been especially done, and the *Union Liberale* called upon the Minister of the Interior to put an end to them as quickly as possible, "unless he wished the populations of the patriotic eastern provinces to find that they might enjoy more security and fewer exactions with the invading enemy than with the auxiliary called to defend them." This indictment appears to have been heavily overcharged; but it had some colour of truth. The writer of a letter from Tours spoke with even greater violence. He said:—

> "Garibaldi's expulsion of the Jesuit Fathers from Dôle appears to have been most arbitrary and unjustifiable in every way. The Jesuits had been lodging and feeding, at their own expense, no fewer than 800 Mobiles for upwards of a month; and there were in their college at the time nearly a hundred lads, sons of the most respectable people in the department. Some of the boys were ill with severe colds, and a few with fever. But, despite the remonstrances of the Sub-Prefect, who had prepared quarters for Garibaldi and his Staff elsewhere, the Fathers and their pupils had to clear out at twenty-four hours' notice. Two of their number, being old and infirm, have since died from the effects of the weather, and from the shock to their system caused by their being made beggars, and sent adrift. I met the other day a young Franc-tireur who had an uncle among the Jesuit Fathers in Dôle, and two nephews among the pupils. He showed me a ball with a mark upon it, which he said he intended for Garibaldi whenever he came across him, even if he should himself be shot the next moment; and he looked like a man that would keep his promise. All along the road from Amiens, as well as in Picardy, I never heard Garibaldi's name mentioned without a curse—more particularly among both officers and men in the Breton battalions of Mobiles."

Testimony such as this, however, must be received with the utmost caution, the *animus* of the writer and his informants being obvious.

To the rule of priestly opposition to the Garibaldians there were a few exceptions. The curé of Mesore, a village to the south of Autun, said that, as Garibaldi had come to help France, they must welcome his troops as brothers, and do what they could for them. The men of the village generally spoke very highly of Garibaldi, and agreed that his arrival had saved the neighbourhood from invasion. They promised to give a good reception to any of the troops who might be quartered there, and said they had prepared accommodation for between two and three hundred men. The *Daily News* correspondent questioned these people as to their political opinions, and they all frankly declared that they had none. "What do we care," said one, "what kind of government we have, so long as we sell our poultry and eggs, and get a good price for our pigs?" The question was difficult to answer from their point of view.

Shortly after the arrival of Garibaldians at Autun, Ricciotti Garibaldi was appointed by his father to the command of the Francs-tireurs. The task was a difficult one, for the Francs-tireurs generally were inclined to be insubordinate, and those whom Ricciotti was to manage were so scattered abroad that it was not an easy thing to collect them. Arms, after a little while, began to arrive in greater proportion than at first. The Army of the Vosges—as it was still sometimes called, though it had removed a considerable distance from the mountains and the department of that name—received at Autun a field-battery and several Spencer rifles, the latter of which were distributed among the Mobile Guards, and were preferred to the chassepôt. The Mobiles occasionally distinguished themselves, and one day captured from the enemy twenty-seven sacks of despatches, double Fredericks, and German paper-money. This was effected by tearing up a rail, stopping a train, overpowering the guards, and carrying off the mail-bags to a neighbouring château. Garibaldi went out reconnoitring daily in a carriage, accompanied by the officers of his Staff, in order that he might become thoroughly well acquainted with the nature of the country. The weather was now getting cold, and snow began to whiten the trees and hills.

While Garibaldi was thus endeavouring to hold the Prussians in check, the latter were making good progress with the sieges of the eastern fortresses. On the 3rd of November Belfort was invested, after a slight engagement; and at the same time the operations against Verdun and Neu Breisach were vigorously pushed forward. The Prussian official paper, the *Staats Anzeiger*, remarked of Belfort that it was a very important position for the Germans, being a key to all the communications of the south-east of France, and the point of junction of three lines of rail. The German writer denied the statement, made in some journals, that Belfort was only a second-class fortress. It belonged, he contended, to the first class, and he proceeded to describe it in detail (together with the neighbouring Montbéliard) as follows:—

> "It is situated upon the Savoureuse, in a plain dominated by numerous mountainous groups at the foot of some immense sandstone rocks, amongst which are the 'Nicotte,' nearly 1,500 feet high, and the 'Mont de la Justice,' more than 1,300 feet high. Belfort defends all passages and communications between the Vosges and the Jura, and stops all those between the towns and south-easterly districts of Alsace and the valley of the Doubs, covering entirely the main road known by the name of 'Trouée de Belfort.' The town is surmounted by a citadel, built, according to the plans of Vauban, upon a rocky cliff rising almost perpendicularly, and surrounded by an *enceinte* furnished with

numerous bastions, which shut the fortress off from two of the most important suburbs of the town of Belfort. Besides the fortifications of this so-called 'roche de Belfort,' whose highest point is 200 feet from the surface of the river, the Savoureuse at Belfort is also defended by a permanent and fortified camp called, 'the permanently-entrenched camp of Vallon,' which can easily contain some 20,000 men. This camp is protected by the important forts 'la Miotte' and 'la Justice,' as also by the newly-formed outworks of 'les Barres' and 'les Hautes Perches.' The town of Belfort, one of the principal cities in the department of the Upper Rhine, contains 8,400 inhabitants. It is the seat of numerous civil and military authorities, and contains some very handsome buildings, such as the hospital, synagogue, theatre, and library; a large business is done in the transit and forwarding of merchandise. The fortified castle of Montbéliard, after a most eventful history, fell at last into the hands of Count Carl Eugen of Würtemberg. In 1792 it was annexed to France in the same manner as many other districts in Alsace, and it was formally ceded to France in 1801, when the peace was signed at Luneville. Montbéliard itself is included in the department of Doubs, contains about 6,470 inhabitants, and has important watch-manufactories, tan-yards, weaving-mills, &c. It is situated at the junction of the rivers of Allaine, Savoureuse, and Lisaine, and also on the Rhine and Rhone canal, and is about twelve miles' distance from Belfort in a southerly direction. It protects the line of railway running through the valley of the Doubs and to Besançon, which runs close to the foot of this fortified castle. The fortifications were preserved by the Imperial decree of the 26th of June, 1867, which ordered the dismantling of many small and unimportant fortified places. Montbéliard, besides being of the greatest importance for the protection of the line of railway, covers many different roads, and the canal can be raked by the guns from the castle. Among the fortifications of the castle, which were renovated and repaired in 1751, may be mentioned the Round Tower and the New Tower. The former was erected in the fifteenth century, and the latter in the sixteenth."*

At the same time that Belfort was invested, the French were defeated in several engagements at Montbéliard. Great numbers were driven through the town, and many fugitives were compelled to seek refuge in the neutral territory of Switzerland. A very large German army was directed against Belfort. Three distinct columns, amounting altogether, it is said, to 100,000 men, advanced upon the fortress, and, having routed the opposing Francs-tireurs and Mobiles at Cernay, and made reconnaissances in the immediate neighbourhood of the chief object of attack, closed up in a compact investing circle, which contracted day by day. All the able-bodied peasants who could be obtained were set to work to aid in the making of earthworks and trenches; but many of the inhabitants fled, in consequence of the heavy requisitions levied by the invaders. The Germans took possession of the eminence at Salbert, from which they were enabled, by their heavy guns, to reach the slopes of the fortifications. On the 4th of November an officer bearing a flag of truce appeared before the gates, and demanded the immediate surrender of the place. This being refused, the bombardment commenced the next day, and was sustained and replied to with so much vigour and persistency that the village of Vezelois was burnt—by the Germans, according to one account, by the French, according to another. The investment was by this time so complete that no one could either leave or enter the fortress; but the French managed to fire the castle of Souvernaus, where the Germans had established their head-quarters. On November 8th Montbéliard was occupied by 2,000 of the invading troops, who were afterwards augmented to 6,000. They extended their reconnoitring expeditions as far as Hericourt, and the belt of country surrounding Belfort was soon completely in possession of the enemy. Occasionally, sorties from the fortress would take place, and efforts would be made to prevent the besiegers from occupying important positions; but these were always frustrated, and the attack went on with the same uniform success for the Germans.

Verdun capitulated on the 8th of November, when the Germans captured two generals, eleven superior officers, 150 inferior, and about 4,000 men, together with 136 guns of different calibres, 23,000 infantry rifles, and a large quantity of miscellaneous war material. This was the place which the French under Bazaine were trying to reach, in their attempted retreat from Metz, when the great battles of August 16th and 18th were fought. It commands the road from Metz and Thionville to Châlons by St. Menehould; and the Germans, finding it in their way, determined to reduce it. The negotiations for its surrender were opened on the 3rd, and an eight days' armistice was first concluded. The French commandant, Baron Guérin de Waldersbäch, had told the German general, von Gail, about the middle of October, that he awaited him at the breach, and that he hoped he would one day issue from the protection of the mountains which kept him hidden from the blows of the besieged. The letter will be found at p. 398 of this volume. After the fall of Metz, however, he found that further resistance was hopeless; for the help which he had expected was now impossible, and, on the other hand, the besieging army might be largely strengthened. He therefore signified to

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* A view of Belfort has been given on p. 331 of this volume.

General von Gail that he was ready to give up the fortress to the besiegers. The town had suffered severely from the bombardment, and the citadel in particular was much damaged by the Prussian shells. General Manteuffel, with a portion of the army that had been engaged in besieging Metz, had already moved towards Verdun, with a view to assisting in its reduction, when the necessity for any augmentation of the attacking force was removed by the surrender of the town. The catastrophe was hastened by the breaking out of internal dissensions among the garrison—some of the soldiers declaring for the Republic, and others for the Empire. It was no small addition to the misfortunes of France that her energies were so frequently divided, in the very face of the enemy, by the barren rage of party fanaticism. The attacking force without was powerfully aided by the convulsive movements within.

A special correspondent of the *Times*, writing from Verdun on November 16th, said that, at a first glance, the town did not seem to have been much damaged by the bombardment. But, on a closer inspection, appearances altered.

"A large barrack full of forage has been burnt out; the Jewish Synagogue is destroyed; in some parts of the city—notably at the parade-ground upon its highest site, and in the precincts of the cathedral a little below—the marks of the bombardment are visible. Here, much of the glass in the windows has been rattled out; those of the cathedral were old and crazy, and have specially suffered. Carpets and tapestries are hung against them to keep out the cold and wet. The roof has been injured, the angles of the choir shattered in some places. Inside, bombs have entered the great clerestory windows upon the north side, and fractured the cornices of the South Academy, besides slightly shattering the pavement. But service goes on; and I heard this morning, at mass, the organ discoursing a strain of delicious heavenly music as an accompaniment.

"The investment of Verdun commenced on the 25th of September; but it was not formally blockaded before the 13th of October, and it surrendered on the 8th of November, after a bombardment of fifty-two hours. This was the third during the siege; but the



A BREAK DOWN.

previous ones were trivial. The Saxon Corps which first invested the city attacked the fortifications with their field-guns—they might just as well have bombarded Verdun with cherry-stones—and after a great waste of ammunition they desisted. The fall of Metz took the heart out of the defence. Verdun surrendered under conditions unusually favourable. It had been attacked by a force of 15,000 men, 2,000 of them artillery, with 140 heavy guns. It has been accorded to the city that all its material, archives, arms, horses, cannon, and munitions shall be inventoried and restored to France at the conclusion of peace. The Garde Mobile, National Guard, and gendarmerie are set at liberty ; no requisitions or money contributions are to be levied, and the troops are to be lodged as far as possible in the casernes and public buildings. . . . .



GENERAL CHANZY.

"I had reason to doubt my first impression of the bombardment of Verdun from an incident which I am about to relate. The chief literary event connected with the city lies in the notices of it contained in Goethe's diary of the campaign of 1792, which he attended in the train of his friend and sovereign, the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, the father of the present Queen of Prussia. A desire to refresh my memory seized me. I inquired at all the book-shops in Verdun for the book, but fruitlessly. Determined, if a copy existed in Verdun, to see it, I went to the library of the College of Verdun. The librarian was absent—I was told an invalid—but they gave me his address, and I proceeded to pay a visit to Monsieur l'Abbé Clouët. I found his residence, an ancient house in the vicinity of the cathedral, and, entering, saw him busily engaged in the attempt to reduce the chaos of his library into some order ; bomb-shells had fallen in the heart of the building, and had shattered everything into the wildest disorder. I saw before me a tall ascetic figure, clad in a black cassock, his head encased in a *bonnet de coton*, surmounted by a rusty broad ecclesiastical hat. I could not help it, but the image of Don Quixote, that knightly visionary, dear to all noble hearts, rose up before me, and that cruel scene, the burning of his library of romances of chivalry. The abbé overwhelmed me with a thousand courteous apologies for the tragical plight in which I found him, and, in reply to my query, answered that the book was not in the College library, but that years ago a copy had passed through his hands, and that he had sat down and made a translation of the passages relating to Verdun, which he would forthwith endeavour to find among the *débris* of his books. I had made a fortunate cast, and encountered a man after my own heart. He ushered me through a succession of ancient chambers crammed with a confused litter of those household gods which bookworms and antiquaries accumulate about them until there is scarce room left for a passage through their apartments. Explaining that his bed-room and sitting-room were destroyed, he led me into the kitchen as his only habitable room, and found for me a seat. Presently he emerged from his library with the precious volume I desired, and I proceeded to extract the passages wanted."

The same writer said of Verdun that, as a fortress, it is simply an anachronism, since it lies in a hole, and can be commanded from the neighbouring heights by modern siege-artillery. The siege-works of the town occupied in 1870 exactly the same positions as in 1792, when the then King of Prussia surveyed the place after its capture, and remarked that it was too straggling for any permanent resistance. The defence, according to the writer in the *Times*, must have been respectable, for the besieged had shelled and reduced to ashes the dwellings in the environs occupied by the enemy. The loss of life on both sides, however, seems to have been slight.

The capitulation of Neu Breisach followed very quickly on that of Verdun. The commander of Fort Mortier, one of the defences of Neu Breisach, struck his flag on the evening of November 6th, and handed over to the besiegers 220 prisoners and five guns. This rendered the speedy capture of the fortress itself a matter of strong probability; for, although the work was not actually a part of Neu Breisach, from which it was distant about a mile, its reduction laid the town at the mercy of the attacking force. The fortifications of Neu Breisach, constructed by Vauban, are in the form of an octagon, the *enceinte* of which is pierced with four gates. The place, as a fortress, owes its origin to Louis XIV., who, being obliged by the Treaty of Ryswick to cede Old Breisach (on the other side of the Rhine) to Austria, strengthened the new town with many defensive works. On the evening of November 10th Neu Breisach capitulated, with 5,000 soldiers and 100 guns; and the formal surrender was made on the following morning. A correspondent of the *Carlsruhe Gazette*, describing the ceremony, said that at about half-past eight, A.M., all the besieging troops were marching on the town. The Strasburg gate—the one nearest to Fort Mortier—was occupied by a company of Landwehr. The entry, however, was made by the Basle gate. Here the whole of the reserve division of von Schmerling, as well as the Prussian, Bavarian, and Baden siege-artillery, took up a position. Some Prussian pioneers of the 10th Division likewise joined in the proceedings. All this while the *rappel* was being beaten in the fortress, and shortly after nine the captured garrison began to march out with their arms. First came the artillery, who bore themselves with much dignity; then followed regiments of the Line, Lancers, Chasseurs-à-cheval, Mobiles, and National Guards. On reaching the Place they were drawn up in line, and some degree of insubordination became visible. Several of the men destroyed their arms and accoutrements, and even an officer was observed breaking his sword. These exhibitions of temper, however, soon passed; the garrison laid down their weapons, and the men were speedily marched off. The surrender was completed at about half-past four in the afternoon, by which time a few drunken soldiers were to be seen staggering about under the guidance of their more sober comrades. The fall of Neu Breisach was mainly owing to the ineffective nature of the guns, which, after repeated firing, became still worse than they were previously. The engineer officer in command of the works was killed the day before the capitulation by the explosion of a shell, and his death had a discouraging effect on the garrison. Provisions were still plentiful; but, as further resistance appeared hopeless, a council of war decided that it would not be justifiable to shed more blood, and the surrender of the fortress was accordingly decided on without opposition.

Thionville capitulated on the 24th of November, and the actual surrender of the town took place on the morning of the 25th, when 4,000 prisoners (according to some 6,000) and 250 guns, fell to the lot of the conquerors. After the capture of Metz the Germans set to work in earnest against Thionville, and two army corps, released by the surrender of the great Moselle fortress, were sent to the neighbouring stronghold in the north. The town was invested on the 1st of November; a heavy bombardment was opened on the 12th, and conflagrations burst out in various parts. The population of the place is between seven and eight thousand, and the number of houses is stated at five hundred. Thionville, therefore, is but a small town; but the fortress is important. It resisted, especially before the complete investment, with great spirit; the garrison frequently making sorties, intercepting the Prussian convoys, and bringing in provisions. Indeed, those who suspected Bazaine of playing false at Metz, and of fighting with intentional weakness, constantly pointed to the more energetic defence of Thionville. At the commencement of the war the latter town supported the left wing of the French Army of the Rhine; and during the siege of Metz communications were several times established between the two fortresses. It is generally supposed that the object of Bazaine in making his great sortie of October 7th was to get away with the larger part of his army to Thionville, so as to enable Metz to hold out the longer by reason of having fewer persons to feed; though the reader is aware that this view has been controverted. The fortress of Thionville is built almost entirely on the western bank of the Moselle; but on the opposite side of the river is a fort of modern construction, containing magazines and cavalry barracks. The place was first fortified as far back as the thirteenth century. It has often been besieged; and in 1643 was taken by the celebrated Prince of Condé. In 1814 it successfully resisted a Prussian attack, at which time the garrison was commanded by General Hugo, father of M. Victor Hugo. The fortifications have been erected at various epochs, and represent the successive ideas of widely different systems of engineering. On the whole, however, the works are strong, and the garrison gave the Germans no inconsiderable amount of trouble before they succumbed. They were well supplied with provisions; and in the end it was not hunger that forced them to yield.

The absence of external forts exposed the town to a direct bombardment. The Germans had 400 guns in position, and with these they kept up a terrific fire. The number of the French guns was 380, ranging from sixteen to twenty-four pounders. On the 22nd of November the bombardment became even heavier than before, and the average number of shots was seventeen a minute. At eleven o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, while the town was burning in several places, General Zastrow demanded the surrender of the fortress. The French commandant is reported to have replied, "So long as one stone stands on another, or one drop of French blood remains to be shed, the place will not be yielded"—a speech very much in the manner of French commandants generally during this war of capitulations, and followed, as in other instances, by the quiet submission of the town and its defences. The very next morning, at six o'clock, the French general offered to surrender Thionville on condition that the Mobile Guards were permitted to go free. The Prussians gave the proposal two hours' consideration, and then, declining it, recommenced the bombardment. This brought matters to a crisis. The commandant hung out the white flag, and indicated a willingness to surrender unconditionally. At six o'clock on the evening of the 24th of November the capitulation was signed, and it was stipulated that on the following morning, at nine o'clock, the conquerors should enter the town. The time of entrance, however, was afterwards made two hours earlier, on account of the insubordination of the troops, who were enraged at the surrender and threatened to blow up the magazine. The capitulation, according to one account, was hastened by the appearance near the ramparts of numerous women and children, who on their knees besought the commandant to submit, as the cellars where they had sought refuge from the Prussian shells were flooded with water, owing to the rise of the Moselle. What made this appeal the more piteous was the fact that the Germans fired, not against the ramparts, but into the town itself. It is said that the civilians actually forced the commandant to surrender; but the latter had always lain under suspicion, on account of his relationship to some Prussian families, and from the commencement of the bombardment he was put under the guardianship of a committee of defence. On the capitulation taking place, those of the garrison who belonged to the regular army—about 2,000 in number—were kept as prisoners; but the Mobile Guards, who were mostly Alsatians, were set free after a little while, as a means of propitiating the German-speaking populations. The damage done to the town was very serious. Not one house was left untouched, and 107 were totally destroyed, together with others which were so heavily battered that it was necessary to rebuild them, either wholly or partially. During the bombardment of the final two or three days the Prussians poured into the town from thirty to forty thousand bombs of eighty pounds' weight.

It is stated that the commandant of Thionville declared from the first that the besiegers' guns were not to be resisted; and some accounts say that the garrison, consisting for the most part of Mobiles, refused to man the walls. The commandant, however, remarked that the people of Metz had so calumniated Marshal Bazaine that, for his own part, he would not capitulate until the inhabitants begged him on their knees to do so, in order that he might not afterwards be reviled as a traitor. Early on the third day of the bombardment a priest was sent to the besiegers with a request that the women and children might be suffered to leave the fortress. The same petition had been made before, and both times it was refused. The capitulation then followed, and one of the conditions demanded by the vanquished was that the Mobiles should be allowed to return to their homes. Before the garrison marched out the assent of the King of Prussia to this stipulation was signified to the commandant, and the Mobiles were accordingly dismissed, with a warning that their lives and property would be forfeited if they were again found in arms. The demeanour of the regular soldiers appears to have been very becoming. When the Germans entered the town they found several of the streets impassable on account of the ruins, while the inhabitants, weeping over the wreck of their worldly possessions, added to the gloom and misery of the scene. The unfortunate people had made covered ways in the streets by the aid of boards and beams; and the total number of casualties was reported as not more than sixty wounded. The municipal authorities, according to a letter in a German paper, were directed to continue their functions, and were told that it was immaterial whether they acted in the name of the Empire or of the Republic, but that "the name of the Law" would be best. It was added that in any case the town would remain German; and, indeed, the Prussians were already calling it by its old Teutonic name of Diederhofen. The place had once belonged to the Duchy of Luxemburg; but in the year 1558, and again in 1643, it was taken by the French, to whom it was finally ceded by the treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. In early times it was the residence of the kings of Austrasia. It was besieged by the Austrians in 1792, when the commandant of the town was General Felix Wimpfen, who, in reply to a formal summons to surrender, said, "You may destroy the fortress, and not leave one stone upon another; but you cannot burn the ramparts." On that occasion Thionville resisted during the whole campaign, and held in check a force amounting to 28,000 men. The besieged made frequent and spirited sorties; and so harassed the enemy as to leave him little peace. Ultimately the siege was raised, and the garrison and commander were amply rewarded by the State for the courage and endurance they had exhibited. Those were days in which capitulations —whether "infamous" or not, to reproduce the phrase of M. Gambetta after the surrender of Metz —were less common than in our own. The enormous power and immense range of modern artillery give the attacking force a great advantage over the defenders; and if the investment cannot be shaken off by sorties, or dispersed by the arrival of a relieving army, the reduction of any fortress, however strong, is simply a question of time. The non-combatants, moreover, are every day acquiring a greater power in the decision of such matters; and the non-combatants are generally, after a little while, in favour of succumbing. In the old days a commandant would not have dreamed of letting himself be dictated to by a crowd of shopkeepers, women, and children. The military idea predominated over all others; and as long as the defence could be maintained, the civilians might starve to death sooner than the garrison would yield. On the whole, we need not regret the gradual softening of manners. In some respects war is now more terrible than of old, but in others the tendency is to reduce the extreme of suffering in many ways, to mitigate as far as possible the inevitable evils of a state of conflict, and to shorten the duration of hostilities.

Another capitulation occurred on the 27th of November, when, after two days' bombardment, La Fere, near Laon, was given up to the Germans, with 2,000 men and 70 guns. The garrison had previously made some vigorous sorties, but without effect; and the Prussians then forced the peasantry to dig ditches, in order to draw off the water which protected the town. La Fere was courageously defended by Captain Planché; but nothing could withstand the force of the Prussian cannonade; and when the town yielded, it was found to be greatly damaged in every part. The fortress, though small, might have been a danger to the Germans in their advance on Amiens, as it would have threatened their rear; it was therefore necessary to expend some trouble in reducing it, and the trouble was quickly rewarded by success.

At the same time the investment of Montmédy was being actively prosecuted. After two engagements, near Chauvency and Thounel, the town was completely surrounded on the 15th of November. On the following day two companies made a sortie from the place, and were all either killed or captured. The roads from Montmédy were blocked by barricades, and the neighbouring villages were occupied by the Prussians. The commandant, being required to surrender, made the usual boast about blowing up the fortress rather than capitulate; and the town in fact prolonged its resistance for several weeks. It will not be until we arrive at a later period in the history of the war that we shall have to record its fall.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Situation of France at the Beginning of November—The Eve of a French Success—Perilous Position of General von der Tann—State of the French Army of the Loire—The Design of General d'Aurelles de Paladines—His Mode of disposing his Troops previous to attacking the Enemy—The Battle of Baccon or Coulmiers (Nov. 9th)—Incidents of the Battle—French Account of the Day's Fighting—Retreat of the Bavarians—Narrative of the *Times* Correspondent—Failure of the French to pursue the retreating Enemy—The Cause of this Omission—Dangerous Position of the Bavarian Life Guards—Fighting on the 10th—Occupation of Orleans by the French—Equivocating Accounts of the Actions by the Prussian Authorities—Details of the Actions—A German Plan foiled by the Success of de Paladines—Von der Tann reinforced—Prince Frederick Charles ordered to the Loire—Address of Gambetta to the French Troops—Exultation in Paris—Historical Reminiscence—Serious Position of the Germans at Versailles—Apprehensions at Head-Quarters—The Road to Paris Open—Hesitation of d'Aurelles de Paladines—Divided Counsels—The Opportunity missed—Formation of an Entrenched Camp at Orleans—The German Position Strengthened—Remarks on the Generalship of de Paladines.

Nothing could be more disheartening than the position of the young Republic in the early days of November. Metz had fallen, and the last great army of the Empire had just passed into captivity. Verdun had capitulated, and Neu Breisach was on the point of doing the same. All the eastern fortresses were in the actual possession of the enemy, or beyond reach of help. Paris was besieged, cut off from the rest of France, and threatened with famine. A large part of the country was occupied by the invaders, who moved in any direction they pleased, and exacted whatever contributions they thought fit. The various armies of France were everywhere compelled to fall back; and even Garibaldi, from whom so much was hoped, seemed utterly at a loss what to do. In the north Manteuffel was marching upon Amiens; in the east Werder was operating from Dijon with great effect; in the west the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was threatening Le Mans; and even the south did not feel itself secure from the incursions of the foe. Anarchy menaced some of the principal cities; and, in the midst of all these overwhelming dangers, men were wrangling about the form of government most desirable to be established, and sacrificing unity of purpose to the exigencies of faction. To sum up all, the endeavours of M. Thiers to arrange an armistice had entirely broken down, and the last hope of foreign intervention had disappeared from view. It would hardly have been possible to add one extra shade of blackness to the wide circumfluence of gloom.

Yet the French were just then on the eve of obtaining a success of no small dimensions, which, had it been properly followed up, might have resulted in the raising of the siege of Paris, and in a general retreat of the German forces. The Army of the Loire was about to give proof of its capabilities, and General d'Aurelles de Paladines to show, for a brief moment, how much might yet be done by the old French qualities of dash and rapidity. Since the capture of Orleans on October 11th, General von der Tann and his Bavarians had occupied a loosely extended line between that city and Châteaudun, to the north-west. The number of his troops being only about 25,000, the regiments were a good deal scattered; and, as this force was the only German army between Orleans and the hosts investing Paris, it appeared to d'Aurelles de Paladines that a blow might be struck with great effect at the general by whom he was confronted. The French commander had now at his disposal more than 120,000 men, not a few of whom were veterans. His divisions were for the most part well appointed, and they had by this time been sufficiently drilled and disciplined to enable them to take the field with a fair amount of confidence in their own powers. They had been kept very quietly in hand after their defeat at Arthenay and Orleans on the 10th and 11th of October; and, nearly a month having now elapsed without the Army of the Loire making any sign, the Germans seem to have rashly jumped to the conclusion that it was of no account, and, with a want of forethought the very reverse of their general habit, to have taken no precautions against surprise. The army of von der Tann, as we have said, was weak; for it had been reduced by the recall to Paris of the 22nd Prussian division, and by the detachment of Prince Albrecht's cavalry to Chartres, for the purpose of holding in check the Army of Brittany. Between von der Tann's corps and the immense army of d'Aurelles de Paladines only a few miles intervened. The position of the former was isolated and dangerous; that of the latter well supported by its base of operations, and in every respect adapted to the inauguration of active hostilities.

It was originally intended that General d'Aurelles should move forward from Blois on the morning of October 29th, drive back the Bavarians, if possible, and endeavour to reach Paris. But on the night of the 28th he telegraphed to Tours that the weather and the roads were bad, that the equipment of part of the Mobile Guards was very insufficient, and that it would be imprudent to hazard an action. It appears that the capitulation of Metz had that very afternoon been communicated to d'Aurelles de Paladines, who knew the fact some hours before the Tours Government, and was on this account disposed to relinquish his project. He seems also to have been influenced by a false report that an armistice had been concluded. The Tours Delegation were much annoyed at the delay, and a good deal of correspondence passed between them and the commander of the Army of the Loire. Some days later it appeared practicable to the French general to make a grand advance towards Paris. He consequently formed the design of crossing the Loire above and below Orleans, in the hope that he should thus, by a converging movement, completely envelope the small Bavarian corps, capture or annihilate it, and then sweep onward to the capital before the besiegers could recover from the shock. In the prosecution of this idea he exhibited considerable skill. One of his divisions he placed at Mer, on the north bank of the Loire, in order to cover Tours; and with the remaining three divisions he moved from his head-quarters at La Ferté St. Aubin (twelve miles south of Orleans) on the 7th of November, and began to mass his troops round Orleans, so as to enable him to fall with the greatest possible effect on the exposed and attenuated forces of von der Tann. General Lussac's 16th Corps was advanced on the west of the city, and was supported by General Polhès's 15th Corps—that which had been stationed at Mer. In this way the Bavarians were threatened with a flank movement from Blois to Marchenoir; at the same time, Pallières, in command of the 17th Corps, menaced Orleans in front, from the south bank of the river; while another force, consisting of 30,000 men, moved up from Bourges, to attack the German commander from the east. The chief part of the French line extended from the Loire, on the right, to Marchenoir, behind the forest of that name, on the left. This was the position assumed by the main body after it had crossed to the north bank of the Loire on the 7th of November. The passage of the river was effected at Beaugency, and was entirely unopposed, the Germans either not feeling themselves strong enough to dispute the movement, or being unaware that it was in progress. An ineffectual attempt, however, was made later in the same day to dislodge the French from the forest of Marchenoir. While the main body of d'Aurelles' troops, about 50,000 strong, was crossing the Loire at Beaugency, to the west of Orleans, another corps, numbering some 25,000, passed over near Châteauneuf, to the east. The Bavarian commander was thus threatened on both flanks, while in front he had the river, so that only the country in his rear was open to him. He remained on the defensive through the greater part of the 8th, waiting for reinforcements, which were in fact despatched to



DANCE OF FRENCH SOLDIERS IN CAMP.


Chateaudun
St Cloud
Villempuí
Patay
Huêtre
Tournoisis
Breuil
Villemblin
Nids
St Peravy la Colombe.
Briey
Chevilly
le Ferté
St Sigismond
Boulay
Gidy
Cercottes
Gemigny
Epiez
Coulmiers
Saran
Moisy
Charsonville
Bucy St Liphard
Ingré
Ecomian
Binas
Ouzouer le Marché
Baccon
ORLEANS
Chavigny
Villermain
St Laurent des Bois
Poilly
Tours
River Loire
Olivet
Cravant
Blois
Oucques
Meung
N.D de Clery
Marchenoir
Villerceau
to
R.R.
Road to
Messière
les Roches
Dry
Villeneuve
Beaugency

BATTLE OF BACCON.
Plan showing the advance of the French Army of the Loire on November 8th, 1870.


Prussian Infantry.
French ,,
Prussian Cavalry.
French ,,
Direction taken by troops advancing or retreating.
PP Cavalry advancing from the east
CC General Reyan's Corps.
Villempui
Patay
Huêtre
Tournoisis
Briey
Breuil
St Peravy la Colombe
Chevilly
Villemblin
Nids
Boulay
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to Vierzon
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SCALE MILES
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S

BATTLE OF BACCON.
Plan showing the retreat of the German Army from Orleans, and capture of Orleans by the French on November 9th, 1870.

him—30,000 men, under the orders of the Duke of Mecklenburg, being sent from the army before Paris. But before this detachment could arrive the French had got so close to Orleans that von der Tann found it necessary to issue forth and give them battle. Leaving a small garrison in Orleans, he advanced at the head of about 18,000 men to meet the overwhelming forces of the French. It was on the evening of the 8th that he quitted Orleans; but it was not until the morning of the 9th that the celebrated action—called the Battle of Baccon or of Coulmiers, after two of the principal places on the field of contest—took place.

General d'Aurelles de Paladines seems to have determined to manœuvre von der Tann out of Orleans without making any direct attack on the city. He therefore threw his left forward from Marchenoir, thus threatening to cut the Bavarians off from Paris. It was a moment of the utmost peril for the German commander, and he had to fight his hardest to prevent his army being captured to the last man. His object in moving towards Coulmiers was to place himself in such a position that he could either cover Orleans, or gain the road to Toury through St. Peravy-la-Colombe; and events showed that under the circumstances this was the best course he could have pursued. The divisions encountered by the Bavarians on the morning of November 9th between Baccon and Coulmiers, about fourteen miles to the west of Orleans, were those of Polhès, Lussac, and Pallières. General Polhès commenced the attack with large masses of infantry, ninety guns, and seven regiments of cavalry. The Bavarians were fearfully outnumbered; but they opposed a stubborn resistance to the assaults of the enemy. Polhès advanced seven times against the small corps of von der Tann, which nevertheless maintained its ground for hours. Baccon and Coulmiers were successively occupied by the French, and the position of the Germans became more and more serious as the day wore on. The army which d'Aurelles was enabled to bring into the field amounted, when its various divisions were drawn together, to 70,000 or 80,000 men, and consisted of nine brigades of the Line, seven Cavalry regiments, and many Mobiles, with 120 field-guns. These troops appear to have been very well handled. The *Cologne Gazette* admitted that they exhibited an amount of discipline and caution not previously shown by any French soldiers during the war. General Paladines, it was observed, had adopted the German tactics, and had thrown out skirmishers on the flanks, and formed lateral columns, to guard against surprise. In the first part of the action, however, the Bavarians made some way. Their right wing, under General Orff, who had the credit of being one of the most skilful of Bavarian officers, forced back the French left wing in great disorder on the centre; and the cavalry, which was posted in the same direction, partook of the general confusion. On the German left matters were not so prosperous for the troops of von der Tann; nevertheless, they kept the enemy at bay for a considerable time, both there and elsewhere. At Gemigny they made a determined resistance to General Chanzy, who advanced against them with rapidity and spirit; but here they were ultimately obliged to give way. It appears to have been the plan of the French commander to direct the Beaugency corps on Orleans, and, while the right wing should stop near Ormes, to send the centre and left through Gemigny, St. Peravy, Boulay, and Briey, in order that they might effect a junction with the cavalry corps which General Pallières was to bring from St. Benoit-sur-Loire towards Cercottes, with a view to cutting off the retreat of the Bavarians towards the north. This plan was to some extent accomplished, but not entirely. The fight lasted from seven in the morning till five in the evening; but, though the Germans were utterly defeated, with great loss, the retreat of von der Tann was not prevented. General d'Aurelles de Paladines, in his elaborate report of the action, says—after detailing the preliminary dispositions of his troops, and relating the occupation of the villages of Baccon and de la Rivière, and of the castles of La Benardière and Grand-Luy—that the troops of General Barry, on the left, were checked in their march by German artillery, and could not, until half-past two in the afternoon, reach Coulmiers, where they were to join the division of General Peitavin. When the skirmishers of that division were joined by General Barry's men, the united body rushed at the double into the gardens and woods situated at that point, but, owing to the fierce resistance of the Bavarians, were unable to take the village. The general then proceeds:—

"The enemy, who had there entrenched himself and had collected a great portion of his forces and artillery, struggled hard to maintain himself in order to protect the retreat of the troops on his left, who were the more in danger as our forward movement became clearer. To stop this resistance the general-in-chief called out General Daries and the artillery reserve, which posted its batteries on a level with Grand-Luy, and, after half an hour's most violent cannonade, succeeded in silencing the enemy's batteries. At that moment the skirmishers, supported by some battalions of General Barry, led by the general in person, resumed their advance, and entered the village, driving out the enemy by four P.M. In this attack General Barry's troops—the 7th Battalion of Chasseurs de Marche, the 31st Regiment of Infantry de Marche, and the 22nd Regiment of Mobiles (Dordogne)—displayed much vigour and dash. On the left of General Barry a portion of the troops of Rear-Admiral Jaurreguiberry, having Commandant Lienard's Francs-tireurs for reconnoitring on their left, went through Charsonville and Epieds, and arrived in front of Cheminiers, where they were assailed by a shower of shells. They deployed their skirmishers, placed their batteries in position, and continued their march whilst opening a musketry fire. The struggle which these troops sustained was the more serious, since they were for a long time exposed to fire not only from St. Sigismond and Gemigny, which were on their front, but also from Coulmiers and Rosières, the fire of which had not yet been noticed by General Barry. About half-past two General Reyan sent information to General de Chanzy that his cavalry had met with a serious resistance, and that his artillery had suffered much loss in men and horses, and, having no more ammunition, was compelled to withdraw. To avoid a flank movement, which the enemy might attempt in consequence of that retreat, General de Chanzy, who during the day showed much perspicacity and determination, ordered his reserve forward, in the direction of St. Sigismond, and supported it by the remaining portion of his reserve artillery. Rear-Admiral Jaurreguiberry had succeeded in having the village of Champ occupied by a battalion of the 37th Regiment; but this battalion had hardly arrived when, being attacked by artillery and several infantry columns, which were just entering the field, it was obliged to leave the village. Owing to the energy of the admiral, we, however, were able to hold our positions till half-past four o'clock, when, by the arrival of a fresh battery of 12-pounders, we succeeded in silencing the enemy's artillery. During that time the 37th Regiment de Marche and the 33rd Mobiles suffered very much. At five P.M. all the troops of Admiral Jaurreguiberry rushed simultaneously forward at quick march and took possession of the villages of Champ and Ormeteau. After the capture of those villages—the last of which had been carefully loopholed and admirably prepared for defence—the enemy, in full retreat, was pursued by our artillery fire as long as daylight lasted. To conclude, we carried all the positions of the enemy, who, as admitted by Bavarian officers who were made prisoners, must have sustained considerable loss."

An account of the battle published in the *Journal du Loiret* stated that—

"While a powerful corps set out from Châteauneuf, with the object of turning the flank of the enemy, General d'Aurelles led his troops towards their front. The army marched upon an extensive line towards Baccon, where the Germans had taken up a position, with their front nearly parallel with the range of woods which lies between Chaigny and Briey St. Liphard. The French met with a determined resistance at Baccon, where the houses were loopholed and the streets barricaded. The village itself, being built upon rising ground, afforded the Germans a good position for their artillery, which they vigorously employed against their assailants. The French troops, however, whose impetuosity was only restrained by the discipline which they have acquired, instantly attacked the position, and carried it after a brief struggle. The French army immediately resumed its march without disorder, and preceded by numerous guns, which were worked with great precision and success, it being the first occasion during the present war that the superiority in numbers and fire was not on the side of the Prussians. From Baccon they advanced to La Renardière, the enemy still retreating, and burning on his passage the farm of Viard, where an immense amount of provisions had been accumulated. At noon the fire slackened on both sides for a time, General von der Tann manœuvring to cover the retreat of the material, which was directed by Ormes towards Arthenay. The French army reached Coulmiers, which was the point to which they had been directed; but about half-past three General von der Tann attempted a movement which on several previous occasions had been successfully effected by the Germans, and sought to turn the left wing of the French. The movement, however, had been anticipated by General d'Aurelles, and the Germans were themselves outflanked by a French division. The retreat was continued, but a stand was made in the woods around Coulmiers, in which a deadly conflict was waged, until the French troops, pouring in with great impetuosity, drove the enemy out, and the success was complete. The Germans fled in disorder by Boulay, Briey, Huetre, and Patay, towards Arthenay, closely pursued by cavalry, who inflicted heavy losses and made numerous prisoners."

The retreat of the Germans was in a great measure determined by their discovering that General Reyan, who commanded on the extreme left of the French army, had marched on St. Peravy-la-Colombe, and seriously threatened the communications of von der Tann with Paris. The Bavarian general saw that there was no time to lose. He at once ordered his troops to evacuate Orleans, and, with the whole of his force, fell back, still fighting, by the Arthenay and Patay roads. At the same time the advance of Reyan on St. Peravy was arrested by columns of superior strength, proceeding from the direction of Beauce, and the French general was compelled to recede. General Pallières, however, accomplished the required movement of his cavalry corps from St. Benoit-sur-Loire to Cercottes. The Bavarians had fought splendidly; but they were clearly out-numbered and out-manœuvred, and von der Tann must have thought himself lucky that he could secure a retreat on Paris by the direct roads leading northwards from the scene of his reverse.

A special correspondent of the *Times*, attached to the head-quarters of the German Army of the Loire, said, in describing the battle :—

> "The French commenced the action by a well-sustained attack on the German centre and right wing, forcing the latter to give way, until General Orff, with the 2nd Bavarian Brigade, by a bold movement, wheeled round the left wing to its support, and for a moment almost seemed about to change the fortunes of the day. The French, however, brought up strong reinforcements, and were supported by an admirably served marine artillery. The precision and efficacy of an arm from which, in French hands of late, so little was to be feared, are the theme of universal remark among the German officers, who, perhaps, had begun to fall into the somewhat natural error, considering their past experience, of underrating their enemy. It is to be remarked that it is to the Marine Infantry and Artillery that the highest praise has been awarded. Notwithstanding, however, the repeated and furious assaults of the French, and the fearful loss they managed to inflict upon their opponents with their artillery, they were unable to rout them, or even to force them from the position they had occupied during the day, and night closed in leaving the Germans worn-out and almost decimated by the day's fight, but not vanquished. They had already marched all the preceding night, they had fought during the whole day of the 9th, and now their only chance of escape was to make another night march on Arthenay. Leaving 700 of their comrades, including 142 officers, dead and wounded, in the hands of the enemy, they turned their backs on the bloody field of Coulmiers as soon as the darkness concealed their movements, and throughout a night of sleet and snow tramped their weary way to Arthenay, having throughout the whole thirty-six hours scarcely tasted a mouthful of food. It is said that, when Prince Frederick Charles asked Marshal Bazaine why the French army did not follow up their partial success on the 16th of August, and escape from their critical position before Metz during the night, he replied, 'We never march by night.' The Germans do not act upon this comfortable principle, and succeeded in reaching Arthenay on the following morning (the 10th) in perfect order, and without any loss of material. There can be no doubt that, had the French army followed up their success, instead of remaining inactive, they might have inflicted a most serious disaster on the Germans."

It will be observed that this account is more favourable to the Bavarians than those which are generally accepted as true, and which there is no reason for doubting. It can hardly be questioned that the Bavarians were really routed from their positions, and that their retreat was not so quiet and orderly as the *Times* writer alleges. Correspondents generally reflect the feelings of the army with which they are associated; and the Germans were just as willing as the French to put the best face they could on any defeat which they might suffer.

It is perfectly true, however, that the French did not pursue their vanquished enemy. This is said to have resulted from an unauthorised act of General Reyan. Previous to the commencement of the battle that officer had been ordered to proceed with ten regiments of cavalry and some batteries of horse-artillery towards the north, that he might cover the French left wing and turn the German right. Instead of this, he opened his guns on the German batteries, and at two o'clock reported (as we have already seen) that his artillery had lost heavily in men and horses, and had no more ammunition, and that his cavalry had met with serious resistance everywhere. He expected to be outflanked; and at five o'clock he again sent word that a column of infantry was appearing before him at Villamblain, and that he considered it indispensable to return to his encampment of the previous night. It afterwards turned out that this column of infantry consisted of Francs-tireurs; but by the time the mistake was discovered the cavalry had already fallen back, and, as night was coming on, it was found impossible to get the men forward again. The Bavarians consequently escaped without pursuit. Such is the account given by General Chanzy in a work on the history of the Loire campaign, an abstract of which, as well as of a volume on the same subject by M. de Freycinet—who was connected with the War Department under M. Gambetta—appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* for September, 1871.

The Bavarian Life Guards, who had been left at Orleans, and who quitted that city on the 9th, found themselves separated from the main body of the army by the events of the day, and came into such close and unexpected proximity to the enemy that they only saved themselves by a forced and arduous night march of fifteen hours, during which they were frequently within earshot of the French position. The personal luggage and camp-carriage of von der Tann fell into the hands of the French during the night, together with a large amount of hospital stores, many sick and wounded, and the Anglo-American Ambulance Corps. Fighting was resumed on the following morning, when some sharp rear-guard actions occurred in the neighbourhood of Patay, and the forces of d'Aurelles de Paladines occupied Orleans. The French official account of their success, issued at Tours on the 11th of November, said :—"The Army of the Loire, under the command of General d'Aurelles de Paladines, carried Orleans yesterday after two days' fighting. Our losses in killed and wounded do not reach 2,000; those of the enemy are more considerable. We have taken more than 1,000 prisoners, and this number is being increased by the pursuit. We have also captured two guns of Prussian make, more than twenty powder and munition wagons with their horses, and a large quantity of fourgons and provision wagons." The *Times* correspondent at Tours spoke of the battle as a decided success, and set down the German loss at 5,000. General von der Tann, however, would only admit a loss of 42 officers, and 650 privates, killed and wounded; and it was asserted that the two guns captured by the French were simply guns belonging to a detachment of the Bavarian Ammunition Reserve, consisting of an officer and eighty men, who had lost their way on the 10th, and fell into the hands of the enemy. About 1,000 sick Bavarians it was found necessary to leave in the hospital at Orleans, and these of course were made prisoners by the French. At Versailles every attempt was made to conceal the real character of the defeat from the French people, and even from the German army; and whatever subterfuges or falsehoods the French authorities had resorted to in their hour of calamity were fully equalled by the Germans, notwithstanding their much-vaunted veracity and virtue, when their own time of suffering and humiliation arrived. It was not until five days after the receipt at the Royal head-quarters of the news of von der Tann's reverse that the fact was announced at Versailles; and the statement was then made in the following terms:—"The General von der Tann having learnt that the so-called (!) Army of the Loire had passed the Loire near Beaugency on the 9th of November, took up a position outside Orleans against it. Having ascertained the numerical strength of his adversaries, General von der Tann retired fighting towards St. Pernisy." The German official report of the battle (which was somewhat meagre, as the reports of defeated armies are apt to be) said that General von der Tann succeeded in entirely maintaining his position until evening; that it was not until dusk, and "after the hostile attacking columns had drawn back," that he resolved to move towards the reinforcements which had been despatched to him from Chartres and Versailles; and that the retreat was effected "with the proud consciousness of having completely broken the enemy's attack (notwithstanding our being considerably in the minority), and of being obliged to make a retrograde movement only by the free decision of the commander." The King of Prussia, in his conjugal confidences with Queen Augusta, admitted a little more, but still varnished over the disagreeable fact. He said:—"General von der Tann, yielding to the superior force of the enemy, withdrew yesterday, fighting, from Orleans to Toury, where he united his forces with those of General Wittich and Prince Albrecht, who had arrived from Chartres. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg will join General von der Tann to-day (the 11th)." These attempts to cover up a plain fact, in itself far from discreditable, are much to be regretted. The Bavarian defeat, after a gallant fight against overwhelming numbers, was in truth more honourable than many victories; but it was a defeat none the less, and it was idle to deny it.

The Blois correspondent of the *Daily News*—who, however, was not present at the battle—said that "it was Cathelineau's troops which first entered Orleans from the south, driving the Bavarians from the bridge which they were defending, and which they did not have time to blow up, as they had intended. They left there the guns which were defending the bridge. At Baccon there was a very determined fight, in which the losses were great on each side. The Germans were completely beaten; their entrenchments were stormed, and they left behind them about 100 wagons of provisions and forage. Only one French division was engaged on this point." The positions held by the Bavarians were excellent, and they had fortified them as much as possible. As on many other occasions, the conduct of the French Mobiles was particularly good, and people began to prefer them to the regular soldiers. The month which elapsed between the taking of Orleans by the Germans and the re-capture of the city by the French had been turned to admirable account by d'Aurelles de Paladines, who, by a series of rigorous measures, had established discipline among his troops, and checked their previous tendency to insubordination and cowardly conduct before the enemy. The effect of this was seen in the steadiness and spirit with which they fought on the 9th and 10th of November. The Tours correspondent of the *Times* gave an abstract of a letter on the subject of those actions, which he had received from a shrewd and intelligent, though not highly educated, French civilian, whose business took him on the 9th to the vicinity of the field of battle, and who witnessed the conflict from the top of a tall straw-stack. From what he saw and what he afterwards learnt, he furnished this account of the affair:—

"The fighting was between Ouzouer-le-Marché and Coulmiers, both places in the department of the Loiret,



BEFORE ORLEANS.



VON MOLTKE BEFORE PARIS.

north and a little west from Orleans, and at a distance of about twenty kilomètres from that city. (The kilomètre, it may be useful here to mention, is a trifle less than two-thirds of an English mile, or, more exactly, as 22 to 35.) On Monday, November 7th, the Germans showed a disposition to take possession of the forest of Marchenoir, but they were repulsed after a slight skirmish, or, as the informant writes, they retired at the sight of the mitrailleuses, and the next day the French advanced, and their head-quarters were at Ouzouer-le-Marché, in front of which place, at eight on the morning of Wednesday, the 9th, they attacked the Germans. The victory was obstinately contested, and the struggle lasted till dark. The hardest fighting was at Coulmiers, attacked by the French. The village stands at the entrance to a wood, within which the German battalions found cover, and also in the houses, of which they had loopholed the walls. In front of the wood they had batteries in a strongly-entrenched position. The French opened a heavy fire of artillery on wood and village. From the top of his stack the informant could plainly see roofs blown into the air and walls knocked down by the action of the shells. Finally, the Germans were driven from their shelter, and that night the French encamped in and around the village. The letter says:—'It was a complete success. Our troops behaved superbly, and not for an instant did they show a disposition to give way. I can tell you nothing of the relative strength of the combatants, or of the forces engaged on either side. It is certain that only a part of the French army was engaged, and that the reserve artillery was not in action—at least, I can depose to its not having been so up to five o'clock. The regiment of Mobiles of the Sarthe is said to have fought well. The young Marquis de Juigné, son-in-law of M. de Talhouet, who is a captain in the Mobiles of Le Mans, was wounded in the arm. The ball was extracted at Oucques.'"

The success of the French on this occasion seriously deranged a plan of operations against Tours which had been conceived by the German military authorities. It appears from a statement published in the *Official Journal* of Berlin that General Werder, then occupying Dijon, was to have effected a junction with von der Tann at Orleans, and to have marched with him against Tours and Bourges. The former city was described as "of some consequence, being the seat of the Delegate Government;" while the latter was referred to as "a very important armed place." The project, in the opinion of the official writer, could be readily accomplished, because of "the thorough disorganisation of the enemy's troops in those parts." The Prussian authorities entirely misunderstood the real character of the Army of the Loire, and disastrously undervalued the resources, discipline, and numbers of the enemy which had started up in front of the Bavarian commander. They paid the penalty of that mistake in the defeats of November 9th and 10th. It was said at Tours that the Bavarians fought with reluctance, and a correspondent of the *Morning Post* stated that prisoners with whom he had conversed admitted that a yearning for home, and a reluctance to promote the ambition of Prussia, were universal in the army corps of von der Tann.

Continuing his retreat, the Bavarian general arrived on the 10th at Arthenay, some ten or eleven miles to the north of Orleans. Here, owing to the inaction of the French, the Germans were able to enjoy a day's rest, and to take up a defensive position. On the 11th they pursued their way in a leisurely manner—it being now evident that there was no occasion to fear further attack—to Toury, situated at a distance from Orleans of about five-and-twenty miles. At this point General von der Tann was reinforced by the Sixth Prussian Army, 40,000 strong, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and by the division which had occupied Chartres and Châteaudun, under General Wittich and Prince Albrecht. These troops had been hastily despatched to his assistance directly the news of his defeat was received at Versailles; and at the same time Prince Frederick Charles was urged to hasten from the line of the Meuse to that of the Loire, where his presence was far more needed. The new Army Corps, formed by the combination of von der Tann's regiments with those which were sent to his support, and amounting to about 70,000 men, was placed under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and was composed of Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Hanoverian, Prussian, and Bavarian troops, together with some recruited in Meiningen, Weimar, and Thuringia. The setting of a superior commander over the head of von der Tann seems to have implied some displeasure on the part of the King of Prussia; yet the only fault which can be charged against the Bavarian general was his ignorance of the proximity, efficiency, and formidable character of the French Army of the Loire—a false security into which he may have been partly lulled by the uniform tone of scepticism with regard to the powers, almost as to the very existence, of that army, prevailing in official Prussian utterances on the subject. The French attack being made, nothing could be more masterly than the way in which von der Tann, with the comparatively small force at his disposal, resisted the assaults of the foe, and effected his retreat with the greater part of his army. It may almost be said that the vanquished reaped more honour than the conquerors; for the latter certainly failed in their main design, which was to surround the whole Bavarian force, to capture it bodily, and then to march on Paris. That de Paladines, with his immense superiority in men, did not accomplish this, detracts considerably from his fame; yet what he did was done well, and his success, though it ought to have been greater, was both solid and brilliant. He published an address to his army from Orleans on November 10th, in which, with no greater warmth of language than the occasion justified, he congratulated the troops on their good fortune. M. Gambetta also issued a proclamation to the Army of the Loire, which ran:—

> "Soldiers!—Your courage and your efforts have brought back victory to our cause. To you France owes her first consolation, her first ray of hope. I am happy to convey to you the expression of the public gratitude, and the praises and recompenses which the Government awards to success. Led by chiefs vigilant, faithful, and worthy of you, you have recovered discipline and strength; you have retaken Orleans with the ardour of old troops accustomed to conquer, and have proved that France, far from being overwhelmed by reverses which have no precedent in history, intends to assume in her turn a vigorous and general offensive. The advanced guard of the country, you are on the road to Paris. Let us not forget that Paris awaits us. Our honour is staked upon our success in loosening the grasp of the barbarians who threaten her with fire and pillage. Redouble your constancy and your ardour. You now know the enemy. Their superiority consisted in the number of their cannon. Recover the French dash, and the fury which ought to help to save the country. With such soldiers the Republic will issue victorious from the struggle.
>
> "GAMBETTA."

The good news was sent by carrier-pigeon to Paris on the 13th; but it did not reach till the 18th. It was at once placarded throughout the city, where it caused the utmost excitement and joy. Some such relief to men's minds was greatly needed. Paris was beginning to get dull and dispirited. The hope of an armistice had relaxed the general tension which had been maintained for several weeks; and when the armistice broke down, it was found very difficult to return to the former warlike enthusiasm. The news of von der Tann's defeat, however, produced an immense effect. For a little while it seemed certain that Paris would be relieved, and that the Prussians would be scattered by the fiery charge of the provincial armies. If there was any thought of yielding between the 6th and the 18th of November, it was utterly consumed in the exultation of the latter date. The Government despatch announcing the victory was read nightly at the political clubs, and was frantically applauded. At the Folies Bergères the President called on the National Guards of Paris to imitate the Army of the Loire; and if—which he scarcely allowed to be possible—they should be defeated, it would still be open to them to die crying "Long live the Republic! Long live France!" The President of the Club des Montagnards declared that the first results of the recent success should be the utter abandonment of all negotiations between France and Prussia, and the immediate march of General Trochu against the enemy. "Citizen Garibaldi," he continued, "is still in the east, picking off Prussians, intercepting their convoys, and incessantly carrying on a partisan warfare. Our first success has been obtained in the provinces. If we should be conquerors, we ought to stop at our own boundaries, and not carry into Germany the ruin and devastation which a barbarian has heaped upon us. The potentates alone are guilty. The people are our brothers; and, in presence of our self-restraint and our fraternity, we will hold out our hand to them, and they will rally under our banner." An orator at another club, however, said that, as France could not fail to be victorious, she ought not to sheathe her sword until she had planted her flag in Germany.

It may be interesting to recall the historical fact that at a short distance from Arthenay, during the wars in the reign of our Henry VI., an English detachment of 2,000 men, under Sir John Fastolfe, encountered, while escorting a convoy of provisions to the army besieging Orleans, a force of 4,000 French and Scotch, commanded by Dunois and the Count of Clermont, who endeavoured to intercept the English, but were completely defeated. The engagement was fought on the 10th of February, 1429. In the following June, the English forces under the same commander were retreating dispirited from Orleans, when they were put to flight at the first onset by the French, led by Joan of Arc. Shakespeare, in the First Part of "King Henry VI." (Act III., sc. 2), introduces this incident, and makes Fastolfe run away in the most undisguised manner. In the first scene of the following act, Talbot denounces Fastolfe at Paris before King Henry (who, by the way, was in truth only a child of seven years old at the time), and tears the Order of the Garter from his leg, explaining his reason in a speech where we find mentioned one of the very places referred to in the accounts of the battles of November, 1870.

"Pardon me, princely Henry, and the rest.
This dastard, at the battle of Patay,—
When but in all I was six thousand strong,
And that the French were almost ten to one,—

> Before we met, or that a stroke was given,
> Like to a trusty squire, did run away;
> In which assault we lost twelve hundred men:
> Myself, and divers gentlemen beside,
> Were there surprised, and taken prisoners."

Assuredly, no recreant knight was to be found among the Bavarians at Coulmiers and Baccon; and, indeed, it is thought that Shakespeare traduced the character of Sir John Fastolfe, who seems to have been a brave and worthy gentleman. Although it is really alleged in history that he ran away at the fight in question, and although he appears to have been expelled from the Order of the Garter, it is equally true that his honours were subsequently restored to him; so that the charge of cowardice (which his whole career certainly renders improbable) would seem to have been disproved.

General Chanzy's work, previously referred to, says that the French slept on the field of battle on the night of the 9th. It began to rain and snow; there was no wood for fires, and the supplies of food and ammunition were got to the front with great difficulty. At daybreak on the following morning a small force of forty-five men went in pursuit of the retreating Bavarians, and it was these men who took the two guns, a certain number of prisoners, and a large quantity of baggage and ammunition. The main body of the army, however, made no attempt to follow the enemy, though it would appear that de Paladines still had 90,000 men in fighting condition. The Bavarians were utterly astounded when they found they were not being seriously pursued; for in the earlier hours of the retreat they expected every moment to be cut up by the French cavalry. Weary and exhausted (for they had marched the whole of the previous night to reach the scene of action, and the weather, as we have seen, was very bad), they would have been an easy prey to any vigorously directed attack by a body of troops in better physical condition. The next few days, according to General Chanzy, were employed in organising convoys, completing the artillery, and procuring clothes for the soldiers. Yet, even when these preparations had been made, the French did not move in force. Their outposts, indeed, advanced, and Arthenay was occupied by them very shortly after it had been abandoned by the Germans; but the main body remained stationary. The Duke of Mecklenburg and von der Tann having turned towards the west, the direct road to Paris was open by the 14th of November, at which time there were barely 5,000 Germans between the Army of the Loire and the capital. The situation appeared so serious to the King of Prussia and his advisers that, on the morning of that day, preparations were actually made for leaving Versailles at a moment's notice. The 14th and 15th of November were passed in anxiety and suspense; the baggage was kept packed in the vans; and the officers looked gloomy, and answered all questions, even those of their own countrymen, with great reticence. It is evident that even the King and General Moltke were mystified as to the real state of affairs. They were under the impression that an army, which in truth they had no reason to fear, was marching on Versailles from the direction of Argentan and Laigle; and while the Duke of Mecklenburg and General von der Tann were consulting measures on the 11th for making a stand against the French, and covering Paris, they received a telegram from the Royal head-quarters, which, to their bewilderment, instructed them to abandon the direct line of defence, and immediately march north-west from Toury, leaving d'Aurelles to do what he liked. Owing to this exaggerated fear of an army, the real nature and position of which were unknown, the road to Paris was left open; and it is certain that for two days Versailles was exposed to the attack of d'Aurelles de Paladines, but that nevertheless he did not attack. He might have marched straight on by Etampes to the Seine; and, although he would then have had to fight a tremendous battle with the investing armies, and might have been beaten, there was nothing to stop him before he came to the lines round Paris, and it is possible that he might have raised the siege. During those nervous two days, Moltke feared that the Duke of Mecklenburg would not be able to get into position in the vicinity of Dreux in time to paralyse the army that was supposed, but erroneously, to be marching on Versailles from Argentan; and he also dreaded, with greater reason, though, as it turned out, without cause, the sudden incursion of de Paladines. By the early morning of the 16th, however, the danger was known to have passed, and orders were given to unpack the luggage, and settle down again into the customary ways. The army from Argentan had melted into air; Prince Frederick Charles was approaching that part of the country where he could interpose between Orleans and Paris; and d'Aurelles de Paladines had obviously made up his mind not at that time to risk a march on the metropolis. The great peril to the Germans—the great opportunity for the French—had gone by; and it never recurred in anything like the same degree. In that war of almost uniform ill-luck for the French, Fortune gave them one supreme opportunity; and the military commander on whom all depended had not the genius or the resolution, the enterprise or the moral courage, to take advantage of the golden moment. D'Aurelles de Paladines, who up to the actions of the 9th and 10th of November had exhibited no small ability, seemed now to be stricken with a kind of mental palsy, or dismayed by his own success. Instances of this sudden failure of power, however, are not wanting in history. Dupleix, the French Governor of Pondicherry in 1747—a man of remarkable energy and enterprise—missed, by a strange and exceptional inactivity, a most favourable opportunity of crushing the rising power of the English in India, and of firmly establishing that of the French; and no other chance was granted either to him or any of his countrymen. Providence is not a spendthrift of such favours. It seldom offers a second time what has been once neglected or refused.

The hesitation of d'Aurelles de Paladines was not at all approved by M. Gambetta, nor, indeed, by some of his own officers. On November 12th a conference took place between the French generals of the Army of the Loire and the War Minister, who had arrived from Tours to congratulate the troops on their victory. General Borel, who had the reputation of a very able soldier, proposed to march at once on the Seine; but the design was strongly opposed by the commander-in-chief, who argued that not only would it be impossible to continue the offensive, but that, in his estimation, it would be dangerous even to remain at Orleans. He expressed a fear that the Germans would come back in force almost directly; stated that M. Thiers, on his return from Versailles, had seen 80,000 Prussians marching down from Paris; and added that his own army, when attacked, as it would be in a day or two, would be found incapable of withstanding the shock. He therefore proposed to evacuate Orleans at once, and revert to his old position. This project was resisted with great warmth by M. Gambetta, M. de Freycinet, and General Borel; and General de Paladines at length consented to entrench his troops round Orleans, and to regard Paris as the ultimate destination of the army. Nothing, however, would induce him to sanction a forward movement at the time; and M. Gambetta was obliged to leave with only a very partial concession to his views. A fortified camp was formed round Orleans, and, on the arrival of fresh troops, a grand total of more than 200,000 men had been attained.

Day after day passed, and the opportunity for effective action grew less and less. By the time the whole of Prince Frederick Charles's army had reached Pithiviers, the difficulty and hazard of an advance had become considerable; but the Prince's corps arrived in separate brigades by different roads, and these might probably have been beaten in detail by a commander equal to the occasion. General de Pallières offered to march against them with his division, and M. Gambetta urged the same course in a despatch dated November 13th; but de Paladines would not permit it, urging, as before, the bad state of the weather, the ill condition of the roads, and the defective clothing of his men. On the 19th of November M. Gambetta adopted a more decided tone. He wrote to General de Paladines:—"We cannot stop eternally at Orleans. Paris is hungry, and calls for us. Prepare a plan which will enable us to reach Trochu, who will come out to meet us." The general, however, was ready with a new excuse. He could not prepare a plan without knowing what Trochu meant to do. To some extent the designs, or at least the wishes, of Trochu *were* known. He had written to M. Gambetta on the 18th of November, by balloon, in answer to the announcement of the victory at Coulmiers:—"Your telegram excites my interest and zeal to the utmost; but it has been five days coming, and we shall want a week to get ready. I will not lose one instant. We have ample food till the end of the year; but perhaps the population will not wait till then, and we must solve the problem long before that." Another balloon was sent out from the capital on the 24th, announcing that a great sortie would be made from Paris on Tuesday, the 29th. Owing to the balloon having been blown over to Norway, this despatch did not reach Tours until the 30th, and it was not until the following day that General d'Aurelles de Paladines moved forward with his entire force, to endeavour to form a junction with the army of General Ducrot, coming from the Seine. He did so unwillingly, even then; and, indeed, the favourable moment had been missed. Disastrous failure attended the enterprise; but the details of this event must be reserved until we arrive at that period of the present History with which it is concerned.

A military critic in the *Times*, summarising the events of the war in March, 1871, observes, with respect to d'Aurelles' decision not to advance, but to form an entrenched camp under the screen of the Forest of Orleans:—"This, we think, was a most unhappy resolve; but, in justice to a veteran officer who possesses no common organising skill, it is fair to say that military reasons of a plausible kind may be assigned for it. There is no proof that General Trochu, who communicated frequently with the provinces by balloons, pigeons, and other devices, expected relief at this moment; he might not, therefore, have been ready to attack as soon as d'Aurelles appeared outside; and, in that event, the Army of the Loire might have found itself in a dangerous position. Besides, d'Aurelles was no doubt informed, after the battles of the 9th and the following day, that the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was being detached from the German camp to aid von der Tann; rumour would magnify the Grand Duke's strength, and, in that event, a cautious commander might well hesitate before attempting such an enterprise as a march on Paris. Moreover—most important fact of all, and probably decisive in d'Aurelles' judgment—Prince Frederick Charles was known to be at that moment on his way from Metz to the Upper Loire. Add to this that the Army of the Loire was as yet imperfectly trained, and that the depression of appalling reverses hung like a spell on the French commanders, and we can understand how a great captain only would have attempted the more daring course." General de Paladines should of course receive the benefit of all these considerations; but it is impossible not to see that he was wanting in that boldness and that faculty of vigorous initiative which are indispensable in the prosecution of great wars.



READING THE NEWS AT BERLIN.



CHURCH IN PARIS CONVERTED INTO A HOSPITAL.

The opportunity which he failed to perceive was visible to the unprofessional eye of M. Gambetta; and had the advice of that fiery lawyer and revolutionist been taken, the subsequent course of events might have been different. But it was the evil destiny of France throughout the war to plan with passion, and to execute with hesitation and distrust.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Change in the German Estimate of French Resistance—Necessity for taking greater Precautions after the Defeat of von der Tann—Formation of Covering Armies—Possible consequences of greater Energy on the Part of d'Aurelles de Paladines—Disastrous Effects of the Surrender of Metz—A Digression on Bazaine's Defence of his Conduct—The Respective Forces of France and Germany—French Scheme of Operations—Attempt of Kératry to relieve Paris—German Arrangements for resisting the Army of the West—Action at Dreux—Defeat of the French, and Retrograde Movement of Kératry's Forces—Perils escaped by the Besiegers of Paris—Changes of Feeling on the Part of the Parisians—Objects of Kératry's Movements—The Taking of Châteauneuf—Advance of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg—Difficult Nature of the Country—Capture of Digny, of Torcy, and of Nogent-le-Rotrou—The Battle of Bretoncelles—Ruined Condition of the Villages—Excitement at Chartres—Relative Positions of the French and German Armies at the Close of November—Character and Formation of the French Armies—Re-entry of the Germans into Châteaudun—Depression among the Germans—Success of the Francs-tireurs in checking the Movements of the Uhlans—Varied Character of the Several Bodies of Free-shooters—Exasperation of the Germans at their Opposition—The Defence hopeless, yet not to be condemned.

General Moltke and his Royal master were not slow to perceive, after the events of November 9th and 10th, that they must take greater precautions against surprise, and not so confidently assume that France had now only a rabble of ill-armed and worse-drilled peasants in the field. The easy self-satisfaction of the investing armies before Paris had been rudely shaken. For two days alarm had prevailed at Versailles, and it had appeared doubtful whether it would not be necessary to raise the siege. A veritable Army of the Loire had started up in the rear, and had advanced some way on the road to Paris; and but for the timidity or the excessive caution of d'Aurelles de Paladines, the pennons of that army might have been seen fluttering in the vicinity of the Seine. The immediate occasion of distrust quickly vanished; yet the German commanders wisely resolved not to be any longer at the mercy of such accidents. Although de Paladines had hesitated, another general might not; and it would have been the height of imprudence to allow the grand siege of Paris to depend on the forbearance or the irresolution of a French leader who might any day be superseded by one more energetic, or who might himself suddenly determine to dash forward at all hazards, incited by the enthusiasm or stung by the reproaches of M. Gambetta. It was therefore decided to interpose between the investing forces and the French armies, of whatever size or degree of organisation, approaching from the south, west, or elsewhere, a number of distinct lines of defence, so as to keep the relieving forces at a distance, and indeed to drive them gradually back into the more remote parts of France. Hitherto this duty of mounting guard had been performed by small, scattered detachments, dangerously spread abroad over the principal roads radiating from the French capital. These had sufficed in the days of universal depression and despair immediately succeeding the gigantic catastrophe of Sedan, and the sealing up of Bazaine in Metz. But the spirit of the nation was now rallying, the resources of the country were being developed, and it was found necessary to provide the stationary besiegers with regular covering armies, which could move hither and thither along the immense circuit of the outer lines, and ward off any attack that might be directed against the operations of the beleaguering hosts. To the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and von der Tann was assigned the duty of keeping watch on an arc extending from Dreux to Toury, and of checkmating the left wing of the Army of the Loire, together with the Army of the West. Manteuffel's corps, instead of continuing its northward march, was placed on a line running from Laon towards Rouen; while Prince Frederick Charles was ordered to suspend his movement in the direction of the Upper Loire, to send a detachment to co-operate with the besiegers to the south of their lines, and with the rest of his army to push on by forced marches until he should arrive in such a position that he could communicate with the Grand Duke and von der Tann, and menace the right flank of d'Aurelles de Paladines. These three bodies of troops formed, in combination, a vast semicircle.

running from Beauvais, on the north of Paris, by Mantes, Dreux, and Chartres, on the west, to Etampes and Fontainebleau, on the south. The east was left open, as no immediate danger threatened the besiegers in that direction, and the country generally was in possession of the Germans. The new dispositions were effected with extraordinary quickness, yet with complete efficiency. By the 19th of November the covering armies were sufficiently in position to render difficult and hazardous any onslaught by the French from either the south or the west.

What might have ensued had these combinations not been made, or had d'Aurelles de Paladines dashed forward to the Seine while the road was open, is one of those speculative points which will probably afford subject-matter for the comments of military critics as long as such topics are debated. It is of course impossible to speak with certainty on the basis of events which never occurred; but a writer in the *Times*, from whom a passage on the subject has already been cited, seems to shadow forth the probabilities of the case, when he says:—"We do not agree with those who think that the Germans, caught between two fires, would have suffered a terrible reverse. Von Moltke would have certainly drawn off in time, as Napoleon did from before Mantua when he became aware of the approach of Wurmser; and it may be assumed that the Army of the Loire would before long have been compelled to retreat. Nevertheless, the siege would have been raised; the armies in Paris, now in fair order, would have been able to march out, and make the renewal of the investment in winter almost impossible; and it is difficult to exaggerate the effect on a brave and emotional race like the French. This indicates what a misfortune to France was the fall of Metz at the close of October. Had the fortress held out ten days longer, no additional corps could have been moved to Paris; in all probability the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg could not have been detached from the besiegers' lines; no apparition of Prince Frederick Charles could have alarmed the chief of the Army of the Loire; and, in these events, we can hardly doubt that d'Aurelles would have overwhelmed von der Tann, and marched with his whole force to Paris."* The same writer remarks that these considerations revive the painful question whether Marshal Bazaine did all in his power to maintain himself at Metz. He thinks the city really succumbed to famine, and that to this extent Bazaine is entitled to an absolving verdict; but he adds that a concurrence of testimony seems to suggest that the generals of the Army of the Rhine did not husband the resources of Metz with proper diligence, nor set an example of the honourable suffering of privations. He believes that, in the case of Bazaine, as in that of some other of the Imperial generals, endurance and forethought were somewhat wanting. Of the Marshal's political combinations the critic forbears to speak, as they have not yet been sufficiently explained; but, with reference to a statement that he had appealed to Prince Frederick Charles to justify his conduct, he bids him bear in mind the remark of Napoleon, "Distrust, until the campaign is over, the applause of an interested foe."

This is certainly the least that can be said with respect to Bazaine's management of the defence of Metz. The latter days of that defence were full of sinister facts, as the earlier chapters of this History have but too plainly shown. The subject having been recalled by considerations arising out of the November movements of d'Aurelles de Paladines on the line of the Loire, we may glance in passing at the vindication of his conduct which the Marshal published in the form of a pamphlet, at Berlin, in December, 1870, but which does not by any means explain away the suspicious circumstances of the capitulation. What the writer says of the earlier part of his operations carries greater weight. He alleges that he did not receive the command of the Army of the Rhine until August 13th, instead of the 9th, as generally stated; in which case he is of course not responsible for the delays connected with the opening disasters of the war. For the sluggishness of his movements on the 14th and 15th of August he blames the War Department; and he attributes his falling back after the indecisive battle of Vionville to the disorganised condition of his army. These excuses may be fair and just; but the failure of the French to break out of Metz, while the Germans were still weakly distributed in front of the fortifications, is not explained. Marshal Bazaine says that after the sortie of August 31st and September 1st he endeavoured several times to communicate with the Government, with the desire of informing them of the dangerous situation of the Army of the Rhine, and of obtaining instructions and information; but his despatches remained without reply, and none of his messengers returned. He then goes on to relate the negotiations of General Boyer, first with the Prussian military authorities at Versailles, and afterwards with the Empress in England —negotiations agreed to at councils of war, and entirely disconnected with politics. He refers to the chaotic and dispirited condition of France, the absence of help on the part of the Metzers themselves, the running out of the food supplies, the want of medicines and of surgeons, and the prevalence of epidemic diseases; and from these facts he infers that nothing more could be done. On the 10th of October it was unanimously decided at a council of war—"1st. To remain under the walls of Metz for as long a time as possible; 2nd. Not to undertake any operations [*i.e.*, not to make any further foraging sorties], the result appearing negative; 3rd. To negotiate within forty-eight hours with the enemy to procure an honourable convention; 4th. In case the enemy imposed conditions inconsistent with honour and with military duty, a passage shall be made by force of arms." The subsequent visit of General Changarnier to Prince Frederick Charles was not, according to Marshal Bazaine, to arrange a capitulation, but to ask for an armistice, with the power of revictualling, or leave for the army to quit the country for Algeria. This failing, the surrender followed very shortly. Such, in brief, is the self-defence of Bazaine; but it does not show why more vigorous and persistent efforts to break through were not made while yet there was a fair chance of success; nor does it refute, except by bare assertion to the contrary, the numerous independent statements to the effect that at the time of the capitulation there was food enough in Metz to have enabled the place to hold out for some time longer. It is no wonder that the French, in those days of reviving hope after the battle of Coulmiers, cursed the act of Bazaine which had set loose upon the Army of the Loire the massive and victorious legions of Prince Frederick Charles.

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* "The Campaign of 1870-71."—*Times*, March 8th, 1871.

In opposition to the German forces, the French now had several armies, some of which were moderately efficient, while others were still very rude and ill-disciplined. In Paris, Trochu found himself at the head of 320,000 men, divided into three grand armies, tolerably well drilled, and accustomed to the trials of military life. General d'Aurelles de Paladines, as we have seen, was in a position to bring more than 200,000 troops to bear against the enemy. Kératry had 55,000 men at Le Mans; General Farre 30,000 at Amiens; General Faidherbe 20,000 at Lille; and General Michel, in combination with Garibaldi, 40,000 at Maçon and Chagny. These figures give a grand total of upwards of 665,000. The German armies amounted to somewhat less than this; but the superiority in discipline, generalship, equipment, and arms, was immense. The invaders, moreover, had the confidence of success, except on a few occasions; while the French were bowed down by a long series of reverses, scarcely relieved by the victory of November 9th and 10th, the fruits of which were destroyed in the bud by the over-much caution of the conquering general. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the Germans were fighting in a foreign land, in the midst of a hostile population, while the French were operating in their own country and amongst their own people, and were inspired by the desperate valour of patriotism and threatened independence. As time wore on, their plan of operations became more clear to the Prussians. From the south, from the west, and from the north, large armies were to hurry up to the relief of Paris; and the capital, pouring out her own forces in a grand sortie, was to burst through the iron cincture of the besiegers, and to coalesce with her deliverers on the field of battle. The design was good; but the ability, resolution, and stubbornness of the Germans overcame it. Nevertheless, there were moments when it seemed to promise success. The late autumn and early winter months were months of desperate fighting, and more than once the Prussian King and his advisers had cause for anxiety. They were also months of terrible slaughter, of dreadful suffering from cold and privation. More than a million and a quarter of men stood in arms against one another; and the rigours of an exceptionally severe winter were added to the horrors of actual conflict.

In consequence of the victory of Coulmiers d'Aurelles de Paladines was made generalissimo of all the French armies outside of Paris. This was on November 12th. Attention was now directed from de Paladines to Kératry, who was ordered by the Government to penetrate the Prussian investing lines round Paris, while Trochu, supported by the fire of the southern forts, would co-operate with the army of relief. Unfortunately for the French, however, Moltke had, by means of his spies, discovered the design, and had of course taken means to baffle it. He ordered the 2nd corps of Prince Frederick Charles's old Third Army to the support of the 6th corps (Tümpling's), south of Paris, and at the same time despatched the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg from Etampes towards Dreux, with directions to attack any force approaching. He also held other troops in readiness to march south-west, if necessary. The advanced guard of Kératry, consisting of 7,000 Bretagne Mobiles, reached Dreux on the 17th of November, and was followed by marching columns from Le Mans, including a small number of sailors. The plan of the French general was to turn the flank of the fifth German corps at Versailles, and to operate on the weak point of the German lines between St. Germain and Argenteuil. This project, however, he was unable to accomplish. In his northward march he had followed the line from Chartres to Châteauneuf, hoping to keep far enough west to avoid being arrested by the enemy. But at Dreux (which had been re-occupied by the French some days before) he was attacked by the Duke of Mecklenburg, with parts of the 5th and 12th Corps, the 5th and 6th Cavalry divisions, and the 22nd Infantry division. The 2nd and 4th Cavalry divisions were held in reserve near Epernon, and the 1st Bavarian Corps of von der Tann was stopped at Etampes on it's march to Orleans, and faced towards Ablis; but the services of these additional troops were not needed. According to a French account, the Germans were about 5,000 strong, and had with them twelve guns. The French, in that case, must have greatly outnumbered their adversaries, and, with more determination and constancy, they would probably have gained the day. The sailors appear to have fought with the utmost valour, rushing on the Prussian guns, and killing the gunners as they stood. But, on the admission of a French writer, the Mobiles, with the exception of those of Calvados, acted feebly and hesitatingly; and the sailors, after having both inflicted and suffered great losses, were compelled to retire. The Germans, in the first instance, had moved upon the town from three different directions, and they commenced a heavy bombardment about one o'clock P.M. On getting into the streets, they were met by a more determined resistance. The French (among whom were a good many boys from fourteen to sixteen years of age, who did not know how to use their chassepôts) fought for the most part behind breastworks, running back as the Germans advanced, and then firing again, and again running. Five hundred Mobiles ran away from one of the barricades, and, seeking shelter in a house, fired from the windows; but a few having been taken prisoners, the rest scattered in confusion. It is said that many of the French had no other uniform than a red strap sewed on the shoulder, and that to these no quarter was given, even the wounded being stabbed with the bayonet. The result of the day's fighting was that the French retired precipitately on Châteauneuf, that Dreux fell into the possession of the Germans, and that two hundred prisoners were taken. The French loss in killed and wounded was 150; the German, 104. On the 18th, the Duke of Mecklenburg advanced beyond Châteauneuf, clearing the woods and hills; and on the following day General Wittich, with the 22nd division, pushed on through Châteauneuf to Digny, and captured several Mobiles. The whole of the French Army of the West now retreated beyond Chartres towards Châteaudun; and Prince Frederick Charles, moving his army towards Beaune-la-Rolande and Montargis, menaced d'Aurelles de Paladines with a flank movement. The fears of King William and General Moltke were by this time removed. How serious had been the occasion of those fears was vividly pointed out by Dr. Russell in a communication to the *Times* dated from the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia, November 18th:—

"The crisis is over! The French have withdrawn from Dreux; they have lost a chance, and the investing army has been relieved from a position which it is not too much to call one of peril. For three days it was not known what was the composition of the army which had suddenly appeared on the line of the Eure. Was it the Army of the Loire, which had evaded the combined forces of the Duke of Mecklenburg and von der Tann? If so, it was evident that the Crown Prince was threatened, and that he would have to move out and give battle. But if the Paris garrison made a grand sortie at the same moment, it became matter of doubt whether the Germans could hold their own on the high plateaux which now give them such mastery. The Prince certainly could not take off 80,000 men without leaving a very thin line of circumvallation. The Grand Duke might be cut off from his communications. If, on the other hand, the force which had been left at Dreux and seen in front of Mantes were a new army, it might be that Bourbaki had by forced marches got out of Manteuffel's reach, and was striking out to join Paladines—in which case the Grand Duke might be overwhelmed, and a serious offensive movement commenced to check Prince Frederick Charles, and to isolate him from the army of the Crown Prince. But whatever it was, the army, which is believed to have been composed of Kératry's levies, has gone back, and, at the same time, the force which fell on von der Tann, and precipitated the evacuation of Orleans, has vanished from Toury. Manteuffel has been heard of not far from Amiens. Prince Frederick Charles has made good his communication with the Crown Prince's army, and both are in communication with the army of the Duke of Mecklenburg. A sufficient force has been concentrated towards Dreux and Mantes to secure the Crown Prince's lines from attack. The danger has passed. The French have lost a great opportunity, and in war, as in other matters, the golden moments once neglected do not return. There is now no talk of any packing up, or of taking the field here. But the greatest change of all, is that which has been noted in the attitude of Paris. A sortie was for three days regarded as positively certain. It was to be a grand movement in three directions: one attack was to be directed against the Würtembergers between the Seine and Marne; another in the direction of Choisy from Villejuif; a third against the heights of St. Cloud and Meudon.



IN THE BATTLE OF DREUX.



IN THE HOSPITAL.

So it was said. These reports, coincident with preparations for an extensive expedition which would weaken the force of the investing army, caused much anxiety."

The French had for a time been much elated, and they were now correspondingly depressed. The tone of the Paris papers altered a good deal after the double failure of d'Aurelles de Paladines and of Kératry to raise the siege. The peace party gained ground, and the *Figaro*, in particular, adjured the Government to dispense with sorties, to convene a National Assembly, and to make peace, all hope of rescue having disappeared. Papers advocating these views found their way into the Prussian lines, and were of course read with much interest and satisfaction. It would seem, however, that the besiegers gave too much weight to such utterances, which were but the expression of a temporary reaction of feeling, consequent on the sudden collapse of hopes that had been too highly raised. It is essentially the French temperament to oscillate between the extremes of confidence and despondency. When de Paladines fell back on Orleans, and Kératry was defeated in his attempt to reach Paris by way of Dreux, the Parisians were for a moment thrown into despair, as they had been several times before. But the impression was evanescent. Paris soon regained its mood of self-assertion and of sanguine reliance on external aid. Fresh plans were formed, fresh resolutions taken for defending the capital against the assaults of the besiegers. More than two months of resistance yet lay in front, and some of the hardest fighting of the war had still to come. In one respect the phlegmatic Germans equalled the volatile French in their most hopeful moods. They were always assuming the exhaustion of their enemy.

The writer of a letter from Versailles, published in the *Staats Anzeiger*, remarked, with reference to these movements of Kératry:—"The position taken up by the French troops between Nogent and Houdan before the events at Dreux had a double object. On the one hand, the line of the Eure was defended, and access to Dreux from the east thereby prevented; on the other, it was attempted to co-operate with the garrison of Paris in a sortie on the west or south side. Houdan is twenty-six miles from Versailles by the château of Pont Chartrain, and eight miles from Dreux. The position at Nogent-le-Roi was selected so that the Rambouillet and Chartres road could be watched. Maintenon, where this road crosses that from Mantes to Chartres, is five miles from Nogent. Newspapers from Paris have clearly shown that special hopes were placed on a movement of troops from the west. These hopes were dispelled by the victory of the 17th. Dreux, which soon after the capture of Chartres opened its gates without a struggle to the German troops, was never formally occupied by them, but only watched by cavalry patrols advancing backwards and forwards. As often as these patrols appeared, they found the town free from any hostile occupation; but after their departure, small bands of Francs-tireurs and Mobiles were accustomed to quarter there. With the change made in the detachments in consequence of the fight of the 9th, the watching of Dreux was given up." It was for some time supposed by the Germans that the attempted march on Paris by way of Dreux was made by a portion of the Army of the Loire, under de Paladines, instead of by the Army of the West, under Kératry. After a while, however, it was found that the former commander was still resting supinely in front of Orleans. The fact was discovered, if we may believe the Versailles correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, by a very bold feat of arms. The German cavalry, having no desire to remain inactive after the loss of the two Bavarian reserve guns at the battle of Coulmiers, made a dash (a few squadrons strong) towards Orleans, and actually re-captured the cannon just before the city. The statement appears almost incredible, seeing that the bulk of the Army of the Loire was close at hand; but the writer asserts that the fact could be vouched for. Still, we must not accept everything that comes from a German source as necessarily true. The really heroic countrymen of Baron Munchausen may sometimes prove their title to have produced that warrior.

Herr Wachenhusen, one of the German correspondents at the seat of war, said that the populace of Châteauneuf expressed to their conquerors an ardent desire for peace at any price. At one time a rumour spread through the town, that peace had actually been concluded. The place was in fact quite exhausted of provisions by the armies—alternately French and German—which had been quartered there. When the regiments of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg got into the town all the shops were found to be shut, and the streets deserted. Some billeting sergeants entered with the Uhlans; but the Mayor was not to be seen at the Hôtel de Ville, nor elsewhere. The French still held one half of the town, and maintained a dropping fire; but the Germans continued to advance, and the Grand Duke established himself in a house before which, only a quarter of an hour earlier, one of the Uhlans had had his horse shot under him. "Notwithstanding all their troubles, and the heavy burdens they have had to bear," said Herr Wachenhusen, "the inhabitants behaved with great tact." The same writer stated that at this time the Francs-tireurs seemed to be disappearing from the scene; even the prisoners in dark blue flannel blouses, with light blue waistbands, called themselves Mobiles, and in reality were so. They were of very little use, however, according to this authority, for they could only fight behind walls, and always ran away when their adversaries advanced. But the army opposed to the Grand Duke did not consist entirely of raw troops: there were several regiments of old, well-drilled soldiers, and these appear to have made themselves felt in action. On the 20th of November the German foreposts marched forward as far as Senonches and La Loupe, the French withdrawing after a few shots from the artillery of their opponents. Although unable to stand for long against the soldiers of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, the Army of the West gave that general a good deal of trouble. His corps was for many days kept marching and countermarching, its plans being repeatedly upset by the shifting tactics of the enemy. Both Kératry and de Paladines appear to have had a besetting terror of seeing their armies surrounded and forced to surrender in a body, after the dismal example of Sedan. There can be no doubt that fear of a repetition of this catastrophe acted like a torpedo on the enterprise of French commanders.

The difficulties of the Duke of Mecklenburg's corps were greatly increased by the nature of the country in which it had to operate, by the dark and foggy weather which prevailed, and by the shortening days of advancing winter. The ground in every direction was densely wooded, and often the German soldiers could only proceed in half-battalions at a time. The French irregulars hid themselves in the recesses of the forests, crouched in the low brushwood, and out of the wide umbrage and the grey mist sent, unseen, their stinging rifle-bullets into the columns of the enemy. Occasionally the Bavarian infantry made sallies into the woods, captured a number of the sharp-shooters, and killed others, with a certain proportion of loss to themselves. But the evil was sure to recur in other places, and progress could only be made with caution and slowness. The capture of Digny, on the 18th, by the 94th and 32nd regiments, was described by Herr Wachenhusen, who wrote:—

> "The detachment struck through the forest on the side of Hauterine. The fog was so dense, and covered the woods with such a thick veil, that the troops could scarcely distinguish each other, and this otherwise simple affair proved a very difficult task. Between three and five o'clock rapid musketry-firing was heard from the woods. The French troops withdrew, however, leaving a few of their number in our hands. During this time the Bavarian billeting corps had marched towards Digny, and fell in with the 22nd Division at the village of Ardelles, close by Digny, where the enemy attempted to stop their way. It would appear, however, as if the fighting that ensued was of the same desultory character as before, for any combined movements were prevented by the weather. It was night, or rather early morning, before a patrol could be sent into Digny, which was found to be deserted by the French. Upon a search being made, about 120 prisoners were discovered, and at the same time a hidden hoard of Bavarian arms, which the enemy doubtless had taken from the wounded. When I passed the village of Ardelles this afternoon, the few farm buildings of the place were in flames; a dense smoke rising from the glowing timbers indicated the spot where the fight had taken place. The villagers were employed in filling up the trenches which the French had dug. The prisoners taken on this spot on the previous day were partly Mobiles, the majority of whom belonged to the wealthier classes."

Torcy was also taken after a march through the woods and a desperate conflict, in which the French tirailleurs fought with great determination, and were not vanquished without much trouble.

> "The engagement (says Herr Wachenhusen) became ultimately so furious, and the French especially kept up such a vigorous fire upon our men, that their further advance into the wood was impossible. It was not until some considerable lapse of time that our troops obtained the upper hand, and were enabled to attack with the bayonet, a vigorous charge being made by the 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion, and the 10th Company of the Fusiliers. It was here that scenes occurred on our side which only the long duration of the war and the longing for home could have produced; and, if I know the spirit of our men, there will soon be no longer any question of giving quarter. Shortly before this attack, the 9th Company had succeeded in overpowering the fire from the village, and, entering the place, had advanced as far as the southern and south-western extremity. At the same time the 12th Company attacked the western side of the village, and the enemy, being driven out of all his positions, withdrew in a north-westerly direction, covering his flank with skirmishers for some time, and thus relinquished the battle. The losses of the 94th Regiment, as given to-day, comprise 10 killed and 28 wounded. The enemy lost 56 killed and 120 wounded, and three officers."

It is reported that the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg gave orders that every one in any description of uniform was to be treated as a soldier; but the statements of Herr Wachenhusen show how little those orders were obeyed. Because the Germans very naturally desired to return home, and because they were annoyed at being attacked from the cover of woods by a species of militia, they considered themselves justified, in defiance of their own commander's injunctions, in committing acts of ferocity from which, Herr Wachenhusen seems to suggest, they would have shrunk if the French had only had the sense and good taste to abstain from defending their country, to confess their inferiority, and to grant the Germans whatever they required. He speaks of "the *murder* of Uhlans and Hussars by Francs-tireurs and Mobiles." On what ground of reason the killing of regular troops by irregular, in the course of actual hostilities, can be called "murder," unless we class all acts of war under that term, is not made clear. The Germans appear to have thought the French guilty of some special enormity in guarding their own existence; and they accordingly revenged themselves with merciless rigour. At the village of La Madeleine, during a skirmish, an officer of the Lancers heard a sharp musketry-fire from behind a clump of trees. On investigation, he found that it came from one man, and that man old. The officer sent a lieutenant and four privates to him, and shortly afterwards saw him lying on the ground, pierced in several places by the lances of the soldiers. One of the privates, as the officer subsequently related to a correspondent, had bored the unfortunate patriot through the body with his lance in such a way that it took two men to withdraw the weapon; yet the old man had still strength enough to discharge his piece, and kill one of the Lancers. Even after the lieutenant had shot him through the breast with his pistol, he fired once more, and it required three additional shots to kill him. Incidents of this nature were related with the utmost coolness. They were defended by the Germans on the ground of military law; but assuredly they cannot be vindicated on the higher ground of morals.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had originally led his army in a north-westerly direction; but he afterwards changed his front, and marched south-west. He then took up a position in a line with the river Eure, so that the 17th Division, under General Treskow, formed his right wing, and the corps of General von der Tann his left, with the 22nd Division for the centre. On both wings a large force of cavalry was posted. To the left was Prince Albrecht, who at the same time kept up communications with Prince Frederick Charles by way of Etampes; while to the right the divisions of Count Rheinbaden and General Schmidt stretched to the north, and covered the flanks. This change was made before the battle of Dreux. On the 22nd of November the town of Nogent-le-Rotrou was occupied by the Germans without resistance, notwithstanding that extensive works of defence had been thrown up, and that many rumours had been afloat to the effect that at this point the French were determined to make a desperate stand. Shortly before the invaders entered the town, the prefectoral administration retired to Châteaudun, and the persons employed on the railway and at the telegraph-office left by the last locomotive.

One of the most important actions fought during the operations now being described was that of Bretoncelles, which took place on November 21st. The scene of the encounter was a narrow gorge in the hills, with abrupt and thickly-wooded slopes on both sides. The French had planted their batteries so as to command the mouth of the defile; and these opened fire on the leading companies of the German column as they entered the gorge. Skirmishers, however, were quickly thrown forward by the Germans, and the artillery was brought to the front. The French batteries on the right-hand side of the valley were silenced after a little while, and retreated to the opposite side, where the fight was kept up much longer. Beyond the woods which clothed the lower part of the hill-side was a long expanse of fields and hedges; and when the French, on being driven out of their first positions, reached this part of the ground, they took advantage of every bush or other means of shelter they could find, fired rapidly at their opponents as the latter ran across the open spaces, and then fled to the next post of vantage. This skirmishing continued for a long time, and occasionally a stand would be made for ten minutes or a quarter of an hour; but the general result was that the Germans continued to advance. The *Times* correspondent with the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's army, who saw the whole engagement from close at hand, said of the progress of the fight:—

> "Now it was a running fire behind the trees of an orchard; now a party took possession of a copse and held it till it became too hot to hold any longer; and then came the usual scurry of white knapsacks and red trowsers which distinguish the French from the German soldier. Meantime the artillery was scientifically dropping shell into the hedges behind which the French were lying. The fields were by this time becoming dotted with bodies, and we could see men stopping, turning, firing, running, and falling; and once I saw a whole French company retreat precipitately, except one man, who deliberately stood in the open, and kept on firing for some time quite alone, and I was glad to see that he was missed by all the shots that were fired at him as he deliberately retreated. Had all the French soldiers stood their ground as well as that solitary in-

dividual, the fortunes of the day might have been very different. Along the bottom of the valley runs the railway from Paris to Le Mans, and where it widens stands the village of Bretoncelles. The French had now been driven out of their position in the narrow part of the valley, and were fighting in the gardens of the village, and along the line of the railway. Along this line advanced the German skirmishers, pushing back the French with loud hurrahs as they drove them to the buildings at the station. Here a momentary pause was made; the French skirmishers had a strong position behind some farm-houses on the right, as well as on the left of the railway, and as the Germans advanced they got fired at from both sides. I saw several drop, and a hot firing ensued. At the railway station, which was suddenly in a blaze, Baron Gleichen, who commanded a company at this point, found that he was being fired upon by a body of men who were inside the building; so he set it on fire, and made prisoners of the occupants, who were thus forced to decamp. I saw them a few moments afterwards as they were brought to the rear; they consisted entirely of marines. About this time a considerable body of Germans, with loud hurrahs, came down upon the village from the hill-tops behind, and thus turned the whole French position. I saw numerous Frenchmen throw away their guns, huddle together under the trees of an orchard, and wait until the Germans should come, when they delivered themselves up as prisoners."

The main body of the French retreated in the direction of Nogent-le-Rotrou; but a dropping artillery fire was kept up by the conquerors for an hour or two later. Two hundred and fifty of the vanquished were taken prisoners, making 600 captives within three days. Several were temporarily detained in the old church at Bretoncelles, and presented a pitiable appearance. Some were mere boys; many had not been more than a fortnight in the army; and all seemed, by their own account, to have been impressed against their will. They complained bitterly of their officers, of their rations, and of their treatment generally, and admitted to the *Times* correspondent that they had taken the first opportunity to throw away their rifles and get captured. It was not always, however, that the irregulars behaved with such poor spirit. Sometimes they gave their adversaries a good deal of trouble; though, like all guerillas, they were subject to sudden fits of depression when sharply handled.

Several other small encounters took place in the course of these operations of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg; all terminating to the advantage of the Germans, and all characterised by much the same incidents. For some days after the fight in the woods near Torcy, no regular troops were visible on the right wing of the Duke's army; they had apparently withdrawn to points where they might be of greater service. The villages exhibited a series of melancholy spectacles. At La Fourche, where a French bivouac on a high piece of ground was stormed and taken by the Bavarian Rifles, together with the village itself, after a sharp combat of two hours' duration, the dead were still lying unburied some days later, and broken muskets, castaway military accoutrements, and other signs of precipitate flight, were thickly scattered about. The place was soon abandoned by the Bavarians; but the neighbouring roads were patrolled. On the road to Courville numerous peasants were to be seen armed with guns, and the advancing column of invading troops frequently met stout, active young fellows in blouses, who were probably Francs-tireurs or Mobiles, temporarily divested of their semi-military character, and returning to their homes as peaceful villagers. Amongst the prisoners taken by the Bavarians some were found to be wearing their uniforms under blue calico frocks. Herr Wachenhusen, who visited Chartres towards the end of November, says he found the town in a state of feverish excitement, in anticipation of a speedy forward movement on the part of the Army of the Loire. The people gathered in clusters in the market-place, and listened for the cannonading. So confident were they that the Germans would soon be driven back that they occasionally made demonstrations which the occupying force of Bavarians found it necessary to put down by rather violent measures. The women of Chartres were all dressed in black; yet they maintained a good spirit in face of the enemy, and still hoped for the best. The Army of the Loire had up to that time maintained its line in front of Orleans, and the people of Chartres drew favourable omens from the fact, of which they were evidently well informed.

In the latter days of November the forces of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and of General Wittich extended in an unbroken line from Chartres westward to Mamers, their right wing confronting the entrenched camp of the French at Conlie, in the department of the Sarthe, and their left communicating (as already stated) with the right of Prince Frederick Charles's army, in front of d'Aurelles de Paladines. The Germans were also massed in strong bodies on the chief roads to Paris, and numbers of skirmishers were thrown out in various directions. At Le Mans the French were posted in force; and, although many of the townspeople had forsaken the place, and moved southward with their families and household goods, to avoid the invasion, food had become very scarce, and it was a common thing to see soldiers running about from door to door to ask for a bit of bread. "The

National Guards here," said a correspondent of the *Morning Post*, "are determined to sally out, occupy positions immediately in the rear of the Mobiles, and fire upon all those who attempt to retreat or shirk their duty. All along the roads leading to Le Mans deep trenches have been dug, partially intercepting the road, and the portion left open to keep up communication has been carefully mined. At the top of every hill formidable barricades have been erected, from which a heavy fire can be directed against the approaching enemy. I have just been watching some of our 'moblots' drilling. The officers in command had to mark the time of march for them, and call out 'Left, right! left, right!' and at times to show them the difference between the left and right leg. The patience of the officers is a matter of great admiration on my part." This correspondent, not unnaturally after all he had seen, dreaded a catastrophe rivalling that of Sedan. He said that the armies of the Loire and of the West, taken together, numbered from 400,000 to 500,000 men, with nearly 3,000 pieces; and people frequently asked why they were so inactive. To put such a question, however, was a deadly offence to the Government; and the editor of a country paper was actually thrown into prison for presuming to seek information on such a topic. The politicians who had always been so bitter against the Emperor for his mode of dealing with the press were just as well inclined to coercive measures as soon as they themselves were in power.



ADMIRAL FLEURIOT DE LANGLE.

The question which the unfortunate editor had asked was nevertheless a very pertinent one. The soldiers of the Western Army were asking it of one another, and exhibiting symptoms of great impatience. "We are ready to march," they said, according to the correspondent just quoted. "Why can we not meet the enemy? Why let him ravage our land from north to south, and from east to west.



BIVOUAC IN THE SNOW.

when our daily papers tell us we are more numerous than the Germans?" At that time every man in France under fifty years of age, whether married or single, had been called to arms. Eleven camps were being formed for the instruction of the Mobilised National Guards from the different departments; and in these the young soldiers might often be seen keeping up their animal warmth by athletic sports and national dances. The first category of the army was composed of men drawn by conscription—that is to say, of regular, professional soldiers. The second class was formed of Mobiles; single men under fifty, capable of bearing arms, and who had in some cases served their time in the army, or had either purchased immunity from military service, or drawn a lucky number in the conscription. The third class consisted of National Guards, mobilised from time to time, according to the exigencies of the situation. The regulars and Mobiles were sent against the enemy; but the National Guards were formed into a body of reserve, and drilled in the practice of war. The effect of this immense drainage of able-bodied men from the ordinary fields of labour was that the country was left almost desolate, and that only women, children, and feeble old men were to be seen in the villages and small towns. Outpost skirmishes in the neighbourhood of Le Mans were of daily occurrence. The town was in part defended by several bodies of Francs-tireurs, composed of gentlemen of good families, who took their meagre pay of one franc per diem, and lived sumptuously on their own means. They are described as fighting desperately, and doing great execution amongst the foreposts of the enemy.* Yet the Germans continued to advance, and the French receded more and more.

Châteaudun was once more entered by the Germans about the close of November. It was found almost deserted when the head of the 1st Bavarian Corps marched into the town. Up to a recent date some 20,000 or 30,000 French had been stationed in the vicinity; but they had all withdrawn by this time. In the town itself the poorer classes, who still clung to their homes, though the more wealthy had sought safer quarters, listened in fear and trembling for the sounds of distant contest, as the capture and partial destruction of the place on October 18th were still fresh in their memories. Not far from Châteaudun the 10th Infantry Regiment and the 9th Rifle Brigade of the Bavarians had an encounter with the rear-guard of the French, and took 150 prisoners, principally Francs-tireurs, all of whom were armed with revolvers, and who had only one piece of artillery to answer the two guns of the Germans. The Bavarian infantry had very hard work with this incessant marching; and the boots of many were so worn that the men were almost barefooted. In some instances, indeed, they took the shoes off the feet of the peasantry, and appropriated them to their own use. The Uhlans also suffered much, for they were the continual marks of the Francs-tireurs, and were frequently picked off from behind hedges and walls. When the invaders could get into comfortable quarters at night, they would sometimes play and dance, with the light-heartedness commonly found among men who follow desperate lives; but, for the most part, a feeling of gloom and depression was observable about this period in the various German armies. The weather was becoming severe; it often snowed; and the contrast between marching in summer and marching in winter was very painfully felt. Even the patriotic Herr Wachenhusen was compelled to acknowledge this. He said that the German soldiers had still the same invincible spirit, but that now, when the skies were grey and clouded, and when the wind shook the last sere leaves over the whitened roads, the moments of rest after a toilsome march necessarily became moments of melancholy reflection. Thoughts of home, and of the loved ones awaiting the return of the absentees, would intrude unbidden into the minds of the watchers or dreamers round the camp-fire. In the evening there was stillness in the villages and cantonments; the streets were deserted, snow covered the roofs, and round the fires sat quiet, serious men, who hummed a melancholy tune. Yet, added Herr Wachenhusen, these were the men "who, as long as the sky was blue, marched with merry songs through France, and planted Germany's banner before the gates of Paris. To-day it was worse than yesterday; to-morrow it may be worse than to-day. But what matters? The Francs-tireurs will be no better off. We sleep in their beds, drink their wine, as far as there is any left in this region; and in the end this peasant war must terminate." Such was the cold comfort to which the Germans were reduced in the peculiarly harassing warfare which, from inability to pursue any other course, except in the neighbourhood of Orleans, the French had succeeded in imposing on their adversaries.

The truth is that the much-despised Francs-tireurs had become a veritable power, which the Germans felt, though they did not like to acknowledge it. The exasperation with which they always alluded to these guerillas is sufficient proof of the fact; but there is other testimony. An occasional correspondent of the *Times* remarked that the Francs-tireurs were now a very important element in the war—not so much from the numbers of the enemy they killed as from the serious interruption they caused to that system of "tentacular feeling of the far-distant surrounding country" which had been one of the chief features of the German invasion of France. In the early days of the war the Uhlans would be sent forward, in small detached parties, thirty, forty, or fifty miles in advance of the main armies, collecting intelligence, and creating confusion and alarm by the apparent omnipresence of the invaders. Against this system the French, in their first paralysis of utter defeat, had nothing effectual to oppose.

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* *Morning Post* correspondent with the Army of the West.

"The Uhlan scouting system," continued the *Times* writer, "was as essential to the Prussian method of invasion as the long tentacles are to various marine animals, or as his long thin six or eight limbs are to the small central body of Daddy-Longlegs. Well, if they have not done much else, the omnipresent Francs-tireurs have clipped many, at least, of those important tentacles. We hear little more of the 'four Uhlans.' The German corps and divisions and minor massed bodies have to make their way about the country as they best can—sometimes in the dark, sometimes in twilight, but no longer in the blaze of noonday (to them), as they did at first. No wonder that a sagacious instinct prompted the great Prussian strategists to declare a war of extermination against them from the outset, to say that they were not regular, respectable, commissioned soldiers, entitled to the immunities of war when captured. At the beginning, in the eastern departments, there was some show of military justification for this position taken up by the Prussian authorities, when they could say that they could not distinguish between Francs-tireurs and peasants; that they had no distinctive dress, no public commission; that they were the illegitimate poachers of war, ready alike to kill a Uhlan at long range from behind a hedge, or to throw their gun into a ditch, and to appear trudging along their fields as the most innocent and inoffensive of bloused peasants. But the Francs-tireurs have now grown into a great, serious, and regular institution. Why have they not a right to serve and defend their country, thus invaded, in this way, as well as in any other? Why have the wandering, far-penetrating Uhlans (splendid corps), who move audaciously in twos, and fours, and dozens, any right to greater immunities than they? And yet I understand the Prussians go on, and claim the right to go on, shooting every Franc-tireur off-hand as fast as they catch them. A great military mistake, in my judgment! The very peril makes the service the more honourable. It attracts all the more the daring and devoted class of men; it makes them the more desperate and unyielding in the field; it supports them under privation; it sharpens their aim; and it makes them sell their lives the more dearly when they find themselves in situations from which there is no escape. An army is entitled to distribute and scatter its *tirailleurs*—why not a nation? I have sustained this argument against high German military authorities at Versailles and elsewhere. I always found them sore, but obstinate, under it."

Swarms of these freeshooters passed through Tours during the month of November. They came from every province of France, from Greece, from Italy, from Spain, from Algeria, from the United States and Canada, from Rio Janeiro and Montevideo. The costumes of some showed that the picturesque had been considered almost as much as the practical requirements of service. A writer from Tours said that the melodramatic brigand was largely represented, and that the observer was constantly reminded of Fra Diavolo, and Massaroni, and other well-known theatrical celebrities. This was especially the case with the South American corps. Its chief, M. de Friès, was popularly called by the name of one of the heroes of M. Alexandre Dumas. He was described as a tall, handsome young man, dressed in a Mousquetaire coat and plumed hat, with a light-coloured moustache of extraordinary length. He and his men wore the South American *poncho*, and they were said to carry with them a lasso, with which, after the fashion of the celebrated riders of the pampas, they could catch a horse while galloping at full speed, and bring it to the ground. The Basque battalion, composed of hardy mountaineers, showed to great advantage. A company from the Gers consisted of only fifty picked men, dressed in black, and as taciturn as the monks of La Trappe. More than half of the body had recently been killed in an encounter with the Germans; and twenty-two, who had been captured, were ordered to be shot. They were actually paraded for that purpose; but their gallant bearing in presence of imminent death excited the admiration of the enemy, and their lives were spared. Men of all ranks were to be found among these irregular combatants, and a battalion from Dauphiné had a distinguished lawyer for a trumpeter.

The farther the army of the Grand Duke got from Paris the more numerous did the Francs-tireurs become. "Hitherto," said a correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, "we have had to contend with soldiers; but now begins the war with the people. Surprises of single orderlies, of small detachments, of provision-wagons and field-posts, are the order of the day. Every tree, it may be said, is now inhabited by a blue-bloused Franc-tireur, who fires from behind it at every Prussian. The Francs-tireurs have ceased to be a distinct class; every peasant, every artisan, is a Franc-tireur." Another German writer remarked:—"The blindness which makes the peasantry grasp the musket is inconceivable. Their resistance is useless, as they already feel and confess; yet their fanaticism is always extreme. To realise all the misery which this foolish and fruitless national resistance brings on their families, one must see the incensed and haughty mien of the prisoners as they are carried away by hundreds, while the women stand weeping and wringing their hands at the doors of the villages, or throng the churches to pray for the rescue of the unfortunates out of the hands of the Prussians. Yet, whoever has luckily escaped from captivity, again seizes his gun, in order the more certainly to get into trouble." At Orleans, Bishop Dupanloup ordered the priests to preach a crusade against the enemy; as a consequence of which direction patrols were fired at from every building and every hedge, and officers carrying orders were shot down by labourers working in the fields, who were secretly furnished with rifles. Numerous priests were arrested for participation in these acts, and the towns of Sens and Némours were severely punished for conniving at the surprise of Prussian detachments. These endeavours on the part of the French to arrest the invasion that was overwhelming them were in the result entirely unavailing; and it may be said, judging by the light of after events, that they were never likely to succeed, and were therefore imprudent. Yet it is impossible to blame men for risking all in the defence of their homesteads against foreign incursion. Such generous sacrifices will be made as long as any portion of the manhood of a nation remains; and when that is wholly gone, the permanent subjection of the country is at hand.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

The Eve of great Contests—Forward Movement of the German Armies—The Weak Point in the German Position—Situation of d'Aurelles de Paladines—Quality of his Army—He determines on attacking the Enemy—Hopeful Anticipations of the French—Encounter with the Army Corps of Voigts Rhetz—The French and German Line—Battle of Beaune-la-Rolande—Error of d'Aurelles de Paladines—Closing up of the German Front—Resignation of General Kératry—Dashing Exploit of Ricciotti Garibaldi—The Germans surprised and defeated at Châtillon-sur-Seine—Various Accounts of the Action—Unsuccessful Movement of Garibaldians towards Dijon—Rout of the Garibaldians—Bad Behaviour of the Mobiles—Pursuit of Garibaldi's Forces on the 27th—Operations in the North of France—Action at Tergnier—Fighting at Boves, Dury, and Villers-Bretonneux—French and German Accounts—Capitulation of Amiens—Incidents of the Surrender—Failure of the Army of the North.

THE comparative inaction which had characterised the month of November after the defeat of von der Tann, and which had only been broken by the strategical movements of German armies, and the feeble resistance from time to time of small bodies of French irregulars, was now about to give place to serious and important contests on a scale of great magnitude. General d'Aurelles de Paladines had let his best opportunity slip by, and the enemy had to some extent recovered the position of advantage which for a little while he had lost. Fronting or flanking the Army of the Loire were the forces of Prince Frederick Charles, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and General von der Tann. The Army of the West, but recently dreaded by the Prussians, had been scattered into weak and ineffectual fragments; and d'Aurelles had now simply himself to rely on for resisting that onslaught of the combined armies with which he was threatened. A forward movement on the part of all those armies was commenced on the 26th of the month. The Grand Duke (who, in the pursuit of Kératry, had marched across the department of the Eure-et-Loire, and through the Orne and the Sarthe) advanced towards Le Mans; von der Tann in the direction of Châteaudun; and Prince Frederick Charles from Toury, Pithiviers, and Montargis, towards Beaune-la-Rolande and Orleans. The position, however, was not without danger for the Germans. Owing to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg having been sent so far westward in pursuit of the army of Kératry, he was at a considerable distance from von der Tann in the closing days of November. His movements were extremely slow, and have been likened to those of a corkscrew; for the swarms of Francs-tireurs who were continually firing upon his men from the shelter of woods and hedges, and whose exploits were related in the last chapter, had delayed, though they could not stop, his march. The consequence was that on the 26th of November there was a large gap between the forces of the Grand Duke and General von der

Tann, so that the German semicircle did not present that unbroken line which was necessary to the safety of the whole. The situation of d'Aurelles de Paladines was for the most part extremely good, though it had the disadvantage of a large river in the rear. The centre of the French army was at Orleans and Châteauneuf, and was protected by the forest and the camp. The left extended to Marchenoir, while the right touched the road running from Gien to Montargis. General de Paladines was thus able to threaten all the roads to Paris; and his line was to that of his opponents as the cord of an arc to the arc itself: consequently, he was in a better position than his adversary for moving quickly, or massing his forces on any given point. The number of men under his command was nearly double that of the Germans; but against this numerical superiority we should set the inferior strength, training, and spirit of several of the French troops. The additional three corps which had been sent to d'Aurelles from the south bank of the Loire, after the successful battles of November 9th and 10th, were far less valuable soldiers than the other three corps with which the commander-in-chief had defeated von der Tann. They included a considerable proportion of raw lads, and their equipment and organisation were extremely defective. A few days were devoted to instilling some better ideas of discipline into these hasty levies; but to organise one's forces in face of the enemy, and on the very eve of a great battle, is a perilous experiment, such as may well inspire any general with apprehension. In most other respects d'Aurelles de Paladines was well circumstanced. He had from 480 to 500 pieces of artillery, among which were ninety-five naval guns, manned by seamen from Cherbourg; and at least a portion of his army consisted of seasoned troops, who had but recently acquired the self-confidence that proceeds from victory.

Matters being in this relative position, the French commander, moved by the incessant requirements of M. Gambetta for vigorous action, determined to attack the enemy. Much was expected from him, and the spirits of the nation at this moment ran very high. The *Moniteur Universel*, writing a few days before the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande, remarked :—"The presumed movements of the Duke of Mecklenburg and Prince Frederick Charles, which have caused some excitement, certainly have not surprised our generals, and our military chiefs have not failed to guard against the flank march which has been so ostentatiously announced in all the German newspapers. Our Army of the Loire is much too powerful to be surrounded, as the braggarts of Berlin promise, by the comparatively weak forces which menace its camp. The Duke of Mecklenburg, who is operating on the left of General d'Aurelles, cannot dispose of more than 40,000 men, having had to detach a part of his troops to support von der Tann. With 40,000 men he of course had no difficulty in capturing Dreux (which was held only by a few battalions of Mobiles without artillery), nor in gaining at Châteauneuf the slight advantage which, according to the Prussian telegram, only cost them the loss of one hundred men, and enabled them to threaten and perhaps to occupy Nogent-le-Rotrou; but without extreme rashness he cannot advance too rapidly either upon Le Mans or upon Vendôme, which are well guarded. It would be a still greater imprudence for him to continue his flank movement to annoy the rear of the Army of the Loire, as he would expose himself to be caught within two fires. As to the army of Prince Frederick Charles, which menaces the right wing of General d'Aurelles, and which has just occupied Montargis, it does not amount to more than 80,000 men." These anticipations and foreshadowings are interesting, as showing the constant habit of the French to celebrate their victories before they have gained them. Still, it must be admitted that there was much in the existing situation to encourage a hopeful mood. The French were in force on the Loire, if nowhere else; and the Germans had for the last few weeks exhibited symptoms of indecision and nervousness, which augured favourably for their opponents. With a more dashing and venturesome commander, the French might even yet have seen the scale of fortune turn in their favour.

It was about the 23rd of November that General d'Aurelles de Paladines gave orders to his army to get ready to march in the direction of Paris, and to send forward a few divisions to open the road. This movement brought the French troops, in the first instance, into collision with the 10th German Army Corps, under the command of General Voigts Rhetz—part of Prince Frederick Charles's army. Three divisions of the Army of the Loire, including the troops of General Michel (which were brought up by railway from Autun to Gien), having been sent against the Germans, an engagement took place on the 24th. A brigade of the German corps already mentioned had taken up a position at Beaune-la-Rolande on the previous day, together with six squadrons of the Hessian cavalry brigade. On the 24th Lehman's and Valentini's brigades marched by two roads from Montargis through Ladon and Corbeilles. At the same time the French advanced from the woods east of Orleans in three


Road to Cambrai
Citadel
Rivery
to Boulogne
Amiens
Bussy
River
to Arras and Brussels
Somme R.
Vaire
Corbie
Hamèle
R.R.
Glisy
Saleux
Selouel
Road to St Quentin
Villers le Bretonneux
Cachy
Duruy
Boves
Gentelles
Road to Royes
Fouancamps
Road to Montdidier
Démuyi
Saines
Hébécourt
Dommartin
Villers

BATTLE OF AMIENS (NO. 1), NOVEMBER 27TH.

This Plan shows the positions taken up by the French Army of the North in expectation of the attack of the German Army. The German troops are advancing on Amiens by three separate roads; and on perceiving the French Army in line, they make dispositions for attacking it.


Road to Cambrai
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Selouel
Road to St Quentin
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Road to Royes
Road to Montdidier
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MILES

BATTLE OF AMIENS (NO. 2), NOVEMBER 28TH.

The French successfully withstand the attack on their right at Duruy, but being outflanked at Villers-Bretonneux are forced to draw in their left. The Germans, though repulsed at Duruy, manage to outflank the French at Villers-Bretonneux, and from their newly-gained positions push more troops on to the rear of the French Army, and force it to retire—the first day into Amiens, then beyond that fortress.

strong columns against the left flank of the Germans. According to a German account, the French were nearly three to one; and they had already occupied Mézières and Ladon in force, and pushed forward by Boiscommun and La Loupe in the direction of Beaune. Mézières, however, was taken by Valentini's brigade, and Ladon, after a hot encounter, by the forces of Lehman. The two brigades then united, and the fighting became still warmer at the crossing of the Bellegarde, Aury, and Beaune-Ladon roads; but in the end the French were completely driven back. The 27th was distinguished by skirmishing along the whole line, through Montargis, Pithiviers, and Toury, to Châteaudun. On the 28th the 10th Army Corps was again attacked by the right wing of the Army of the Loire, and a struggle took place at Beaune-la-Rolande, ending in the discomfiture of the French. Voigts Rhetz had been expecting an attack all the previous day, and he was prepared for it when at length it came. By this time the armies of General d'Aurelles de Paladines on the one side, and of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and Prince Frederick Charles on the other, were drawn up face to face, in two lines, several miles in length, extending from beyond Beaune-la-Rolande, on the east, to Arthenay, on the west. On the left of the French line was the 16th Corps, under General Chanzy; in the centre, with the head-quarters, was the 15th Corps, commanded by General de Pallières; on the right was the 20th Corps, that of General Crouzat, who had been summoned in great haste from Chagny; while at the extreme right was posted the 18th Corps, which had been removed from Gien to the outskirts of the forest in front of Montargis. The German right was commanded by the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, the centre by General von der Tann, and the left by Prince Frederick Charles.



GENERAL PODBIELSKI.

At two o'clock P.M. on the 28th of November, General Crouzat, covering his attack with artillery, bore down on the 10th Corps of Voigts Rhetz with great energy. At three the fighting had become general round the village of Beaune-la-Rolande, the French being now reinforced by portions of the 18th and 15th Corps, and the Germans by the first and fifth divisions of Alvensleben's 3rd Corps, accompanied by Prince Frederick Charles. Inspired by their recent successes over von der Tann, the French fought with all their old ardour; but the Hanoverians under Voigts Rhetz stood firmly, and checked the fiery advance of their enemies. By five o'clock in the evening the French had completely surrounded the village of Beaune-la-Rolande, which was in flames, and into which the attacking force poured a terrible artillery fire. The French attempted to carry the place by an assault of infantry, but failed, and then demanded its surrender. This was refused, and the battle was resumed with still greater fury. At length the Prussians holding the village were completely out of ammunition. The colonel of the 16th Regiment, addressing his men, said:—"My children, we have been ordered by our Prince to hold this village at all hazards; but in our efforts to do so we have used up our ammunition. This is a misfortune; but you must remember that there is one sort of ammunition which never fails—our bayonets. You must now trust to them. The French must be driven back with the cold steel; we have no other means of stopping them." The men answered this gallant speech with a hearty cheer, and, on being ordered to bring their arms to the charge, did so with the utmost spirit. All necessity for a closer encounter, however, was shortly afterwards removed by the success which, in another part of the field, attended the movements of those divisions of Alvensleben's 3rd Corps which had been sent to the support of Voigts Rhetz. These reinforcements had turned the tide of the advancing French, had taken 900 prisoners, and had strewn the ground thickly with killed and wounded. The Prussians now advanced in force, driving the French steadily back, and the troops of Voigts Rhetz and Alvensleben bivouacked on the battle-ground they had won. According to German accounts a thousand French were found dead on the field, 4,000 were wounded, and 1,600 taken prisoners; while the German loss amounted in all to nearly a thousand, including not many officers. It was admitted that one Prussian gun was captured, owing to the artillerymen and horses being killed. It appears also that some German prisoners were taken by the enemy. The French account alleged that the troops engaged in the affair were only young conscripts, under fire for the first time, who nevertheless behaved with great gallantry and steadiness; and it was added that after the engagement the Prussians evacuated Beaune-la-Rolande, and set it on fire, the position being found untenable. The number of French engaged on this occasion seems to have been 60,000; of Germans, about 30,000. The object of the former was to reach Fontainebleau, where they were to effect a junction with the Army of Paris, which, it was hoped, would by that time have broken loose; and it was the road leading to Fontainebleau that the 10th Corps of Voigts Rhetz covered and blockaded. But for the reinforcements sent from Pithiviers, the Germans would probably have been defeated; for it is admitted that up to that time the position was critical. In the retreat the less highly disciplined of the French troops disbanded in hundreds; but the others maintained their cohesion.

The first renewed attempt of the Army of the Loire to reach Paris had ended in failure. General de Paladines appears to have committed a grave mistake in advancing only his right wing, without a simultaneous movement on the part of the left and centre. It was to his left (the right of the enemy) that the gap in the German line, occasioned by the distance of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg from von der Tann and Prince Frederick Charles, presented a weak point, inviting the very attack which was in fact delivered against the strongest part of the adversary's position. But the French commander made no attempt to repair his error until it was too late. On the 29th he fell back within the shelter of his entrenched camp, and there remained during that and the following day, doing next to nothing. A little skirmishing occurred on the 30th; but by this time Prince Frederick Charles—who had opened his eyes to the fact that the Army of the Loire was not the contemptible mob of ragged guerillas which the military authorities of Versailles had represented it to be—was taking measures to concentrate all the German forces within a less extended front, and to close the interval between the right and centre. This drawing together of the German divisions was mainly effected on the 29th and 30th, and, though a necessary operation, was not without a danger of its own. The corps of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, in facing half round to join with that of von der Tann to the east, necessarily exposed its flank to the enemy. Had d'Aurelles de Paladines attacked in this direction on either the 29th or 30th of November, it is highly probable that he would have thrown the forces of the Grand Duke into disorder, and have gained a very important victory. As it was, he delayed his movement until the 1st of December; and, although the change of position on the part of the German right was not then quite completed, and a partial French success was the result, the various German corps were by that time sufficiently concentrated to allow of combined action within a few hours later, and another disastrous failure fell to the lot of the French. But these events must be related further on. For the present we must trace the course of affairs in other parts of France.

The ill-success of the Army of the West in opposing the advance of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was followed by the resignation of Count de Kératry, and of M. Carré Kérisouêt, his chief of the Staff, in consequence of M. Gambetta placing another officer over their heads. The resignation was formally completed on the 28th of November at the camp of Ivre l'Evêque, when the two commanders surrendered their powers to General Gongeard. M. de Kératry, addressing several of the officers, said that he retired with regret, but without any personal quarrel. Having been unanimously solicited to remain (it would seem, by his own officers), he had replied that he ought to show the first example of discipline and abnegation. M. Carré Kérisouêt said he would remain in the camp for a short time to complete certain work; and General Gongeard, on assuming the command, expressed regret at the departure of the former commanders. Notwithstanding these civil speeches, it was evident that some disagreement had arisen between M. de Kératry and M. Gambetta; for the former addressed to the latter a note in which he recounted his services in a tone of injury, and attributed his resignation to certain orders sent to him from Tours on the 26th of November, when the western army was advancing to the attack. He added that, as soon as events would permit him, he would have the superior Administration of War and Marine brought before a council of war; and he accused M. Gambetta of committing the signal weakness of allowing himself to be dictated to by a subordinate who was "a personification of treachery to non-Imperialists"—a strange charge to be brought against the Minister of War. The cause of disagreement appears to have been that Kératry, relying on the "impregnability" of his camp, to which he refers in his letter, was not sufficiently enterprising in his mode of dealing with the enemy; and that M. Gambetta (who had been at Le Mans only a few days before, on which occasion he is supposed to have had some altercation with M. de Kératry, though, in addressing the soldiers, he employed the usual terms of flattery with respect to their commander) was determined that more active measures should be pursued. It was feared that M. de Kératry, a Breton among Bretons, would acquire a degree of personal influence which he might turn to purposes of his own; and, for this reason, 20,000 Republican Mobiles from Marseilles and other southern towns were incorporated with the western legions, and ultimately the original commander was supplanted by another.

Garibaldi was all this while making some not very successful efforts to check the advance of the Germans in the east of France, under Werder. For a moment, however, it seemed as if Fortune were about once more to declare herself in his favour. The general's son, Ricciotti, was the hero of a very gallant exploit on the 19th of November. This young soldier had, as already stated, been appointed to the command of a corps of Francs-tireurs, with whom were associated a certain number of Italian guerillas and adventurers of all nations. About the middle of the month he started from Autun (his father's head-quarters) on an expedition against the rear of Werder's forces, and, at the head of 560 men, marched north twenty-six miles to Saulieu. Here, on the 17th, he heard that 800 Germans were quartered at Châtillon-sur-Seine, fifty miles to the north-west of Dijon, and about a hundred miles from the Garibaldian base of operations. The Prussians were awaiting reinforcements from Chaumont, and Ricciotti thought the opportunity favourable for a surprise. He immediately ordered a forced march to Montbard, which he reached by night. The following morning he set out for Culmiers-le-Sec, where he arrived at two o'clock in the afternoon. Having rested his men, he again started at one o'clock the next morning (the 19th), and got within a few hundred yards of Châtillon at half-past five A.M. He then divided his troops into two bodies, one of which he sent to attack the western side of the town, on the road to Tonnerre, while the other was to operate on the southern side. Eighty men, belonging to the Francs-tireurs of the Haute Savoie, were next despatched to surround the Hôtel de la Côte d'Or, where the Staff officers were lodged. The German foreposts and sentinels having been captured, Ricciotti entered the town at the head of his troops. The men rushed forward with loud cries of "Garibaldi! Garibaldi!" The doors of the houses were forced open, and, the soldiers and their officers being in bed, large numbers were at once made prisoners. Some resisted with desperation, and were killed; others rushed out half-dressed into the street, with such arms as they could snatch up at the moment, and were shot down as they appeared.

The Germans, however, had contrived to send off couriers on horseback to hurry up reinforcements from Chaumont and Laignes; and Ricciotti, knowing that he could not encounter any additional troops with the small force at his disposal (for out of his 560 men he had been obliged to detach 150 on reconnoitring duty), made the best of his time while the town was yet in its comparatively weak condition. Fighting was maintained for about half an hour, when a good many of the Germans succeeded in escaping from the enemy, and in gaining the high road to Chaumont. "The remainder, who had recovered from their surprise," said the *Daily News* correspondent, "concentrated themselves in the Town-hall, which Colonel Ricciotti decided on not attacking, the enemy holding a tolerably strong position. After holding the town for precisely one hour and a quarter, news came to the effect that the German troops, already signalled as on the road from Chaumont to Châtillon, were not far distant. Colonel Ricciotti at once ordered a retreat, which was executed in the most perfect order, the Francs-tireurs carrying along with them 167 prisoners, among whom were eleven officers, as well as sixty-two horses, four carriages, saddles, and harness; arms, such as sabres, revolvers, and needle-gun rifles; a quantity of ammunition, several cases of German cigars, and boxes of papers and letters belonging to the Staff. The enemy's losses in killed and wounded were calculated at more than one hundred, among whom two colonels and two majors were killed: one of the colonels was the German Prefect of the town." The Garibaldian losses were only three killed and twelve wounded. On leaving Châtillon, Ricciotti retired to Culmiers-le-Sec, from which, after a brief rest, he proceeded to Montbard. It is stated that after his departure the Germans, in their rage and mortification, killed every one they found in the streets, and fired into some of the houses through the windows. According to some account it appears that they even threatened to sack the town during the night; but it does not appear that they carried this menace into execution, and it is only charitable to hope that the story was altogether untrue.

Garibaldi heard the news at Arnay-le-Duc, a small town twenty-five miles north-west of Dijon, to which he had suddenly removed his head-quarters from Autun. On learning what had been accomplished, his face lighted up with a proud smile, and he exclaimed, in French, "It is a pretty little blow of our boy!" He then penned a brief account of the affair, to be inserted in the order of the day, in which he spoke of the persons concerned having "well merited of the Republic," promised promotion to the officers who had specially distinguished themselves, recommended the prisoners to French generosity, and warned the enemy not to force the free corps to commit reprisals by acts contrary to the rights of man. The spirits of the Garibaldians were greatly raised by this event, and the Tours Delegation conferred a well-merited reward upon Ricciotti, who had certainly displayed remarkable coolness and courage, by making him a member of the Legion of Honour. A German account of the affair, published in the *Westphalian Gazette*, gave much the same impression of the general character of the action as the narratives which were written from the Garibaldian side. Having stated that the attacking force entered the town at six o'clock in the morning, after the outposts had been withdrawn, the account proceeds as follows:—

> "At about half-past six the first shots fell, and immediately afterwards active firing was heard in all parts of the town. The drums and bugles sounded the alarm, but they were speedily silenced, the men having been shot down. The troops were soon awakened by the noise, and, collecting themselves, they rushed out into the streets, where a sanguinary fight ensued. About nine o'clock, our men, finding themselves overpowered by the enemy, relinquished the fight, and withdrew from the town. Halt was made on the next rising ground, some of the Hussars having been despatched towards Château Vilain for assistance. These latter met on the way a troop of about 500 men belonging to the reserves of the 10th Army Corps, who accompanied them to where the fugitives were halting. On their arrival they were received with cheers, and the whole force returned towards the town at the double. After having reconnoitred the place, the battalion marched in with their colours flying, and made halt before the Hôtel de Ville. The town was searched, but the Garibaldians had vanished. After a while several of our men came out of their hiding-places, and our losses were ascertained. There were missing 120 men and seventy horses; of the former, ten killed and ten wounded were discovered in some of the houses. The remainder were probably carried away prisoners. Some of the bodies were found in the beds, where they had been stabbed as they lay. We bivouacked in the street throughout the following night. At about two o'clock in the morning the 6th Company marched in from Château Vilain. At half-past six in the morning firing was again heard from one of the approaches to the village, and it was found that one of our rifle brigade had been shot down. After that all was quiet."

A French officer, one of Ricciotti Garibaldi's corps, related that all his companions gave evidence of remarkable coolness, and that Ricciotti himself, though he had his horse killed under him, did not let his cigar fall from between his lips. The conduct of the people of the town, he adds, was infamous. They refused to open the doors of the houses where the Prussians were lodging, and the Garibaldians were compelled to batter their way in, while the rifle-bullets were pouring on them from the windows, and they were unable to reply. "We were obliged," says the writer, "to blow out the brains of several of these cowards. At length we were able to take the Prussians by assault, and we pursued them with the bayonet into the rooms, the cellars, and the garrets. In an hour all was over." The truth with respect to the wretched inhabitants seems to be that they were placed in the painful dilemma of choosing between their patriotism on the one hand and their fear of Prussian vengeance on the other. That they were not really favourable to the invaders of their country, and that at least some of them took part with the Francs-tireurs, is proved by the charge of "shameful" conduct brought against them by the writer in the Westphalian paper already quoted, who said that the town had merited—from the German point of view—very serious chastisement. In struggles of this nature it is generally the unfortunate fate of civilians to receive the buffets of both combatants.

The success of Ricciotti, though not very important, encouraged Garibaldi to aim a more important blow at the army of General Werder; but this time the result was less favourable for the guerillas. The main body of the Garibaldian forces, accompanied by the general himself, advanced towards Dijon on November 25th. They marched from Pasques (situated to the north-west of Dijon), and during the early morning of the 26th attacked the outposts of a German battalion. The officer immediately in command of the attacking force was Menotti Garibaldi. He had marched so rapidly and secretly that the Prussians were again surprised, and at first were driven back. Three times the assailants advanced to the assault with great vigour, on the admission of the Germans themselves; but the latter, on being supported by another battalion, repulsed the guerillas, who fled in disorder, throwing away their weapons. The fighting took place near the village of Lantenay, which stands halfway up the southern side of a range of wooded hills lying south-west by south of Dijon. Although, as already stated, the attack was led by Menotti, the general arrangements were directed by Garibaldi himself in person. The Prussians, on recovering from their temporary defeat, drew up in force on some rising ground immediately behind the village of Prenois, and shortly afterwards Garibaldi's scouts perceived a German column advancing across the valley. The general, who was breakfasting at the time, was informed of the fact, and immediately proceeded to draw up his troops in line of battle. The artillery was placed on rising ground on the left; Francs-tireurs were sent into the wood on the right; the Genoese formed the centre; and the Mobile Guards were placed in the rear. The day was now wearing on, and a little after one o'clock P.M. the Garibaldian batteries opened fire, and were answered by the Germans from the rising ground behind Prenois. The German cannon-balls flew for the most part over the heads of the guerillas, and did but little harm. The right wing advanced in excellent order, and Garibaldi soon gave directions for a forward movement along the whole line. The general and his chief officers were at this time a good distance in front; and, after a while, the former, who had been watching the German columns through a field-glass, exclaimed, "They are retreating!" Calling to a captain of the 7th Chasseurs d'Afrique, he added, "Go and see if you cannot pick up a few stragglers." Thirty-nine horsemen, accompanied by Colonel Canzio, Garibaldi's son-in-law, and Captain Tironi, galloped after the enemy, who was apparently retiring with precipitation. In a little while they came to a wall, behind which some twenty or thirty men had been posted by the Germans to protect their retreat. These men fired three volleys into the Garibaldian horsemen, killing eight horses and wounding three riders. While the pursuers were trying to get round the wall, the Germans forming the ambuscade took to flight, and, a few minutes later, the Garibaldians, led by Colonel Tanara and Major Erbe, entered Prenois, and were very well received by the villagers. Pressing on, the little detachment reached the verge of a hollow, on the left of which was another village, while on the right lay a wood, extending to the top of the rising ground. From this point the Germans could be seen hurriedly retreating, yet at the same time covering their retreat at every available opportunity. The left of the Garibaldian line was now a considerable distance ahead. It therefore halted while the right, with the Mobile Guards in the rear, was ordered to advance along the side of the wood, to prevent the enemy from attacking in that direction. Shortly afterwards it became apparent that the Germans had established a battery on the high ground in front, and from this they opened a rapid fire on the advancing Garibaldians. The artillery of the latter, however, replied so effectually that, after about ten minutes' interchange of shots, the Germans again retired. On reaching the top of the rising ground imme-


Nemours
Montargis
Briare
Sceaux
Pithiviers
Prince Frederick Charles' Army
Beaune la Rolande
Battle of Beaune la Rolande Nov 28
Canal
Mezières
Lorris
Boiscommun
Bellegarde
Chateauneuf
St Benoit
Sully
Gien
Line of Retreat of the Right Wing of the Army of the Loire which formed the nucleus of Gen. Bourbaki's Army
Chilleurs aux Bois
Canal
until the 27th of November
Jargeau
the Loire
Neuville
Thoury
Janville
Artenay
Battle of Artenay (Dec. 2)
Mecklenburg's Army
Duke of
Bazoches les Hautes
Orgeres
Loigni
Lumeau
Poupry
Sougy
Chevilly
Cercottes
Ormes
Orleans
Battle of Bazoches les Hautes Dec. 2nd
Patay
St Peravy
Coulmiers
Baccon
Army of the French
Occupied by the French
Meung
Beaugency
Mers
Coming from Le Mans
Bonneval
Châteaudun
(forming a part of the Army of the Loire)
Charsonville
Ouzouer le Marché
Marchenoir
Ouques
Positions of the Left Wing of the Army of the Loire
Line of Retreat of the Left Wing of the Army of the Loire which later formed Chanzy's Army of the West
A B C D E G H I L M N O
French } Infantry.
German } Infantry.
French } Cavalry.
German } Cavalry.
A 17th (Sonnis) Corps.
B 16th (Chanzy) ,,
C 15th (Pallières) ,,
D 20th (Crouzat) ,,
E 18th (Bourbaki ,,
Direction taken by troops advancing or retreating.
G 10th Corps.
H 3rd ,,
I 9th ,,
L 4th Division, Cavalry.
M 22nd ,, Infantry.
N 1st Bavarian Corps.
O 17th Infantry Division.
5 10 15 20 MILES
SCALE

PLAN OF ORLEANS AND THE SURROUNDING COUNTRY,

Illustrating the series of battles resulting in the final defeat of the Army of the Loire, and the second capture of Orleans by the Germans, December 4th, 1870.



BRINGING IN THE WOUNDED

diately before them, the Garibaldians found themselves on the road from Paris to Dijon. It was now raining hard, and Garibaldi, who had been on horseback all day, and whose horse had fallen with him some time before, was so tired, that he was glad to get into a carriage which had been procured for him at a neighbouring house. In this carriage, accompanied by Colonel Canzio, and surrounded by the officers of his Staff, he placed himself at the head of the column. Before proceeding any farther, however, he asked the Italians, who were in front, whether they would be content with having driven the enemy back, or would prefer to go on to Dijon. They unanimously answered, "To Dijon! to Dijon! Long live the general!" The column accordingly resumed its march. What ensued was very graphically described by the correspondent of the *Daily News*, who was present with the Garibaldians, and who noted the facts already recorded.

"We had marched (says this writer) for about ten minutes without seeing or hearing anything of the enemy, when we came to the spot where the road to Dijon turns to the right. Five hundred yards farther on the general's carriage drew up on the right hand side of the road, and the advanced guard was sent forward. It was now quite dark, the sky was as black as coal, but not far ahead on the left we saw the light which rose from Dijon, and illuminated the sky above. The advanced guard had been gone about five minutes, and other troops had followed, when suddenly the reports of two needle-guns were heard. These were followed by several others, and we then knew that our advanced guard had reached the Prussian outposts. The order given to the troops had been 'Do not fire; use your bayonets, and we shall sleep at Dijon to-night.' Hardly two or three minutes after the first discharge there came a regular shower of bullets, which whistled about our ears in a most unpleasant fashion. The only thing that surprises me is that two-thirds were not killed. The general's carriage was beside the high road, surrounded by the officers of his Staff; and yet, by the most miraculous chance, not one was killed, or even hurt. 'It's getting hot,' said an officer beside me. He had hardly uttered the last word when there came a second shower of lead, and then a third. This time we all leant over our horses' necks. Fortunately for us the Prussian fire was very high, and consequently almost all the balls passed over our heads. Several of my companions, however, had their *képis* grazed and their cloaks pierced. Colonel Bordone's horse got a ball in its nose, but no one was wounded. Our troops continued to advance. In front were the Italians, the Chasseurs des Alpes, and several other companies of Francs-tireurs. Presently we found ourselves almost alone beside the road. Ahead we still heard the burr of the mitrailleuses, but none of the balls reached us. It was evident from this that the enemy's batteries had retreated. Immediately behind us were our two batteries of artillery, and behind them the remainder of our troops. An aide-de-camp was sent to bring them up; and as, after two or three minutes, no one appeared on the scene of action, a second was despatched. I accompanied the third, to see what was the matter. On arriving at the end of our line of artillery we found the Mobile Guards, many of whom pretended that the road was encumbered by the cannon and ammunition-wagons. 'Where are the officers?' exclaimed the aide-de-camp. No one answered; several of them had hidden their heads in the hoods of their cloaks. After a great deal of difficulty a few officers were found, and the Mobiles were set in motion, advancing towards the front on either side of the artillery."

The superior officers did the most they could to encourage their men, by singing the "Marseillaise" and shouting for the Republic; but these incitements were less effective under the fire of the enemy than in the safe seclusion of club-rooms and wine-shops. At the next shower of rifle-balls the Mobiles were so terrified that some threw themselves flat on the ground, while others leapt into the ditches at the side of the road. Those who flung themselves on the earth wounded each other by their bayonets in the hurry and confusion of the moment. After a little while they rose to their feet again, and fired at random, although they had been expressly ordered only to use their bayonets. A good many of the Garibaldians were in front at the time, and these unfortunately received the fire of their comrades. They consisted of Italians and Francs-tireurs, who had up to that moment behaved with admirable coolness. Imagining, however, that they were being attacked by the enemy in the rear, and that they would be cut off from the rest of the army, they now turned round, and endeavoured to rejoin the others. The Mobiles, seeing a number of men coming towards them, and supposing they were Germans, fled with the utmost speed. Their officers implored, upbraided, and struck the fugitives with the flat of the sabre; but all in vain. The Mobiles disregarded the words, evaded the blows, and scattered right and left into the fields. The retreat soon became general. Garibaldi and his Staff were left almost alone; and if the Germans had chosen to pursue, the disaster to the patriots would have been still greater than it was. Madame Jessie White Mario, and a Polish doctor belonging to Ricciotti's brigade, who, together with the ambulances, had remained five miles behind the army on its advance, picked up and attended to as many of the wounded as they could look after; but several were left where they fell, and not a few were trampled under foot.

The army retired to Lantenay, and on the

27th was pursued by the Prussians, who advanced along the ground above the village in three columns, about ten o'clock in the morning. Garibaldi's two sons were sent up the hill with a body of troops, and an artillery encounter followed. Again, however, the Mobile Guards ran away, leaving the Italians and the Francs-tireurs to do the best they could for themselves. The general stayed on the ground as long as possible, but was ultimately compelled to retreat once more. On the 28th the army was back at Arnay-le-duc, and on the 30th they were again at Autun, with the exception of Ricciotti and his Francs-tireurs, who were left for a time at Arnay, to watch the movements of the Germans. In these encounters the Garibaldians lost 250 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Fortunately, however, they were enabled to bring away all their cannon.

Very little fighting had up to this time taken place in the north of France; but towards the end of November events of interest occurred there. The Prussians were foiled in an attempt to seize Evreux, on the 19th; on the 20th a detachment of Mobile Guards fell into an ambuscade at Tergnier, in the department of the Aisne. They had been sent out by the commandant of the small garrison of Ham; and, on arriving near the place, the leader of the column sent for the Mayor, by whom he was assured that the village was entirely free from Prussians. The Mobiles, thinking all safe, entered the main street in loose order, and were immediately received by a sharp musketry fire from the houses. The Prussians were, in fact, strongly posted in the village, and the French had been lured into it by the treachery of one of their own countrymen. Staggered by so unexpected an attack, the Mobiles at once retreated, leaving a few dead and wounded on the spot, but carrying off their guns. They then re-formed their ranks, and retired, fighting, to Ham, which, however, was occupied by the Prussians on the 22nd. The movement was represented by the Germans as an attempt to relieve La Fere, which, as previously set forth, capitulated a week later; but the French denied that it had any such character. Some other engagements of a trifling nature occurred about the same period; but their general effect was that, although occasionally suffering a repulse, the army of General Manteuffel acquired every day a firmer hold on the north of France. The operations now undertaken against Amiens, however, were of more serious import, and they resulted in another German triumph.

The right of the French army covering Amiens was established, on the evening of November 26th, at Boves-et-Dury, their left leaning on Villers-Bretonneux. Masses of German troops were in front, and the French position was unfavourable, being hampered by the river Somme. Two days before some fighting had taken place between the two armies, in which both sides claimed the advantage; but the probability is that the engagement was slight, and the issue indefinite. On the 26th the engineers of the left wing were ordered to construct earthworks in front of Villers, for the purpose of establishing batteries; and at dawn on the following morning (the 27th) the French artillery opened fire. The fight continued until evening, and the French asserted that at the close of day the main line of the Germans had been compelled to withdraw. Shortly afterwards, however, it was discovered that a body of Prussians had established themselves in the rear, and that another had actually got into the chief thoroughfare of Villers. The French turned into a bye-street only just in time to escape a volley. In another moment a third body of Prussians was seen approaching. The town was surrounded. Each man among the French then endeavoured to shift for himself. Several hid themselves in a sort of dark granary; but the woman to whom the place belonged ordered them off. "I am old and lonely," she said. "You will cause me to be murdered. Go, or I will denounce you." All this while they could hear the Prussians passing to and fro, firing in every direction, and breaking open the doors. They preferred to remain, as their concealment offered at least a chance of safety. The old woman, after all, did not denounce them, but, on the contrary, brought disguises, by the help of which they were enabled to escape. The French army, according to French reports, was less than 20,000 strong, and, being spread over a very extensive front, was scattered in thin lines, unsupported by solid reserves. It is even stated that no use was made of the few reinforcements which were at hand—neither of the squadrons of gendarmerie, nor of the bodies of Francs-tireurs. The ammunition, moreover, soon ran out, and some of the artillery batteries could not fire more than seventy-five rounds. "Against all these defects," observed a local French newspaper, "the Prussian army opposed, first, numbers, including important reserves, which, brought either from Rheims or Paris, raised its effective force to above 50,000 men; secondly, an artillery much superior as to number, and well ammunitioned; lastly, general dispositions and a methodical plan, which were wanting on our side. Still, except for a few failings, which must be attributed to absence of sufficient direction more than to want of courage, our small army gallantly sustained the enemy's attack." The German accounts stated that the French forces outnumbered those on their own side, but that nevertheless the army covering Amiens was driven back to its entrenched position before that city, with a loss of several thousand men. A battalion of Marine Infantry was ridden down by the 9th Regiment of Hussars, and the new colours of a regiment of Mobile Guards were captured, as well as several hundred unwounded prisoners. The Prussian loss was—to quote the favourite ambiguity of Versailles—"not inconsiderable." The probability is that it was great.

It would appear, from a statement put forward by the French military authorities at Lille, that the main design of the Army of the North was to help the efforts of the Armies of Paris and of the Loire to effect their junction. "With this view," proceeds the statement, "the 22nd Army Corps was concentrated near Amiens before being completely organised. The necessity of defending Amiens, and of not abandoning the line of retreat through Corbie and the railway, rendered it indispensable to occupy a line very extended in proportion to our forces. This disadvantage had its compensation. We were thus enabled to avoid the effects of the convergence of the powerful firing of the enemy's artillery. The concentration of the troops at Amiens had the expected result; for General Manteuffel's Army Corps, reinforced by troops from Beauvais, proceeded towards the North with a force estimated at 50,000 men, out of which number 39,000 at least were engaged on the 27th of November along a line of battle of more than four leagues from Saleux to Marceleane." Each side, it will be seen, asserted that it was overmatched in point of numbers by the enemy. This is no uncommon circumstance in warfare. The one combatant seeks to extenuate his defeat; the other to exaggerate his triumph. It is seldom that either is very scrupulous as to the truth; and even with a disposition to put forth nothing but simple fact, it is almost impossible for a commander to form anything like an exact idea of the number of men opposed to him. The same remark applies to the calculations, after a great battle, with regard to the number of killed and wounded. The wildest guesses are hazarded, and the contradictions are often beyond reconciliation.

The French account published at Lille states that, about half-past four o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th, "a retreat was ordered towards the Somme. This movement was effected without being molested by the Prussians. Towards the same hour, the enemy, who held Saint Fascien and Dury, turned the position of Boves and Saint Nicholas, which had to be evacuated. Taking advantage of his numerical superiority, he extended his forces around Amiens as far as the Metz bridge, and thence threatened Notre Dame de Grâce—a position on the Lower Somme, through which it was easy for him to penetrate into the city." It was then that the chiefs of the army, finding themselves overmatched, determined to retire farther north, which was done on the 28th. General Manteuffel, pursuing his advantage, drove the French in a northerly direction towards Arras. In their retreat they blew up the bridge at Albert on the Amiens and Lille railroad. Amiens itself fell on the 28th. A detachment of Manteuffel's army, under the command of General Göben (who defeated Frossard at the battle of Forbach, on August 6th), advanced to the city, surrounded the fortress, and fired at all who appeared on the ramparts. The commandant refused to surrender, and was shortly afterwards killed by a ball through the lungs. The Prussians had eight batteries of artillery in position, commanding the citadel from three sides; and the citizens, fearing to be shelled from without, and blown up from within—the defenders having, in the usual theatrical way, sworn to fire the magazine rather than yield—were for some time in a state of painful anxiety. Negotiations, however, were soon opened. The garrison offered to surrender if they were granted the honours of war; but this condition was at once refused. Shortly afterwards the white flag was displayed, and the Germans entered, taking 600 prisoners. They themselves state that the place was sufficiently strong to have detained them nearly a fortnight, had it been properly defended. It appears, on the contrary, to have been disgracefully abandoned. The Army of the North, which was to have protected it externally, fled on the approach of the Germans without firing a shot; and the Prefect of the Somme was not ashamed to leave the unfortunate city before it was taken, and to signalise his departure by a proclamation, which ran:—"Citizens!—The day of trial has arrived. Notwithstanding my efforts, Amiens is about to fall into the hands of the enemy. A council of war has decided on the retreat of the Army of the North, and on the disarmament of the National Guard. I have to leave you for the present, but hope to return soon. Remain calm and confident, and France will be saved. Long live France! Long live the Republic!" A correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* says that the retreat "was simply a disorderly, drunken flight, headed by General Farre, the commander of the Army of the North, and brought up in the rear by the Prefect of the Somme." With the exception of the commandant of Amiens, and four civilians who had imprudently or ignorantly got into danger, no one was killed or wounded on either side during the actual attack on the city.

A gentleman who was in Amiens when it was captured communicated to the *Times* some particulars of the occurrence.

"The *rappel* (he said) began to beat at half-past three on the morning of the 28th, and from that hour till six there was a general *sauve qui peut*, the railway being retained for the military, and afterwards broken up as far as Hangest. Then followed a continuous discharge of musketry from all the little boys of the town, who had assembled at the railway station to fire at the big clock by means of the quantity of loaded muskets flung down in the hurry of departure. After three boys had been killed it was thought necessary to put a stop to this worrying pastime, and a silence as of the grave succeeded. While waiting for my carriage I watched from my window the chief of the hotel and a waiter carefully bury some treasure in the garden, covering the spot afterwards with dead leaves. Then some one rushed in breathlessly to tell me that the inevitable two Uhlans were to be seen, and, as most of the people were very frightened and some very angry, I began to fear difficulty in getting away. The worst of such a position is the impossibility of obtaining reliable information. At last the Prussians did come. Not two Uhlans, but an officer riding in advance of twelve men. Then more cavalry and infantry, which filled the Place Périgord, and massed themselves near the Cathedral. The tears came into my eyes, for it was a sad sight to witness by the side of Frenchmen, and I could not help thinking of all the good blood so uselessly poured out on the previous day (the 27th). The French had fought well, particularly the Infantry of the Marine and the Chasseurs. The latter were literally mown down by the Prussian artillery. They had repulsed the Prussians three times, but the latter always fell back upon reinforcements, whereas the French had none. I could not but admire the demeanour of the Prussians as they entered. It was very grave and quiet. They seemed to note everything as they passed with the air of travellers rather than of conquering invaders. An acquaintance told me afterwards that those who passed the beautiful Cathedral all looked back to examine it. Unfortunately, as I know too well, they are not always so subdued and civilised. The aspect of the working-men in Amiens was one of great exasperation. They assembled in the streets, and attempted to make barricades; but whether their wrath was principally directed against their own superiors or the invaders seemed doubtful."

The Prussians are said to have behaved admirably after their occupation of the town; but a German writer confessed that his countrymen made rich booty, especially in tobacco. In the citadel guns and munitions of all kinds were captured. The German cavalry patrols soon ventured far beyond Amiens, and brought in prisoners every day. Many Mobiles gave themselves up voluntarily to the pursuing troops, and expressed a wish to return home, as they were tired of fighting. It is recorded that in the various actions of the Army of the North up to the close of November 5,000 men were lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the side of the French, and 1,400, including eighty officers, on that of the Prussians. For a time the operations of the northern forces organised for the relief of the capital were struck with paralysis; but further on we shall find the same army, under more energetic leadership, giving indisputable evidence of its existence, and rousing once again, for a brief moment, the expiring hopes of Paris.

CHAPTER XXXV.

State of Paris—Excitement and Depression—The Services of the Carrier-Pigeons—An Englishman arrested by the Prussians—Exodus of Englishmen from Paris—Ruin and Devastation—Distress among the French at Versailles—Scheme for Victualling the Town—Dwellers in Caves—Troubles of Count Bismarck—The French Emperor's Opinions on the War—Condition of Marseilles—Insubordinate State of the Southern Provinces—Proceedings of the Southern League—Supply of Arms to the French—Complaints of the Germans—Bishop Dupanloup on the War—The Religious Element—Dissensions in Germany—Science in Warfare—Affair at Etrepagny—Russia and the Peace of 1856—Circular of Prince Gortschakoff—Reply of Earl Granville—Further Correspondence on the Subject—Mr Odo Russell at Versailles—Proposal of a Conference—Views taken by the Continental Powers—The Conference of London, and its Results—Apprehensions as to the Designs of Russia and Prussia.

General Burnside, returning from a visit to Paris in the early autumn, described the city as a madhouse inhabited by monkeys. The phrase did not do justice to the real patriotism and self-devotion of a large number of the citizens, nor to the endurance under privations of all; yet it had a certain applicability. The wild delusions of the people—the hysterical alternations between exaggerated



THE DEFENCE OF PARIS—DESTRUCTION OF THE BRIDGE OF JOINVILLE-SUR-MARNE.

hope and excessive despondency—the feverish demonstrations, the excited oratory—were strongly suggestive of the wards of a lunatic asylum; while the antic posturing and solemn buffoonery of the ultra-Republicans not unnaturally reminded an astute observer of the manners of baboons and chimpanzees. The folly of making demonstrations before the statue of Strasburg in the Place de la Concorde still continued; and a ladder was now placed at the side of the figure in order to enable passers-by to deposit their *immortelles* on the top. In midst of all the disaster of the time, the spirit of enormous self-satisfaction, inseparable from the Parisian mind, exhibited itself in its wonted proportions. This would have been very well, if self-satisfaction were the same thing as self-reliance; but in truth the one mental condition is generally the reverse of the other, and excludes rather than invites its opposite. The more noisy were constantly proclaiming that the world would shortly be amazed by the terrific nature of their revenge. The more sanguine averred that there was a secret tunnel connecting Paris with the provinces, through which flocks and herds constantly entered the city, so as to prevent the possibility of famine. The more speculative talked of mysterious and awful plans, by means of which, when the right moment arrived, the investing forces would be suddenly exterminated and blown into the air. All spoke of Paris as the centre of civilisation, and of the Germans as barbarians; though it must be obvious to the whole world that the Germans are, to say the least, as civilised as the French. In these ways the beleaguered citizens beguiled the tedium of their captivity, and thought that because their multitudinous little trumpets were loudly blown, the enemy must needs be scared and vanquished.



THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

Serious work, however, went on in the midst of all the hubbub; and nothing conferred more real credit on the Parisians than the ingenuity with which, by the agency of balloons and pigeons, they contrived to communicate with the external world. The pigeons were sent off in the balloons, and, being freighted with messages on arriving at their place of destination, were set free for the return voyage. Many never returned, but others did. Paris and Tours were thus enabled to address one another; and the two Governments were to a great extent united, though of course liable to occasional delays and accidents. The carrier-pigeon was of such immense service to the national cause that some people seriously desired it to be proclaimed a sacred bird. One day a pigeon arrived with despatches which were all contained in a scrap of paper about an inch and three-quarters in length, and nearly an inch and a half in breadth. This was enclosed in a quill, fastened to one of the tail-feathers of the pigeon; and on the paper was photographed, in characters so small that none but the most powerful microscope could reveal the nature of the contents, an immense number of messages. Private letters, as well as public despatches, were sent and received in this way. The process employed in all such modes of communication was as follows:—The despatches and messages were first set in type, and then reduced by photography to a space no larger than a finger-nail, though the original size may have been equal to three or four pages of the *Times*. This minute printing, after being enlarged under the microscope, was copied out by clerks, and distributed. Balloons also were used by private individuals for personal conveyance, though sometimes not very successfully. The English gentleman, Mr. Worth, whose balloon adventure has already been related, got into a dilemma by endeavouring to leave the French capital by means of the air. Not choosing to lie under any obligation to Mr. Wodehouse (our representative in Paris), from whom he could doubtless have obtained a passport, he embarked with three others in a balloon. The reader already knows that this balloon, having been carried over the Prussian lines, was brought down by a shower of Prussian bullets. The voyagers were detained, and sent to Versailles, where they arrived in the early part of November; and representations were afterwards made by the British Government on behalf of Mr. Worth. He and the others were well treated; but they appear to have been regarded as prisoners of war, though, it would seem, without sufficient reason, as far as Mr. Worth was concerned. Señor Galvez, the Peruvian Minister of Paris, was also arrested by the Prussians in endeavouring to leave Paris by the ordinary routes. He had requested a safe-conduct from Count Bismarck, and had been refused; but important business, and the illness of his wife in London, induced him to make the attempt at all risks. Adducing his diplomatic character, he insisted on his right to pass; and, on reference being made to Versailles, this was allowed.

At the same time efforts were being made to facilitate the departure, in a regular manner, of several of the British residents in Paris. A great many difficulties were raised, both by General Trochu and Count Bismarck; but at length they were permitted to leave, and, after a tedious examination of their papers, started from the gate of Charenton, accompanied by a detachment of Prussian Dragoons, by Mr. Wodehouse, and by some of the members of the English Embassy not at Tours. It was ten days before they reached London, so slow was their progress through the occupied and wasted portions of the country, and so circuitous was the route they were compelled to follow. A correspondent of the *Daily News*, who formed one of the party, gave a dismal account of the devastated condition of the fields and villages, and of the dictatorial bearing of the German soldiers towards the French civilians with whom they came in contact.

Much of this devastation was due to the French themselves, in their vain hope of starving out the invader; but a good deal was owing to the strategical operations of the Prussians. One of the newspaper correspondents, writing from Versailles, said:—

> "I went out lately to the front, and was for a short time beyond the line altogether. The great occupation of those whom I passed was hacking and hewing, chopping and sawing down French trees. Whole acres of timber were being vigorously cleared; and the soldiers were as busy as backwoodsmen on a 'lumbering' expedition. There was great heartiness in the way the men went to work. They seemed to enjoy the exercise of hacking and hewing. They have plenty of food, good clothing, and tolerable shelter; so why should they not sing at their wintry work? The sad part of the scene is more in the reflecting on such havoc being spread round Paris than in the actual loss of timber at any one particular spot. Imperial parks and gardens, private villas, the retreats of ease and splendour, which encircle the city, are damaged or swept away with but a hundredth part of the after misery that must attend the ruin of the suburban villages. I think that I must be far within the mark when I give eighty thousand as the number of people turned out of house and home, left utterly destitute in most cases, by the operations of the siege. When Paris is thrown open, there will be sore need of help. Not only will the city be starving, but one belt of land close to it will be almost a desert, and another belt, stretching back for many miles, will be so much impoverished as to yield but scanty supplies—to yield nothing at all in excess of what the troops will want."

The distress already was very great. Versailles, according to Dr. Russell, was filled with the former occupants of the pleasant environs of Paris, turned out of their homes by the sad necessities of war. They were subsisting on charity—the charity of those who were almost as poor as themselves.

These ruined gentry had sold their plate, furniture, and clothes, and were now often in want of actual food. "There are old officers," said the writer, "who lived on their half-pay; *employés* in retreat, whose modest pensions gratified every need; aged ladies, teachers, governesses. The religious houses are crammed with refugees. Funds are wanting, and to these helpless and unoffending people will come a fate worse than death by fire and sword, if help is not forthcoming." The town had been subjected to requisitions amounting in value to many thousands of pounds; its ordinary revenues were destroyed; all the wealthy inhabitants had fled; and for two months the place and its vicinity had been supporting a hostile army. So little government was there, apart from military considerations, that marauders—with an audacity rivalling that of the Camorristi of Naples under the Bourbons—actually went about removing furniture in vans, as if they were authorised to do so by the householders. So high was the price of necessaries in Versailles that the official (German) *Moniteur* of the city published an account of a plan put forward by Herr von Brauchitsch, the Prussian Prefect of the department, for remedying the existing state of things. The document ran :—

> "The question of provisioning the town of Versailles has for some time past occupied the attention of the proper authorities, who have not failed to notice the remarkable want of individual enterprise, both on the part of the traders of the town and of the municipality itself. The prices of certain articles of consumption continually increasing, and the supplies diminishing in the same proportion, Herr von Brauchitsch, Prefect of the Seine-et-Oise, has found it necessary to address a formal requisition to the Mayor, calling upon him to establish, between this date and the 5th of December, extensive stores of various articles in sufficient quantities to ensure, if necessary, the supply of Versailles for the space of four weeks. The municipality itself, by drawing up a list of articles of consumption already deficient or becoming scarce, afforded the necessary bases for the order issued by the Prefect to preserve the town of Versailles from the disastrous consequences of an exorbitant advance in the prices of provisions. It did not appear at first that it was well understood how beneficial this arrangement would be for the town, nor how much the interests of the inhabitants would be promoted by the direction of Herr von Brauchitsch, who, in order to guard against the possible inconvenience of a passive resistance, informed the authorities of the town that in case of disobedience the commune would be visited by a heavy fine. We have reason to know that measures are being taken to deal seriously with this question, and it has been understood how advantageous for the town of Versailles —even in the event of the speedy capitulation of Paris—will be the existence of stores of provisions, as in the latter case ample opportunity for the re-sale of those stores to the famished capital will be afforded."

The people of Claye, a village about four miles from Versailles, adopted a singular expedient for getting away from the Germans. They actually concealed themselves underground, from which they occasionally reappeared. Immense wine-caves have been formed round Claye, some of which are constructed at an immense depth below the surface; and into these the owners of the several houses descended, taking their household goods with them, while the intruders occupied the dwellings above. Several of the fugitives who after a while reappeared in the village confessed their subterranean places of concealment; and property was discovered in a cave, of the existence of which the Germans had been quite unaware. A good deal of wine was concealed by the people in their gardens, and the invading forces were constantly digging up treasures of this kind, which they knew how to turn to account.

Though the Parisians had greater cause for dissatisfaction than their successful enemies, it must not be supposed that the latter were entirely free from troubles. Even the great Federal Chancellor had his trials, some of which would seem to have been of a serious character. A correspondent of the *New York World* reported a conversation he had had with Count Bismarck, according to which the Minister had been thwarted in his schemes. His design had been to proceed with the bombardment of Paris as soon as practicable; in pursuance of which intention a park of artillery was established at Villacomplay. The King, however, was afterwards persuaded by General Moltke to leave the city to be reduced by famine, aided by internal discord. Bismarck, says this authority, found himself excluded from the councils at which military questions were decided. During the war with Austria in 1866 he had been consulted in all matters; but now great plans were settled without his knowledge, although, if they went wrong, he had to bear the odium. The Chancellor also said that he had been baffled in regard to his project for the reorganisation of Germany. He had desired and contemplated a real union of the various States in one great Empire; instead of which, a half-hearted Confederation was about to be established. In his opinion, the great object of the war did not lie on the French side of the Rhine, but on the German; and that object had not been fully attained. It seems strange that the Prussian Minister should have expressed himself thus unreservedly to a newspaper correspondent; yet it is so likely that the Count's views and position were such as are here set down, that the report is perhaps substantially correct, even though the writer may have drawn a little on his general knowledge of probabilities in eking out what the Chancellor may have rather hinted than spoken. With the active prosecution of hostilities, the influence of Bismarck doubtless experienced some diminution. The King—himself much more a soldier than a statesman—not unnaturally threw himself into the hands of a leader like Moltke, who knew how to plan campaigns, to organise armies, to defeat the forces of the enemy, to take cities, and to ensure the final triumph of Germany. In the same way, the predominance of Cavour suffered a temporary check in the Italian war of 1859, and Victor Emmanuel was compelled to consider the military rather than the political situation. It is well known that Bismarck and Moltke were not on the most cordial terms, and it is more than probable that each found the other in his way. King William could dispense with neither; but for the present he leant more to the fighting man than to the councillor.

The American correspondents were very busy in cross-questioning great men as to their ideas and motives. A gentleman belonging to the *New York Herald* had an interview with Marshal Bazaine, which did not add much to what we know of the fall of Metz; and another with the French Emperor at Wilhelmshöhe. His Majesty said he could only liken the catastrophe which upset his Government to an earthquake produced by the combined action of elements whose existence is known, though it is impossible to trace their hidden operations. "My Government," continued the Emperor, "has been almost too willing to listen to the clamour of those who, sometimes in good faith, imagine that they know best how to promote the welfare of the country. I thus consented to the removal of the existing check to the right of free assemblage. As soon as I had done so, the privilege was abused to an unlimited extent. The public meetings no longer discussed political or social questions in a sober and dignified manner; they became tumultuous in the highest degree. During a whole year, assassination, poisoning, and rebellion, were openly preached to the masses, and urged upon them as the best and only means of saving the country." The constant cry of "treason," which had been raised by the French since their reverses, was due, according to the Emperor, to the national dislike to acknowledge defeat. It had been said that he had himself made this exclamation in the disastrous days of August; but it was not true. "What," he added, "I may have said, and what was said by many members of the Government, was, probably, that we had deceived ourselves as to the strength of our army, as well as that of the Prussians. As for myself, basing my opinion upon personal conviction, I have often cautioned against erroneous estimates. I well recollect how often Marshal Niel pointed to the drawers of his desk, and told me, with confident mien, that the army was complete and ready for every operation. It was no less the case with Marshal Lebœuf. It was probably not the fault of their hearts, but of their heads." This assertion with regard to Marshal Niel, it should be borne in mind, is contradicted by other statements, which aver that the Marshal repeatedly called the Emperor's attention to the defective condition of the army. On the correspondent asking the Emperor if he felt he had sufficient mental strength to take up the reins of government once more, should the opportunity arise, he replied that, considering the uncertainties and difficulties of such a task, he felt little ambition. He would rather be independent; rather even remain a prisoner in Germany. Not even for his son could he wish such a fate. "He would be happier," said the Emperor, "in private life, without the overwhelming responsibilities attaching to such a station in a country which can never forget a humiliation. Prussia ought not to be too severe; she ought to recollect that I allowed her to fight the Austrian war—that I could have prevented it. The history of the situation previous to 1866, and since—also that of the occurrences before and after Sedan, an exposition of which I have ordered to be written and published—will fully explain the relative merits of the two Powers." These reports of conversations with crowned heads and persons of distinction must be received with caution, for they are often subject to contradiction, in whole or in part; yet they should not be entirely disregarded. The Emperor always sought publicity, and may not have been sorry to state his case in this manner.

Marseilles still continuing in a very excited state, the Government sent thither, in the beginning of November, M. Alphonse Gent, a very advanced Republican, who was invested with the rank of Prefect, with full administrative and military powers. For some time past M. Esquiros had been using his usurped authority in a very despotic manner, and had refused to resign his office into the hands of M. Marc Dufraisse, who was commissioned to supersede him. Another Prefect was then sent, but with no better success. Fresh complaints of M. Esquiros were made to M. Gambetta, especially from the clerical party, who had certainly been treated with great tyranny and injustice. M. Gent was therefore despatched, as a person having more influence with the extreme Republicans than either M. Dufraisse or his successor. Even he, however, met with serious resistance. On the very day of his arrival (November 2nd), a riot occurred, in the course of which M. Gent was slightly wounded by a pistol-shot. A Revolutionary Commune had been appointed two days before, by whom M. Esquiros was nominated President of the Southern League for the Organisation of the National Defence in the Bouches-du-Rhône and neighbouring departments. M. Gent had some difficulty in suppressing this Revolutionary Commune, which aimed at the establishment of a separate Republic; but at length he succeeded, M. Esquiros having the good sense, in the end, to resign his powers, and to beg his fellow-citizens not to allow his name to be made a pretext for civil war. At the same time, the pointed cannon ranged round the Prefecture produced a salutary effect on the so-called Civic Guard, who had entrenched themselves in that building, but who at length consented to parley, and agreed to dissolve as a separate force, and to be incorporated in the National Guard. A semblance of peace was thus restored to the city; but the Government, on all these occasions, had to encounter the difficulty of proving its own authority to be superior to that of any pretender who chose to seize on power with the support of a self-appointed committee. The "Besieged Resident" of the *Daily News* related that the Government on a certain day visited one of the Mairies. They were received by the Mayor, whom they found established in a suite of apartments. He showed them over the palace, and offered them luncheon. They then incidentally asked who had nominated him to the post he so ably filled. "Myself," he replied; "just by the same authority as you nominated yourselves, and no less." The reply did not admit of a rejoinder; and this was a weakness from which the Provisional Government suffered throughout.

Similar disturbances occurred at Lyons, Perpignan, and elsewhere. The rioters at Perpignan committed some terrible excesses. The colonel in command of the town was wounded with a sabre, and several other persons were stoned; but order was ultimately restored, and after a while the Red Republicans began to be discredited, even in Lyons, their chief seat. The news of the loss of Metz appears to have excited the extreme politicians of the south to acts of frenzy. It was thought that the Government was lukewarm, and not sufficiently penetrated with revolutionary ideas. The same bitter reproaches which were recently directed against the Emperor and his advisers were now showered upon the heads of General Trochu, M. Jules Favre, M. Gambetta, and the other members of the Provisional Administration; and France discovered (for the third time) that she may be Republican in name without advancing any nearer to the Republican ideal. The consciousness of this fact exasperated the demagogues to the utmost fury of speech, even when they did not go to the extent of actual insurrection. M. Duportal, the Prefect of Toulouse, said, in the course of a violent address:—"After having established the Republic on the corpse of the last Prussian, we will establish equality upon the corpse of the last Monopolist. Then we will occupy ourselves in just reprisals—punishments deserved by all the pensioned supporters of Monarchy. The wretches! they do not understand that if there were any of them in this immense multitude, the mere elevation of my eyebrows would cause you to give them back to that dust whence they have sprung." At Marseilles there was a woman's club, at which a vote was proposed and carried, to the effect that the guillotine should be permanently established, and that the first person executed should be the Bishop of Marseilles. These extravagances revolted all persons of ordinary sense and fairness; yet, considering how many there are who have neither the one quality nor the other, they constituted a real danger to society. The *Phare de la Loire* remarked that the meeting of a Constituent Assembly (of which there seemed no chance) would be the only means of remedying the occurrences at Lyons and Marseilles. The Alhambra Club, in the latter town, received a report from M. Gaston Crémieux, who had just returned from Tours; and on the strength of that report voted the deposition of the Government of the National Defence, and the establishment of the Southern League. "This League," said the *Phare de la Loire*, "will be composed of forty-eight delegates — three of each of the sixteen departments in the valley of the Rhône. Sixteen of these delegates are to sit permanently in Marseilles, where they are entrusted with the executive power, while the others have the 'mission' to *republicanise* the peasants. At the same sitting they decreed the recall of General Cluseret and the liberation of citizens Combe and Bastelica; they then tried the Prefect of the Vosges, the Mayor of Epinal, General Cambriels, and Citizen Gambetta, accused of treason, scoundrelism, and not loving the Republic. The Prefect of the Vosges was condemned to death as a traitor, as well as General Cambriels. Citizen Gambetta was condemned to execration for scoundrelism, and for not having executed the orders of the people of Marseilles. The Mayor of Epinal was more fortunate; his trial was adjourned. As to General Cambriels, it was decided that a Polish general should be appointed to replace him." General Cambriels, however, had already resigned his position. These decrees show that the Southern League was as eager to dismember France as Prussia itself was. The prospect of civil war was added to the actual fact of foreign occupation.



PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF.

Undeterred by these threats and criticisms, M. Gambetta went on energetically with his work of stimulating the national spirit and eliciting all the elements of the national defence. He issued on the 10th of November a decree authorising the Prefects to accept offers of church-bells, to be melted down for the manufacture of cannon, and directing that the names of the contributing parishes should be inscribed upon the guns thus produced. Another decree enacted that until the 15th of December no protest should be made nor action brought on any commercial bills of exchange accepted previously to 15th of August. It was mainly owing to the energy of M. Gambetta that the newly-recruited armies of France were, on the whole, so well supplied with arms. Many of these came from England; and it was one of the grounds of complaint by Germany against this country that we furnished the French with means for keeping up the struggle. German officers frequently observed to Dr. Russell, "It is by British cannon and bullets that our soldiers fall;" and they would ask, "Why don't you send men to hold your guns at once?" America, however, did more in this respect than England. The *Times* asserted in the course of November that the well-known steamers which ran between Brest and New York had recently brought with them rifles, cartridges, cannon, and mitrailleuses, to an extent throwing our exportations into the shade. It was even said that, in defiance of Federal laws, they had carried recruits to the



GUN-BOATS ON THE SEINE.

French army. A similar attempt was made, during the autumn, in London, where several Irishmen were engaged, ostensibly to serve in the ambulance corps, but in reality, as it afterwards appeared, to act as soldiers. The project, however, was a clear violation of international law, and it was vigorously suppressed by the law officers of the crown. Pursuing its statements with respect to America, the *Times* said that there had been, within two months, shipments of nearly 400,000 guns and carbines, of 45,000,000 cartridges, and of several cannon and mitrailleuses. "It would seem, indeed," continued the *Times*, "that the Prussians themselves find it difficult to impose limits on their own commerce, so as to prevent its being indirectly serviceable to the enemy; for our reporter on the state of trade in Birmingham writes that the sword-bayonets for the chassepôt rifles, though sold with the guns at Birmingham, are first imported from Prussia, which thus helps to arm France." But for these helps from foreign countries, France would have been unable to prolong the war much after Sedan; and it is therefore not surprising that Prussia should have felt exceedingly angry on the subject. Another grievance alleged by Germany was the treatment by France of the crews of captured German merchantmen as prisoners of war. Count Bismarck demanded the release of their captains, forty in number; but the French Government refused to accede to this requisition, unless an equal number of French military officers were given up. The Federal Chancellor thereupon ordered forty French notables to be arrested and kept in prison at Bremen.

Revolutionary sentiment was not the only influence appealed to for maintaining the martial ardour of France. Religion was pressed into the service by the great dignitaries of the Church. Bishop Dupanloup addressed a letter to the clergy of Orleans, with reference to the re-capture of that city by the French, in which he remarked that it was under the walls of their town that, for the first time since the national reverses, victory had returned to the banners of France. This victory was a great honour to the Army of the Loire, and it should arouse the enthusiasm of the French people. The destiny of the country might perhaps in a few days be decided near Orleans. But the mere bravery of the army was not sufficient. They must rely on the assistance of God, "who alone holds in His sovereign hands fortune or defeat, life or death, war or peace." More than once God had worked miracles for France. St. Aignon and Jeanne d'Arc were witnesses of this. Men of faith had knowledge of such things, and great religious warriors drew from them their confidence. Quoting the passage in the 20th Psalm, v. 7—"Some trust in chariots, and some in horses, but we will remember the name of the Lord our God"—the Bishop exclaimed, "Oh, if France were thus moved; if, in the conviction that all is vain where God is not, but that nothing is impossible where He interposes, we turned towards Him, uttering from the depths of our abyss this agonising cry, 'Help us, O Lord, out of trouble, for vain is the help of man!' (*Da nobis auxilium de tribulatione, quia vana salus hominis*); if we astonished the world by an earnest return to God, manifested by unanimous and confident prayers—God, on His part, would lend to us His hand, and would work marvels to save us." There were indeed, added the Bishop, grounds for hope in this respect. A more religious feeling was beginning to prevail in the army: the officers confessed, and the soldiers had been seen praying in the churches. Monseigneur Dupanloup then proceeded to relate a striking legend of early French history:—

> "After having crossed the Rhine with his northern hosts, Attila had advanced to the gates of Orleans, and caused the walls to fall under the blows of his battering-rams. The people were shut up in the church with their Bishop, and cried to him with alarm, 'What must be done?' The Bishop, full of holy confidence in God, replied, 'We must pray: we must prostrate ourselves in prayer, and ask with tears for the aid of God, who is always nigh unto them who call on Him in trouble.' They did so, and while they prayed, 'Look,' exclaimed the Bishop, 'at the heights of your ramparts, and see if the help of God be not coming.' Three times they looked; and three times, seeing nothing on the horizon, they began to pray with more confidence and more tears. And then St. Aignon exclaimed, 'Look again!' Following the advice of the old Bishop, they again mounted the towers, and cried, 'We see something like a cloud, which rises on the horizon.' 'It is the help of God,' cried the Bishop; 'it is the help of God.' It was true, and soon Attila withdrew from Orleans, the walls of which his battering-rams had beaten down, and led his barbarous hordes to the fields of Châlons, where the last blow of Providence fell upon them. Is that the history of our fathers fourteen hundred years ago? Is it ours? And this army, the first struggles of which have delivered our town—is it not the help of God? Let us hasten, then, to the temples, gentlemen, and, like our fathers at the bidding of St. Aignon, let us prostrate ourselves in prayer, and with hope. Let us give to the whole of France the example of confidence in the help of Heaven."

Appeals such as this had doubtless some effect on the excitable minds of the French people. It is a mistake to describe the French as an irreligious race generally. Infidelity is common in the large cities, and among the intellectual classes; but the mass of the population in the provinces are more prone to take a religious view of life than the people of many other countries. Their religion may have, to our Protestant feelings, a superstitious colour; but it is none the less sincere. Not unnaturally, it took, during the afflictions of 1870, a deeper and graver tone than is its wont, though it must be admitted that it sometimes assumed rather fantastic forms. The statue of Joan of Arc at Orleans received as many votive wreaths and pious supplications as the shrine of an ancient god. It seemed to be really supposed that the Maid was present in her effigy, ready to listen to the prayers of the faithful, and once more to rescue France.

Germany had her internal dissensions, as well as the country to which she was opposed. Some at least of the Hanoverians had never forgiven the forcible annexation of their land by Prussia in 1866; and cases of insubordination occasionally broke out. Two Protestant clergymen were tried in November on charges connected with State affairs. One, Herr Burgdorf, had compromised himself by a sermon, in which he described the war as a heavenly chastisement, and referred to the old position of Hanover under the late dynasty as especially fortunate. For this he was censured and warned by the Consistory; and the Government prosecuted him on a charge of disloyalty to the King of Prussia, and of libelling Count Bismarck. He was acquitted, however. The other minister, Herr Grote, was prosecuted for attempted bribery. He had been sentenced, in his absence, to a year's imprisonment for several press offences; but, an amnesty having been granted, he thought he might with safety return home. When, however, he found that the police were on his track, he tried to leave the country, was recognised and arrested at Kreiensen, and then attempted to bribe the policeman who had apprehended him. He also was acquitted of the charge now brought against him, but was obliged to undergo his original sentence. These were the elements of disaffection which France hoped to turn to her account in the prosecution of the war, but which she lacked the skill to manipulate, or which did not exist in a sufficient degree to be made available. Germany, on her part, rejoiced in the consciousness of complete triumph over her enemy. At the meeting of the North German Parliament on the 24th of November, the speech from the Throne referred tauntingly to the certainty of France endeavouring at some future time to revenge herself for the humiliation she was then suffering, and again asserted the absolute necessity of Germany rectifying her frontier, as a measure at once of protection and of justice.

Both the belligerents called in the aid of science to further their operations. The Germans employed traction-engines on the high-roads, for drawing large fortress-guns, or wagons with munitions and provisions; while the French invented a species of travelling battery in connection with the railways. The latter took the form of a locomotive with a long train attached, all the carriages of which, as well as the engines, were bullet-proof and loop-holed, so as to protect the train against an enemy. One object of this movable fortification was to defend a train of provisions for the Paris garrison, if by any possibility it could get through the Prussian lines. The carriages attached to the train were constructed to hold about five hundred men; and the whole was provided with four small rifled cannon, which could be worked within a moving casemate. It is only recently that mechanical science has been so largely pressed into the service of war; but the practice is likely to be still further extended with every successive resort to hostilities. The art of slaying is every year becoming more scientific; and the campaigns even of a Napoleon and a Wellington are already antiquated and primitive.

The French, however, received less advantage from these ingenious contrivances than from the boldness and stratagem of the irregular troops. On a small scale the Prussians were frequently checked by falling into ambuscades, of which, with all their astuteness, they were unaware. In this way they met with a rather serious mishap about the 30th of November, at Etrepagny, in the department of the Eure, north-east of Evreux. The Germans were commanded by Colonel Rex, who, in spite of all the precautionary measures he had taken, was attacked in the middle of the night by a hostile force of 1,800 men, including, it is said, 1,400 troops of the Line. The people of the little town co-operated with the soldiers, and a number of armed men, concealed in the churches, did a good deal of execution. Finding themselves assailed on all sides, the Prussians were compelled to fight their way out of the place, and it was only by great exertions, and with rather serious losses, that they got clear of the houses, and succeeded in reassembling outside Etrepagny. About a hundred men and seventy horses were killed and wounded, and the French captured a gun. For a brief time the Prussians were compelled to retire to Gisors; but on the following day they re-occupied Etrepagny, which they burnt down, as a punishment for the assistance given by the inhabitants to the French military forces. A correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* says that when the Germans were attacked in the night they were in bed and asleep, with the exception of the sentinels posted at the outskirts. On the French troops bursting in, therefore, they were completely taken by surprise; and it was on account of this so-called treachery that the town was burnt down. The French suffered severely for their temporary success; but it showed what might be done by ability and determination. Garibaldi, writing to a correspondent on November 16th, 1870, observed—after premising that he had been in favour of Prussia up to Sedan, but since then opposed to her, because she was endeavouring to trample under foot a generous nation:—"The French have found a renewal of their vitality in their misfortunes; and at this moment there is hardly a Frenchman capable of bearing arms who is not ready to take up a gun for the defence of his country. The male population of Germany, which has been armed and sent to invade France, is diminished each day by the sword and by sickness, whilst the defenders of France increase in number. France is not yet capable of measuring her forces with those of Germany in a pitched battle. But the French army, which is now scattered over a vast area, and for that very reason out of the enemy's reach, is invincible; and, with the enthusiasm which rises every day, the position of Prussia becomes more precarious. There is neither rhodomontade nor exaggeration in what I say. I am in the ranks of the people, whose pulsations I watch carefully, and you will admit that I am skilled in discerning how the pulse of a nation beats. In a word, I assure you that I am more than confident in the final victory of the French Republic." The event proved that Garibaldi was too hopeful when he thus wrote; but at that date there were signs which made his prognostications not improbable.

While these events were occurring in France, Europe was threatened with another war, in which, had it really taken place, the chief belligerents would have been England and Russia. It has already been shown that the sympathies of the Czar—who was the nephew of the Prussian monarch—were powerfully excited in favour of Germany as the war progressed, and as victory after victory crowned the arms of the united German Powers. The Emperor Alexander proved this in many ways—by flattering speeches with reference to King William, by excessive congratulations on each succeeding triumph, and by the conferring of special honours on the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony, and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. After the conclusion of peace the Prussian monarch sent a telegram to his august nephew at St. Petersburg, saying, "Never will Prussia forget that she owes it to *you* that the war has not assumed the greatest dimensions," and signed, "Your grateful friend for life, WILHELM." To this the Czar replied, "I feel happy in having been able to prove to you my sympathies as a devoted friend. May the friendship which ties us together secure the happiness and glory of both countries!" These civilities were published in the official *Journal* of St. Petersburg. By his negative, though far from ineffectual, support of Prussia, the Russian Emperor seems to have calculated that he had secured the goodwill of the leading German State; and in the autumn of 1870 he unfolded a scheme which doubtless he had been long maturing. Ever since 1856 Russia had writhed under the restrictions imposed on her by the Treaty of Peace of that year. By the Treaty in question, which brought the Crimean war to a close, the Black Sea was neutralised, avowedly as a check on the ambitious designs of Russia with respect to Turkey. While open to the mercantile marine of all nations, the waters and ports of that sea were formally and perpetually interdicted to vessels of war of any nation whatever. Russia and Turkey, moreover, engaged neither to construct nor maintain any naval or military arsenal upon the coast. These conditions, to which the Court of St. Petersburg was compelled to accede by the exhaustion of defeat, rankled, with an ever-increasing sense of humiliation, in the minds of Russian statesmen and of the Russian people. It was thought that the time had now arrived for undoing what had never been willingly done. France, the chief agent in the war for the defence of Turkey, was prostrate and helpless. England was evidently not disposed to repeat the costly and rather disappointing experiment of fifteen years before. The very man who had quitted the Ministry of that day because he did not approve of the Crimean war, was now at the head of the Government. The political traditions of Lord Palmerston had given place to the economical ideas of Mr. Gladstone. Sardinia, in becoming Italy, had, it is true, become immensely stronger; but Italy had nothing to gain by a new war for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, and had a great deal to lose in the event of a crushing defeat. Prussia and Austria had always been rather disposed to take a Russian view of the quarrel out of which grew the deadly struggle extending from 1853 to 1856; although it is true that, at the time when their assistance would have been valuable, they temporised with much ingenuity, and evaded any responsibility to either side. In 1870 it was obvious that Austria was not in a position to enter into any great European war; while Prussia, besides having her hands engaged, was apparently well-disposed to let Russia do what she liked, provided that the interests of Germany were not endangered.

Such was the position of affairs when the Czar determined to abrogate, so far as he was concerned, the Treaty to which he had signified his assent in the spring of 1856. The Russian Minister, Prince Gortschakoff, had visited Berlin immediately after the declaration of war in July, 1870; and it is said that an agreement was then come to, that, in exchange for Russia's neutrality (which was equivalent to a practical increase of the German forces) Prussia should connive at the Czar's contemplated departure from the Treaty of Paris. Some intimations of a desire to adopt such a course had already appeared in the Russian official press; but as yet no formal step had been taken. On the 20th of October, however, Prince Gortschakoff addressed to Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador in London, a despatch (communicated to Lord Granville on November 9th), in which it was affirmed that the Treaty had been broken in several ways to the detriment of Russia, and that consequently Russia had resolved to re-establish the balance founded in the East by that agreement. The cautious and ambiguous language of this despatch was explained by the much more specific utterances of a circular addressed by Prince Gortschakoff, on October 31st, to the European Powers generally. The Russian Minister here observed :—

"Successive alterations in the treaties considered as the foundation of the European balance of power have rendered it necessary for the Imperial Cabinet to inquire how far the political position of Russia has been and ought to be modified by these changes. Among the treaties alluded to, that which touches Russia more nearly than any other is the compact of March 30th, 1856. The special Convention between the two States bordering on the Black Sea, which forms an appendix to this Treaty, obliges Russia to confine her naval forces to a *minimum*; at the same time, this Treaty establishes the principle of the neutralisation of the Black Sea. By laying down this principle the signatory Powers intended to remove the very possibility of a conflict between the Powers bordering on the Black Sea, or between either of them and the maritime Powers. This arrangement was intended to increase the number of the territories which have been accorded the benefit of neutrality by common consent, and thus to protect Russia herself from the danger of attack. A fifteen years' experience has proved that this principle, on which the safety of the South Russian frontiers exclusively depends, is no more than a theory. In reality, while Russia disarmed in the Black Sea, and, by a declaration contained in the minutes of the Conference, likewise loyally deprived herself of the possibility of taking measures for an effectual maritime defence in the adjoining seas and ports, Turkey preserved her privilege of having an unlimited number of men-of-war in the Archipelago and the Straits, while France and England were also at liberty to assemble their squadrons in the Mediterranean. Again, under the Treaty in question, the war-flag of all nations is formally and perpetually prohibited entry into the Black Sea; but the so-called Straits Treaty closes the Straits only in time of peace to men-of-war. Owing to this inconsistency, the shores of the Russian Empire are exposed to attack even from less powerful States, if they have some naval forces at their disposal. All that Russia could oppose to them would be some ships of small size."

The Treaty of 1856 had, moreover, been modified by the union of the Danubian Principalities under a foreign Prince, and by the entrance, under various pretexts, of foreign men-of-war into the Bosphorus and the Black Sea. At the same time, the adoption of ironclad vessels increased the danger menacing Russia in case of war; so that she was now more than ever unable to encounter an enemy in the Euxine.

"Under these circumstances, his Imperial Majesty could not but ask himself what are the rights and duties accruing to Russia from this modification of the general situation, and the disregard shown to engagements which, although conceived in a spirit of distrust and levelled at herself, she has invariably and most conscientiously obeyed. After maturely considering this question, his Imperial Majesty arrived at the following conclusions, which you are instructed to bring to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited. Our illustrious Master cannot admit, *de jure*, that treaties violated in several of their general and essential clauses should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the interests of his Empire. Nor can his Imperial Majesty admit, *de facto*, that Russia should rely for safety on a fiction which has not stood the test of time, and that she should allow her safety to be imperilled by herself respecting a Treaty partly set aside by others. Confiding in the equitable sentiments of the Powers who have signed the Treaty of 1856, as well as in their consciousness of their own dignity, the Emperor commands you to declare that his Imperial Majesty cannot any longer hold himself bound by those stipulations of the Treaty of March 30th, 1856, which restrict the exercise of his sovereign rights in the Black Sea; that his Imperial Majesty deems himself both entitled and obliged to announce to his Majesty the Sultan that he will no longer regard as valid the special and additional Convention appended to the said Treaty, which fixes the number and size of the men-of-war which the two Powers bordering on the Black Sea shall keep in that sea; that his Majesty loyally informs of this the Powers who have signed and guaranteed the more comprehensive Treaty, an integral part of which



LOCOMOTIVE BATTERIES IN ACTION.

is the Convention in question; and that his Majesty restores to the Sultan the full exercise of his sovereign rights in this respect, re-claiming the like full exercise of the same rights for himself. In acquitting yourself of this duty, you will take care to point out that the only object of our illustrious Master in this step is to protect the safety and dignity of his Empire. His Imperial Majesty has no wish to revive the Eastern question. His Imperial Majesty sincerely desires to contribute towards the continuance and consolidation of peace in the East, as well as everywhere else. His Imperial Majesty fully adheres to his consent to the general principles of the Treaty of 1856, which have fixed the position of Turkey in the European system. His Imperial Majesty is ready to enter into an understanding with the Powers who have signed that transaction, for the purpose either of confirming its general stipulations, or of renewing them, or of replacing them by some other equitable arrangement, calculated to secure the quiet of the East, and the balance of power in Europe."

Earl Granville, writing to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg on November 10th, stated the views of the English Government on this high-handed despatch of Prince Gortschakoff. He said:—

"We have here an allegation that certain facts have occurred which, in the judgment of Russia, are at variance with certain stipulations of the Treaty; and the assumption is made that Russia, upon the strength of her own judgment as to the character of those facts, is entitled to release herself from certain other stipulations of that instrument. This assumption is limited in its practical application to some of the provisions of the Treaty; but the assumption of a right to renounce any one of its terms involves the assumption of a right to renounce the whole. This statement is wholly independent of the reasonableness or unreasonableness, on its own merits, of the desire of Russia to be released from the observation of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856 respecting the Black Sea. For the question is, in whose hand lies the power of releasing one or more of the parties from all or any of these stipulations? It has always been held that that right belongs only to the Governments who have been parties to the original instrument.

"The despatches of Prince Gortschakoff appear to assume that any one of the Powers who have signed the engagement may allege that occurrences have taken place which in its opinion are at variance with the provisions of the Treaty; and, although this view is not shared nor admitted by the co-signatory Powers,



LORD GRANVILLE.

may found upon that allegation, not a request to those Governments for the consideration of the case, but an announcement to them that it has emancipated itself, or holds itself emancipated, from any stipulations of the Treaty which it thinks fit to disapprove."

The effect of such a doctrine, if carried out, would be to bring the entire authority and efficacy of treaties under the discretionary control of each one of the signatory Powers. Her Majesty's Government could not give any sanction to the course announced by Prince Gortschakoff; but, had the Russian Government addressed to the several Powers signing the Treaty of 1856 a request for reconsideration of that compact, on the ground that its terms had been broken by others, or that, owing to altered circumstances, those terms now weighed with undue severity on Russia, "Her Majesty's Government would not have refused to examine the question in concert with the co-signatories of the Treaty."

This notification by Lord Granville of the views of the British Cabinet called forth from Prince Gortschakoff a response (dated November 20th) of a more conciliatory character than the original circular to the European Powers. The Czar now expressed his willingness to arrive at the desired result in harmony with the Governments which signed the Treaty of 1856; but at the same time alleged, as a reason for not having made an appeal to those Governments, the failure of previous attempts to unite the Powers in a common deliberation with a view to removing various complications which troubled the general peace. Together with these mollifying assurances, however, the despatch contained a renewed expression of the determination of Russia to be no longer bound by that part of the Treaty which restricted her use of the Black Sea. As a matter of fact, she had ceased to be bound by it for a long while. In the year 1863 a new naval harbour, intended as a substitute for Sebastopol, was commenced by the Russian Government on the shores of the prohibited waters. This was at the town of Poti, at the mouth of the river Rion, on the eastern coast of the Euxine, not many miles distant from the Turkish frontier. The Treaty of Paris had also been evaded by the creation at Odessa of a Steamboat Company, all the ships belonging to which (though the Company was nominally private) were at the disposal of the Government, and were so constructed that they could easily be plated with armour, and armed with twelve guns each.

Lord Granville's rejoinder to Prince Gortschakoff's new communication bears date November 28th; but in the meanwhile the Government had dispatched Mr. Odo Russell—a very experienced diplomatist—to the German head-quarters at Versailles, to ascertain the views of the Prussian Government on the question raised in Prince Gortschakoff's circular; the impression in England being very general that Russia and Prussia had come to some secret understanding for violating the Treaty of 1856, and defying this country (in the absence of all help from France) by a formidable military alliance. Count Bismarck, however, assured Mr. Russell that the Cabinet of Berlin had given no sanction to the step taken by the Czar; and it was now suggested by Prussia that a Conference of the Powers should be held in London for the settlement of the Black Sea question. Mr. Russell, in writing to Lord Granville on the subject, said:—"The Chancellor authorised me to telegraph to London that, if your Lordship consented, he would willingly take the initiative of proposing a Conference for the purpose of endeavouring to find a pacific solution to a question which I had frankly proved to him was of a nature, in its present state, to compel us, with or without allies, to go to war with Russia." Though the full strength of these representations by Mr. Russell was afterwards disavowed by Mr. Gladstone, the Prussian proposal was accepted by the English Government, upon the understanding, as Lord Granville stipulated in his despatch of November 28th, that the Conference was to assemble "without any foregone conclusions as to its results." In that case, Her Majesty's Government would consider, with the respect due to a great friendly Power, any proposals which Russia might have to make.

Count Bismarck, in replying to the Russian circular, admitted that the complaints of the Czar were natural, expressed a hope that the question would be settled amicably, and endorsed the argument of Prince Gortschakoff that, owing to one of the co-signatory Powers being at that time without any organised Government, and therefore unable to take part in a Conference, an appeal for revision of the Treaty would, in the first instance, have been awkward. Austria and Italy objected to the form of the original Russian demand, while intimating a readiness to consider the complaints of the Czar, if submitted to a Conference; and with these assurances Russia professed herself satisfied. Even Turkey—the Power most nearly concerned in the issue that had been raised, and for whose protection against Muscovite encroachment the neutralisation of the Black Sea had been effected—appeared not unwilling that the matter should be reconsidered by the Powers who had made the first Treaty. The Conference accordingly met in London on the 17th of January, 1871, and after several sittings a new Treaty was signed on the 13th of March, by which the neutralisation of the Black Sea, established just fifteen years before, was abrogated. At the first meeting of the Conference a protocol was agreed to, recording it to be an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty without the consent of the other contracting parties. This was certainly a very important point to establish after the arrogant and most unwarrantable announcement of Prince Gortschakoff that Russia would of her own motion withdraw from the obligations solemnly contracted in 1856. Owing to the conclusion of peace between France and Germany, the representative of the former country was enabled to be present at the last sitting, and to sign both the Treaty and the protocol; so that all the Powers who were parties to the earlier Treaty were parties also to the later. The danger of an Anglo-Russian war was thus removed, and it cannot be denied that on many grounds this was a subject for congratulation. But the country generally was far from pleased with the transaction. Englishmen could not but perceive that their Government had been forced by the insolence of Russia into abandoning one of the chief features of the Treaty of Paris, for securing which so much blood and treasure had been expended. Lord Granville, indeed, repudiated the Czar's pretension to proceed in the matter solely by his own will and pleasure; but at the same time he so clearly gave the Russian Government to understand that its wishes would be agreed to by England, if the request were civilly made, that the point was almost conceded from the first, since there could be very little doubt as to the action of the other Powers. It was never sufficiently clear that Russia, before entering the Conference, had explicitly and formally withdrawn the offensive circular, and declared her readiness to accept the decision of the Powers, whether that decision was in favour of her views or against them. People could not but suspect that had the decision been adverse she would have gone her own way in defiance of the other Governments. and that a favourable decision was come to as much out of dread of the consequences of refusing it as from any sense of justice. The subjection of Europe to the two great military and despotic Powers of the North was feared by many who are not generally given to alarmist notions; for it could not be doubted that Prussia, though she might not have come to any actual agreement with Russia on the subject of the Black Sea, was well disposed to abet the ambition of the Czar in return for his sanction of her own. Still, the horrors of another war had been averted; and that was something—and indeed much—in the midst of wide-spread misery and ruin.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Preparations for a Great Sortie from Paris—Trochu's Design, and Gambetta's—Scene of the Chief Fighting—Gathering of the Troops—Address of Trochu—Proclamation of the other Members of the Government—Disposition of the Attacking Forces—The Sortie of November 29th—Fighting in Various Directions—The Main Part of the Design prevented by a Rise of the Marne—Proclamation of General Ducrot—Excitement at the Gates of Paris—Renewal of the Sortie—Crossing of the Marne by Ducrot, on the 30th—Villiers taken by the French, and re-taken by the Saxons—Progress of the Sortie at Brie and Champigny—Courage of General Ducrot—Incidents of the Battle—State of Champigny after the Fight—The Struggle at Creteil—Cowardice of the Belleville Battalion—Precipitate Flight of the French—Making Use of the Dead Horses—Sorties toward the North and North-east—Truce of December 1st—Brie and Champigny re-taken by the Würtembergers, and again captured by the French (December 2nd)—Advance of the French on Villiers—Their Failure to take the Position—Results of the Day's Fighting—Re-crossing of the Marne by the French—Remarks on the Military Situation—Inaccuracy of the Prussian Reports—Explorations of the Battle-field—Terrible Sufferings of the Wounded—The Insanity of War.

We have now reached that period of the Franco-German war when the main effort of the Parisians to break through the investing lines was made in conjunction with the Army of the Loire. The action of Beaune-la-Rolande, on the 28th of November, when the right wing of d'Aurelles de Paladine's forces unsuccessfully attempted to shatter the left wing of the Germans, has already been related; but this was only the beginning of the tremendous and bloody struggle which for fully a week raged on the banks of the Seine, the Marne, and the Loire, and scattered dead and wounded in terrible prodigality over all the wintry fields. General Trochu felt by this time sufficiently assured of the discipline of his troops to make a sortie on a great scale, in the hope of joining the army of deliverance from the south. As previously mentioned, he sent a balloon from Paris, on the 24th of November, conveying to the Tours Government a notification that he would sally out on the 29th, and, in the event of success, push on towards the Loire in the direction of Gien. But the balloon was unfortunately blown over to Norway, so that the intelligence was not received by the proper authorities until the 30th. This doubtless contributed to the ill-success of the French; but Trochu, not being aware of the miscarriage of his communication, continued his preparations for the great blow which it was hoped would deliver the capital and the country. Those preparations went on night and day. A reconnaissance towards Choisy-le-Roi on the south, occurred on the 26th of November, and led to some rather sharp fighting. Immense movements of troops took place in Paris on the 27th and 28th, and it was obvious that events of the gravest importance were at hand. Masses of armed men were brought together, and concentrated mainly on the southern and south-eastern sides of Paris. The streets resounded with the tramp of many regiments; the notes of the bugle rang out sharply at intervals through the stir and hum; cannon rattled along the ways towards the city gates; and the flag that had not yet been utterly stricken down fluttered restlessly in the frosty air. Women, looking sadly on those ever-moving columns of gallant soldiers, thought only of the death or anguish to which so many were surely going; men calculated the chances of the struggle, and wished it were well over and the Prussians in hurried flight towards the frontier. On the whole, the feeling in Paris was one of sanguine anticipation; but, as usual throughout the war, General Trochu was doubtful and depressed. His original design was to break out of Paris by way of Rouen and Havre, and to revictual the capital by vessels from the Lower Seine. Thwarted in this by the persistence of M. Gambetta, who was determined that the attempt should be made in the direction of the Loire, General Trochu reluctantly adopted the alternative plan, and failed, as he anticipated he would.

It must be admitted, however, that he did his best, and that his scheme of action was skilful. He determined to make feigned advances from Mont Valérien towards Bougival and Bezons, on the west and north-west; from Fort Nogent towards Mont Avron, on the east; and from St. Denis, on the north; while the real attack would be on the south and south-east, towards L'Hay, Chevilly, Choisy-le-Roi, Mont Mesly, Bonneuil, Champigny, Villiers and Brie. The chief scene of the fighting was to be on the river Marne, opposite the large woods extending round Vincennes. The course of the Marne, from its junction with the Seine at Charenton to Neuilly, is very serpentine, the bends being both numerous and abrupt. The country which it traverses is covered—especially on the side next to Paris—with numerous forts and redoubts. On account, probably, of the near proximity of these dangerous works, the Germans had always refrained from taking up a position close to the river, and had established their entrenchments and batteries no nearer than Villiers, Couilly, Noisy-le-Grand, and places in the vicinity, on the left (or south-eastern) bank of the stream. They had, indeed, some outposts lying under shelter at Champigny and Brie, not far from the river, and within range of the enemy's fire; but these were only for purposes of observation. Between the Paris forts and the main body of the German army, in that direction, lay the Marne itself, in the first instance, and, in the second, a piece of ground on its left bank, from two to three miles in breadth. Here it was that, in the main (though not on the first day), the prolonged and sanguinary struggle took place.

On the evening of the 28th of November the *générale* was beaten in the streets of Paris, and enormous bodies of troops, with their batteries of artillery, moved towards the points of departure from the city. A proclamation, signed by Trochu, was posted up in the dusk, and this was read with eager interest by the excited people. It was expressed with point and spirit, and with a remarkable absence of that flowery exaggeration which generally characterises French addresses of this nature. "Citizens of Paris, soldiers of the National Guard and Army!" exclaimed the Governor of Paris, "the policy of invasion and conquest seeks to complete its work. It has introduced into Europe, it pretends to establish in France, the right of brute force. Europe may submit in silence to this insult; but France means to combat it, and our brethren call us to go beyond our walls for the last struggle. Despite the blood already spilt, blood is going to flow again. Let the responsibility be on those whose detestable ambition tramples under foot the laws of modern civilisation and of justice. Putting our trust in God, let us march forward for our country." A second proclamation, signed by the other members of the Government, said that the effort then about to be made was one which the honour and safety of France demanded. The citizens of Paris had waited for that effort with a patriotic impatience which their military leaders had had trouble to moderate. The Government, however, had only delayed in order that they might be provided with powerful means of attack. Those means were ready, and the battle had begun. But the ardour of the soldiers must be supported by the firmness and civic virtue of the civilians. "Whatever," continued the address, "may be the violence of the emotions which agitate us, let us have the courage to keep calm. Whoever would foment the least disturbance in Paris would betray the cause of its defenders, and serve the cause of Prussia. As the army cannot conquer except by discipline, so neither can we resist except by union and order. We reckon on success; we shall not allow ourselves to be depressed by any reverse. Above all, let us seek our strength in the unshaken resolution to destroy, as a germ of ignominious death, every manifestation of civil discord." This exhortation to refrain from internal strife (the mere necessity for which is a strange comment on Parisian habits) was not without its effect. The city remained outwardly calm, though of course terribly agitated at heart by the possibilities of success and failure. It was in truth a period of awful suspense—one of those moments in which the fate of a nation seems to hang trembling in the balance; and faction itself was hushed and quiet in the presence of tremendous issues.

At eleven o'clock on the night of November 28th, Forts Charenton, Ivry, Bicêtre, Montrouge, Vanvres, and Issy, together with the redoubts constructed a short time previously at Moulin Saquet and Hautes Bruyères, and a number of gunboats on the river above Port à l'Anglais, opened a terrific fire on the besiegers' lines from St. Germain to the confluence of the Seine and Marne. The object of this fire was mainly to cover the movements of the troops; but it seems also to have been hoped that it would act as a signal to the Army of the Loire, which was at that time believed to be not far off. Thus aided, large masses of men poured forth in various directions, and endeavoured to carry several positions in proximity to the German lines. The main body of the attacking forces was divided into two armies: one commanded by General Ducrot, who was to break through the Prussian lines at Villiers, Champigny, and Brie; the other by General Vinoy, to whom was assigned the task of operating towards Choisy-le-Roi and Chevilly. In the meanwhile General Thomas was to hold Paris with another large army, including the National Guards, while feigned attacks were made towards the east, north, and west. The operations towards the south-east were unfortunately prevented by a sudden rising of the waters of the Marne, which carried away the pontoon-bridges thrown over the river for the transport of the troops. But in other quarters the movements of the French were attended with some success, though only of brief duration.

In the early morning of the 29th a division under the command of General de Beaufort debouched from behind Fort Valérien in the direction of Bougival and the heights of Malmaison, on the road to Versailles; and at the same time General de Liniers pushed rapidly forward towards the bridge at Bezons, to the north-west of Paris. The French advanced with much spirit; but the Prussians received them with a large force of Line infantry, in combination with several Jäger companies and a number of field-batteries. General de Beaufort's men attempted to storm the German works around Bougival and Montretout; but the assault was not sufficiently supported to have much chance of success, and after a while the attacking column withdrew behind the guns of Fort Valérien, leaving a good many killed and wounded behind. Even the Germans could see that the attack was rather feigned than real; for when the men showed a disposition to rush to the front, their officers restrained them, to their evident disappointment. Had they pushed on, however, they would have lost frightfully, for the Germans were strongly posted. "The French officers," said an eye-witness, "exposed their lives freely to hold their men just where they were wanted; and the cool, steady fire of the Jägers caused much loss to the Gardes Mobiles. One French officer sprang to the front, and made straight to the place where the Jägers lay. He was shot down just as he turned to wave on the hesitating skirmishers." By about mid-day the French had retired; but their chief object had been gained, for it was merely sought to effect a diversion, and it was hoped that the movement had drawn off a portion of the Prussian army on the south, so as to aid the more serious attack in that direction. On the north Admiral Roncière had the command of the sortie, which extended from St. Denis towards Epinay, Drancy, and Le Bourget. He was met by Alvensleben's Fourth Corps, and a portion of the Saxon Guards under Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, by whom he was defeated with considerable loss. To the east, the plateau of Avron was occupied by the Marines of Admiral Saisset, supported by the divisions of General d'Hugues and a large number of long-range guns, capable of menacing Chelles, Neuilly, Noisy, Brie, and Villiers. Simultaneously with these operations, the right of the French army, commanded by General Vinoy, moved towards Choisy-le-Roi, Thiais, L'Hay, and Chevilly, to the south of Paris. The operations of Vinoy were greatly aided by the fire from the redoubts of Moulin Saquet and Hautes Bruyères, which rendered the whole road between Sceaux and Choisy, passing by L'Hay and Chevilly, quite untenable. Twenty battalions, led by the general himself, advanced, at nine o'clock in the morning, against the



THE FIRST EFFECTS OF THE BOMBARDMENT.

position occupied by Tümpling's Sixth Prussian Corps. At first, the attacking force seemed to carry all before it. The French established themselves in favourable positions, and the Germans were compelled to bring up reinforcements. These, as they approached L'Hay and Choisy, were much cut up by the redoubts at Moulin Saquet and Hautes Bruyères, by the gunboats on the Seine, and by the guns mounted on ironclad railway carriages, to which allusion was made in the last chapter of this History. The Germans, however, in their turn, unmasked a number of field-batteries, which inflicted great losses on the French, and caused their lines to waver and fall back. Several battalions were thrown into disorder; the expected supports did not arrive; and, in the end, after about two hours' fighting, the attacking columns were directed by General Trochu to withdraw, it being found impossible to carry out the chief feature of the day's design. "It is estimated," says a correspondent of the *Daily News*, "that the French loss must have been between five and six hundred men. The Germans lost about one hundred, thirty of whom were Bavarians injured by the artillery fire, the rest being Prussians of the Sixth Corps. I rode out towards Choisy-le-Roi, and found the country alive with German troops mustered to repel the sortie. It is no idle boast of the besieging forces that they can concentrate twenty-five or thirty thousand men upon any threatened point. The weather was raw and misty, and the mud very deep; but the Germans were in excellent spirits. Some of the columns were singing, others were enlivened by the music of brass bands. Every one knew exactly where to go, and what was expected of him." The action was in fact well fought on both sides; and the French, though they were ultimately driven back, exhibited greater determination and steadiness under fire than on several previous occasions.

The fighting on the 29th, however, was slight in comparison with that which followed on the next day. We have seen that the most important part of the original plan—that of crossing the Marne, and attacking the Prussians in the direction of Brie, Villiers, Champigny, and other places to the east and south of the river—was thwarted by an unusually high tide, which destroyed the military bridges. This being only a temporary obstacle, it was resolved to carry out the project when the waters had subsided. General Ducrot, who was to operate beyond the Marne, was specially committed to some great achievement; for the



THE DEFENCE OF PARIS—THE BURNING OF THE BRIDGE OF ASNIÈRES.

Official Journal of November 29th had contained a proclamation by him to the Second Army of Paris, in which he pledged himself to brilliant success or heroic death. This address is so singular, when read by the light of subsequent events, that it must here be given entire. It ran :—

> "Soldiers of the Second Army of Paris!—The moment has arrived to break the iron circle which for too long has been enclosing us, and threatening to stifle us in a slow and sorrowful agony. Upon you has devolved the honour of this grand work; I feel sure you will show yourselves worthy of it. It will be hard for us to commence; we shall have to overcome serious obstacles; but we must regard them with calmness and resolution, without either exaggeration or weakness. This is the truth. The very first steps we advance, and close to our outposts, we shall encounter an implacable enemy, whom but too numerous successes have made bold and confident. Therefore, a vigorous effort will have to be made, but it is not beyond your strength. To prepare you for action, the Commander-in-Chief has with foresight accumulated more than 400 guns, two-thirds of which, at least, are of the largest size. No material obstacle can resist their effect, and to break through the enemy's lines there will be 150,000 of you, all well-armed, well-equipped, abundantly provided with ammunition, and, as I hope, animated with irresistible ardour. If victorious in this first stage of the struggle you will have secured success, as the enemy has despatched to the banks of the Loire his best soldiers, and there the heroic and successful efforts of our brothers detain them. Have courage, then, and confidence! Think that in this supreme struggle we shall fight for our honour, for our liberty, for the salvation of our beloved and unhappy country; and, should this motive not be sufficient to arouse your hearts, think of your fields laid waste, of your ruined families, of your sisters, of your wives, of your desolate mothers! May this thought lead you to share the thirst for vengeance and the subdued rage which animate me, and inspire you with a contempt for danger. As to me, I am determined—I swear it before you, before the whole nation—that only dead or victorious will I re-enter Paris. You may see me fall, but you will not see me retreat. Then do not stop, but avenge me.
>
> "Forward, then, forward! and may God protect us!
>
> "DUCROT,
>
> "The General-in-Chief of the Second Army of Paris."

General Ducrot was a brave and able officer; but, being an impulsive Frenchman, he could not see the excessive imprudence of an announcement such as this. In the event he returned to Paris neither victorious nor dead, but with his reputation tarnished by the non-fulfilment of a perfectly gratuitous piece of braggadocio. People, however, remarked that he had good reason for dying, even by his own hand, rather than suffer himself to be made prisoner by the Germans. He was one of the generals in command at Sedan, and was accused by the Prussians of having broken his word of honour not to fight against them during the existing war; on the faith of which promise he had been allowed a degree of freedom. Ducrot himself denied that he had broken his parole; but the Prussians repudiated his explanations, and vowed that they would shoot him if ever they had the opportunity. He was therefore engaged on desperate service; yet, even with this excuse, the vaunt with which his proclamation concluded was unworthy of a responsible officer setting out on a serious expedition. It is strange that the French cannot see how deeply they compromise their nobler qualities of courage, devotion, and patriotism, by these theatrical displays and ridiculous assumptions.

During the whole of the 29th the utmost excitement prevailed throughout Paris. Although the general fact of a sortie on a great scale had been officially announced for that day, it was not precisely known in what direction the attack or attacks would be made. For once the plans of the Government had been so well kept that for some hours the most various opinions prevailed as to the exact nature and locality of the struggle. The papers were forbidden to publish any military intelligence but such as the authorities themselves might furnish; and for the present they furnished none. Large crowds gathered about the gates, especially those to the south, whence, in the opinion of the greater number, the assault had been mainly directed in the early hours of the morning. The largest throng was at the Avenue d'Italie. Ambulance-carriages were waiting there towards one o'clock P.M., and the roads from the old external Boulevards to the fortifications were almost blocked with foot passengers. Strong bodies of National Guards were stationed at different points, to hold back the crowd, and keep a passage clear for the vehicles which might shortly be expected with the wounded, for which melancholy service all kinds of conveyances—including omnibuses, furniture-wagons, carts, and trucks—had been impounded. "At every few yards," said the *Journal des Débats*, "compact groups were formed to discuss the military operations of the previous night. Some individuals pretended to be able to give exact information as to what had occurred. These statements naturally became the subjects of discussion, carried on with more or less animation, but certainly without useful result, as none of those who professed to be well informed were in a position to give positive details. From time to time carriages came to remove the wounded from the ambulance established at 143, Avenue d'Italie, into the interior of Paris. In the course of the afternoon about one hundred wounded soldiers of the Line passed by. With the exception of ten, who appeared to be severely wounded, or who at least presented the aspect of extreme suffering, most of these men seemed to be but slightly hurt. They replied without difficulty to the occasionally too pressing questions addressed to them concerning the current reports of the capture of Choisy and L'Hay by our troops, and the re-capture of those positions by the enemy. At three o'clock the throng became more dense, and among the crowd were to be seen great numbers of public functionaries and persons well known in the political world, in art and literature, who had been attracted to the spot by the conflicting rumours which had been circulated on the Boulevards and at the Bourse." In the course of the afternoon several battalions of troops passed by on their return from the sortie, and the popular excitement was maintained until long after dark.

The sortie was renewed at a late hour on the night of the 29th. The Marne being now in a favourable condition, eight pontoon-bridges were thrown across, and Ducrot, issuing from the Forest of Vincennes, advanced at the head of an army variously estimated at 80,000, 120,000, and 150,000 men — though the highest number (notwithstanding that it is mentioned by Ducrot himself in his proclamation) is doubtless an exaggeration. By the time the troops had reached the opposite bank, it was the early morning of the 30th, and a terrible day's work lay before them. The First Corps (Blanchard's) and the Second Corps (Rénault's) crossed the Marne between Joinville and Nogent; the Third Corps passed the river in front of Brie; and a smaller body was thrown upon Bonneuil, in the peninsula between the Marne and the Seine. These movements were, as usual, aided by the artillery of the forts. Vincennes, Rosny, Nogent, and Mont Avron, threw a fiery rain of shells among the Germans, and much execution was effected in their ranks by these terrific projectiles. The forces opposed to the French were the Twelfth Saxons, commanded by Prince George, who occupied a curved line from Noisy-le-Grand to Ormesson (beyond the bend in the Marne), and the Würtembergers, under the direction of General Oberwitz, who continued the line in front of Bonneuil, supported by Fransecki's Second Corps. The chief fighting of the day occurred round Brie, Villiers, and Champigny, which together form a sort of triangle, distant about eight miles south-east from Paris. The apex of this triangle is at Villiers, lying to the east of the second bend of the Marne, counting those bends from the junction of that river with the Seine. At half-past seven o'clock in the morning an immense army of Frenchmen approached the three-cornered piece of territory thus marked out, and a comparatively small force of Germans, animated by the stubborn courage of their race, prepared to dispute the enemy's advance.

On gaining the ground which was to be the scene of contest, the French attacked with their usual ardour, and the brunt of their assault fell in the first instance on the Saxon outposts; but before mid-day three regiments of Saxons and a brigade of Würtembergers were on the field, and ultimately the German commanders were enabled to place 25,000 men in position. This, however, left them at a great numerical disadvantage as compared with the French; and it confers the highest honour on both divisions of the investing force that they should have held their ground even to the extent they did. Saxons and Würtembergers vied with each other in the tenacity with which they clung to their positions as long as possible, and only gave way after inflicting great losses on their adversaries. They were terribly cut up, and the officers, exposing themselves at every point, were struck down in large numbers. When the French had got close up to the villages, the fire of the forts was suspended, and for a while there was a pause in the operations of the day. It was not, however, for long. After a short rest, Colonel Abendorth, placing himself at the head of a body of Saxons, called on them to follow him into Villiers, which a little while before had been occupied by the enemy; and with a loud shout they rushed forward. A dreadful struggle at close quarters ensued; General Rénault fell, severely wounded; and, after an obstinate resistance, the French were driven out. Many prisoners were taken at this point by the Germans, and the French were exposed in the open field to the full assaults of the enemy. Nevertheless, they continued to fight with the utmost determination. A battery of mitrailleuses stationed on the plateau opposite Villiers poured a terrible fire into the Saxons, and on the ridge in front of Villiers a clamorous tide of battle ebbed and flowed throughout the failing hours of the day. The horse of Colonel Abendorth was shot dead. His rider mounted another, which almost immediately afterwards was also killed. The colonel was hurt by the fall of the second animal; but, rising to his feet, he called on his men to continue the charge. Again they advanced, losing great numbers at every step; but at the close of the struggle in that direction, which was about four o'clock in the afternoon, the Germans remained in the position of masters. Villiers was in their hands, and the French perceived that they were not strong enough to retake it. Two field-guns belonging to the latter were seized on the plateau; but so fearful a storm of shot, shell, and grenades was poured upon the captors that they were obliged to abandon their prize. The fight had lasted several hours, during which the French had hurled themselves again and again in fiery masses against the stubborn ranks of the Saxons, only to be broken, scattered, and driven still further back beyond the village. As twilight deepened into darkness, the two armies found themselves at no great distance apart, surrounded by heaps of dead and dying, and only prevented by the approach of night from again rushing at each other in the fury of mortal combat.

As far as Villiers was concerned, the fighting had ended disadvantageously for the French; but at other points they succeeded in a marked degree, and on the whole they were in a better condition than the Germans at the close of the day. The loss of Villiers after so desperate a struggle was no doubt to be regretted; but the favourable results obtained elsewhere, and the general fact that the assailants retained their position beyond the Marne, more than counterbalanced the one reverse.

While the terrible struggle just narrated was going on at Villiers, the French were steadily making way at Brie and Champigny. At both those points the Germans were driven back by the fierce onslaughts of their opponents; and, although they did not yield the positions without very severe fighting, they were ultimately compelled to retire. At Champigny the attack was headed by Ducrot himself. His column was stopped by the first Prussian barricade, and the front ranks fell back in disorder, throwing the rear into a confusion as great as their own. The moment was critical; but Ducrot rushed towards the barricade, pulled out the gabions with his own hands, and opened a gap for his men. Encouraged by this splendid example, the soldiers rallied and carried the work. A French writer, M. Edmond Dardenne, brother of the Secretary to the Parisian Ambulance of the Press, has described Ducrot as a man who has always remained true to the old traditions of French generals, in obedience to which a commander places himself for the charge with the first rank of his men, and is present everywhere at the most deadly spots, to lead them on by his example. According to this observer, "Ducrot is tall, robust, bony, well-knit square-shouldered; his hair and beard iron-grey; his face resolute and energetic; his glance cold and penetrating; short, slow, concise, and deliberate in his speech. His expressive countenance, his reserved manner, and his soberness of gesture, remind one of the typical American general in the War of the Union."* The rhodomontade previously quoted from Ducrot's proclamation does not harmonise with this description; yet there can be no doubt that the author of that proclamation is a man of courage and enterprise. His contempt of danger on the present occasion secured victory to his troops at that particular spot. The success, however, was only obtained after a hard struggle, attended by moments of great anxiety. A correspondent of the *Times*, who followed the fortunes of the day at no great distance from the contending armies, says he found himself confronted by what appears to have been all along one of the great French difficulties in the campaign—the inability of seeing the enemy, owing to his concealing himself among the woods and hollows of the undulating ground. General Trochu, in his speech to the National Assembly in June, 1871, made exactly the same remark. He said, speaking of these very sorties:—"I was convinced that if the enemy would show me his infantry alone in the open field, mine would beat him; but we saw only his cannon." The *Times* correspondent, proceeding with the account of what he witnessed, said that from the top of a house in Joinville-le-Pont he could perceive the French slowly but steadily advancing towards the heights to the right of Champigny. The Prussian retreat, however, was being executed in very good order, and every foot of ground was obstinately disputed. Shells were bursting in showers over the high ground near Mont Mesly, and the roar of mitrailleuses and cannon filled the air. Very little was being done with the rifle; it was in the main an artillery duel. After a while the correspondent quitted the house where he had taken up his post, and, accompanied by a friend who had a pass, made for the field:—

"We took the road for Champigny, and had not to go many hundred yards to find abundant proof of how stubborn and sanguinary the fight had been. The way was blocked by ambulances filled with wounded men, and some of the houses in the village had been riddled through and through with shell. A little further on we came upon a group of surgeons, with Dr. Ricord at their head, hastily performing such operations as could not be postponed, though the number of wounded brought to them was so great that some had to lie unattended on the ground, bleeding rapidly, as it seemed to us, to death, but in such agonies, and with their forms and faces often disfigured in so ghastly a fashion, that it was impossible to wish that they could live.

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* See "Inside Paris during the Siege," by an Oxford Graduate. London, 1871.

As we could be of no use there, we were glad to turn away from a scene of such horrors, and hurry on to find out what was the fortune of the fight. We were both novices, and it was only slowly we began to discover that the nearer you get to a battle-field the less you are able to understand of it, unless, indeed, you have the luck to secure some commanding position, in which case you have probably also the ill-luck to be inconveniently near a battery. From the house-top in the distance, imperfect as our view had been, we could at least see the whole French force, and form a pretty good notion of what was happening to it. But here, with troops all around us, and on the very ground which had just been taken from the enemy, we were completely in the dark as to what was going on, and might almost have wandered into the Prussian lines without knowing it. At last, as we emerged from a wood on the other side of Champigny, we came upon a bit of high ground, and, mounting it, got a fair view of a considerable portion of the field. The sight was by no means reassuring. It was then near four o'clock and the French left appeared to have completely given way. One regiment was in full, though very orderly, retreat towards the spot on which we were standing. They were not making even a show of fighting, but were quietly drawing out of range with the downcast yet in nowise shamefaced look of men who had done their best, but in vain, and felt they could now do no more. Other regiments were still holding the ground they had gained, but under a murderous fire, which was tearing them to pieces, and under which no French troops could long remain quiet. They must either dash on or retire, and I was preparing to see them do the last, when my own retreat was precipitated in a manner I had not at all calculated on. The retreating regiment, approaching the eminence we were on, came into view, and, being worth powder and shot—which, I suppose, we were not—drew a fire unpleasantly warm, and I found myself all of a sudden first lying flat on my face, in eager imitation of a neighbour who seemed to consider this the right thing, and then scampering in a panic down into a hollow, in which I was tolerably safe, but could see absolutely nothing. What I heard, however, made me fear that the Prussians were getting the best of it. The sound of the firing, which about four o'clock became heavier than it had ever been, was principally from their quarter, and as if they were concentrating for a final attack. The fusillade, which had before been comparatively feeble, suddenly became deafening, as if a large body of infantry were advancing to carry a strong position; the sharp quick rattle of as it seemed many thousand rifles blending into dense volleys of sound, which for about the space of half an hour never for an instant flagged. The strange noise of the mitrailleuses, which has been happily compared to the growl of some wild beast, was scarcely less continuous; and the whizzing of shells over head, and the booming of cannon, vigorous as they had always been, seemed to increase, if possible, in intensity."

This writer bears strong testimony to the courage of many of the French troops who came within his observation. He saw regiments advancing firmly, and even coolly, under the full fire of the batteries, every volley of which told with murderous effect; and even the regiment which he found in retreat was retiring in perfect order. On the other hand, however, he admits that in the woods and about the village of Champigny he saw more shirking than was pardonable even in young troops. The trees in the woods were hacked and riddled with the enemy's shot; and the French, not seeing their adversaries, and being unable to reply, were scared and demoralised. The correspondent was much struck by the calm courage and self-possession of the members of a religious fraternity who made it their duty to look after the wounded. He saw one of these noble-hearted men pick up a shell, which, when a soldier shouted to him to take care, as it might explode, he slowly and quietly deposited on the ground, observing to the writer and his friend, who had made a precipitate rush from the place of peril, that "it was very dangerous to let these things fall hard, as the concussion might make them explode." Of the appearance of Champigny after the fight, the Paris correspondent of the *Morning Post* said:—

"A couple of hundred yards of road brought me to the first houses of Champigny, a long straggling village, very much knocked to pieces. Some of the houses had the whole of their front and roof carried away by the fire, and others had great holes in the roof, and all were marked with the white splotch of the bullet. Just outside the village, a greensward, covered with fragments of red and blue cloth, bloody linen, and lint, half trampled into the grass, showed where the wounded had been laid. The street was full of French soldiers, every one of whom seemed to be laden with straw, of which the Prussians left a large quantity in the place, as well as a great store of vegetables, both of which have proved very acceptable. The houses were covered with German inscriptions chalked on the doors and shutters, the street encumbered with barricades, which the French have hastily constructed of tables, chairs, barrels, and earth. The road is paved, and the stones were still covered with blood, while dead and wounded came by me at every step. At the end of the village I came upon the advanced posts, who were exchanging shots from behind a barricade with the Prussians, posted some hundred yards above in a house on the road; then, turning back, and turning to my right, I came upon the encampment of the soldiers, who were cooking their soup on the slope of the hill, and then upon the fields where the battle had most fiercely raged. They were trampled by the feet of thousands of armed men into one rough mass of rugged earth, patched here and there with vines, from which the grapes still hung rotting on their stems. The railway traverses the hill here, and there is a level crossing, the lodge of which was surrounded by artillery, horsed and ready to march.



STREET IN ST. CLOUD.



TAKING OF BRIE-SUR-MARNE, NOVEMBER 30TH.

Further on was a large but half-demolished stone building, called the Lime-kiln, which here marks the extreme limit of the French lines."

As soon as they had gained the two villages of Brie and Champigny, the French began to entrench themselves, though at Champigny they were subjected to a severe shelling from the Prussian guns at Couilly and Chenevières. At one time during the 30th, the French occupied a line right and left of Ormesson; but from this very advanced position they were afterwards forced to recede. They were encountered by the Würtembergers, subsequently supported by a brigade of the Second Pomeranian Corps, and by part of the Sixth Corps. But for the steadiness of the Würtembergers, who, though for a while driven back, disputed every inch of ground against very superior numbers, the general position of the besiegers at the close of the day might have been even more serious than it was. During the morning, as on the previous day, General Vinoy directed sorties towards Choisy-le-Roi, on the western bank of the Seine, while General Susbielle advanced beyond Creteil, on the eastern bank, in the narrow peninsula formed by that river and one of the bends of the Marne. At this point the fighting was very minutely observed by the Paris correspondent of the *Morning Post*, who wrote:—

"Just outside Creteil I found an enormous file of ambulance carriages, and a regiment massed and under arms and ready to march. It was now nearly ten o'clock, and the action had already been begun, for the forts behind, and the batteries of St. Maur on the left, were throwing shot and shell which whistled through the air overhead, and, as it seemed, all around. The narrow street was filled with troops marching to the front, chiefly regiments of the Line; but there was one battalion of the National Guard already in the village—part of it, indeed, at the outposts; and as it was the 170th—a Belleville battalion—I was anxious to see how it would behave. The Prussians were still in their old positions on this side, occupying a barricade of trees five hundred yards beyond the village, and the heights of Mesly, still further beyond. I committed my horse to safe custody, and walked on to the furthest houses, and there turned to the left, where I found a battery of eight guns in position on the hill, which here descends to the Marne, running close below. Creteil, being on a hill overlooking on the left the peninsula of St. Maur, and to the heights of Villiers, and in front commanding a full view of the rising ground of Mont Mesly, is admirably situated for a general view of the operations; but when the line of battle is extended it is impossible to follow it throughout, and I shall describe more particularly what I had immediately under my own eyes. From the battery I saw the French skirmishers dotted thickly along the flank of the hill at a distance of three hundred yards, and a short distance beyond the Prussians firing on them from the wood. In a minute or two the fusillade began in earnest—a rolling, rattling, crackling fire, which now and then swelled into a continuous roar. The road on the right was partially hidden by trees; but I could see the Prussian barricade, indicated by an incessant curtain of white smoke, which distinguished it from the rest of the line, where the action was as yet indicated only by little detached puffs. Suddenly the smoke of the barricade cleared off, and was not renewed; and the instant after I saw a swarm of men running rapidly at and disappearing behind the barricade, which was thus taken at the point of the bayonet. The skirmishers on the left nevertheless continued in their position, running only to and fro along their own line, while the Prussians kept up a vigorous fusillade, as we knew in the battery, for the balls occasionally fell around us, we being on higher ground and in the line of fire. Over the Marne I could see the red trousers swarming up the hills beyond Champigny, and the artillery alternately galloping up and firing, while the Prussian line had already—this was at eleven o'clock—disappeared over the crest. Meantime St. Maur was keeping up an incessant fire of heavy guns towards Villiers-sur-Marne and Cœury. The ground rose on the right of the battery where I was posted; I could not, however, gain from it a full view of the action immediately at hand. I returned, therefore, to the main street of Creteil, and, finding a high house at the end of the village, entered it—the door, like all doors in Creteil, was open—and went up to the top storey. The view thence was superb. In front, and on the right of the road, there was before me the whole slope of the hill of Mont Mesly rising from a valley which dips on the right or western side of the village. On the top of the hill, some eight hundred yards off, the Prussian skirmishers were running to and fro, and keeping up an incessant fire. A little below them were the French skirmishers, similarly engaged; and still further down were two columns of supports, flanked by batteries of field-artillery. The supports were standing at ease, their bayonets glistening in the sun; but the artillery was leisurely throwing shells over the crest of the hill, not without being answered, for, although the Prussian artillery could not be seen, there came every now and then a shell, which tore up the earth, and threw clouds of dust into the air. At length, the Prussians disappearing, the French skirmishers advanced over the crest (this was at half-past eleven), and the supporting columns advanced in beautiful formation slowly upward, followed by the artillery. Here the action seemed to warm, and some of the French skirmishers began to fall back—in very good order, however—firing and turning slowly. Wounded men, pale and bloody, now began to arrive, some walking, some borne on brancards."

The writer subsequently mounted his horse, and rode up to what in the morning had been the last French barricade. As he was about to pass through, he met a number of breathless men in hasty retreat, who eagerly sought the shelter of a wall at the side of the road, the enemy's bullets at this time falling very thickly. The infection of fear soon communicated itself to the Belleville battalion, stationed at the village of Creteil. These fire-eating warriors, belonging to one of the revolutionary districts of Paris—the men who, under the leadership of Gustave Flourens, had been concerned in the insurrectionary movement of October 31st, with the express design of carrying on the war more vigorously, and who were always clamouring for sorties—now looked at each other with pale faces, and confessed they were beaten, while some openly walked away to the rear. On the road a mounted gendarme rode furiously about, asking the skulkers if they were wounded, and, on being answered in the negative, bidding them, with many oaths, return to the front. But it was too late. The fortune of the battle had, in that particular direction, as at Villiers, turned against the French, and they were seen running at full speed over the crest of the hill. At this moment the Prussian artillery appeared at the top of the high ground, and sent a shell into the village, where it blew a house to pieces. The noise of the conflict was appalling. The big guns of St. Maur were firing incessantly, and the battery between Creteil and the Marne replied vigorously to the Prussian batteries. It was now half-past twelve. The Place in the centre of the village was covered with wounded men, for whom there was but one surgeon. Soldiers of all arms fought and struggled with each other to get through the village. Without leaders or any controlling authority, they filled the village with consternation and clamour, and even, in the extremity of their fear, trampled over their wounded comrades. "It was not an army that was retreating," writes the *Morning Post* correspondent; "it was not even a respectable mob." Yet the village was still held by the French at the close of the day, although they had been unable to retain the advanced position at Mont Mesly.

A remarkable proof of the scarcity of provisions in Paris was seen while the French were advancing from Creteil, in the earlier part of the day. Whenever a horse was struck down, a group of men instantly gathered round it, regardless of the bullets of the enemy, and in a little while dispersed. This happened again and again, and the Prussians wondered what it could mean. On driving the French back, however, and occupying the ground they had recently covered, the Germans saw that which explained the mystery. Only the skeletons of the horses were left; the carcases were stripped of the flesh, disembowelled, and in some instances deprived of the head. The food thus acquired was too valuable to be neglected, and it was obtained even at the risk of life.

Noisy-le-Grand, on the extreme left of the French line of attack, was also seriously threatened during the operations of the 30th. Together with these movements on the south-east, a sortie towards the north, conducted by Admiral Roncière, led to some results. At three o'clock, the admiral, advancing from Fort Denis, occupied Drancy, and thence pushed on to Epinay. The attacking party consisted of five battalions—four of regulars, and one of Mobile Guards; the German regiments occupying Epinay were the 26th and 71st. The French had already in some degree cleared the ground by the heavy guns at La Briche; and they now sent a gunboat down the Seine, which swept the banks clear of the German outposts, and landed a number of troops at the point of attack, to join with those who had come by land. While these latter were crossing the plain the German batteries on the crest in front of Montmorency fired on them with considerable effect. The houses on the western side of Epinay, however, were occupied by the French, and the Prussians were almost surrounded before they were aware of the full extent of their danger. They accordingly fell back, fighting, towards St. Gratien, where they were reinforced. The French at the same time barricaded themselves at Epinay, but were not allowed to remain there long unmolested. Six battalions of the 15th Prussian Brigade, with three companies of the 26th Regiment lent by the 16th Brigade, rapidly marched on Epinay, and the French were driven out, after holding the place nearly two hours. The German loss was considerable, amounting to between forty and fifty men and five officers killed, and 135 men and eight officers wounded. There was also a small loss in an attack on Stains, to the east of Epinay, where the fighting was not very serious. The wounded were taken in the first instance to St. Gratien, where the château of the Princess Demidoff was converted into a hospital; but, the position being exposed to the fire of La Briche, it was found necessary to remove the unfortunate sufferers to Montmorency and Eau Bonne, further north.

Another demonstration took place at a late hour in the direction of Le Bourget, to the north-east of Paris. Dense masses of troops appeared on the plain in front of Fort Aubervilliers, and advanced on the German position—the same which had been taken by the French on the 27th and 28th of October, and re-captured by the Germans on the 30th. On those occasions there was some very hard fighting; on the present, the attacking force, after proceeding a little way, turned back without coming to close quarters. Possibly they regarded their main object—that of creating a diversion in aid of the more important sorties—as sufficiently accomplished.

Exhausted by their efforts on the two previous days, the armies of France and Germany rested on the 1st of December from their deadly labours, and devoted the brief interval of quiet to burying the dead and bringing in the wounded. For these purposes a truce was agreed to. It was to expire at one o'clock P.M.; but fighting was not resumed any time that day. The Bavarian batteries near Châtillon, however, fired into Paris the first shells sent into the city during the siege; but this firing beyond the ramparts is said to have been by mistake, and the Crown Prince of Prussia ordered that no more shells should be allowed such length of range until the proper time arrived. The silence which, with this slight exception, prevailed all along the lines made an impressive contrast to the hellish uproar of the previous day, and actually induced a French regiment bivouacking near Fort Vincennes to believe that the Germans had been attacked during the night, utterly routed, and driven so far off that the noise of the French cannon, then completing their destruction, could not be heard! If these hopeful speculators were not speedily undeceived, their dream did not outlast the morrow. It was decided at a German council of war, held on the 1st, that the villages of Brie and Champigny must be retaken the following morning at any cost. Their retention by the French would have seriously threatened the investment, and might have enabled the besieged—who had already in that quarter pushed the besiegers back from their former line—to advance to fresh and still more important successes. Moltke therefore determined to do his utmost to regain what he had lost.

Preparations for the attack were made by the Germans during the night of the 1st and early morning of the 2nd of December. The French, as usual, made no preparations, though they must have been aware that they would not be suffered to remain in undisputed possession of the places they had recently acquired. The Germans renewed the struggle at seven o'clock A.M. on the 2nd, and the French, according to the miserable precedents of the war, were once more surprised in both villages while making their soup for breakfast. Before describing the operations of the day, it will be as well to indicate briefly the nature of the ground on which those operations were conducted. The country from Noisy-le-Grand to the bends of the Marne, where that river approaches the Seine, has the character of a gradual rise, furrowed by rather frequent depressions. In the neighbourhood of Brie, and again at Champigny, the fields are flat for a considerable distance; but towards Villiers the ground ascends, and is thickly covered with copse-woods and vineyards. Villiers stands higher than the neighbouring villages; and it will therefore be seen that it was in a better position for resisting any assault by the French than were Brie and Champigny for throwing back the attacks of the Germans. This was all the more reason why the French should have availed themselves of the pause in active operations on the 1st to render the positions they had won with so much hard fighting as difficult as possible for the enemy to recover. But they appear to have done much less in this respect than might have been supposed.

A large German force was detailed for the work of retaking Brie and Champigny. It consisted of the Second Division of the Saxon Army, under the command of General von Netirhoff, comprising the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, and 108th Regiments; a division of Würtembergers, commanded by General von Oberwitz, a Prussian officer; and a number of men from the Second Army Corps, under the direction of General Fransecki, who, in virtue of seniority, had the nominal command of the whole force. The total number of Germans engaged is estimated at about 22,000. When the French were surprised at Brie by the 107th Regiment of Saxons, very little resistance was made, for but little was possible. Some of the men were asleep, others were taking their morning meal, and none were in a position to encounter their energetic adversaries. After a short struggle, Brie was again in German hands, together with nearly 500 French prisoners, including eight officers. A little later than this—that is to say, just before eight o'clock—Champigny was attacked by the Würtembergers. Here there was more resistance; but, after a fight of some obstinacy, the French were compelled to retire, and the Würtembergers established themselves in the village. The fortune of the day, however, was far from determined. A pause of about an hour ensued, at the end of which time the German forces began to attack the main lines of the French army, and to endeavour to carry the bridges over the Marne. Suddenly a most awful cannonade burst out from the French forts and batteries on the other side of the river. These works had received many additional guns during the preceding day, and their effect was now experienced by the Germans in a terrible degree. Old and seasoned soldiers have said that they never before experienced anything so tremendous. From Noisy to Champigny swept the dreadful tempest of death. Even Montmorency, which had been thought out of range, received seventy-two shells. Houses were battered down, trees broken into fragments, and men killed and wounded in great numbers. The French at first retired before the charge of their enemies, with the intention, it is supposed, of drawing them more within the range of this infernal fire. Undeterred by the balls and shells which continually plunged into their ranks, the Germans dashed forward with loud shouts and battle-cries. The officers exposed themselves in front of their regiments with reckless courage, and of course lost many of their number. Their men continually gained ground, and the French as steadily receded; but the fire from the forts created such fearful havoc in the attacking columns, that the advance itself became a form of disaster. Once or twice the Germans attempted to bring their own artillery into play; but the nature of the ground prevented its being planted in any position where it would have been safe from destruction by the shells from the French works. Cavalry were present on both sides; but the actual fighting took place between the infantry of the two armies. As fast as men were struck down in the French lines, their places were filled by others, and a constant fire from the chassepôts was maintained by them, and answered by the needle-gun of the Germans. Again and again the latter endeavoured to get at the pontoon-bridges over the Marne, with a view to destroying them, and so cutting off the retreat of Ducrot's army; but the attempt was always frustrated. Some of the French shells (which appear to have been of a new description, now for the first time employed) reached a distance of 7,000 yards, and whole files of the Germans were swept away. At length it was found necessary to desist from the design of breaking down the bridges. The retreat was sounded; and at nearly three o'clock the Germans fell back. The French then once more pressed forward, and reoccupied Brie and Champigny, with the exception of a corner of the latter village, where the Würtembergers still held their ground.

The most elaborate and exact account of the operations of the day, of which Brie and Champigny were the objective points, is that furnished by Mr. Bowles, the Special Correspondent of the *Morning Post*, who described what he had actually seen. After depicting the panic-stricken rout of the French, on being surprised in the early morning at Brie and Champigny, he proceeded:—

"There can be no doubt whatever that the redoubt of St. Maur saved the French army that day. It commands all the plains and the height beyond, and possesses heavy guns, throwing 72 lb. and 40 lb. shells, while outside were crowded together sixty others, which, in the moment of panic, General Favé ordered up from the lower portion of the peninsula in order to protect the retreat. It was indeed considered at that moment that all was over. The Prussians were in Villiers, on the heights, down in the woods, and in the first houses of Champigny; while on the left we could see the French falling back along the further part of the Marne. The telegraph officials were established in a little wooden hut outside the redoubt, and they packed up their papers and instruments, and prepared for a start. Consternation was depicted on every face. The Prussians had brought five or six batteries of artillery, which, from the top of the hill on the left of the white house, were pouring a perfect hail of shells upon Champigny and the last troops that stood firm, a little wavering line of fusillade answering feebly as it fell back on its receding supports. The whole line, in fact, was in full retreat. Champigny was half taken by the Prussians.

"Then was seen the enormous power that in the hour of danger a single man of intelligence and courage can exercise. Captain de Charmes brought his guns to bear upon the Prussian batteries, and in half an hour (at eight o'clock) had silenced them. Soon after some change was observable in the plain. Gendarmes began to gallop to and fro, and belabour the fugitives with the flat of their sabres. The bridges were barred, and the mob of soldiers crowded up against the river, and began to halt, and to rally under the houses of Champigny. The shells meantime were falling among them, and I could see several concealed behind banks of earth and walls, whence the gendarmes drove them out from time to time. Two batteries of artillery now trotted into the plain, wheeled into position, and opened fire, while a third established itself by the railway lodge, a fourth close to the lime-kiln, round which the abandoned tents were still standing, and the fires slowly dying out. Our redoubt was firing rapidly. Several shells exploded as they left the piece, and a fragment of one of them went right through the telegraph hut, just missing the operator. The mitrailleuses were firing heavily on the left, and it was one continued din, rattle, and hissing of shells. It was now nine o'clock, and the Prussian batteries by the white house opened again. The shells began to hiss about, with that increasing loudness which shows that they are approaching. The distance was over two miles; but the Prussian gunners aimed well, and all their shells fell in the redoubt, or quite close to it. One of them carried away the side of an embrasure close to me, and exploded, half-stifled, in the earth, but did no damage. About a hundred shells fell during the next hour and a half.

"At ten o'clock the French line had ceased its sustained backward movement, and was wavering to and fro, while the troops in the plain, rallied and re-formed, began to move to the front again in order, to the inspiriting sound of the charge, and in a quarter of an hour the first line was again seen running up the hill by the lime-kiln and over by the railway lodge, which was on fire and blazing, while the left was running back over the crest of the hill. At eleven o'clock the redoubt had again silenced the Prussian batteries, which retired to the right of the white house under shelter of the rising ground and a thick fringe of elms. The fusillade continued in one unbroken rattle, with varying intensity as it advanced and retired. At twelve o'clock the left recovered itself, and from that time to the end of the day it remained almost motionless. In half an hour the Prussians were running out of Champigny up the hill by the white house; but it was only to be relieved by fresh skirmishers, who came down to the wood in a cloud, their helmets gleaming in the sun, followed by two heavy columns of supports marching in great black squares. Meantime the battle continued, and a shell or two still fell from time to time on the plain. But the tide had now turned; the French still pressed slowly forward, and the Prussians, beaten off in their attack, retreated to their first positions, while their artillery moved off to the right along the wood to Chennevières."

While the terrible fire from the French forts was still proceeding, the Saxons began to remove their prisoners, driving them on in the direction of Noisy through the fiery rain of bursting shells. Many Frenchmen were in this way slain by French projectiles, and the Saxons also suffered severely. The prisoners, according to the *Daily News* correspondent with the Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, seemed to be hearty, well-fed, and in good spirits. A sergeant spoke cheerily to the correspondent as he passed, and observed that if any one calculated on the speedy capitulation of Paris he would find himself very much out in his reckoning. Food was plentiful, and the programme was "sorties every day in every direction." Captors and captives made their way as well as they could along the exposed road; and shortly afterwards it became apparent that the French had in their turn undertaken a movement of attack. A dense column of soldiers, consisting of reinforcements which had been bivouacking under the guns of Nogent, on the other side of the Marne, suddenly appeared in battle array before the fort, formed right and left across the Chaumont railway (which runs in that direction), and advanced towards the river. Having crossed



COUNT KÉRATRY.


Paris.
Montreuil
Fort Rosny
Mont Avron
Neuilly
Fort Nogent
Vincennes
Nogent
Noisy le grand
Brie S.M
Redte la Faisanderie
Charenton
Villiers
Joinville
Fort Charenton
Champigny
St. Maur
Coeuilly
Fort Montrouge
Arcueil
Fort Bicêtre
Ivry
Fort d'Ivry
Cachan
Vitry
Maisons Alfort
Villejuif
Bourg la Reine
l'Hay
Creteuil
Chennevieres
River Marne
River Seine
R.R. to Orleans
R.R. to Lyons
Chevilly
Mont Mesly
Ormesson
la Queue
Fresnes
Thiers
Choisy
Bonneuil
Noiseau
les Bangis
Sucy en Brie

THE GREAT SORTIE OF NOVEMBER 29 AND 30.

No. 1.—Showing the advanced posts of the Besieged and Besiegers previous to the Sortie.


French Troops
German Troops
1
2
3 MILES
SCALE
Paris.
Montreuil
Neuilly
Fort Nogent
Noisy le Grand
Vincennes
Nogent
Brie S.M.
Villiers
Charenton
Faisanderie
Pont de Joinville
Fort Montrouge
Ivry
Fort Bicêtre
Fort d'Ivry
Fort Charenton
St. Maur
Champigny
Coeuilly
Villejuif
Vitry
R.R. to Orleans
River Seine
Créteuil
River Marne
Chennevières
Bourg la Reine
l'Hay
Ormesson
la Queue
Chevilly
Bonneuil
Thiais
Choisy
Noiseau
Sucy en Brie

THE GREAT SORTIE OF NOVEMBER 29 AND 30.

No. 2.—Showing the most advanced positions temporarily held by the French troops, and to what extent the German line was pushed back.

the bridges, they were joined by another army which deployed at the double from St. Maur, and also crossed the Marne. The united forces now made a massive and continuous wall of men, stretching athwart the neck of the peninsula formed by one of the great bends of the stream. The object of this movement was soon disclosed. The French had determined to make a fresh attack on Villiers, which they had seized in the earlier part of the 30th of November, but from which they had afterwards been driven out by the Saxons. They now pushed on with as much steadiness and regularity as if they had been on the parade-ground. "The deployment," said the *Daily News* correspondent, "sprang up with immense rapidity and seeming discipline; but there appeared to be considerable looseness in the formation, a total want of interval, and indeed in places an overlapping of battalions." It being apparent that part of the French design was to enclose Villiers, to attack it from all sides, and to spread on towards Noisy-le-Grand and other points where the investing lines might possibly be pierced, the necessity of taking energetic measures was at once seen by the Saxon commander. He resolved to go forth, and meet the enemy in the open field. The men marched out on to the brow of a hill under the deadly shell-fire of Fort Nogent, some of the projectiles of which not improbably fell among the ranks of the French. The opposing armies rapidly approached one another. "Then," wrote the *Daily News* correspondent, "came a volley, then a venomous file-firing, and the French broke, and gave ground. It was only to back into the next dip, to let the guns of the fort go to work again. The Saxons had perforce to find what cover they might. When the 108th Regiment came back—it had not been gone twenty minutes—thirty-five officers out of forty-five had gone down. And now came a lull in the musketry-fire, just as, a few minutes before, there had been a lull in the cannon-fire. The Saxons could not get their artillery into action with advantage. The ground itself was unfavourable, while the fire from the forts must, in the nature of things, have speedily silenced the field-guns." After a time the artillery in the forts slackened fire considerably; and about one o'clock the French, having received reinforcements, again advanced towards the Saxons, and were once more hurled back. This time the German troops determined to do something more than simply stand on the defensive. They followed the retreating French, came to close quarters with them, and pressed them steadily down the incline, in spite of occasional rallies. In the end, Ducrot's troops were obliged to give up their attempt to retake Villiers, and be content with having again established themselves in Brie and Champigny.

During the progress of this frightful struggle for the possession of Villiers, General Trochu (who was himself present beyond the Marne, and is said to have been slightly wounded) telegraphed a hopeful despatch to Paris. Dating his message from the battle-field at a quarter to two o'clock P.M., he said:—"The Prussians, with enormous forces, attacked the French position at daybreak to-day. The fighting has lasted more than seven hours, and at the moment of sending off this report the enemy is giving way along the whole line, and once more abandoning the heights. I have ridden along the line of skirmishers from Champigny to Brie, and have been received with enthusiastic cheers by the troops." Trochu anticipated that the enemy would return to the attack, and he was not deceived. At half-past five in the evening he again telegraphed to Paris—this time from Fort Nogent, on the Parisian side of the Marne. He now spoke of having carried the German positions, but abstained from giving any details. The truth is that matters stood much as they had done in the morning. The French remained at Brie and Champigny, excepting in a small part of the latter village, to which the Würtembergers still clung; the Saxons held firmly to Villiers, and presented so formidable a front that the French, on the following day, gave up a fresh attempt to carry the position, after having advanced some way towards it. Both sides counted their dead and injured by thousands; the loss of the French, on the whole of the sorties, being (according to their own official statements) rather more than 6,000 killed and wounded, while that of the Germans has been computed at 8,000. The French, in addition, saw about 3,000 prisoners pass into the hands of their enemy; but they themselves took nearly 800. It is said that the Germans desired to send some of the slightly wounded men whom they had captured back to Paris, where they would have served the cause of the besiegers by helping to consume provisions; but they insisted on their rights as wounded men, and went into captivity. A despatch from Paris to Tours related that General Trochu had at certain moments restored the fight by inciting the infantry lines to fresh efforts by his presence. Trochu, in his turn, said that Ducrot had deserved the thanks of the country. The French had in fact exhibited great courage and energy. They had shown that they could not only cross the Marne, but maintain themselves on what may, for present purposes, be called the German side of that river, for at least four days. It was not until the evening of the 3rd of December that Ducrot's forces evacuated Brie, while Champigny seems to have been retained until the following day; and even then they were not driven out, but retreated with little molestation, because they perceived the dangerous character of the situation.* The column which had advanced to Bonneuil had retired some time previously; and Ducrot, recrossing the Marne, took up a position for a brief while in the Forest of Vincennes, whence he issued a proclamation to his troops, which, after the boast contained in his address at setting forth, must have seemed rather foolish. It ran :—

> "Soldiers! —After two days' glorious battles, I have made you re-cross the Marne, because I was convinced that further efforts would be fruitless in a direction in which the enemy had time to concentrate his forces and to prepare means of action. Had we persisted in that direction, I should have uselessly sacrificed thousands of brave men. Far from aiding the work of deliverance, I should have seriously compromised it, and at the same time have led you to an irreparable disaster. But the conflict has only ceased for a moment; let us resume it with courage. Be ready! Complete with speed your ammunition and your provisions. Above all, raise your hearts to the height of the sacrifice which is demanded by the holy cause, for which we must not hesitate to lay down our lives."

One of the reasons given for Ducrot's retreat was that the sudden access of cold, and the want of warm clothing for the troops, exposed the men to the most extreme suffering. All the warm rugs and sheepskins had been left in Paris; and, though so near at hand, it was found a difficult matter to get them to the front. The news of the sorties, when it arrived at Tours, called forth from M. Gambetta a speech to the populace, in which he said :—"I have good hope; your sons will return to you victorious. Victory revisits our arms. The genius of France, momentarily veiled, again smiles radiantly upon us. The Prussians, disconcerted on all sides by our new-found vigour, are learning to retreat. Who can doubt the issue? Now we see the difference between a despot fighting to satisfy caprice and a nation fighting for the triumph of justice, right, and eternal honour. This victory belongs to the Republic, for the Republic has accomplished all we have seen. France is raised, re-established by her own strength, after having been betrayed and abandoned by all. This is what a really free nation can do."

The Germans were startled by the strength which the garrison of Paris had suddenly proved that it possessed. A correspondent of the *Times* remarked that those who a fortnight before were strongest in the belief that Paris was on the point of capitulating, were now of a very different opinion. A day or two after the sorties, the Crown Prince of Saxony visited the field of battle, and expressed himself much pleased with the manner in which officers and men had performed their duties. The correspondent himself doubted whether men had ever been called on to oppose by rifles alone such a cannonade as that to which the Saxons had been subjected. The German positions were strengthened at the weak points after the events just recorded, and preparations were made against renewed sorties. An impression, nevertheless, went abroad that the position of the besiegers was not so secure as had been thought; and it is held by some that the French might have done more than they did, had they followed up their successes. The military historian of the *Times*, whose sagacious criticisms we have had occasion to quote more than once before, remarks on this subject :—

> "According to the evidence of eye-witnesses, the whole German force on the French front on the 2nd of December was 25,000 men; this had been reduced at least a fifth; and, though it had retired in good order, the extraordinary losses of its officers induce us to think that it had suffered some abatement from its high martial courage. On the other hand, the French were not less, certainly, than 55,000 strong [probably much more]; these could have been raised to 100,000 by immediate reinforcements from Paris; they were full of confidence; and the terrible execution done by the forts had inspired them with exulting hope. It may be, therefore, that had Trochu combined the troops he could have made available for a great effort on the 3rd of December he might possibly have cleared a passage; and, had he done so, and marched boldly on the great German depôt of Lagny, on the main line of the hostile communications, he might have caused the siege to be raised, and have practically gained a base for his army. Such an attempt certainly would have been perilous, but there were strong arguments, we think, in its favour. The force inside Paris was not a mere garrison; a large and far from despicable army had been formed for active operations; and as Trochu ought to have been aware that, in the actual circumstances of the war, the arrival of a relieving army was an event he could not fully rely on, he ought, perhaps, to have made up his mind to act decisively with the means in his hands; and had he done so, he certainly had a favourable opportunity at this moment. Instead, however, of making the effort, the Governor of Paris remained immovable; and as

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* There is some contradiction in the various accounts of the sortie as to whether the French retired behind the Marne on the 3rd or 4th; but the fact appears to be that the greater part of the army re-crossed on the first of those days, and that the remainder, forming the garrison of Champigny, followed on the next.

soon, probably, as the news reached him that the Army of the Loire was defeated, he made preparations for withdrawing his forces."*

The hopes of the French were strung to the highest during those terrible days of contest and slaughter. A great many exaggerated anticipations were fostered, and from time to time announcements were made which were much in excess of the truth. But the Prussian reports were certainly quite as far from accuracy, and in two or three instances were distinguished by the most astonishing mis-statements and the most complacent self-contradictions. Dr. Russell remarked one day to a Prussian officer that the German bulletins had up to that time—about the period of the sorties—always spoken the truth. The Prussian replied, "Wait till we get a reverse, and then see if we cannot lie just as well as our neighbours. Depend on it we are great in all things." Indeed, the German official journal published at Versailles openly scoffed at the expectation that the whole truth would be stated. There had already been occasions on which—as this History has shown—the Germans had followed the invariable custom of armies in difficulties, and had concealed or distorted whatever facts were unfavourable to their interests. They did so again, and to a still greater degree, in connection with the actions fought on November 30th and December 2nd and 3rd. A telegram from Versailles, dated on the earliest of those days, alleged that by six P.M. the German troops had "repulsed the enemy along the whole line." The Prussian King, in a despatch to Queen Augusta of the same date, wrote:—"To-day important sorties were made on the east side [of Paris] against the Würtembergers and Saxons at Bonneuil-sur-Marne, Champigny, and Villiers, which were captured by the French, and afterwards recaptured by our troops." General Oberwitz, also on the same day (November 30th), sent a despatch to the King of Würtemberg, asserting, as King William had done, that the French had been driven out of those positions on the Marne which for a short time they had been able to hold. Now, if there be a fact in all history which is absolutely certain, it is that the French attack of November 30th was *not* "repulsed along the whole line," and that the assailants retained possession of Brie and Champigny, as well as some less important posts. The Prussian monarch himself tacitly admitted this in a telegram of December 2nd, addressed to the Queen, in which he said:—"Yesterday there was no fighting, but to-day Champigny and Brie-sur-Marne—the points occupied by the enemy on this side of the river—have been retaken by Prussian, Würtemberg, and Saxon troops." This statement was repeated in another despatch from Versailles, of the same date, and also in the official *Staats Anzeiger*, of Berlin, which concluded its account by saying, in the most precise terms, that, after the reconquest, on the morning of December 2nd, of Brie and Champigny, General Trochu renewed the attack, "without succeeding, in an eight hours' fight, in regaining the reconquered positions." It is thus apparent that all the positions were not retaken on November 30th. But the later account is quite as misleading as the earlier; for, as the reader has just seen, the renewed attack of the French on Brie and Champigny, during the middle hours of December 2nd, resulted in their again possessing themselves of those positions, from which they did not retire until the 3rd and 4th. In estimating the moral character of these self-contradictions on the part of the Germans, it should be observed that the subsequent accounts are not given in correction of the anterior, but are evidently put forward with no other intention than to create an impression of more numerous successes than the facts warranted. It is impossible to believe that the King, the German commanders, and the German official writers, were all under the impression that the French had been driven back in every direction, when they still retained the positions of Brie and Champigny, and had not yet withdrawn a man across the Marne.

The French account of the sorties was published in the *Official Journal* of December 5th, and stated:—

"The plan, the execution of which has been for the last four days so vigorously carried out, now enters upon a new phase. The day before yesterday [December 3rd], in broad daylight, our troops came down again in excellent order towards the Marne, while the enemy did not dare to molest them. The forts kept good watch. The fatigues so courageously endured by the young army of Paris required a short rest. The cold is much more severe and piercing on the hills than in the open country, or inside Paris. The fight had lasted during the whole day [December 2nd seems to be here intended], and strict vigilance was necessary to avoid an unexpected attack, as was the case on the morning of the 2nd inst. Therefore no sleep was possible; added to which, any one indulging in sleep on the hard ground in such a temperature would have risked being frozen to death. These and strategical reasons caused the movement, which will lead to fresh engagements, as announced in the order of the day of General Ducrot, the true meaning and import of which have been perfectly understood by the Parisian population. Some papers suppose that we have abandoned the position at Champigny. This is not the case; on the contrary, we are assured that our troops remain strongly established in those positions. The number of German prisoners taken from the battle-field now amounts to more than 800; many of them are detained in the forts. No serious affair has occurred since the 2nd inst.; but that does not prevent our generals preparing for the new stage of the struggle upon which we are now about to enter. The Prussian Staff is reported to show uneasiness at the prospect. The enemy, who has in all directions to go over enormous distances before facing us, begins indeed to feel that he will soon be exhausted by marches and countermarches, if we continue ever so little to attack him successively on several opposite points. The immense circle round which he has to manœuvre grows daily more extended, in consequence of our conquering advanced positions after each engagement; and therefore the increasing difficulty of quickly concentrating troops, which threatens General von Moltke's plans, must be contemplated at Versailles with some legitimate fear. Paris, on the contrary, perfectly understanding what is going on, co-operates by all the means at her disposal with the views of her skilful and gallant Governor. The works of general organisation and equipment, and the artillery works, are pushed on with fresh efficiency and vigour. The military resources placed at the disposal of battalions armed by private industry are, so to say, inexhaustible. The zeal displayed by the population in assisting the victims of the conflict also deserves special mention."

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* "The Campaign of 1870-71."—*Times*, March 9th, 1871.

The statement that the French were still (that is to say, on the 5th of December) at Champigny seems not to have been in accordance with the fact; but, as the troops appear to have remained there until some time on the 4th, the assertion was probably true at the moment when the official writer was penning his report for publication on the next day.

Owing to the immense extent of ground along which the several actions were fought, it was unfortunately long before all the injured men could be brought in, or even attended to in any way. The weather was extremely cold, and the sufferings of the wounded, lying in fields and ditches, or on bare hill-sides, under the frosty moonlight, were terrible to contemplate. The Paris correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, who, during the whole of December 1st accompanied one of the ambulance corps engaged in the duty of picking up the wounded French round Creteil, gave an appalling account of what he saw. He wrote:—

"It was scarcely daylight when our wagons drew up in front of the church at Creteil. The positions of the two armies had remained unchanged during the night. The French occupied the village; the Prussian outposts were at a distance of a few hundred yards beyond. 'Are there any wounded who have not been removed?' Yes; there were some on the rising ground to the right, and four or five in the church. We enter the house of God. The altar is dismantled, the seats have disappeared—taken for firewood. On the stone floor, on some straw near the entrance, is the crouched-up body of a wounded officer, who has died from cold during the night. Within a few yards a soldier, wounded badly in the leg, lies on a mattress; a third unfortunate sits bolt upright, motionless, silent. 'But the worst are here,' said a soldier, who lighted us with a piece of candle. Lying on some straw was a poor fellow shivering with the cold. The blanket which had been thrown over him was of little service. Near to him was standing a monk. The doctor examined the wounded man, and said 'he should have some hot soup at once. When was he examined by a surgeon? What has been given to him?' 'Alas, sir!' replied the monk, 'we have been unable to give him anything. I have watched the wounded during the whole night. No surgeon has visited them. It is impossible to obtain any soup.' 'Chocolate—hot wine—anything warm; the man is half-starved and frozen.' 'I can drink nothing,' said the soldier, faintly; 'give me a piece of chocolate.' We gave him some, which he ate with avidity. . . . .

"By this time the sun had long set, the moon had risen, and the night was bitterly cold; but to leave mangled humanity on the battle-ground was an impossibility. Some wine was given to those whom we had already found; they were covered with blankets, and again we started. The army surgeon had disappeared, but a man told us that he had been ordered to show where the wounded were lying. At the last barricade he left us. We pushed forward up the rising ground. Suddenly, a few yards ahead, we heard several shots exchanged, and then a volley. Addressing an officer, we asked if there were any wounded. 'Yes, there is one in that outhouse.' We entered. Lying on his back on the floor was a wounded soldier, unable to move; he had been there for several hours. He was put on the stretcher, and we descended the hill."

On passing the French outpost, a soldier called out to the ambulance party, "There are more wounded higher up on the hill. Listen!" They stopped, and shortly heard a voice piteously appealing for help. The exact position of the unfortunate man could not be discovered, though the moon was shining brightly. All was still; every one listened in breathless silence, and in a few moments the heartrending cry again swept over the hill-side, this time in the accents of despair. "We have heard him calling for help during the last hour," said a corporal. A small party was organised to search for the miserable sufferer, and, in going up the hill, one of the outposts said, "There is a man in the quarry." The searchers turned into the quarry, and found a wounded man stretched on the ground. "Was it you who called?" they asked. "Yes."

"How long have you been here?" "Since nine o'clock this morning." All those hours in the freezing air, the waning day, the gathering dusk, the ghastly moonlight! This terrific incident calls to mind the description of a battle-field given several years before by a poet who saw such things by the help of imagination and of a shuddering sympathy:—

> "Behold him! By a ditch he lies,
> Clutching the wet earth,—his eyes
> Beginning to be mad. In vain
> His tongue still thirsts to lick the rain,
> That mock'd but now his homeward tears;
> And ever and anon he rears
> His legs and knees with all their strength,
> And then as strongly thrusts at length.
> Rais'd or stretch'd, he cannot bear
> The wound that girds him, weltering there;
> And 'Water!' he cries, with moonward stare.
>
> "A wound unutterable—Oh God!—
> Mingles his being with the sod.
> His nails are in earth, his eyes in air,
> And 'Water!' he crieth—he may not forbear.
> Brave and good was he; yet now he dreams
> The moon looks cruel,—and he blasphemes."*

An exploration of the battle-field was also undertaken by the *Times* correspondent with the Saxon Army, after the last of the sorties. He knew that Villiers would be the best point at which to commence his horrible task; and to Villiers therefore he went. The village was terribly shattered by the shells from the French forts, and the ground was ploughed up in every direction. Passing through a park at the end of the village on the Paris side, he came out upon rising ground. It was one of the hottest parts of the battle-field, and hundreds of dead lay in the cold air, while the cannon on Avron and Nogent were still heavily thundering in the distance.

"One of the first great groups I came upon was composed of sixty French soldiers. A few Saxons and Würtembergers lay around them; but the Germans had already removed and laid in their last sleeping-place most of their dead. The centre of the group was formed of a close line of forty-six. You could not have placed a body between any two. They fell shoulder to shoulder, just as they had stood to fire. One poor fellow lay on his face. He had two rifle-wounds in his back. He had partly stripped himself, and he died with a hand on each bullet-hole. Several had taken off their knapsacks and placed them under their heads, and, so pillowed, had breathed their last breath. Others clenched their water-bottles in one hand, but had been unable to remove the cork, and died without being able to wet their lips in their last agony. Some, in their sufferings, had burrowed their faces in the thick clay on which they lay, and turned their bloody and earth-stained faces upwards before they expired. Two I saw who had their arms fixed and their fists clenched, as if while dying they were engaged in a pugilistic encounter. Only very few were on their sides. These had their knapsacks under their heads. There were men of whose faces beamed the smile of an infant, and whose countenances were like handsome wax-work. The expression of others was that of terrible agony. Every feature was contorted; their legs had been convulsively jerked up until their knees stuck into their stomachs, and their finger and thumb-nails had been squeezed until they became riveted into the palms of their hands. Behind, before, and at the corners of this line of forty-six dead men were others, Saxons and French. One had a frightful wound in the face. He had pulled his hands up into his sleeves to warm them, but his cap had fallen off, and the blood clotted on his hair till it was all in bloody mats. Near him was another who had taken a biscuit from his knapsack and the bottle from his side, and had partaken of a little of both. More than one of the slain had died with the hands clasped in prayer."

Enough! Let us draw the veil of sorrowful compassion over these awful passes of human agony—these unimaginable horrors, which need not be endured, and would not be endured, if men were wise, and rulers were not so prone to trade upon their folly, their jealousy, and their greed. On all who contributed to bring about that war, whether on the French side of the Rhine or the German side—whether by political plotting, or incendiary writing, or braggart speech-making—the knowledge of such facts should fall like withering fire; yet it is probably those very persons who feel them the least. The conscience that is accustomed to look on men as pawns in some great game of mingled cunning and force, seldom perceives anything beyond the general issue of the struggle; and popular passion, after the first effect of triumph or humiliation has passed away, is only too ready to repeat the bloody experiment. Thus, princes and peoples conspire to their own ruin; and modern science is at hand to heap the battle-field of to-day with yet more devilish sufferings than in the past.

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* "Captain Sword and Captain Pen," by Leigh Hunt; originally published in 1835.

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